Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

Preview:

Citation preview

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    1/14

     

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

    JEFFREY HUDAK, :

    :Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO.

    :vs. :

    :BENJAMIN CLARK, KYLE :

    HNAT, JOHN DOE #1, JOHN :

    DOE #2, JANE DOE #1 and JANE :DOE #2, :

    : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

    Defendants. :

    COMPLAINT

    Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (“Plaintiff”), by his undersigned counsel, hereby

    complains of the above-named defendants, as follows:

    I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION

    1. 

    This is a civil rights action resulting from circumstances which

    constitute an unlawful arrest in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth

    Amendment to the United States Constitution, made actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

    1983.

    2.  On or about September 12, 2014, Pennsylvania State Trooper Bryon

    Dickson was murdered, and Pennsylvania State Trooper Alex Douglass was

    seriously injured, in a highly publicized shooting which took place at the

    Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Blooming Grove, PA.

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 1 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    2/14

     

    2

    3. 

    In the immediate aftermath of the aforesaid attack, it goes without

    saying that every member of the Pennsylvania State Police was highly emotional,

    understandably angry and strongly motivated to pursue and apprehend the person

    or persons responsible for said attack.

    4.  Unfortunately for Plaintiff, however, he became an innocent victim

    and/or target of the Pennsylvania State Police’s zealous, fast-moving and

    emotionally driven pursuit of the aforesaid attacker.

    5. 

    In an incredible and threatening display of law enforcement presence,

    manpower and authority, Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, without warrant, at his

    mother’s private residence in Scranton, PA on the morning of September 13, 2014,

    less than twelve (12) hours after the attack in question.

    6.  As set forth more fully below, the Pennsylvania State Police had

    absolutely no legal basis for the warrantless arrest of Plaintiff for the murder of

    Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass in the morning

    hours of September 13, 2014.

    7.  While the Pennsylvania State Police were understandably emotional

    and angry with the unspeakable ambush of their fellow troopers, they unfortunately

    ignored, trampled and violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during their zealous

    and emotionally driven pursuit of the actual person responsible for same.

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 2 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    3/14

     

    3

    II. PARTIES

    8. 

    Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (“Plaintiff ”) is a competent adult individual

    residing at 2662 Ransom Road, Clarks Summit, PA 18411.

    9.  Defendant Benjamin Clark (“Clark”) is a competent adult individual

    who, at all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State

    Police. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Clark acted under color of state

    law, in his individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a

    Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant

    Clark personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or

    acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.

    10.  Defendant Kyle Hnat (“Hnat”) is a competent adult individual who, at

    all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police.

    At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hnat acted under color of state law, in his

    individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a

    Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant

    Hnat personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or

    acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.

    11.  Defendant John Doe #1 is a competent adult individual who, at all

    times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At

    all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in his

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 3 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    4/14

     

    4

    individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a

    Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1

     personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in

    the misconduct complained of herein.

    12.  Defendant John Doe #2 is a competent adult individual who, at all

    times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At

    all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in his

    individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a

    Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2

     personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in

    the misconduct complained of herein.

    13.  Defendant Jane Doe #1 is a competent adult individual who, at all

    times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At

    all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in her

    individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a

    Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1

     personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in

    the misconduct complained of herein.

    14.  Defendant Jane Doe #2 is a competent adult individual who, at all

    times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 4 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    5/14

     

    5

    all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in her

    individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a

    Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2

     personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in

    the misconduct complained of herein.

    15.  Defendants Clark, Hnat, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Jane Doe #1 and

    Jane Doe #2 will be referred to herein collectively as the “Defendants”. 

    III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

    16.  This Court possesses jurisdiction over the claims set forth herein

     pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

    17.  Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391

     because a substantial part of the events and/or omissions giving rise to the claims

    set forth herein occurred in this district.

    IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    18.  As referenced above, Defendants detained and/or interrogated

    Plaintiff under circumstances which constitute an arrest on September 13, 2014.

    19.  More specifically, in what can only be described as an incredible and

    threatening display of law enforcement presence, manpower and authority, the

    roadways outside Plaintiff’s mother’s home were blocked, surrounded and/or

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 5 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    6/14

     

    6

    littered with multiple marked and unmarked law enforcement cars and sport utility

    vehicles.

    20.  The home was also surrounded by a multitude of heavily armed law

    enforcement officers, some or all of whom possessed SWAT type weapons and/or

    were dressed in SWAT type gear.

    21.  After appearing at the side door of his mother’s  private residence in

    response to the doorbell, Plaintiff was stunned when two (2) Pennsylvania State

    Police Troopers (one female and one male) confronted and accosted Plaintiff at

    gunpoint with the use of what appeared to be a semi-automatic assault rifle. Those

    troopers are referenced herein as John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #1.

    22.  While held at gunpoint in a threatening fashion, the troopers directed

    Plaintiff to come out of the house with his hands up, and then immediately placed

    Plaintiff in handcuffs with his hands behind his back.

