12/09/06 - SRAE Congress DeFilippo, Pezzullo, SBG Logistics Group @ 2006 1 Perceptions of the Industrial Risk and Emergency Management Procedures in Hazmat

12/09/06 - SRAE Congress

DeFilippo, Pezzullo, SBG Logistics Group @ 2006

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Perceptions of the Industrial Risk and Emergency Management Procedures in Hazmat Logistics: a Qualitative Mental

Model Approach

Roberto De Filippo, SBG Logistics GroupLuca Pezzullo, Ph.D, Department of General Psychology, University of

Padova

This research was made possible by a grant from SBG Logistics Group



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Industrial Risk and Transport: a “web of risks”

• Logistics Systems represents a fundamental and sometimes underestimated part of the whole “industrial risk and safety” sector.

• The intrinsic complexity and dynamicity of logistics systems involves the functional interactions among industries, infrastructures, logistical hubs, urban areas, vehicles, haulers, laws, procedures… constituing a “web of unsafety” emerging from the many “points of interaction” among different parts of the whole system.



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• The “Where (it happens)” and “Who (has to handle it immediately)” of potential risks, in hazmat road transport are the two big “unanswered questions”.

• While in a Factory the “Where” is well established, and the “Who” is often an “organized emergency squad”, in the road transport sector the “Where” is… “maybe everywhere”, and the “Who” is “a lone driver without adequate equipment”.

Where ? Who ?

The role and actions of drivers, in the socio-technical system of hazmat road transport, is thereby focal.



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Road Transport and ADR• The road transport of “Industrial Hazmat”, as explosive-

or inflammable substances, is an high-risk activity: in many countries there are special and strict regulations for tankers driving and hazmat handling.

• In Europe oil-, fuel- and other explosive substances tanker drivers need to pass a difficult test, the “ADR Examination”, to gain their special “licence”, necessary to drive tanker trucks.

• ADR Procedures are very strict, “algorithmical”, technical procedures determining how to handle, in detail, each phase of loading, transporting and unloading hazmats on a tanker, and how to handle emergencies and critical incidents occuring in these phases.



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• ADR Procedures are taught, executed and applied “as is”, in a very formalized way. In the logistics safety sector, an high value is attribuited to the perfect implementation of ADR.

Safety perceptions in Tanker Drivers

But currently there is some “ignorance” about workers’ actual perceptions and cognitive representations of ADR Procedures.

How a procedure is implemented is strongly related to the way the procedure itself is perceived by people applying it.



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A Quali-Quantitative Approach

• We choose an integrated approach, using two adapted tools derived from the constructivist approach: a Landfield Laddering Procedure (“pyramid”), and a modified “Dependency Grid”.

• A brief personal data questionnaire was also provided.

In collaboration with SBG Logistics Group, a leading European logistics corporation, we proposed to study these subjective representations, with the purpose of enhancing training programs for drivers, and to individuate “criticalities” in the actual implementation of “abstract” procedures



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The Tools: Landfield Pyramids

1. In the first level, subjects were asked to define, in their own terms, their own subjective concept of “operational safety” and of “operational unsafety”.

2. In the second level, they have to redefine these concepts in strict relation to ADR Procedures.

3. The third level was differentiated in two groups (Procedures Group and Human Factor Group): 26 subjects were asked to define “how is recognizable a safe or unsafe ADR procedure”; 21 “what are the human factors that make safe or unsafe” these same procedures.

Landfield Pyramids are three-step procedures, asking subjects to provide their own constructs and representations about a theme, in a qualitative way. Each level is composed by a “positive” and a “negative” item, and it build the background for the following level.



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Adapted “Dependecy” GridsDependecy Grids are simple tools, used to study “which resources” drivers would use in “different types of incidents”. ADR Procedures provide indication for the use of certain types of resources for specific types of incidents, but it seems interesting to evaluate if experienced tanker drivers feel the necessity to use other or different resources for help, or somewhat disagree with the “official guidelines”.

• Examples of Resources:• Firefighters, Road Police; Co-workers; Calling a more expert

driver; Call corporate Emergency Center; Ask for technical advice at Corporation offices; Do it by myself, basing on my personal experience; etc...

• Examples of Incidents:• Loss of fuel on the road; dangerous fuel mixture during the

loading; car-truck crash without fuel release; car-truck crash with fuel release; etc…



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VALVAR

(1) Chiamo ilResponsabileSEROP

(2) Chiamo il ResponsabileTecnico Mezzi

(3) Chiamo il secondo autista

(4) Telefono al numero di emergenza800-977957

(5) Chiamo direttamente un collega espertoper avere un suo parere

(6) Applico quanto previsto da ADR (DPI, materiale per tamponatura perdite, ecc.)

(1)Prevalentemente mibaso sulla mia esperienza

(8) Attivo gli Enti diStato (VVF, Polizia, ecc)

Durante la fase di carico vengo informato della perdita dalle valvole di aerazione (1)

X X X

Durante il tragitto mi accorgo di una perdita di prodotto (2)

X X

Durante il tragitto causo un incidente e sono scarico

(3)X X

Durante il tragitto vengo tamponato, senza perdita e sono carico (4)

X

Durante il tragitto causo un incidente e sono carico (5)

X X

Durante la fase di scarico causo una miscela (6)

X X X

Durante la fase di scarico avviene uno spandimento nel pozzetto (7)

X X

Durante la fase di scarico avviene uno spandimento nel piazzale del PV (8)

X X

Nel PV gli attacchi non permettono un buon accoppiamento (9)

X

Nel Nel PV lo scarico del prodotto è molto lento (10) X X



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Research Design

• 47 tanker drivers, working for the SBG Special Logistics Group, were involved in the research.

• The research tools were applied in two different settings, in two different towns of northern Italy.

• Each driver compiled a Landfield Procedure, an Adapted Dependency Grid and a personal data questionnaire.

• Data from the Landfield Procedures and the Grids were analyzed indipendently by two researchers; in a second time, data were compared and integrated.



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Data Analysis1. Landfield Pyramids were analyzed extrapolating the

pattern of responses, and with a bottom-up approach to find emerging semantic categories expressed by drivers in relation to safety- and ADR concepts. Drivers were then divided into categories, corresponding to the semantic representations expressed.

2. Grids were analyzed with a frequency analysis of resources/incidents responses, to find what are the most diffused resources called upon the various incidents.

3. Data from these tools were then integrated, and correlated with socio-personal data derived from the brief questionnaire, searching for trends and explicative variables.



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Quantitative Data:Low Correlations

• Many correlational analysis (Chi-square) were carried on to verify possible correlations between variables as socio-anagraphical data (age, working experience, marital status, etc), and Incidentality.

• But, to the initial dismay of researchers, none Chi-square reached 0.05 Alpha value..

• There are only small trends with Alpha values near 0.10 for the relations between years of working experiences and some types of incidents, but it seems that “classical” socio-anagraphical data were not-so-strictly correlated with Incidentality.



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Quantitative Data• The weakness of correlations is indeed an index of

the underlying complexity of “safety attitudes”: it’s improductive (and maybe wrong) to concentrate too much attention in identifying an isolated “socio-anagraphical” variable “explaining the whole thing”…

• There are not specific distributions in the Resources/Incidents grid: the expressed preferences are very similar to those stated and prescribed by ADR Procedures.

• But nonetheless, the very low level of “social-networking” and peer-consultations among tanker drivers was unexpected: the expressed reference to “peer resources” in case of an incident is less than 15%.



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Qualitative Data • So, we turn on qualitative

data, trying to understand which factors and “semantic structures” seems to be related with safe or unsafe behaviour in logistics work.

Some results allowed us to obtain a better picture of the “underlying psychological processes” that characterize tanker drivers, and to see what variables were not considered in the first phase.



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“Lone Wolf Syndrome”• In the Landfield Pyramids, nearly everyone

“omitted” to talk about peer-relationships, peer-consultation, peer-coaching.

• Also for “personality factors” cited as typical of “safety-oriented workers”, the variables are focalized on individuality and autonomy.

• The Tanker Driver perceive himself as “alone” for risk-, safety- and emergency handling issues: an emergency is a matter between him and his Corporation (and ADR procedures); fellow drivers are not involved, and social horizontal links are nearly nonexistent.

This is a relevant difference with other “emergency management” sectors, in which the “basic functional unit” is the squad, or a team.



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ADR as source of identity…

• This strong positive social identity status has some interesting consequences in their representation of Emergency Management Procedures and ADR. If ADR-badged status is an element of positive social identity, ADR procedure itself could be considered implicitly “good”, also for the “social gain” that it provides…

• So, the drivers’ attitudes towards ADR could be lightly flawed, and critical attitudes could be somewhat reduced by these “social benefits” issues.

Among tanker drivers, there is a diffused self-perception as an “élite”: ADR-badged tanker driver view themselves as an “élite”, standing out among fellow “normal truck” drivers.



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Conceptual Structures of “Operational Safety”

• The structure of “Operational Safety” concept is described by drivers in Landfield Pyramids using substantially three different “metaphors”:

1. Safety = To be calm (Unsafety = To be nervous)

2. Safety = To act with care and attention (Unsafety =To do operations too quickly)

3. Safety = To know regulations and ADR (Unsafety = To be indifferent)



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The three “philosophies”:• From qualitative data analysis emerged three types of

workers:• (8) Green Workers: “Besides ADR, we need to think by

ourselves and value our experiences”.Philosophy: Apply ADR, but first and foremost be Calm and Smart.

• (18) Yellow Workers: “We need to pay attention and be careful during ADR Procedures implementation”.Philosophy: Apply ADR, and Pay Attention.

• (21) Red Workers: “We need to apply ADR Procedures in a very strict way”. Philosophy: ADR is enough.



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A paradox…• Red Workers, those referring to ADR procedures with

expressions as “ADR it’s intrinsically good”; “ADR is studied to be perfect, not further improvable”; “A safety-conscious workers is a worker applying ADR in an mechanical way”, are also the drivers with the highest ratio of road and mixtures incidents: 38% of “Red Workers” had incidents in the past three years, while Green Workers are the drivers with the lowest incidentality ratio: only 1 on 8 (12,5%).

• Red Workers are also the drivers with less work experience in the tanker driving field, also if there are not differences among the groups for variables as chronological age or driving experience (i.e., many Red Workers are middle-aged men with many years of experience as “normal truck driver”).



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Paradox explained ?• Thus, the higher incidentality ratio in so-called “Red

Workers” vs. “Green” ones it’s not only a problem of “age” or “road experience”, but appears to be related also to subjective representations and mental models of risk and safety procedures, and resulting attitudes towards ADR-in-practice.

• Red Workers apply a more “mechanical thinking”, an algorithmical approach that is coherent with the “formal normative guidelines” and explicit Organizational Culture.

• They are more “insecure” in their first years of work in this sector, and then they rely more heavily on strict application of “formal procedures” (reinforced in this by diffused organizational culture).



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Paradox explained ?• Green Workers apply a “constructive critical thinking”

to ADR Procedures, and this is possible for two reasons:1. They are more experienced, and this build a

deeper base for personal competence and self-efficacy;2. They are also less bound to “ADR licence” for

their social identity status, as younger drivers do.

• It is possible to hypotesize that Red Workers (and the organizational culture of logistics corporations) emphasize a formal, strict, “external locus of control” focused on the “Procedure” (the Procedure is “right”, the Worker is “inadequate”), while Green and Yellow ones rely more upon “internal factors” (attention, experiences, good sense, etc…: the Procedure is “right”, but also the Worker is “right”).



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Applications for Drivers’ training and Organizational Culture

• We need to recognize that the usual approach “ADR is perfect, drivers are imperfect, therefore we need only to apply ADR in a mechanical way” is somewhat defective.

• ADR is “quite good”, but we need to recognize the necessity for a more explicit focus on personal competence and experiences; a (bit) less mechanical ADR-compliance and a (bit) more validation for workers’ good sense, experiences and “calm attitudes” could do very much to attain a better involvement and responsabilization of tanker drivers in building safer behaviors.

• There is also a cultural and organizational problem about the “functional loneliness” of tanker drivers, that is reflected in attitudes related to emergency management and safety behaviours.



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Methodological Conclusions1. It’s possibile and useful to use qualitative tools also with

not-so-highly educated subjects. Many researchers use only university or college students as subjects for qualitative research, and some authors tell explicitly that only highly-educated subjects could provide good-quality data with these approaches. It’s not true: with a bit of attention, it’s possible to obtain highly-heuristical data also with other subjects.

2. Mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches could provide a better representation of subjective mental models and attitudes towards safety and risk issues. We need to explore in a wider way the personal and semantic issues underlying risk representations and safety behaviours in industrial and logistics workers, and qualitative methodologies provides good tools to do this.



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Thank you for your attention !

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12/09/06 - SRAE Congress DeFilippo, Pezzullo, SBG Logistics Group @ 2006 1 Perceptions of the Industrial Risk and Emergency Management Procedures in Hazmat