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ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM

BY A CONVICTED FELON

Houston Criminal Defense Attorney John Floyd Discusses the Current

State of the Law Regarding Illegal Possession of a Firearm by a Felon

Terry Blanet Hukill, a convicted felon, was arrested in October 2006 by the

Dallas Police Department for illegal possession of 21 firearms, including a

sawed-off shotgun. The arrest culminated an investigation by the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) under a Project Safe

Neighborhoods program, a nationwide federal effort targeting gun crimes.

On December 14, 2007 U.S. District Judge Jane J. Boyle sentenced Hukill,

who pleaded guilty in September to possessing a prohibited firearm (sawed-

off shotgun) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to fifteen

years in prison.

In August 2006 the Tohono OOdham Police Department responded to a call

that shots had been fired on the Tohono OOdham Indian Nation in Arizona.

During a search of the residence of Daniel Martinez, the police found three

firearms a .38 Smith and Wesson revolver, a 370 caliber Winchester rifle

with a scope, and a .22 caliber Mossberg Model 70 Pinkster rifle with an

altered barrel and stock. The search also produced an assortment of other

weaponry - nunchakus, brass knuckles, and a stun gun - and illegal drugs.

Martinez admitted that all the weapons were his. Having previously beenconvicted of assault with intent to commit murder and assault of a person

under age 16 in 1999, Martinez was charged with illegal possession of

firearms by a convicted felon. He was also prosecuted under the Project Safe

Neighborhoods program and in June 2007 he was sentenced to a term of 44

months in a federal prison.

In February 2006 Pennsylvania State Troopers executed a search warrant of

a motel room that had been rented by Deion Wilson. The officers found a

handgun in a coat located in the room. Wilson said that coat did not belong

to him and that he had never worn it. DNA analysis, however, establishedthat Wilson had worn the coat. As a three-time convicted felon, Wilson was

charged in a federal indictment with illegal possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. On December 8, 2006 U.S. District Judge Terrence F.

McVerry sentenced Wilson to 27 years in prison and five years of

supervised release.

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These random cases from across the nation reflect how serious federal/state

law enforcement and prosecutors consider illegal possession of firearms by

convicted felons. Both federal and Texas gun laws are strict.

FEDERAL GUN STATUTE

18 U.S.C. 922(g) provides it shall be unlawful for any person:

1. who had been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

2. who is a fugitive from justice;

3. who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as

defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C.

802]);

4. who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been

committed to a mental institution;5. who, being an alien (a) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States,

or (b) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to

the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in

section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.

1101(a)(26)]));

6. who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable

conditions;

7. who, having a citizen of the United States, has renounced his

citizenship;

8. who is subject to a court order that (a) was issued after a hearing of

which such person received actual notice, and at which such person

had an opportunity to participate, (b) restrains such person from

harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person

or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other

conduct that would place intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily

injury to the partner or child, and (c)(i) includes a finding that such

person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such

intimate partner or child, or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against suchintimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause

bodily injury; and

9. who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of

domestic violence.

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18 U.S.C. 924(a)(4) provides that except as otherwise provided in this

subsection, section (b), (c), or (f) of this section, or in section 929:

whoever violates section 922(g) shall be fined under this title,

imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Notwithstanding any

other provision of law, the term of imprisonment imposed under this

paragraph shall not run concurrently with other term of

imprisonment imposed under any other provision of law. Except for

the authorization of a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years

made in this paragraph, for the purpose of any other law a violation

of section 922(g) shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor.

924(e)(1), known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), provides

that a person convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in

violation of 922(g) shall receive a mandatory sentence of 15 years

imprisonment if that person has three prior convictions for a violent felony

or a serious drug offense.

924(e)(2)(A) defines a serious drug offense as:

an offense under the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 821],the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act [21 U.S.C. 951],

or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act [46 U.S.C. App.

1901] for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or

more is prescribed by law; or

an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or

possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled

substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances

Act [21 U.S.C. 802], for which a maximum term of imprisonment

of ten years or more is prescribed by law.

