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North American Philosophical Publications

Wittgenstein and the Mental Life of AnimalsAuthor(s): David DeGraziaSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 121-137Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications

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8/20/2019 27744613 (OO)


History

of

Philosophy

Quarterly

Volume

11,

Number

1,

January

1994

WITTGENSTEIN

AND

THE

MENTAL LIFE OF

ANIMALS

David DeGrazia

I. INTRODUCTION

WITTGENSTEIN

is

commonly

regarded

as

having

been

sceptical

about

the mental

life of nonhuman animals

(referred

to

simply

as

"animals"

in

this

essay).

He is

thought

to

have

denied

that

any

animals

are

self-conscious,

thinking, perhaps

even

conscious

creatures.

His

well-known

Private

Language

Argument

is

often taken

to

undergird

his

scepticism.1

Yet several

passages

of

the

Philosophical

Investigations

suggest

a

different

interpretation.2

What did

Wittgenstein

think about the mental life of animals? What

does

the

Private

Language Argument

(PLA)

suggest

about their mental life?

(What

it

suggests

might

not

be what

Wittgenstein actually thought.)

How

are

we

to

respond, philo

sophically,

to

the

implications

of

Wittgenstein's

work for

animal mentation?

The first

question

is of historical

interest,

perhaps

most

of all

to

those

who

find

Wittgenstein's philosophy generally congenial

yet

feel that

he had

a

blind

spot

about

animals.

The

second

and third

questions

are

of

interest

to

the

philosophy

of

mind,

for obvious

reasons,

but also

to

ethics.

Animal

welfare

is

today

taken much

more

seriously

by

moral

philosophers,

and

society

as

a

whole,

than

it

was

a

couple

of decades

ago.

But

any

moral

system

granting

a

significant place

to

animals

presupposes

a

great

deal

about their

mental

life?for

example,

that

they

can

enjoy

or

suffer,

or

have desires. Common

sense

and

probably

most

philosophers readily

attribute

such mental

states to

at

least

higher animals such as mammals. But ifthe PLA is correct, then, according to some

scholars,

it

is unclear

that

any

animals

can

have such

morally

relevant

mental

states.3

And if

they

cannot,

their

moral status

may

again

be

regarded

as

negligible

or

even

nil. Thus

the

PLA

may

be

a

thorn in the

metaphysical

side

of

animals ethics.

Its

logical

power

motivates

addressing

the second and third

questions

above.

The

remainder

of this

essay

divides

into

five

parts:

(1)

a

brief

exegesis

of the

Private

Language Argument;

(2)

a

critique

of Rollin's

interpretation

of and chal

lenge

to

the

PLA

as

it

applies

to

animals;

(3)

the author's

view ofwhat

the

PLA

suggests

(and

does

not

suggest)

about

the

mental

life of

animals?in

particular,

about

animal

thought;

(4)

an

analysis

of

apparently

conflicting

statements

by

Wittgenstein, culminating

in a reconciliation (which extends

beyond

animal

thought

to

such

states

as

sensations, emotions,

and

desires);

and

(5)

some

sugges

tions

(no

more

than

that)

about

how

to

respond,

philosophically,

to

the

implica

tions of

Wittgenstein's

work

regarding

the

mental

life of

animals.

121





8/20/2019 27744613 (OO)


122

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

II.

BRIEF

EXEGESIS

OF THE PRIVATE

LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

The

Private

Language

Argument

follows

Wittgenstein's

discussion

of rule-fol

lowing

in

the

Investigations,

which

is

contained

in the sections

leading

up

to

242

(and

beginning

around

138).

These sections defend the thesis that rule

following

is

a

practice,

a

statement

meriting

brief

explication.

Wittgenstein

argues

that

no

sign?something

taken

to

mean

something

else,

such

as a

word,

instruction,

or

wordless

signal

giving

directions?is

self-explicating. Any

sign

and

any

explanation

of

a

sign

(which

is itself

a

kind

of

sign)

can

be

variously

interpreted.

