Part 1

Nigeria's MEND: Connecting the Dots

March 17, 2009

Since 2006, a little-known militant group in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta has made life difficult for international oil companies in the region. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has attacked oil-field infrastructure, kidnapped foreign workers and stolen oil and sold it on the black market. Enriching itself and others in the process — and contrary to the image it tries to convey — the group is not exactly a band of freedom fighters. An in-depth STRATFOR investigation has revealed ties to the Nigerian political establishment and a lineage that begins with the end of military rule in 1999.

Editor’s Note: This is the first part of a three-part series on the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

Analysis

Nigeria is the largest producer of crude oil in Africa and the fifth-largest supplier of crude oil to the United States. (One of its blends, called “Bonny light” after a town and oil port in Rivers state, is highly valued because of the ease with which it can be refined into high-quality gasoline.) Nigeria’s oil output, however, has been reduced 20 percent over the last two years by the activities of an indigenous militant group that the world knows very little about. In 2006 and 2007, attacks on oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) contributed to a spike in global oil prices — and to Nigeria’s placement high on the list of countries critical to U.S. energy security.

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For all its influence on oil prices, MEND has played its cards close to its chest. Its name denotes a liberation army fighting to free the people of the densely populated Niger Delta, Nigeria’s main oil-producing region. But MEND seems more focused on making life difficult for — and profiting by — international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the Delta than on resisting the government in Abuja. Often, MEND refers to a mysterious “shepherd” and to itself as “sheep obeying orders,” listening to the shepherd’s voice for guidance on such matters as when and where to attack. Typical targets, owned and operated by such IOCs as Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Agip, Gazprom and Total, include pipelines, flow stations and loading platforms. MEND makes money by kidnapping for ransom and by illegally “bunkering” crude oil. (By definition, bunkering is the supplying of fuel or oil to a ship, but in southern Nigeria it has come to mean the illegal process of tapping into pipelines, stealing the crude and selling it on domestic and foreign black markets.)

That much is known about the group. It is also clear that MEND is not exactly a band of freedom fighters. Although it has tapped into a flowing spigot of oil money in the Delta, little of this cash has been redistributed to the people of the region. The group actually appears to have ties to the Nigerian political establishment, ties that are known but have never been clearly diagrammed. Who is the shepherd? How closely is he tied to Nigeria’s government? Are there other patrons who can deploy MEND to do their bidding? How do its patrons intend to employ the militant group in the coming years, particularly leading up to local, state and national elections in 2011?

STRATFOR set out to answer these questions (and more) in hopes of better understanding MEND’s origins, makeup and methodologies — and how it could continue to exert its influence on global oil supplies and prices.

A Mobilized Ijaw

In May of 1999, after almost 40 years of nearly continuous military rule, a group of politicians and former members of previous military regimes came together to form a

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new Nigerian government. This formation occurred at all levels throughout the country — local, state and national — and was the result of the first democratic elections that had not been annulled in Nigeria since the country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. It was truly a transitional era, offering hope and liberation from decades of oppressive military rule.

Click to view interactive image

It was also a mad scramble for power as politicians of all stripes joined under the

t the

y e

In December 1998, to help impose INC selections in anticipation of the April 1999 y

eir

banner of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) — the country’s dominant political party — to compete for assembly seats at the local, state and national levels. Compared to the PDP, other Nigerian political parties were inconsequential, buPDP would take no chances. In the oil-rich Niger Delta, the tribal Ijaw organization, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), mobilized to influence the selection of candidates in the region. Representing the ethnic majority in the Niger Delta, Ijaw tribal Chief Edwin Clark, also the leader of the INC, had been appointed to the junta’s Federal Executive Council as information minister in 1975 and served on the council with then-Gen. and later President Olusegun Obasanjo. Having seen the region ruled bnon-Niger Delta appointments made by military juntas, Clark maneuvered behind thscenes in Abuja and the Delta selecting candidates who were natives of the Delta and who would be beholden to him as officeholders. (Sixty-seven years old in 1999, Clark preferred to leverage his long-standing experience and influence from behind the scenes rather than hold an official state office.)

elections, the INC created the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). Composed of young, largelunemployed men and headquartered in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state, the IYC was deployed mainly to coerce votes for PDP candidates. Non-PDP candidates and thsupporters were cajoled, threatened or killed if they seriously challenged PDP candidates. IYC members also began bunkering crude oil from IOC installations,

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keeping a small portion of the proceeds for themselves and funneling the rest to and regional PDP representatives, who used the money to buy votes and support.

local

Flush with bunkering revenue and deploying bands of armed, marauding youths, the

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Political Rivalry in Rivers State