924(e)(2)(B) defines a violent felony as any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile

delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive

device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if

committed by an adult, that:

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has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person or another; or

is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.

See also: United States Sentencing Guidelines, 4B1.2(a)(2)[crime of

violence defined as any offense that involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another].

The Supreme Court has gradually expanded what constitutes a violent

felony under the ACCA. See: Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990);

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). The Supreme Court in Taylor

and Shepard examined whether a state law burglary conviction that defined

the offense beyond the generic offense of burglary, one of the offensesenumerated in 924(e), would allow the government to seek enhancement

on the ground that the defendant committed a generic burglary. See: Taylor,

supra, 495 U.S. at 599-600. The court concluded that a person has been

convicted of burglary for purposes of a 924(e) enhancement if he is

convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the

basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a

building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. Id. at 599.

Because the ACCA generally prohibits the [district] court from delving intoparticular facts disclosed by the record of conviction, Shepard, 544 U.S. at

17, both Taylor (jury verdicts) and Shepard (guilty pleas) adopted what the

Supreme Court called a formal categorical approach, Taylor, 495 U.S. at

600, leaving the [district] court normally to look only to the fact of

conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. Shepard, 544

U.S. at 17 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).

More recently the Supreme Court held that a state attempted burglary

conviction could be considered a violent felony under the ACCA. See:

James v. United States, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1586 (2007). The EighthCircuit, in an en banc decision, followed the James categorical approach

to find that a state DWI conviction also constitutes a violent felony under

ACCA, even though a conviction under the state statute does not always

involve the actual driving of a vehicle while intoxicated. See: United States

v. McCall, 507 F.3d 670, 674 (8th Cir. 2007)(en banc)[a charging paper

alleging the felony offense of driving while intoxicated should be construed

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as referring to the dominant offense of driving while intoxicated]. The

McCall court elaborated further that because a guilty plea to [this charge]

without more, raises no inference that the offense was not a violent felony,

and the record did not offer any indication that the defendant was not driving

a vehicle at the time he committed the DWI, the district court was correct in

its conclusion that McCalls guilty plea to that offense constituted a violent

felony. Id., 507 F.3d at 675.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that both Taylor and Shepard

recognized an exception to this categorical approach . . . for a narrow

range of cases where state law defines an offense more broadly than the

generic enumerated offense. See: Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17 (quoting Taylor,

495 U.S. at 602). When a state prior conviction results from a jury verdict,

the district court may look to the indictment or information and jury

instructions to decide if the jury was actually required to find all theelements of [the] generic [offense]. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. In cases

involving guilty pleas, the district court is limited to the terms of the

charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy

between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was

confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this

information all of which must show that the defendant necessarily

admitted elements of the generic offense. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. The

Eighth Circuit referred to this Taylor and Shepard approach as a modified

categorical approach. See: United States v. McCall (McCall I), 439 F.3d

967, 974 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

The Supreme Court in James acknowledged that under this categorical

approach [o]ne could imagine a situation in which attempted burglary

might not pose a realistic risk of confrontation or injury to anyone but

found the offense was a violent felony under the ACCA because the ACCA

does not require metaphysical certainty. Rather, 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)s residual

provision speaks in terms of a potential risk. . . .We do not view [Taylors

categorical] approach as requiring that every conceivable factual offense

covered by a statute must necessarily present a serious potential risk ofinjury before the offense can be deemed a violent felony. . . . One can

always hypothesize unusual cases in which even a prototypically violent

crime might not present a genuine risk of injury . . . . As long as an offense

is of a type that, by its nature, presents a serious potential risk of injury to

another, it satisfies the requirements of 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)s residual

provision. See: James, supra, 127 S. Ct. at 1597 (internal citation omitted).

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This approach extends to a district court virtual unfettered discretion in

determining what constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. This is

significant because it is rare for a firearms offense not to be accompanied by

other illegal conduct. For example, the U.S. Justice Department states that

the possession of a firearm is virtual prerequisite to the sale of drugs or the

commission of other violent acts. See: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.