A

sign's

meaning

is

determined

by

how

it

is used.

Now to follow a

sign

in the correct or intended

way

is to follow it in accordance

with

some

rule.

How is

one

to

grasp

the

rule

for

following

a

sign?i.e.,

grasp

its

meaning?

If

one

entertained all

logically possible

doubt about what

a

sign

meant,

one

could

interpret

it and all

supplementary explanations

ad

infinitum,

by

demanding

rules

for

interpreting

every

attempt

to

explain

the

first and

successive

rules.

Fortunately,

humans

are

normally

able

to

learn what

'add 2'

or

'??'

or

'green'

means,

even

if correction

and further

explanations

are some

times

needed.

That

someone

understands

a

sign

can

be determined

only by

her

demon

strating

the relevant competence, say by successfully continuing a series by

twos.

Importantly,

nothing

"in

the

head" of

a

rule-follower

is

necessary

or

sufficient

to

credit

her with

understanding:

not

necessary

because

competence

is

demonstrated

without

anyone's

knowing

what is

in

the

rule-follower's

head;

not

sufficient

because

anything

"in

the

head" would

just

be

a

further

sign,

and

would

clearly

not

constitute

understanding

if

the

individual

were

entirely

unable

to demonstrate

mastery

in her behavior.

Moreover,

that

a

particular

way

of

following

a

rule is

correct

depends,

ultimately,

upon

agreement

in

judgments

among

participants

in

the relevant

practice.

Without such

agree

ment, logically possible

doubts could

condemn

any

rule

(and

explanations

of

it)

to

ineliminable

ambiguity.

What allows such

agreement

is

common

disposi

tions?the

fact that

participants

find it natural

to

respond

to

or

interpret

a

sign

in

a

particular

way,

even

if,

conceivably,

a

rational Martian

might

respond

differently.

Common

dispositions,

cultivated

in

a

shared

"form

of life"

(way

of

living,

with

shared

practices),

make

possible

the

understanding

of rules?in

cluding

those

for

language

use.

Now that

the

sections

leading

to 242

have

purported

to

establish

that

rule-following

is

a

practice,

what remains

to

be

seen

is

whether

there

can

be

a

practice

of

applying

words

to

private objects.

This

is

where

the

PLA

(243ff)

comes

in.5

In

243

Wittgenstein

introduces

the notion of

a

private

language

as

one

whose

words

"refer

to what

can

only

be known

to

the

person

speaking:

to

his

immediate

private

sensations"

or

private

objects.

Notice

that

pain,

for

example,

would

not be

a

private

object

in this

sense.

'Pain' refers

to

a sensa

tion-type,

tokens

of which

we

all

have;

the

term

is

readily taught

to children





8/20/2019 27744613 (OO)


WITTGENSTEIN AND ANIMAL

MENTALITY 123

and is part of public discourse,

so

that incorrect usage

can

be corrected (even

if

correction is almost

never

necessary).6

However,

when

one

says

things

like,

"You don't

really

know

what

pain

feels like

to

me,

and

I

don't

know

what it feels

like

to

you,"

one

has

in mind

such

a

(putative)

private object.

(Much

recent talk

of

"qualia"

also

invokes

this

notion.7)

It

is,

of

course,

most

natural

to

think

that there

can

be

a

language

referring

to

such

objects,

and

this

assumption

is of

great

philosophical

importance.

Many

within the

empiricist

tradition,

for

example,

have

assumed

that

the

only

matters

of fact that

we

know

with

certainty

are

our

own

experiences;

these

philosophers

often

take

for

granted

that

these

items of

knowledge

can

be

expressed,

at

least

to

oneself,

in

language,

without

presupposing

an

exter

nal world

or

other

minds.8

Descartes

apparently

makes

the

same

assump

tions

in

his

cogito

and successive

arguments

in

the

Meditations.