    23.  Without providing Plaintiff with any reason or justification for their

    actions, the troopers then quickly escorted and placed Plaintiff in the back seat of a

    State Police cruiser, at which time Plaintiff was transported in a parade of law

    enforcement vehicles to the Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Dunmore, PA.

    24.  During transport, Plaintiff remained handcuffed in the back seat while

    at all times supervised by another fully armed and currently unidentified female

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 6 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    7/14

     

    7

    trooper who sat directly beside Plaintiff. That female trooper is identified herein as

    Jane Doe #2, and the driver of the vehicle is identified herein as John Doe #2.

    25.  Upon arrival at the Dunmore Barracks, the troopers physically

    removed Plaintiff from the back seat of the car, and held on to his handcuffed arms

    while they walked him into the barracks.

    26.  At that time, it is believed and therefore averred that various members

    of the media were tipped-off to Plaintiff ’s arrival at the Dunmore Barracks as

    various news media outlets were parked outside the barracks.

    27.  In fact, Plaintiff and his family would also learn that the Pennsylvania

    State Police released Plaintiff’s identity and disseminated his photograph to the

    media and general public prior to his unlawful arrest and interrogation.

    28.  Once inside in the barracks, the troopers brought Plaintiff back into a

    locked interrogation room, where he was met by Defendants Clark and Hnat.

    29.  Prior to his arrival at the barracks, Plaintiff still had absolutely no idea

    why he was forcefully taken into custody by the State Police.

    30.  However, based on the nature and tone of the questioning by

    Defendants Clark and Hnat, and to his utter shock and surprise, it soon became

    apparent to Plaintiff that he was being directly accused of the murder of Trooper

    Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 7 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    8/14

     

    8

    31. 

    While locked in the interrogation room inside the barracks, Plaintiff

    underwent hours of intense questioning and unsubstantiated accusations by

    Defendants Clark and Hnat, and his requests for an attorney, to use the restroom

    and/or to make a phone call were ignored and/or denied.

    32.  Although the troopers finally allowed Plaintiff to use the restroom and

    to call his sister, they only did so after they compelled Plaintiff to provide them

    with a DNA sample and undergo gunpowder residue testing.

    33. 

    Moreover, Plaintiff was not allowed to use the restroom without being

    detained and accompanied by one of the troopers, who stood directly beside

    Plaintiff the entire time, and even refused to allow Plaintiff to wash his hands.

    34.  And while Plaintiff was eventually allowed to call his sister, he was

    not allowed to do so in private but, again, only while still detained in the presence

    and under the supervision of the troopers.

    35.  To make matters worse, Plaintiff would learn from his sister that, after

     being taken away by the state police, she immediately contacted and arranged for

    an attorney, Bernard J. Brown, Esquire, to represent and protect Plaintiff’s interests

    in this matter.

    36.  In fact, Plaintiff learned from his sister that Attorney Brown was on

    site at the Dunmore Barracks for several hours waiting to see and counsel Plaintiff.

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 8 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    9/14

     

    9

    37. 

    To that end, when he first arrived at the barracks, Attorney Brown

    went to the front desk, presented his business card, and alerted those present to his

    representation of, and demand to see, Plaintiff.

    38.   Not only did the troopers deny Attorney Brown access to Plaintiff, but

    they also intentionally failed and/or refused to even notify Plaintiff of Attorney

    Brown’s presence. 

    39.  Instead, Defendant Clark and Hnat continued with their intense,

    lengthy, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or interrogation of Plaintiff, where

    they continued to falsely accuse Plaintiff of the unspeakable murder of Trooper

    Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass. They also continued to

    deny Plaintiff’s requests for a lawyer. 

    40.  Due to his ongoing concern for Plaintiff’s rights and the troopers’

    intentional refusal to even notify Plaintiff of his presence, Attorney Brown had

    separate counsel, Robert M. Buttner, Esquire, prepare and fax a letter to the Pike

    County District Attorney, Raymond Tonkin, Esquire.

    41.  In that letter, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and

    incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit “A”, Attorney Butner alerted the

    District Attorney to the troopers’ failure and/or refusal to allow Attorney Brown

    access to Plaintiff, as well as their failure and/or refusal to even alert Plaintiff to

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 9 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    10/14

     

    10

    Attorney Brown’s presence in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under both the United

    States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

    42.  Accordingly, Attorney Butner further requested that the District

    Attorney contact said troopers and immediately advise them to alert Plaintiff to

    Attorney Brown’s presence.  (See Exhibit “A”). 

    43.  It was only late that afternoon after the District Attorney finally

    intervened at the insistence of Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendants Clark and Hnat

    finally discontinued their relentless, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or

    interrogation of Plaintiff.

