View
236
Download
5
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
.
.
. :
.
.
(
)
. .
.
. .
.
. .
) 7 (
) 7(
)2012 17 : (
.
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
22 . .
.
. )( . .
. )(
. . .
. . ) (
( ( )
. . )
) ( . .
. ) (
. .
. .
. .
! .
. . )( !
.
.
.
1980 2001
.
1980 .
.
1992 .
.
": "1978
.
1990
. "
"1978 500
1433143314331433 25252525 1391139113911391 2012201220122012 27 15
25252525 1391139113911391
- ) ( .
.
.
:
. .
.
:
.
.
.
.
.
.
) (
.
( )
( )
.
.
( ) ) (
. ) (
.
. ) (
.
) (
.
( ) (
)
.
:
. .
.
.
) ( :
(
) .
:
.
. !
:
.
:
.
. .
.
) (
( . ... )
.
.
. (
) . ) (
:
:
.
: :
.
.
.
(
. )
:
.
.
. :
.
.
.
: .
.
. .
.
.
.
. .
.
.
. .
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
. .
!
.
.
.
.
.
.
. (
)
. .
....
.
.
.
) (
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
25252525 1391139113911391
.
.
.
.......
:
.
.
.
) (
.
.
.
.
( )
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
25252525 1391139113911391
. 2017
.
.
.
2017
.
.
.
.
.
.
2002 ) (
50
. 8 2012
.
16
.
.
. .
.
. !
!!
!
70
16 .
12
...... 90 12
.
27
.
.
.
.
.
.
. ] [
.
5
.
"
!"
.
.
.
.
.
.
) ( .
. .
.
. 2001
.
.
.
: :
.
. .
.
:
.
.
:
.
.
:
. ( ) .
)
(
.
.
)
(
.
.
.
25252525 1391139113911391
.
:
. .
.
.
.
:
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
)(
! " # $% ! &'' ()
*% +, - . !# ' ! (/) 0. ' .1 .2 34% .%
5050 #% % 3,6 66 % 66 $) 50 66 ' 7( (
6/0 6 !'6 # #8 ( (7 ( 2 9( : .
; < 66 2 !'2 2 6 =>6 +?@ 6 !A ( BCD' 0
; (< 6 6 ! ( E B2 !D/3 (C 66 G H32( IJ
() 3E #(6 D7 ( 6 % ( ( #66 K1L M N! 7 !
2 62 (O &) # ( 3P 6(! Q@ R() !) O3 2 0 !
A B#; #66 ST'
25 1391
by Becky Anderson Democracy without Justice
President Karzai and his top aides have blocked the release of an important report: Conflict Mapping In Afghanistan Since 1978, prepared recently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. The report mentions hundreds of the current power holders atrocities committed during the countrys devastating civil war in the 1990s.
Titled "Conflict Mapping In Afghanistan Since 1978," the damning report accuses up to 500 members and leaders of rival ethnic and political groups, some of whom currently hold prominent government positions, of being involved in widespread human rights abuses from the communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion of the late 1970s to the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Some of the accused are former Mujahideen who fought the Soviet Union in 1980s. They were popular and considered as heroes defending the country. But, they became hated warlords when they turned against each other after the Pro-Soviet Communist Government of Dr Najibullah collapsed in 1992. These warlords committed unprecedented atrocities and human rights abuses that the history of Afghanistan has ever recorded. In Kabul alone tens of thousands of civilians were dead; thousands of women and children were raped and the countrys infrastructure was left in tatters. The nation took refuge in the Taliban to save them from the warlords. The Taliban crashed them from power and forced them
to flee to the neighbouring Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, India, etc. When the US decided to attack Afghanistan and to topple the Taliban regime, it needed foot soldiers deployed from among the Afghans. These very warlords were approached and put in power after the Taliban collapsed and since then are still in power. Probably the initial intention of the US was to change these warlords from warriors to political activists, but they had to be disarmed first. This did not happen. They were brought to politics with more weapons and hate against the Taliban and all those who were not happy with their rule in the 1990s. The warlords are now stronger than ever as the International Community is backing them with souls and treasure. They have been in power over a decade and the nation is looking with tied hands at how democracy functions and is flourished by warlords, human rights abusers, drug businessmen and corrupt expatriates. Some details of the report, which is the result of six years intensive research, were recently released by "The New York Times". It provides an authoritative list of the principal players in the wars of the last three decades, as well as insight into specific incidents, through evidence collected from more than 180 mass graves and the testimonies of thousands of survivors and witnesses. "This report has mapped the atrocities and human rights violations in Afghanistan and highlights the main incidents of the past three
