ENBANCJENNYM.AGABONandG.R.No.158693VIRGILIOC.AGABON,Petitioners,Present:Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Puno,Panganiban,Quisumbing,YnaresSantiago,

SandovalGutierrez,versusCarpio,

AustriaMartinez,Corona,CarpioMorales,Callejo,Sr.,Azcuna,Tinga,ChicoNazario,andGarcia,JJ.

NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSION(NLRC),RIVIERAHOMEIMPROVEMENTS,INC.Promulgated:andVICENTEANGELES,Respondents.November17,2004xx

DECISION

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

Thispetitionforreviewseekstoreversethedecision[1]

oftheCourtofAppealsdatedJanuary

23, 2003, in CAG.R. SP No. 63017, modifying the decision of National Labor RelationsCommission(NLRC)inNLRCNCRCaseNo.02344200.PrivaterespondentRivieraHomeImprovements,Inc.isengagedinthebusinessofsellingandinstallingornamentalandconstructionmaterials.ItemployedpetitionersVirgilioAgabonand

JennyAgabonasgypsumboardandcorniceinstallersonJanuary2,1992[2]

untilFebruary23,1999whentheyweredismissedforabandonmentofwork.

Petitionersthenfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalandpaymentofmoneyclaims[3]

and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissalsillegalandorderedprivate respondent topay themonetaryclaims.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionstates:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the termination of the complainants illegal.Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to pay them their backwages up toNovember 29,1999inthesumof:1.JennyM.AgabonP56,231.932.VirgilioC.Agabon56,231.93and,inlieuofreinstatementtopaythemtheirseparationpayofone(1)monthforeveryyearofservicefromdateofhiringuptoNovember29,1999.Respondent is furtherordered topay thecomplainants theirholidaypayandservice incentiveleavepayfortheyears1996,1997and1998aswellastheirpremiumpayforholidaysandrestdaysandVirgilioAgabons13thmonthpaydifferentialamountingtoTWOTHOUSANDONEHUNDREDFIFTY(P2,150.00)Pesos,ortheaggregateamountofONEHUNDREDTWENTYONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT & 93/100 (P121,678.93) Pesos forJenny Agabon, and ONEHUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND EIGHTHUNDREDTWENTY EIGHT & 93/100 (P123,828.93) Pesos for Virgilio Agabon, as per attachedcomputationofJulietaC.Nicolas,OIC,ResearchandComputationUnit,NCR.

SOORDERED.[4]

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners hadabandonedtheirwork,andwerenotentitledtobackwagesandseparationpay.Theothermoney

claimsawardedbytheLaborArbiterwerealsodeniedforlackofevidence.[5]

Upondenialof theirmotionforreconsideration,petitionersfiledapetitionforcertiorariwiththeCourtofAppeals.

TheCourtofAppealsinturnruledthatthedismissalofthepetitionerswasnotillegalbecausethey had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,thedecisionoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommissionisREVERSEDonlyinsofar as it dismissed petitioners money claims. Private respondents are ordered to paypetitionersholidaypay for four (4) regularholidays in1996,1997,and1998,aswellas theirserviceincentiveleavepayforsaidyears,andtopaythebalanceofpetitionerVirgilioAgabons13thmonthpayfor1998intheamountofP2,150.00.

SOORDERED.[6]

Hence,thispetitionforreviewonthesoleissueofwhetherpetitionerswereillegallydismissed.[7]

Petitionersassertthattheyweredismissedbecausetheprivaterespondentrefusedtogive

themassignmentsunlesstheyagreedtoworkonapakyawbasiswhentheyreportedfordutyonFebruary 23, 1999. They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losingbenefits as Social Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners also claim that private

respondentdidnotcomplywiththetwinrequirementsofnoticeandhearing.[8]

Privaterespondent,ontheotherhand,maintainedthatpetitionerswerenotdismissedbuthad

abandonedtheirwork.[9]

Infact,privaterespondentsenttwoletterstothelastknownaddressesofthepetitionersadvisingthemtoreportforwork.Privaterespondentsmanagereventalkedtopetitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June 1999 to tell him about the newassignment at Pacific Plaza Towers involving 40,000 square meters of cornice installationwork.However,petitionersdidnotreportforworkbecausetheyhadsubcontractedtoperforminstallationworkforanothercompany.PetitionersalsodemandedforanincreaseintheirwagetoP280.00perday.Whenthiswasnotgranted,petitionersstoppedreportingforworkandfiled

theillegaldismissalcase.[10]

