The Nuclear Power Sector in Japan: Nuclear Materials Management/Fuel Cycles

Practices, Plans and Policies

2006 Asian Energy Security WorkshopNovember 6-7, 2006

Beijing, China

Tatsujiro SuzukiThe University of Tokyotatsu@pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp

CONTENTS

• Japan’s New National Energy Strategy

• Japan’s New Nuclear Energy Policy

• Three Major Issues– Nuclear Power under Liberalized Electricity

Market– Spent Fuel, Reprocessing and Plutonium– Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle Approaches and

Japan’s Response

Japan’s New Energy Strategy (2006)

• Responding to emerging global and regional energy security risks– Concern over “politicization” of global oil market – Diversified energy security risk– Applying “comprehensive energy security”

approach

• Set numerical targets for key policy goals by 2030

• Acceleration of Nuclear Power Programs, including Nuclear Fuel Recycling and Fast Breeder Reactor(FBR) programs

Japan’s New National Energy Strategy (2)

Basic Perspectives of “Comprehensive” Energy Security Strategy

Source: New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnationalenergystrategy2006.pdf

Japan’s New National Energy Strategy (3)

(1)   Target of energy conservationAt least another 30% improvement of efficiency will be attained by 2030.

(2)   Target of reducing oil dependenceThe ratio will be reduced from current 50% to be lower than 40% by 2030.

(3)   Target of reducing oil dependence in the transport sectorThe percentage will be reduced from 100% to around 80% by 2030.

(4)   Target on nuclear power generation.The ratio of nuclear power to all power production will be maintained or

increased at the level of 30 to 40% or more up to 2030 or later.(5)   Target of overseas natural resources development

Oil volume ratio will be increased from current 18% to around 40% by 2030.

Source; New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnationalenergystrategy2006.pdf

Maintain Share of Nuclear Power

Source; New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnationalenergystrategy2006.pdf

Koizumi begins Central Asia visit

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has arrived in Kazakhstan to begin the first visit to Central Asia by a Japanese premier

Japan’s “Resource Diplomacy”

BBC World News, August 28, 2006

“In the game of regional politics, Japan feels it has a role to play in helping offset growing Russian and Chinese influence” Col Christopher LangtonInternational Institute of Strategic Studies

source: BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5291858.stm

Overview of Japan’s Nuclear Power Programs and Policies

• Total of 55 nuclear power plants (49.6 GWe) are now providing roughly 1/3 of total electricity generation in Japan (as of March 2006)

• While primary energy consumption is not growing much, electricity demand is still growing, but at slower rate, primarily due to stabilized population growth.

• Nuclear power is expected to maintain its share (30~40%) until 2030, for both energy security and environmental reasons.

METI’s New Nuclear Energy Policy “Nuclear Power Nation Plan”(2006)

• Realization of replacement and new orders under the liberalized market

• Higher utilization of existing reactors with enhanced safety performance

• Steady progress in nuclear fuel cycle• Early commercialization (2050) of FBR• Strengthening industry’s technical and human resource• Promotion of international activities of nuclear industry• Active contribution to effective international regime in

reconciling expansion of nuclear power and non-proliferation

• Strengthening confidence building between local community and the government

• Steady progress in waste disposal

Liberalization of Electricity Market in Japan

• Japanese electricity market is gradually being liberalized after 1995.

• 1995IPP* was introduced• Independent Power Producer

• 2000. 3~ : >2,000 kWe market (~25%)• 2004. 3~ : > 500 kWe market (~40%)• 2005. 3~ : > 50 kWe market (~63%)• 2007 Full market liberalization will be disc

ussed

Future projection of nuclear capacity without any new orders

Capacity(10MW)

source: METI, “Nuclear Power Nation Plan,” Aug.2006 (in Japanese)http://www.meti.go.jp/report/downloadfiles/g60823a01j.pdf

Measures to promote nuclear power under liberalized market

• Financial mechanism– Allow levelized depreciation of capital investment– Allow reserve system for future reprocessing (beyond R

okkasho)– Reexamine funding mechanism for decommissioning fu

nd

• Realize benefits of CO2-free power• Promote “extended regional power management”

to allow maximum use of nuclear power

Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program

Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant- Owner : JNFL- 800 tHM /yr of capacity- 3,000tHM of spent fuel storage capacity.- Active testing started from March.31, 2006.- Operation year: 2007- Plutonium will be separated and MOX powder will be produced by the end of November for the first time.