By June 2001, a rivalry had begun between Ijaw Chief Clark and Rivers Gov. Odili,

t $1

ile of

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PDP swept the 1999 state governorship positions in the Delta as well as the national presidency (governors James Ibori in Delta state, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha in Bayelsa state and Peter Odili in Rivers state and President Obasanjo in Abuja; although 10 states technically comprise the Niger Delta, these three are the dominant oil-producing states). The PDP permitted the IYC to continue its illebunkering operations as payment for the services it performed for the PDP duringelection season.

whose position as governor of the region’s largest oil-producing state gave him control — with little transparency or oversight — over an annual budget of almosbillion (along with his government’s stake in illegal bunkering). The level of Rivers state revenues and those of its capital, Port Harcourt — hub of the entire oil-producing region — made Odili the Delta’s most powerful elected politician whClark continued to pull the strings behind the scenes. Now that he was in the seatpower, Odili resented the challenge to state authority posed by the Clark-led INC and its activist wing, the IYC. While he was indeed a powerful politician in Rivers state, Odili was not an Ijaw. He was born into the minority Igbo tribe, the dominant tribe ithe country’s “south-east geopolitical zone” (one of Nigeria’s six administrative regions; the Ijaw are the dominant tribe in the south-south zone). The fact that Odili’s tribal heritage was not Ijaw did not necessarily restrict his political power —oil income and PDP patronage gave him all the influence he needed.

Moving to undermine the INC/IYC in Rivers state, Odili used his influence in the summer of 2001 to elect a new IYC leader, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, one of the

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founders of the group (succeeding IYC president Felix Tuodolo). An ambitious ancharismatic youth leader from Buguma town, located west of Port Harcourt, Asrepaid Odili by deploying IYC activists in Rivers state to conduct illegal bunkering operations and engage in political intimidation on behalf of Odili and against rival PDP politicians.

Asari’s youth acti

d ari

vists became Odili’s private paramilitary force in Rivers state, although Asari and the IYC did not work exclusively for Odili. With his IYC credentials

ri ll

INC/IYC operations in Rivers state, there was no immediate breakdown in the broader political machinery, since attention was focused

ook ived

d

ent for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has evolved in sync with Nigerian power brokers and politicians as they have fought for influence and

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ement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

and armed cadres in other Niger Delta states, Asari still commanded influence throughout the oil-producing region and continued to work for Clark and his loyalists who were in positions of authority in Delta and Bayelsa states (outside of Odili’s jurisdiction). IYC activists were deployed again ahead of the April 2003 national elections to wage a low-intensity war against rival candidates, and governors Ibo(Delta), Alamieyeseigha (Bayelsa) and Odili as well as President Obasanjo were are-elected on the PDP ticket.

Despite Odili efforts to control

on winning the 2003 elections. These elections were intended not so much to transfer power from incumbent to successor as to consolidate the PDP lock on elected positions throughout Nigeria. Elected officials playing by the PDP rule b(which calls for them to simply pay up and not double-cross their patrons) recesupport for a second term. Chief Clark remained a kingmaker in the Niger Delta, analthough Odili had an agenda apart from INC/IYC’s, he played his part by ensuring that the state helped fill government and PDP coffers as well as the purses of individual politicians.

Part 2

Nigeria's MEND: Odili, Asari and the NDPVF

March 18, 2009

Summary

The Movem

wealth. And Nigeria’s wealth lies largely in Rivers state, where a rivalry between IjawChief Edwin Clark and Rivers Gov. Peter Odili resulted in a declaration of war againthe state of Nigeria by Ijaw youth leader Mujahid Dokubo-Asari. Having once worked closely with Asari and his Ijaw Youth Council, Odili decided to dump him in order to undermine Clark. Odili took the gloves off and Clark responded in kind.

Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a three-part series on the Mov

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Analysis

Soon after Nigeria’s 2003 national elections, Rivers state Gov. Peter Odili sat back sed the situation. He had just been sworn in for his second term as

governor of the leading oil-producing state in the Niger Delta, at the helm of a state

arting

nt a.

crude oil production. Ninety-five percent of Nigeria’s oil production comes from the

and asses

government generating on the order of $100 million per month. It was not clear to Odili that a third gubernatorial term was even possible. Politicians were still chtheir way in the new democratic Nigeria, which had just gone through its second election cycle. Although the constitution restricted elected officials to two terms, there was no guarantee that a strongman would not figure out a way around that. In any case, Odili had his sights on a higher office — either president or vice preside— that would befit his growing stature as a political heavyweight in the Niger Delt

Oil is Nigeria’s raison d’être, its only real form of wealth. The majority of Nigerian government revenues — and 95 percent of its export income — are generated by

