© CARONTE·· Slide 1 The research leading to the results of the project has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2013-2016)

© CARONTE·· Slide 1

The research leading to the results of the project has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2013-2016) under grant agreement n° 606967.

Brussels, 11. June 2015

Joachim Kochsiek - Coordinator

CARONTE – MID TERM CONFERENCE


AGENDA OF THIS PRESENTATION

The project in brief

Main objectives

Approach

Interims results

About today

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Main objectives

Approach

Interims results

About today




Duration: September 2014 to February 2016

CARONTE is a FP7 project but contributes to H2020

H2020 reinforces support to EU’s security policies

Improving competitiveness of EU industries to address security gaps and prevent threats (incl. cyber-threats)

CARONTE is Coordination and Support action not a research project

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The project in brief – CARONTE in relation with existing security projects

Current and finalised projects:

Work on specific, sometimes very detailed issues

Provide concrete results (products, measures, processes) for implementation

Proposes future research and policy activities

Considers existing project and achieved results

Recommends new and follow up approaches


The project in brief – partners

University of Security Management in Košice(USMKE)

11 Partners covering 8 Member States from North to South and from West to Eastand all transport modes




Main objectives

Approach

Interims results

About today



Main objective

CARONTE addresses the question:

„How can a Research Agenda most efficiently tackle current and future threats to land transportation?“


Objectives from operators’ point of view

Looking at relevance

Keeping transport flow easy and affordable

Considering and supporting European cohesion by cheap and easy transport with a high level of security

Searching for synergies in security and transport processes, technologies,...

“Those who give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”(Benjamin Franklins’ Contributions to the Conference on February 17 (III) Fri, Feb 17, 1775

Operative relevance

Cargo theft /

extreme weather /reliability

Terrorism


Objectives from operators’ point of view

Looking at relevance

Keeping transport flow easy and affordable

Considering and supporting European cohesion by cheap and easy transport with a high level of security

Searching for synergies in security and transport processes, technologies,...

Those who give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”(Benjamin Franklins’ Contributions to the Conference on February 17 (III) Fri, Feb 17, 1775

Operative relevance

Cargo theft /

extreme weather /reliability

Terrorism

Terroris

m is no daily

business

?! But take in

mind th

e

unfore

seeable!

What c

ould one imagine

before

9/11?




Main objectives

Approach

Interims results

About today


assessment of the state of play

existing and emerging risks

High Level Advisory Board

Gaps and requirements

Potential approaches and

solutions

High Level Advisory Board

FINAL RESEARCH AGENDA AND ROADMAP

Approach




Main objectives

´Approach

Interims results

About today



Interims results –State of the play

Assessment of the state of play in security and in transport

Identified projects, best practices, regulations and standards

Created characteristic sheets for each item (available on the web-site, soon)

Different analyses to verify and consolidate state of the play

Challenge: Many policies are in preparation, many research project are active, fulfilled on national and EU-level,....

Survey is not over

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Assessment of the state of play in security and in transport

Analysis of the results - Split among various inputs


Status and interims results –State of the play

Relevant policies as a frame for land transportation Frames for transport

European Agenda on SecurityOf note: Cyber, CBRNE, counter radicalism and recruitment, counter organised

crime, resilience

European Agenda on SecurityOf note: Cyber, CBRNE, counter radicalism and recruitment, counter organised

crime, resilience

EU approach

to the detection

and mitigation of CBRN-E

risks

EU approach

to the detection

and mitigation of CBRN-E

risks

An open and

secure Europe:

making it happen(covers

migration)

An open and

secure Europe:

making it happen(covers

migration)

Customs Risk

Manage-ment and Security of the supply chain

Customs Risk

Manage-ment and Security of the supply chain

Cyber Security Strategy

and Proposal

for Directive to ensure

a high common level of

NIS

Cyber Security Strategy

and Proposal

for Directive to ensure

a high common level of

NIS

A European program

for Critical Infra-

structure protection

A European program

for Critical Infra-

structure protection

Preventing

Radicali-sation to Terrorism

and Violent

Extremism

Preventing

Radicali-sation to Terrorism

and Violent

Extremism



H2020 Calls from Work Program – Secure societies – Preotecting freedom and security of Europe

