Upload
others
View
1
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
16 th of november, 2015 B. Van der Herten, Corporate Risk & Safety Manager
P. Lafontaine, Safety expert
MIVB – some key figures
MIVB = Maatschappij voor het Intercommunaal
Vervoer te Brussel
Who are we?
Institutional context
The STIB Today
• Belgium = 3 Regions
= 3 public transport companies + SNCB & Infrabel
Flemish Region = VVM - De Lijn
Brussels Region = MIVB
Walloon Region = SRWT - TEC
Brussels Capital Region = STIB shareholder (100 %)Each company has its own pricing policy, but within the Brussels Region,there is a certain degree of price integration between trains, trams, the metro and buses.
• MIVB
> Leading urban public transport company in Belgium
> Operates an integrated network +/- 650 km
An integrated network
An integrated network
The STIB Today
> Operates in the 19 municipalities of the Brussels-Capital Region and in 12 other neighbouring municipalities
> Serves an area of 242 km²
> Transports almost one million Brussels residents and commuters every day
The STIB Today
An integrated
network
• 4 metro lines• 17 tram lines• 50 bus lines• 11 night bus lines
Ridership
The STIB Today
364.6 millionTrips made in 2014
+ 10 millionvs. 2013 (+2.8%)
Places x kilometres offered
The STIB Today
• 2014: 8.1 billion places-km
• In 10 years: + 60% thanks
to the extension of the
metro and tram networks
and higher-capacity
vehicles.
• To be the preferred urban mobility solution in
Brussels.
• The MIVB makes a daily commitment to creating a
more accessible and more sustainable city.
Our vision
…our main challenges
11
Complexity Complexity & new
technology
Expectations from
stakeholders increased
Enterprise Risk (& Safety)
Management Concepts @ MIVB
The risk concept
13
FOR
PROCESS
&
PROJECT
Integrated management system
…integrated with the other management systemsProcess & Quality
Management
ISO 9001 : 2015
Demand & Project
Management
14
Risk Management
ISO 31000 : 2009
Leadership
Planning
Support
Operations
Performance
ImprovementContext
ISO HLS
FOR
PROCESS
&
PROJECT
A shared framework @ MIVB
• Visual determination of risks on a STIB « heatmap » with 5 final criticality levels
• Proactive identification of priorities based on those risksclassified as « unacceptable »(*)
• Presentation of the evolutions(risk control) to Management and stakeholders
(*) Risk appetite determined by company
Critical Risks
Important Risks
Moderated Risks
Acceptable Risks
Negligible Risks
1 2 3 4 5
5
4
3
2
1
Likelihood
Imp
act
15
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL
1 2 3 4 5
IMPACT
VERY RARE OCCASIONNAL POSSIBLE REGULAR CERTAIN
1 2 3 4 5
LIKELIHOOD
“enables a
more
objective
estimation of
impact and
likelihood”
• Impact and likelihood estimated on 5 levels based on predefined criteria
• While considering existing measures & controls � « Residual Risk »
• With direct involvement of relevant experts and stakeholders
Safety &
Hazard
Financial &
Compliance
OperationalStrategy &
Business
* Sortie de trajectoire
* Collision
* Incendie & explosion
* Heurt de personnes
* Entrainement de personnes
* Chute de personnes
* Blessures de personnes
* Electrisation
* Malaise
* Non-conformité avec la législation et la règlemention existante
* Non-conformité avec les engagements et autres obligations contractuelles
* Modifications légales et réglementaires belges (ou européennes voire internationales)
* Non-respect des marchés publics
* Détérioration de la protection des responsabilités extracontractuelles STIB
* Non-respect des droits des tiers
* Détérioration de la protection des droits STIB
* Suicides
* Vols et braquages d’actifs STIB
* Agressions physiques et/ou morales sur voyageurs
* Vols et braquages sur voyageurs
* Actes criminels
* Agressions physiques et/ou moralessur agents STIB
* Détérioration matérielle
* Intrusion et occupation physique
* Nuisances envers le confort de service
* Lésions par agents physiques
* Lésions par agents chimiques
* Incendie & explosion
* Maladie et agents biologiques
* Manutention et ergonomie de travail
* Chute de personnes et d’objets
* Blessures de personnes par machines et équipements de travail
* Dommagespsychosociaux
* Défaillance opérationnelle et pertes par défaillance du contrôle interne et/ou des instruments financiers
* Fraude financière interne
* Fraude financière externe