Dept of Justice, Federal Firearms Offenders, 1992-98 (2000). This has

created a sentencing bias in the federal system reflected by conclusions

drawn by federal circuits that defendants who are charged with unlawful

possession of a firearm are generally guilty of separate state or federal

crimes, although they may not always be charged with them. See: United

States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2000). See also: United

States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997)[a firearm is a tool of

the trade for drug dealers].

Whether influenced by crime bias or realities, the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines also provide for an increase in the base sentencing range when a

firearm is possessed in connection with another felony offense. See:

Loney, supra, 219 F.3d at 287-88. See also: United States v. McDonald, 165

F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1999)[Guidelines reflect the concern about the

increased risk of violence when firearms are used or possessed during the

commission of another felony]. USSG 2K2.1(b)(6) provides, in relevant

part, that if the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in

connection with another felony offense [his sentence will] increase by 4

levels.

Some federal appeal courts, however, have held that another felony

offense stated in 2K2.1 requires a distinction in time or conduct

between the predicate offense and the possession of a firearm. See: United

States v. Fenton, 309 F.3d 825, 827-28 (3d Cir. 2002). In Fenton the

predicate offense was burglary of a sporting goods store. Id., at 826-27. The

defendant stole several firearms during that burglary. Id. The Third Circuit

reversed a district court finding that the burglary constituted another felonyoffense and that the stolen firearms had been possessed in connection

with the burglary. Id. The Fenton court reasoned that the possession of a

firearm could not constitute an integral aspect of the burglary because if it

did, then the two offenses would have to be considered one and the same,

and, as such, the firearm possession could not be deemed another felony

offense. Id. The court summarized its holding by saying a state law crime,

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identical and coterminous with the federal crime, cannot be considered as

another felony offense within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Id., at 826.

But the federal circuits are sharply divided on this issue. Like the Third

Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has held that enhancement was improper under

2K2.1(b)(6) for stealing firearms during the burglary of a pawn shop

because there was no separation of time or conduct. See: United States v.

Sanders, 162 F.3d 396, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1998). See also: United States v.

Szakacs, 212 F.3d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 2000)[conspiracy to steal firearms not

sufficiently distinct from firearms possession to be considered another

felony offense]. The Fifth and Eighth circuits, however, have reached

divergent conclusions. These circuits have ruled that a 2K2.1(b)(6)

enhancement does indeed apply when a firearm is obtained as a result of a

burglary or theft. See: United States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316, 323-24 (5 th Cir.1999); United States v. Kenney, 283 F.3d 934, 938-39 (8th Cir. 2002).

And the Third Circuit felt compelled to revisit and revise Fenton two years

after it was decided. See: United States v. Lloyd, 361 F.3d 197 (3d Cir.

2004). In Lloyd the defendant placed a bomb under the car of an intended

victim. He pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a destructive device in

violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and conspiracy to violate that provision in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Id., at 199. The district court found that the

defendant had possessed a firearm in connection with a state felony offense

of criminal mischief and applied the enhancement provisions of 2K2.1(b)

(6). Id., at 199-200.

The Lloyd court rejected the narrower view of Fenton in favor of a broader

analysis of 2K2.1(b)(6) under a test announced in Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Blockburger test permits

punishment under two criminal statutes based on the same conduct if each

offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. Id., 284 U.S. at

304. The Lloyd court said this analysis could also be applied to 2K2.1(b)

(6) relative to another felony offense only if that offense and the firearmpossession offense each have one element the other does not. See: Lloyd,

supra, 361 F.3d at 200-01. See also: United States v. Purifoy, 326 F.3d 879,

880-81 (7th Cir. 2003)[holding that offense of assault, when committed with

firearm, could be another felony offense under 2K2.1(b)(6)].

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The Third Circuit last year seem to retreat even further from Fenton and

Lloyd. See: United States v. Navarro, ___ F.3d ____ (3d Cir. 2007, No. 05-

4102). The defendant in Navarro was involved in a police chase that resulted

in the crashing of his vehicle. He fled the scene only to be captured a short

time later. The police found a loaded, semiautomatic handgun on the roof of

the vehicle and a jacket that contained a quantity of marijuana and cocaine.