So the

PLA

is of intrinsic

philosophical

interest,

independent

of

its

specific

implications

for animals and of historical

questions

regarding

Wittgenstein's

use

of

it.

With this

background,

let

us

take

a

look

at

the essential structure

of

the PLA:

(1)

For

an

expression

to

be

part

of

a

(genuine)

language,

it

must

be

meaningful;

(2)

For

an

expression

to

be

meaningful,

it must be

possible

to

use

it

correctly

or

incorrectly;

(3) For it to be

possible

to use an

expression

correctly

or

incorrectly,

there

must

be

criteria

(rules)

for

correct

use;

(4)

For

there

to be

criteria

(rules)

for

correct

use,

there

must

be

a

practice

that allows confirmation

or

correction

of the

prospective

expression-user;

(5)

No

expression referring

to

a

private

object

(in

the

sense

defined)

admits

of

such

a

practice;

therefore

(6)

No

such

expression

admits

of criteria for

correct

use;

therefore

...

[you

get

the

idea]

there

can

be

no

private language.

Each of

premisses

(1)

-

(4)

is

either

assumed

or

defended

in

the

passages

preceding

the

PLA; (4),

or

its

equivalent,

was

discussed above.

Why

does

Wittgenstein

assert

(5),

which

sets

the

logical

dominoes

tumbling

toward his conclusion?

In

the crucial

sec.

258,

Wittgenstein

has

us

imagine

an

attempt

to

use

a

term

to

refer

to

a

private

object.

You wish

to

keep

a

diary

about the

recurrence

of

a

certain

private

sensation.

You associate

the

letter 'S' with it and record it

on

each

day

on

which the

sensation

occurs.

Is this

intelligible?

Can there

be

a

practice allowing

for confirmation

and

correction

of

the

use

of'S'?

Wittgenstein

first

points

out

that

you

cannot formulate

a

definition

of

'S'

(which

would

guarantee

its

meaningfulness).

You

reply

that

you

can

give

yourself

an

osten

sive

definition. How?

You

say

that

you

can

concentrate

your

attention

on

the

sensation

so as

to

impress

upon

yourself

the connection

between

it and

'S.'

Wittgenstein

replies:

But

"I

impress

it

upon

myself

can

only

mean:

this

process

brings

it

about that

I

remember the

connexion

right

in

the

future.

But

in

the

present

case

I have

no

criterion

of

correctness.

One

would like

to

say:

whatever

is

going

to

seem

right

to

me

is

right.

And that

only

means

that

here

we

can't

talk

about

'right'.





8/20/2019 27744613 (OO)


124 HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

So

Wittgenstein

is

arguing

that such

would-be definition and recollection

do

not amount to

a

practice

allowing

for confirmation

or

correction

of

plural

uses

of the

term. No correction is

possible,

so

there

really

is

no room

for

talking

about either

confirmation

or

correction.

This is where

widespread

misunderstanding

of the PLA

occurs.9

Many

com

mentators

(and

students,

I

have

noted)

take

Wittgenstein

to

be

making

an

essentially

epistemological

point,

based

on

the

fallibility

of

memory:

You

cannot

be

sure

that

you

correctly

remember

what

sensation

you

originally

associated

with 'S'?because

there

is

no

way

of

checking?so

you

cannot

know

that

your

present

sensation is S.

Unfortunately,

such

passages

as

the

following

appear

to

support

this

reading: "Always

get

rid of the

private

object

in this

way:

assume

that it

constantly changes,

but

that

you

do not notice the

change

because

your

memory

constantly

deceives

you."10

Critics

wonder

why

they

should be

sceptical

about

memory,

when

Wittgenstein

entertains

no

such

scepticism

about

public

objects.

But

Wittgenstein's

point

is

a

deeper

thesis

about

meaning

(and,

implicity,

even

ontology).

The

epistemological

interpretation

above

assumes

that

there

is

a

fact of

the

matter

whether

S

is

occurring

at

a

particular

time.