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTIONSEC - CIP

Disaster-resilience: safeguarding and securing society,

including adapting to

climate changeSEC - DRS

Fight against crime and Terrorism

SEC - FCT

Border Security and External Security

SEC – BESDetection DIGITAL SECURITY

H2020 adresses many aspects from the policies



Work Program Smart, green and integrated transport can indicate new

Solutions

Threats

SafetyInfrastructure

ResilienceSocio-economic and behavoural

Physical internetAutomated road

transport

Intelligent transportation

systems


Interims results –Risks

Identifying existing and emerging risks (WP3)

Identified 252 risk scenarios(description of source, reason, method, threat, impact, vulnerability,...)

Assessed relevance of the scenarios with different methods

Identified main vulnerabilities, threats and risks in quantity and quality statements

Included external experts via a cyber-security-workshop

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Interims results –Risk scenarios

Security Target Number of reported risk scenarios

1. Road 782. Rail 129

2.1 Connecting Infrastructure 392.2 Mobile units 162.3 Control systems 102.7 Cargo 162.8 Passenger 14

4. Interfaces 23

Analyses made, lead to qualitative statements for potential risks and threats



Physical risks Personal risks Cyber risks Crime Rising violence in cargo theft Rising organisation of crime Bombing (often by suicide

attackers or with the help of vehicles) the most important mean of terrorists (followed by sabotage, and arson)

Very low, up to no, reporting of dirty bombs, or poison

Attractive targets are junctions, tunnels, and bridges

Also important passenger trains (especially Metros, as frequently seen in Russia or Belarus)

Aging or poorly maintained infrastructure in some countries can cause more vulnerabilities, as robustness, bypassing possibilities or the likelihood or easiness to cause failures rise

Staff as a target of criminals or terrorists

Staff as an enabler for terrorists and criminals

Force / extortion Corruption Lack of knowledge (IT-Security,

security recommendation) Careless Lack of acceptance due to

complexity of use regarding IT and IT Security

Lack of education and training in security and in use of modern technologies, processes and IT

Lack of motivation Each private end device which has

access to a network could be a security risk

Internet of the things introduces new communication between items with new potential gates for attacks

Software errors multiple with the number of connected systems

Open information flow in logistic systems also offers gates for criminals and terrorists

IT-Systems with different levels of security, especially quickly aging software or hardware in connected systems introduces weak points to a chain

Access to web based communication systems with unsecured end devices (esp. private devices with lower security standard and not hardly manageable security policies)

Rising interconnection and interdependency of traffic management and control systems also with relation to safety (automatic train control)

Outsourcing of IT-Systems also for traffic control with new interfaces and actors and uncertain security measures

Spoofing of information / signals Disturbing of information / signals As vehicles communicate between

each other spoofing of information or infiltration of wrong information can cause high risks in transport

New dangers due to increasing ICT and connectivity in more and more automatic and autonomous cars



Physical risks Personal risks Cyber risks Crime Rising violence in cargo theft Rising organisation of crime Bombing (often by suicide

attackers or with the help of vehicles) the most important mean of terrorists (followed by sabotage, and arson)

Very low, up to no, reporting of dirty bombs, or poison

Attractive targets are junctions, tunnels, and bridges

Also important passenger trains (especially Metros, as frequently seen in Russia or Belarus)

Aging or poorly maintained infrastructure in some countries can cause more vulnerabilities, as robustness, bypassing possibilities or the likelihood or easiness to cause failures rise

Staff as a target of criminals or terrorists

Staff as an enabler for terrorists and criminals

Force / extortion Corruption Lack of knowledge (IT-Security,

security recommendation) Careless Lack of acceptance due to complexity

of use regarding IT and IT Security Lack of education and training in

security and in use of modern technologies, processes and IT

Lack of motivation Each private end device which has

access to a network could be a security risk

Internet of the things introduces new communication between items with new potential gates for attacks

Software errors multiple with the number of connected systems

Open information flow in logistic systems also offers gates for criminals and terrorists

IT-Systems with different levels of security, especially quickly aging software or hardware in connected systems introduces weak points to a chain

Access to web based communication systems with unsecured end devices (esp. private devices with lower security standard and not hardly manageable security policies)