ItiswellsettledthatfindingsoffactofquasijudicialagenciesliketheNLRCareaccordednotonly respect but even finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is

especiallysowhensuchfindingswereaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals.[11]

However,ifthefactual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are conflicting, as in this case, the

reviewingcourtmaydelveintotherecordsandexamineforitselfthequestionedfindings.[12]

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of the facts, ruled that

petitioners dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned their employment andwerealreadyworkingforanotheremployer.Todismissanemployee,thelawrequiresnotonlytheexistenceofajustandvalidcausebutalso enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend

himself.[13]

Article282of theLaborCodeenumerates the justcausesfor terminationby theemployer:(a)seriousmisconductorwillfuldisobediencebytheemployeeofthelawfulordersofhisemployerorthelattersrepresentativeinconnectionwiththeemployeeswork(b)grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties(c)fraudorwillfulbreachbytheemployeeof the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative (d)commissionofacrimeoroffensebytheemployeeagainstthepersonofhisemployeroranyimmediatemember of his family or his duly authorized representative and (e) other causesanalogoustotheforegoing.Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his

employment.[14]

It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of

employmentbytheemployer.[15]

Foravalidfindingofabandonment,thesetwofactorsshouldbepresent:(1)thefailuretoreportforworkorabsencewithoutvalidorjustifiablereasonand(2) a clear intention to sever employeremployee relationship, with the second as the moredeterminativefactorwhichismanifestedbyovertactsfromwhichitmaybededucedthattheemployeeshasnomoreintentiontowork.Theintent todiscontinuetheemploymentmustbe

shownbyclearproofthatitwasdeliberateandunjustified.[16]

InFebruary1999,petitionerswere frequently absenthaving subcontracted for an installationworkforanothercompany.Subcontractingforanothercompanyclearlyshowedtheintentiontosevertheemployeremployeerelationshipwithprivaterespondent.Thiswasnotthefirsttimethey did this. In January 1996, they did not report forwork because theywereworking foranother company. Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would bedismissed if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clearintention to sever their employeremployee relationship. The record of an employee is a

relevantconsiderationindeterminingthepenaltythatshouldbemetedouttohim.[17]

InSandovalShipyardv.Clave,[18]

weheldthatanemployeewhodeliberatelyabsentedfromwork without leave or permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a jobelsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job. We should apply that rule with morereason here where petitioners were absent because they were already working in anothercompany.The law imposesmany obligations on the employer such as providing just compensation toworkers,observanceoftheproceduralrequirementsofnoticeandhearingintheterminationofemployment.On theotherhand, the lawalso recognizes the right of the employer to expectfrom its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also good

conduct[19]

and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such

personswhosecontinuanceintheservicewillpatentlybeinimicaltohisinterests.[20]

Afterestablishingthattheterminationswereforajustandvalidcause,wenowdetermineiftheproceduresfordismissalwereobserved.

TheprocedureforterminatinganemployeeisfoundinBookVI,RuleI,Section2(d)oftheOmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode:

Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of termination of

employment,thefollowingstandardsofdueprocessshallbesubstantiallyobserved:I.For terminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282of the

Code:(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for

termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunitywithinwhich to explain hisside

(b)Ahearingorconferenceduringwhichtheemployeeconcerned,withtheassistanceof

counsel if the employee sodesires, is givenopportunity to respond to the charge, present hisevidenceorrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthimand

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due

considerationofallthecircumstances,groundshavebeenestablishedtojustifyhistermination.In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last knownaddress.

Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the

employeewhiledismissalsbasedonauthorizedcausesinvolvegroundsundertheLaborCodewhich allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized causerequirespaymentofseparationpay.When the terminationofemployment isdeclared illegal,reinstatementandfullbackwagesaremandatedunderArticle279.Ifreinstatementisnolongerpossiblewherethedismissalwasunjust,separationpaymaybegranted.