Overview of Rokkasho Project(as of 2006.4)

LLW disposal

Enrichment HLW Storage

Reprocessing

Size ~1 million drums*

to 3 mill drums

Started with 150 ton SWU/y

to 1500 ton SWU/y

1,440 canisters to

2,880 can.

800 ton/y

(spent fuel pool of 3,000 tons)

Status 143,755 drums

(1992)

1050 ton SWU/y

(1992)

760 canisters

(1995)

U testing (2005)

Hot testing (’06)

Operation(’07)

Construction Cost

\160 bill \250 bill \80 bill \2,140 billion

*200 litter each

Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/menu/cycle/cycle1.html

Category Items \ 10 bill

Reprocessing Rokkasho (800t x 40 yrs)

Decommissoning (\155)

1100

HLW Storage From Europe 30

LLW Storage From Europe 57

HLW transportation 19

HLW disposal Only vitrified waste 255

TRU disposal 81

SF transportation 92

SF storage Up to 34000 tons 101

MOX fuel fabrication 119

U. Enrich. Back end 24

Total 1,880

Source: Report of Study Group on Cost Estimate for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (METI, 2004)

Estimated Total Life Cycle Cost of Rokkasho Project

Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (1)

• JAEC established technical-subcommittee on economic comparison of fuel cycle options.

• Four scenarios until 2060

1. Reprocessing all spent fuels (Rokkasho+2nd Plant)

2. Reprocessing at Rokkasho, and direct disposal

3. Direct disposal of all spent fuels

4. Interim storage of all spent fuels (decisions to reprocess or direct disposal will be deferred)

Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Economic Comparison (\/kWh, 2% DR) - (2)

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4

U Fuel 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.61MOX fuel 0.07 0.05 - 0.01Reprocessing 0.63 0.42 - 0.06HLW Storage/trans/

disposal0.16 0.10 - 0.06

TRU Disposal 0.11 0.07 - 0.03Interim Storage 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.13SF direct disposal - 0.12~0.21 0.19~0.32 0.09~0.16

Total fuel cycle cost 1.6 1.4~1.5 0.9~1.1 1,1~1.2Total Power gen. Cost

5.2 5.0~5.1 4.5~4.7 4.7~4.8

Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (3)

(\/kWh) Secnario1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4

Power Gen. Cost

5.2 5.0~5.1 4.5~4.7 4.7~4.8

Cost due to Policy Change

- - 0.9~1.5 0.9~1.5

Total Cost 5.2 5.0~5.1 5.4~6.2 5.6~6.3

Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (4)

• JAEC LTP committee decided that maintaining “all reprocessing/recycling policy” is appropriate

• 2nd reprocessing plant will be needed after 2040, and FBR should follow.

• JAEC now included R&D on direct disposal as a future option.

Cost Sharing Scheme

PPS Customers General Power Users

Back end cost “not covered” by the existing scheme(about \12.7 trillion)

Transmission cost charge

Newly Created “Back End” Fund

Electricity Rate

Source: Denki Shimbun, May 12, 2004

Need to cover future reprocessing and SF Storage costs

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Spent fuel: 32,000tUSpent fuel: 34,000tU

Reprocessing at Rokkasho

MOX fabrication at Rokkasho

Interim storage

Back-End of Fuel CycleSpent Fuel Management Issues

• Legal Constraints– Reactor and Radioactive Material regulation requires r

eactor operators to specify “final disposal method” of spent fuel

– “reprocessing” is the only method for utilities since JAEC’s LTP does not allow direct disposal

– Amendment made in 1998 to allow “interim storage” (outside reactor and reprocessing sites)

• Law for HLW Disposal (1999)– Law defines HLW as “vitrified waste from reprocessin

g” (spent fuel is not included as HLW and cannot be disposed by Nuclear Waste Management Organization [NUMO])

Back-End of Fuel CycleSpent Fuel Management Issues

• Physical and Political constraints– Utilities promised reactor site communities to remove