Rising interconnection and interdependency of traffic management and control systems also with relation to safety (automatic train control)

Outsourcing of IT-Systems also for traffic control with new interfaces and actors and uncertain security measures

Spoofing of information / signals Disturbing of information / signals As vehicles communicate between

each other spoofing of information or infiltration of wrong information can cause high risks in transport

New dangers due to increasing ICT and connectivity in more and more automatic and autonomous cars

Problem:relevance and likelihood of risks

“expect the unforseeable”



Compensating and relativizing statements

Density of land transport networks make bypassing of weak points easy

Public transport companies and authorities have made large efforts to improve the security

Terrorist attacks have not been reported in the supply chains in Europe

Dirty bombs or poisoning have not been reported (apart from the Sarin Attack in Tokyo 1995), although the general

discussion about the possibility is present.


Interims results –Gaps

Gap & Requirement analyses bases on three pillars

Matrix-Analyses of threats vs. research

projects, policies, standards,...

Matrix-Analyses of threats vs. research

projects, policies, standards,...

Expert interviewsExpert interviews Expert workshopExpert workshop


Interims results –Gaps&reqirements

Sectors

RailRailRoadRoad

CyberCyber Interfaces /Logistics

Interfaces /Logistics

Cross cutting / Generic



Interims results –Gaps&reqirements

Maintain freely accessible systemStaff • education, learning, awareness•selection•ProtectionSharing of best practicesFinance•value •cost coverage•EfficiencyUsability of security solutions•Standardisation (danger or enabler?)Ethical / privacy issues•obstacle or driver?Detection and monitoring systemsRisk assessmentCrises management

The top headlines




Interims results – Some (main) statements from the Advisory Board

Need of general solutions to deal with hazards – all hazard approach

Need to assess the value of security and preparedness

Rehabilitation of operations to be improved

Global supply chains make supply more vulnerable

Soft measures to improve security: Education Awareness Understanding risk assessments

Need of a definition of criticality

Considering customers needs


Interims results –Potential development directions / visions

Finalisation of gaps, risks or state of the art not yet possible or even

dangerous indicators shown

Working-Groups finding potential approaches and matching with

continuing analyses of gaps, risks,....

Matching and selecting relevant approaches at a later stage

Rail Road CyberInterfaces /

logistics

Mass of data, opinions, ongoing activities difficult to handle


Interims results –Potential development directions / visions

Finalisation of gaps, risks or state of the art not yet possible or even

dangerous indicators shown

Working-Groups finding potential approaches and matching with

continuing analyses of gaps, risks,....

Matching and selecting relevant approaches at a later stage

Rail Road CyberInterfaces /

logistics

Mass of data, opinions, ongoing activities difficult to handle

Next slide shows the full range of ideas

Not yet consolidated to future needs


Interims results –Solutions / Visions summary

Increased cyber securityIncreased cyber securityEducation and learning actions

Education and learning actions

Assessment of the value of security

Assessment of the value of security Testing areasTesting areas

Harmonisation and clearance of standards

Harmonisation and clearance of standards

Awareness and in general integrated security

Awareness and in general integrated security

Identification the real transport needs and the reals use of it

CARONTE

Identification the real transport needs and the reals use of it

CARONTE

Defining and assessment of criticality

Defining and assessment of criticality

Cheap and easy to integrate detection technologies

Cheap and easy to integrate detection technologies


Interims results –Result / view forward

Many aspects could be solved by policies and activities in general security

The more transport is integrated in general security the better or

Standards set by transport solutions as lighthouses or standards

Question: How to integrate transport and how to transfer to transport CARONTE




Main targets

Approach

Interims results

About today



Interims results –About today

Panel I. Land Transport: the salient issues – and general industry needs

debate on land transport security trends, obstacles facing the sector, cost considerations for public vs private sector, threat analysis; privacy vs security issues

The current activities and needs / demands / aspects from the industry

Panel II. European & national security research needs in land transport, from global to local: keeping land transport moving

How to come from the needs and frames to practical results on local and sectorial basis

How to treat policies and directives on local and sectoral sector

Demands: How can CARONT provide added value to the completed or ongoing security projects?

Documents

© CARONTE·· Slide 1 The research leading to the results of the project has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2013-2016)