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principal author

Shuja Nawaz

foreword

Arnaud de Borchgrave

January 2009

FATAA Most Dangerous Place

Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

CSISCENTER FOR STRATEGIC &

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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principal author

Shuja Nawaz

forewordArnaud de Borchgrave

FATAA Most Dangerous Place

Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in theFederally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

January 2009

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About CSIS

In an era o ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center or Strategic and Inter-national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmak-ers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the utureand anticipate change.

Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height o the Cold War, CSISwas dedicated to the simple but urgent goal o finding ways or America to survive as a nation andprosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one o the worlds preeminent publicpolicy institutions.

oday, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. Morethan 220 ull-time staff and a large network o affiliated scholars ocus their expertise on deenseand security; on the worlds regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issuesthat know no boundary in an increasingly connected world.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman o the CSIS Board o rustees in 1999, andJohn J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chie executive officer since 2000.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this publica-tion should be understood to be solely those o the author(s).

Cover photo: aliban militants, October 9, 2008 epa/CorbisCartographer: Robert L. Wiser

2009 by the Center or Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-0-89206-562-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNawaz, Shuja. FAAa most dangerous place : meeting the challenge o militancy and terror in the FederallyAdministered ribal Areas o Pakistan / Shuja Nawaz. p. cm. Includes bibliographical reerences. ISBN 978-0-89206-562-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. errorismPakistanFederally Administeredribal AreasPrevention. I. itle.

HV6433.P18N38 2009 363.325170954911dc22 2008050502

The CSIS Press

Center or Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006el: (202) 775-3119Fax: (202) 775-3199Web: www.csis.org

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| iii

Executive Summary v

Foreword byArnaud de Borchgrave vi

Preace ix

Acknowledgments xi

List o Acronyms and Abbreviations xii

1. A Most Dangerous Place: FAA Explained 1

Why FAA Is the Way It Is 7

Te Rising Militancy 9

Basic Perceptions and Realities 10

Pakistans Role and Concerns 11

Understanding FAA Society and Dynamics 13

Role o the Mullahs 14

U.S. Actions in Aghanistan and the Region 15

2. Issues and Answers 17

Te Aghan aliban and Teir Role in FAA 17

Te ehreek-e-aliban-e-Pakistan and Other Militant Groups 18

Current Developments in FAA and the NWFP 19

U.S. Develpment Assistance or FAA 21

Political, Economic, and Social Development Challenges in FAA 22

How to Change the Situation 28

3. Searching or a Military Solution 32Changing the actics 33

Poor raining and Equipment 34

contents

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iv | fataa most dangerous place

4. What Can Be Done 36

Te Government o Pakistan 36

Te Pakistani Military 39

Te U.S. Government 40

Te U.S. Military and CENCOM 40

Te Government o Aghanistan 41

5. Conclusion 42

About the Authors 44

Maps and TablesMap 1. Federally Administered ribal Areas (FAA) 3

Map 2. Ethnic Groups o Pakistan 4

Map 3. Ancient ribal Boundaries 5

able 1. Population o FAA (1998) 2

able 2. Selected Development Indicators or Pakistan, the NWFP, and

FAA (2003) 8

able 3. FAA Agencies and ribes 13

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| v

Increased militancy and violence in the border region between Aghanistan and Pakistan known

as the Federally Administered ribal Areas o Pakistan has brought FAA into sharper ocus, as

U.S., Aghan, and Pakistani leaders attempt to find solutions to the problems underlying the situa-

tion there. Tis most dangerous spot on the map may well be the source o another 9/11 type o at-

tack on the Western world or its surrogates in the region. Should such an attack occur, it likely will

be spawned in the militancy that grips FAA and contiguous areas in Aghanistan and Pakistan

today. Te principal actors are the aliban, in both countries; their alliesormer Soviet-era mu-

jahideen commanders including Gulbadin Hekmatyar o the Hezbe Islami and the Haqqani group(headed by Jalaluddin and his son Siraj); Sunni militants rom Central and Southern Punjab; and

al Qaeda, which benefits rom links to most o these insurgents. Te aliban leader Mullah Omar

is suspected to be hiding in southwestern Aghanistan and Pakistani Balochistan. Te aliban

are engaged in a struggle against oreign orces inside Aghanistan and now against the military

in Pakistan. Hekmatyar has spoken against the Pakistani government but has not yet taken up

arms against it. Te Haqqanis have also not provoked a battle with the Pakistani orces as yet. Te

Punjabi militants, however, have become ranchisees o al Qaeda and have been linked to attacks

on the Pakistani state and its army.

While many ideas have been put orward or tackling the issues acing FAA, too ofen they

rely on longer-term plans and solutions. Tis report attempts to define the conditions that spawn

militancy and violence among the Pakhtun tribesmen that inhabit FAA and suggest practicableways o approaching them in the short and medium term. Concrete actions by the principal

actorsthe U.S., Aghan and Pakistan governments and the U.S. and Pakistan militariesare sug-

gested. Tese will need to be underpinned by a national debate in Pakistan, in particular, on the

nature o the countrys polity and the need to tackle terrorism and militancy as domestic issues.

But the debate will need to be rooted in a clear consensus among the civil and military leadership

on the nature o the Pakistani state and society and how to tackle the growing militancy inside

the country and in broad-based support rom major political parties and the general public. Te

United States needs to orge a longer-term relationship with Pakistan and its people, shifing rom

a transactional relationship to one built on strategic considerations and respect or Pakistans

political and development needs. Failure to bring peace and to restore a modicum o stability to

FAA will have widespread repercussions or the region and perhaps the world.

executive summary

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vi |

Te geopolitical nexus o Pakistan-FAA-Aghanistan-India must be seen as a regional crisis

that requires a holistic politico-military approach. But suspicions and disinormation about each

others motives, replete with conspiracy theories, have combined to make Pakistan, the Muslim

worlds only nuclear power, the most dangerous place in the world.

Pakistan is ground zero in the U.S.-jihadist war. Te countrys existential crisis is compounded

by the global financial crisis. Now in International Monetary Fund (IMF) receivership, Pakistan

(its 170 million people the second largest-Muslim population afer Indonesia) is now in danger

o becoming a ailing state unless its riends help it financially and with training and advice. Withinflation running 30 percent, grinding poverty, soaring ood prices, and a resurgent aliban on the

home ront, economic collapse would give al Qaeda additional cover against the U.S. war on ter-

ror. Pakistan is too important a state to be allowed to drif or decline.

Pakistans Federally Administered ribal Areas (FAA) that border Aghanistan are at the

heart o the immediate crisis, as they provide sae havens or aliban guerrillas and al Qaeda

terrorists, and have sown the seed o Islamic militancy and terror inside Pakistan proper. Many

Pakistanis are convinced the United States is colluding with India to break up Pakistan, one o the

worlds eight nuclear states. American observers o the South Asian geopolitical landscape have

reportedly detected collusion between the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency) and the aliban

organization as part o a Pakistani desire to have a pro-Pakistani aliban regime in Kabul.Troughout the 1990s, ISI enjoyed a close relationship with the aliban movement that ruled

Aghanistan rom 1996 until overthrown by the U.S. invasion in October 2001. aliban chie Mul-

lah Mohammad Omar gave al Qaedas Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist training camps extrater-

ritorial privileges.

Pakistanis resent the United States recent nuclear deal with India, establishing India as a

counterweight to China, a close ally o Pakistan. Tey also see the United States as assisting Indias

economic activities in Aghanistan to supplant Pakistans influence and encircle Pakistan. Tus,

the July 2008 bombing o the Indian Embassy in Kabul was seen in New Delhi and Washington as

the work o extremists linked to the ISI. Te recent Mumbai terror attacks and the ensuing war o

words between India and Pakistan could well have led to an actual conflict i cooler heads had not

prevailed and riendly nations not intervened. Te permutations o what South Asian players are

doing to each other would be arcical i not so dangerous when taken seriously.

How does one deal with members o Pakistans parliament who asked Gen. David M. McKier-

nan, the commander o U.S. orces in Aghanistan, Why did you Americans come to Aghanistan

when it was so peaceul beore you got there? Many Pakistanis still consider al Qaeda and the

aliban the good guys who launch suicide attacks as punishment or the Pakistani army fighting

an American war. Such views are aired on Pakistani television talk programs, where conspiracy

forewordarnaud de borchgrave

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foreword | vii

theorists also argue that the United States is unding the aliban to tie down the Pakistan Army

while the United States takes over Pakistans nuclear arsenal. Still others maintain Bin Laden is a

figment o American propaganda that provided the pretext or the United States to invade Aghan-

istan and weaken Pakistan.