Niger Delta; of that total, roughly 40 percent comes from Rivers state (Bayelsa andDelta states each contribute about 15 percent). Control over the oil provides tremendous advantages beyond short-term personal gain; oil-derived income finances a patronage network that ensures long-term loyalties upstream and down.

which is a minority in east geopolitical zone —

ark continued to have in

e

To achieve higher office, Odili — a member of the Igbo tribe,Rivers state but the dominant tribe in the neighboring south-first had to break the political hold that Ijaw Chief Edwin Clthe Niger Delta. Although Odili worked closely with Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) President Mujahid Dokubo-Asari during the 2003 elections (and had gotten Asari elected IYC president in 2001), Asari still had one foot in Clark’s camp. Asari’s divided loyalties weakened Odili’s grip on the levers of power in Rivers state — Asari could pass actionable intelligence on Odili to Clark for use against the Rivers governor. Maintaining a connection to Asari, and by extension Clark, was a pric

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Odili could no longer afford to pay if he wanted to propel his own ascendancythe dominant People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

Odili had to dump Asari and break from Clark without ex

within

posing himself to an Asari counterattack. To deal with Asari, Odili repeated a move from his 2001 IYC playbook

Tom had been his deputy in charge of the Rivers state’s Okrika “axis” (a MEND term for the turf or territory it

. n

e news of Asari’s being dumped by Odili very well. For Clark to maintain his influence in the Niger Delta, he needed to keep Odili in check.

(in which he had Asari elected president of the IYC in order to lure the group of marauding youth away from Clark and into his camp), this time luring away Asari’s deputy, Ateke Tom, in return for exclusive patronage.

When Asari held the IYC presidency from 2001 to 2003,

controls or is fighting to control). Tom’s gang was called the Icelanders and its turf stretched from Port Harcourt south to Bonny Island. Now Odili provided political protection to Tom while he waged war against Asari. For compensation, Tom was given free rein to take over illegal bunkering routes that Asari claimed for himselfTom split from Asari and renamed his Icelanders the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), ipart to improve his reputation following alleged Icelander atrocities. Based in the town of Okrika and the slums in and around Port Harcourt, the NDV hunted down Asari’s forces in Rivers state.

Neither Asari nor Clark took th

Failure to respond to Odili could permit the Rivers state governor to become too politically powerful for Clark to contain. Odili had taken the gloves off, forcing Clark to respond in kind.

Click to view interactive image

By July 2003, Asari had transformed the IYC — an activist organization that had olence — by adding a dedicated militant wing known participated in some targeted vi

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as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The IYC remained an activisyouth organization promoting Ijaw interests throughout the Niger Delta while its militant wing, led by Asari, battled Odili’s proxy militia, the Tom-led NDV.

Fallout from the April 2003 elections carried into the summer as the NDPVF

t

fought running battles against the NDV. In October, the NDV assassinated Onengiye Ofori

m

m’s forces during their assaults — police and military forces would stand aside during NDV operations —

t

feat nse,

inst the NDPVF in September triggered Asari to declare “all out war” against the Nigerian state. Asari

e and

nflict that threatened to spread beyond the control of Niger Delta politicians, caused global crude prices to hit $50 per barrel for

f te

s not

n Tom’s forces. Tom himself was charged with murder in connection with a November 2004 attack on the member of an

sted

e

Terika (aka Occasion Boy), Asari’s deputy in charge of the Tombia axis, located about a half-hour’s boat ride southwest of Port Harcourt. In addition to battling eachother, the two militias fought for control over bunkering routes, the proceeds frowhich were used by their respective political patrons.

Despite the fact that Odili provided political cover for To

Asari’s forces maintained their positions and effectively fought back throughout 2004. In June of that year, the Rivers state government was forced to raise the stakes, deploying a state-level contingent of army, navy and police forces againsAsari units. Fighting intensified, with battles waged not only in the creeks and villages of Rivers state but in the streets and neighborhoods of Port Harcourt. Combined forces of the NDV and the state security apparatus were unable to dethe NDPVF, forcing the Odili government to request federal assistance. In respoarmy personnel comprising the Joint Task Force (JTF) were deployed in September 2004 in support of the NDV and state security personnel.

These combined JTF, NDV and state security operations aga

adopted Ijaw nationalist slogans to defend his attacks, saying that the Ijaw tribNiger Delta had been exploited for decades by corrupt Nigerian governments and that his group was fighting to control the resources in the region.

Ceasefire and Simmering Conflict

Asari’s declaration of war, igniting a co

the first time ever and brought Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo into the mix.In October 2004, Obasanjo called Asari and Tom to the Nigerian capital and negotiated a ceasefire. In return for disarming their militias and turning in their weapons, the federal government would pay militant leaders the equivalent o$1,000 per weapon and grant amnesty for any crimes committed. The Rivers stagovernment promised to pay an additional $1,800 per weapon surrendered. It iclear how many weapons were given up or how much money Asari received, but he returned from Abuja and proceeded to live an extravagant lifestyle in Port Harcourt, complete with mansions and the freedom to travel about in luxury SUVs, while still maintaining control of his militant group.

Political pressure was also exerted to rein i

NDPVF-allied gang called the Greenlanders. Rather than give himself up, Tom pinned the blame on his deputy, Soboma George. In November 2004, George was arrefor murder and jailed in Port Harcourt. Tom’s betrayal of George would have repercussions. George was broken out of jail in June 2005 by a force led by then-NDPVF deputy Farah Dagogo. George went on to form his own gang, called thOutlaws, and joined Asari’s side in the struggle.

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(click image to enlarge)

Meanwhile, pipeline sabotage and bunkering by the NDPVF and the NDV was becoming more common in the oil-producing states, and more burdensome for the

d patch up critical pipelines and abandon those that were less critical, which reinforced grievances among grassroots supporters of militants

Oil

n

owever, by the Nigerian senate in May 2006. Vice President Atiku Abubakar had been instrumental in mobilizing politicians to defeat the Obasanjo

bitions al,

unning a successful presidential campaign requires a deep network of supporters and funds, Atiku then

oil companies. They woul

that the foreign oil companies did little more than pollute the local communities.companies also would continue to pay protection money to local chiefs and youth organizations, which would reinforce the perception of a corrupt relationship betweethe companies and authorities at all levels, which in turn would justify the militancyand violence.

By 2005, President Obasanjo still had his sights on amending the country’s constitution so that he could be allowed a third term in office. Obasanjo’s efforts were blocked, h

amendment. Atiku, a Muslim from the northeastern Adamawa state, had amhimself for the presidency, and Obasanjo interpreted his maneuvering as a betraywhich led to Atiku’s being marginalized within the ruling PDP.

Atiku did not abandon his presidential aspirations, however. The Nigerian vice president sent out feelers to the opposition Action Congress (AC) party to gauge his chances of becoming its presidential candidate. Knowing that r

turned his eyes toward the Niger Delta.

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While Atiku was looking for routes to a presidential nomination, he reached an agreement with Bayelsa state Gov. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. The governor had been a pro-Obasanjo member of the PDP since winning office in 1999, but the lure of a possible vice presidential slot on Atiku’s ticket was an offer too good to refuse. Alamieyeseigha ran his state as a personal bank account and the corruption was ignored — until his switch to Atiku. The federal Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) began to investigate Alamieyeseigha, and in September 2005 he was detained in London on money-laundering charges. In December 2005, Alamieyeseigha was impeached, imprisoned and replaced by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan. As a result of the Atiku/Alamieyeseigha saga, the EFCC became a useful tool for the ruling PDP to destroy its own as well as opposition politicians who run afoul of the established hierarchy.

Government authorities also pursued Asari, who was arrested in September 2005 on treason charges following statements he made at a conference, calling for the disintegration of the Nigerian state. Asari’s trial lasted two months, and in November 2005 the NDPVF leader was sentenced to prison, where he served 18 months (even though he was never technically convicted of treason).

Looking Ahead to 2007

Although Obasanjo failed to gain a third term as president, he was not about to back down easily. The two-time civilian president (Obasanjo also ruled Nigeria as military dictator from 1976 to 1979) needed to ensure that he would be safe from prosecution for any crimes committed during his administrations (accusations leveled at Obasanjo included economic malfeasance and human rights violations) and to ensure a financially comfortable retirement. Obasanjo needed a successor who would be beholden to him so that Obasanjo could continue to play a kingmaker role in the ruling PDP.

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In 2005, looking ahead to the 2007 national elections, state politicians began jockeying for the presidency. With a rival (though junior) governor — Alamieyeseigha — sidelined after being imprisoned and with militia leader Asari imprisoned, Odili could make a serious run for the office. But having Odili ensconced at the Aso Rock presidential compound in Abuja would be too much of a threat to Ijaw Chief Clark. Odili was already a powerful politician in the Niger Delta as governor of the leading oil-producing state, but he was not an Ijaw, and Clark considered him a usurper. As president, with even more money and patronage at his finger tips, Odili would become too powerful for Clark to control. In a region (and country) where turf and influence are matters of life and death, seeing Odili at Aso Rock was a vision that Clark simply could not bear.

It is not clear whether Clark himself had ambitions for the office. He probably did not, given his age (he would be 75 in 2007) and preference for working behind the scenes. In any case, Clark soon envisioned a politician of his own at Aso Rock. The Niger Delta was too important a region not to have a secure stake at the highest levels of government. As one of the country’s six official geopolitical regions, the south-south zone, encompassing the Delta and its Ijaw majority, had never produced a Nigerian president, and Clark believed the time to do so was now.