SF to reprocessing facility– Physical storage capacity has been limited by political

opposition to:• Expansion of storage capacity on site• Acceptance of SF from other reactors/sites

– Spent fuel handling tax is being raised at reactor sites

• Now, some utilities plan to build first Away-from-Reactor (AFR) interim storage facility (5000 tons) at Mutsu city (Aomori)– But the condition is to continue reprocessing policy

Cumulative inventory and management of spent fuel in the future

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 20500

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

Cum

ula

tive

inve

nto

ry o

f sp

ent

fuel [t

HM

] At Reactor Pool Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Pool Mutsu Interim Storage

Planned Reprocessing at Rokkasho

Additional Storage Capacityto Avoid Reprocessing

Spe

nt

fuel st

ora

ge c

apac

ity

[tH

M]

Projected Spent Fuel (Low burn- up ratio) Projected Spent Fuel (High burn- up ratio)

Spent Fuel as of the end of March 2004

2005 2010 2015 20200

1,000

2,000

3,000

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

PWR

Addit

ional

sto

rage

cap

acit

y needed b

eyo

nd N

PP

sit

es

[tH

M]

Available storage capacity at Rokkasho and Mutsu Low burn- up case High burn- up case

BWR

Additional storage capacity needed beyond NPP sites

Start of Mutsu interim storage

Rokkasho pool only

Assumption:Rokkasho storage pool: 1,500tHM for BWR and1,500tHM for PWR(1,096tHM for BWR and 680tHM for PWR was already filled by the end of April 2006.)

2019

2014 2016

Japan’s Pu Balance(as of April 2004)

Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Answers to the questions raised by Inami Tetsuo (The House of Representatives member) for the Pu management in Japan(August 2004). The number is rounded off to one decimal.

Posessed Pu Separated Pu Consumed Pu0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Pu Surplus Oversea: 37.4 Domestic: 5.7(Dec.2004)

5

7 46

157

7

15

7

98

2424

Am

ount

of

plu

toniu

m [

tPu]

NPP Rokkasho Tokai UK Flance Fugen, J oyo, Monju, DCA

Unseparated Pu

Pu Surplus Oversea: 35 Domestic: 5

22 Fugen: 1.5J oyo : 1.5Monju : 1.8DCA : 0.1

50

100

150

0

50

100

150

50

100

150

Sep

arat

ed p

luto

nium

[tP

u]

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 20200

50

100

150

50

100

150

Stockpile(Domestic) Stockpile(Oversea)

(c)

(b)

Supply total Demand total Stockpile

(a)

Figure 4. Future plutonium stockpile until 2020

37tPu

74tPu

48tPu

AssumptionBefore 2004: actual dataAfter 2005 : Demand MOX fuel: From 2012, 9.3 tPu/year/plants x18 plants

Monju: re-start from 2010, 0.47tPU/year Supply Rokkasho reprocessing plant: start from 2006 (2 -6tPu/year from 2006-2009, 8tPu/year from 2010)

6tPu

81tPu

81tPu

Progress of MOX fuel programElectric compan

y　 Start Local Gov’t

ConsentLicensing Applicatin

LicenseApprove

dNote

Hokkaido Tomari 201

0

Tohoku Onagawa 2010

Tokyo Fukushima I-3 ? (OK) OK OK Local consent cancelled

Kasiwazaki-kariwa-3 ? (OK) OK OK Same as

above

Chubu Hamaoka-4 2010 OK

No local consent system

Hokuriku Shika 201

0

Kansai Takahama-3 2007 OK OK OK Plan

suspended

Takahama-4 2007 OK OK OK Plan

suspended

Chugoku Shimane-2 201

0

Negotiation underway with local

government

Shikoku Ikata-3 2010 OK OK

Kyusyu Genkai-3 2010 OK OK OK

JAPC Tsuruga-2 2008

Tokai-2 2010

J-Power Oma 2010 　 　 　 　

as of September 2006

Plutonium Issues

• Japan’s plutonium stockpile could increase up to 150 tons by 2020. - If Rokksho plant start its operation as planned wit

hout any progress in MOX recycling programs

• Even with full MOX recycling programs as planned, Japanese plutonium stockpile will be around 80 tons in 2011.– In order to consume such large stockpile of plutonium, Jap

anese utilities must speed up and scale up its MOX recycling programs substantially.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(1)

• Need for tighter control on enrichment and reprocessing facilities/technologies

• IAEA Elbaradei Proposal and MNA (multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach)– Assurance of fuel supply– Enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinati

onal ownership or multilateral control– Multinational management of spent fuel and HLW

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(2)

• US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) –US, Russia, France, Japan, UK, China– Fuel supply guarantee to those who give up

enrichment/reprocessing facilities– Accept spent fuel/HLW from those who give up

enrichment/reprocessing facilities (cf. “Fuel Leasing scheme proposed by Russia)

– Develop Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) and proliferation resistant fuel recycling technologies

– Develop a small reactor for developing country– Develop advanced safeguards technologies

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(3)

• Uncertainties about GNEP– Double standards for enrichment/reprocessing

facilities (separate “have” and “have not”)– Under development of advanced fuel recycling

and ABR technologies– No firm prospect for accepting foreign spent

fuel and HLW

• Not clear how these approaches are effective for current non-proliferation issues

Multilateral Approach over Nuclear Fuel Cycle

• Closing nuclear fuel cycle is one of the corner stones of Japan’s energy security– Considered as “semi-domestic” energy source

• At first, reluctant to support “multilateral approaches” as it may conflict with Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle strategy

• New energy strategy has adopted more positive policy toward multilateral approaches– Contributing to enhanced global non-proliferation regime– Japan can be a supplier nation of nuclear fuel cycle in

the future

Japan’s response to GNEP

• Feb.7: Japan's view– Positive statement and “will discuss what Japan can

do to contribute to the proposal” (PM office, METI/MOFA/MEXT)

• Aug.8: "Nuclear power nation plan" – METI Nuclear Policy Committee and Japan’s New

Energy Strategy published in June– Reaffirm commitment to FBR and closed fuel cycle

• Sep.8: Proposal for Expression of Interest (EOI)– JAEA, JNFL, Fuji electric group, Mitsubishi heavy

industries ltd., etc.

• Sept.: Japan’s proposal for Nuclear Fuel Assurance (METI, JAEC)

Japan’s ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for

Nuclear Fuel Supply (1)• Japan’s strategic thinking

– Make Japan's presence in the GNEP– Secure the position as a supplier of enriched uranium service in

the future (do not want to limit future suppliers to only six nations)

• Basic concepts– Supplementary to six country proposal– Intend to reduce possibility of “supply disruption” in addition to

preparation for possible disruption- need to enhance “transparency” of the market

– Six country proposal separate countries into “have” and “have not”. This proposal is intended to cover as many countries as possible as future suppliers.

Japan’s ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for

Nuclear Fuel Supply (2)• Each country can voluntarily register the following

supply capability at IAEA– Natural uranium– Uranium conversion– Enrichment service– Uranium fuel fabrication – Uranium fuel stockpile

• Registration can be categorized into the following three groups.– Level 1: Has commercial supply capability, but has not exported to

international market– Level 2: Has already exported to int’l market– Level 3: Has stockpile which can be readily exported

Japan’s ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for

Nuclear Fuel Supply (3)• Role of IAEA

– Managing the Standby Arrangements System, including establishing database

– Clarifying conditions to receive fuel assurance• Safeguards, safety, PP, export control, etc. • Note that “giving up supply capability” may not be

appropriate under the sprit of “universal” condition

– IAEA does not have any legal ownership, but will play important role in making arrangements between supplier and recipient states

• Reflecting negative response to six country proposal

– 6 country proposal could deny the right (Art. 4) of NPT– Japan’s proposal does not deny such right

Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan

Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan

CONCLUSION (1)

• Energy Security Strategy has changed significantly – More complex, diversified, multi-layered strategy

• Nuclear power is critical component of Japan’s energy strategy– Maintain 30~40% share of electricity generation

• Various measures are needed to ensure competitiveness of nuclear power under liberalized energy market

CONCLUSION (2)

• Japan’s commitment to closed fuel cycle remains strong

• But such commitment may create financial, political and social risks to Japanese nuclear program– Reprocessing is costly– Plutonium stockpile may increase

• In order to avoid such risks, Japan should explore socio-political solutions, including multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle