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132013
Critical
Review
for
Buddhist
Studies
|| Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos : Hyoung Seok Ham : : || (Abhisamaylakravtti) , , (pratipatter
dhrlambanodde) : || : Gregory Schopen( ) / || : ( ) : ( ) : ( )
132 0 1 3
Critical
Review
for
Buddhist
Studies
GEUMGANG UNIVERSITYGeumgang Center for Buddhist StudiesNonsan, South KoreaISSN 1975-2660
Critical Review for Buddhist Studies
(ISSN 1975-2660) , , , . .
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www.gcbs.geumgang.ac.kr 041-731-3614 041-731-3629
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Critical Review for Buddhist Studies
13
| | Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos
: Hyoung Seok Ham 9
: 55
: 113
| | (Abhisamaylakravtti)
, , (pratipatter dhrlambanodde) : 143
| |
: Gregory Schopen( ) / 193
| | : ( ) 247
: ( ) 265
: ( ) 281
| | 297
| | 305
Inclusivism: the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever- Renewing Cosmos
Hyoung Seok Ham
Critical Review for Buddhist Studies
(Critical Review for Buddhist Studies)13(2013. 6) 9p~53p
Inclusivism: the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos
_Hyoung Seok Ham()(University of Michigan)
(inclusivism) . (Paul Hacker) . .
: (Inclusivism), , , ,
10 vol.13
1
The uneasiness some scholars feel about the incorporation of
Hinduism in the list of so-called world religions is mainly due to the
wide varieties of religious belief and practice that are supposedly
denoted by the singular term Hinduism. Unlike other world religions,
Hinduism does not provide a coherent picture when judged by the
major elements of a religion. Multiple gods, scriptures, doctrines, and
rituals without a unifying principle have contributed to scholars
conception of Hinduism as multiple religions, that is, Hinduisms.
Considering that the Abrahamic religions (viz. Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam) are deemed separate religions, even though they share
origins, scriptures, and religious views (such as eschatology), their
Hindu counterpart is not a vaguely conglomerated mass called
Hinduism but rather sub-divisions of it that form coherent and
distinct religious entities: They are indeed religious, while Hinduism
is not (von Stietencron 2001, 46). With this perception of Hinduisms
multiplicity, scholars argue that the notion of Hinduism, which
conveys an illusionary idea of a monolithic entity, is constructed, if not
invented, out of many discrete religious traditions of India during the
British Raj period without a real-world referent.
Although this position on the invention of Hinduism reflects
critiques on previous orientalists scholarship of the colonial period
and the modern development of historical and philological knowledge
of ancient India, the obvious weakness of this approach is that it does
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 11
not take insiders self-understanding into serious consideration.
Although outside observers do not perceive a unifying principle that
binds seemingly separate religious phenomena together, it is possible
that in the minds of practitioners and believers these phenomena
constitute one coherent whole. To counter the claim of the modern
invention of Hinduism, therefore, some have searched for expressions
of Hindu unity in pre-modern materials to prove that the notion of
Hinduism encompassing diverse religious practices does not emerge
from outside (or, more accurately, from the encounter with the West)
but existed long before British rule. Doxographical literature that
presents heterogeneous philosophies in a harmonious hierarchical
scheme (Nicholson 2010) and the disparate identities of Hindus and
Muslims described by late-medieval poets such as Kabir (Lorenzen
2006) can be regarded as self-representations of the pre-modern Hindu
people. Thus, Hinduism, like its religious counterparts, qualifies and
should be viewed as one independent religion.
Although these two positions are directly opposed regarding the
singularity (or plurality) of Hinduism, the nature of their presentation
of Hinduism is common in that they tailor Hinduism(s) so that it fits
within the model of and becomes comparable to other belief systems
that are well established in the category of religion. Regardless of
whether they explicitly touch upon the relationship between Hinduism
and religion as a category, their manipulations and analyses of
source materials assume that Hinduism is, or sometimes should be, a
religion. Given the long history of changes in meaning the term
12 vol.13
religion has undergone and the particular status it has attainedwhich cannot be assessed without considering categorical distinctions
such as church/state, private/public, and religion/science, which reflect
specific European historical experience in modern (European) societies, both unitary and pluralistic visions of Hinduism are attempts
to translate alien phenomena into European jargon. In other words,
listing Hinduism as a religion is a European gesture of understanding
toward Indian materials. When this gesture of understanding (i.e.,
translation) seems so natural that it takes root in both ordinary and
scholarly language, the movement of understanding takes a reverse
turn: based on the equivalence between two signifiers (Hinduism and
religion), the identity of the semantic fields of those terms is taken for
granted, and the target language, originally devised to convey the
meaning of the source language, exercises its power on the latter.
It is because of this problem in locating Hinduism adequately in
modern European languages that, despite a continuity in the unitary
vision of Hinduism, the assertion that Hinduism (as a religion) has
existed since the pre-modern period cannot be validated. Hinduism,
however it is defined, cannot be characterized in relation to such
categories as state, public, and science. Thus, arguing that the
religion we now call Hinduism existed before British rule (Lorenzen
2006, 7) is a projection of the modern European model of religion into
the Indian past (Fitzgerald 2010, 127). However, if a pluralistic version
of Hinduism is adopted, following the advice of von Stiecron (2001),
we find ourselves in a very implausible situation. Driven by the belief
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 13
that comparability with other historical religions can be ensured
only by distinguishing the various Hindu religions from Hinduism,
von Stiecron divides Hinduism into separate traditions, such as
Vaiavism, aivism, and aktism, and suggests comparing them with
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2001, 46-7). The awkwardness of this
project is obvious: do Vaiavism and aivism have the same relationship
that is maintained between Christianity and Islam? Do the Vaiavas
distinguish themselves from the aivites as Christians do from Muslims?
Making Vaiavism comparable to Christianity and registering it in
the list of religions is simply another means of projecting the specific
model of religion onto Hinduism.
Implicit in the practice of recognizing Hinduism or Vaiavism as a
religion is that it is a way of viewing others from ones own perspective.
Therefore, it is no less a manifestation of the mental framework of the
viewer than of the reality of the viewed. In this regard, to elucidate
various strands in the formation of or debate about Hinduism as a
religion, it is essential to understand the framework that renders
Hinduism as such by examining the historical context of its origin in
modern European culture. However, if we aim to develop a scholarly
discourse that can accommodate and translate more of Hinduism than
Hinduism as a religion, there is also a need to put the viewers perspective
(i.e., categorizing Hinduism as a religion equal to Christianity) into a
dialectical relationship with the perspective of the viewed (i.e., the
Hindu view of Others). Therefore, although Europeans took the
initiative in the encounter and the dialogue between India and
14 vol.13
Europe has been an uneven, asymmetrical one thus far (Halbfass
1988, 172-3), we must allow the Hindu voice to Others to converse
with the European voice to Others so we can find an adequate realm
of discourse that can embrace a more comprehensive perspective on
both forms of understanding Others and can do less injustice to either
of them.
2
This paper examines the relatively unheard voice of India toward its
Others. However, like its European counterpart, this voice is not a
homogenous one; India developed various attitudes and strategies of
understanding its cultural (including religious) Others. Rather than
attempting to make an exhaustive list of these attitudes, I would like to
focus on one conspicuous pattern of conceiving Others in Hindu
culture: inclusivism, as named by Paul Hacker and defined as a way
of thinking that consists in claiming for, and thus including in, ones
own religion what really belongs to an alien sect (Hacker 1995, 244).
Although Hindu inclusivism has been mostly recognized as a modern
Hindu attitude toward Western Others and has been discussed within
the context of religious diversity with the specific concern of religious
tolerance, I take a different approach for several reasons.
First, inclusivism is not a modern phenomenon. As Heesterman
(1991) rightly observes, inclusivism that is, the claim to all-
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 15
embracing unity and universality[,] appears to have ancient roots
(296). In fact, the inclusivistic attitude of Neo-Hindus stems from
hoary antiquity (Hacker 1995, 244). Therefore, only by investigating
claims such as Hinduism is not a religion, but religion that
encompasses all other religions, which have been expressed by
modern Hindu thinkers, it is not possible to understand the inner logic
of the claims and the historical weight they have on Hindus. The first
step to approaching inclusivism should be to acknowledge that this is a
recurring assertion toward cultural Others throughout the history of
India. In this regard, I will trace the origin of inclusivistic ideas back to
the most ancient scriptures of India, the Vedas, and to the various
ideologies devised to protect their inviolable authority. Scanning the
historical contexts of inclusivism, we will realize that it is not a novel
strategy developed to counter Western missionaries; modern Hindu
thinkers employ the same method and scheme inherited from
antiquity, but with modern concerns in mind (ibid., 245).