    44.  At no point prior thereto was Plaintiff told or given any indication that

    he was free to leave, or that he could refuse any of law enforcement’s demands or

    instructions or otherwise terminate the encounter and/or interrogation.

    45. 

    Plaintiff was at all times accosted by Defendants who, by a show of

    significant force and authority, restrained his freedom to walk away.

    46.  Indeed, in light of the aforesaid circumstances, no reasonable person

    would believe that he was free to leave. On the contrary, Plaintiff would have been

     physically restrained if he had refused to accompany Defendants or try to escape

    their custody.

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 10 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    11/14

     

    11

    47. 

     Notably, various members of the Pennsylvania State Police continued

    to follow Plaintiff everywhere for a period of days after his unlawful arrest and/or

    interrogation.

    COUNT I

    42 U.S.C. § 1983

    Unlawful Seizure/Wrongful Arrest/False Imprisonment

    Plaintiff v. Defendants

    48.  The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated herein

     by reference as though fully set forth.

    49.  In view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident set forth

    more fully above, the actions of Defendants on September 13, 2014 constitute a

    seizure and arrest of Plaintiff within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the

    United States Constitution.

    50. 

    To that end, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a law enforcement

    officer from arresting a person unless there is probable cause to do so.

    51. 

    Significantly, probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion that

    the person committed the crimes he or she is accused of.

    52. 

    Here, Defendants had absolutely no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff

    for the murder of Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper

    Douglass on September 13, 2014.

    53. 

     Nevertheless, Defendants initiated Plaintiff ’s ar rest without probable

    cause in that the facts and circumstances available to the Defendants at that time

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 11 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    12/14

     

    12

    were clearly insufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that

    Plaintiff committed the serious and highly stigmatizing criminal acts of murder

    and/or attempted murder of two (2) Pennsylvania State Troopers for which he was

     being wrongfully accused.

    54.  In fact, the Defendants knew there was no probable cause to detain

    and arrest Plaintiff under the facts and circumstances available to them at the time.

    If they did, Defendants would have prepared an affidavit of probable cause and

    secured an arrest warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate judge following

    the proper process and procedure.

    55.  Defendants took this unlawful action against Plaintiff based solely on,

    at best, the mere suspicion that Plaintiff must have committed these brutal acts

     because Plaintiff’s wife, who was separated from Plaintiff for approximately a year

    and a half, was in an alleged relationship with Trooper Douglass. This wholly

    conclusory accusation, gross innuendo and/or rank speculation -- bereft of any

    supporting fact, evidence and/or detail whatsoever -- does not, and cannot, form

    the basis for probable cause for Defendants’ actions.

    56.  Plaintiff’s constitutional right not to be detained and arrested without

     probable cause as aforesaid was clearly established and known by Defendants at all

    times relevant to the conduct giving rise this action and, therefore, Defendants are

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 12 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    13/14

     

    13

    not entitled to qualified immunity. Clearly, an arrest without probable cause is,

    and has been, a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

    57.  Moreover, Defendants’ unlawful detainment and arrest of Plaintiff as

    aforesaid was willful, wanton, malicious and taken with a reckless or callous

    disregard for Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.

    58.  At all times relevant to conduct complained of herein, the Defendants

    acted in their individual capacities and under color of state law. Moreover, each of

    the Defendants personally directed, participated, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or

    acquiesced in said conduct.

    59.  As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conduct as

    aforesaid, Plaintiff has suffered an unlawful seizure and restraint of his liberty in

    violation of his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as severe

    emotional distress, mental anguish, inconvenience, personal humiliation,

    embarrassment and/or damage to his name and reputation.

    60.  The facts and circumstances surrounding Defendants’ encounter with

    and arrest of Plaintiff were highly and widely publicized by the national and

    international print and/or news media. To make matters worse, Plaintiff’s name

    and photograph quickly appeared on social media, in multiple newspaper articles

    and/or televised news broadcasts for the whole world to see.

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 13 of 14

  • 8/20/2019 Jeffrey Hudak v State Police

    14/14

     

    14

    61. 

    Due to the widespread release of his name and photograph, Plaintiff

    and/or his family received multiple phone calls/messages inquiring of the

    unfolding situation and Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in the murder of Trooper

    Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.

    62.  Moreover, when conducting a Google search using Plaintiff’s name

    and other relevant search criteria, the story surrounding the false accusations

    against Plaintiff in connection with the murder of Trooper Dickson and the

    attempted murder of Trooper Douglass still appear.

    WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in this action in his favor and

    against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, together with compensatory and

     punitive damages, interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees and such other and further

    relief to which this Court deems just and proper.

    Respectfully submitted,

    WRIGHT & REIHNER, P.C. 

    By: /s/ George A. ReihnerGeorge A. Reihner

    148 Adams Avenue

    Scranton, PA 18503(570) 961-1166

    (570) 961-1199 –  fax

    Dated: February 18, 2016 Attorneys for Plaintiff

    Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 14 of 14