* Contrepartie
* Liquidité
* Marchés financiers
* Modification des relationsavec les parties prenantes
* Modification des relations avec le DITP
* Détérioration des relations avec les partenaires sociaux, arrêt de travail et grève
* Evolutions sociétales
* Evolutions technologiques
* Détérioration de l’image et de la réputation
* Non-respect des cadres de références
* Non-respect des règlements, des polices et des valeurs
* Abus d’usage autorisé des actifs et des moyens
* Détérioration des rôles et responsabilités
* Perte de contrôle managérial & de leadership
* Détérioration de la planification
* Détérioration du rapportage
* Indisponibilités et utilisation des moyens budgétaires
* Initiatives et décisions politiques
* Indisponibilité/continuité du personnel et des fonctions clés
* Perte de connaissances et des compétences internes
* Détérioration de l’équité de traitement / gestion du personnel
* Détérioration de l’ambiance et de la motivation au travail
* Perturbation dans la composition dupersonnel
* Inadéquation des candidats recrutés avec les profils recherchés ,
* Départ volontaire
* Défaillance matérielle et des équipements liée au mode de transport
* Indisponibilité de matériaux et des équipements liée au mode de transport
* Erreur de manipulation
* Déviation des procédures préétablies
* Dimensionnement du projet
* Technologies du projet
* Intégration du projet
* Organisation du projet
* Répercussions métier du projet
* Ressources du projet
* Défaillance matérielle et des équipements ICT
* Défaillance logicielle et des applications ICT
* Hacking, virus et intrusions système
* Intrusion et occupation physique dans les locaux sensibles
* Acte malveillant interne ICT
STIB-MIVB
RISK
IDENTIFICATION
MODEL
* Changements climatiques
* Catastrophes naturelles
* Dommages environnementaux accidentels et pollutions
* Surconsommation
* Epidémies & pandémies
V1.2 2015
* Violation de la vie privée pour les clients
* Violation de la vie privée pour les employés
17
Safety & Risk Governance1X/
Month1X/
Trimester
1X/Month
Project Incident ChangeProcess review
Safety Risk Management
Pulsar
The MIVB metro of the future
The STIB Today
L 1-5 : PULSAR Programme - modernisation and automation, new rolling stock
L 3 : upgrading from tram to metro between Albert and Nord, and extension from
Nord to Bordet
• Renovation and automation (up to UTO) of existing metro lines 1 & 5
• Pulsar programme : 4 main projects and 30+ « satellite » projects> Rolling stock (43 new trains), fit for UTO operation
> Signalling system : CBTC + IC/IV + ATS
> New depot « Erasme » and existing depot « Delta » : fit for UTO operation
> Platform screen doors : for UTO operation
• To be implemented in different stages, spread over 10 years, with bothlines remaining in operation
> Complex migration scheme : line 1-5 remain in operation
> ATO at first, then proof of concept (« mini-UTO » in 3 stations), then full UTO
> Many interfaces with the existing system environment
L 1-5 Pulsar programme
21
Erasmus: depot for the automatic metro
The STIB Today
Workshop : Maintenanceof 6 metro trains Administrative building Test track
Erasmus Terminus Depot : Storage of 23 metro trains
• No specific legal obligations for Safety in urban public transport in Belgium> MIVB worked on the basis of ‘historic practices’, the application of norms &
standards, but
> No formal Safety management before 2011
• RAMS_Safety plan Pulsar based on MIVB Safety management system (under construction) and on:
> CENELEC norms;
> Benchmark with BOStrab, NFPA 130 (example of Copenhagen metro), French Safety frame work (STRMTG);
> Common Safety Method 2015/1136 for Risk Evaluation and Assessment(integrated with the Enterprise Risk Management of MIVB)
• Discussion with government for the adoption of a Safety legislation(under construction, see next slide)
Legal frame work Safety
23
6.1. Safety activity
6.3. Autorisation by authorities& acceptance by MIVB
7.3. Autorisation & acceptanceby MIVB
6.2. External IA
7.1. Safety activity
Internal IA
1. Change
3. Safety Significant?
4. InternalMIVB?
Stop
Convention
5. Major? > x mio
No
No
7. No6. Yes
Change process flow
Yes
Yes
2. Safety related?
Yes
No
7.2. InternalIA?
External IA
No
Yes
Stop
• ExCom decision 2011: MIVB will develop a Safety management system following the 2004/49 Directive for heavy rail.