Second, inclusivism is not merely part of characteristic Hindu
patterns of thinking that are separable from the main body of its
philosophy. Just as recognizing Hinduism as a religion in European
scholarship is a manifestation of the self-understanding of religion
in European society, Indian attitudes toward alien Others are also an
expression of the self-understanding of its own culture. Therefore, the
discussion of inclusivism only within the context of the religious
diversity of the modern world becomes superficial in nature. With the
recognition that inclusivism is an outflow of the pattern of thinking
16 vol.13
that regulates the inner as well as the outer realms of Hinduism, I
observe and analyze the general framework in which truth-claims are
made in traditional India. A peculiar rhetorical feature of truth-claims
in India is that the authority of a claim is not based on its novelty or
creativity but on its authenticity and congruency with ancient
revelation. As we will see below, this rhetorical framework has at least
two presuppositions: 1. truth was fully revealed to mankind at the time
of Creation, and 2. truth can be accessed, even in the degenerate age,
intact. It is my assertion that these assumptions have their provenance
in the Vedic rituals and have been affirmed by various ideologies in
defense of the authority of the Veda. It is these cultural (or Vedic)
beliefs in the fullness and accessibility of revelation that prevent Hindu
thinkers from seeing Otherness: the other, the foreign is not seen as
something that could be added to, or combined with, ones own system;
instead, it is something a priori contained in it (Halbfass 1988, 411).
Finally, inclusivism is not only the characteristic Hindu mode of
treating alien cultures but is also a definitive feature that penetrates
and provides a unifying vision of diverse forms of Hinduism. In this
respect, this essay agrees with Lorenzen (2006) that there has been
and continues to be an identity that is shared, at least, by Hindu
intellectuals. They share a certain world-view that enables scholars of
India to bind them together, and I argue that this vision of the world
(or the universe) is inclusivistic. As will be shown later with the case of
the aivites (as documented in von Stiecron 1995), without recognizing
the pervasiveness of the inclusivistic pattern, scholars who share the
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 17
constructionist view support their arguments with examples that
actually evince the unitary vision of Hinduism. However, this is not to
prove the existence of Hinduism in terms of institutional, doctrinal,
ritual, or customary unity, which is implicitly presupposed in unity of
Hinduism arguments, such as that of Lorezen (2006). We must note
that this tendency to define a unitary religious group based on unified
substance be it a people, scripture, or belief system is common to both positions. Thus, I argue against the constructionists claim for the
following two reasons: 1. there was no religion in the modern sense in
the past in either India or Europe,1) and 2. despite the existence of
discrete groups that can be distinguished on a scriptural, doctrinal, or
cultural basis, they all shared inclusivistic attitudes toward each other.
This pattern of thinking has always been the model through which
Indians have understood their own culture and that has provided them
with a unifying vision of differences. Similarly, I would like to differentiate
myself from the opponents of the constructionists for the following
two reasons: 1. although we can find evidence that there was an
awareness of identity and unity in the pre-modern era, this evidence
cannot prove the continuing existence of the Hindu religion in the
modern sense, and 2. unity cannot be defined on a material basis (e.g.,
people, scripture, institutions); it must be defined based on a pattern
of thinking that was perpetuated throughout history and that was
shared by the different religious groups posited by constructionists.
This pattern is inclusivism.
1) See Fitzgerald (2010) for the history of the meaning of the term religion in Europe.
18 vol.13
3
Although Paul Hacker does not problematize the pre-modern
inclusivistic tendencies, he acknowledges their continuing existence and
exemplifies them with two cases that have become classical. One is the
case of Tulsds (1532-1623), who went to the Vras aivites and
insisted that worship of iva was not contradictory to his own devotion
to Rma because iva himself was the foremost devotee of the god
Rma. In this way, without creating a conflict with the followers of iva,
Tulsds claimed it [i.e., the religious cult of iva] in its entirety for his
own (Hacker 1995, 245). This strategy of absorbing the entire religious
system of others into ones own and placing it at a lower level in the
hierarchical scheme that culminates in ones own ultimate god is typical
of inclusivism. To the example of Tulsds, Hacker adds the sermon of
Ka to Arjuna at the battlefield of Kuruketra:
Deluded men despise me in the human form I have assumed,
ignorant of my higher existence as the great lord of creatures.
When devoted men sacrifice to other deities with faith, they sacrifice to me, Arjuna, however aberrant the rites. I am the
enjoyer and the lord of all sacrifices; they do not know me in
reality, and so they fail.2) (Bhagavadgt 9.11, 23-4; translation
2) avajnanti m mh mnu tanum ritam/ para bhvam ajnanto mama
bhtamahevaram//11// ye 'py anyadevatbhakt yajante raddhaynvit/ te 'pi mm
eva kaunteya yajanty avidhiprvakam//23// aha hi sarvayajn bhokt ca prabhur
eva ca/ na tu mm abhijnanti tattventa cyavanti te//24//
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 19
from Miller 1986, 86-8)
In this passage, Ka, like Tulsds, notes the ignorance of people;
they are worshipping other gods (anyadevatbhakt) and performing
aberrant rituals (yajanty avidhiprvakam) without knowing that
Viu is the ultimate God. However, this is a slightly different version
of the Tulsds story. Instead of making other gods devotees of Viu,
Ka says that even sacrifices devoted to other gods are, in reality and
ultimately, given to Viu, who is the sole enjoyer of them. However,
despite minor differences in details, we can see that, by placing ones
own god over anothers and thus absorbing all other religious practices
into itself, the basic inclusivistic scheme is retained here.
A more sensitive reading of the passage, however, reveals that the
Gts version of inclusivism is more fundamental than that of
Tulsds. The portion to which I want to draw attention is the second
half of verse 9.24, which Miller translated as they do not know me in
reality, and so they fail. Here, Ka is saying that those who do not
possess the correct knowledge of reality will deviate (cyavanti). Unlike
Tulsdss position of embracing the religious cult of iva in its
entirety, albeit as an inferior form of devotion, Ka clearly
denounces others religious practices, even though they are, in reality,
worship of Ka himself. Why does he do this? Is this not contrary to
the all-embracing sprit of inclusivism? I think the key phrase for
understanding Kas denouncement is they do not know (na
abhijnanti te). Although Miller translated the verb abhij as to
20 vol.13
know, the more prominent and appropriate meaning would be to
remember. Accordingly, a more correct translation of the half-verse
would be they do not remember me as reality, therefore, they
deviate. What is the difference between to know and to remember?
One of the chief differences between these two actions lies in the
difference of the object involved. Remembering something involves
recollecting something that was already known; thus, its main object
belongs to the past. It necessarily presupposes past experience with a
given object of knowing, and the act of remembering takes the
knowledge produced as its object. In contrast, in the act of knowing,
the actors past encounter with a knowable object, and previous
knowledge about it are not presumed.
Kas denouncement, in this regard, is not aimed at peoples
ignorance but at their oblivion or forgetfulness of the truth that should
be known to them from the past. Indeed, in the earlier chapter of the
Bhagavadgt, Ka says that he has given this same teaching to
people long before in the ancient past, or, more correctly, when the
first mortal beings appeared in the world.
I taught this undying discipline to the shining sun, first of
mortals, who told it to Manu, the progenitor of man; Manu
told it to the solar king Ikshvaku. Royal sages knew this
discipline, which the tradition handed down; but over the
course of time it has decayed, Arjuna. This is the ancient
discipline that I have taught to you today; you are my devotee
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 21
and my friend, and this is the deepest mystery.3) (Bhagavadgt
4.1-3; translation from Miller 1986, 51)
According to the passage, the Gt is the second teaching of Viu.
He conveyed the complete teaching to the first mortal beings in the
universe, and they, in turn, entrusted it to the first human being,
Manu, and to trustworthy persons such as Ikvku. Therefore, all
human beings who are descendents of Manu should know the message
of Viu and should uphold it as truth.
However, people gradually forgot about the primordial teaching
and began to worship other gods and to perform aberrant rites.
Those practices are not conceived as novel and creative religious
activities because the ultimate truth about religious matters has been
fully and completely revealed; therefore, that truth formed the
original knowledge of human beings. All the creative ideas of mankind
stem from the original knowledge bestowed on them, and the Gt
conceives of these creative ideas as aberrant (avidhiprvakam) and
decayed (naa). More importantly with regard to inclusivism, it is
because of the derivative nature of worshiping other gods that all
sacrifices are ultimately devoted to Viu alone. Although other
religious practices are decayed, they are still derivatives of the original
worship of Viu. Because the ignorance of worshippers impedes their
3) ima vivasvate yoga proktavn aham avyayam/ vivasvn manave prha manur
ikvkave 'bravt//1// eva paramparprptam ima rjarayo vidu/ sa kleneha
mahat yogo naa parantapa//2// sa evya may te 'dya yoga prokta purtana/
bhakto 'si me sakh ceti rahasya hy etad uttamam//3//
22 vol.13
spiritual advancement, however, Viu descended to the earth in the
form of Ka to instruct people in exactly the same teachings. Hence,
the ignorant predicament of mankind is not something irrevocable.