decades. When the human rights commission was documenting the cases, people came up with names and they were identifying the perpetrators and saying whom did what to them. This is how the report is identifying hundreds of those perpetrators," says Horia Mosadiq, Amnesty Internationals Afghanistan researcher. She was part of the 40-member team of Afghan researchers (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 25 July 2012). Mosadiq adds that those accused of atrocities in the report - including the massacring of civilians or prisoners and the indiscriminate destruction of towns and villages - include some of the most prominent members of the current Afghan government. Ostensibly, for the sake of reconciliation and justice, President Hamid Karzai ordered the preparation of such a report in 2005. The report was completed and submitted in December 2011, but is unlikely to be released anytime soon, according to Mosadiq. Karzai stopped its release and kept it as a hanging sword over the heads of his rival warlords. Mosadiq adds that the decision to suppress the document coincided with the removal of several members of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. "If we want to give people some level of accountability and justice," Mosadiq says, "it's important for people to know what happened to them, who did it, why they did
it, and to pressure the Afghan government to deliver this justice and accountability to the people of Afghanistan." Abdul Jabar Thabit, former Attorney General, spoke to the media (01 Oct 2007) saying: only low profile people can be brought to justice; the corrupt powerful government officials are walking free; I have no dare even to name them. I gave to President (Karzai) the names of the 20 most corrupt government officials who are also involved in illicit drug business, but the president ordered me not to prosecute them. Zia Masoud claimed, when he was Vice-President, that some high ranking government officials were involved in drug business. When Karzai was asked to comment on his Vice-Presidents remarks, he replied: He wished he dared to name them. Ali Ahmad Jalali claimed at the time when he was Minister of Interior that 4 ministers and 13 governors were involved in drug trafficking, but could not dare to name them. Imagine how the state machinery and democracy function when the Attorney General, Minister of Interior, Vice-President and President of the country dont dare to name those corrupt officials and drug traffickers who hold high ranking government offices. The report "Conflict Mapping In Afghanistan Since 1978" may be kept hidden for some time, but not forever. We urge the pressure groups and civil societies to make the release of the report soon possible.
by Dr Afghan
LEAVING THE MESS BEHIND were malfunctioned by corruption of different kinds. It is most dangerous than any other weakness on the ground
Afghanistan will pass through two important stages in the coming two and a half years that will determine its future and will affect the future of the region and NATO as well. During this period, the US and NATO will hand over most of the security responsibilities to the Afghan Army - military transition - and Hamid Karzai may leave the presidential palace to another actor political transition. Military transition. NATO is committed to support the Afghan Army by required training, increasing its number to 350,000 and equipping it with modern weaponry. However, the Afghans are sceptical. The Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to be a factional army, loyal to patron warlords rather than being loyal to the country, the Afghan Constitution, and the president of Afghanistan. The Afghan army lacks a purpose or ideology to fight for. It fights for money and the money comes from foreigners. The increase in numbers and equipment will not make the ANA a more competent army, fully capable of shouldering the responsibility of security in Afghanistan beyond 2014. It is a huge financial burden - $4.1 billion a year and not is practical the NATO will be in a position to carry on such a huge financial burden for long. There is little prospect for the ANA being able to successfully defend the government against the Taliban without the US physical military support. It will critically need US intelligence and air support for so
long that this will question the independence of the army and legitimacy of the Afghan Government. The Afghan Army and police are not reliable: it is estimated that over 17 % of the NATO trained Afghan soldiers joined the insurgency and 6 % of the NATO casualties have come from the Afghan soldiers and police. This danger will increase significantly when transition is completed by the end of 2014. Corruption at all levels in the Afghan Government has fed warlords and insurgency alike. The army is part of the government, not the opposite. If the government is corrupt, the army will not be the exception. According to the plan, NATO will continue to assist the Afghan army and police after 2014, while cutting down its assistance significantly to other sectors. Without a good government in place, such support will make the army and police the most corrupt attractive institutions in the country as the huge foreign money will be available only in the army and police. Political transition. The security transition hinges on an effective political transition from President Karzai to a new leadership. The Afghans inside and outside of the government say Mr. Karzai did little to set up a political system that will support a new president. Karzai neither has a clear vision and political agenda for the country nor did he make a coherent and strong working team. Also, he did not give an opportunity to others to emerge as political leaders. It is believed