• 3 chapters are being implemented:• Safety strategy
• Safety governance (based on the governance described in the SMS of London Underground – detailed roles & responsibilities)
• Safety risk management (based on ERM MIVB and on the Common Safety Method 2015/1136 for risk evaluation and assessment)
• Other sections under construction (Safety culture, incident/accident analysis, competences of Safety critical functions, Safety risk appetite, …)
Safety management system
25
• Through a risk register including risks on :• Program level,
• Main project level• Signalling
• Rolling Stock
• Platform Screen Doors
• Depots
• Satellite project level
• Based on the risk identification model of MIVB
• Detailed management of Safety, and Occupational Health and Safety risks is done separately
Program risk management Pulsar
26
• Risk analysis for the existing metro system, taking into account :• Earlier work (Bureau Veritas, 2006) - limited to operations risks
• Relevant parts of MODSafe work packages (D2-1,2,3 – D4-1,2 D5-2)
• MIVB Incident/Accident reports 2004-2012
• Results of workshops involving management and work floor individuals
• Hazard Log Pulsar • Developed in the concept phase op the Pulsar program
• By a team of 5 safety engineers
• Taking into account the results of the risk analysis of the existing metro system
• Relevant parts of MODSafe work packages (D2-1,2,3 – D4-1,2 D5-2)
• Focus on additional risks related to automatisation, with UTO as the final goal
• Early implication of ISA (TÜV Rheinlandt)
Safety risk management
27
• In the absence of Belgian legislation and standards, benchmarking was adopted (as in Kopenhagen)
• Benchmark with BOStrab
• Scope : PULSAR tender documents for Signalling and Rolling Stock
• Relavant items of BOStrab, Technische Regeln, VDV Schrift, Vorläufige Richtlinien
• Results are positive : roughly 95% compliancy, deviations are due to the lack of Belgian legislation
• Benchmark with NFPA 130 (Fire Safety)
• Focus on additional risks related to automatic operation (UTO as the ultimate goal) of the existing lines
• For the future extension of L 3 : NFPA130 to be used as the basis, unless the Belgian law or EN norms impose different but equivalent safety measures
• Banchmark with STRMTG
• Provided equally satisfying results
Safety risk management PULSAR
28
• Documents used for Signaling project
> BOStrab version 11/12/1987, revision 2008, relevant paragraphs
> Technische Regeln TR SIG ZA - Zulassung un Abnahme von Signal- undZugsicherungsanlagen gemäβ BOStrab (Ausgabe Mai 2007, RedaktionelleÄnderungen Dezember 2008)
> VDV Schrift 331 - Sicherheitsintegritätsanforderungen für Signal- und Zugsicherungsanlagen gemäß BOStrab
> VDV Schrift 345 - Technische Einrichtungen zur Automatisierung und Fernbedienung von Zugsicherungs- und Fahrsignalanlagen BOStrab
> Vorläufige Richtlinien für den Fahrbetrieb ohne Fahrzeugführer (FoF) nach den verordnung über den Bau und Betrieb er Straβenbahnen (BOStrab-FoF-Richtlinien – Ausgabe 01/97)
Benchmark BOStrab – PULSAR Signaling
29
• Documents used for Rolling Stock project
> BOStrab version 11/12/1987, revision 2008, relevant paragraphs
> Technische Regeln für die Bemessung und Prüfung der Bremsen von Fahrzeugennach BOStrab (TR Br – Ausgabe Dezember 2008)
> Technische Regelnn Spurführung nach BOStrab (TR Sp3 Ausgabe Mai 2006)
> Vorläufige Richtlinien für die Bemessung des lichten Räumes von Bahnen nachBOStrab (Ausgabe 12/96)
Benchmark BOStrab – PULSAR Rolling Stock
30
Thanks