The defendant admitted to officers after his arrest that the handgun and

drugs belonged to him. Id. He stated that he had obtained the handgun in

2002 through a drug exchange (three rocks of crack for the gun). Id. He

was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and two counts of simple

possession of a controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. 844(a). He pleaded

guilty to these offenses. A pre-sentence report recommended a four-level

enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6), citing the predicate offense as the simple

possession charges. Id.

The defendants attorney objected to the enhancement, pointing out that the

simple possession offenses were not a felonies under 21 U.S.C. 844(a).

The government conceded this point but argued that a 2K2.1(b)(6)

enhancement could apply because of the defendants admitted drug

distribution offense (the crack for the handgun), a felony under 21 U.S.C.

841. The district court agreed and sentenced the defendant to 108 months in

prison. The Third Circuit noted, however, that since the defendant had an

actual prior 1996 drug conviction, his simple possession offenses were no

longer misdemeanors under 844(a) and unquestionably could be utilized as

the predicate offense. Id.

The defendant pointed out on appeal that absent the 2K2.1(b)(6)

enhancement he would have received a sentence between 63 to 78 months

based on a total offense level of nineteen and a criminal history category of

VI. While the Third Circuit noted that the defendants case was atypical

because the firearm was neither used nor intended as a means of

intimidation or protection, but rather was proffered as an item of trade, the

court was not persuaded by that distinction:

FromLloydandFenton a two-part standard may be distilled fordetermining whether an offense committed in connection with possession of

a firearm may support an enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)[6]. The first

part of the test, fromBlockburger, is legal in nature and asks whether thepredicate offense and the firearms possession crime each have an element

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that is not shared by the other. The second part of the test, fromFenton, is

essentially factual in nature and asks whether more than mere possession of

the firearm brandishment or other use was an integral aspect of the

predicate offense. If these two questions are answered in the affirmative,

then the four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)[6] should apply.

Judged by this standard, it is clear that the District Court properly applied

the enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)[6]. The predicate offense in this

case was drug distribution under 21 U.S.C. 841(a), a felony offense

under the Guidelines.

The offenses of drug distribution and firearms possession satisfy the first

part of theLloydstandard, theBlockburgertest. Dispensation of a controlledsubstance is an element of drug distribution but not of firearms possession;

possession of a firearm is an element of firearms possession but not of drugdistribution. The two offenses each have an element not shared by the other

and therefore should be viewed as separate offenses for purposes of section

2K2.1(b)[6]. Id. (Internal citations omitted).

Felony Probation and Deferred Adjudications

Tese decisions reflect that the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

under almost any circumstances will result in a seriously enhanced sentence

in the federal system. However, does this mean that an individual who has

received a past probation before judgment or some other type of deferred

adjudication before conviction would be subject to prosecution under

922(g)?

921(a)(20) provides:

The term crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year does not include

(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanorand punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined

in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were

held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a

person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be

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considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon,

expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person

may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

The United States Supreme Court in Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S.

368, 371 (1994) first interpreted this statutory provision to mean:

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in

accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were

held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a

person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be

considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon,

expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person

may not ship, transport, possession of receive firearms. Id., at 371. See

also: Caron v. United States, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1998)[ "Not all . . .convictions, however, count for purposes of 922(g) . . . ." A conviction for

which the defendant's civil rights have been restored is not a predicate

offense "unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the

person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms"].

The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Daughtery, 264 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2001),

cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1121 had an opportunity to apply these two

Supreme Court decisions to a 922(g) case in which the defendant was

convicted in Texas for delivery of marijuana and injury to a child, and was

imprisoned for those offenses. The Texas court released him and placed himon shock probation for ten years. He was discharged by the court from that

probation in 1995. Id., at 514.

The facts leading up to Daughertys 922(g)(1)(a) and 924(a)(2)

conviction were set out by the court as follows:

In March 2000, police officers responded to a disturbance call placed by

two sisters staying in a motel room. They complained that Daugherty had

repeatedly harassed and threatened them. The officers found Daugherty

standing outside the motel room, talked to him, and searched him for

weapons, finding none. They then spoke with the two sisters, who said

Daugherty had a weapon in his truck. One of the officers found a rifle,

which Daugherty admitted he owned and which was manufactured in Egypt

and imported through Knoxville, Tennessee. Id.

http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=f6bcb78e30fa2dc721ea484284f1c9e7&_xfercite=%3Ccite%20cc%3D%22USA%22%3E%3C!%5BCDATA%5B264%20F.3d%20513%5D%5D%3E%3C%2Fcite%3E&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=63&_butInline=1&_butinfo=18%20U.S.C.%20922&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=77c921abab7e901f925a41d6f49c4694http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=f6bcb78e30fa2dc721ea484284f1c9e7&_xfercite=%3Ccite%20cc%3D%22USA%22%3E%3C!%5BCDATA%5B264%20F.3d%20513%5D%5D%3E%3C%2Fcite%3E&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=63&_butInline=1&_butinfo=18%20U.S.C.%20922&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=77c921abab7e901f925a41d6f49c4694

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Following his indictment, Daughertys attorney filed a motion to dismiss

the indictment on the ground that his two state felony convictions did not

prohibit him from possessing a firearm, because he had been discharged

from probation for both offenses. The court denied that motion. Id.

Citing United States v. Dupaquer, 74 F.3d 615, 617 (5 th Cir. 1996), the Fifth

Circuit said that Texas law would determine whether Daugherty was a

convicted felon pursuant to 922(g)(1). Id., at 515. Daugherty argued that

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 42.12(20)(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001) restored his civil

rights such that he no longer should be considered a convicted felon. Id.

The Fifth Circuit then outlined the legal issue squarely before the court:

We have a two-part test to determine whether the unless clause of

921(a)(20), which supports a 922(g)(1) conviction, is triggered. First, we

ask whether the state which obtained the underlying conviction revivesessentially all civil rights of convicted felons, whether affirmatively with

individualized certification or passively with automatic reinstatement.

Second, we determine whether the defendant was nevertheless expressly

deprived of the right to possess a firearm by some provision of the

restoration law or procedure of the state of the underlying conviction.

Because Daugherty's rights were passively revived by operation of law, not

by individualized certification, we examine Texas law to decide whether any

provision or procedure limits his right to possess firearms. The government

contends that, even assuming that Daugherty's general civil rights were

restored under art. 42.12, 20, so as to fulfill the first part of theDupaquiertest, some procedure of the state of the underlying conviction expressly

deprived him of the right to possess a firearm. Id., 515-16 (internal citations

omitted)[emphasis original].

The government argued that Tex. Penal Code Ann. 46.04(a)(Vernon 2001)

prohibited Daugherty from possessing a firearm. Daugherty, on the other

hand, argued that under 42.12(20) a person discharged from a probation is

no longer convicted. The Fifth Circuit noted that neither 42.12(20) nor 46.04 explains whether the successful completion of probation supervision

renders one no longer convicted. Id., at 516. The Fifth Circuit addressed

this statutory conflict as follows:

In United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1988), we noted

specifically that the successful completion of probation does not expunge a

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8/8/2019 01-30-08 Wfp Gun Poss

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conviction for purposes of 922(g). We decided Morales two years after

Congress amended 922(g) to include the unless clause. Thus, under Fifth

Circuit precedent, Daugherty remained a convicted felon.

The government also contends that the Concealed Handgun Act ("CHA"),

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. 411.171(4) (Vernon Supp. 2001), prevents

Daugherty from owning a firearm. The government strongly relies on Tune

v . Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 23 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. 2000), in which the

defendant was denied a license to carry a concealed handgun because he had

been convicted of a felony. See id. at 360. He argued that, because hisconviction had been was set aside under art. 42.12, 20, he was no longer

convicted under the CHA.Id. at 363. The Texas Supreme Court, noting

that the CHA deemed a felon convicted after an adjudication of guilt is

entered against him whether or not his sentence is subsequently probated

and he is discharged from supervision, id. (citation omitted), declared thatTune was not eligible for a concealed-handgun license.Id. at 364. AfterTune, most Texas courts have held that a person applying for a concealed-

handgun license remains convicted for purposes of the CHA.

Daugherty responds correctly that Tune applied only to the definition of

convicted as provided in the CHA and thus is not squarely on point here.

The court in Tune stated, however, that the Legislature may wish to keep

concealed handguns out of the hands of persons who have been convicted of

a felony, even if those persons satisfactorily completed community

supervision.Id. That rationale also applies here, because the Texas

Legislature has passed laws designed to keep firearms out of the hands of

convicted felons.

Both 46.04 and the CHA demonstrate the power of the legislature to

regulate the bearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime. TEX. CONST.

art. I, 3. Thus, Tune provides strong analogous support for affirming

Daugherty's conviction.

Under Texas law, Daugherty remained convicted even after successfullycompleting probation. Consequently, he is subject to the penalties that state

law imposes on convicted felons. Section 46.04 prohibits felons from

possessing firearms outside their homes. Accordingly, Texas statutory law

activated the unless clause in 921(a)(20) and prevents Daugherty from

possessing a firearm. Id., 517-18.

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Sixth years later the Fifth Circuit in an immigration case expanded

Daugherty by holding that a Texas deferred adjudication, not considered a

felony conviction under state law, could be used for sentencing enhancement

purposes. See: United States v. Ramirez, 367 F.3d 274, 277 (5 th Cir. 2004).

See also: See also: Moosa v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 171

F.3d 994, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1999) [The term conviction is now defined as

a formal judgment of guilt entered by the court or, if an adjudication of guilt

has been withheld, where the judge has imposed some form of punishment,

penalty, or restraint on the aliens liberty].

Inasmuch as a deferred adjudication always entails some form of

punishment, penalty, or restraint in order to qualify for a non-finding of

guilt, these deferred proceedings could fall within the meaning of

conviction as defined by the Fifth Circuit. Deferred Adjudications are

definitely considered felony convictions for immigration purposes and forsentencing enhancements under the federal sentencing guidelines.

THE TEXAS GUN STATUTE

Tex. Penal Code 46.04 provides:

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he

possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person's release

from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person's release

from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory

supervision, whichever date is later; or

(2) after the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than

the premises at which the person lives.

(b) A person who has been convicted of an offense under Section 22.01,

punishable as a Class A misdemeanor and involving a member of the

person's family or household, commits an offense if the person possesses afirearm before the fifth anniversary of the later of:

(1) the date of the person's release from confinement following conviction

of the misdemeanor; or

(2) the date of the person's release from community supervision following

conviction of the misdemeanor.

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(c) A person, other than a peace officer, as defined by Section 1.07,

actively engaged in employment as a sworn, full-time paid employee of a

state agency or political subdivision, who is subject to an order issued under

Section 6.504 or Chapter 85, Family Code, under Article 17.292 or Chapter

7A, Code of Criminal Procedure, or by another jurisdiction as provided by

Chapter 88, Family Code, commits an offense if the person possesses a

firearm after receiving notice of the order and before expiration of the

order.

(d) In this section, "family," "household," and "member of a household"

have the meanings assigned by Chapter 71, Family Code.

(e) An offense under Subsection (a) is a felony of the third degree. An

offense under Subsection (b) or (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.

For the State to obtain a conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm

by a felon under 46.04(a)(1), it must establish the following elements:

a person

who has been convicted of a felony

possesses a firearm

after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons

release from confinement following conviction of the felony or thepersons release from supervision under community supervision,

parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later.

See: Hunt v. State, 994 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet.

refd).

46.04(a)(1) has survived the litany of constitutional challenges listed

below:

Right to Bear Arms defendants have challenged that 46.04 violates

the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms guaranteed by

Article I, Section 23 of the Texas Constitution - a right that applies

only to citizens of the State of Texas. See: Jordan v. State, 56

S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001). But even if a

citizen has standing to challenge 46.04 under Tex. Const. art. I,

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23, the courts have held that the Texas Legislature had a rational

basis for restricting a convicted felons possession of firearms. Id.