Procedurally,(1)ifthedismissalisbasedonajustcauseunderArticle282,theemployer

must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard ifrequestedbytheemployeebeforeterminatingtheemployment:anoticespecifyingthegroundsfor which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing oropportunitytobeheard,anoticeofthedecisiontodismissand(2)ifthedismissalisbasedonauthorizedcausesunderArticles283and284, theemployermustgive theemployeeand theDepartment ofLabor andEmploymentwritten notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of hisseparation.Fromtheforegoingrulesfourpossiblesituationsmaybederived:(1)thedismissalisforajustcauseunderArticle282of theLaborCode,foranauthorizedcauseunderArticle283,orforhealth reasonsunderArticle284,anddueprocesswasobserved (2) thedismissal iswithoutjust or authorized cause but due process was observed (3) the dismissal is without just orauthorizedcauseandtherewasnodueprocessand(4)thedismissalisforjustorauthorizedcausebutdueprocesswasnotobserved.In the first situation, thedismissal isundoubtedlyvalidand theemployerwillnot sufferanyliability.

Inthesecondandthirdsituationswherethedismissalsareillegal,Article279mandatesthat the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and otherprivileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or theirmonetaryequivalent computed from the time the compensationwas not paid up to the time of actualreinstatement.Inthefourthsituation,thedismissalshouldbeupheld.Whiletheproceduralinfirmitycannotbecured,itshouldnotinvalidatethedismissal.However,theemployershouldbeheldliable fornoncompliancewiththeproceduralrequirementsofdueprocess.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheldbecause it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for anothercompany. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and insteadarguedthatsendingnoticestothelastknownaddresseswouldhavebeenuselessbecausetheydidnotresidethereanymore.Unfortunatelyfortheprivaterespondent,thisisnotavalidexcusebecause the lawmandates the twinnoticerequirements to theemployees lastknownaddress.[21]

Thus,itshouldbeheldliablefornoncompliancewiththeproceduralrequirementsofdueprocess.Areviewandreexaminationoftherelevantlegalprinciplesisappropriateandtimelytoclarifythe various rulings on employment termination in the light of Serrano v. National Labor

RelationsCommission.[22]

Prior to1989, the rulewas that adismissalor termination is illegal if the employeewasnotgivenanynotice.Inthe1989caseofWenphilCorp.v.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,[23]

we reversed this longstanding rule andheld that the dismissed employee, althoughnotgiven any notice and hearing, was not entitled to reinstatement and backwages because thedismissalwas forgravemisconduct and insubordination, a justground for terminationunderArticle282.Theemployeehadaviolenttemperandcausedtroubleduringofficehours,defyingsuperiorswho tried topacifyhim.Weconcluded that reinstating theemployeeandawardingbackwagesmay encourage him to do evenworse andwill render amockery of the rules of

disciplinethatemployeesarerequiredtoobserve.[24]

Wefurtherheldthat:Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should bemaintained.Hehasnorighttoreturntohisformeremployment.

However, the petitionermust nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend toprivaterespondenthisrighttoaninvestigationbeforecausinghisdismissal.Theruleisexplicitasabovediscussed.Thedismissalofanemployeemustbeforjustorauthorizedcauseandafterdueprocess. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must beimposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation asrequiredbylawbeforedismissingpetitionerfromemployment.Consideringthecircumstancesof this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. Themeasure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission

committedbytheemployer.[25]

Therulethusevolved:wheretheemployerhadavalidreasontodismissanemployeebutdidnotfollowthedueprocessrequirement,thedismissalmaybeupheldbuttheemployerwillbe penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as theWenphil orBelatedDueProcessRule.

OnJanuary27,2000,inSerrano,theruleontheextentofthesanctionwaschanged.We

held that the violation by the employer of the notice requirement in termination for just orauthorizedcauseswasnotadenialofdueprocess thatwillnullify the termination.However,the dismissal is ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from the time ofterminationuntilitisjudiciallydeclaredthatthedismissalwasforajustorauthorizedcause.

The rationale for the reexamination of the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was the

significantnumberofcasesinvolvingdismissalswithoutrequisitenotices.Weconcludedthatthe impositionofpenaltybywayofdamagesforviolationof thenotice requirementwasnotservingas adeterrent.Hence,wenow requiredpaymentof full backwages from the timeofdismissaluntilthetimetheCourtfindsthedismissalwasforajustorauthorizedcause.

Serranowas confronting the practice of employers to dismiss now and pay later by

imposingfullbackwages.We believe, however, that the ruling in Serranodid not consider the full meaning of

Article279oftheLaborCodewhichstates:ART.279.SecurityofTenure.Incasesofregularemployment,theemployershallnotterminatethe services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. Anemployeewhoisunjustlydismissedfromworkshallbeentitledtoreinstatementwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandotherprivilegesandtohisfullbackwages, inclusiveofallowances,andtohisotherbenefitsor theirmonetaryequivalentcomputed from the timehiscompensationwaswithheldfromhimuptothetimeofhisactualreinstatement.This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or

authorized causes provided by law. Payment of backwages and other benefits, includingreinstatement,isjustifiedonlyiftheemployeewasunjustlydismissed.

ThefactthattheSerranorulingcancauseunfairnessandinjusticewhichelicitedstrong

dissenthaspromptedustorevisitthedoctrine.

To be sure, theDueProcessClause inArticle III, Section 1 of theConstitution embodies asystemofrightsbasedonmoralprinciplessodeeplyimbeddedinthetraditionsandfeelingsofour people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entirehistory.Dueprocessisthatwhichcomportswiththedeepestnotionsofwhatisfairandright

and just.[26]

It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative aswell ason the executive andjudicialpowersofthegovernmentprovidedbytheBillofRights.

Due process under the Labor Code, likeConstitutional due process, has two aspects:substantive, i.e., thevalidandauthorizedcausesofemployment terminationunder theLaborCodeandprocedural, i.e., themannerofdismissal.Proceduraldueprocess requirements fordismissalarefoundintheImplementingRulesofP.D.442,asamended,otherwiseknownastheLaborCodeofthePhilippinesinBookVI,RuleI,Sec.2,asamendedbyDepartmentOrder

Nos. 9 and 10.[27]

Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code.Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply withconstitutionaldueprocess.

Constitutionaldueprocessprotectstheindividualfromthegovernmentandassureshim

ofhisrightsincriminal,civiloradministrativeproceedingswhilestatutorydueprocessfoundintheLaborCodeandImplementingRulesprotectsemployeesfrombeingunjustlyterminatedwithoutjustcauseafternoticeandhearing.

InSebuguerov.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,[28]

thedismissalwasforajustandvalidcausebuttheemployeewasnotaccordeddueprocess.Thedismissalwasupheldbythe Court but the employer was sanctioned. The sanction should be in the nature ofindemnification or penalty, and depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of theomissioncommittedbytheemployer.

In Nath v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29]

it was ruled that even if theemployeewasnotgivendueprocess,thefailuredidnotoperatetoeradicatethejustcausesfordismissal. The dismissal being for just cause,albeitwithout due process, did not entitle theemployeetoreinstatement,backwages,damagesandattorneysfees.

Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in his separate opinion inMGG Marine Services, Inc. v.

NationalLaborRelationsCommission,[30]

whichopinionhereiteratedinSerrano,stated:C.Wherethereisjustcausefordismissalbutdueprocesshasnotbeenproperlyobserved

byanemployer,itwouldnotberighttoordereitherthereinstatementofthedismissedemployeeor the payment of backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with the procedureprescribedbylawinterminatingtheservicesoftheemployee,theemployermustbedeemedtohaveoptedor,inanycase,shouldbemadeliable,forthepaymentofseparationpay.Itmightbepointedoutthatthenoticetobegivenandthehearingtobeconductedgenerallyconstitutethetwopart due process requirement of law to be accorded to the employee by the employer.Nevertheless,peculiarcircumstancesmightobtain incertainsituationswhere toundertake theabovestepswouldbenomorethanauselessformalityandwhere,accordingly,itwouldnotbeimprudent to apply the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in lieu of separation pay, nominal

damagestotheemployee.xxx.[31]

After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on

employment termination,webelieve that in cases involvingdismissals for causebutwithoutobservance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon theSerrano doctrine and to followWenphil byholding that thedismissalwas for just causebutimposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than thatimposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result bydispensingjusticenotjusttoemployees,buttoemployersaswell.

Theunfairnessofdeclaringillegalorineffectualdismissalsforvalidorauthorizedcausesbutnotcomplyingwithstatutorydueprocessmayhavefarreachingconsequences.This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the most notorious violators of companypolicyarerewardedbyinvokingdueprocess.Thisalsocreatesabsurdsituationswherethereisajustorauthorizedcausefordismissalbutaproceduralinfirmityinvalidatesthetermination.Letustakeforexampleacasewheretheemployeeiscaughtstealingorthreatensthelivesofhiscoemployeesorhasbecomeacriminal,whohasfledandcannotbefound,orwhereseriousbusiness losses demand that operations be ceased in less than a month. Invalidating thedismissalwouldnotservepublicinterest.Itcouldalsodiscourageinvestmentsthatcangenerateemploymentinthelocaleconomy.

Theconstitutionalpolicytoprovidefullprotectiontolaborisnotmeanttobeaswordtooppress employers.The commitment of thisCourt to the cause of labor does not prevent us

fromsustainingtheemployerwhenitisintheright,asinthiscase.[32]

Certainly,anemployershould not be compelled to pay employees for work not actually performed and in factabandoned.The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who is admittedlyguiltyofmisfeasanceormalfeasanceandwhosecontinuedemploymentispatentlyinimicaltothe employer. The law protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor

selfdestructionoftheemployer.[33]

It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a grave offense, i.e.,abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process were complied with, wouldundoubtedlyresultinavaliddismissal.AnemployeewhoisclearlyguiltyofconductviolativeofArticle282shouldnotbeprotectedbytheSocialJusticeClauseoftheConstitution.Socialjustice,asthetermsuggests,shouldbeusedonlytocorrectaninjustice.AstheeminentJusticeJoseP.Laurelobserved,socialjusticemustbefoundedontherecognitionofthenecessityofinterdependenceamongdiverseunitsofasocietyandoftheprotectionthatshouldbeequallyandevenlyextendedtoallgroupsas a combined force in our social and economic life, consistentwith the fundamental andparamountobjectiveofthestateofpromotingthehealth,comfort,andquietofallpersons,and

ofbringingaboutthegreatestgoodtothegreatestnumber.[34]

This is not to say that the Court was wrong when it ruled the way it did inWenphil,Serranoandrelatedcases.Socialjusticeisnotbasedonrigidformulassetinstone.Ithastoallowforchangingtimesandcircumstances.

Justice Isagani Cruz strongly asserts the need to apply a balanced approach to labormanagementrelationsanddispensejusticewithanevenhandineverycase:

Wehaverepeatedlystressedthatsocialjusticeoranyjusticeforthatmatterisforthedeserving,whetherhebeamillionaire inhismansionorapauper inhishovel. It is true that, incaseofreasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitutionfittinglyextendsitssympathyandcompassion.Butneverisitjustifiedtogivepreferencetothepoor simplybecause theyarepoor,or reject the rich simplybecause theyare rich, for justice

mustalwaysbeservedforthepoorandtherichalike,accordingtothemandateofthelaw.[35]

Justice in every case should only be for the deserving party. It should not be presumed thatevery case of illegal dismissal would automatically be decided in favor of labor, asmanagement has rights that should be fully respected and enforced by this Court. Asinterdependentandindispensablepartnersinnationbuilding,laborandmanagementneedeachother to foster productivity and economic growth hence, the need toweigh and balance therightsandwelfareofboththeemployeeandemployer.

Where thedismissal is fora justcause,as in the instantcase, the lackofstatutorydue

process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, theemployer should indemnify theemployee for theviolationofhis statutory rights, as ruled in

Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission.[36]

The indemnity to be imposed should bestiffertodiscouragetheabhorrentpracticeofdismissnow,paylater,whichwesoughttodeterintheSerrano ruling.Thesanctionshouldbe in thenatureof indemnificationorpenaltyandshoulddependonthefactsofeachcase,takingintospecialconsiderationthegravityofthedueprocessviolationoftheemployer.Under theCivil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,whichhasbeenviolatedorinvadedbythedefendant,maybevindicatedorrecognized,andnot

forthepurposeofindemnifyingtheplaintiffforanylosssufferedbyhim.[37]

As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions,[38]

anemployerisliabletopayindemnityintheformofnominaldamagestoanemployeewhohasbeen dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with therequirementsofdueprocess.TheCourt,afterconsideringthecircumstancestherein,fixedtheindemnity at P2,590.50, which was equivalent to the employees one month salary. Thisindemnityisintendednottopenalizetheemployerbuttovindicateorrecognizetheemployees

righttostatutorydueprocesswhichwasviolatedbytheemployer.[39]

Theviolationofthepetitionersrighttostatutorydueprocessbytheprivaterespondentwarrantsthe payment of indemnity in the formof nominal damages.The amount of suchdamages isaddressedtothesounddiscretionofthecourt,takingintoaccounttherelevantcircumstances.

[40]Consideringtheprevailingcircumstancesinthecaseatbar,wedeemitpropertofix

itatP30,000.00.Webelievethisformofdamageswouldservetodeteremployersfromfutureviolations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides avindicationorrecognitionofthisfundamentalrightgrantedtothelatterundertheLaborCodeanditsImplementingRules.

Private respondent claims that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it failed to pay

petitionersholidaypay,serviceincentiveleavepayand13thmonthpay.Wearenotpersuaded.

We affirm the ruling of the appellate court on petitioners money claims. Private

respondentisliableforpetitionersholidaypay,serviceincentiveleavepayand13thmonthpaywithoutdeductions.As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where theemployeemustallegenonpayment,thegeneralruleisthattheburdenrestsontheemployertoprovepayment,ratherthanontheemployeetoprovenonpayment.Thereasonfortheruleisthat the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documentswhich will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims ofworkershavebeenpaidarenotinthepossessionoftheworkerbutinthecustodyandabsolute

controloftheemployer.[41]

In the case at bar, if private respondent indeed paid petitioners holiday pay and serviceincentive leave pay, it could have easily presented documentary proofs of such monetary

benefitstodisprovetheclaimsofthepetitioners.Butitdidnot,exceptwithrespecttothe13th

monthpaywherein it presented cashvouchers showingpaymentsof thebenefit in theyears

disputed.[42]

Allegationsbyprivaterespondentthatitdoesnotoperateduringholidaysandthatitallowsitsemployees10daysleavewithpay,otherthanbeingselfserving,donotconstituteproof of payment. Consequently, it failed to discharge theonusprobandi therebymaking itliableforsuchclaimstothepetitioners.AnentthedeductionofSSSloanandthevalueoftheshoesfrompetitionerVirgilioAgabons

13thmonth pay,we find the same to be unauthorized. The evident intention of Presidential

Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to

employeesnotalreadyreceivingthesame[43]

soas to furtherprotect the levelofrealwages

fromtheravagesofworldwideinflation.[44]

Clearly,asadditionalincome,the13thmonthpayisincludedinthedefinitionofwageunderArticle97(f)oftheLaborCode,towit:

(f)Wagepaid toanyemployeeshallmean the remunerationorearnings,howeverdesignated,capableofbeingexpressedintermsofmoneywhetherfixedorascertainedonatime,task,piece,orcommissionbasis,orothermethodofcalculatingthesame,whichispayablebyanemployerto an employee under awritten or unwritten contract of employment forwork done or to bedone,orforservicesrenderedor toberenderedandincludesthefairandreasonablevalue,asdeterminedbytheSecretaryofLabor,ofboard,lodging,orotherfacilitiescustomarilyfurnishedbytheemployertotheemployee

fromwhichanemployer isprohibitedunderArticle113[45]

of the sameCode frommakingany deductions without the employees knowledge and consent. In the instant case, privaterespondentfailedtoshowthatthedeductionoftheSSSloanandthevalueoftheshoesfrom

petitionerVirgilioAgabons13thmonthpaywasauthorizedbythelatter.ThelackofauthoritytodeductisfurtherbolsteredbythefactthatpetitionerVirgilioAgabonincludedthesameasoneofhismoneyclaimsagainstprivaterespondent.

The Court of Appeals properly reinstated themonetary claims awarded by the LaborArbiter ordering the private respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for fourregularholidaysfrom1996to1998,intheamountofP6,520.00,serviceincentiveleavepayforthe same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance ofVirgilioAgabons thirteenthmonthpayfor1998intheamountofP2,150.00.

WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thepetitionisDENIED.ThedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdatedJanuary23,2003, inCAG.R.SPNo.63017,finding thatpetitionersJennyandVirgilioAgabonabandonedtheirwork,andorderingprivaterespondenttopayeachofthepetitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the amount ofP6,520.00,serviceincentiveleavepayforthesameperiodintheamountofP3,255.00andthebalance of Virgilio Agabons thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00 isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera HomeImprovements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount of

P30,000.00asnominaldamagesfornoncompliancewithstatutorydueprocess.

Nocosts.SOORDERED.