Part 3

Nigeria's MEND: A Different Militant Movement

March 19, 2009 Summary

An outgrowth of the Ijaw Youth Council’s (IYC) militant wing, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) first emerged in December 2005 when it took credit for blowing up an oil pipeline in Delta state. It is not clear who activated the group or coined its name, but it soon became clear that MEND was a useful tool for Ijaw Chief Edwin Clark in containing his arch rival, Rivers Gov. Peter Odili. By early 2006, as Nigeria geared up for its third round of elections in 2007, a different kind of militant group was waging war in the Delta.

Editor’s Note: This is the third part of a three-part series on the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

Analysis

As he tried to envision his own political protégé as Nigerian president, Ijaw Chief Edwin Clark knew that he did not have a monopoly on power and influence in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the militant wing of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), had been decapitated in September 2005 when the

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government arrested IYC President and NDPVF leader Mujahid Dokubo-Asari on charges of treason. As in 2003, when the NDPVF was formed, Clark needed a strong militant capability to challenge Rivers Gov. Peter Odili and emerge as the premier power broker in the Niger Delta. Clark no longer had Asari, but he still had Asari’s network of NDPVF deputies scattered throughout the region.

In December 2005, an umbrella militant group emerged calling itself the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), made up of former Asari deputies and factions empowered to carry out attacks in their home territories. Their first operation was an attack on Royal Dutch Shell’s Opobo pipeline in Delta state. MEND has yet to identify its founder or current leader, but a spokesman known as Jomo Gbomo, who communicates to the media only by e-mail, announced in May 2007 that newly elected Vice President Goodluck Jonathan was a MEND patron. Jonathan also is widely known as a protégé of Ijaw Chief Clark’s.

At the time, the leaders of known MEND factions included Farah Dagogo, whose gang in the Tombia axis of Rivers state became known as the Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF); Ebikabowei Victor (aka Victor Ben and Gen. Boyloaf), who commanded the faction Bayelsa state axis; Government Ekpemupolo (aka Gen. Tammo and Government Tompolo), whose faction, headquartered near the town of Warri in Delta state, was called the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities; and Soboma George, whose gang, since breaking from Ateke Tom and his Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), became known as the Outlaws and served as another MEND faction in Rivers state.

MEND also included an arms dealer named Henry Okah, who was based in South Africa until his arrest in Luanda, Angola, in September 2007 on arms smuggling charges. Okah was later extradited to Nigeria, where he is being held on charges of treason.

MEND was launched as a tool of the Ijaw to attain national prominence at a time when the presidency was up for grabs. Odili had made his move and Clark, from all indications, had responded. Odili had Tom and the NDV; Clark had Asari’s network, rechristened MEND, which began conducting attacks in the weeks following Asari’s imprisonment in November 2005. In addition to fighting Tom’s forces, MEND attacked oil infrastructure targets as they had never been attacked before, sabotaging pipelines, bunkering oil and kidnapping foreign oil workers for ransom.

These concerted and coordinated attacks under the MEND banner gave international prominence to the Ijaw as well as money. The attacks also represented a different militant strategy in the Niger Delta. What set MEND apart from earlier groups was its apparent willingness to destroy the oil sector in order to achieve political goals. MEND was interested in establishing income streams and filling political offices over the long term, not in agitating for quick payoffs, and its aggressive focus on oil infrastructure was meant to establish credibility, not destroy the sector. But they were willing to push it pretty far. MEND attacks in 2006 and 2007 resulted in the shuttering of 600,000 barrels per day in crude output — a quarter of the country’s oil production — and in the kidnapping of hundreds of foreign and national oil workers (none of whom were killed).

It was not long before the international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the Delta began having trouble recruiting people to work there. Higher salaries, bonuses, kidnapping insurance and reinforced security helped matters some, as did a

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concentration on offshore operations. The belief was that exploration and production onshore in the difficult-to-defend mangrove swamp and riverine environment exposed installations and workers to MEND attacks while the more distant and isolated offshore operations (some as far as 75 miles from land) were less vulnerable. Offshore platforms were not immune to MEND attacks, however. In June 2006, MEND fighters on speedboats attacked an oil rig 40 miles off the coast of Delta state, kidnapping eight foreign workers and several Nigerian workers. It was a new seaborne capability the militant group would use more frequently.