Te lawless border regions o FAA tend to get lost in the shuffle o conspiracy theories. Yet

FAA is critical to the success o the NAO operation in Aghanistan and the political integrityo Pakistan itsel. As long as FAA gives cover to alibans sae havens, the United States and its

NAO allies are bound to lose ground. Barack Obama has said that a strong, dependable Pakistan

is a prerequisite to success in Aghanistan. Americas new president also avors transerring some

7,500 troops rom Iraq to Aghanistan to reinorce the 32,000 American soldiers there now, or a

country the size o France. An unsecured FAA is tantamount to an unwinnable war.

Te Pakistani army was never a willing partner o the United States against aliban in FAA.

Some $10 billion in U.S. aid or Pakistan since 9/11 lef Islamabad no choice but to move the army

into tribal areas to take on aliban. But the mostly Punjabi army needed interpreters to dialogue

with locals. Tey also took heavy casualties. U.S. unmanned Predators appeared to be more suc-

cessul with good intelligence and missiles aimed at aliban and al Qaeda meetings, always sur-

rounded by women and children, than the Pakistani military. And U.S. air strikes also ueled more

anti-Americanism in Pakistan proper.

Chairman o the Joint Chies o Staff Adm. Michael Mullen says the longtime rif between the

two militaries has deprived both nations o the trust needed to combat terrorism. Teres not a

Pakistani junior officer that doesnt know who ormer Senator Pressler is, he told the Washington

imes, and theres not a junior officer in the U.S. military that knows who Sen. Pressler is. He was

reerring to the 1985 legislation sponsored by ormer Sen. Larry Pressler, a South Dakota Republi-

can, which banned economic and military aid to Pakistan unless the U.S. president certified, on an

annual basis, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device.

Admiral Mullen said he was stunned in early 2008 when he was invited to speak to a group o

30 Pakistani war college students at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. Te majority o the questions

were about the Pressler amendment, which was passed beore most o the students were born.

In October 1990, the Pressler amendment kicked in when President George H.W. Bush (41)

could no longer certiy Pakistans non-nuclear status. U.S. and Pakistani military exchanges came

to a halt during the 1990s. Anti-Americanism in Pakistans officer corps soon took root. More

recently, disagreement with the U.S. invasion o Iraq and the perception that U.S. policy in South

Asia tilts toward India, have not improved matters. Te U.S.-led war against aliban extremists in

Aghanistan and U.S. pressure to fight aliban in FAA have made seamless cooperation arduous

between the two militaries.

In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation o Aghanistan, some 1,300 Pakistanis attended

U.S. war-staff colleges. In the 1990s, the number dropped to 300. And over the past eight years,

it was a paltry 98. Senior Pakistani officials are reluctant to accept U.S. counterterrorism training

or to participate in combined operations. But they have accepted 25 military trainers to advise

selected members o the Frontier Corps, raised rom tribes in FAA, who will then train others

fighting aliban and al Qaeda terrorists.

Te numbers are small and the FAA problem humongous. Outside o the global financial

crisis, it is without question the most urgent problem acing the Obama administration and its

Pakistani counterparts. Hence, this report.

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viii | fataa most dangerous place

o assess the nature o the problem and to offer practicable short- and medium-term solu-

tions, the Center or Strategic and International Studies assembled a team o experts chaired by

Shuja Nawaz, a long-time expert who has been studying the relationship between the Pakistani

army and the countrys polity. Teir views and recommendations are distilled in this monograph

written by Mr. Nawaz.

Arnaud de BorchgraveDirector, ransnational Treats

Center or Strategic and International Studies

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| ix

Te increasing militancy and violence in the border region o Pakistan and Aghanistan and the

very complex skein o realities and perceptions affecting regional and external actors view o the

situation makes it necessary to shed light on the underlying issues in FAA, the Federally Admin-

istered ribal Areas. By the same token, it is important that the national, provincial, and local gov-

ernments and citizens groups, plus the international community, take action sooner rather than

later to address the needs o FAA and contiguous areas in Aghanistan so that the local popula-

tion can be won over and thus help isolate the militants. Tis will require military, socioeconomic,

and political actions and a willingness to move on all ronts.It is likely that the next 9/11 type o attack on the global stage, though not necessarily on the

United States proper, will be hatched rom this region by the oreigners under the guidance o al

Qaeda. Early in 2008, the ormer deputy head o Britains MI6 secret service, Nigel Inkster, named

as public enemy number one pro-aliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, who comes rom South

Waziristan in Pakistan.1It is also widely believed in the West that the al Qaeda leaders Osama

bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are also somewhere in this region or move between FAA and

Aghanistan. Mullah Omar, the Aghan aliban leader, is also believed to be hiding in the region

o southwestern Aghanistan and among sympathetic tribesmen in Balochistan Province. He and

ormer mujahideen commanders rom the anti-Soviet jihad have now declared war on the or-

eign troops inside Aghanistan. Adding to the threat is the presence o the Sunni militant groups

that once were sponsored by the Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence in Kashmir but that nowhave allied with al Qaeda and the Pakistani aliban to attack the state. FAA truly is a dangerous

place today not only or the region but also or the world. Failure to change the current downward

trajectory in FAA will have serious costs or Pakistan and its society and adversely affect Aghani-

stans attempts to craf a stable national entity, making FAA an even more dangerous place or the

region and the world.

Although the major responsibility or action rests with Pakistan, it is imperative that the new

United States administration understands the gravity o the situation and the importance o help-

ing Pakistan and Aghanistan to win back and empower the people o FAA and the bordering

Aghan provinces. Tis can be possible only with a concerted and concentrated effort to improve

their lives and thus help them resist successully the inroads o militancy, religious extremism, andglobal terrorism that have made a home in that area and are spreading into the settled areas o the

North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Tere is no simple or elegant solution to these problems that are rooted in history and the

powerul local tribal culture. Nor is there any single approach that can be uniormly applied across

1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7244817.stm, accessed October 26, 2008.

preface

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x | fataa most dangerous place

the region. Rather, both national governments and international actors, especially the United

States with its huge military, economic, and political ootprint in the region, will need to take into

account the special circumstances o each o the seven agencies o FAA and contiguous areas in

Pakistan and Aghanistan to come up with measures that will help the people o the region im-

prove their lives and thus help create a stable polity and growing economy.

CSIS through its Office o ransnational Treats Projects under Director Arnaud de Borch-grave undertook a study to examine the situation in FAA and come up with some practicable

measures that could be taken in the near term (12 years) and medium-term (35 years) and that

could lay the ground or longer-term development and security in the region. A team led by Shuja

Nawaz, and comprising Ayesha Jalal (ufs University), Mariam Abou Zahab (Sciences Po, Paris),

Joshua . White (Johns Hopkins SAIS), Kimberly Marten (Barnard College), and Azhar Hussain

(International Center or Religion and Development), undertook to examine the situation and

come up with potential solutions. Khalid Aziz, an independent analyst in Peshawar and ormer

chie secretary o the NWFP, provided much material and useul commentary. Shuja Nawaz

supplemented the work o the team by a visit to Pakistan that included meetings with civil and

military officials, leading experts on FAA, U.S. embassy and aid officials, tribal maliks, and local

news media in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar, North Waziristan, and Malakand/Swat. JoshuaWhite also visited Pakistan in the late summer o 2008 and provided resh insights rom the field.

Te team met a number o times to pool its efforts and discuss its findings. Arnaud de Borchgrave

supervised the analytical effort to identiy and ocus on the major issues and answers.

Te team recognizes that a number o other studies were produced on the region in the U.S.

election season. We note the particular contribution o the report on FAA rom the Council

on Foreign Relations by Daniel Markey, the report by the Pakistan Studies Working Group in

Washington, D.C., and the report rom the Center or American Progress, among others. Rather

than take a long historical or 60,000-oot view o the situation, this study attempts to produce a

granular view o the situation on the ground in FAA and o U.S.-Pakistan relations relating to the

region and Aghanistan. And, rather than enumerating all the ideal changes that the team wouldwant to see, this report offers suggestions or immediate and practicable measures as the basis or

medium- and longer-term steps that can help change the socioeconomic and political landscape

o the region so that it can be transormed rom a dangerous place on the map to one o relative

peace and stability.

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| xi

We wish to acknowledge the help o Debbie Stroman o CSIS in the work o the team and in put-

ting together the basic draf and o Roberta Fauriol o CSIS or her editorial work and or shep-

herding the production o this report. We also wish to acknowledge the help given to us by numer-

ous others in collecting inormation and providing both analysis o the situation on the ground

and logistic support. We wish to thank officials o the government o Pakistan, especially Governor

Owais Ghani o the North-West Frontier Province; the staff o the FAA Secretariat in Peshawar;

and National Security Advisor Maj. Gen. Mahmud Ali Durrani (retired). We wish to thank senior

officials o the Pakistan Army at its General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and in the field, includingArmy Chie General Ashaq Parvez Kayani; then Director General Military Operations and now

Director General Inter-Services Intelligence Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha; Corps Commander XI

Corps, Peshawar, Lt. Gen. Masood Aslam; Director General Inter-Services Public Relations Di-

rectorate Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas and his colleagues; and other senior Army officers. We thank the

staff o the United States Embassy in Pakistan, the U.S. Agency or International Development, and

the Office o ransition Initiatives; Maj. Gen. Syed Ali Hamid (retired); independent analysts and

journalists Rahimullah Yusuzai, Iqbal Khattak, and Imtiaz Gul; and 23 tribal maliks o North Wa-

ziristan who shared their views on their basic needs. We also wish to recognize with deep thanks

the incisive commentary and useul suggestions o CSIS Burke Chair Anthony H. Cordesman on

an earlier draf o this paper. As is customary, none o these persons bears any responsibility or

this report.

Acknowledgments

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xii |

acronyms andabbreviations

ANA Aghan National Army

ANP Awami National Party

BCCs Border Coordination Centers

CAOs civil affairs officers

CENCOM U.S. Central Command

CERF Commanders Emergency Response Funds (CENCOM)

COIN counterinsurgency

FAA Federally Administered ribal AreasFC Frontier Corps

FCR Federal Crimes Regulations

FR Frontier Region

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)

JUI Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam

LIC low-intensity conflict

MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

MNA member o the National AssemblyNWA North Waziristan Agency

NWFP North-West Frontier Province

OI Office o ransition Initiatives (USAID)

PA political agent

PAA provincially administered tribal areas

PML-N Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz Shari

PPP Pakistan Peoples Party

ROZs Reconstruction Opportunity Zones

Rs. Pakistani rupees

SOFA status o orces agreementSWA South Waziristan Agency

NSM ehreeke-Niaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammedi

P ehreek-e-aliban-e-Pakistan

UAVs unmanned aerial vehicles

USAID United States Agency or International Development

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|1

1

I Pakistan loses the fight against militancy in FAA, it may ace a regional political disaster with

global repercussions. It is imperative, thereore, that Pakistan and its allies, especially the United

States, understand the nature and causes o the conflict raging there.

FAA, a territory covering some 27,500 square kilometers perched on the border between

Pakistans North-West Frontier Province and southern Aghanistan and home to over 3.5 million

Pashtun (also Pakhtun1) tribesmen and some 1.5 million reugees rom Aghanistan, continues to

be the center o global attention in the wake o the United States invasion o Aghanistan in 2001.

In recent years, FAA has become a bone o contention between the United States and Pakistan, asU.S. incursions into FAA have produced a war o words and even direct conrontations between

U.S. and Pakistani orces on the border. FAA is also considered home to many al Qaeda opera-

tives, especially the numerous oreigners rom the Arab world, Central Asia, Muslim areas o the

Far East, and even Europe who flock to this war zone or training, indoctrination, and sometimes

respite rom repression at home.

FAA rests in the middle o a tough neighborhood that extends in the southwest into Bal-

ochistan, a region o deep-seated political dissent against the central government o Pakistan rom

Baloch tribes that have requently gone to battle against the Pakistan Army. Teir insurgencies

over time have shaken and continue to threaten the political stability o Pakistan. Te Pashtun

area o Balochistan is also home to some Aghan aliban who took reuge among ellow tribes-men inside Pakistan. It and FAA proper also serve as a base or attacks against oreign orces in

southwestern Aghanistan.

But FAA is only one part o a broader set o challenges that ace Pakistan today as it struggles

to find its eet as a democracy again afer eight years o autocratic rule. Te country is struggling to

define its ederalism and to concede powers to the ederating provinces. But a history o autocratic,

central rule (both civilian and military) rom Islamabad remains a major stumbling block. Paki-

stan also aces a gigantic economic crisis, ueled among other things by global inflation and rises

in the price o oil and ood that, i they produce hyperinflation, would seriously threaten Pakistani

society. An economic meltdown may pose a more immediate danger than even the simmering and

sometimes horrific bursts o terrorism and militancy that afflict Pakistans northwest and parts o

the hinterland. o meet these existential threats, the new Pakistani government will need to createa national consensus on all ronts and will need the support o its riends rom abroad.

Te seven agencies that constitute FAA and come under the control o the president o

Pakistan through the governor o the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are, rom north to

south, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan (see

Map 1, Federally Administered ribal Areas.) All except Orakzai share a border with Aghanistan

1. Both pronunciations are correct, Pakhtunbeing avored by northerners and Pashtunby southerners.

a most dangerous place

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2 | fataa most dangerous place

and each has a dominant tribe or tribal group and economic base and physical characteristics that

distinguish it rom the others. Immediately to the east o FAA in the settled area o the NWFP

are six contiguous Frontier Regions that also come under the control o the governor but areadministered on a daily basis by provincial representatives: FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR ank, FR

Bannu, FR Lakki, and FR Dera Ismail Khan. Abutting FAA and the NWFP to the north and west

in Aghanistan is a string o nine provinces (rom north to south: Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar,

Khost, Paktika, Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz), most o which are inhabited by Pash-

tuns. (Nuristan, Kunar, and Nimruz have other tribal groups also present, but the ethos is largely

Pashtun). Immediately beyond these nine are the heavily Pashtun provinces o Paktia and Logar.

Some 15 million Pashtuns inhabit Aghanistan while about 25 million inhabit Pakistan, o

which FAA is an important part because it contains tribes that straddle the Durand Line, the

disputed border between British India and then Pakistan and Aghanistan. (See able 1, Popula-

tion o FAA. See also Map 2, Ethnic Groups o Pakistan and Map 3, Ancient ribal Boundaries,

showing Pashtun areas o Aghanistan and Pakistan and overlapping tribal boundaries). Pashtuns

represent some 42 per cent o the population o Aghanistan, by ar the largest single ethnic group.

O the Pashtun population in Pakistan, about 3 million live in its largest city, Karachi. Interestingly,

roughly hal the population o FAA temporarily lives outside the territory as migrant labor or as

displaced persons, another potential source o instability.2

2. Mariam Abou Zahab (see About the Authors at the end o this report).

Table 1. Population of FATA (1998)

Agency/FR Area (sq km)Population

(total)

Populationdensity (personsper sq km)

Annual growthrate, 19811998(in percent)

FATA 27,220 3,176,331 117 2.19

Bajaur 1,290 595,227 461 4.33

Khyber 2,576 546,730 212 3.92

Kurram 3,380 448,310 133 2.50

Mohmand 2,296 334,453 146 4.28

North Waziristan 4,707 361,246 77 2.46

Orakzai 1,538 225,441 147 - 2.69

South Waziristan 6,620 429,841 65 1.95

FR Bannu 745 19,593 26 - 6.65

FR Dera Ismail Khan 2,008 38,990 19 - 2.09

FR Kohat 446 88,456 198 2.59

FR Lakki 132 6,987 53 - 4.81

FR Peshawar 261 53,841 206 2.22

FR Tank 1,221 27,216 22 -0.61

Source: Khalid Aziz, FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006-2015,FATA Secretariat, 2006.

Note: The average annual population growth for FATA is slightly lower than the provincial average of 2.8 percent and the

national average of 2.7 percent. The average household in FATA consists of 9.3 persons, compared to 8 persons in the

NWFP and 6.8 persons in the country as a whole. FR = Frontier Region

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a most dangerous place: fata explained | 3

Map 1. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Inset shows FATA in the context of Pakistan and neighboring countries.

Source: With permission, Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad, Pakistan; adapted for this report by

Robert L. Wiser.

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Map 2. Ethnic Groups of Pakistan

Mixed groups are indicated by alternating tones; only selected internal administration shown. Names and boundary

representation are not necessarily authoritative.

Source: Khyber Gateway (http://www.Khyber.org); adapted for this report by Robert L. Wiser.

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Map 3. Ancient Tribal Boundaries

Source: Tribal Locations of the Pathans, Khyber Gateway (http://www.Khyber.org); adapted for this report by Robert L,

Wiser.