See also: Wilson v. State, 44 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth

2001, pet. refd).

Due Process Under Due Course of Law and Due Process Provisions

of the Texas and United States Constitutions The courts have held

that 46.04 does not offend the due process provisions of either the

fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution or art. I, 19 of the

Texas Constitution. See: Sheppard v. State, 586 S.W.2d 500, 502, 503

n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Texas courts apply essentially the same

standards in assessing a due course of law challenge under the state

constitution and a due process challenge under the U.S. Constitution.

See: Jordan v. State, supra, 56 S.W.3d at 331. See also: Garay v.

State, 940 S.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,

pet. refd). Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals inUnited States v. Giles, 640 F.2d 621, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1981) whose

interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)-(8) sets forth the prerequisites

for a firearms conviction as a conviction of a crime, violent or

otherwise, and punishable for more than one year in prison, Texas

courts have said that 46.04 adheres to this precise federal standard.

See: Jordan v. State, supra. The Jordan court held: Giles concerned a

constitutional challenge to the federal statute under virtually identical

grounds to those appellant raises here. In Giles, the defendant claimed

the federal statute, as amended to include convictions for nonviolent

crimes, violated the equal protection guarantees rooted in the Due

Process Clause, on which appellant relies here, by not distinguishing

between violent and nonviolent prior convictions.Id. at 624. Inrejecting the challenge, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit joined several other federal circuit courts in concluding

the statute was rationally related to the congressional goal of

precluding access to firearms for those convicted of serious crimes

because of their greater potential to abuse the right to possess

firearms.Id. at 625-27. While not bound by this analysis, we agree

with it and conclude it is dispositive of appellant's challenge to section46.04. Id., 56 S.W.3d at 331.

Ex Post Facto Violation Article I, 10 of the U.S. Constitution and

Art. I, 16 of the Texas Constitution provides that an ex post facto

law (1) punishes, as a crime, any act committed previously that was

innocent when done; (2) changes the punishment and inflicts greater

punishment than the law attached to the crime offense when it was

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committed; or (3) deprives a person charged with a crime of any

defense available when the act was committed. See: Jordan v. State,

supra, 56 S.W.3d at 331. The defendant in Jordan agued that at the

time he committed his prior felony of possession of marijuana,

46.04 applied only to those previously convicted of a violent felony.

He said that a greater punishment had been inflicted on him than

authorized by the law attached to the criminal offense when he

committed the prior offense. Id., at 332. The Jordan court held that in

a closely related situation in a case involving possession of firearm

by a felon, the Court of Criminal Appeals found no ex post facto

violation. See Salazar v. State, 423 S.W.2d 297, 298-99 (Tex. Crim.App. 1968). The prior conviction in Salazarwas for robbery.Id. at298. After Salazar was convicted of robbery, the statute proscribing

felons possessing firearms was changed to include not only prior

convictions involving violence, but burglary and robbery as well.Id.In rejecting the ex post facto challenge, the Court of Criminal Appeals

emphasized that Salazar was being punished for actions he committed

after the enactment of the amendment that brought his prior robbery

conviction within the felon in possession statute. See id. at 298-99.Id.

Double Jeopardy In May 2004 Arnoldo Belmontes was involved in

a fight that resulted in the death of Robey Guerra. He was indicted for

murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The State

tried him on the murder charge first. In January 2005 a jury found him

not guilty. Belmontes testified in his own defense, admitting that he

possessed a firearm while on supervised probation for a felony offense

of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana.

Belmontes then entered a plea of nolo contendere to the 46.04

violation. See: Belmontes v. State, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 2917

(Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006). On appeal Belmontes argued that the

Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitutions guarantee against double

jeopardy prevented the state from prosecuting him on the 46.04

violation following his acquittal of murder. See also: Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 1.10 (Vernon 2005). Applying the Blockburger test toreject Belmontes claim, the appeals court held that the murder

offense of which Belmontes was acquitted required proof that: (1) a

person, (2) intentionally or knowingly, (3) intends to cause serious

bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that

causes the death of an individual. TEX PEN. CODE ANN. 19.02 (b)

(Vernon 2005);Brown v. State 955 S.W.2d 276, 284 (Tex. Crim. App.

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8/8/2019 01-30-08 Wfp Gun Poss

17/22

1997). The conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm by a

felon required proof that: (1) a person, (2) who has been convicted of

a felony, (3) possesses a firearm, (4) after conviction and before the

fifth anniversary of the person's release from confinement following

conviction of the felony or the person's release from supervision under

community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever

date is later. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. 46.04 (a) (1) (Vernon 2003);

Hunt v. State, 994 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, pet.ref'd). Application of theBlockburgertest demonstrates that unlawful

possession of a firearm requires proof of at least one element that the

murder offense does not. Id., LEXIS at 8-9.

In 1997 the Legislature amended the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to

allow a deferred adjudication to be used for enhancement purposes. See:

12.42(c)(2) and (g)(1).This legislative amendment automatically triggeredthe question of whether a discharged deferred adjudication could be used as

a prior felony conviction under 46.04.

Four years after this legislative amendment the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals was called upon to answer that specific question: Can a

successfully completed deferred adjudication be used to enhance punishment

for a later offense when the provision permitting such enhancement did not

exist at the time adjudication was deferred? See: Scott v. State, 55 S.W.3d

593 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).

The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit

in Daugherty and Moosa by answering the question with a resounding no.

Id., at 594. The court of criminal appeals explained why:

Under the Texas Penal Code enhancement scheme, a life sentence must be

assessed to a defendant who commits a sexual offense listed in 12.42(c)(2)

(A) if that defendant has previously been convicted of a sexual offense listed

in 12.42(c)(2)(B). When appellant pled guilty in 1991 to indecency with a

child, the deferred adjudication statute provided that a discharged deferredadjudication would not be considered a conviction except in certain

enumerated circumstances:

A dismissal and discharge under this section may not be deemed a

conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by

law for conviction of an offense except that.

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8/8/2019 01-30-08 Wfp Gun Poss

18/22

None of the exceptions involved the use of a deferred adjudication to

enhance a subsequent offense. In 1997, 12.42 was amended to add a

provision that makes a deferred adjudication count as a conviction under

subsection (c)(2)(B), regardless of whether sentence was ever imposed or the

defendant was subsequently discharged from community supervision:

For the purposes of Subsection (c)(2): (1) a defendant has been previously

convicted of an offense listed under Subsection (c)(2)(B) if the defendant

was adjudged guilty of the offense or entered a plea of guilty or nolo

contendere in return for a grant of deferred adjudication, regardless of

whether the sentence was ever imposed or whether the sentence was

probated and the defendant was subsequently discharged from community

supervision.

In the same bill that amended 12.42, the Legislature also amended the

"disqualifications and disabilities" clause of Article 42.12, 5(c) to

accommodate the change in 12.42(g)(1): "Except as provided by Section

12.42(g), Penal Code, a dismissal and discharge under this section may notbe deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities

imposed by law for conviction of an offense" (1997 amendatory language

italicized). Id., 595-96.

The Scott court, however, added the following caveat:

The distinguishing factor in this case is the existence in the prior statute of

an explicit limitation on the collateral consequences of deferred

adjudication. The resolution of criminal charges will always carry the

possibility of collateral consequences, and as long as those consequences are

not statutorily restricted, disabilities and disqualifications which the

defendant might not have anticipated may proceed from the prior cause. But

when a statute explicitly restricts the collateral consequences of an offense,

the defendant is entitled to rely on that restriction. Punishment for the

offense is increased by the removal of the statutory restriction, and such anincrease in punishment constitutes an ex post facto law. Id., 597-98

In 1991 when the defendant in Scott pleaded guilty to indecency with a

child, the deferred adjudication statute provided that a discharged deferred

adjudication would not be considered a conviction except in enumerated

circumstances. Id., at 595.

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