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGOAssociateJusticeWECONCUR:

HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.ChiefJustice

REYNATOS.PUNOARTEMIOV.PANGANIBANAssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBINGANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZ

AssociateJusticeAssociateJusticeANTONIOT.CARPIOMA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONACONCHITACARPIOMORALES

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.ADOLFOS.AZCUNAAssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

DANTEO.TINGAMINITAV.CHICONAZARIOAssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

CANCIOC.GARCIAAssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,ArticleVIII of theConstitution, it is hereby certified that theconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.ChiefJustice

[1]PennedbyAssociate JusticeMarinaL.Buzonandconcurred inbyAssociate Justices JosefinaGuevara

SalongaandDaniloB.Pine.[2]

Rollo,p.41.[3]

Id.,pp.1314.[4]

Id.,p.92.[5]

Id.,p.131.[6]

Id.,p.173.[7]

Id.,p.20.[8]

Id.,pp.2123.[9]

Id.,p.45.[10]

Id.,pp.4243.

[11]Rosariov.VictoryRicemill,G.R.No.147572,19February2003,397SCRA760,767.

[12]Reyesv.MaximsTeaHouse,G.R.No.140853,27February2003,398SCRA288,298.

[13]Santosv.SanMiguelCorporation,G.R.No.149416,14March2003,399SCRA172,182.

[14]ColumbusPhilippineBusCorporationv.NLRC,417Phil.81,100(2001).

[15]DePaul/KingPhilipCustomsTailorv.NLRC,364Phil.91,102(1999).

[16]Sta.CatalinaCollegev.NLRC,G.R.No.144483,19November2003.

[17]CosmosBottlingCorporationv.NLRC,G.R.No.111155,23October1997,281SCRA146,153154.

[18]G.R.No.L49875,21November1979,94SCRA472,478.

[19]JudyPhilippines,Inc.v.NLRC,352Phil.593,606(1998).

[20]PhilippineSingaporeTransportServices,Inc.v.NLRC,343Phil.284,291(1997).

[21]SeeStoltNielsenMarineServices,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.128395,29December1998,300SCRA713,

720.[22]

G.R.No.117040,27January2000,323SCRA445.[23]

G.R.No.80587,8February1989,170SCRA69.[24]

Id.at76.[25]

Id.[26]

Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Due process is violated if apracticeorruleoffendssomeprincipleofjusticesorootedinthetraditionsandconscienceofourpeopleastoberankedasfundamentalSnyderv.Massachusetts,291U.S.97,105(1934).[27]

DepartmentOrderNo.9 tookeffecton21June1997.DepartmentOrderNo.10 tookeffecton22June1997.[28]

G.R.No.115394,27September1995,248SCRA535.[29]

G.R.No.122666,19June1997,274SCRA386.[30]

G.R.No.114313,29July1996,259SCRA699,700.[31]

Serrano,supra,Vitug,J.,Separate(ConcurringandDissenting)Opinion,323SCRA524,529530(2000).[32]

Capiliv.NLRC,G.R.No.117378,26March1997,270SCRA488,495.[33]

Filipro,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.L70546,16October1986,145SCRA123.[34]

Calalangv.Williams,70Phil.726,735(1940).[35]

Gelosv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.86186,8May1992,208SCRA608,616.[36]

G.R.No.112100,27May1994,232SCRA613,618.[37]

Art.2221,CivilCode.[38]

G.R.No.108405.April4,2003citingKwikwayEngineeringWorksv.NLRC,G.R.No.85014,22March1991, 195 SCRA 526, 532 Aurelio v. NLRC, G.R. No. 99034, 12 April 1993, 221 SCRA 432, 443 andSampaguitaGarmentsCorporationv.NLRC,G.R.No.102406,17June1994,233SCRA260,265.[39]

Id.citingBetterBuildings,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.109714,15December1997,283SCRA242,251Iranv.NLRC,G.R.No.121927,22April1998,289SCRA433,442.

[40]Savellanov.NorthwestAirlines,G.R.No.151783,8July2003.

[41]Villarv.NLRC,G.R.No.130935,11May2000.

[42]Rollo,pp.6071.

[43]USTFacultyUnionv.NLRC,G.R.No.90445,2October1990.

[44]Whereasclauses,P.D.No.851.

[45]Art.113.Wagededuction.Noemployer,inhisownbehalforinbehalfofanyperson,shallmake

anydeductionfromthewagesofhisemployeesexcept:(a)Incaseswheretheworkerisinsuredwithhisconsentbytheemployer,andthedeductionistorecompensetheemployerfortheamountpaidbyhimaspremiumontheinsurance(b)Foruniondues, incaseswhere the rightof theworkerorhisunion tocheckoffhasbeenrecognizedbytheemployerorauthorizedinwritingbytheindividualworkerconcernedand(c)IncaseswheretheemployerisauthorizedbylaworregulationsissuedbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment.