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    ***WTO Disad******WTO Disad*** .....................................................................................................................................................1nc 1/2 .........................................................................................................................................................................

    1nc 2/2 .........................................................................................................................................................................***Uniqueness*** ......................................................................................................................................................Uniqueness Counterplan .............................................................................................................................................Compliance Works ......................................................................................................................................................Compliancy High- farm subsides ................................................................................................................................***Links*** ...............................................................................................................................................................Incentives ....................................................................................................................................................................Renewable Subsidies ................................................................................................................................................1Efficiency Standards .................................................................................................................................................1Competitiveness ........................................................................................................................................................1Caf Standards ..........................................................................................................................................................1Renewable Incentives are Market Specific Targeting ...............................................................................................1***Compliance Good*** .........................................................................................................................................1Hege ..........................................................................................................................................................................1Trade Sanctions .........................................................................................................................................................1***WTO Collapse Bad*** .......................................................................................................................................1Compliance Key to WTO .........................................................................................................................................1China .........................................................................................................................................................................2Protectionism ............................................................................................................................................................2Trade Wars ................................................................................................................................................................2Warming ....................................................................................................................................................................2***Free Trade Impacts*** ........................................................................................................................................2Competitiveness ........................................................................................................................................................2Environment ..............................................................................................................................................................2Global Alternative Energy Adoption/Warming .........................................................................................................2***IPR Good*** ......................................................................................................................................................2WTO Compliance Key to IPR ..................................................................................................................................2Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR ..........................................................................................................................3IPR Module: Econ .....................................................................................................................................................3IPR Module: Econ .....................................................................................................................................................3IPR Module: China ...................................................................................................................................................3IPR Module: China ...................................................................................................................................................3IPR Module: Medicines ............................................................................................................................................3***Aff*** .................................................................................................................................................................3No Linkrenewable incentives arent targeted ......................................................................................................3Not UniqueNo International Compliance .............................................................................................................3Not UniqueUS Not Compliant Now .....................................................................................................................3Not UniqueUS Not Compliant Now .....................................................................................................................4

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    1nc 1/2The WTO and its settlement systems credibility are on the brink.

    Robert Z. Lawrence Professor of International Trade and Investment at Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, March

    2007,The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System

    http://www.cfr.org/publication/12871/united_states_and_the_wto_dispute_settlement_system.html [Zavell]

    The shift from bilateral to multilateral enforcement helps secure the legitimacy of the trading system and reduces the political costsassociated with bilateral dispute settlement. It helps the United States itself keep protectionist impulses at bay. It is also particularlyuseful for dealing with disputes with Americas largest trading partners, such as the European Union, Japan, China, India, and Brazil,with which the United States has not signed free trade agreements. And yet, despite these considerable strengths, support for theWTO and its dispute settlement system remains fragile. This report describes how that system operates, considers the arguments ofits critics, and finally provides some recommendations for improvement.

    Targeting of domestic renewable industries with incentives will be successfully challenged at the WTO

    Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007WTO Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate ChangePolicyhttp://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell]

    Most types of subsidies for climate-friendly investments are likely to be found "actionable" or even "prohibited" by the SCMAgreement. For example, the Senate version of H.R. 6 contains a provision for renewable fuel facilities loan guarantees (H.R. 6, Senateversion, Section 124). Facilities may receive loans of up to $250 million, covering up to 80% of the total cost of the facility. This federa"financial contribution" is "specific to certain industries or enterprises" in the sense of Article 2 of the SCM, as it is intended for thebiofuels industry. However, the loan guarantees provision is aimed at "a particular subsidized primary product or commodity" - ethanoland other biofuels - and affects another primary product, conventional fuels. If it is found to be empirically-provable that internationaltrade in biofuels and/or conventional fuels is substantially affected by this loan guarantee program (alone or in conjunction with othersimilar provisions in H.R. 6), they may become a WTO dispute issue. In such circumstances, a dispute panel may determine that loanguarantees, besides providing domestic "technological and economic benefits" to renewable fuels facilities (which in itself does notmean that they have international trade consequences), also serve to increase the U.S. share of the world market in ethanol and otherbiofuels "as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of three years, and this increase follows a consistent trendover the period that subsidies have been granted." (SCM Article 6.3 (d)). In this case, the loan guarantees would constitute an"actionable" subsidy, which could be successfully challenged under WTO rules.

    Fiat guarantees the US will not complythis tanks the WTO

    Tara Gingerich, Senior Staff, American University Law Review; J.D. Candidate, October, 1998The American UniversityLaw Review, Comment: Why The Wto Should Require The Application Of The Evidentiary Threshold Requirement In Antidumping Investigations Lexis, [Zavell]

    The WTO has obligations to the international community. While it must be flexible out of political necessity, it also must set standardsfor international trade. It needs to establish a clear requirement of an evidentiary threshold in antidumping investigations. The standardmust be one by which all countries can, and will, abide. The organization must realize its limitations and accept that if it pushes itsmembers too far, they will not comply and the organization will lose all credibility. Conversely, it must not shrink from its responsibilityto promote fair and free trade, or the WTO will risk becoming meaningless. Antidumping measures may have met this balance in the

    past, but they no longer do; the initiation threshold must now be set clearly, and at a sufficiently high level, in order to accomplish thesame goals.

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    1nc 2/2WTO key to solve Nuclear War

    Copley News Service, 99 (December 1)

    For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclearwinter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattleapparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their ownprosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for thbenefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament oranti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, laboror paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists,such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urgedpeople and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As longas nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage waThat's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of theworld feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many

    anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wageearners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies thatmake high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have goodjobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 peoplwho work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domesticproduct. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter.Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care aboutworld peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

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    ***Uniqueness***

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    Uniqueness CounterplanText: The United States federal government should comply with all future WTO dispute settlement rulings

    And, we have an advocate.National Association of ManufacturesNo Date Listed, Last updated Thursday, May 15, 2008http://www.nam.org/policypositions/IEAP_intltrade.htmlIEAP-01 International Trade Policy [Zavell]

    The WTO dispute settlement process is the key enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance with multilateral trade obligations. ThNAM believes all WTO member economies, including the United States, should comply with WTO agreements, including the DisputeSettlement Understanding.

