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This brings us back to the broader issue of growth vs risk. China’s debt levels have been climbing faster
than GDP for more than a decade, especially since 2009 when Beijing launched its economic stimulus
package to counter the effects of the global financial crisis. If we use total bank loans and bonds to
measure debt, it comes out at around 193% of GDP as of 2014, up from 130% in 2001.
As we argued in The easing dilemma: Volatility and leverage up, yield yet to fall (10 February 2015),
China’s central bank faces a policy challenge. Easing, including two rate cuts and one reserve
requirement ratio (RRR) cut, has yet to significantly bring down borrowing costs in the real economy.
The disruption of fund flows – due to potential lower onshore RMB yields and a weaker exchange rate –
also reduces the effectiveness of policy easing.
This means the government has to weigh the effectiveness of injecting more liquidity as it tries to drivedown yields. Liquidity remains tight despite several rounds of monetary easing, as seen in the persistently
elevated 7-day interbank repo rate. China’s Treasury curve now looks similar to the US in January 2008:
flat at c3-4% and inverted at the short end, reflecting the difficult financing outlook, especially for banks.
Moreover, default stress should remain an overhang as repayment pressure increases in a market that has
yet be tested by the default of a publicly-issued bond. Besides, it remains to be seen how cutting the ties
between struggling LGFVs and local governments will play out. Despite the challenges, we think the
pace of change will continue this year, with the focus on:
Simplifying rules as the regulators of different credit platforms compete for market share (although
there is a risk that this may intensify segmentation).
More savings will be channelled into the bond market via wealth management products, which will
help the bond market to expand.
The bond market is becoming a competitor to traditional lenders, which may force them to balance
their desire for growth by focusing on efficiency and profitability. This is evident by the rapid growth
in the issuance of asset-backed securities in 2014.
In summary, given that the economy is in need of more funding, we expect the onshore and offshore bond
market to continue to grow in size and sophistication.
This report is the fourth of a series being published for HSBC’s RMB, Reform and China’s Global
Future forum on 26 March 2015.
Gross and net supply of onshore bonds Gross and net supply of CNH bonds and CDs
Source: Wind, HSBC Source: Bloomberg, HSBC
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Gross issuance Net issuance
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
RMBbn
Bond CD Net bond Net CD
https://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=pxqLkQHWbM&n=446849.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=pxqLkQHWbM&n=446849.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=pxqLkQHWbM&n=446849.PDF
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Summary: A time of progressand problems 1
Onshore bond market: Bigger,broader, but… 4
Growth accelerates in 2014 4
Market dynamics 6
Trading platforms 20
Investors 21
Recent developments 24
Conclusion 25
Changing dynamics of offshoreRMB bonds… 26
…They will come back 28
Disclosure appendix 50
Disclaimer 52
Contents
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Growth accelerates in 2014
China is now the third largest issuer of bonds in the
world, behind the US and Japan, as shown in Fig 1,
based on the total amount of bonds outstanding. This
is largely because of activity in the onshore market,
where growth of bonds outstanding has averaged
20% since 20011 (Fig 2) and around 93% of China’s
bonds are issued. Fundraising on the domestic bond
market rose to a new level last year: gross issuance
reached RMB12trn, up 35%, and net issuance rose
to RMB6trn, up 60% (Figs 3 and 4).
However, when adjusted for GDP, China’s bondmarket is still much smaller than those in developed
countries (Fig 1). The majority of financing still
comes from the banking system, whose share in
total social financing (TSF), a measure of total
funds raised by corporates in the financial system,
though in long-term decline, has stayed at around
60% in the past five years. So, while great progress
has been made, the era of direct debt financing in
China is still at an early stage.
______________________________________1 Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) between 2000 and 2014.
1. China is now the third largest bond market in the world
Source: World Bank, Bloomberg, HSBC
Note: Total bonds outstanding refer to all bonds issued by the country’s government
and corporates in both domestic and offshore market. For China, domestic bonds
account for 93% of the total. Debt data is as of 28 Feb 2015. GDP is as of 2013
Onshore bond market:Bigger, broader, but…
China’s onshore bond market is breaking new ground in terms of
size, issuance and the contribution it makes to fund raising
Its investor base and the range of products continue to expand
But structural challenges in the areas of default, ratings and
regulation need to be addressed
Zhi Ming ZhangHead of China ResearchThe Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited
+852 2822 [email protected]
Helen Huang AnalystThe Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited+852 2996 [email protected]
- 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
2.5 3.0 3.5
-
5,000
10,000 15,000
20,000
25,000
U n i t e d S t a t e s
J a p a n
C h i n a
G e r m a n y
F r a n c e
U n i t e d K i n g d o m
I t a l y
C a n a d a
S p a i n
S o u t h K o r e a
N e t h e r l a n d s
U S D b
n
Total bonds outstanding
Total bonds outstanding / GDP (RHS)
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2. Bonds outstanding breakdown, 2000-2014
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Certificate and deposit, collateral debt obligation and securities firm commercial paper are included in financial corp; asset-backed securities backed by non-credit underlying assets is
included in non-financial corp.
3. Gross issuance breakdown, 2000-2014
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Certificate and deposit, collateral debt obligation and securities firm commercial paper are included in financial corp; asset-backed securities backed by non-credit underlying assets is
included in non-financial corp.
4. Net issuance breakdown, 2000-2014
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: net issuance is calculated as gross issuance minus principal repayment. Certificate and deposit, collateral debt obligation and securities fir m commercial paper are included in f inancial
corp; asset-backed securities backed by non-credit underlying assets is included in non-financial corp.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
R M B b n
Central gov Local gov Quasi-gov Financial corp Non-financial corp Growth rate YoY, RHS
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
R M
B b n
Central gov Local gov Quasi-gov (PBoC, policy bank)
Financial institution Non-financial corp Growth rate YoY, RHS
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%140%
(1,000)
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000 7,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
R M B b n
Central gov Local gov Quasi-gov (PBoC, policy bank)
Financial institution Non-financial corp Growth rate YoY, RHS
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Opening up to the world
Offshore investors have access to the onshore
bond market through several channels (Table 5).
Foreign investors’ bond holdings increased 68%
y-o-y in 2014, much greater than the rise in their
investments in equities, loans and deposits (Fig 6).
More doors may be open soon. In early February
2015, the South China Morning Post reported that
talks were taking place about a “bond-connect”
scheme that would mimic the Shanghai-Hong
Kong Stock Connect scheme launched in 2014.
Despite its rapid growth, the bond market is still
dominated by onshore investors. As of December
2014, foreign investors’ holdings totalled
RMB672bn, equivalent to only 1.9% of total
onshore bonds outstanding. This is due to
several factors:
Quota controls: Foreign investors need access
to one of the schemes listed in Table 5 and the
investment amount is subject to a quota.
Except for foreign central banks, few offshore
investors have much appetite for long-dated
onshore bonds.
Many offshore investors are still not familiar
with onshore dynamics.