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While the Aghan government has not chosen to see it as such, the dominant element in the

insurgency and now increasingly civil war taking place inside that country is Pashtun. Te ousted

aliban leaders have chosen to portray themselves as representatives o the Pashtuns, fighting

to take back their country rom an occupying orce o the United States and other oreigners

and against, in their view, an unrepresentative government in Kabul that is dominated by non-

Pashtuns. Whether this is a valid basis or their actions or not, it has been used to strengthen

perceptions among the Aghan population and those inside FAA that the Pashtuns, who have

been traditionally rulers o Aghanistan, have been displaced by orce. Te aliban leaders use this

perception as a uel or recruitment and or garnering support in the Pashtun territories inside

Aghanistan and across the border in FAA. As a result, the aliban have allied themselves with

various disaffected groups headed by ormer mujahideen commanders that operate in different re-

gions o Aghanistan and FAA against oreign orces inside Aghanistan. Te Aghan government

views the aliban and its allies as renegades that are trying to regain power and that survive largely

because o sae havens across the border in Pakistan, specifically in FAA. In July 2008 Aghan-

istan lashed out at neighboring Pakistan . . . , alleging that its intelligence service and army are

behind the bloody aliban-led insurgency, calling the security orces the worlds biggest producers

o terrorism and extremism.3

Te discord between these neighbors runs deep into history.4

Pakistan has seen itsel as a scapegoat or the ailure o the U.S. invasion o Aghanistan to

eliminate the aliban. On its part, it sees Aghan involvement in FAA unrest. Reerence is made

to the Aghan Mullah Dadullah, the so-called ather o suicide bombings in Pakistan, who was a

militant leader in South Waziristan until his death in a Predator attack, and Qari Ziaur Rehman o

the Aghan Kunar province who heads the militancy in Bajaur. Pakistans support or the Aghan

aliban may have waned afer its own Operation Zalzilla (earthquake) in South Waziristan that

ended in 2008.

As described by Shahid Javed Burki, the

Pashtun belt that Aghanistan and Pakistan share presents a unique problem to the interna-

tional community. It straddles a difficult, inhospitable, extremely underdeveloped terrain. Itis inhabited by people who have preerred to be guided by a tribal code o behavior [Pash-

tunwali] rather than by laws made by modern states or modern times. o this code that has

existed even beore Islam entered the area, they have added some aspects o the Islamic law,

Sharia. Te combination o these two codes has produced a way o lie that has been practiced

or centuries. Among its many eatures the strongest are an abhorrence to accept outside inter-

erence in internal affairs, an equal amount o reluctance to be governed by a central authority

that operates rom a distant place, and confidence in the ability o local leaders to provide pro-

tection to their communities and to provide an environment in which they can live according

to their own laws and practices.5

Te tribes operate through their maliks,or influentials, some determined by the tribes them-

selves and others official maliks who are selected or avors by the political agent (PA) o each

agency, the official who represents the government and who, along with the maliks, is responsible

or local governance. Te PA provides stipends to maliks in line with their perceived status in

the governments eyes. Te number o maliks varies rom agency to agency inside FAA. North

3. Associated Press, July 14, 2008.4. See Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique Resolving the Aghanistan-Pakistan Stalemate, Unit-

ed States Institute o Peace, Special Report. October 2006.5. Shahid Javed Burki, How to Develop the Aghan-Pak ribal Belts? unpublished paper.

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Waziristan, or example, has some 1,600 maliks. (More than 600 tribal maliks in FAA have been

assassinated by the militants.)

Pashtun society has changed over the years with greater interaction between inhabitants o

FAA and other parts o Pakistan and the Middle East, largely through migration o laborers and

provision o transport services inside Pakistan proper. Yet, elements o these old traditions con-

tinue to hold sway over portions o FAA.

Most o the aliban leadership o Aghanistan and ollowers o at least two major mujahideen

commanders6 o the Aghan war against Soviet occupation during the 1980s are believed to have

taken reuge in FAA among their ellow tribesmen, where they continue to prosecute their war

against the United States and the new Aghan government. In the past, the Aghan aliban notice-

ably avoided getting into direct battle with their Pakistani hosts in the southern part o FAA, and

the Pakistan Army appears to have returned the avor. But that is now changing. In the north, in

Bajaur in particular, there is clear evidence o Aghan leadership o some o the aliban insurgen-

cy. And, increasingly, it is becoming difficult to differentiate between the Aghan aliban and the

local variety. In addition, elements o al Qaeda, the global terrorist conglomerate, continue to use

FAA as a base and training ground or al Qaeda and its ranchisees, including the extreme right-

wing Sunni extremist groups rom Central and Southern Punjab inside the Pakistani hinterland.

Tere is some empathy or al Qaeda in FAA in general and among the aliban. Tere are also

reports that the aliban and al Qaeda have ormed an effective military alliance o convenience.

U.S. military sources point to the presence o Uzbeks, Arabs, and other oreigners in recent at-

tacks inside Aghanistan.7

Adding to the witches brew o terror and militancy in FAA is the emergence o a homegrown

ehreek-e-aliban-e-Pakistan (P) under a renegade leader rom South Waziristan named

Baitullah Mehsud. Mehsud is orming a regional alliance across the region and hooking up with

Sunni extremist militants in the settled areas o the NWFP, or example Dir, Malakand, and Swat.

He has also established links to the Aghan aliban o Mullah Umar. Te Ps avowed aim is to

establish a religious state in Pakistan based on its own interpretation o Islamic jurisprudence (Sh-aria) but more closely linked to tribal custom or rivaaj. Te P and its affiliates have taken the

battle against the Pakistani state into the hinterland and are widely believed to have been behind

some o the more spectacular and horrific attacks inside Pakistan proper, including the assassina-

tion o ormer prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 in Rawalpindi and the bombing

o the Marriott Hotel in September 2008 in Islamabad.

Why FATA Is the Way It IsOne o the poorest and most disenranchised regions o Pakistan, FAA has become a breeding

ground o militancy and discontent and poses a serious threat to both Aghanistan and Pakistan.

Almost all the socioeconomic indicators o FAA (health, access to doctors and health acili-

ties, education, etc.) are nearly hal those o Pakistan as a whole and much below the levels o the

6. Jalaluddin Haqqani, ormerly o the Maulvi Khalis group within the Hizb-e-Islami and then a mem-ber o the aliban government, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar o the eponymous group o the Hizb-e-Islami.Haqqani has ties to North Waziristan. Hekmatyar does not have a permanent base.

7. Briefing at the Newseum, Washington, D.C., by Gen. David McKiernan, Commander, NAO Inter-national Security Force in Aghanistan, October 1, 2008;Washington Post, October 2, 2008.

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NWFP. (See able 2, Selected Development Indicators.) FAA has suffered rom lack o proactive

and participatory governance mechanisms and has been subject to an anachronistic, top-down ad-

ministrative system that served the colonial British power but is not suitable or a modern society.

Because o these conditions and general neglect by successive central governments in developing

the economies and polity o the region, it will continue to provide a avorable environment or ter-

rorism and militancy. Tis will create a contagion effect spreading into the heartland o Pakistan i

the underlying conditions that spawn violence and provide a haven or the Aghan aliban and al

Qaeda are not addressed urgently.

Yet FAA remains one o the more misunderstood areas o the region despite its crucial loca-tion and key role in the current wars within Aghanistan and now Pakistan. Seven years afer

the U.S. invasion o Aghanistan and the removal o the aliban regime and dislocation o the al

Qaeda leadership into the border regions o Aghanistan and Pakistan, the war against terror and

militancy in this region appears to be more o a game o blind mans bluff than a well planned po-

litico-military campaign in an area and a situation marked by layers o complexity. A major reason

or this is the absence o involvement by the people o FAA in plans or their own development or

political participation. Most plans are being made or them, ofen rom aar.

FAA has had very limited participation in the political system o Pakistan. Until 1997, its rep-

resentatives in the National Assembly (and briefly in the provincial assembly when West Pakistan

had a single assembly) were selected by the tribal maliks. In 1997 universal ranchise was extended

to FAA. But it could only send representatives to the ederal legislature. oday it has 12 members

o the National Assembly and 8 senators. But there is no representation to the provincial assembly

o the NWFP because FAA, unlike the contiguous provincially administered tribal areas (PAA),

does not come under the government o the province. Te Pakistan Political Parties Act does not

apply to FAA and officially political parties cannot operate or campaign inside its boundaries

(although their flags can be seen flying on many houses in FAA). Tis has given a ree field o

operation to the religious groups, affiliated with various political parties in Pakistan, who use the

Table 2. Selected Development Indicators for Pakistan, the NWFP, and FATA (2003)

Indicator Pakistan NWFP FATA

Literacy ratio (both sexes, in percent) 43.92 35.41 17.42

Male literacy ratio 54.81 51.39 29.51

Female literacy ratio 32.02 18.82 3.00

Population per doctor 1,226 4,916 7,670

Population per bed in health institutions 1,341 1,594 2,179

Roads (per sq km) 0.26 0.13 0.17

Source: Imtiaz Sahibzada, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Tribal Areas, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Strengthening

and Rationalization of Administration) Draft Report 2006, Islamabad, April 2006, pp. 6365.

Note: Literacy rates according to 1998 census; all other figures for 2003. NWFP = North-West Frontier Province.

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Friday prayers, among other things, to spread their word and garner support. Paradoxically, the

state o Pakistan has not only used FAA as a buffer zone between itsel and Aghanistan but also

employed its tribesmen as a reserve orce that has been deployed or insurgency operations in

Indian-held Kashmir. raditionally, FAA political representatives tended to side with whatever

government was in power in Pakistan. But the lack o political participation has also created a

sense o deprivation o rights and alienation rom Pakistan proper. Te intrusion o religion-based

politics in the region has changed the situation now and the state can no longer rely on blind sup-

port rom FAA representatives. Te militants use their own interpretation o Islam as a binding

and legitimizing orce or their activities against the state.

The Rising MilitancyTe balance has been swinging in avor o the militants and terrorists inside both Aghanistan

and Pakistan. Aghanistan is now acing a dramatic change rom insurgency to civil war, with the

NAO- and U.S.-supported government losing control o larger swathes o territory. 8Pakistan too

has lost its ability to manage FAA to its ends as it did in the past and is fighting desperately to

regain control even over parts o the NWFP where home-grown militancy has created a parallelgovernment o terror. In 2002 the regime o President and Chie o Army Staff Pervez Musharra

moved the regular Pakistan Army into FAA or the first time since the army was withdrawn afer

independence in 1947. oday there are the equivalent o six inantry divisions in the area, with

a combined military orce o some 120,000 made up o members o the Pakistan Army and the

Frontier Corps (FC), a ederal paramilitary orce recruited mostly rom the tribal areas. Te move-

ment o the military into FAA severely compromised the writ o the political agents, who are

responsible or handling the tribes in the seven agencies and six FRs. Te diplomatic manipulation

that a political agent uses was replaced by a supra authority that damaged the political command

and control system. Pakistan lost control, which was replaced by management through coercion.

But it did not work and caused the fire o militancy to spread not only inside FAA but also into

the settled districts o the NWFP.

Adding to the explosive mixture has been the presence o sectarian violence in FAA, specifi-

cally in the Parachinar area o the Kurram Agency, where a proxy war was waged or many years

between Iranian and Saudi-supported Shia and Sunni orces. Te conflict now is locally supported.

Te injection o Punjabi Sunni militants into the area has urther worsened the situation, as have

the links between those elements and al Qaeda. Tese Sunni militants rom the Punjab were once

the chosen vanguard o the officially trained and sponsored groups that Pakistans Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) directorate used to prime the pump o Muslim unrest in Indian-held Kashmir

and thus to stoke the fires o resistance and conflict against Indian rule in that disputed territory.

Tat patron-client relationship continued well into the regime o President Musharra but o late

has been severed, with evidence emerging that these groups have been implicated in attacks oneven the Pakistan Army itsel inside Pakistan proper. A global dimension to this volatile situation

has emerged rom the al Qaeda connection, with FAA now serving as a magnet or disaffected

social and political rebels rom Western societies (some British o Pakistani origin and some Ger-

mans) and escapees rom the repressive regimes o Central Asia that have made FAA their home

or training under the aegis o al Qaeda as well as or rest and recuperation rom struggles inside

8. See, or instance, Anthony Cordesmans report Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? Te Rising Treat,CSIS, Washington, D.C., September 18, 2008.

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their own countries. Te Aghan aliban and the P have concentrated their actions against the

U.S. orces in Aghanistan or the Pakistan Army and civilian targets respectively.

Te United States and its coalition partners in Aghanistan under NAO via the United

Nations-mandated ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Aghanistan) have been fight-

ing on the military and economic ront to help rebuild war-torn Aghanistan since 2001. Roughly

70,000 oreign troops are currently deployed, but not all are involved in military operations.Almost all the fighting against the aliban is being done by the United States, Britain, Netherlands,

and Canada. Te rest o the orces have been operating under some 70 caveats imposed by their

parliaments or governments against aggressive military operations. Te United States shifed its

ocus rom Aghanistan to Iraq soon afer the invasion o Aghanistan in 2001 in the quest to rid

Iraq o Saddam Hussein and eliminate the potential threat o suspected weapons o mass destruc-

tion. Tis move created despondency in the region, especially in Pakistan, which saw this move

as a reprise o the U.S. withdrawal rom the region ollowing the 1989 retreat rom Aghanistan

o the Soviet 40th Army under Gen. Boris Gromov, leaving behind a messy civil war that affected

Pakistans border regions as well and drew its intelligence service into action on behal o avored

surrogates inside Aghanistan.

Basic Perceptions and RealitiesCertain basic perceptions and realities emerge rom the experience o the United States in Aghan-

istan afer 2001 and Pakistans oray into FAA:

Te United States went into Aghanistan without a comprehensive plan or winning the war

beyond the military ouster o the aliban (evidenced by its shif o ocus to Iraq), or or the

socioeconomic rehabilitation o the country afer decades o war.

Te United States ailed to see the proactive need to help Pakistan transorm its own army and

Frontier Corps into a counterinsurgency orce or help equip and train them or that purpose; Ithas been in reactive mode ever since 2001.

Aghanistan has shown no willingness to address the grievances o the aliban against the

excesses o the Northern Alliance orces in the wake o the U.S. invasion. Tis keeps the anger

o the aliban and their Pashtun supporters alive.

Te United States cannot win the war in Aghanistan without the ull and willing participation

and support o Pakistan, its army, and the general population, especially with a new civilian

administration in place. It certainly cannot win by aligning itsel to any one Pakistani leader,

political or military, as evident in the past reliance on President and General Pervez Musharra.

Te United States depends or more than 80 percent o cargo and 40 percent o its uel in

Aghanistan on transit shipments via Pakistan9; Uzbekistan has expelled the United States; andRussia has the ability to block overflights to reach urkmenistan or ajikistan and then into

Aghanistan. Te only other relatively shorter land route is via Iran rom Chahbahar on the

Arabian Sea. But U.S. hostility toward Iran makes that an impossible alternative. Tis severely

limits the United States options in taking military action inside Pakistan that could provoke a

backlash, including the closure o this supply route into Aghanistan.

9. U.S. Secretary o Deense Robert Gates, UPI.com, September 23, 2008.

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Pakistan, its army, and the ISI have maintained an ambivalent position regarding the Aghan

aliban, based on the twin supposition that the United States would exit the region yet again,

perhaps afer capturing or killing some key al Qaeda leaders, and that the Pashtun aliban

would return to power in Kabul. Tey would rather have a neutral or riendly Pashtun govern-

ment in power, even i it is the aliban.

On its part, Aghanistan ears a Pakistani desire to maintain control over Aghanistan because

o its land-locked status and as a client state.

Another powerul and persistent perception inside Pakistan is that rival India has chosen to

develop civil and military ties with Aghanistan and even to uel militancy inside Pakistan in

retaliation or past (and perhaps current) Pakistani support or militants in Indian-held Kash-

mir. Many Pakistanis see a conspiracy to encircle and weaken Pakistan in the region.

Yet neither conrontation nor capitulation by Pakistan to U.S. interests in Aghanistan and

FAA is the right approach. Rather, engagement and a joint effort to eliminate the militancies

inside Aghanistan and Pakistan is the best approach.

Te Pakistan Army is seen as an alien orce inside FAA. Te Frontier Corps has lost its effi- cacy over the years. Both the army and the FC are ill-equipped and ill-trained or counterinsur-

gency (COIN) warare. Compounding their difficulty is the act that they are operating inside

their own borders against their own people.

Te traditional system o governance inside FAA involving the governments political agents

interacting with largely compliant tribal maliks, who are on the official payroll, has been sup-

planted by a reer system under which renegade leaders have emerged and the religious leaders

have taken on greater import. Te old system cannot be restored in its entirety nor or the long

run.

No plan or FAA will work unless it involves the local people and they are given a responsible

role in its implementation. However, all efforts will need to be made to ensure that the tradi-

tional leakage o unds or resources to the privileged ew is prevented or reduced and that

there is equitable sharing o opportunities and finances.

Pakistans Role and ConcernsTe United States and its NAO allies have been pressing Pakistan to do more to stop the Aghan

aliban and al Qaeda rom seeking sanctuary in FAA and the northern reaches o the NWFP a-

ter the U.S. invasion o Aghanistan in 2001. o sweeten the incentive, the United States since 2001

has provided more than $10 billion subvention to Pakistan to offset the cost o moving troops

into the region. (Te Pakistan Army now maintains that most o these financial flows did not, in

act, go to the army but were absorbed by the Ministry o Finance during the regime o GeneralMusharra or budgetary or balance o payments support. Te army calculates that it received no

more than $300 million o U.S. Coalition Support Funds in 2008.10) Te United states has also o-

ered to help Pakistan retain and re-equip the Frontier Corps and even the regular army. Pakistan

undertook to train the FC first. And agreement was reached among Pakistan, Aghanistan, and the

United States to set up coordination mechanisms. But the United States suspects and alleges that

10. Interviews by Shuja Nawaz with senior Pakistan Army officials.

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Pakistan has not done enough because it continues to support the Aghan aliban or elements o

the ISI continue to look the other way, i not actually assist these aliban in their missions in-

side Aghanistan. Following growing attacks in Aghanistan, the United States moved to send in

drones to attack selected targets inside FAA and on September 12, 2008, launched an incursion

with Special Forces that landed helicopters near Angoor Adda in North Waziristan and attacked

a suspected militant hideout inside Pakistani territory. Immediately, Pakistan stopped the passage

o supplies to the United States and NAO via the Khyber Pass, ostensibly or security reasons and

nonpayment o tolls. But the point was made, and U.S. troop movement into Pakistan stopped or

the time being. A perception emerged inside Pakistan that the United States wished Pakistan to

fight militancy on the border to aid U.S. efforts in Aghanistan. In other words, Pakistan was being

orced to fight Americas war.

Adding to this is an abiding ear in Pakistan is that the United States will vacate Aghanistan

again beore the country is stabilized politically and economically and Pakistan will have to bear

the brunt o the costly and bloody blowback o that move. In many ways that blowback rom the

U.S. invasion o Aghanistan has already started with the rise o alibanization inside Pakistan and

the terrorists taking the battle to the heart o Pakistans capital, Islamabad, and even targeting the

armys sof targets in different cantonments or military reservations.

Compounding the difficulty o Pakistan in collaborating with the U.S. and other oreign orces

inside Aghanistan is the long-standing dispute o the Aghan government with the Durand Line,

which it sees as an artificially imposed border by the British11. Without recognition o the Durand

Line as the border, Pakistan-Aghanistan collaboration cannot take place as effectively as it could

i the border were officially sanctioned and could serve as the basis o collaborative efforts to seal it

rom both sides.12Currently some 1,000 border posts on Pakistans side attempt to monitor move-

ment across this difficult and porous border. Pakistani military sources maintain that only 84 co-

alition and Aghan National Army border posts exist on the Aghan side. Te tribes that straddle

the border do not recognize the border as anything more than a bureaucratic hindrance to their

movements or amily and tribal unctions and relationships. Indeed, the so-called reugees romthe Aghan-Soviet War, some 1.5 million o whom still reside on the Pakistan side o the Durand

Line, resent being called reugees, as they believe they are living in their own vatanor homeland.

As mentioned above by Burki, Aghans historically tend to coalesce against any oreign occu-

pying orce. Tough divided into strong ethnic regions and tribes and subtribes to whom Aghans

show strong allegiance, Aghanistan is one o the ew countries in the region with a strong sense

o territorial unity resulting rom a historically autonomous provincial system o government

with a weak central authority, having been a conjoined political entity or almost 200 years. Beore

11. Te history o the Durand Line that was set in 1893 is ofen orgotten in the current contretempsbetween Aghanistan and Pakistan about this boundary. Indeed, the Aghan ruler or amir, Abdur Rehman

Khan, invited the British to help demarcate the border, leading to Sir Mortimer Durands expedition underorders rom the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne. Aghan clerics opposed their amirs decision, and he too realizedhe would lose large areas o his tribal territory: Chagi, oba Achakzai, Kakar Khorasan, Waziristan, Kurram,irah, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Chitral. Te survey o the border began in 1894 and lasted two years.Te Mohmands reused to allow the actual survey work to be conducted because the proposed line wouldhave cut their tribe in hal, leaving the boundary in that agency between Shilman and Nawa unmarked tothis day. (Details courtesy o a background note prepared by the late Lt. Col. M. Yahya Effendi (ret.).)

12. A ormal border would allow the setting up o officially sanctioned border crossing points andeliminate the current ree movement across the border. Anyone not using a ormal crossing point could thenbe easily targeted as a militant.

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the arrival o the aliban as an Islamist orce that wanted to meld the different tribes into a single

religious agglomeration, Aghanistan worked as a nation through a national compact or meesak-e-

millithat recognized the pluralistic nature o the country and ceded the central role o government

in Kabul to a ruler rom the Durrani tribe.13

Understanding FATA Society and DynamicsWhile it is tempting to consider FAA as a single entity, it would be a mistake to do so. Each o

the seven agencies within FAA has its special tribal, geographic, socioeconomic, and religious

characteristics and these affect the level and nature o the militancy in each. (See able 3, FAA

Agencies and ribes.) And FAA as a whole, as was shown in able 2, is on a much lower level

o socioeconomic development than the rest o Pakistan, even the North-West Frontier Province.

Most o the agencies contain a dominant tribe, with well- defined subtribes and clans that demand

primary and absolute loyalty. While recent developments have created fissures in these tribal

structures, with religious leaders and transregional leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud emerging

in FAA, tradition continues to play a part in individual and group decisionmaking. In religious

terms alone, there is a loose definition o Islamic traditions mixed with tribal customs ofen domi-

nated by interpretations by local mullahs, or religious leaders, who themselves belong to different

sects or subsects o Islam. Predominantly Sunni, the inhabitants o FAA are urther split among

the Deobandi and Barelvi schools o jurisprudence. A small but powerul Shia minority in the Par-

rots Beak area o Parachinar in the Kurram Agency has been the target o Sunni attacks, addinganother layer o complexity to the troubles in the region.

Shia-Sunni conflict has produced more than 1,500 deaths in the Kurram Agency,14with

the Shia coming under attack rom the Sunni locals aided by Punjabi militants belonging to the

13. Interestingly, even Aghan president Hamid Karzai belongs to a subtribe o the Durrani. Elementso this tribe have held leadership positions in Pakistan as well.

14. 1,500 killed and 500 injured. As reported by News International, October 9, 2008,http://www.thenews.com.pk/.

Table 3. FATA Agencies and Tribes

Agency Major Tribe Nature of Trouble

Bajaur Tarkani, Utmankhel Militancy

North Waziristan Utmanzai Wazir, Daur Militancy and tribal conflict

South Waziristan Ahmedzai Wazir, Mehsud Militancy

Khyber Afridi, Shinwari Militancy

Kurram Toori, Bangash Sectarian

Mohmand Mohmand, Safi Militancy and tribal conflict

Orakzai Orakzai Tribal conflict

Source: Adapted, with permission, from Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

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Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and other extremist groups once trained by the ISI or war in

Kashmir, as well as the aliban rom South Waziristan. Tis conflict has its roots in history, going

back to the creation o the Durand Line between Aghanistan and British India. Currently some 40

percent o the 500,000 inhabitants o Kurram are Shia belonging to the uri tribe. Te dominant

Sunni tribes are Mangal and Bangash. Over time, the influx o Aghan reugees during the Soviet

invasion tilted the balance in avor o the Sunnis. Although the Shia initially aided the Pakistan

Army in tracking down the aliban and al Qaeda escapees rom ora Bora in Aghanistan, dur-

ing the more recent sectarian clashes, the government orces have not intervened on their behal,

blaming the violence on mysterious oreign hands. Te Sunnis termed the Shia traitors and

agents o the United States and the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan Army and made them the target

o horrific attacks and punishment. Tese included beheadings that were videotaped, with DVDs

o those actions distributed widely to spread terror among the population o the region. Frustrated

in their inability to get help rom the authorities, the Shia have turned to Aghanistan or succor,

relying on Aghanistan as an escape route and also as a supply route or ood and other essentials

that cannot reach them through the Kurram Agency.

Role of the Mullahsraditionally in Pashtun areas, tribal mullahs or clerics did not have a lot o political author-

ity. Tey ofen sat outside the circle at a tribal gathering orjirgaand were asked only to lead the

prayers or success o whatever course o action was decided by the maliks15or elders at each

meeting. I a tribal area was threatened by outside invasion, mullahs might be called on to rally the

tribesmen and lead a jihad in response. But or the most part, the mullahs were impoverished and

illiterate, and they depended on the maliks to provide them with both income and security (or

example, by protecting their mosques rom raiders). Te mullahs did not have an independent

political voice.

Tis changed radically starting in 1979. At that time, Pakistani leaders eared that two out-side influences could challenge state security: growing extremist Shiite influence in the region

that resulted rom Ayatollah Khomeinis revolution in neighboring Iran, and the large presence o

Soviet orces in Aghanistan afer December 1979. Pakistan eared that the Soviets might rekindle

the Pashtunistan idea o a separate homeland or the Pashtuns o Aghanistan and Pakistan and

prepare the ground or territorial control and access to the warm waters o the Arabian Sea and

Indian Ocean. As a result, Pakistan poured state and private money and armaments into a variety

o largely Sunni mujahideen movements. Iran supported the Shia mujahideen on the Western

border o Aghanistan. Soon Pakistans efforts were supported by huge influxes o money rom

Saudi Arabia and the United States; eventually $6$8 billion would be distributed to the clerics

waging jihad.16 For the first time in history, the mullahs were not dependent on the maliks or

their survival.Te Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate believed that it could control how these

unds were used by setting up a group o official mujahideen parties, much as the British had

15. As mentioned earlier, maliksare not tribal chies but elders, many o them appointed by the govern-ment and placed on the official payroll in return or services. Some have hereditary positions. Others areelected rom within their own tribes and unction as equals in tribal gatherings. Te titular head o a tribeis more ofen than not a primus inter pares.

16. Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedara,Afghanistan, Arms, and Conflict(London: Routledge, 2008).

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set up official hereditary maliks. But over time, these movements mutated out o state control.

Within a decade, the mujahideen infighting and chaos had spawned the aliban17in 1994a

movement o radical madrassa (religious school) students who were willing to work with the Paki-

stani state when it served their interests, but also able to undermine that same state when Pakistan

threw its lot in with the United States in the war against al Qaeda. International support contin-

ued long afer the United States and Saudis lost interest and the Soviets were driven out o Aghan-

istan. Some oreign unds were given to the mullahs by sympathetic Pakistani emigrants in the

West, particularly in the UK; more recently, the work o the militants has been financed by the rent

and service payments they receive rom the al Qaeda operatives they have helped hide inside the

FAA, smuggling, drug-running, and collection o taxes in the areas under their control. Once

again, outside unding that was intended or a particular short-term political purpose provoked

lasting and unintended social consequences that undercut the intentions o its original finan-

ciers. In recent years these mullahs have adopted a Kalashnikov culture, heading up militias that

enorce their obscurantist interpretations o Sharia law even in villages and city neighborhoods

beyond FAA, in the nearby settled areas o Pakistan. Tey have killed more than 600 maliks18in

the past two years, and they regularly lead deadly raids against military and police installations.

Adding to the militancy is the presence o remnants o the Maoist Mazdoor Kissan Party that isueled by unhappiness with the unequal distribution o land in the region.

U.S. Actions in Afghanistan and the RegionAnother element in the increasing disaffection inside FAA and the NWFP has been the ratchet-

ing upward o U.S. actions along the border and inside that region. Unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs) or drones launched rom Aghanistan have been regularly used by U.S. orces to target

specific al Qaeda and other targets inside FAA with Hellfire missiles. While these attacks have

been successul in many cases in eliminating their intended targets, in some case they have pro-

duced collateral civilian damage and deaths o innocent women and children. Tis has created a

huge backlash among the tribesmen and even among the general population o Pakistan. State-ments rom U.S. leaders about reserving the right to pursue and attack aliban and other targets

inside Pakistan have urther set local populations and even the Pakistan Army against the United

States, as all such actions reflect badly on the armed orces o Pakistan and their ability to protect

the borders with Aghanistan.

Pakistan has been either unable or unwilling to stop the cross-border activity o aliban and

allied orces operating out o FAA. Apart rom the lack o capacity o Pakistani orces, there are

signs that local tribal ties and ambivalence o Pakistani intelligence operatives inside FAA toward

Aghan aliban or mujahideen commanders may be responsible or the inability o Pakistan to

control these militants.

Te United States, or its part, believes that it is owed support and allegiance by the Pakistaniarmy and other orces because it has covered the costs o moving the 120,000 Pakistani troops into

FAA. Pakistan measures its costs not only in the movement o troops and loss o public support

17. alibanis the plural o talibor student or more generally someone who seeks knowledge. Tiscollective name o the group has begun to be used erroneously ofen as a singular noun in the West, or ex-ample when reerring to a single person as the American aliban.

18. Khalid Aziz.

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or its action but also in deaths o more than 1,300 soldiers since the army moved into FAA and

adjoining areas in the NWFP.

Te lack o a single U.S. commander in charge o the fighting inside Aghanistan means there

are ofen conflicting tactical and strategic considerations at play, especially in dealing with Paki-

stan. Te U.S. Central Intelligence Agency controls many o the drones that attack inside Pakistan.

At the tactical level, the relatively small number o U.S. orces in Aghanistan produces rustrationsor local commanders, leading them to attack Pakistani positions in areas rom where they see

attacks being launched into Aghanistan by the aliban. Inside Aghanistan, the absence o an exit

strategy has prolonged the conflict and thus not allowed the allies (and the Aghan government) to

shif the blame on to the aliban or not agreeing to negotiate a solution to the war.

As stated earlier, the United States wants Pakistan to do more. Tere is some basis or this

stance. Te United States sees Pakistan as taking action selectively against some but not all militant

groups and certainly reraining rom attacking those Aghan aliban who seek sanctuary inside

FAA but do not fight against the Pakistan military. Te perception on the Pakistani side is that

the United States wishes Pakistan to do all! Civil and military officers state that the United States

has not devoted the quantum o orce inside Aghanistan necessary to turn the tide militarily

against the insurgency or attempt to seal the border rom the Aghan side. Some also believe that

the U.S. presence in Aghanistan uels the militancy inside that country and Pakistan. Te Aghan

National Army (ANA) o roughly 80,000 is also not seen as trained enough to take on the fighting

or the patrolling effectively. Te strong perception in Pakistan is that the ANA is predominantly

composed o non-Pashtuns and thereore unwelcome in the nine largely Pashtun provinces that

abut the Pakistan-Aghanistan border near FAA.

While the United States has attempted to set up collaborative mechanisms to bring Pakistan,

Aghanistan and U.S. or NAO orces together, this effort did not begin in earnest until some

five years afer the invasion. Afer much discussion and debate and oot dragging on the Pakistan

side, plans were finalized to set up Border Coordination Centers (BCCs) and to train trainers who

would then train members o the Frontier Corps inside FAA. Only one BCC had been set up byall 2008, and the training program o selected Frontier Corps trainers had just begun in October.

Some progress in cooperation was evident when Gen. Ashaq Pervez Kayani, the Chie o Army

Staff o Pakistan, attended a meeting o the tripartite commission in Kabul in August 2008 and

hosted another meeting the next month in Rawalpindi. Despite Pakistans complaints against the

United States or its lack o support, a key actor hindering Pakistans ability to fight the insurgency

has been its own orces lack o training and indoctrination or fighting an insurgency inside its

own borders. Still clinging to its sel-image as a conventional army, Pakistans military has not ully

accepted the need to change to counterinsurgency mode. Although its commanders in the field

have shown the capability or learning by doing, Pakistan still needs to make a concerted effort to

accumulate the lessons rom the field and incorporate them into a doctrine.

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|17

2

The Afghan Taliban and Their Role in FATATe Aghan aliban rely on tribal ties to set up bases inside FAA. Te Haqqani network, or

instance, uses North Waziristan as its reuge rom the war inside Aghanistan. Here it benefits

rom tribal loyalties, even rom the Frontier Corps lower ranks, who are, afer all, ofen mem-

bers o the same Wazir or Daur tribes o that agency or rom FC units rom other FAA agencies.Similarly, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar also has well-established links inside FAA, dating back to his

days as a rebel, trained and equipped by the ISI against the communist Aghan government and

later against the Soviet orces in Aghanistan. He also has well-developed ties to old ISI hands

rom the aliban era. Tese ISI hands are ofen recruited as contractors to develop intelligence and

maintain ties at local levels by the novice army officers rotated into ISI rom the regular ranks o

the Pakistan Army. (Many o the Soviet-era ISI hands are now less active and effective in dealing

with aliban fighters, many o whom were not even born when the Soviets entered Aghanistan in

1979.) Cleverly, the Aghan aliban have chosen not to enter the ray against the Pakistan Army

or state in most o FAA, except Bajaur where an Aghan is leading the militants. Te army may

have returned the avor. Te FC certainly finds it difficult to attack the Aghan aliban who may

be ellow tribesmen, creating a paradoxical situation with regard to the sealing o the border. U.S.observers on the Aghan side believe that FC personnel either do nothing or sometimes provide

covering fire or ingress or egress o Aghan aliban fighters. One reason or the inefficacy o

the FC border posts is that they are isolated and poorly manned and cannot be deended against

concentrated attacks by militants. FC soldiers find it wiser sometimes to look the other way when

well-armed aliban bands cross the border near them. Tese deficiencies are being addressed

jointly by Pakistan and the United States.

Inside Aghanistan, the aliban have increased their area o influence, ofen with local sup-

port. Teir financing is robust, with money likely coming rom a thriving opium trade and taxes

imposed by local warlords, and contributions rom the Pashtun diaspora and Arab supporters

in the Middle East. Te inability o the Aghan government to successully draw the aliban into

talks on governing the country and thereby separating the extremists rom the moderate elements

in the movement has allowed the conflict to continue. alks between the Aghan government

and the aliban in Saudi Arabia late in 2008 offer some hope o a change that may help dilute the

strength o the aliban. Historically, the aliban resist instructions rom any oreign government,

Muslim or non-Muslim.

issues and answers

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The Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan and OtherMilitant GroupsMany people in the North-West Frontier Province o Pakistan retain positive associations re-

garding the aliban movement o the 1990s, which they saw as bringing stability and traditional

Pashtun values to Aghanistan afer years o civil war. Teir view o the contemporary alibanmovement in Aghanistan is somewhat more complex but still largely positive. Tere is a great deal

o conusion, however, about Pakistani aliban groups such as the P. On the one hand, their

criminality and willingness to resort to suicide attacks against other Muslims belie their Islamic

message; on the other hand, their violent resistance against the Pakistani state is unsettling to

many Pashtuns in both the settled and the tribal areas o the rontier.

Baitullah Mehsud, who originated the idea o the P in South Waziristan and broke out o

the normal boundaries o tribal leadership and the confines o his native area in South Waziristan,

has created a transregional movement. He has aligned himsel with different disaffected local

groups and even some criminal elements to produce a network o militants across the NWFP

and FAA and has been linked to operations inside the settled areas o Pakistan. He aced initial

difficulty in recruiting or his movement but admitted to a journalist that U.S. Predator attacks

that killed civilians helped his recruitment efforts tremendously: I spent three months trying to

recruit and only got 1015 persons. One U.S. attack and I got 150 volunteers!1Te P aces

some local opposition rom other militant groups, including Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan,

who is Ahmedzai. Te Mehsuds largely stayed away rom the insurgency in 20032004 led by Nek

Mohammad Wazir.

In the Khyber and Mohmand areas, other local militant groups have been fighting each other,

some even under the guidance o the ISI and other official sponsors with a view to keeping them

occupied and away rom any alliances with the P. Te reasons or these skirmishes are ofen

local, criminal, or or control o local markets and taxes on commercial activities. In some

cases the fighting is based on differences o opinion on religious dogma (Deobandi versus Barelvischools o Sunni Islamic thought, or example).

Te rise o ad hoc anti-aliban lashkars (militia) in recent months, and the relatively muted

response o the public in the NWFP to the militarys operations in Swat, Bajaur, and Mohmand,

suggest that the tide o public opinion may be slowly turning against the insurgents. Now that the

sheer criminality o these insurgent groups is becoming widely known and acknowledged, public

patience is wearing thin. Te government o Pakistan has wisely begun to reer to these aliban

groups as criminals and dacoits (quaint old Anglo-Indian term or robbers, derived rom the

local word dakoo), reusing to brand them with religious labels. Another quaint old English term,

miscreant,2has been in vogue in the Pakistan Army since 1971, when the independence-seeking

Bengalis were labeled as such. Te religious basis o this word may not be the reason it was chosen

this time by the military spokesmen, but most Pakistanis and even audiences in English-speaking

countries around the world have a hard time understanding this outmoded term! Tis conver-

gence between the discourse o the state and that o the common people vis--vis the insurgents is

an important and positive development.

1. Based on an interview that Baitullah Mehsud gave to Iqbal Khattak o the Daily imes (Lahore).2. Middle English word or disbeliever or heretic.

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issues and answers | 19

Current Developments in FATA and the NWFPLocal communities are beginning to mobilize against militant groups. Tis is happening spo-

radically, in places like Bajaur, Dir, Buner, and Peshawar, but it has made quite an impression on

provincial elites. Citizen mobilization programs have the potential to play an important role in

counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in the Frontier, since most communities have both the legiti-

mating mechanisms (jirgas or tribal conclaves) and means (small arms) to mobilize quickly. Te

U.S. government might want to consider ramping up support or provincial programs that can

take advantage o this trend, including the training o well-equipped, rapid-response police orces

that can be deployed in support o citizen groups, while ensuring that these efforts are not seen

as American-managed but as locally managed. Te emergence o tribal lashkarsin Bajaur against

militants in the all o 2008 was a sign o the success o this movement. Yet there is a potential

danger that the leaders o these groups may become independent local warlords, equipped by the

state.

Te provincial government has gained a measure o public support or anti-insurgent opera-

tions.Te Awami National Party-led governments attempted peace deals in Swat succeeded by

ailing. Even though the deals in Swat with the ehreek-e-Niaz-e-Shariah-e-Mohammedi (NSM)and the P ell apart rather spectacularly, they were both necessary and productive: by dem-

onstrating a good-aith effort, the government won substantial public support or more kinetic

operations o the kind that are currently being conducted in Swat by the army and in the Bajaur

agency by the Frontier Corps.Te ANP-led government, however, remains vulnerable on a num-

ber o ronts. Most directly, aliban groups have begun specifically targeting the ANP in an at-

tempt to weaken its resolve. argeted actions against ANP politicians and their amilies, as well as

ANP-affiliated businesses, have already caused a number o party workers to dampen their public

rhetoric and question more aggressive action against the militants. On the political ront, the ANP

is highly vulnerable on the right rom religious parties and rom the actions o the mainstream

Pakistan Muslim League. I the security situation does not improve noticeably in the next six to

nine months, this government may be in trouble.

Te United States can also help Pakistan develop a comprehensive communications strategy to

counter the militants propaganda. Lack o access to speedy justice, tentative responses by police

to insurgent activity, and dysunctional systems o local government are all important secondary

drivers o the aliban insurgency in the Frontier.Te U.S. government should do an initial needs

assessment with the government o Pakistan to see i there are any practical ways that the United

States and the international community could support targeted justice reorm efforts.

Fighting Militancy in the Frontier Region

Although the militants in FAA and the NWFP have tried to paint their struggle in Islamic terms,at heart the issues that have spawned unrest and violence in the region are economic and political.

Te extended neglect o the needs o the local population or economic development and political

voice has made FAA an area that is ripe or militancy as a means o asserting the rights o its in-

habitants. Te traditional system o political administration and intermediary maliks was riddled

with corruption with resources diverted by the privileged maliks to their own uses rather than to

the needs o the tribes. Te political agents and the government were complicit in these arrange-

ments, as they used bribery and corruption to urther their control over the maliks and the tribes

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in FAA. It was common knowledge that many maliks and other leaders o the tribal communi-

ties had established residence in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Hangu, and even Islamabad. Tey and

their amilies were on the official dole and ofen served as ghost employees o various govern-

ment-sponsored projects. A celebrated recent case challenged the credentials o a member o the

National Assembly rom FAA who continued to be shown as a caretaker o a local government

school. Pakistani rules prohibit anyone in government service rom being able to contest electionsor at least two years afer retirement or separation rom such a post.

Interaction between FAA tribesmen and their counterparts in the settled areas o the NWFP

and Pakistan proper provided evidence o the vast economic and social disparities that exist

between FAA and the rest o Pakistan (as was shown in able 3 in chapter 1) .Such disparities as

literacy rates (almost 44 percent or Pakistan as a whole versus 35.4 percent in the NWFP and 17.4

percent in FAA) provide ertile ground or militancy in the name o religion and social justice.

ribesmen who traveled to the settled areas ound it hard to compete with their brethren or jobs

in the marketplace or places in higher educational institutions.

Making the sense o deprivation o the local population worse is the continuation o an

anachronistic legal system that operates in FAA. Te Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) inheritedrom the British applies in FAA. Not that the criminal justice system o Pakistan provides speedy

justice to Pakistanis in general. However, onerous local rules that apply colonial solutions and

punishments to crimes committed in FAA persist under the FCR. For example, a whole tribe may

be held responsible or the actions o an individual. Tis has helped the militants gain avor among

large numbers o disaffected people who see such rules as unair and unjust. While the new civil-

ian government announced its intention to amend the FCR, progress has been slowed by locally

vested interests, including FAAs current representatives who would tend to lose some o their

influence i the system o governance were to be changed.

Changes within FATAPakistan used FAA as a buffer zone between itsel and Aghanistan, and so long as troubles re-

mained confined to FAA they did not concern the government deeply. Tat situation has changed

now with violence and militancy spilling over into the settled areas. FAA can no longer be com-

partmentalized.

Te separation o FAA rom the government o the NWFP also makes it difficult to treat

militancy in both FAA and the NWFP in a coordinated manner, with FAA being managed rom

Islamabad via the Governors House in Peshawar rather than rom the provincial government o

the NWFP. Economic planning is also complicated, since FAA has a separate secretariat and a

separate development plan that is not easily dovetailed into provincial efforts.

Certain basic changes have occurred in FAA that need to be recognized and dealt with:

Te weapons balance has shifed. Except or tanks and airplanes, insurgents all have good

weapons and communications systems, including satellite phones.

Insurgents are very mobile, relying on all-terrain double-cab pickup trucks, ofen smuggled in

rom Aghanistan.

Demographic pressure in FAA has

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