Click to view interactive image

In early 2006, it was still not clear what was going to happen in the 2007 elections.

bid

With the presidential field wide open, aspiring candidates piled on. Nigerian en a

for

. (The

President Olusegun Obasanjo was working to amend the constitution in order to serve a third term. By May 2006, however, Obasanjo’s constitutional amendmenthad been blocked in the senate, with opposition mobilized by Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who had his own eye on the presidency. Obasanjo would not be runningfor re-election in 2007.

northerners believed it was their turn to hold the presidency, after having sesouthwesterner rule at Aso Rock since 1999 (Obasanjo, a member of the Yoruba tribe, hails from the country’s south-west zone). Political tradition in Nigeria calls presidential power to rotate among the country’s six geopolitical zones. After being ruled by a southwestern president and a northeastern vice president (Atiku Abubakar, from Adamawa state), northerners believed it was their turn againnorthern Hausa tribe dominated Nigerian politics during the military junta era and remained a powerful force through their continued dominance over the army.)

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Perhaps fearful the Hausa would use the military to overthrow Nigeria’s nascent democracy, Obasanjo agreed that the northerners should regain the presidency and that the best the southerners could do was gain the vice presidency. But Obasanjo would drive a hard bargain, particularly with the Ijaw and Odili. Political advancement in Nigeria is not free, nor is it based on merit. The campaign waged by militants in the Delta against the IOCs (together with the revenues the militant activity generated) would win the vice presidency for the south-south zone.

Publicly, Clark began to undermine Odili’s candidacy for vice president by questioning the Rivers state governor’s ethnicity. Odili was a member of the Igbo tribe, which is the dominant tribe in the south-east geopolitical zone but has a minority presence in Rivers state (where Odili was born). In any case, Odili’s tribal heritage did not automatically disqualify him for the vice presidency. He was still a useful politician to Obasanjo. According to sources, Odili made significant financial contributions to the country’s dominant People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in order to secure the vice presidency. PDP politicians from other geopolitical zones likely received backchannel payoffs to sign off on Odili’s candidacy. At some point, however — probably in the fall of 2006, shortly before the PDP held its December primaries — Odili lost his bid for vice president. Despite his sizable down payment for the job, STRATFOR sources say, Odili was displaced at the last minute by Clark protégé Goodluck Jonathan, then governor of Bayelsa state.

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(click image to enlarge)

When Odili was still maneuvering to secure the vice presidential slot, he needed to protect his turf in Port Harcourt. Two of his aides were maneuvering to succeed him as Rivers state governor: Celestine Omehia, Odili’s special assistant since 1999, and Rotimi Amaechi, Rivers state assembly speaker. In the PDP primaries in December 2006, Amaechi’s name emerged as the candidate to succeed Odili. STRATFOR sources say Amaechi was not Odili’s preferred successor, however, and in February 2007 Amaechi’s name was removed from the election roll — likely by Odili — and replaced with Omehia’s. Meanwhile, Omehia hired Soboma George of the Outlaws gang to act as his enforcer. Facing no resistance from the state, the Outlaws proceeded to wage an unrestrained militancy campaign in Rivers state throughout the election season, indicating that they received political protection to do so.

Omehia was sworn in as Rivers state governor on May 29, 2007, but his governorship was doomed from the start. An NDPVF-allied gang led by Rivers state militant Prince Igodo, and hired by Amaechi threatened to attack the inauguration. The Outlaws, calling in Farah Dagogo’s NDSF for assistance, proceeded to attack Igodo’s camp, killing the gang leader and preventing an attack on the inaugural festivities.

That same day, in Abuja, new Nigerian President Umaru Yaradua and Vice President Goodluck Jonathan were sworn in. Shortly before the inauguration, a MEND spokesman confirmed that Jonathan was one of its patrons. With Jonathan assuming a point position for managing Niger Delta affairs, the Ijaw now had a prominent seat at the table in Abuja, with a direct hand in managing resource flows and lucrative patronage appointments. One of Jonathan’s first moves was to release the imprisoned Asari, who got out in June 2007 and immediately began singing Jonathan’s praises. According to STRATFOR sources, Asari was released to serve as a proxy for the federal government to re-establish control over his gangs in the Niger Delta. Soon after Asari returned to the region, his gangs began to ally with Tom’s NDV to battle the Outlaws.

All Roads Lead to Clark

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In August 2007, after the government’s Joint Task Force (JTF) carried out a two-pronged attack against the Outlaws, assaulting a hotel in Port Harcourt where George was staying as well as one of his village homes, George appealed to Chief Clark for protection. George addressed Clark as if Clark were a father figure who needed to intervene to save his son.

Omehia faced a different kind of attack. Amaechi filed an appeal challenging Omehia’s election, and in October 2007 the Nigerian Supreme Court annulled Omehia’s victory (ruling that no election actually took place) and ordered that Amaechi be installed in his place. Mere days after Amaechi was sworn in as Rivers state governor, he travelled to Clark’s camp professing his loyalty for whatever Clark did to secure Amaechi’s belated victory.

When Amaechi was sworn in as governor, Tom was given political protection — for the time being, anyway. Tom’s forces were needed to push back George’s Outlaws, who had the run of the state. While Tom was receiving patronage, George retreated underground. Tom’s protection did not last long. In January 2008, JTF forces attacked his camps at Okrika. The NDV was attacked again by the JTF in June 2008 and pushed back from positions in Rivers state toward positions in neighboring Bayelsa state. Clashes there resulted in the death of the NDPVF-allied gang leader Gibson Kala.

In July 2008, while Tom’s forces were being pushed toward Bayelsa, Dagogo’s NDSF was called in to fight George’s Outlaws, who were still conducting kidnapping and bunkering operations — though unsanctioned, as far as Gov. Amaechi was concerned — in Port Harcourt and southern Rivers state. Amaechi lured Dagogo away from George’s control by promising protection in gaining a monopoly over bunkering and kidnapping operations in Rivers state. Cooperating with Dagogo was a gang leader named Egbiri Papa (aka Soboma Jackrich), whose gang became known as the People’s Liberation Force (PLF).

Dagogo and his patron in Port Harcourt did not remain on positive terms for long, however. In August 2008, the two had a falling out over a disagreement on kidnapping ransom money. A month later, units of the JTF attacked NDSF camps in Rivers state. (MEND blamed the move on Amaechi and Nigerian President Yaradua). Battles waged for a week between the JTF and NDSF before a ceasefire was reached. Two days later, JTF forces attacked NDV camps in Rivers state with inconclusive results. (Tom was not arrested, nor did he launch reprisals).

The government offensive continued. In November 2008, MEND accused the JTF and the Rivers state government of paying $3 million to NDSF insiders to assassinate Dagogo. The plot was uncovered and Dagogo survived the assassination attempt. Only marginal reprisals took place (some NDSF insiders reportedly were killed). Then in December, the JTF arrested PLF leader Papa, who had been a deputy to Dagogo. Papa was arrested on his way to peace talks in Rivers state arranged by Asari, who was nowhere to be found at the time of the arrest. In January 2009, the JTF conducted raids against NDV and Outlaws camps in Rivers state. (MEND said nothing specific about the raids against George’s Outlaws and mentioned only that the JTF attacked three communities in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the release of two British hostages.) According to an NDV spokesman, Tom’s forces called off threatened reprisal attacks following Clark’s intervention.

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By early 2009, IOCs had hardened their office and residential compounds in Port Harcourt to the point where kidnapping operations seldom, if ever, occurred. Oil workers now traveled to exploration and production sites by helicopter to avoid the threat of being kidnapped while caught in traffic. When ground transportation was required, workers were moved in heavily armed convoys surrounded by protective details of Nigerian soldiers (whose competence is sometimes questionable). IOCs have essentially abandoned plans for large-scale investment in the Nigerian onshore sector, while the offshore sector still attracts widespread interest. Despite the threats, violence and costs of working in Nigeria, the quality and quantity of the region’s crude ensures that IOCs will remain active in Nigeria’s oil sector as long as the oil is there.

As it Stands Now

Today, Asari is the sole militia gang leader moving about openly in the Niger Delta without interference from the government. STRATFOR sources say he travels with a security detail of official Mobile Police (“Mopol”) officers, although he also probably relies on NDPVF loyalists for personal protection. (Mopol is a paramilitary unit of the Nigerian police that specializes in rapid response operations.) STRATFOR sources report that Tom, George and Dagogo, in contrast, are forced to sneak around the Delta to avoid being detained. Asari is working to re-establish his influence among his former deputies (who along with their followers make up MEND), but STRATFOR sources say his influence has yet to be consolidated. Asari’s former deputies are not so thrilled to see their independence and influence usurped by their old leader, and have not automatically accepted him back into the fold.

Odili, meanwhile, is no longer active in Rivers state politics, and STRATFOR sources say he splits his time between Abuja and South Africa. The ex-Rivers state governor received an immunity deal in March 2008 that protected him from prosecution and enabled him to keep the money he acquired during his governorship. The deal will likely last as long as he avoids interfering in or destabilizing Rivers state. Should he become active again he would likely be investigated by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and, if convicted of any kind of wrongdoing, put in prison and stripped of his wealth, which is precisely what happened to former governors Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa state and James Ibori of Delta state.

Alamieyeseigha, released from prison in July 2007 after serving two years, maintains a very low profile and a small degree of influence in Bayelsa state. According to MEND, his successor as governor, Goodluck Jonathan, now vice president, owes his current position to the militant group as a result of its 2006-2007 campaign. STRATFOR sources say Clark is a patron of Jonathan’s and that Asari is being controlled from Jonathan’s office.

Jonathan’s successor in Bayelsa state, Timipre Sylva, is kept on a very short leash by the PDP. Sylva’s 2007 election was challenged by the opposition Action Congress party, which filed an appeal with the appellate court in Port Harcourt. The court ruled that that no election actually had taken place and called for a new election. With backing by Vice President Jonathan, Sylva won the new election and remained in office. The ordeal was a reminder to Sylva that as long as he played by the rules, the PDP would support him. If he did not, then the PDP would find a way to reopen the court case or remove him from office in a less judicial manner.

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Clark, too, could use a short leash in Delta state. Although incumbent Gov. Emmanuel Uduaghan maintains positive relations with Clark, the Ijaw chief initially held up Uduaghan’s nomination in order to extract loyalty from the Warri-based politician.

Former President Obasanjo left office in May 2007 to become chairman of the board of trustees of the ruling PDP party, a godfather position that would allow him to retain the power to reward his friends and punish his enemies.

Moving Forward

The next national elections in Nigeria will be held in April 2011. If tradition holds (and politicians play by the rules), incumbents will be nominated for a second term. Yaradua will be nominated as president; Jonathan will be nominated as vice president and Amaechi, Sylva and Uduaghan will be nominated as governors in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states, respectively. Thus, national elections in 2011 will be no watershed and should not generate widespread violence. However, if Yaradua’s health prevents him from standing for re-election (he has had to travel abroad for medical attention several times since the 2007 election season), competition over who would fill his shoes will likely turn violent. Should Amaechi step out of line, his minority Ikwerre tribal status in Rivers state could be used to end his political career.

Considerable — though geographically concentrated — violence could occur if any candidate refuses to play by the rules (e.g., fails to acknowledge his patron or pay the money expected of him). An aspiring candidate could also trigger violence in order to carve out a political position for himself. The way to get attention in Nigeria is to become a big man, and the way to become a big man is to employ a militant gang to beat your rivals. Nice guys do not get very far in Nigeria.

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The bigger battle will come ahead of the 2015 national elections, when the presidency is up for grabs. With tradition calling for northerners to rotate the presidency to another geopolitical zone, the Ijaw of the south-south Niger Delta will no doubt believe that what was denied them in 2007 should come their way in 2015. The 2007 vice presidency was a compromise; the Ijaw have their sights set on the presidency. Of course, other geopolitical zones will also be aiming for Aso Rock, so a battle for prominence and patronage will surely be waged to determine the officeholders in 2015. Given the campaign patterns in past elections, the action will likely begin in 2013.

In the meantime, Chief Clark will continue to play a leading godfather role as he maintains his influence among Ijaw youth, who can be quickly mobilized to achieve political aims. Politicians in the Niger Delta will pay homage to Clark, who in turn will pay homage to his network of senior Ijaw figures as well as PDP power brokers at the national level. Militant gang leaders like Tom, George and Dagogo will not be killed (if previous strikes against their camps are indicative of JTF capabilities) but will be kept around for use when their forces are needed. Until then, in times of lean patronage, they will carry out bunkering and kidnapping operations to support themselves. All the while, inter-gang violence will continue as Asari tries to rebuild his influence over the gang networks and as MEND faction leaders resist that influence.

The fact is that as long as there is sweet Nigerian crude to be extracted from the Delta, first tapped by the British in the late 1950s, there will be political and militant turmoil in the region. Tenuous understandings that keep tensions and violence to a manageable level will occur from time to time, as long as the Ijaw believe their political and financial stake in the region is assured. This is currently one of those times.

Meanwhile, some questions may have to go unanswered. Who is the “shepherd”? The weight of evidence (gained through open sources and STRATFOR human intelligence sources) indicates that MEND has an assortment of patrons at the state level that can activate various units for localized attacks. Our intelligence also suggests that at least one national-level politician (the sitting vice president) can activate MEND factions for larger, more centrally controlled operations. Is there one preeminent godfather? That would be the aging Ijaw patriarch Edwin Clark, though our MEND sources tell us he is not the so-called “shepherd” (who may be more than one person or who may not even exist). Another principal enabler is former President Obasanjo, who has been instrumental in allowing regional politicians to activate attacks against oil infrastructure and rival militant proxies to achieve his and their political goals.

Who the shepherd is does not really matter. MEND or its component factions will be a fact of life for the denizens of the oil-rich Niger Delta for the foreseeable future. Nigeria is a fledgling democracy with an economy wholly dependent upon crude oil. Until it matures as a nation-state with a more diversified economy, militant groups emerging, evolving and fighting each other and the IOCs will continue to make the Delta a dangerous place.