Karzai likes a weak and corrupt government system and a fragile state in the country to ensure that he will retainpower for years to come in one form or another. The Afghans did not ask for an election in 2004; they were asking for a good government. This was the International Community seeking legitimacy through election for its installed regime in Kabul. Most Afghans believed what was promised by the International Community and went to the polls in large numbers in spite of tangible threats and hoped the situation would change for the better: a functional government. The election was conducted and Karzai was stamped as the elected president. The International Community flooded the Afghans with promises but few were fulfilled and the hopes of the Afghans for a good government were dashed. Karzai without any tangible accomplishments stood again for presidential election in 2009. The International Community again encouraged the Afghans to vote and promised Afghanistan will certainly change this time for better. The Afghans with no better alternative went again to polling stations under more odd security conditions: some of them lost their coloured fingers, ears and noses as a price for taking part in the election. But, we all saw what happened to the election process; it was name and shame. As a result the legitimacy of the Afghan Government came
under more serious questions. The European Union and the UN monitors turnout estimates suggested as many as a third of the 54.6 % of ballots for Karzai were fraud. Kai Edie, the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan at the time, accused the Americans of rigging the election and thus sacked his deputy, Peter Gailbraith, for interfering in the election. Here, everyone knew the future of the Afghan government would be in more disarray and the little trust that existed within the government apparatus would vanish. NATO accused the Afghan Government for its failures and the Afghan Government blamed NATO for hypocrisy. To escape blame the governments media were sharply criticising NATO for destabilising the government, fuelling insecurity, exaggerating and exploiting ethnic differences, flourishing illicit drug business and scammed the elections. The Afghan Government preached against the NATO presence and agenda in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government claimed its failure was mainly due to the wrong doing of NATO. Whats been accomplished is a shared accomplishment, and whats been a failure is a shared failure, said Said Jawad, the former Afghan ambassador to Washington. As a result the credibility and popularity of NATO not only declined among ordinary Afghans but also among governments high rank officials that were fed by world assistance. NATO, in its part, criticised the Afghan Government and claimed it is a narco-state plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption. Thus, for over ten years, the Afghan Government not only did not improve but instead deteriorated and
that the Afghans have neither a trusted government nor that the International Community has a credible partner in Afghanistan. Thus, all has failed to have a good government. The Northern Alliance, while being in the important government positions and sharing responsibility for the current chaos, is clapping for Karzai and that finally came under the rain of critics from the International Community. With no better image among people, the Northern Alliance tries to encourage NATO to pave the way for this sectarian group to rule Afghanistan directly after the term of Karzai is over in 2014. There is urgent need for a change, and good government, before the troops withdrawal in 2014. It is the US and NATOs prime responsibility to pave the way for the emergence of a good government in Afghanistan, a political transition, before the military transition is completed. It can be in two ways: reconciliation with the Taliban and/or paving the way for a fair and free election to result in the emergence of a competent leader. Otherwise, military transition without political transition (to have a reliable, trusted and viable government in Afghanistan that will pave a way for a comprehensive internal settlement) is a step in the wrong direction. Similarly, supporting a factional army without a good, trusted and accountable government is another step in the wrong direction. These are the messes created by the International Community and it is its duty to fix them. It is believed there is still the opportunity to fix these messes, otherwise, the situation will get out of control and will indeed lead to another kind of insurgency.
.
. .
.
1990 .
.
.
...
25252525 1391139113911391 .
180
.
":
.
".
( ): 2012 25 /
.
2005
. . 2011
.
.
. ":
".
2007 ":
.
".
.
) ( ": ".
.
! "
"1978 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. ... .
!
. .
. .
. . .
.
((
) ( . ))
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
. .
!
-
. .
. . .
. . . . .
. .
.
: . .
. .
$ "!
*+ / "1 / .- "$ $9 :9* 678 234
A
Recommended