5. Eligible offshore investors in interbank market
Investors Quota
Qualified Foreign InstitutionalInvestors (QFII)
USD66.9bn, all securities
RMB-denominated QFII (RQFII) RMB299.7bn, all securitiesForeign central banks, monetaryauthorities, SWFs and Supras
N/A
RMB clearing banks in Hong KongSAR and Macau SAR
N/A
Offshore RMB cross-border tradesettlement banks
N/A
Offshore insurance companies N/A
Source: CEIC, HSBC. Data as of December 2014
6. Offshore investors’ holdings in onshore financial assets
Source: PBoC, HSBC
Market dynamics
The onshore bond market differs from the
offshore market in many areas, including product
classification, trading platforms, regulations and
rating schemes. Not much has been done in the
way of converging the two markets as
participation by foreign investors is still quite low.
But at the same time these differences also makeit more difficult for foreign investors to
participate. In this section, we address the key
dynamics one by one.
Products
There are mainly five types of issuers in the
onshore bond market: the central government, local
governments, quasi-government entities (including
the PBoC, China’s central bank and policy banks),
financial institutions and non-financial corporates.
Back in 2000, the central government and quasi-
government entities accounted for 98% of bonds
outstanding (Fig 7). This declined to 55% in 2014
as more corporate issuers tapped the bond market
(Fig 8). We now take a more detailed look at the
main categories of bonds.
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Equities Bonds Loans Deposits
R M B b n
2013 2014 Growth
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Treasuries
Treasuries, also referred to as onshore Chinese
government bonds (CGBs), are issued by the
Ministry of Finance (MoF). This was China’s
largest bond class until 2014, when bonds issued
by policy banks took over.
Among Chinese bonds, Treasuries have the most
diversified tenors (Fig 10). They are also the mostimportant guide to the pricing of other bonds as
they have the best credit quality, strong issuance
volumes and ample liquidity. Back in 2000 they
represented 72% of total bond issuance. The
percentage declined in the next six years as more
corporates issued bonds and since 2008,
Treasuries accounted for 12-20% of total bond
issuance per year (Fig 11).
9. Yield on Treasuries: a key indicator
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015
10. Breakdown of Treasuries outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
11. Treasury issuance and as % of total bond issuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
J a n - 2
0 0 9
M a y - 2
0 0 9
S e p - 2
0 0 9
J a n - 2
0 1 0
M a y - 2
0 1 0
S e p - 2
0 1 0
J a n - 2
0 1 1
M a y - 2
0 1 1
S e p - 2
0 1 1
J a n - 2
0 1 2
M a y - 2
0 1 2
S e p - 2
0 1 2
J a n - 2
0 1 3
M a y - 2
0 1 3
S e p - 2
0 1 3
J a n - 2
0 1 4
M a y - 2
0 1 4
S e p - 2
0 1 4
J a n - 2
0 1 5
1 yr 3 yr 5 yr
10 yr 30 yr
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Local government bonds (muni-bonds)
Muni-bonds are issued by local governments. This
young market started in 2009 when the MoF issued
muni-bonds on behalf of local governments for the
first time. Growth has been quite slow as the
issuance quota is strictly controlled. As of 2014
muni-bonds outstanding totaled RMB1.16trn, only 3%
of total bonds outstanding in the onshore market. In
2014 muni-bonds accounted for 3% of total bond
issuance (Fig 12).
The slow growth is quite deliberate as Beijing wants
to keep tight control of the amount of bonds issued
in order to prevent local governments borrowing too
much. Strict quotas and eligibility criteria are in
place, even for local governments deemed to be on a
strong financial footing. But relaxation has been
gradually introduced. When the scheme started, the
MoF was in charge of issuing and repaying all muni-
bonds on behalf of local governments. This has been
relaxed to allow all provincial governments and afew selected cities to issue their own muni-bonds
(Table 13), but the MoF is still the dominant force in
this market (Fig 14).
12. Muni-bond issuance and as % of total bond issuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
14. Breakdown of muni-bonds outstanding by issuer, 2014
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014.
The muni-bond market is important because it is
seen as a way of solving the local government
debt problem. But, first, a bit of background.
Beijing’s huge stimulus package of 2008-09
encouraged local governments to build a wide
range of infrastructure projects. According to the
Budget Law at that time, local governments were
not allowed to borrow. To get the necessary
financing local governments created alternative
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Gross issuance As % of total bond issuance
MoF81.5%
Guangdong3.4%
Zhejiang3.2%
Shanghai3.1%
Jiangsu2.8%
Shandong2.1%
Jiangxi1.2%
Shenzhen1.0%
Beijing0.9%
Ningxia0.5%
Qingdao0.2%
13. Major changes in regulation for muni-bonds since 2009
Date Rules
Feb 2009 MoF issued and repaid muni-bonds on behalf of local governmentsOct 2010 Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Shenzhen allowed to issue muni-bonds on their own, but issuance is subject to a quota and
the MoF still handled repayments
Jun 2013 Jiangsu and Shandong were added to the test programMay 2014 10 local governments permitted to issue and repay muni-bonds on their own, including the six local governments already in the testprogramme, plus Beijing, Jiangxi, Ningxia and Qingdao, subject to quota
Oct 2014 All provincial level governments permitted to issue and repay muni-bonds on their own, subject to a quota
Source: MoF, State Council, HSBC
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channels called local government funding vehicles
(LGFVs). The LGFVs were technically state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and so could tap into
funding channels open to companies, neatly
sidestepping restrictions on local government
borrowing.
But there was a big problem. The LGFVs created
huge amounts of debt and local governments are
now faced with so many liabilities that Beijing is
taking steps to shut down this funding channel inorder to lower the chances of systemic risk.
Since October 2014, local governments have been
working to update the amount of their three types
of debts, as requested by Beijing:
Type 1: debts for which local governments
have repayment liability.
Type 2: debts for which local governments
have guarantee liability.
Type 3: debts for which local governments
have contingent liability.
In future, Type 2 and Type 3 will no longer enjoy
explicit or implicit government guarantees. These
debtors will be required to make repayments or
refinance the debt using their own resources. Type
1 debt is further classified into government
general debt and government project debt tied to
specific projects (Table 15). They will be funded
by a combination of muni-bonds, project revenue
and government support.
As a result, the issuance of muni-bonds will
accelerate to meet the funding gap previously filled
by LGFVs, which issued as much as RMB1.8trn
onshore bond in 2014 and have about RMB640bn
due every year from 2015 to 2019 (Fig 16). In 2015,
local governments were given a RMB600bn muni-
bond issuance quota (RMB500bn general-
obligation muni-bonds and RMB100bn revenuemuni-bonds tied to specific projects). In addition,
Beijing granted a RMB1trn quota for repaying or
refinancing existing Type 1 debt, accounting for
53.8% of Type 1 debt coming due in 2015. These
recent developments should drive rapid growth in
the muni-bond market in 2015.
15. Local government debt classification requirements
Debt type Underlying assets Repayment sources
Government generaldebt
Social welfare projectswith no commercial
return
General obligationmuni-bonds, fiscal
revenueGovernment projectdebt
Social welfare projectswith commercial return
Revenue muni-bondstied to specific
projects, governmentfund revenue, projectrevenue
Corporate debt Non social-welfareprojects
Corporate bonds andloans, corporate
revenue
Source: HSBC
16. LGFV bond gross issuance and repayment amount, 2006-2019
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data include principal repayment only. Data as of 10 February 2015.
The hard work has just started. We think more
reforms are needed before the market, rather than policy support, plays a decisive role in muni-
bonds. For example:
Local governments should have to disclose
more detailed information about their
financial status and improve their risk
management capabilities. Otherwise investors
buying muni-bonds will continue to rely on
the implicit guarantee from the central
government, something that Beijing does not
want to bear. Unlike in the US, local
authorities in China do not yet have
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
2 0 1 8
2 0 1 9
R M B b n
Gross issuance Repayment
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standalone balance sheets. If they are in
danger of defaulting, then the central
government would be forced to bail them out.
While muni-bonds will help, a stronger
mechanism than an issuance quota is needed
to prevent local governments from borrowing
excessively. Beijing’s implicit guarantee
gives local officials an incentive to borrow,
since they are unlikely to be allowed to go
bankrupt. They also have incentives to borrow long term as the debt will fall due
after their term of government service comes
to an end.
17. Yield of muni-bonds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015
18. Breakdown of muni-bonds outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
Policy bank bonds
The three policy banks – China Development Bank
(CDB), Agricultural Development Bank of China
and Export-Import Bank of China – are now
collectively the largest bond issuers in terms of
amount outstanding: RMB9.7trn, or 27% of total
bond outstanding onshore as of 2014. CDB is the
biggest contributor; accounting for 62% of policy
bank bonds outstanding (Fig 19).
19. Breakdown of policy bank bonds outstanding by issuer
Source: Wind, HSBC
Policy banks rely heavily on the bond market for
funding. According to CDB’s annual report, the
amount of bonds issued (RMB5.84trn) were
equivalent to 71% of total assets (RMB8.19trn) as
of 2013. This is because: 1) policy banks cannot
take deposits like commercial banks; and 2) they
provide funding for many projects that help the
economy – such as public housing and
infrastructure in poor areas – but do not generate
much return.
Beijing helps policy banks raise funds at a low
cost, for example setting the risk weight of policy
bank bonds at zero to attract purchases from
commercial banks, who are the biggest investors
in the onshore bond market. Policy bank bonds
are also exempt from rating requirements. Simply
put, policy banks enjoy sovereign credit status,
like CGBs and PBoC bills.
Thanks to this government support, policy bank
bonds have become the biggest bond class in
terms of amount outstanding as well as trading
volume. In 2014, these three banks issuedRMB2.3trn of bonds, accounting for 19% of total
bond issuance (Fig 20). Like Treasuries, policy
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
A u g - 1
0
N o v - 1
0
F e b - 1
1
M a y - 1
1
A u g - 1
1
N o v - 1
1
F e b - 1
2
M a y - 1
2
A u g - 1
2
N o v - 1
2
F e b - 1
3
M a y - 1
3
A u g - 1
3
N o v - 1
3
F e b - 1
4
M a y - 1
4
A u g - 1
4
N o v - 1
4
F e b - 1
5
%
3 yr 5 yr 7 yr 10 yr
3 yr 31%
5 yr 54%
7 yr 12%
10 yr 3%
ChinaDevelopment
Bank
62%
AgriculturalDevelopment
Bank ofChina22%
Export-Import Bank
of China16%
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bank bonds offer tenor diversification. A yield
spread of 89bp to 97bp (2014 average) over
Treasuries further enhances their attractiveness to
investors. The risk is that, should this policy
support ever be withdrawn, the benefits associated
with these bonds would be discounted.
20. Policy bank bonds issuance and as % of total bondissuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
21. Yield of China Development Bank bonds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015
22. Breakdown of policy bank bonds outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
PBoC bills
PBoC bills are bonds issued by the central bank.
Between 2004 and 2010 this was the largest bond
class, accounting for up to 63% of total onshore
issuance per year (Fig 23) as the central bank tried to
offset the growth in the money supply created by
foreign exchange inflows. As the main purpose is to
offset capital inflows, maturity is quite short, with
tenors of 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and 3 years.
Issuance has slowed down significantly since 2011as capital inflows have declined. As of 2014, only
RMB422bn of 3-year PBoC bills remain traded as
all the others have matured.
23. PBoC bill issuance and as % of total bond issuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
Financial bonds
Financial bonds refer to bonds issued by financial
institutions, mainly policy banks, commercial banks,
securities firms and insurance companies. We
exclude policy bank bonds (see above) because they
are quasi-government bonds supported by the central
government, while other types of financial bonds are
backed by the issuers’ credit quality.
Bonds are an important source of capital for
commercial banks. One reason for enlarging the
financial bond market in 2004 was to help
commercial banks to improve their capital
adequacy ratios before their IPOs. That is why
commercial banks’ subordinated bonds, which arecounted as tier-2 capital, have always been the
biggest component of financial bonds (Fig 24). As
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%30%
35%
40%
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Gross issuance As % of total bond issuance
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
J a n - 2
0 0 9
J u l - 2 0 0 9
J a n - 2
0 1 0
J u l - 2 0 1 0
J a n - 2
0 1 1
J u l - 2 0 1 1
J a n - 2
0 1 2
J u l - 2 0 1 2
J a n - 2
0 1 3
J u l - 2 0 1 3
J a n - 2
0 1 4
J u l - 2 0 1 4
J a n - 2
0 1 5
1 yr 3 yr 5 yr
10 yr 15 yr
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the main purpose of commercial banks’
subordinated bonds is to support capital adequacy,
tenors are quite long: the breakdown as of 31
December 2014 was 10-year (36%), 15-year
(61%) and 20-year (3%), as shown in Fig 25.
24. Breakdown of financial bonds outstanding by bond type
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014.
25. Breakdown of commercial banks’ subordinated bondsoutstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
26. Yield of commercial banks’ subordinated bonds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015.
Enterprise bonds
Enterprise bonds, introduced in 1985, were the
first bond class opened to non-financial
companies. In the first 20 years growth was rather
slow as a result of various administrative
restrictions put in place to control risks. For
example, issuers were required to get the bond
guaranteed by third parties and the approval
process was long and complicated. A lot of these
restrictions were relaxed in 2008 and the
enterprise bond market today is over eight times
bigger than it was in 2007, making it the second
largest bond class for credit issuers in terms of
amount outstanding. Since 2012, enterprise bonds
have accounted for 5-8% of onshore bond
issuance (Fig 27).
27. Enterprise bond issuance and as % of total bondissuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
LGFVs are key contributors to the growth of
enterprise bonds. Around half of LGFV bonds
issued between 2005 and 2012 were through
enterprise bonds, although the percentage fell to
39% in 2013 and 35% in 2014 (Fig 28) as Beijing
started to tighten its control over local government
borrowing that forced LGFVs to tap into more
diversified borrowing sources.