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    Compliance WorksCompliance rates highnations values trade reputationRobert Z. Lawrence Professor of International Trade and Investment at Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy

    School of Government, March 2007, The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement Systemhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12871/united_states_and_the_wto_dispute_settlement_system.html [Zavell]

    The dispute settlement system has generally been successful in helping members resolve disputes and in obtaining compliance whereviolations have been found. Many cases have been settled in the consultation stage.12 While there are delays, particularly whenlegislative action is required, and a few cases in which compliance has been lacking, the evidence suggests that by and large the UnitedStates and other countries eventually come into compliance.13 Nations appear to comply less because of retaliation, which has rarelybeen used, but rather because they believe it is in their interest to do so.14 This is because on balance they benefit from the rules andcare about their reputations in a system in which there are ongoing negotiations. They also care about their relationships with significantrading partners.15

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    Compliancy High- farm subsides

    US complying with WTOrecent subsidies reductions

    Doug Palmer, Reuters, July 16, 2008 U.S. will make "enormous" cuts for WTO deal:

    Schwabhttp://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN1626797920080717?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0 [Zavell]

    WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is prepared to make "enormous" cuts in farm subsidy spending limits and its barriers toforeign goods to reach a breakthrough next week in world trade talks, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab said on Wednesday."We have already signaled our willingness to put an enormous amount of market opening and subsidy discipline on the table in thecontext of an agreement," Schwab said in a speech to the Washington International Trade Association.

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    ***Links***

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    Incentives

    Positive incentives targeted at a specific industry violate WTO Law

    Lucas Assuno, Research Director at the International Centre for Trade and SustainableDevelopment. 11-20-2000 http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2000-11-20/20-11-00-Assuncao.pdf[Zavell]

    In introducing subsidy incentives to domestic firms, governments will obviously attempt to foster industrial development and, at thesame time, achieve reductions in present or future greenhouse gas emissions. However, if the sector where such subsidies are introducedis significantly open to foreign trade, such subsidies could potentially be challenged under WTO rules. Under Art.5 of the WTOAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, they could be actionable as being discriminatory subsidies and tax incentivescausing adverse effects to the (trade) interests of other members. Subsidies might be qualified as WTO-illegal if they are: (1) grantedspecifically to a particular firm or industry within a country, (2) linked to exports of the subsidised good, (3) contingent upon the use ofdomestic over imported inputs, or (4) found to cause "adverse effects" to foreign competitors. Most subsidy schemes aimed at reducinggreenhouse gas emissions would be considered specific under the WTO Subsidies Agreement and fall under criteria (1) above. On theother hand, defining adverse effects can be rather complicated, but it would not prevent a country home to competitor producers frominitiating a WTO dispute if they estimate the subsidy impairs their market share or discriminates against their exports. It is indeed

    conceivable that in key economic sectors several of the subsidy schemes currently envisaged to reduce specific industries's emissionswould run against WTO rules. Potential conflict with trade rules could then become a reality -- and a real obstacle to climate changepolicy. This risk for conflict will be higher depending on how relevant a certain sector is for Annex I Party emission reductions and howsignificant trade flows are in that specific sector.

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    Renewable Subsidies

    Renewable Subsidies will be prohibited by WTO rules

    Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 WTO Compatibility of Four Categories ofU.S. Climate Change Policyhttp://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell

    Subsidies for renewable energy are very likely to violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For exampleloan guarantees for renewable fuels facilities in H.R. 6 are financial contributions targeting specific industries and commodity productsthey may act to increase the U.S. world market share in biofuels while decreasing foreign countries U.S. market share in conventionalfuels. Any subsidy that affects the export performance of a U.S.-produced climate-friendly good is likely to be prohibited under WTOrules .

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    Efficiency Standards

    Energy efficiency standards will be challenged in WTO

    Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 WTO Compatibility of Four Categories ofU.S. Climate Change Policyhttp://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell

    Because energy efficiency standards may limit U.S. imports of energy-inefficient products, exporting countries may contend that theregulations constitute a protectionist measure. PPM-based measures, distinguishing between otherwise-like products exclusively on thebasis of the way in which they were produced, may be particularly difficult to defend under WTO rules. On the other hand, PPM-basedenergy efficiency standards may also face domestic opposition because higher standards imposed on U.S. manufacturers may cause themto raise prices, undermining the international competitiveness of U.S.-manufactured products Eco-labels are complementary to energyefficiency standards and regulations. They inform consumers about the environmental characteristics of products and the environmentalimpact of their performance over time. Eco-labels may change consumer preferences and behavior. The wholesale purchasing decisionsof large retailers may shift in response to changing consumer demand, significantly affecting patterns of international trade. Allproducers will need to adapt to these changes, but producers in developing countries may have disproportionate difficulties in adjustingtheir production methods to the new requirements and in qualifying for eco-labeling schemes. Thus, eco-labeling is a potential source o

    dispute at the WTO.

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    Competitiveness

    Policies that favor US markets over others even if primarily aimed at helping the environment will be

    struck down absent attempts to co-operate with other countriesAlina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 WTO Compatibility of Four Categories of

    U.S. Climate Change Policyhttp://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell

    Renewable fuel standards employed in the United States. have already been challenged at the WTO. In 1996, a landmark WTO disputefound the Gasoline Rule in the U.S. Clean Air Act to violate GATT 1994 Article III on National Treatment. In many ways similar to theRFS provided for in H.R. 6, the Gasoline Rule allowed only gasoline of a specified cleanliness to be sold to consumers in the mostpolluted parts of the United States, and applied to all refiners, blenders, and importers of gasoline. Brazil and Venezuela argued that theGasoline Rule discriminated against their products in U.S. markets. The United States appealed the panels findings, arguing that, even it discriminated against foreign products, the Gasoline Rule was a permissible exception under Article XX (g) on General Exceptions,because it was intended to preserve an exhaustible resource clean air. The Appellate Body subsequently agreed that the primary aimof the Gasoline Rule was to conserve clean air, and that clean air is an exhaustible resource that can potentially qualify a domesticmeasure as a GATT Article XX General Exception. Ultimately, however, the Appellate Body found the Gasoline Rule to be WTO-

    incompatible due to the manner in which it had been applied. Because the United States had not sought to cooperate with Brazil andVenezuela in passing the Gasoline Rule, the measure did not pass the Chapeau of Article XX on General Exceptions. In effect, themeasure was found to constitute arbitrary [and] unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.Pursuing the Chapeau of Article XX further, the Appellate Body found the Gasoline Rule to constitute a disguised restriction oninternational trade because the United States failed to eliminate costs for foreign producers that it had eliminated for domestic refinersThis particular argument may be extended to the RFS in H.R. 6, and in particular the provision to exclude small refineries, if it is foundto impose greater costs on foreign producers than on domestic producers.

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    Caf Standards

    Caf Standards will be voted down by WTO empirically proven

    Alina Syunkova National Foreign Trade Council December 2007 WTO Compatibility of Four Categories ofU.S. Climate Change Policyhttp://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf. [Zavell

    Several comprehensive energy and climate change bills include CAFE standards for automobiles, including H.R. 1506, the FuelEconomy Reform Act. In a 1994 GATT dispute, U.S.-Automobiles, similar U.S. CAFE regulations were struck down by a Paneldecision for violating GATT Article III on National Treatment. Although never adopted, this ruling has often been cited by internationallawyers and provides insights into future WTO treatment of CAFE standards. Specifically, according to U.S.-Automobiles, CAFEregulations like the ones employed in the United States in 1994 risk violating Article III.4 of the GATT.

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    Renewable Incentives are Market Specific TargetingTargeting renewables is a specific subsidy

    Andrew Green assistant professor in the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Oct 2006World Trade Review CambridgeUniversity Press http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=524032 [Zavell]

    A further concern relates to subsidies that focus on research and development in particular industries or that promote the development orenewable energy. Renewable energy subsidies, for example, could be viewed as specific as they apply not to the energy industry as awhole but to a sub-sector. An argument that there are many types of renewable energy such that the subsidy is spread across a range ofindustries seems unlikely to prevail (although the potential for co-generation sources to use such subsidies attenuates this conclusionsomewhat). However, the obiter comment set out above by the Panel in USFinal Determination Softwood on natural resources makesthe likely interpretation somewhat less clear. If governments can provide oil without it being held to be specific because oil benefitsmany industries, the research and development subsidies to renewable energy could possibly be viewed as non-specific.

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    ***Compliance Good***

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    HegeUsing the WTO to resolve the IPR issues is critical to US trade leadership and hegemony

    Alain J. Lapter, B.S. in Broadcast Journalism, U of Colorado; J.D., UConn; LL.M. in IP, George Washington

    University, 2005The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take It Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis,

    Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property Law Society Journal of IP, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 217, Spring, Lexis

    In addition to Professor Oman's arguments, a more contemporary rationale also exists. In relation to the global political climate in whicthe United States operates, disassociation from the WTO would produce overwhelming negative sentiment throughout the world. Ithe last several years, the United States has embarked on a quasi-unilateral course of action regarding global trade and the war oterrorism. This platform has alienated long-standing allies and has established a virtually non-existent coalition. Consequently, thUnited States is walking on eggshells, and, therefore, can ill-afford to further isolate itself from the global community. It is conceivabthat any decision of disassociation would irreversible alienate the United States. The United States would be perceived as incapable oworking on a global scale. Its status as the world's economic leader would be diminished significantly and would provide sufficienincentive for our trading partners to seek new markets, thereby negatively affecting American businessmen and consumers.

    Nuclear War

    Zalmay Khalilzad,US Ambassador to the UN, 1995 "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World Aftethe Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring

    Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return tomultipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable notas an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, theglobal environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Secondsuch a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threatsof regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostilglobal rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including aglobal nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balanceof power system.

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    Trade Sanctions

    Unilateral refusal to comply causes trade sanctioning

    Carol J.Miller

    Professor of Business @ SMSU Lawand

    Jennifer L.Croston

    M.B.A @ SMSU WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental

    Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act 1999 The American Business Law Association, Lexis[Zavell]

    These Tuna-Dolphin IandIIdecisions became bellwether cases for assessment of unilateral ETMs. The United States was placed in theawkward position of having to decide whether to abide by the panel's interpretation of GATT principles or to do what prevailing U.S.public domestic opinion and U.S. law deemed to be environmentally correct.208If the United States followed the panels' decisions, theUnited States would be forced to permit importation of tuna caught by methods it does not sanction and which violate its conservationpolicy. By refusing to follow the GATT panel decision, however, the United States would draw into question its allegiance to freetrade policies and risk countervailing sanctions from affected nations. Failure to follow WTO rulings will have more significant

    consequences under the new dispute settlement procedures because an individual nation can no longer block a panel decision. Aunanimous vote of the WTO Dispute Settlement Board is necessary to reject the WTO panel decision or Appellate Body Report.Consequently, the WTO procedure poses greater risks for implementation of U.S. environmental law. 209 A WTO panel already has ruledthat certain provisions of the U.S. Clean Air Act related to reformulated gasoline violated GATT principles,210 compelling the UnitedStates to amend those sections of its domestic legislation related to oil refineries. The 1998 Shrimp-Sea Turtle Ruling by the WTOAppellate Body against the U.S. embargo of shrimp from nations that had not adopted U.S. "comparable" standards to safeguardendangered sea turtle species211 further draws into [*108] question how a nation can effectively enforce environmental policy whensome, but not all, affected nations are parties to MEAs that recognize the standards.

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    ***WTO Collapse Bad***

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    Compliance Key to WTOUS Disregard of rulings kills WTO cred

    John Gero, Director of the Trade Remedies Division @ the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs & International

    Trade, Kathleen Lannan , Member of the Bar of Ontario and New York, Trade Policy Officer @ the CanadianDept. of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, 1995, Canada-United States Law Journal, Trade and Innovation:Unilateralism v. Multilateralism, Lexis) [Zavell]

    The effectiveness of the WTO will be severely undermined if the disputed issues are covered by the WTO and the United States does nocomply with the WTO dispute settlement procedures. This could happen if, for example, the United States issued a section 301determination before the WTO mechanism has run its course; if it retaliated after losing a case; if it used threats and pressure to convincmembers to drop complaints against the United States or to meet its demands; or if it did not comply with a ruling after it had lost a case

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    ChinaThe WTO agreement is at a critical cross-roads - collapse of the WTO leads to conflict-ridden bilateral

    agreements that make U.S.-China trade conflict inevitable

    G. JohnIkenberry

    , Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, jan/feb2008

    , Foreign Affairs "The Rise of China and

    the Future of the West" www.ituassu.com.br/china_ikenberry_fa.pdf

    The United States should also renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. On the economic front, this would includebuilding on the agreements and architecture of the WTO, including pursuing efforts to conclude the current Doha Round of trade talks,which seeks to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries. The WTO is at a critical stage. The basicstandard of nondiscrimination is at risk thanks to the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Meanwhile, there aregrowing doubts over whether the WTO can in fact carry out trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture, that benefits developingcountries. These issues may seem narrow, but the fundamental character of the liberal international order -- its commitment to universalrules of openness that spread gains widely -- is at stake. Similar doubts haunt a host of other multilateral agreements -- on globalwarming and nuclear nonproliferation, among others -- and they thus also demand renewed U.S. leadership.The strategy here is not simply to ensure that the Western order is open and rule-based. It is also to make sure that the order does notfragment into an array of bilateral and "minilateral" arrangements, causing the United States to find itself tied to only a few key states invarious regions. Under such a scenario, China would have an opportunity to build its own set of bilateral and "minilateral" pacts. As a

    result, the world would be broken into competing U.S. and Chinese spheres. The more security and economic relations are multilateraland all-encompassing, the more the global system retains its coherence.

    Unrestrained U.S.-China Trade Conflict Escalates To A Shooting War That Would Destroy The U.S.Henry C KLiu, Chairman of a New York-based private investment group, 2005 (Asia Times, Online:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/global_economy/GH20Dj01.html)

    The resultant global economic depression from a trade war between the world's two largest economies will in turn heighten furthermutual recriminations. An external curb from the US of Chinese export trade will accelerate a redirection of Chinese growth momentuminward, increasing Chinese power, including military power, while further encouraging anti-US sentiment in Chinese policy circles. Thiin turn will validate US apprehension of a China threat, increasing the prospect for armed conflict.A war between the US and China can have no winners, particularly on the political front. Even if the US were to prevail militarilythrough its technological superiority, the political cost of military victory would be so severe that the US as it currently exists would notbe recognizable after the conflict and the original geopolitical aim behind the conflict would remain elusive, as the Vietnam War and theIraq war have demonstrated. By comparison, the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, destructive as they have been to the US social fabric, aremere minor scrimmages compared with a war with China.

    China US War goes Nuclear

    Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2001, The Nation, p 20

    China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious U.S. militarists know that chinasminiscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaicChinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinesecivil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to awar that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a

    war would bankrupt the Unites States, deeply divided Japan, and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the worlds mospopulous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclearholocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to Chinas sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independenceformally, forward-deployed US forces on Chinas borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

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    ProtectionismWithdrawal of US multilateral trade leadership causes the deterioration of global trade and economic

    growth, in favor of hostile regional blocs and protectionism

    C. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International Economics, 2001 Foreign Affairs, April, Lexis

    A MORE SUBTLE CAUSE of the present crisis is the decline of effective U.S. leadership in the global economic system. This in turnstems from a domestic popular backlash against globalization and the resulting political stalemate in Washington. During the postwaperiod, the pervasive tension between regionalism and multilateralism (mainly as a result of increasing European integration) wgenerally resolved in favor of multilateralism due to steady American leadership in that direction. The United States insisted on a newround of global trade liberalization after each major step in the European integration process, which otherwise would have createadditional trade discrimination and likely emulation around the world. Thus the primacy of GATT was maintained. Indeed, a positivdynamic between regional and global trade liberalization remained consistent for more than four decades. Even when the United Stateitself began to embrace regionalism -- from bilateral free trade with Canada to the North American Free Trade Agreement to thproposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) -- it was careful to simultaneously pursue new multilateral initiatives to ensure aumbrella of global trade liberalization. Washington's ability to maintain such leadership has been severely curtailed over the past fivyears, however. Despite the strength of America's economy and the reduction of its unemployment rate to a 30-year low, the popular backlash against globalization h

    produced a political stalemate on most international economic issues. As a result, the president has had no effective authority to negotiate new trade agreements sinc

    1994. Legislation to replenish the IMF languished for a year in the midst of the Asian crisis, until it was rescued fortuitously by the farm community's interest in restorinits exports to Asia. Even relatively straightforward issues -- such as extending permanent normal trade relations to China or offering enhanced market access to Africa anthe Caribbean -- required lengthy, all-out presidential and business campaigns to persuade Congress. Largely as a result of this domestic standstill, America's internationaeconomic posture has been compromised. The United States' initial refusal in 1997 to contribute to the IMF support package for Thailand for fear of further rilinCongress, for example, earned lasting enmity throughout Asia. The main reason for the debacle at Seattle was the United States' inability to propose a new round of tradnegotiations that would meet the legitimate interests of other major players. Lacking the domestic authority to lower its own trade barriers, Washington was forced to offean agenda that sought to reduce protection only in other countries -- a prospect that was understandably unappealing to the rest of the world. Similarly, in 1997 -- 98 APECnegotiations, the United States unsuccessfully pushed a program of sector-specific liberalization that focused almost wholly on U.S. export interests. And six years aft

    the idea of the FTAA was launched in Miami, little progress has been made toward hemispheric trade liberalization. This international leadership vacuum hahad two subtle but profound effects on the world economy. Like a bicycle on a hill, the global trading system tends to slip backwards inthe absence of continual progress forward . Now , with no serious multilateral trade negotiations taking place anywhere in the world, thbacksliding has come in the form of intensified regionalism (which is inherently discriminatory), as well as mercantilist and protectionidisputes across the Atlantic. An East Asian free trade area -- and along with it, a three-bloc world -- will likely emerge if the UniteStates remains on the sidelines of international trade for another five years. Such U.S. impotence would also mean that the traditionallpositive impact of regional liberalization on the multilateral process would give way to increasing antagonism and even hostilitbetween the regional blocs. The other chief effect of the leadership vacuum is increased international disregard of, or even hostilittoward, the U nited States on the economic front. Because of its weight in the world economy, its dynamic growth, and its traditional leadership role, thUnited States remains the most important player in the global economic system. The other economic powers generally seek to avoid confronting it directly. The EU, fexample, has tried to avoid overt battles, despite its escalating range of disputes with the United States. East Asian governments are careful to assure Washington that thenew regional initiatives are fully consistent with existing global norms and institutions -- a conciliatory stance that is in sharp contrast to Mahathir's shrill rhetoric ofdecade ago and Japanese Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibara's aggressive 1997 promotion of the AMF. In reality, however, the United States is perceived awanting to call the shots without putting up much of its own money or making changes in its own laws and practices. These specific economic complaints fuse with anfeed on more general anti-American sentiments throughout the world. Hence, the two other economic superpowers are proceeding on their own. The EU has launched theuro, a new association agreement with Mexico, and negotiations with Mercosur (the trade bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay); East Asia i

    pursuing the AMF and the East Asian free trade area. The result is a clear and steady erosion of both the United States' position on the globeconomic scene and the multilateral rules and institutions that it has traditionally championed. If not checked soon, this erosion couldeteriorate into severe international conflicts and the disintegration of global economic links.

    Protectionism causes nuclear warMichael Spicer, Economist; member of the British Parliament, 1996 The Challenge from the East and the Rebirthof the West, p. 121

    A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possiblerupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of astrife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the directioof world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead .

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    Trade Wars

    WTO collapse causes future trade tensions to escalate into shooting wars

    RaymondWaldmann

    , Vice Prez for International Relations at Boeing,1999

    Seattle PI, 5-11, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/wtoop.shtml

    Trade is not a panacea for the political, economic and social problems of the world. But it is a force for peace and cross-cultural contactCountries are less likely to go to war against their trading partners than they are against strangers. The WTO furthers the process ofprotecting against commercial skirmishes and potential trade wars by forging agreement among nations on trade protocols. Without theWTO, trade would be too dangerous a proposition for countries to leave to their trade ministries, and eventually trade disputes couldbecome national security issues. A non-WTO world would more closely resemble the international economy before World War II, whercountries used trade as tools of foreign policy, and international commerce was a pawn of aggressor states. As Franklin D. Roosevelt'sformer secretary of state Cordell Hull said, "When goods do not cross borders, armies do." Fortunately we do not live in that world.Indeed, if the WTO didn't exist, we would have to create it. And that is precisely what the United States and 22 other countries did in1948. Today, 134 members of the WTO are dedicated to preventing trade conflicts from getting out of hand. By nature, the wheels ofinternational law move slowly, but the WTO patiently and continuously improves its rules and institutions in order to make the world abetter place. Through successive rounds of trade talks going back to 1949, the GATT and its successor the WTO have reduced tariffs ongoods from industrial countries from an average of more than 40 percent in 1948 to today's 3.9 percent. As a result, trade has exploded;today it is 26 times the volume of 1949. Through GATT and WTO, countries have tackled and solved some of the thorniest problems oftrade, and have settled hundreds of trade disputes. The WTO has already: Dramatically reduced tariffs and other barriers to trade, so thatoday's exporters and consumers are able to shop for the best deals almost anywhere in the world; Solved more than 100 trade disputes ithe past four years between countries before they got out of hand and turned into bitter trade wars;

    WTO destruction leads to trade wars

    Kevin Watkins, director of the UN's Human Development Report Office, 2003 Essay, Prospect, July 24, Lexis

    Some anti-globalisers will view any proposal to reform the WTO as ill-conceived. But what are the alternatives? If you want a glimpseinto the future of a world with a weakened multilateral system take a look at the content of regional and bilateral trade pacts. RobertZoellick, the US trade representative, now arrives at international meetings waving the US-Singapore free trade agreement and holding up as a model for all countries. Its provisions include duty free market access for US exports, a legal provision prohibiting future impor

    taxes, unrestricted rights of entry and profit repatriation for US investors, and intellectual property rules that make the Trips agreementlook tame. The US would probably be happy to see the end of the WTO and is busy building a trade empire that projects the realities ofits unrivalled power. Witness the creation of a middle east free trade zone-and the refusal to allow Egypt entry as punishment for itsrefusal to support the US case against the EU over genetically modified food. The WTO's rules are rigged in favour of the strong. Yetabolition is not an option. Apart from removing a source of pressure on the US and the EU to open markets, cut farm subsidies, and haltprotectionist abuses, it would risk a ruinous spiral of conflict. Rich countries would bulldoze poor ones into deeply unequal tradetreaties. The multilateralism of convenience and bilateral power politics that the Bush administration is promoting in other internationalinstitutions would prevail. Ultimately, that is in nobody's interest-Cancun is the place to draw a line in the Mexican sand.

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    WarmingWTO key to solve warming

    Susan C. Schwab, Ambassador, United States Trade Representative, December 9, 2007Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Changehttp://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/96703.htm [Zavell]

    The potential benefits of a WTO climate initiative and EGSA are compelling. A recent World Bank study shows that trade in climate-friendly technologies would likely to grow 7-14% as result of a WTO deal. WTO Members have the opportunity to take bold, ambitiouaction now to use trade tools, such as tariff reductions on clean technologies, to advance clean energy and climate change mitigationobjectives. There is no time to waste arguing over approaches; we need immediate results that benefit all: producers, consumers,exporters, importers. Trade liberalization in the WTO can make a real difference in accelerating the spread of new, cutting edge cleantechnologies ones that can make concrete contributions to global efforts to mitigate climate change. According to the World Bankstudy, while FDI is the most important means of transferring technology, weak intellectual property rights regimes (or regimesperceived to be weak) in developing countries often inhibit diffusion of specific technologies beyond the project level.

    WTO is key to carbon restriction legitimacysolves warmingPeterFranklin, staff writer, April 25, 2006Only the WTO can stop global warminghttp://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/25/onlythewtocanstopglobalw

    Good stuff all round, the problem is none of it brings us any closer towards changing one rather important fact: As a result of humanactivity, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are now higher than at any point at human history and are still climbing.To stabilise those concentrations the nations of the world have to make deep cuts in their emissions. So far progress is not encouraging,which has brought great cheer to the opponents of the Kyoto treaty. Targets don't work, they say. What we need instead is newtechnology. This is a position that Tony Blair has been flirting with for some time. But new technology costs money, so who will pay?The obvious answer is the polluter. And so how should the costs be fairly apportioned between different countries? According to howmuch they pollute, of course. Which takes us back to targets. The reason why they haven't worked so far is because they're not enforcedThus any successor to the Kyoto treaty, which expires in 2012, needs to be underpinned by an effective enforcement mechanism.So far,dear readers, I sense I am carrying most of you with me - but here's where I throw it all away. Look around the world and there are only

    two enforcement mechanisms that can operate on a truly global level. The first of these is the US military, but that's not looking soeffective of late. The second is the World Trade Organisation. The anti-globalisation movement may hate it - but one of the reasons whythey do is that it is ready and able to enforce free trade agreements. If the WTO were more like the Kyoto treaty then signatory nationscould agree to tariff reductions and then fail to implement them in the sure knowledge that there'd be no come back. As it is, however,protectionism is punished through trade sanctions and so cheating is kept to a minimum. That's why the negotiation of further free tradeagreements are so fraught, signatory nations know that they will be held to their commitments. The anti-globalisers will argue that theWTO enforces agreements that cheat the poor, but that is not the issue here. Indeed, the poorest nations of the world have very little tofear from a global agreement to limit carbon emissions because their emissions are so low. From a different angle, the climate changesceptics will argue that enforced targets would represent an attack on national sovereignty. But strangely that doesn't seem to botherthem when it comes to enforcing free trade. So my modest proposition is this: negotiate a successor to Kyoto and then let the WTOenforce it. Nations that failed to meet their carbon targets would have a proportionate tariff slapped on their imports. Such a systemcould even be used to deal with countries that refused to sign up to the new agreement. The WTO would unilaterally impose a target oneach non-signatory nation, with their excess carbon emissions and consequent penalties being assessed in absentia. The export-ledeconomies of China, India and other key Kyoto absentees would be particularly susceptible to such pressure.

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    ***Free Trade Impacts***

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    CompetitivenessFree Trade Key to Competitiveness

    (Kenneth Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration in Department of Commerce,

    December 10

    th

    , 2001, Globalization, National Security and Export Controls,http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/archive2001/GlobalizationNScarsdaleNY.htm)

    One of the simple and clear points, in my view, is the continued importance of international trade. Indeed, the promotion of free trade is-- and remains a fundamental pillar of the Administrations economic and foreign policy. In our view, free and open trade sustainseconomic growth and contributes to economic prosperity. The benefits of free trade are undeniable. Open markets allow for increasedexport sales, which lead to more jobs, higher revenues, more profits, and overall economic growth. Department of Commerce statisticsshow that exports have accounted for almost one quarter of U.S. economic growth during the past decade. While the United Statesnegotiated and implemented the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round trade agreements, the U.S. economygrew at its fastest rate in a generation. Similar statistics show that free trade also benefits American workers. Jobs supported byinternational trade pay 13 to 18 percent more than the national average. Free trade also benefits U.S. consumers. Global competitionresults in more choices and lower prices in the marketplace. Finally, free trade enhances U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplaceImports stimulate competition, which leads to technological innovation and quality enhancement.

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    EnvironmentProtectionism Kills The Environment

    (Richard Katz, Co-Editor, Oriental Economist Report And TOE Alert, 22-JUN-2007, The International Economy

    http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6910875/Will-environmentalism-become-the-new.html)

    First, protectionism is bad for the environment. World Bank data shows that, while global warming gases per dollar of GDP initially risas poor countries industrialize to the per capita income of a country like South Africa or Chile, they tend to fall back again as countriesgrow richer. How about organic wastes that factories emit into the water supply? As measured by pollution per worker, factories inmiddle-income countries tend to be cleaner than in poor ones, and cleaner still in rich countries. Not only does environmental awarenesgrow once people have a full belly and a solid roof, but rich countries can better afford environmental safeguards. And it is trade thathelps transform poor countries into rich ones. Globalization underpinned the economic miracles that have lifted hundreds of millions ofChinese and Indians from hunger, infant mortality, and illiteracy. Not coincidentally, China's rapid development has also engendered apublic outcry within China about the sinking water table, and the air pollution that kills hundreds of thousands each year.

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    Global Alternative Energy Adoption/WarmingEnvironmental Trade Barriers Turn Case- They Destroy Adoption Of New Alternative Energies And

    Undermine Effiency

    (Otto GrafLambsdorff, Former German Federal Minister Of Economics, 22-Jun-2007, The InternationalEconomy, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6910875/Will-environmentalism-become-the-new.html)

    Beyond doubt, environmentalism is gaining momentum-not only in politics, but also in business. Customers are increasingly willing topay extra for environment-friendly goods in the light of noticeable climate change. Of course, companies want to take advantage of themarket's readiness to pay higher prices. In this context, protectionism is a promising tool for domestic producers to safeguard highmargins by excluding international rivals. For instance, instead of competing for cheaper and better products, European manufacturers oelectronics achieved in 2002 surcharges on imports of energy-efficient bulbs from China. The 66 percent duty is more than dubious asEurope's leaders are at the same time urging households to make use of exactly these energy-efficient light bulbs. If the duty ended,market prices of energy-efficient bulbs would equal those of conventional ones. The consequences of this kind of protectionism are twofold: first, domestic manufacturers are not forced to produce more cost-efficiently; and second, many customers who cannot afford theartificial high prices continue to purchase conventional bulbs. The European Commission acts Janus-faced: While defendingunnecessary high prices for energy-efficient bulbs due to successful lobbying, it is striving for a significant reduction of carbon dioxide

    emissions. Obviously, the attractive international market for environment-friendly goods must stay free of protectionism for our planet'ssake. Only if premium energy-efficient products become affordable for the majority can a pivotal contribution to environmentalprotection be made. By the way, Australia has just decided to ban incandescent bulbs. Instead of intervening, governments should moreoften trust and release market forces to boost environmentalism. The promotion of free trade would be a sufficient first step towardlowering the energy-efficient bulbs' pricing and as a consequence changing consumer habits. If the Chinese can offer eco-friendlyproducts under more favorable conditions, let them do the business.

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    ***IPR Good***

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    WTO Compliance Key to IPR

    Non-compliance with WTO leads to collapse of US IPR protection and international isolationism

    Donald P. Harris, Associate Professor of Law, Spring, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 185, The International IntellectuaProperty Regime Complex: Trips And Treaties Of Adhesion Part Ii: Back To The Past Or A Small StepForward?, Lexis, [Zavell]

    The United States has already demonstrated a willingness to ignore adverse WTO decisions.92 The United States' refusal to abide byWTO decisions can have serious negative implications. For example, the United States could jeopardize its leadership role in intellectuaproperty, ruin its credibility and weaken its position in future bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and put United States' intellectualproperty rights holders at risk, for other countries would have little incentive to continue protecting United States holders' works.93Inaddition, the United States risks being perceived as isolationist and protectionist, which could harm it not only as respects intellectualproperty but also with respect to other areas, including the war on terror.94

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    http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n92http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n92http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n93http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n93http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n93http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n94http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n94http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n94http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n92http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n93http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa7696bfb6afaf057672df1f325db753&docnum=19&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=11&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAz&_md5=cf6f18a2e0d1a49630fe40537e6d60c1#n94
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    Ext.: WTO Compliance Key to IPR

    Lack of WTO observance tanks US IPR

    Alain J. Lapter, B.S. in Broadcast Journalism, U of Colorado; J.D., UConn; LL.M. in IP, George WashingtonUniversity, 2005The WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take It Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis,Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property Law Society Journal of IP, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 217, Spring, Lexis [Zavell]

    [*257] As Professor Ralph Oman observed, the United States has several broader reasons for continued adherence to international IPagreements. 165 First, observance would help the U.S. "secure dynamic leadership in international copyright relations". 166 Aspreviously discussed, the United States is the largest exporter of copyrighted work. Therefore, an international IP platform is the onlyviable method to protect its economic interests abroad. The United States has already seen the DSU's advantages both in effectiveenforcement and in the establishment of bright line protection obligations. Second, continued observance "will enhance the UnitedStates' political credibility and strengthen its position for negotiating multilateral and bilateral trade agreements involving intellectualproperty." 167 If the United States were to walk away from the WTO, other States could interpret the move as protectionist andisolationist in nature. These "trading partners" would have little incentive to continue the domestic protection of U.S.-originating IPworks. 168 The move would render the United States' negotiating position null and void. On the other hand, the DSU procedureprovides a platform on which the U.S. can work with its trading partners in resolving disputes amicably. 169 Third, continuedmembership in the WTO will provide a sense of security for U.S. authors. 170 TRIPs provide these authors effective judicialintervention unavailable under Berne. It creates the "stronger copyright laws and better universal copyright [*258] enforcement" thatProfessor Oman envisioned with Berne, not only through its provisions but through eventual dispositive caselaw interpreting theagreement. 171

    US abiding by WTO rulings key to IPR credibility

    ChristopherCostigan, President, Gambling911.com April 8, 2007 http://www.gambling911.com/US-Online-Gambling-WTO-Decision-040807.html [Zavell]

    Should the US fail to abide by the ruling, the global implications could be immense. That's because the United States plans to file acomplaint with the WTO against China as early as this week. The US complaint involves allegations that China has been engaging inpiracy of copyrighted movies and books. Officials have prepared two cases, one saying China sets too high a value on pirated movie or

    music disks before prosecuting violators, and another objecting to restrictions on the sale of foreign books and movies in the nation, thesaid. The people, three industry officials and one lawyer, spoke on condition they not be identified. China's illegal copying of movies,music and software cost companies $2.2 billion in 2006 sales, according to an estimate by lobby groups representing Microsoft Corp.,Walt Disney Co., and Vivendi SA. The WTO complaints are the first by the U.S. against China for breaching intellectual property rightsin a country where copying has extended to bags, golf clubs and even shampoo. ``The U.S. believes that now it's time to put morepressure'' on China, five years after the country became a WTO member, said Standard Chartered Plc's economist Stephen Green inShanghai. ``The U.S. believes that China has clearly infringed rules that it agreed to play by,'' prompting the action, he said. But Chinawill have every opportunity to point towards the US unwillingness to abide by the recent WTO decision should a complaint be filed."Hypocrisy" charges will be easy to come by. While the United State can file an appeal in the Antigua vs USA matter, this just opens thedoor for China to continue profiting from piracy for the next five years. In a letter to President George W. Bush in October, House Speaker

    Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers said that `no country in the world has done more to undermine American intellectual property than China.''U.S. complaints were imminent, Trade Representative Susan Schwab said on Feb. 22. ``We're all going to run out of patience at some point,and that's going to be sooner rather than later,'' she said. Under WTO procedures, the U.S. will formally ask for consultations with China wheit files its complaints. Only after 60 days can the U.S. ask for an independent panel to adjudicate the dispute. The U.S. plan may not escalateinto a formal complaint, said Li Yushi, deputy director of the Chinese commerce ministry's research institute. ``This is just another turn offocus by the U.S. government in dealing with its widening trade deficit with China,'' Li said today in Beijing. `The administration understandsthat China has made efforts in IPR protection, as well as our limitations in enforcing the effort.'' China is also one-upping the US in regard toits explosive gambling industry based primarily in Macao. While the United States government continues to demonize online gambling, LasVegas and river boat gaming continues to thrive Stateside. But many fear the Vegas market could soon dry up with high rollers choosing Macaover Sin City. This year, Macao became the biggest gambling center in the world and continues to grow. Indications were that Vegas hadintended to supplement losses by jumping into the billion dollar online gambling industry. Those plans were shot down with the passing of thinew law, a law that does not exempt Las Vegas casinos. As for the US government's complaint against China, they may have even bigger

    worries to contend with on the counterfeiting front. Tiny Antigua may decide to follow China's lead, and what's to stop them? Should theUnited States elect to ignore the WTO decision, the price they'll be paying could be astronomical. More astute policymakers inWashington appear to realize this. Chairmanship of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Franks, has already announced hewill draft legislation to repeal the anti-online gambling measure.

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    IPR Module: EconAdditionally, IP is key to overall US competitiveness and growth

    James Mendenhall, General Counsel for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Federal News

    Service, July 15 2005, Lexis, [Zavell]The services sector now accounts for about 60 to 80 percent of the U.S. economy. It's one area where the United States actually has atrade surplus. Protection of intellectual property has come to play a central role in U.S. economic growth. The value of innovation,creativity and branding, covering everything from movies and music to software and pharmaceuticals to basic trademarks, it's the keydriver of U.S. competitiveness

    Economic decline causes a nuclear war

    Mead, 1992(Walter Russell, NPQS Board of advisors, New perspectives quarterly, summer 1992, page 30 )

    Hundreds of millions - billions - of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders haveembraced market principles -- and drawn closer to the west because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if itcan't? What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South

    against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - These countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will posea much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.

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    IPR Module: EconGrowth can't exist without property right enforcement

    Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 2/27/2004, "Intellectual Property Rights", Statement a

    the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit,http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/default.htm [Zavell]

    Of particular current relevance to our economy overall is the application of property right protection to information technology. Anoticeable component of the surge in the trend growth of the economy in recent years arguably reflects the benefits that we have derivedfrom the synergy of laser and fiber optic technologies in the 1960s and 1970s. This synergy has produced very little that is tangible ininformation technology. Yet the information flow that it facilitates has fostered the creation of vast amounts of wealth. The dramaticgains in information technology have markedly improved the ability of businesses to identify and address incipient economic imbalancebefore they inflict significant damage. These gains reflect new advances in both the physical and the conceptual realms. It is imperativeto find the appropriate intellectual property regime for each.

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    IPR Module: ChinaMarket Access Generated By IPR Protection Prevents Chinese Military Tech Progress

    Segal - Senior Fellow Council On Foreign Relations - 2004 Washington Quarterly, Summer

    http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v027/27.3segal.html

    Many of the risks of the commercialization and globalization of R&D are uncontrollable, but the United States should be ready to try toexploit the possible security gains of exporting high-technology commercial products to China. U.S. sales to China promote dependencon U.S. technologysomething the Chinese worry aboutand give U.S. intelligence agencies knowledge of the potential weaknesses ithe technologies the Chinese have purchased from abroad, as well as how they might be exploited in a conflict or for more routineinformation collection. U.S. technology firms located in or exporting to China may also crowd out Chinese producers. The presence offoreign firms offering high salaries to the best Chinese scientists and engineers makes it more difficult for the PRC to attract technicaltalent to its own defense R&D programs, which hampers Chinese efforts to develop a spin-on system and thus maintains thetechnological gap between U.S. forces and the PLA. Chinese officials have complained, for example, about Intel's recruitment of someof the country's top engineering graduates.33 In addition to fostering domestic policies focused on expanding private and public R&Dimproving mathematics and science education, and increasing investment in technology infrastructure, the U.S. strategy must be

    built on fair access to international markets, particularly China. U.S. trade officials should continue to push China to live up to

    its WTO commitments. Chinese technology producers are finding new ways to exclude foreign penetration of their markets through thuse of rebates of value-added taxes; the failure to provide adequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR); and the definition ofnew standards in digital video disks, cellular phones, and wireless technologies. A March 2004 letter from Secretary of State ColinPowell, Secretary of Commerce Don Evans, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick protesting regulations requiring all wirelessimports to contain data-encryption technology now produced only in China is an example of the type of pressure that the United Statesshould be prepared to use.34 U.S. technology trade with China will need to be predicated on the country's adherence to the commitmentdefining its WTO membership: [End Page 168] transparency, nondiscrimination, elimination of trade barriers, and IPR protection.

    Chinese Tech progression Causes US-China War

    Christensen- Associate Prof Poly Sci @ Mit2001 International Security, Vol 25 No 4, Posing Problems WithoutCatching Up, Pp. 5-40

    China does not appear poised to become a peer competitor of the United States. If it were to do so, China's economic growth and

    increasing technological sophistication must allow China to close the gap with the American military, create power projectioncapabilities that would threaten the American position in East Asia, and replace the former Soviet Union as a global security threat.Given the great leaps in economic and military power that this would entail, it seems incredible to many, including this author, that China mighachieve such an outcome anytime in the next few decades. Of course, it is possible that China might accelerate its progress greatly by enjoying

    the "advantage of backwardness" in a quickly changing world of high technology: That is, by being more innovative than the United Statesby necessity, China might then skip levels of technological development in the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) and quicklclose the gap with a United States that is perceived as too self-confident and too bureaucratically hidebound to maintain a healthy leadagainst such a newcomer. Those who reject this scenario point to the low starting point for China's military modernization; China's ownimpressive institutional and bureaucratic obstacles to innovation; and its continuing reliance on outsiders to develop new defense technologiesthat, themselves, are of late-Cold War vintage. In fact, the common argument among this group is not only that China is not likely to close thegap quickly between itself and the United States, but that the American technological lead will likely expand in the next few decades. As RobeRoss puts it persuasively, it appears so far that if there is going to be a revolution in military affairs in East Asia, "it will be a largely Americanrevolution."6 Such conclusions should not be cause for excessive optimism, however. Chinese strategists seem to recognize the reality ofChina's persistent relative [End Page 8] weakness, but they do not therefore throw up their hands in defeat, considering great power conflict

    unthinkable.No matter how much Beijing might wish it could develop capabilities that could match or defeat American military power,China's strategy for the next twenty to thirty years appears more realistic: to develop the capabilities to dominate most regional actors, tbecome a regional peer competitor or near peer competitor of the other great powers in the region (including Russia, Japan, and perhapsa future unified Korea), and to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict ofgreat interest to China. As leading military officers argue in one recent internally circulated Chinese military education book (which isanalyzed in detail below): "Our weaponry has improved greatly in comparison to the past, but in comparison to the militaries of the advancedcountries [fada guojia], there will still be a large gap not only now but long into the future. Therefore we not only must accelerate ourdevelopment of advanced weapons, thus shrinking the gap to the fullest extent possible, but also [we must] use our current weapons to defeatenemies. . . . [We must] explore the art of the inferior defeating the superior under high-tech conditions." 7 In the near term, China seemsdevoted to developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan's diplomatic policies, and to threaten or carry out punishment oany third parties that might intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf, including both the United States and Japan.8

    Continues No Break

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    IPR Module: ChinaContinued No Break

    [End Page 9] If Beijing elites become convinced that relatively limited military capabilities and coercive tactics might allow for thepolitically effective use of force against Taiwan and, if necessary, American forces, then war between the United States and China

    becomes a very real possibility. This is true regardless of whether China's military force is generally backward compared with those of theUnited States and its allies, whether China still would be defeated in a toe-to-toe full-scale war with the United States, or whether the overall

    balance of power across the Taiwan Strait has changed enough to allow a successful amphibious invasion by the People's Liberation Army(PLA).

    US becomes immersed in a war with china, flashpoints around the world also escalate to nuclear

    conflagration, culminating in extinction.

    Strait Times 2k(No one gains in war over Taiwan; June 25, lexis)

    The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington wereto conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such ascale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already tol

    the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China asbelligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, SingaporeIf China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere maytry to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance opower in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armedwith its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase . Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According toGeneral Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at thetime thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personalaccount of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that USwas confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the UShad to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a waagainst China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that candestroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recentlythat Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang,

    president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholarin Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. Hesaid military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreignintervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, forChina puts sovereignty above everything else .

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