The structure of the Gts narrative can be observed in religio-
philosophical Sanskrit scriptures of different affiliations in which
various truth-claims are made. It is the general framework within
which a (religious and philosophical) truth wraps itself and asserts its
authenticity and through which a truth can be recognized by others as
such. This is the standard way of modeling, formulating, and producing
truthful knowledge in traditional India. And this framework is a
reflexive product of the paradigmatic knowledge, i.e., the Veda (lit.
knowledge), and its surrounding cultures.
4
One of the conspicuous effects of the inclusivistic framing of truth is
that it makes the truth ever-present in the world. By revealing the
whole truth at the time of Creation and transmitting it to the very first
progenitor of human beings, Manu, the truth becomes something that
has existed since the very beginning of the universe and that should be
known and upheld by every individual on earth. It may decay, but
when adharma prevails on the earth, God will descend and teach this
undying discipline again. In this way, the truth (i.e., dharma, in
the case of the Gt) has always been on the earth without changing. If
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 23
change occurs, the truth can be and should be renewed.
This timeless nature of the truth is reflected in the style of the
religio-philosophical texts of India, which are notorious for their
presumed lack of historical awareness (Pollock 1989, 603). This
issue has been noted as a very Indian phenomenon by many outsiders
since the beginning of the second millennia.4) Many explanations have
been proposed for the cause of this conspicuous symptom of failing
to provide historical references, mainly based on the Indian concept of
time; to Indian people, time is cyclical, as seen in their Yuga theories.
And moreover, anything appears and happens in the course time is
seen as illusion (my) according to their representative philosophy of
the Advaita Vednta (Perrett 1999, 313-4). Among the many speculations,
for our purpose, I would like to discuss a theory proposed by Houben
(2002) that attempts to find an answer in the Vedic rituals.
According to Houben (2002), although prominent grammarians
such as Bharthari and Bhaoji Dkita changed the direction of the
Sanskrit grammarian tradition with their ingenious innovations, they
do not acknowledge their newness but present their theories of
language as if they represent the views of munitraya (viz. Pini,
Ktyyana, and Patajali), whose works are incontestable in the
tradition. What is worse, from the perspective of modern historians, is
4) Al Biruni, who travelled India around 1020 CE, notes, Unfortunately the Hindus do
not pay much attention to the historical order of things, they are very careless in
relating the chronological succession of their kings, and when they are pressed for
information and are at a loss, not knowing what to say, they invariably take to
tale-telling (quoted in Perrett 1999, 308).
24 vol.13
that Bharthari and Bhaoji Dkita, by not presenting concrete
historical references in their works, situated their works in the timeless
realm. To locate and determine the historical contexts of their works,
much knowledge from outside the text is needed (ibid., 464). Rather
than seeking to provide information from outside the text, Houben
looks for a possible reason to explain the lack of concrete historical
references and proposes the ritual culture as a key to solving this
problem. As he notes, finding an answer in Vedic ritual seems
promising because this is the domain in which most (if not all)
Brahmins, who are the main producers of Sanskrit texts, are supposed
to participate.
However, Houbens treatment of Vedic ritual, unlike other studies
on this subject, only focuses on its formality. Basing his work on the
theory of ritual proposed by Rappaport,5) who defines the ritual
domain as eternal and timeless on the basis of his research among
the Marin of New Guineas Central Highlands,6) Houben asserts that
regular participation in this timeless ritual realm may have influenced
5) The work to which Houben refers is Rappaport, Roy A. Ritual and Religion in the
Making of Humanity, Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology.
Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
6) Rappaports theory of ritual time can be seen in the following passage quoted by
Houben: [Liturgical acts] repeatedly recover the eternal which, being nothing if not
immutable, is intrinsically true and thus moral That which occurs in rituals intervals is not historical but timeless, and to participate in a canon is to escape from times flow into what is, in fact, often regarded as the unbounded, the infinite,
the limitless, the absolutely true and the immortally vital (quoted in Houben 2002, 469).
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 25
Hindus perception of time: in their scholarly and creative textual
productions, Brahmin authors can afford to remain close to the
ritually created time out of time and need not descend to the
time-experience of social reality (473). It was the obligation of
Brahmins to participate in the cyclical ritual activities that overruled
ones engagements in daily life and eventually impose(d) a
schedule and organize(d) intellectuals lives (470).
This focus on the formality of Vedic ritual based on an absolute
demarcation between the ritual and mundane realms in this case, the timeless vs. the historical realm is reminiscent of the work of Fritz Staal (1979), who sees no meaning, goal or aim in Vedic ritual
(8-9). According to Staal, because ritual is pure activity without
meaning or goal (9), what matters in the ritual setting is the
exactitude of ritual activities, not the result that can be obtained
through those actions. In this way, Staal finds in his materials pure
syntax devoid of any semantic meaning. Although Houben, unlike
Staal, is not concerned with the grammar that governs ritual activities
but with the side effects of ritual activities (i.e., their influence on the
mentality of participants), they share the same attitude toward the
Vedic rituals in that they are not concerned with self-understandings
of the Vedic rituals provided in the Veda itself. Instead, they draw
conclusions on the same material without referring to traditional
explanations of the meaning of ritual activities.
This neglect of the explanations provided by the Veda itself is partly
due to the prevalent presupposition called the paradox of the Vedas
26 vol.13
in Western scholarship on the authority of the Veda in ancient India.
According to Renou (1965), an Indian intellectual always believes
oneself to be in the wake of the Veda, when one turns ones back on
it (1). In other words, Indian orthodox schools never doubted the
absolute authority of the Veda, but they were unconcerned about its
contents, and they eventually developed their own philosophies
without dependence on the Veda. Halbfass aptly summarizes the
situation as follows: The preservation and glorification of the text
seem to coincide with its neglect and the obscuration of its meaning
(Halbfass 1991, 2). The authority and role of the Veda in the
intellectual history of India is so nominal that even in the most
orthodox domains, the reverence to the Vedas has come to be a
simple raising of the hat (Renou 1965, 2).
5
This seeming neglect of the contents of the Veda by the tradition
should not lead modern scholars to dismiss these contents altogether.
If we assume that both he (i.e., Bharthari) and Bhaoji Dkita had
been Vedic students for several years of their life (Houben 2002,
470), is it reasonable to conjecture that they did not concern
themselves with the contents of the Veda? Does the lack of reference
to the Veda or the discontinuity of their thought with the Veda prove
their ignorance or neglect of the Vedic revelation? Moreover, does
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 27
their disinterested attitude toward the contents of the Veda justify our
investigation of only the external formality of the Veda? As Halbfass
notes, Renou, who initially posed the question of the Vedic paradox,
observes that real extensions of the Veda in later Hinduism are
found in its process of transformation into the living substance of
Hindu practices and speculation (Halbfass 1991, 2-3). Therefore, the
influence of the Veda in the later thinking of Hindu philosophers
should not be assessed solely by these philosophers continuity with
the Veda in terms of its philosophical agenda. In this section, by
reviewing the cosmogonic myths contained in the Veda, we will
attempt to understand the timeless nature of the ritual realm.
Furthermore, we will encounter the inclusivistic scheme found in the
Gt again in the Vedic creation myths, and we will realize that the
Gt developed its model based on the Vedic model. In this way, we
will see that the real extensions of the Veda in the intellectual
history of India lie in its peculiar pattern of thinking, namely,
inclusivism, which is perpetuated throughout history.
Unlike the revelations of other monotheistic religions, the Veda
was not revealed at a certain point in time (Wilke & Moebus 2011,
349). Although the universe continuously undergoes cycles of creation
and destruction, the Veda is not affected by the transient phenomena
of the universe; it transcends time. According to Mms, the most
orthodox school specializing in the Vedic hermeneutic, the Veda does
not have an author because the existence of a specific author would
indicate that it was produced at some point and that there was a time
28 vol.13
when the Veda was not in the universe. The authorlessness
(apaurueyatva) theory, in this sense, is devised to prove the eternal
existence of the Veda by depriving it of historicity. Efforts by
Mms to erase historical traces from the Veda also took more
audacious forms. While projecting the Veda as an anonymous work is
an attempt to give it an eternal outlook, they also attempted to find
evidence in the text to demonstrate its eternality by taking a specific
hermeneutical position.
Because it is believed that the text was seen by ancient is (lit.
seers), we often find that portions of it are recorded under their
personal names. Because those seers are regarded as the transmitters
of the eternal truth, the appearance of their names in the text does not
harm the timelessness and, thus, the absolute authoritativeness of the
Veda. However, the problem is that we also see in the Veda proper
names of people other than the seers. For example, we find a sentence
such as, Babara Prvhai [son of Pravha] once desired (Taittirya Sahit 7.1.5.4, quoted in Pollock 1989, 608). Undoubtedly, this
sentence evinces the sensitivity of the authors (or seers) of the Veda
to their phenomenal surroundings; we can establish a partial genealogy
based on it (Pravha - Babara). However, later Mmsakas, by
deliberately reading concrete references such as this to denote
eternal objects, effaced historicity from the text. In this case,
Mmsakas read Prvhai not as the name of a historical person
but as howling wind. Reading this as a historical figure is an illusion,
according to them, that arises due to the similarity of sounds of the
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 29
word (rutismnyamtram), which denotes two different objects (one
eternal and the other phenomenal). It is Pollocks (1989) assumption
that Mmsakas intentionally chose to follow the nairukta or
etymological analysis of the Veda over the aitihsikas approach,
which seeks to explain the Vedic texts on the basis of the things that
have actually happened (itihsa) to deprive the Veda of a dimension
of historical referentiality and make its truth eternal (608). In this way,
the eternality of the Veda based on its authorlessness (apaurueyatva)
is confirmed by their [i.e., the Vedas] contents (ibid.)
Considering this transcendence of the Veda, we might think that
whatever truth or knowledge it contains would be irrelevant to this
transient world. However, the situation is quite the opposite. The
Veda, existing eternally, is revealed at the time of every creation to the
Creator god Prajpati and serves as a manual or blueprint of the
universe so that he can create the same universe repeatedly. However,
the significance of the Veda at the time of Creation is more than
simply a guidebook. The Creator god Prajpati uses it as physical
material for the entire universe; everything is literally made from the
text or, more correctly, the sounds of the Veda. The way of using the
Vedic sounds is ritualistic.
Because there is considerable variety in the cosmogonic myths in
the Veda, it is difficult to conflate them into a standard version of a
creation story. However, although the narratives differ from one
another, one common theme is that the universe was created by ritual
activities. In the Purua-Skta (V 10.90),7) one of the more famous
30 vol.13
creation stories in the Veda, the whole world is created by sacrificing
the cosmic giant Purua. Space (sky, mid-region, earth), the four
varas (Brhmaa, Katriya, Vaiya, dra), various inhabitants of the
world (cows, goats, sheep), and heavenly gods (Agni, Indra, Srya,
Vyu) all emerged out of the sacrifice of that primordial man (V
10.90.10-5).
One interesting point in the story is that the Veda refers to itself as
one of the products (in fact, the first product) created from this first
ritual performance: From that sacrifice in which everything was
offered, the verses and chants were born, the metres were born from
it, and from it the formulas were born (V 10.90.9). Here, the
verse denotes the g Veda, the chants denote the Sma Veda, and
the formulas denote the Yajur Veda. All three principle Vedas
came into being through the medium of ritual activities.
Another notable point in the Purua-Skta is that it shows the
beginning of the Vedic homological thinking, often characterized as
the cardinal feature of the corpus of the Veda (Smith 1989, 31). In the
Skta, the sacrificial products do not emerge randomly; they are
created in an orderly, though not entirely systematic, way, as seen in
later Brhmaa ritual texts. We see that relationships (bandhu) are
made between Puruas mouth and the Brahmin, the head and sky, the
mind and the moon, and so on. This system of equations, as Renou
calls it (ibid.), was further developed in other cosmogonic myths and
7) For the translation of the g Veda and the Purua-skta in particular, I referred to
Doniger (1981, 29-32).
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 31
defined the nature and status of the Veda itself.
In another cosmogonic narrative introduced in the atapatha
Brhmaa, the Creator god Prajpati builds a sacrificial altar, which
represents the primordial man Purua, and practices tapas (i.e.,
asceticism) out of a desire to multiply (i.e., to reproduce). After
accumulating creative power, Prajpati first created Brahman, that is
threefold knowledge (tray vidy the Vedas) and then spoke the language of creation. In other words, by reciting or calling out
mantras, every corresponding object came into being. Most important
among those words are three vyhtis (bh, bhuva, sva); upon their
recitation, there emerged the earth, mid-region, and heaven,
respectively (Wilke & Moebus 2011, 416-8). Everything has arisen
from these three regions, including the Veda.8)
From him who had exerted himself and practiced tapas the three
worlds earth, midregions, and heaven were brought forth. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From those heated
[worlds] three lights were produced: Agni, fire; he who purifies
here [Vyu, wind]; and Srya, the sun. He infused warmth into
these three lights. From those heated [lights] the three Vedas
were produced: the g-Veda from Agni, the Yajur-Veda from
Vyu, and the Sma-Veda from Srya. (atapatha Brhmaa
8) The apparent circularity of creation (the Veda creates three worlds, and from three
worlds, the Veda is created), according to Holdrege (1994, 49), is a typical Vedic
paradox of mutual creation.
32 vol.13
11.5.8.1-4; translation from Holdrege 1994, 49)
This tripartite creation activity of Prajpati continues to fill the
world and give it a natural and social order. His creation includes the
social classes (the three upper classes), seasons, parts of day, cardinal
directions, and the meters of the Vedic hymns (for a chart of his
creations and their homological interrelationship, see Smith 1994, 82-3).
The most important feature in this narrative is that the creation
activity of Prajpati was a linguistic one, and the linguistic expressions
that were once used by the Creator god are left to mankind in the
form of the Veda. However, Prajpatis linguistic activity was not an
ordinary, communicative one; rather, it was a statement of truth
which makes everything that was uttered true (Wilke & Moebus
2011, 416; see also Wheelock 1989, 118) which became an important
theme of Indian epics. However, there is a slight difference between a
truth statement and the Vedic mantras used in the creation ritual.
Whereas the former makes itself true by creating the corresponding
physical reality depending on the truth value of a claim, the Vedic
mantras transform themselves into the physical material of the
products of the ritual. In other words, mantras become the physical
substance of their production; the fundamental callings (vyhtis, viz.
bh, bhuva, sva) of Prajpati are themselves the earth, mid-region,
and heaven. With these correspondences established between the
realm of sound and the realm of form (Holdrege 1994, 48), gods on
earth (i.e., Brahmin priests who aspire to assume the role of Prajpati)
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 33
gain access to the secret of the universal creation and control over the
entire universe. By resonating mantras in the ritual setting, the
Brahmin priests can manipulate reality, which is made of mantras.
6
Upon closer examination of the cosmogonic myths of the Veda, we
realize that the same inclusivistic pattern of the Gt works within
them. The Creator god Prajpati creates everything in the universe by
reciting the Vedas (or the Vedic mantras), which exist eternally as the
universal principle in the primordial ritual, similar to Vius revelation
of truth to the first human being, Manu. The only difference between
them is that the truth of Viu is to be transmitted to later generations,
whereas the Vedic words are not to be transmitted because they
ontologically constitute every being in the three worlds. Furthermore,
we find the counterpart of Vius regular descent to the earth: the
primordial creative activity of Prajpati is continuously emulated and
enacted by the Brahmin priests at every significant juncture of human
time, such as morning, the new and full moon days, and the last and
first day of a year. This activity signifies that the entire universe is
regularly renewed by human rituals using the same eternal linguistic
materials. Just as Viu reminds mankind of the same truth, the Brahmin
priests, as human gods, repeatedly reveal the same everlasting
cosmological secret. Finally, just as Ka sees no otherness, but only
34 vol.13
decay, in devotion to other gods, the Veda sees no otherness, but only
remoteness, in the derivative order of things because everything is
made of itself in sequence.
Although the Veda claims universality by presenting itself as the
source of the universe, later interpretations of the Veda show that its
subject matter was conceived exclusively in relation to the dharma
(the ritual obligations of Brahmins) and moka(liberation from the
cycle of rebirth). Except for the Mms and Vednta schools, which
devoted themselves to the hermeneutic of the Veda, other scientific
knowledge systems that developed in traditional India did not inherit
the topics of their investigation from the Veda. Therefore, the Vedas
self-declaration that it is the source of universal knowledge seems
easily refutable, and one might think that the actual influence of the
Veda was minimal compared with the respect paid to its authority by
the tradition. Nonetheless, despite the apparent dearth of knowledge
on everything in itself, the Veda realized its universalistic claim by
providing the standard model for true knowledge in the course of
history.
The most exemplary phenomenon to prove this case is the
continuous appearance of texts that claim to be the Veda or to be
fully rooted in the Vedic revelation. For example, the Dharmastras,
which prescribe the normative behaviors of Hindus, assert that they
derive all their rules directly from the Veda. If a certain rule is not
found in the extant Veda, this does not indicate its non-Vedic origin;
rather, it affirms the existence of a lost Veda. In addition to this
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 35
rhetoric of the lost Veda, we see throughout Indian history
numerous texts that were counted as the last addition to the Vedic
corpus, namely, the fifth Veda: various Puras, Mahbhrata,
yurveda, Nyastra, and, more recently, the Bible. By emphasizing
their revelatory origin in accordance with their title Veda, these
texts verify the universal claim of the Veda that knowledge of
everything was completely revealed at the time of creation.
This process of making the foundational text of a tradition a Veda is
not merely the act of calling ones own scripture a Veda. It reflects a
prevalent cultural ideology about legitimate religious and scientific
knowledge systems. In this regard, traditional intellectuals not only
called their own canon a Veda but also projected their ideas of the
Veda onto their own canon. The gradual elevation of munitraya in the
Sanskrit Grammarian tradition (vykaraa) to the status of is,
traced and documented by Deshpande (1998), is illuminating on this
point. Sanskrit grammar was developed as one of the auxiliary
sciences (Vedga) to keep the Veda intact. As an auxiliary science,
the status of its core text, the Adhyy of Pini, differed from that
of the Veda. Whereas the latter was the full manifestation of the truth,
the former was a study on that revelation and a human effort to
understand the eternal truth. Because of this difference in their status,
unlike the Veda, whose text or sound was to be preserved with the
utmost exactitude, Pinis text was considered improvable by later
generations of scholars, and Pinis grammatical rules were indeed
criticized and emended by later grammarians such as Ktyyana and
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Patajali. Over time, the works of these three grammarians (munitraya)
were viewed as quasi-Vedas (chandovat), as mythical narratives
developed around them. From Bhartharis time on, grammarians
designated them [Maha-]is (the same title as those who saw the
Vedic truth), recognizing Pinis work (especially the ivastra) as
the revelation from iva (Mahevara) and revering Patajali as the
incarnation of ea, the king of all Ngas (Deshpande 1998, 19-27). In
these mythical thoughts, we can clearly observe how grammarians
transformed their fundamental texts into Vedas by making Pini a
seer who received the complete (grammatical) knowledge from the
god iva and by making Patajali an avatra of ea who reaffirmed
the same truth.
Whereas Deshpandes (1998) study addresses the diachronic
dimension of a phenomenon that can be called the Vedicization of
all knowledge systems by outlining how the Sanskrit grammarians
canons (viz. the Adhyy and the Mahbhya) gradually came to
resemble the outlook of the Veda, Pollocks (1985) study treats the
synchronic dimension of the same phenomenon by considering how
much the Vedic model of knowledge was prevalent in traditional
India. Delving into the notion of stra and its ideological power
over actual practices in every aspect of Indian life, Pollock enumerates
diverse ranges of fields in which strict rules have been established.
According to his documentation, it seems that all human activities
have prototypical, paradigmatic counterparts laid out in stras. From
everyday activities such as boiling rice, raising cattle, and sexual
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 37
intercourse to technical matters such as making a pot or building a
house, stras prescribed the normative model to be followed. By
locating their origination in the time of cosmological creation, these
stras take the same outfit of the Veda. In this process of making
Vedas in every realm of human life, the Vedas claim that they are the
source of all knowledge about everything gradually became true.
In relation to our subject matter, inclusivism, one of the most
important implications of this Vedic self-realization process is that it
virtually prevents one from seeing any novelty in human life. The
standard model of human behavior was revealed at the very beginning
of the universe, and mankind inherited that knowledge of everything
in the form of the Vedas. Consequently, any effort to improve ones
knowledge does not consist in discovering yet unknown truth but in
reminding oneself of once fully revealed but now forgotten truth. In
this respect, the main task for traditional Indian intellectuals was to
re-appropriate the past (rather than to pioneer the future) because, to
borrow the words of Jayanta, all sciences have existed, precisely like
the Vedas, from the first creation (from the Nyyamajar, quoted in
Pollock 1985, 516).
7
As evident from the previous section, the Veda, as the stra par
excellence (Pollock 1985, 518), provided the template or framework
38 vol.13
through which any system of knowledge should present itself to be
recognized as the truth. However, as we have seen in the case of the
Vedicization of the canonical treatises of the Sanskrit grammarians,
this process of making every stra a Veda is not devoid of a historical
dimension. It was not the case from the beginning of scientific studies
in India; rather, it was a gradual process. Although lucid elaboration
on this phenomenon, which occurred over two thousand years, would
require more rigorous future research with a more comprehensive
outlook, I would like to briefly conjecture regarding a condition that
may have maintained this Vedic or inclusivistic model of truth by
focusing on the role of the ia (a learned one) in the degenerate age.
In the study abovementioned (Deshpande 1998) that traces how the
traditional maxim (yathottara hi munitrayasya prmyam),
which granted i-like status to the munitraya and affirmed the
highest authority of Patajali, was popularized in the tradition,
Deshpande sees a rupture of the tradition between Patajali and
Bharthari with regard to the final authority in the domain of Sanskrit
grammar. His observation is in accordance with the traditional
categories for distinguishing two generations of grammarians, namely,
lakyaikacakuska (those whose attention is solely fixed on the
Sanskrit usage to be described) and lakaaikacakuska (those
whose attention is solely fixed upon the rules of grammar). The first
three grammarians (viz. Pini, Ktyyana, and Patajali) belong to
the first group, which is characterized by their right to modify
grammatical rules based on their observation of the correct usage of
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 39
Sanskrit. All later grammarians belong to the second category,
indicating their inability to emend the established rules of the first
three sages (Deshpande 1993, 33).
When this distinction between the two groups of grammarians is
made explicit, it reflects reality because Patajali, while paying due
respect to his seniors, exercises his right to oppose their opinions,
whereas Bharthari does not. Moreover, and more significantly, it
reflects these two grammarian-philosophers self-awareness of the
nature of the era in which they lived. The difference between their
self-awareness can be assessed by examining the difference in their
notion of the ias (or social elites). For Patajali, the ias are the
normative speakers of Sanskrit who can be defined by their way of
life and place of residence (ibid., 62). Thus, they were a contemporary
and neighboring community in which he could collect correct usage of
Sanskrit and on which he could base his investigation. In contrast,
according to Deshpande (1998), Bharthari could not point to
grammar-independent contemporary usage of Sanskrit (20) and
identified the ias with the ancient grammarians who lived in the
golden age: there is a strong feeling that the current times are
decadent, and that there are no truly authoritative persons around
(ibid.).
To support his argument on the difference between Patajali and
Bhartharis notions of ia, in another study, Deshpande (1994)
collected relevant primary materials that evince each grammarians
understanding of the term. Although it is clear in his presentation that
40 vol.13
Bharthari feels remote from the glorious period of munitraya, it is
conspicuous in the materials that whenever Bharthari speaks of the
tradition of the ias, he is emphatic about its unbroken continuity.
For example, in the Vtti on Vkyapadya 1.27, he uses the expression
received through uninterrupted tradition consisting of successive
teaching of the cultured (iopadeapramparygamvicchedengatni)
along with another expression of more or less the same meaning.
Deshpande also comments on this phrase that the ias of one
generation transmit their knowledge to the next generation of ias in
an unbroken way, and presumably the latter-day ias derive their
authority from their being in line of transmission from the ias of the
older generation (Deshpande 1994, 103). Furthermore, it is not only
in the Vtti but also in a verse of the Vkyapadya that we find the
expression regarding the uninterrupted lineage of the ias. Verse
133 in the first chapter reads as follows: Knowledge of the correctness
of words is the subject of this tradition called Grammar. It is here that
the uninterrupted tradition of cultured people is recorded.9) (quoted
in ibid. 106; emphasis added)
Bhartharis belief in the uninterruptedness of lineage of the ias
culminates in Vkyapadya 1.125, where he clearly states that the
lineage of the ias will never be severed, even in the decadent age.
Even if the doctrines perish and there are no more authors to
9) Vkyapadya 1.133, sdhutvajnaviay sai vykaraasmti/ avicchedena inm
ida smtinibandhanam//
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 41
compose other, cultured people follow the right path mentioned
in the rutis and the smtis.10) (quoted in Deshpande 1994, 105)
Combining all these expressions in the work of Bharthari, we may
conclude that even though he perceived himself as living in the
degenerate era, he still thought that the lineage of learned people who
regulate their behavior in accordance with the Veda continued to
exist. The persistent existence of this group of ritualists11) has
particular significance in relation to the inclusivistic pattern of the
Veda because it shows that there has always been a possibility of
partaking in the primordial ritual of Prajpati and, as a result, of
renewing the eternal truth; regular ritual practice can be read as the
equivalent of Vius avatra. Although the Brahmin intellectuals
thought of their own era as a decadent one, by performing obligatory
rituals they had the opportunity to participate in the eternal realm;
they had one foot in the decadent world and the other in the eternal
world. The story of Yarvastarva, mentioned in the Mahbhya,
further elucidates this situation:
Thus it is heard. There were in ancient times great sages called
10) Vkyapadya 1.125, asta yteu vdeu kartv anyeu asatsv api/ rutismtyudita
karma loko na vyativartate//
11) What Bharthari means by follow the right path mentioned in the rutis (in VP
1.125) is further commented in the Vtti as do not violate the rites taught in the
Scripture (rutivihitni karmi). Therefore, it is ritual activity (karma) that the
ias perform according to the ruti (i.e., the Veda).
42 vol.13
Yarvastarva. They had direct insight into the nature of
things, knew this and the yonder worlds, had realized what
there is to be realized, and had attained the true knowledge of
the world as it is. Those highly honored sages used the
[incorrect = Prakrit] expressions yarva and tarva when
they should have used [the proper Sanskrit] expressions yad v
na and tad v na. However, they did not use these incorrect
[=Prakrit] expressions during a sacrificial performance.12)
(quoted in Deshpande 1994, 112)
By applying the inclusivistic pattern we found in the Gt to the
situation of the Brahmins in this narrative, we realize that the
Brahmins are the embodiments of inclusivism. 1. They are well versed
in the complete truth revealed at the time of universal creation (i.e.,
the Veda). 2. However, because they live in the degenerate age, when
the language of the gods (Sanskrit) is no longer used, they speak
Prakrit in their ordinary life. 3. Nevertheless, when they remind
themselves of the primordial truth, they speak Sanskrit because the
Creator god Prajpati used that language when he created the
universe. It is from this dual position, from which the Brahmins could
view the pristine as well as the decayed state of the universal truth,
that they viewed and understood the world. As I conclude this paper, I
12) Mahbhya on P.2.4.56, eva hi ryate/ yarvastarvo nma rayo babhvu
pratyakadharma parparaj viditaveditavy adhigataythtathy/ te tatrabhavanto
yad v nas tad v na iti prayoktavye yarvastarva iti prayujate yje pua
karmai npabhante/
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 43
would like to note the doxographical genre of Sanskrit literature as
the manifestation of this specific viewpoint of the Brahmins.
8
The stika (affirmer) and the Nstika (denier) are the most widely
used categories for describing Indian philosophy. Like many other
critical terms in Sanskrit, the meanings of these categories have not
been constant. They have been the locus of debate, and their meaning
has been negotiated throughout history. Nonetheless, as the Hindu
orthodox schools gained the upper hand over (now extinguished)
Buddhism and Jainism, the interpretation offered in the Manusmti
was fixed as their natural meaning, and it remains the dominant way
of reading them: Any twice-born who disregards these two roots
[ruti and smti] on the basis of the science of logic should be excluded
by the righteous as a nstika, a reviler of the Veda13) (Manu. 2.11;
translation from Nicholson 2010, 168). Another famous category is the
standard list of six daranas (viz. Skhya-Yoga, Nyya-Vaieika,
and Mms-Vednta). According to the definition of Manu. 2.11,
all six daranas belong to the stika camp because they accept the
Veda as the ultimate source of truth.
All the standardized categories used in Indian philosophy have their
13) Manu. 2.11 yo vamanyeta te mle hetustrrayd dvija/ sa sdhubhir bahikryo
nstiko vedanindaka//
44 vol.13
provenance in a specific genre of Sanskrit literature that is referred to
by modern scholars as doxography. The lack of historiographical
literature in India is a well-known phenomenon, and this commonly
held observation is also evident in the Indian philosophical works.
Indian intellectuals did not record the history of their philosophical
development; instead, they enumerated views of schools from a
fixed list. This peculiar way of presenting and summarizing the
philosophy of ones own tradition was often viewed as a sign of
inferiority (notably by Hegel). It was compared with other traditional
presentations, such as the Greek, and it determined the way of
studying Indian philosophies in the modern period. Rather than
examining the interrelationship between various competing groups of
philosophers, modern scholars preferred to focus on one specific
school depending on their own interest (Halbfass 1988, 349-50).
The doxographical presentation of philosophical schools is indeed a
peculiar, uniquely Indian phenomenon when compared with the
Greek and Chinese traditions, but it is not an incidental one.
Considering the inclusivistic pattern of thinking about truth, there is
no way of summarizing all the philosophical traditions other than
situating them in an ahistorical realm and treating them as eternal
philosophical units. In the doxographical scheme, we find a few
interesting characteristics that are pertinent to our topic of inclusivism.
First, Sanskrit doxographies always include the Nstika schools,
such as those of the materialists, Buddhists, and Jains in their list. In
the minds of these authors, despite the Nstikas violent rejection of
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 45
the Vedic authority, everything has its fundamental roots in the Veda;
therefore, although their philosophies are deformed, they must be
addressed in the same scheme. Kumrilas severe revilement of the
Nstika is noteworthy in this regard; to him, Buddhists and Jains are
not only to be criticized philosophically but also ethically, for they do
not accept the fact that the Vedas are the source [of their teachings],
just as an evil son who hates his parents is ashamed to admit his
descent from them (quoted in Smith 1989, 18).
Second, doxographical works give each philosophical school a
hierarchical order. This can be explained by the same logic with which
we understood Kas anger toward the worshippers of other gods.
Although Ka readily admits that devotion to other gods will
ultimately reach Viu, it fails because these devotions are decayed
forms of worship. In a similar vein, the authors of doxographies list
Buddhist teachings as a form of philosophy, but they unanimously
locate Buddhism at a very low level to signify how much these
teachings are deformed from the pristine teaching of the Veda. In
addition to the low status of the Nstika schools in the hierarchical
order, it is also interesting that they have the highest teaching that will
lead its followers to the ultimate goal of liberation. According to the
structure of the inclusivistic pattern, we can interpret this fact as
acknowledgement of the possibility of directly accessing the universal
truth of the Veda. Viewed in this way, the doxographical scheme that
was widely adopted to outline the landscape of Indian philosophy is
none other than a manifestation of inclusivism developed out of the
46 vol.13
Veda itself.
Before concluding this discussion, I would like to return to the
problem introduced at the beginning of this paper. The constructionists
assert that Hinduism can be understood as consisting of many
different religions. Based on the differences between various religious
groups in the main god, scripture, and rituals, they argue, Hinduism
should be differentiated, and the whole concept of the oneness of
Hindu religion was introduced by missionaries and scholars from the
West (von Stietencron 1995, 51). However, we realize upon close
examination of their source materials that even though they seem to
be evidence of the separate identities of different groups, they also
emulate the Vedic model of truth and incorporate the inclusivistic
pattern in understanding religious others. The analysis of one aivite
text by von Stiecron (1995) is exemplary in this respect. In the text
(i.e., the Somaambhupaddhati), which is his focus of analysis, we see
a general roadmap of the aivas for ultimate liberation or the goal of
becoming iva himself.
According to the text, the universe is the emanation of iva,
consisting of 36 tattvas (i.e., principles that constitute all worldly
existence) and an infinite number of individual souls (au). For an
individual soul to reach and attain the omniscient and omnipotent
state of iva, one must strive to return to the source of universal
creation against the stream of ivas emanation. This path to the
supreme God and the goal of reaching and becoming himself,
according to the text, is common to all people, whether they are
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 47
Vaiavas, Buddhists, or Jains. However, these heretics have upper
limits, whereas the aivas have no hindrance in their pursuit of the
ultimate goal:
The followers of Buddha are situated in buddhi-tattva (as their
muktisthna); the Jainas in (sattvagua which forms) the top of
the guas; but those who fully know the Veda (i.e., the
Mmsakas) are in (prakti which is) the womb of the guas;
and those who direct themselves towards Bhagavan (Viu) are
in purua (-tattva).14) (Somaambhupaddhati v. 7; Quoted in
von Stiecron 1995, 61.)
Although von Stiecron finds a conclusive corroboration for his
constructionist view in this passage, which offers a clear picture of the
relative ranking and their own keen sense of superiority (ibid.), we
see this as a variation of the typical doxographical understanding of
others that is prevalent in other religious or philosophical groups.
Although the aivas strive to reach iva (not other gods), they employ
the same Vedic inclusivistic pattern. iva revealed the full roadmap of
liberation at the time of creation. By following it step by step, one
regains the original truth, although those who follow decayed forms of
practice will fail. The real extension of the Veda is not to be found
in terms of its subject matter. As Halbfass (1990) notes, the role of the
Veda in Indian intellectual history is found in the Veda itself because
14) buddhitattve sthit bauddh jains tu guamastake/ vedntajs tu tadyonau purue
bhagavanmukh//
48 vol.13
it exhibits a paradigmatic commitment to an absolute origin and
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52 vol.13
Abstract
Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos
Hyoung Seok Ham
University of Michigan
This paper seeks to define a unifying vision of Hinduism from within
the tradition and claims that this vision is inclusivistic. By reviewing
scholarly discussions on inclusivism, the singularity/plurality of Hinduism,
and the timelessness feature of Sanskrit literature, the paper analyzes
how truth claims were made in ancient India and identifies a possible
provenance of inclusivism in the role of Brahmins who regularly
emulated the Creator god Prajpati. Considering the influence of Vedic
ritualistic culture on the perception of truth and otherness, the real
extension of the Veda, despite its seeming neglect in the tradition,
should be appreciated for providing Indian intellectuals with a
paradigmatic framework of knowledge throughout history.
Inclusivism: the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos 53
Key Words : Inclusivism, Hinduism, Hinduisms, Vedic rituals, truth claims
2013 6 9 2013 6 21 2013 6 24
(Critical Review for Buddhist Studies)13(2013. 6) 55p~111p
(, )
, , 134 .
, , .
85 () 5(Nos. 2748-2752) 6(S. 2733, S .4102, S. 4107, S. 2463, S. 2439, S. 2662) . , 5 6
56 vol.13
, , () () .
,I. S. 2733 S. 4102, BD06199 (3)II. S. 4107, BD06198 (11)III. S. 2463, BD06199 (32), S. 113vIV. S. 2439, BD06196 (70), P. ch. 4567, BD06197 (26),
P. ch. 3308V. S. 2662 II V
. 3( 2, 1) ,
1) 206. ()2) 1468-4. (~)3) BD06202 (15). () 2 .1) S. 6494 (~)2) S. 4107 (~)9 , 4
, 7 , .
: , , , , ,
57
1.
1)
19251932()85
( 1 )
(CE.578- 645?)2)()
1) ([1932]pp.3-4)2) ([2010] [2011] [2012b])([2012]p.76, p.273108)
58 vol.13
(T.85) 3)
I No.2748 170a05-176c17 S.2733 293 508
I No.2748 172a20-179c28 S.4102 408 6
II No.2749 180a05-189b20 S.4107 512 7
III No.2750 189b26-194c01 S.2463 247 6
IV No.2751 194c07-199a12 S.2439 240 6
V No.2752 199a18-205b05 S.2662 373 103 7 8
III[S.37]()[S.520](
[] )
()([1931])(p.97)[S.2502](() T.85 No.2745)[1931]
3) ([1932 1933]Lionel Giles[1957][1959-1963][1978])()
Lionel Giles I S.4102 early 6th cent 6 II S.4107 7th cent III S.2463 6th cent 5 IV S.2439 early 6th cent V S.2662
59
[S.2504]
IIVII
2.
2748-2752 pls.25-33pp.94-107([1959-1963]4))
16[1977-2000]4746[1996-1998]55(1)
4) ([1978a]p.8039 [1978b]p.123(10) [1979]p.27712)
60 vol.13
134()5)
2-1. I. [S.2733] [S.4102] (T.85 No.2748)
([1932]pp.25-27)(pp.94-97)([1978b] pp.108-113 [1993]pp.644-650)([1998F]p.48)
6)(CE.508)() 7)II
(4908))27
5) 6) 7) [P.2250v](
118, p.78b)8) ([1965]pp.115-120)(
[1978]pp.234-236)
61
508([1991]p.46)(pp.94-95)9)([1981]pp.274-275)([1932]p.26)( )([1992a])([1991])
([1993] p.650)[32]()[32]I([1978b]pp.109-111)()([1992b])
2-2. II. [S.4107] (T.85 No.2749)
(p.102)([1977c]pp.64-65 [1991])([1998F] p.46)
9) (CE.497-554)(CE.529)(T.50 no.2059 p.364a, ll. 10-11)
62 vol.13
()()10)(CE.-879-)11)()II
()15( )13[S.4107]3.
10) ([2010]pp.124-128)11) ()Ho-ke-ky-gen-zan-y-sh.()Fa-hua-ching-hsan-tsan-yao-chi.
() ()(10, p.32d)
63
[S.4107][S.649412)]()()
[11]()[11] [S.4107] ([1991]pp.377-379)63913)(645)[11]
[S.4107][244(77 5 4583)]()14)[S.6494]
[15]()( 206 Kor. 206)()
12) ([2010 2012b])13) ([2012b]pp.52-54)14) ([2012]p.24)
64 vol.13
2-3. III. [S.2463] (T.85 No.2750)
(pp.99-100)([1978b]pp.114-117 [1993]pp.651-652)([1998F]p.45)
(CE.-763-)(T.85 No.2823)
(pls.31-32 144MF15)37-49 )53(144MF28-31 )16)300()
17)(569)()()(IIV)([1932]p.27)
[32]([A1])
15) 144microfilm([1989])16) 5317) ([S.6915] [BD08705(65)] [P.2202v])
65
([B1])()18)([1993]pp.651-652)
[S.113v]()
18) [A1][A2][B1][B2][B3][C0] [S.2463][32]
/28 5 [A1] (32(BD06199) p.11, l.255)17 [A1] (S.2463 p.30, l.39 )25 [A2] (S.2463 p.46, l.175 T.85 no.2750 p.193a, l.20)6 [B1] (32(BD06199) p.15, l.293)19 [B1] (S.2463 p.37, l.5 T.85 no.2750 p.189c, l.7)21 [B1] (S.2463 p.39, l.38 T.85 no.2750 p.190b, l.11)22 [B1] (S.2463 p.41, l.74 T.85 no.2750 p.191a, l.15)23 [B1] (S.2463 p.42, l.94 T.85 no.2750 p.191b, l.19)28 [B1] (S.2463 p.48, l.227 T.85 no.2750 p.194a, l.28)26 [B2] (S.2463 p.47, l.194 T.85 no.2750 p.193b, l.27)20 [B3] (S.2463 p.38, l.16 T.85 no.2750 p.189c, l.28)24 [B3] (S.2463 p.44, l.142 T.85 no.2750 p.192b, l.18)27 [C0] (S.2463 p.47, l.209 T.85 no.2750 p.193c, l.26)
[A1][B2][S.2463][A2](T.85 no.2748 p.178c, l.18 S.4102 p.16, l.347)[B1](T.33 no.1707 p.339a, l.18)[B3](T.42 no.1824 p.91c, l.20)(T.42 no.1824 p.123b, l.25)(CE.539)([S.2732])(T.85 no.2769 p.342c, l.9, p.346c, l. 27)(SZ.46 no.791 p.855b, l.19)(SZ.46 no.791 p.886b, l.17)[C0]
66 vol.13
([1993]p.652)
2-4. IV. [S.2439] (T.85 No.2751)
(pp.100-101)([1978b]pp.117-120 [1993]pp.653-659)([1998F]p.45)([2013])
[S.2439]()[70]( )()
1.
2. 3. [P.4567]( )
()
19)([P.4567][70][S.2439])20)
19) ([2013])(1) ([1978b 1993])[P.4567][S.2439][70][26](2)(BnFV[1995])[P.4567][S.2439](3) ([1998E 1998F])[P.4567][S.2439][70][26](4) ([2013])[P.4567][S.2439][70]
67
IIIIII
21)
[26]()([1993]p.658)[26]([26] [70])22)
20) (CE.435-499)(T.34 no.1721 p.452c)(T.34 no.1718 p.137a)( (9))
21) ([S.2463])(T.85 no.2750 p.189c, ll.14-22 S.2463 p.38, ll.9-14)([70(BD06196)]) (70(BD06196) p.1, ll.5-8)
22) 2()26337()()()7098()()([1998F]p.45)
68 vol.13
23)
[26][P.3308]( 53624))([1993]pp.659-662)
[P.3308][26]([26]338[P.3308]114[P.4567]92[70]98[S.2439]240)
23) ()26()()()([70] [S.2439])([1978b]p.120)
24) [P.3308]P.3308_110(06): P.3308_111(20): P.3308_112(21): P.3308_113(18): P.3308_114(06):
69
2-5. V. [S.2662] (T.85 No.2752)
(pp.102-105)([1977c]p.68)([1998F]p.45)
103(1)4657
25)26)
()27)
(pp.103-105)
25) 410221131112
26) (73)(T.85 no.2752 p.203a, l.25 - p.203b, l.3 S.2662 p.11, ll.244-249)(91)(T.85 no.2752 p.204a, ll.24-27 S.2662 p.13, ll.306-308)
27) ([2012b]p.54)
70 vol.13
3. [S.4107]
()([2012b]pp.34-35)( )( )([S.6494])() ()
()2-2. [S.4107]
71
3-1. [S.4107]
[S.4107]28)(T.85 no.2749 p.180a, l.5 S.4107 p.1, l.1)29)(T.85 no.2749 p.189b, l.20 S.4107 p.24, l.512)
(SZ.34 no.638 p. 868a, l.24)()30)(SZ.34 no.638 p.898c, ll.20-21)
[S.4107]15( )
3-2. [S.4107]
15()[S.4107]
28) (T.9 no.262 p.42c, l.2 - p.43a, l.1)
29) (T.9 no.262 p.51a, ll.5-6)
30) (T.9 no.262 p.51b, l.29 - p.51c, l.1)
72 vol.13
(SZ.34 No.638) [S.4107]
31)(p.878a, l.22-p.878b, l.6)
32)33)(T.85 no.2749 p.180a, l.16-p.180b, l.4
S.4107 p.1, ll.8-20)
(p.878b, ll.10-12)
31) (T.85 no.2780 p.537b, ll.4-9) [S.4107
32) (T.85 no.2786 p.564a, ll.6-10) [S.4107
73
(p.878b, ll.13-14)
34)
(T.85 no.2749 p.180b, ll.5-7 S.4107 p.1, ll.20-22)
35)36)
(p.880a, ll.2-5)
(T.85 no.2749 p.181a, ll.12-15 S.4107 p.3, ll.60-62)
[S.410733) 34) ()
(T.34 no.1721 p.608a, ll.1-2)[S.4107[S.4107(T.85 no.2749 p.180b, ll.18-21 S.4107 p.2, ll.28-30)(T.34 no.1720 p.373c, ll.12-20)
35) ()(T.34 no.1723 p.832c, ll.4-6)
36) [11(BD06199 p.13, l.275 - p.14, l.276)
74 vol.13
(p.887c, l.24 - p.888a, l.1)
(T.85 no.2749 p.182b, ll.13-22 S.4107 p.7, ll.134-141)
(p.882b, ll.7-9)
(p.882b, l.19)
(p.882b, ll.21-23)
37)
(p.883a, ll.22-23)
(T.85 no.2749 p.182b, ll.23-26 S.4107 p.7, ll.141-143)
[11(T.34 no.1723 p.832c, ll.4-6)37) SZ.34 p.347 38) SZ.34 p.886 39)
75
38)
(p.886c, ll.5-7)
(T.85 no.2749 p.183c, ll.19-25 S.4107 p.10, ll. 207-211)
39)40)
(p.889b, ll.1-2)
41)42)43)
(p.889b, l.18 - p.889c, l.2)
44)45)46)
(T.85 no.2749 p.186b, ll.13-23 S.4107 p.16 ll.147-354)
(T.34
76 vol.13
47)
(p.890c, l.23 - p.891a, l.2)
no.1723 p.837b, l.28 - p.837c, l.5)
40) (CE.756-815)41)
(T.34 no.1721 p.614c, ll.22-24)
42) [S.4107[S.4107()
43) (T.34 no.1723 p.837c, ll.4-7)((46))[S.4107][S.4107
44) (T.34 no.1723 p.837c, ll.7-12)[S.4107[S.4107
45) (T.34 no.1721 p.614c, ll.16-22)[S.4107
77
() 9() 4() 2
1513[S.4107]
( [S.4107]) 1513[S.4107]
[S.4107]
46) []T.34 p.614 ()T.34 p.614 ()(T.34 no.1721 p.614c, ll.22-26)[S.4107
47) (T.34 no.1723 p.838a, ll.3-5)
78 vol.13
4.
561721
()11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
I[S.2733]
I[S.4102]
[32]
[S.113v]
III[S.2463]
[P.3308]
[26]
[P.4567]
[70]
IV[S.2439]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
79
2248)
2[Kor.206]
[Kor.1468]
[15]
[S.6494]
II[S.4107]
[11]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
[P.2346] [S.6789](15603582 [1985 1986 2000]) [S.4136] [304(7754643)] [][S.6891](8771962 [1981c])
48) [S.6494][S.4107] [11] [15] ([1977c]p.72)[Kor.206] [Kor.1468]
80 vol.13
No.1 ()1 [S.2733] 2 [S.4102] 3 [32] 4 [S.113v] 5 [S.2463] 6 [P.ch.3308] 7 [26] 8 [P.ch.4567] 9 [70] 10 [S.2439]
2[P.2346]
[S.6789][S.4136]
[304][]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
[S.4136](CE.523-592)49)
([1986])
50)
49) (CE.1094)()(T.55 no.2183 p.1148c, l.23 p.32, p.178)
50) () ~
81
No.1 ()11 [Turfan24-1] 12 [Turfan24-2] 13 [S.2504] ()14 [53] ()15 [P.ch.2346] 16 [S.6789] 17 [S.4136] 18 [S.6891] 19 [15] 20 [S.6494] 21 [S.4107] 22 [11] 23 [S.2662] ,24 [S.1589] 25 [S.2465] 26 [P.ch.2176] 27 [P.ch.3832] 28 [66] 29 [43] 30 [68] 31 [12] 32 [39] 33 [Ch1215r] 34 [782] ,[079]35 [789] ,[100]36 [790] ,[101]37 [914] , 38 [921] , 39 [S.3713v] ()40 [P.ch.2118v] ()41 [P.ch.2159v] 42 [791] ,[099]43 [P.ch.2118r] 44 [S.1358v] 45 [S.4298] 46 [S.5849] 47 [49]
Total 3 44 17 11 8 4 3 9 1 1 1 4 2 1 25 1 47
82 vol.13
No.1 [1917][1924]
[1925]
[1930]
[1931]
[1932]
[1933]
[1959-
63]
[1989] ()
1 [S.2733] pp.25-26pp.9-
10p.2
()pls.25-
26 pp.25-
26pp.94-97()
/
(CE.508)
2 [S.4102] p.26 p.2()pls.27-
28 pp.26-
27pp.94-97()
[S.37]
3 [32] p.107 p.355 4 [S.113v] (CE.V)5 [S.2463] pls.31-32 p.27
pp.99-100 (CE.VI)
7 [26] p.107 p.355 9 [70] p.107 p.354 ([2013])10 [S.2439] pl.33(I) p.27
pp.100-101
13 [S.2504] p.4()pls.29-
30 pp.27-
28pp.97-
99 [S.2502]
14 [53] p.107 p.355 ()16 [S.6789] 17 [S.4136] [S.496]18 [S.6891] 19 [15] p.107 p.355 20 [S.6494] 21 [S.4107] pl.33(II) p.27 p.102
[S.520]
22 [11] p.107 p.355 23 [S.2662] pp.102-105 ,
24 [S.1589] 25 [S.2465] p.1() 28 [66] p.107 p.355 29 [43] p.107 p.355 30 [68] p.355 31 [12] p.355 32 [39] p.355 48 [48] p.498 44 [S.1358v] pp.106-107
47 [49] p.107 p.355 49 [97v] p.410 50 [81v] p.413 ([2008])51 [90] p.498
-[S.85-4-4] [Ch.85 IX.4]
p.1()
Total 2 1 4/5 6 11/12 6 17 14 16 2014,16
83
No.1 No.2 [1978]
[1990]
[1996]
[1997A]
[1998E]
[1998F]
[1999]
[2006] ()
1 - [S.2733] p.184 () (1) () / (CE.508)2 - [S.4102] p.184 () (2) () 3 - [32]
5 - [S.2463] p.184 [S.2460a](CE.VI)
6 - [P.ch.3308] p.220 (A) (A) p.143 (CE.536)4 - [S.113v] p.185 (B) (B) (CE.V)7 - [26] () (1) () ([1997A])9 - [70] () (2) () 8 - [P.ch.4567] p.221 (1) (1) p.141 ([1998E])10 - [S.2439] p.184 (2) (2) (CE.VI)
- 52 [15(3317)] (CE.545)
- 53 [B248] 51)
(CE.566),
- 54 [767] [047]
(CE.570) 13 - [S.2504] p.183 (1) (1) 14 - [53] ()
- 55 [697] (2) (2) (, CE.528)52)
51) No.53(S.2430)()([1954]p.31)(566)([1998F]p.48)[S.2430]()()[S.2439]
52) No.55(2)(528)(717)([1998F]p.45)
84 vol.13
No.1 No.2 [1978]
[1990]
[1996]
[1997A]
[1998E]
[1998F]
[1999]
[2006] ()
15 - [P.ch.2346] p.221 p.102 (CE.VII),([2010])
16 - [S.6789] p.184 (2) (2) 17 - [S.4136] p.184 (3) (3)
18 - [S.6891] p.185 (1) (1) , (CE.VII)19 - [15] 20 - [S.6494] p.185 21 - [S.4107] p.184 22 - [11] , (CE.VIII)23 - [S.2662] p.185 ,27 - [P.ch.3832] p.221 (C) (A) (1) p.102 , 48 - [48] () (B) (2) 29 - [43] (C) (3) , (CE.VIII)- 56 [S.6474] (D) (4) 25 - [S.2465] p.184 , 28 - [66] , (CE.X)- 57 [P.ch.4818] p.102 , (CE.VIII?)- 58 [x1060] p.102 30 - [68] () (E) (5) , (CE.VIII)- 59 [746] (F) (F) (6) , - 60 [P.ch.4797] p.102 , (CE.VIII?)
32 - [39] () (G) (7)[34] ([1997A]) , (CE.VIII-)
31 [12] () (H) (8) , (CE.VIII