Policy tightening intensified in December 2014,
when the China Securities Depository and
Clearing Corp (CSDC), the clearing agency forexchanges, disqualified bonds issued by higher
risk corporates from being used as collateral for
Commercialbank
subordinatedbond50%
Commercialbank bond
18%
Securitiesfirm CP
20%
Insurancecompany
bond7%
Otherfinancial
institutionbond5%
10 yr 36%
15 yr 61%
20 yr 3%
4
5
6
7
8
J a n - 0
9
J u n - 0
9
N o v - 0
9
A p r - 1 0
S e p - 1
0
F e b - 1
1
J u l - 1 1
D e c - 1
1
M a y - 1
2
O c t - 1 2
M a r - 1 3
A u g - 1
3
J a n - 1
4
J u n - 1
4
N o v - 1
4
%
Subordinated bond, AAA, 15 yr Subordinated bond, AA+, 15 yr
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%7%
8%
9%
-
100
200
300
400
500 600
700
800
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Gross issuance As % of total bond issuance
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repo transactions. The aim is mainly to stop
LGFV bonds being used in leveraged borrowing.
28. Breakdown of LGFV bond issuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
29. Yield of 7-year enterprise bonds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015.
30. Breakdown of enterprise bonds outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
Corporate and enterprise bonds
Both corporate and enterprise bonds are for non-
financial corporates. But they also differ in terms
of issuer, listing venue and regulation (Table 31).
31. Differences between corporate and enterprise bonds
Name Issuer Listing venue Regulator
Corporatebond
Originally opened tolisted non-financialcompanies only.Expanded to allcompanies with
shareholding structure(excl. LGFVs) from 16January 2015.
Exchange only CSRC
Enterprisebond
Mostly non-listed non-financial companies. Afew listed companiesalso issue enterprisesbonds.
72% were dual-traded in interbank
and exchange;28% were tradedin interbank only
as of 2014
NDRC
Source: HSBCNote: Listed commercial banks were allowed to issue corporate bonds after November 2013.CSRC: China Securities Regulatory Commission. NDRC: National Development and ReformCommission.
Corporate bonds were introduced in 2007, around
the same time as some other types of creditinstruments began to take off, such as mid-term
notes (MTNs), enterprise bonds and commercial
paper. But corporate bonds have been left behind,
accounting for only 2% of China’s bonds
outstanding as of 31 December 2014, compared
with 8% for enterprise bonds, 9% for MTNs and 5%
for commercial paper.
32. Corporate bond issuance and as % of total bondissuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Enterprise bond PPN MTN CP Others
3.0
5.0
7.0
9.0
11.0
J a n - 0
9
J u l - 0 9
J a n - 1
0
J u l - 1 0
J a n - 1
1
J u l - 1 1
J a n - 1
2
J u l - 1 2
J a n - 1
3
J u l - 1 3
J a n - 1
4
J u l - 1 4
J a n - 1
5
%
AAA AA+ AA A+
3 yr 0.30%
4 yr 0.05%
5 yr 2.27%
6 yr 7.64%
7 yr 57.29%
8 yr 2.07%
10 yr 22.37%
11 yr 0.07%
13 yr 0.03%
15 yr 7.12%
18 yr 0.00%
20 yr 0.68%
30 yr 0.10%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Gross issuance As % of total bond issuance
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CSRC simplified the approval process for
corporate bond issuance (although it still insists
on checking the information disclosed by issuers).
36. Yield of 5-year MTNs
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015.
37. Breakdown of MTN outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
Commercial paper (CP)
CP is the biggest bond class at the short end, withtypical tenors of 3 months, 6 months, 9 months
and 1 year (Fig 38). The approval process is the
same as for MTNs, which gives issuers more
flexibility than enterprise bonds and corporate
bonds. This instrument is specifically designed to
meet non-financial corporates’ short-term funding
needs2. Issuance as a percentage of the total
onshore bond market keeps increasing; CP
______________________________________2 Securities firms can also issue CP, but it is not under regulation of NAFMII. We classify securities firms’ commercial paper as financialbonds in this report.
accounted for 18% of annual bond issuance
between 2012 and 2014 (Fig 39).
38. Breakdown of CP outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
39. CP issuance and as % of total bond issuance
Source: Wind, HSBC
40. Yield of AAA-rated CP
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data of February 2015.
Government-backed institutional bonds
There are only two issuers of this bond class –
China Railway Corp (CRC) and Central Huijin
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
J a n - 0
9
A p r - 0 9
J u l - 0 9
O c t - 0 9
J a n - 1
0
A p r - 1 0
J u l - 1 0
O c t - 1 0
J a n - 1
1
A p r - 1 1
J u l - 1 1
O c t - 1 1
J a n - 1
2
A p r - 1 2
J u l - 1 2
O c t - 1 2
J a n - 1
3
A p r - 1 3
J u l - 1 3
O c t - 1 3
J a n - 1
4
A p r - 1 4
J u l - 1 4
O c t - 1 4
J a n - 1
5
AAA AAA- AA+ AA
AA- A+ A A-
2 yr 0.2%
3 yr
18.9%
4 yr 1.2%
5 yr 61.7%
6 yr 1.2%
7 yr 10.9%
8 yr 0.5%
10 yr 4.6%
12 yr 0.1%
15 yr 0.8%
=3 month,=6 month,
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Investment (Huijin), a state-owned investment
company that holds shares of state-owned
financial institutions. CRC bonds were used to
finance China’s massive railway infrastructure
construction and the Huijin bonds were issued in
2010 for subscribing to the ICBC, BOC and
CCB’s rights issues and injecting capital into the
Export-Import Bank of China and China Export &
Credit Insurance Corp.
These two issuers are not purely commercially-driven companies. They have significant public
welfare and state asset management responsibilities
and the government provides explicit support to help
them reduce funding costs.
41. Yield of China Railway Corp bonds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015.
42. Breakdown of government-backed institutional bondsoutstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
Asset-backed securities (ABS)
ABS are bonds backed by a pool of assets,
converted in shares which are sold to investors.
Table 43 shows the three types of ABS in China.
Of these three, Collateralised Debt Obligations
(CDO), which are backed by credit assets such as
corporate loans and mortgage, are the largest.
ABS were launched in 2005 but growth was very
slow until 2014 (the market was shut down over
2009-2011 following the global financial crisis).
As we argued in Our multi-asset view of the third
plenum China’s turning point? (15 October 2013),
the key challenges were: 1) banks were reluctant
to sell high quality assets; 2) ABS were much
more complex than a cash bond, increasing
transaction costs; and 3) ABS offered limited
yield spread for investors to compensate for low
liquidity and the due diligence cost.
0
2
4
6
8
2 0 0 9
2 0 0 9
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
%
1 yr 3 yr 5 yr 10 yr 30 yr
5 yr 2.9%
7 yr 18.3%
10 yr 49.5%
15 yr 10.8%
18 yr 0.3%
20 yr 15.4%
30 yr 2.8%
43. Breakdown of ABS by products
Products Full name No. of bondsoutstanding
Amountoutstanding
(RMBbn)
As % of all ABSoutstanding
As % of all bondsoutstanding
Underlyingassets
Listingvenue
Regulator
CDO CollateralisedDebt Obligation
241 251 83% 0.70% Credit assets Interbank CBRC
ABS Asset-backedSecurities
120 33 11% 0.09% Non-financialcorporate
assets
Exchange CSRC
ABN Asset-backedNotes
50 17 6% 0.05% Non-financialcorporate
assets
Interbank NAFMII
Total 411 301 100% 0.84%
Source: Wind, HSBCNote: Data as of 31 December 2014. CBRC: China Banking Regulatory Commission; CSRC: China Securities Regulatory Commission; NAFMII: National Association of Financial MarketInstitutional Investors.
https://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=ekkrZAi0aX&n=390208.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=ekkrZAi0aX&n=390208.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=ekkrZAi0aX&n=390208.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=ekkrZAi0aX&n=390208.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=ekkrZAi0aX&n=390208.PDF
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These concerns eased in 2014 because: 1) the
increasing number of financial products available
to savers (e.g. wealth management products,
popular savings schemes that pay higher rates of
interest than bank deposits, and money market
funds) have made it more difficult for banks to get
new deposits; in order not to breach the loan-to-
deposit ratio, they have to sell existing loans to
release quotas for new loans; 2) as LGFV bonds
start to wind down, investors are searching for
alternative high yield bonds, which helps support
demand; 3) increased new issuance is improving
liquidity; and 4) regulators are helping too: in
November 2014 the CBRC and CSRC announced
simplified approval processes for ABS.
As a result, there was a big jump in ABS issuance
in 2014. Gross issuance reached RMB331bn, 11
times more than in 2013, and accounting for 3%
of total bond issuance in 2014 (Fig 44). There are
still issues that need to be addressed, such as tenordiversification (now the issuance tenor is quite
short – some 80% are below 3 years, Fig 45) and
liquidity improvement (a lot of investors still buy
and hold until maturity).
44. ABS issuance accelerated in 2014
Source: Wind, HSBC
45. Majority of ABS have tenors of less than three years
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
46. Yield of ABS
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of February 2015.
Privately placed notes (PPNs)
PPNs allow unlisted non-financial companies to
issue bonds privately to selected investors in the
interbank market. Similar to MTNs and CP, PPNs
are open to non-financial companies, the custody
agent is the Shanghai Clearing House (SCH) and
the regulator is NAFMII. Introduced in 2011, PPNs
have grown into a major bond class, raising nearly
RMB1trn in 2014, accounting for 8% of total bond
issuance (Fig 47), even more than MTNs.
As these bonds are privately placed, regulators
impose fewer restrictions, an approach welcomed by
issuers and investors. At the same time, PPNs may
carry a higher risk than publicly listed bonds and
liquidity is tighter. Maturity is also quite short –55% has a tenor of 3 years (Fig 47).
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
R M B b n
Gross issuance As % of total bond issuance
=6 month,
=1yr, =2yr, =3yr 20%
0
2
4
6
8
J a n
- 1 1
M a y
- 1 1
S e p
- 1 1
J a n
- 1 2
M a y
- 1 2
S e p
- 1 2
J a n
- 1 3
M a y
- 1 3
S e p
- 1 3
J a n
- 1 4
M a y
- 1 4
S e p
- 1 4
J a n
- 1 5
%
ABS, 1 yr ABS, 2 yr
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47. PPNs: Rapid growth since being launched in 2012
Source: Wind, HSBC
48. Breakdown of PPN outstanding by tenor
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. Maturity refers to issuance tenor.
Among so many bond types, trading is
concentrated on five, namely Treasuries, policy
bank bonds, MTN, CP and enterprise bonds (Fig
49). We list the features of these key bond classes
in Table 50.
49. Trading volume is dominated by selected bond classes
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Trading volume refers to transaction amount (buy or sell) per year.
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
-
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
2011 2012 2013 2014
R M B b n
Gross issuance As % of total bond issuance
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50. China bond market overview
Treasuries Muni-bonds Policy bankbonds
PBoC bills Financialbonds
Enterprisebonds
Corporatebonds
Mid-term notes(MTN)
Commercialpaper (CP)
Government-backed
institutionalbonds
Asset-backedsecurities
(ABS)
Launch time Re-launched in
1981
2009 1994 2002 Mostly f rom2004
1985 2007 2008 Re-launched in2005
1995 2005
Amountoutstanding(RMBbn)
9,591 1,162 9,708 422 2,352 2,912 666
3,377 1,761 1,018 301
Turnover 1
(RMBtrn/week,interbank only)
108 2 345 2 13 84 NA 99 101 9 NA
Typical tenor(years, atissuance)
1, 2, 3, 5, 7,10, 15, 20,
30, 50
3, 5, 7, 10 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10,15, 20, 30, 50
0.25, 0.5, 1, 3 5, 10, 15 6, 7, 10, 15 3, 5, 7, 10 3, 5, 7, 10 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,1
7, 10, 15, 20 1-3
Issuer MoF Localgovernments2
3 policy banks3 PBoC Financialinstitutions
Mostly unlistednon-financialcompanies4
Mostly listedcompanies5
Non-financialcompanies
Non-financialcompanies
China RailwayCorporation,
Central HuijinInvestment
Banks for CDO,non-financial
companies for ABS and ABN
Approvalauthority
MoF State Council,MoF
PBoC PBoC PBoC, CBRC,CSRC
NDRC CSRC NAFMII NAFMII NDRC for CRC,State Council
for Huijin
CBRC for CDO,CSRC for ABS,
NAFMII for ABN
Bond rating No rating AAA 9%; no
rating 91%
No rating No rating AAA 59%; AA+
14%; AA 8%; AA- 3%; A+
1%; A-1 5%; Norating 11%%
AAA 37%; AA+
26%; AA 36%; AA- 1%
AAA 57%; AA+
21%; AA 20%; AA- 1%
AAA 65%; AA+
21%; AA 13%; AA- 1%
A-1 60%; no
rating 40%
AAA for CRC
bond 89%; norating for Huijin
bond 11%
AAA 73%; AA+
4%; AA 2%; AA- 2%; A+ 2%; A 1%; no rating
16%
Listing venue Interbank,exchange,
OTC
Interbank,exchange
Mostly ininterbank
Interbank Interbank Interbank,exchange
Exchange Interbank Interbank Mostly ininterbank, some
in exchangeand OTC
CDO and ABNin interbank,
ABS inexchange
Settlementagent6
CCDC,CSDC
CCDC, CSDC Mostly in CCDC CCDC CCDC CCDC, CSDC CSDC CCDC, SCH7 SCH8 Mostly in CCDC CDO and ABNin CCDC, ABS
in exchange
Note:1. Turnover refers to transaction volume (buy or sell) in interbank market. Data are calculated as average of weekly transaction volume in 2014. Source of data for policy bank bonds is CFET because Wind groups policy bank bondswith financial bonds and a breakdown is not available. Data for other types of bonds are from Wind.2. All provincial level government plus Shenzhen and Qingdao
3. Including China Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China, The Export-Import Bank of China4. A few listed companies also issue enterprise bonds but the majority are unlisted companies.5. Eligible issuers were expanded to all companies with share-holding structure in 16 January 2015.6. CCDC: China Central Depository & Clearing Co.; CSDC: China Securities Depository and Clearing Co.; SCH: Shanghai Clearing House. All are settlement agents onshore.7. MTN issued after 17 June 2013 is under custodian of SCH.8. Custodian agent of commercial paper was changed from CCDC to SCH fr om September 2011 onwards.Source: Wind, CFET, HSBC. Data as of 31 December 2014.
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Trading platforms
Onshore bonds are traded on three platforms:
interbank, exchange (including Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) and over-the-counter
(OTC), which is operated by commercial banks’
retail counters. Institutional investors can
participate in the interbank and exchange markets.
The exchange market also allows individual
investors to participate. As shown in Table 51, the
interbank market is the dominant platform.
The interbank market offers a much wider range of
products, as shown in Table 52. Most bonds can
only be traded on one of the three platforms. Of the
28 types of bond in the onshore bond market, only 6
can be traded on more than one platform (Table 53).
There are three custodian agents. China Securities
Depository and Clearing Co (CSDC) for bonds
traded in the exchange market, while China
Central Depository & Clearing Co (CCDC) and
Shanghai Clearing House (SCH) cover bonds in
the interbank market.
51. Interbank vs. exchange bond markets1
Interbank Exchange
Trading volume2 (RMBtrn, 2014) 38.9 1.4 Amount outstanding3 (RMBtrn, 2014) 34.3 2.6Investors Institutions Institutions and individualsTrading venue China Foreign Exchange Trade System &
National Interbank Funding Center (CFET4)Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange
Custodian and settlement agent5 CCDC and SCH CSDCTrading mechanism Private negotiation (majority), market making Public auction (majority), private negotiation for block
trade
Source: Wind, HSBC. Data as of 2014
Note:1. The table does not include OTC market because it is very small compared with interbank and exchange markets and is purely fo r individual investors.2. Data refer to one-side trading volume, i.e. buy side or sell side3. Interbank bond market size is calculated as sum of amount outstanding under custodian of CCDC and CSDC. Some bonds are t raded in both interbank and exchange markets. So sum of
amount outstanding in interbank and exchange markets is larger than total bond outstanding as there is double counting.4. Other than bonds, CFET has many other fixed income products, including bond derivatives, FX spot and derivatives, interbank lending, repo and interest rate swaps5. CCDC: China Central Depository & Clearing Co; CSDC: China Securities Depository and Clearing Co; SCH: Shanghai Clearing House.
52. Product offerings in the interbank and exchange bond markets
Interbank • From non-financial issuers: MTN, CP, super-short-term CP, PPN, ABN, collective MTN, government-backed institutionalbond, enterprise bond, collective enterprise bond, international institution bond
• From financial issuers: CD, commercial bank subordinated bond, commercial bank bond, securities firm bond, securities firmCP, insurance company bond, other financial institution bond, CDO
• From government/quasi government issuers: Treasuries, policy bank bond, municipal bond, PBoC bill
Exchange • From non-financial issuers: corporate bond, privately placed bond, CB, ABS, enterprise bond, collective enterprise bond,government-backed institutional bond (very little amount)
• From government/quasi government issuers: Treasuries, policy bank bond (very little amount), municipal bond,
Source: Wind, HSBC
53. Bonds that can be traded across markets, RMBbn, as of 31 December 2014
______________________________ Amount that can be traded in _______________________________
Bonds Amountoutstanding
Interbank only Exchange only OTC onlyInterbank+
Exchange+OTCInterbank+Exchange
Interbank+OTC
Treasuries 9,591 19% 0% 11% 54% 14% 2%
Policy bank bonds 9,708 99% 0.3% 0% 0% 0% 1%Municipal bond 1,162 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%Govt-backed institutional bonds 1,018 97% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2%
Enterprise bonds 2,912 26% 0% 0% 1% 72% 1%Collective enterprise bond* 12 14% 0% 0% 0% 86% 0%
Source: Wind, HSBC
* Collective enterprise bond is a product for more than one borr ower to collectively issue one bond. This t ype of bond was introduced to help small companies to issue bond. Besides collectiveenterprise bond, there is also collective MTN that has similar structure.
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Interbank market
The interbank market was originally set up in
1994 for commercial banks to trade currencies.
From 1996, banks were required to conduct all
interbank lending in this market and the range of
products offered has since been expanded to
include bonds, repurchase agreements (repos),
interest rate swaps and derivatives. It is also a
much broader market in terms of who can trade –
participants now include a wide range of
institutions, financial and non-financial.
This market has gradually opened up to foreign
investors. As of 13 March 2015, of the 7,680
institutions allowed to invest in RMB products such
as bonds and repos on the interbank market, there
were 98 foreign banks (offshore), 88 foreign-owned
onshore banks, 11 foreign insurance companies, 77
R-QFIIs and 19 QFIIs (Fig 54).
54. Number of onshore RMB product participants
Source: CFET, HSBC
Note: data as of 13 March 2015
Exchange market
Until 1997 the exchange market was the dominant
trading platform for bonds and stocks. But bond
trading significantly shrank after banks exited this
market in 1997 and has remained lukewarm ever
since because banks are the biggest investors in
the bond market in China.
The CSRC has been trying to ease the ban on
commercial banks’ trading in the exchange
market: in 2009, listed banks were allowed to
trade bonds there; in November 2013, listed
commercial banks were allowed to issue bonds; in
December 2013 wealth management products
(WMPs) were permitted to invest in fixed income
products. However, the interbank market has now
achieved such dominance that it will be difficult
for the exchange market to catch up.
Investors
Many different types of institutional investors
have joined the bond market since 1998 when the
interbank market began to open to non-bank
institutional investors. Individual investors are
now the minority.
Domestic banks remain the dominant investors.
For the 78% of onshore bonds for which holding
information is available, national, city and rural
commercial banks collectively hold 60% (Fig 55).
Domestic banks are also the biggest trading
participants, contributing 54% of trading volume
in 2014 (Fig 56). The onshore branches of foreign
banks are becoming bigger players, representing
13% of trading volume in 2014. Other major
investors include securities firms, insurance
companies and investment funds. We now discuss
their different investment styles.
55. Commercial banks are the biggest holders of bonds
Source: Chinabond, Shanghai Clearing House, HSBC
Note: data above include RMB28trn domestic bonds that account for 78% of total bond
outstanding as of Dec 2014. Investor holding information for the rest of the bonds is not
available. “Others” including mainly credit unit, policy banks and stock exchange (as a
trading agent for investors). Data as of December 2014.
Commercialbank, 1,322
, 17%
Policy bank,3 , 0.04%
Investmentinstitutions,2,563 , 33%
Insurancecompany,139 , 2%
Securitiescompany,118 , 2%
QFII, 19 ,0.2%
RQFII, 77 ,1%
Otherfinancial
institution,169 , 2%
Non-financialinstitution,148 , 2%
Non-legalentities, suchas pension,
WMP,investment
product,3,122 , 41%
Nationalcommercial
bank50%
Foreignbank1%
Citycommercial
bank7%
Ruralcommercial
bank4%
Securitiesfirm1%
Insurancecompanies
7%
Fund11%
Others19%
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56. Commercial banks, especially the smaller ones, are themain contributors to bond trading volumes
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data refers to transaction volume, both buy and sell, in interbank market in 2014.
Commercial banks
Banks are the most conservative investors. Around
80% of their holdings are Treasuries and policy bank
bonds that do not have default risk (Fig 57).
57. Bond holdings of commercial banks
Source: Chinabond, Shanghai Clearing House, HSBC
Note: Holing information is available for only 78% total bonds outstanding. Data as of
31 December 2014.
Securities firms
Securities firms are the most aggressive investors.
The majority of their holdings are in enterprise
bonds, MTNs and CPs (Fig 58), with less than
20% in products such as Treasuries and policy
bank bonds. This is because funding costs for
securities firms are comparatively high, so they
have to chase higher yields from credit bonds in
order to gain a decent spread.
Insurance companies
Similar to commercial banks, insurance companies
are also very conservative. They prefer Treasuries,
policy bank bonds and financial bonds. They are the
second largest investors in financial bonds as they
have an appetite for long-term products (Fig 59).
59. Bond holdings of insurance companies
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Holding information is available for only 78% total bonds outstanding. Data as of
31 December 2014.
Funds
Investment funds are the second largest investors
in MTNs and enterprise bonds after commercial
banks. In other bond classes, they like policy bank
bonds because their yields are higher than
Treasuries (Fig 60).
Others(mainly
securitiesfirms and
funds)33%
Citycommercial
banks27%
Joint-stockcommercial
banks14%
State-owned
nationalcommercial
banks3%
Foreigninstitutions
(incl.domesticbranch)
13%
Ruralcommercial
banks10%
Treasuries34.4%
Policy bankbonds45.0%
Enterprisebonds3.9%
Financialbonds
3.4% MTNs8.6%
CP4.3%
Others0.3%
Treasuries14.6%
Policy bankbonds29.9%
Enterprisebonds15.3%
Financialbonds27.6%
MTNs10.5%
CP1.8% Others0.2%
58. Bond holdings of securities firms
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Holing information is available for only 78% total bonds outstanding. Data as of31 Dec 2014.
Treasuries7%
Policy bankbonds10%
Enterprisebonds37%
Financialbonds
1%
MTNs31%
CP13%
Others1%
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Regulatory regime
China’s bond market is overseen by several
regulators. Each has its own territory and rules that
artificially split the market and hurt liquidity. For
example, the interbank market is largely regulated
by the PBoC, NAFMII and CBRC while the
exchange market is the CSRC’s territory (Table 61).
Competition between regulators is one of the
reasons why the consolidation of the two trading
platforms has been slow. Moreover, some areas
are regulated by more than one regulator, creating
extra administrative work for issuers and
investors. For example, both the CBRC and PBoC
have a say in banks’ issuance of financial bonds.
61. Bonds need approval from different regulators before
issuance and are listed in different venues
Product Approval requiredbefore issuance
Listing venue
Treasuries Ministry of Finance Interbank, exchangeMunicipal bonds State Council,
Ministry of FinanceInterbank, exchange
Policy bank bonds PBoC InterbankFinancial bonds PBoC, CBRC, CSRC InterbankEnterprise bonds NDRC Interbank, exchangeCorporate bonds CSRC ExchangeMTN, CP, PPN NAFMII Interbank
Note: PBoC refers to People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank; NDRC refers to NationalDevelopment and Reform Commission, a regulator responsible f or reforms and industrialpolicies; CSRC refers to China Securities Regulatory Commission, regulator of China’ssecurities market and NAFMII refers to National Association of Financial Market Institutional
Investors, an association set up by PBoC to regulate issuance of several types of bondsincluding MTNs and commercial papers.
Source: HSBC
Rating system
Rating agencies were set up in the 1990s and their
opinions have become more important as the
market has grown. The market is dominated by
domestic rating agencies, including:
Dagong Global (大公国际, a local firm)
China Chengxin International (中诚信国际, a
joint venture with Moody’s)
China Lianhe Credit Rating (联合资信, a joint venture with Fitch)
Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & Investors
Service (上海新世纪资信)
Pengyuan Credit Rating (鹏元资信评估有限
公司)
Golden Credit Rating International (东方金诚)
Shanghai Far East Credit Rating (上海远东资
信)
China Chengxin Security Rating (中诚信证
券评估)
United Ratings (联合信用评级)
But ratings do not necessarily accurately reflect an
issuer’s credit quality. Bonds rated AAA account
for 55% of all credit bonds outstanding. Only 18%
of credit bonds are rated below AA+ (Fig 62).
Also only 32% of onshore bond have a rating
because many big bond classes are exempted from
rating requirements, such as Treasuries, policy
bank bonds, municipal bonds that the MoF issues
on behalf of local government, PBoC bills and
Huijin bonds.
60. Bond holdings of funds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Holding information is available for only 78% total bonds outstanding. Data as of
31 December 2014.
Treasuries3%
Policy bankbonds33%
Enterprisebonds21%
Financialbonds16%
MTNs27%
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62. Over half of credit bonds are rated AAA
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: Data as of 31 December 2014. A-1 is rating specifically for CP. Around 32% of
onshore bonds have a rating. Credit bonds refer to those issued by financial institutions
and non-financial corporates, i.e. exclude Treasuries, muni-bonds, policy bank bonds
and PBoC bills.
Recent developments
The onshore bond market has changed rapidly in
the past few years. In addition to increasing in
size, the market is growing in complexity, a trend
that is likely to continue as the financial needs of
the economy become more sophisticated. Thechallenge now is how to achieve a balance
between growth and risk.
Default stress
Onshore bond issuance took off in 2009. By 2014
repayment and refinancing was becoming a major
concern as more bonds came due (Fig 63) at a
time when corporate earnings were deteriorating.
As shown in Table 64, the number of bond issuers
that have recorded consecutive losses has been
increasing rapidly.
63. Gross issuance and repayment (principal and coupon)schedule of non-financial corporate bonds
Source: Wind, HSBC
Note: both issuance and repayment data exclude CP because it comes due within 1
year and thus distorts growth trend in future years compared with historical years.
64. Bond issuers that have three consecutive years of losses
As of 3Q 2014 As of 2013 As of 2012
No. of issuers 54 28 14 Amount ofbondsoutstanding(RMBbn)
405 155 73
As % of totalcredit bonds
outstanding
2.8% 1.3% 0.8%
Source: Wind, HSBC
There has yet to be a default for a publicly issued
debt instrument. All the near defaults on principal
have resulted in bail-outs by either regulators or
third parties. While this may protect investors in the
short term, it is increasingly detrimental to the long-
term development of China’s bond market because:
Investors go for products that offer higher
yield without doing sufficient due diligence
on the issuer. This disadvantages high quality
issuers that deserve lower yields.
Issuers tend to borrow excessively because
they believe regulators will bail them out if
they have trouble making repayments. This
has become one of the obstacles to
deleveraging.
China’s debt levels have been climbing faster than
GDP for more than a decade, especially since
2009 when Beijing launched its massive
economic stimulus package to counter the effects
AAA55%
AA+17%
AA16%
AA-1%
A-110%
Others1%
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
R M B b n
Gross issuance To tal repayment
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of the global financial crisis. If we use total bank
loans and bonds to measure debt, it comes out at
around 193% of GDP as of 2014, up from 130%
in 2001 (Fig 65).
65. China bonds and loans as % of GDP
Source: CEIC, Wind, HSBC
Tight liquidity
As we argued in The easing dilemma
(10 February 2015), liquidity remains tight despite
several rounds of monetary easing. This is evident
by a persistently high 7-day repo rate (Fig 66).
66. 7-day repo rate: persistently high
Source: Bloomberg, HSBC
China’s Treasury curve now looks strikingly
similar to the US in January 2008: flat at c3% to
4% and inverted at the short end (Fig 67),
reflecting the challenging financing outlook,
especially for banks.
67. China and US Treasury yield curve comparison, 2015 vs.2008
Source: CEIC, HSBC
Conclusion
In 2014, the onshore bond market made great
progress in many areas such as issuance, new
product launches and the simplification of
regulations. We think the pace of change will
continue to increase this year, with the focus on:
Simplifying rules as the regulators of different
credit platforms compete for market share
(although there is a risk that this may
intensify segmentation).
More savings will be channelled into the bond
market through wealth management products,
which will help the bond market to expand.
The bond market is becoming a competitor to
traditional lenders, which may force them to
balance their desire for growth by focusing onefficiency and profitability. This is evident by
the rapid growth in the issuance of asset-
backed securities in 2014.
In the long term some structural issues need to be
addressed, including the lack of a default
mechanism, an unsatisfactory rating system and
the fragmented regulatory landscape. However, as
the economy is in need of more funding, we
expect the onshore bond market to continue to
grow in size and sophistication.
100%
125%
150%
175%
200%
-
20,000 40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
Debt: bond Debt: loan Total debt / GDP (RHS)
R M B b n
2
3
4
5
6
7
3 N o v 1 4
1 0 N o v 1 4
1 7 N o v 1 4
2 4 N o v 1 4
1 D e c 1 4
8 D e c 1 4
1 5 D e c 1 4
2 2 D e c 1 4
2 9 D e c 1 4
5 J a n 1 5
1 2 J a n 1 5
1 9 J a n 1 5
2 6 J a n 1 5
2 F e b 1 5
9 F e b 1 5
1 6 F e b 1 5
2 3 F e b 1 5
2 M
a r 1 5
9 M
a r 1 5
1 6 M
a r 1 5
%
Rate cut Rate cutRRR cut
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 M
6 M 2
Y 4 Y
6 Y
8 Y
1 0 Y
1 5 Y
2 0 Y
China, 11 Mar 15 US, 14 Jan 08
%
https://www.research.hsbc.com/R/20/mVab4Dahttps://www.research.hsbc.com/R/20/mVab4Dahttps://www.research.hsbc.com/R/20/mVab4Da
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The offshore RMB (CNH) bond market
underwent several major changes last year.
Offshore yields, which used to trade as much as
200bp below onshore levels, have now converged
to similar or even higher than onshore peers. The
main driver has been the further liberalisation of
cross-border flows.
The CNH bond market has continued to grow
despite the RMB weakening against the USD.
With nearly 15 offshore RMB centres already
established, we expect the pool of CNH liquidity
to increase further, although the rate of expansion
will be affected by currency sentiment.
In this report, we provide an update to ‘CNH bond
primer: Hot dim sum’ in The redback primer: An
essential guide to renminbi asset classes (20
March 2014), addressing the top 10 questions
regarding the market in the past 12 months:
1) How important is the CNH market in terms of
offshore financing for Chinese companies?
2) How fast have cross-border RMB flows
expanded?
3) What caused the accelerated convergence of
onshore and offshore yields?
4) In an environment of currency uncertainty, are
there any new drivers to support the offshore
RMB pool?
5) How has the primary market evolved in the
past 12 months?
6) Have any new structures emerged in recent
bond offerings?
7) What type of new investors may find CNH
bonds attractive?
Changing dynamics ofoffshore RMB bonds…
The CNH bond market has become an increasingly important
channel for Chinese companies to source offshore financing, in
the context of the central government’s ‘go abroad’ strategy
Offshore yields have converged to onshore levels in early 2015 on
the back of broadening channels of cross-border flows and
changing expectations about the RMB FX rate
The growth of the offshore pool and demand for CNH bonds are
likely to resume once currency sentiment stabilises, helped by the
rising number of offshore RMB centres around the globe
Crystal Zhao AnalystThe Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited+852 2996 [email protected]
Zhi Ming ZhangHead of China ResearchThe Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited
+852 2822 [email protected]
https://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=Qfhjm9I7V0&n=409050.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=Qfhjm9I7V0&n=409050.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=Qfhjm9I7V0&n=409050.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=Qfhjm9I7V0&n=409050.PDFhttps://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=Qfhjm9I7V0&n=409050.PDF
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Q1: How important is the CNH market
in terms of offshore financing for
Chinese companies?China has become the centre of emerging market
borrowing since quantitative easing was launched
in the US. Driven by cheaper offshore financing
costs, Chinese borrowers have accumulated
USD1.5trn debt from international lenders as at end
of September 2014 (USD1.1trn bank loans and
USD0.4trn bonds), up from a mere USD200bn five
years ago, according to BIS data (Fig.1 and Fig.2).
Offshore bonds are an increasingly important
channel for Chinese entities to raise fund. They have
raised a total of USD500bn bonds in G3 currenciessince 2007 and have been expediting CNH issuance
since the market took off five years ago (Fig.3). In
2014, for every RMB raised overseas by Chinese
issuers, 25% came from CNH bonds (including
bank certificates of deposit).
We think CNH bonds will continue to play an
essential role in the offshore financing of Chinese
companies, especially at a time when the RMB is
…They will come back
CNH bonds have proved less popular in the last few months due to
expectations of RMB weakness and tighter offshore liquidity
Attractive carries on RMB would lure back investors once
sentiment stabilises; Formosa bonds are adding to issuer diversity
We remain positive on the CNH market, given policy support for
domestic companies going abroad and the increasing global use
of the RMB
Crystal Zhao AnalystThe Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited
+852 2996 [email protected]
Zhi Ming ZhangHead of China ResearchThe Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited+852 2822 [email protected]
Fig.1 Onshore funding costs have been much higher thanoffshore levels post the financial crisis
Fig.2 Total cross-border claims on China reached USD1.5trn asof end of September 2014
Source : Bloomberg, HSBC Source: BIS, HSBC
Note: All BIS reporting banks’ cross-border claims include banks’ positions vis-à-vis
their own offices.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15
(%)
USD3m Libor Onshore 3m SHIBOR
Onshore 1 year lending benchmark rateOnshore 1 year household saving benchmark rate
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
S e p - 0
0
S e p - 0
1
S e p - 0
2
S e p - 0
3
S e p - 0
4
S e p - 0
5
S e p - 0
6
S e p - 0
7
S e p - 0