This

presupposes

that'S'really

meant

something (by

naming)

all

along,

that

there

is such a

thing

as S. But

Wittgenstein

is

precisely

denying

that'S' succeeds

in

naming,

that there is

a

private object

named 'S.'

His

interlocuter

cannot

assume

she remembers

correctly

unless she

assumes

she

knows

what

'S'

means?but,

on

Wittgenstein's

terms,

she

still

has

to

show

that

there is

a

practice

that

can

make

use

of such

a

term

meaningful.

In

trying

to set

up

such

a

practice

she

cannot

simply

help

herself

to

the

meaningfulness

of'S' 11

Here

Quine's

dictum

"No

entity

without

identity"

is

entirely

to

the

point.

For

Wittgenstein,

there

cannot be

private objects

because

they

lack criteria of

identity.12

One

can

imagine Nagel's

response:

"There

is

something

that

it is like

to be your interlocuter at a certain time. Ifwhat it is like to be her now, is the

same as

what

it

was

like

when

she

named

S,

then

she is

right

that

S

recurs;

if

not,

she's

wrong."

But,

according

to

Wittgenstein,

nothing

counts

as

being

the

same

or

different

here,

so

there is

no

fact

of the

matter

regarding

identity.

Malcolm Budd

puts

the

point quite clearly:

[T]he

combination of

an

act

of

attention

to

a

sensation

and

the

utterance

of

This

is

called "S"' does

not

determine the

meaning

of'S':

any

ostensive definition

can

be

variously

understood. It

is

the

way

in

which

a

sign

is

used,

or

is

intended

to be

used,

that determines its

meaning,

and

the

concentration

of

a

person's

attention

...

implies

nothing

about how the

sign

is

to

be

used.

And

the

combination

of

an

act

of attention

to

a

sensation and the utterance

of

'This

sensation

is called "S"'

likewise

does

not

determine

the

meaning

of'S': the

intention

to

use

'S'

as

the

name

of

a

kind

of sensation of which

this is

an

instance

leaves indeterminate the

nature

of

the

kind in

question.13

The

term

for the

putative

private

object

lacks

content;

no

criteria for

using

it

exist,

so

it

singles

out

nothing

in

the

mental

world.14





8/20/2019 27744613 (OO)


WITTGENSTEIN AND

ANIMAL

MENTALITY 125

III. HOW NOT

TO

INTERPRET

AND

TAKE

ON

THE

PLA

AS

IT

APPLIES

TO

ANIMALS: ROLLIN'S

READING

AND

REPLY

What

does the

PLA

imply

about

animals?

I first

approach

this

question

nega

tively, by considering

Bernard

Rollin's

wrongheaded

answer.

Rollin's

The Un

heeded

Cry

is

possibly

the

best

booklength

examination of

issues

in the

philosophy

of

mind

as

they

bear

on

animal mentation.

That

he

misunder

stands the

PLA

suggests

its

elusiveness;

that his

reply

to

it

is

ineffectual raises

the

spectre

of

the

PLA

as

a

metaphysical

thorn

in

the

side

of

animal

ethics.

Exposing

Rollin's

errors

will

begin

to

clarify

what

the

PLA

does and does

not

suggest

about animals.

(The

italicized

statements

are

Rollin's

assertions;

my

commentary

follows.)

According

to

Wittgenstein,

"to have

a

concept

...

there

must

he

rules

for

the

use

of

the

concept

which

can

he checked

publicly."16

Wittgenstein

does

not

make that assertion.

He

says

that for

a

sign

to

be

meaningful

(for

it

to

count

as

part

of

a

language),

there

must

be rules

for

correct

use

that

allow

public checking.

Rollin's

statement

can

be

salvaged

if

we

assume

that

a

concept

is

supposed

to

be

"marked"

by

a

meaningful

sign,

some

"vehicle" for

the

concept

(like

a

word

which

requires

rules

for

use).

"That

means

there

must

be ways in which

one can

conceivably misapply

the

concept,

and be detected and

corrected/'11

This

is

correct,

on

the

(perhaps

charitable)

interpretation

above.

"This is

possible

only

when the vehicles

of

the

concept

are

public

...."18This

is

correct

and

rightly

implicates

the

vehicle

of

a

concept.

An

example

of

this

is

a

child's

calling

a cow

a

"dog"

and

being

corrected.19

The

example

is

appropriate.

(Note

that

the

vehicle

of

the

concept

dog

is

the

word

'dog'

in

English.)

A

relevantly

similar

example

is

this:

A

puppy

sees

his

owner

rattling

a

martini-shaker

and?using

the

concept

"dish

rattling?food time"?ap

proaches

the

owner, only

to

be

corrected with

"No,

that's

not

for you."20There

are

several

problems

here.

First,

it is odd at

best

to

describe

"dish

rattling?

food

time"

as a

concept;

presumably

it

is

an

inference

employing

several

concepts

(leaving

aside for

now

the

question

of

whether

such

a

thought

is

attributable

to

the

animal).

More

importantly, granting

that the

dog

has

a

candidate

for

a

meaningful

sign

(a

mental

image)

in his

head,

its

use

has

not

been

corrected

by

the

owner's

reaction. Rollin

appears

to

be

confusing

(1)

the

meaningfulness

of

a

sign (e.g.,

word,

mental

image)

with

(2)

the

truth

of

an

apparent

belief

(e.g.,

"That's food"

or

"Food

time ")

that

might employ

that

sign

or

the

concept

for

which

it is

a

vehicle.

It

is the

apparent

belief,

probably

attributed

on

the basis of the

dog's

behavior

and

history,

that

gets

corrected.

What

would the

owner

know about

the

dog's

use

of

a

mental

image?

The issue

of

meaning

is

prior

to

that

of

truth,

just

in

the

sense

that

you

need

meaning

even

to

have

a

belief whose

truth

or

falsity

you

may

consider.

Now the

boy's

exclamation

"dog"

clearly

means





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126 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

something, namely dog(s)?a

fact

guaranteed by

the

conventions

of

English

and the

context

of his

utterance. But it is not

yet

clear

that

the

dog's

mental

image

means

anything.

Rollin

presupposes

that it

means

food,

begging

the

very

question

Wittgenstein

is

worried

about?how

a

sign

can mean

anything.

Nothing

in the scenario shows that there is

a

way

of

checking

up

on

the

dog's

meaning

food by

itsmental

image.

How

that connection could

be checked

up

on

is

entirely

mysterious.21

There

is

another

major

confusion

in

the

example.

The

PLA

targets

private

objects

for which there

are

public signs,

such

as

the

letter'S.' Rollin's

example

concerns

a

public object,

food,

for which there is

only

a

private

sign,

so

the

example

does not

challenge

the PLA.22

Public

correction

does

not

require

the

involvement

of

a

human

being.

For

example,

a

dog

who

sees a

shimmering

on

asphalt

(that

is,

has

a

shimmer

ing

perception)

and

believes

it

means

water

may

be

publicly

corrected when

he walks

over

and

finds

no

water.22.

There is

a

similar

problem

here. It has

not

been shown that the

shimmering

(the

visual

image)

is

a

meaningful

sign.

Rollin

goes

directly

to

the belief?"That's

water"?and confuses the

issue

of

truth with that of

meaning.

Now Rollin

might respond

as

follows:

"Look,

I'm

trying

to

show animals have

thoughts

and that the PLA doesn't block this

claim." Maybe animals do have thoughts?his example is not implausible. But,

first,

Rollin

claims

to

be

taking

the

PLA

on

its

own

terms,

showing

how animals

can

meet

its

requirement

of

public

checks

on

the

use

of

a

sign.

On

this

count

his

example

fails.

Second,

if

the PLA's

requirment

is

unreasonable,

that needs

to

be shown and

we

need

an

explanation

of how

a

mental

image

can

constitute

a

thought,

when it is

not

even

clear

how,

by

itself,

it

can

mean

anything.

"If

the

private-language

theorist

is

persistent,

he

may say,

'But how does

the animal know the

next

time

that he is

using

the

sign

or

idea in

anything

like the

way

he did

before?

The animal

only

has

memory,

we

at

least have

other

people/

The

answer

is

simple. If

we can

be

sceptical

about

memory,

we can

also be

sceptical

about other

people's

memory,

and

ask

how

we

ever

really

know that

they

are

using

a

word

or

concept

the

way

they

did

before?

So

public

checks don't

really help

in the

face

of

extreme

scepticism/'24

This

is

precisely

the confusion

discussed

in the

previous

section.

Wittgenstein's

point

is

not

primarily

epistemological

and

does

not

concern

scepticism

about

memory.

It

concerns

the

criteria of

identity

for

a

putative private

object

(what

constitutes "the

same"?)

and the

meaningfulness

of

an

effort of

private

naming.

The

PLA

is

refuted

by

noting

that

the

possibility of publicly

checking

"linguistic

concepts"

depends

on

the

possibility

of leaving

some

such

con

cepts

unchecked. For

example,

to

correct

the

boy's

use

of 'dog,'

we

must

assume

that he has

mastered other

concepts

such

as

'No'or 'cow.'We

cannot

go

on

checking

on

his

mastery

ad

infinitum.

But

that

is

no

real

problem,

because

the

boy's

behavior

will

show

whether he has

the

concept.25

It

is

true

that

public

checking

cannot

go

on

forever. This

point

is

acknowledged

in





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WITTGENSTEIN

AND

ANIMAL

MENTALITY

127

Wittgenstein's

anti-rationalist treatment of

understanding.

For

people

to

un

derstand each

other,

they

must at

some

level be

disposed

to

react to

signs

in

similar

ways;

mutual

understanding

is

ultimately

founded

on

"agreement

in

judgments"

(see

sec.

II).

It is

also

true

that

behavior

reveals

whether

someone

understands

a

concept,

word,

or

something

else?this is

one

of

Wittgenstein's

more

well-known theses. But

neither

point

is

an

argument

against

the

PLA,

which is consistent with

both.

Again,

the PLA

concerns

signs

for

putative

private

objects.

While,

as

Rollin

holds,

a

dog

might

show

by

his

behavior that

he

understands his owner's

command,

that would not

be

evidence for such

a

sign.

Thus it

does

not

challenge

the PLA.

Rollin offers other arguments in favor of attributing thought to animals, and

some

are

fairly compelling.

They

will

not

be

dealt

with

here.

Rather than

taking

on

the

PLA

directly,

these

arguments

confront

a

supposed

implication

of the

PLA?that

animals

cannot

think. In

the

next

section

we

will

study

that

alleged

connection

between

the PLA

and

scepticism

about

the mental

life

of

animals.

IV.

WHAT DOES

THE

PLA?OR

WITTGENSTEIN'S

BROADER

PHILOSOPHY

OF

LANGUAGE-SUGGEST

ABOUT

THE

MENTAL LIFE

OF

ANIMALS?

Regarding

what the PLA

suggests

about the mental life of

animals,

the

analysis

is

confined

to

animal

thought,

for

reasons

of

space.

It is

divided into

parts

and

begins

with what the

PLA

suggests

about

animal

language.

Here is

an

argument

that,

on

some

fairly plausible assumptions

that

Wittgenstein

does

or

would

accept,

the PLA

entails

that

at

least

the

vast

majority

of animals lack

language:

(LI)

The PLA

entails that

there

cannot

be

a

private

language

(a

language

whose terms

refer

to

"private objects"

as

defined

above);

therefore

(L2)

The

PLA

entails

that animals lack

a

private language;

(L3)

Define

"public

language"

as

any

language

that

is

not

a

private

language26;

(L4) Any language requires rules for correct use and a practice that allows for

correction

(an

assumption generated

by

combining

several

premisses

of

the

PLA);

(L5)

At least the

vast

majority

of

animals lack

what L4

requires

of

any

language

(an

empirical

assumption);

therefore

(L6)

The PLA

entails that

at

least the

vast

majority

of

animals

lack

a

public

language (given

assumptions

L4

and

L5);

therefore

(L7)

The

PLA

entails

that

at

least

the

vast

majority

of

animals

lack

language (given assumptions

L4

and

L5).27

Note

that,

in

spite

of

my

'The PLA

entails'language,

the

PLA

itself

does

not,

strictly

speaking,

entail

or

suggest

anything

about

animal

language?even

if

it

has

that

reputation.

The PLA

is about

private languages, languages

whose

terms

refer

to

private

objects

in

that

specialized

sense.

And such

languages

are

surely

the

last

thing

that

could

plausibly

be

ascribed

to

animals

Surely

an

animal

language

would

have terms

or

signs

that referred to

things

in the

world,

such

as

water

and

food. To

go

from

the PLA to

scepticism

about animal

language,

you

need not

only

the

empirical premise

about

what at

least

most





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128

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

animals

lack,

but the

philosophical premise

about

what

all

languages require.

That

all

languages

require

rules for correct

use

and

practices

that allow for

correction is

a

hallmark

of

Wittgenstein's

philosophy

of

language

generally,

not

anything particular

to

the

PLA.

All

the PLA

adds is

that

animals cannot

have

private

languages.

On

the

other

hand,

the

general

thesis

about what

languages

require

is

a

premise

of the

PLA. So

why

not

say

that

(given

the

empirical

assumption)

the

PLA

does

support

scepticism

about

animal

language?

While not

clearly

false,

this

way

of

stating

the

matter is

potentially

misleading

about

where

the

weight

of

the

argument

for

scepticism

lies.

Regarding

the

empirical

premise

about

animals'language-relevant

abilities,

it is

pretty

safe?especially

because

it

avoids

denying

language

to

all

animals.

Hereafter

its truth will be

assumed

(subject

to

deleting

the words

'the

vast

majority

of).

What about animal

thought?

In

light

of

the

preceeding, talking

about what

the

PLA

entails

will

be

stopped

and the conclusion

supported

by

the

PLA

plus

the two

above-mentioned

premisses

will

be

picked

up.

We

may

safely

ascribe

that

conclusion

to

Wittgenstein,

since

it is

implied by

the

combination of theses

he

held and

an

empirical premise

we

have

every

reason

to

believe he would

accept.

Now consider

an

argument

that takes

us

from

that conclusion

to

scepticism

about animal

thought:

(Tl)

Animals lack

language;

(T2)

Thought

requires

language

(a

philosophical

thesis

commonly

attributed to

Wittgenstein);

therefore

(T3)

Animals lack

thought.

This

argument

proffers

a

profound

conclusion.

But

did

Wittgenstein

really

hold

T2,

that

thought

requires language?

There is

considerable

evidence that

Wittgenstein

did hold

this

thesis,

even

if

it lies

largely

"under the surface" of

his

text.

Perhaps

the

strongest

supporting

evidence

is

Wittgenstein's

attack

on

the

Augustinian conception

of

language-learning.

On this view

children

are ac

tively

thinking

about the world before

learning

language,

at which time

they

associate conventional

words

with

thoughts

they

already

had:

Augustine

describes

the

learning

of human

languague

as

if the child

came

into

a

strange country

and

did not

understand

the

language

of the

country;

that

is,

as

if

they

already

had

a

language, only

not

this

one.

Or,

again:

as

if the

child could

already

think,

only

not

yet

speak.

And "think"

would here

mean

something

like

"talk

to

itself'.28

McGinn

comments

on

the

philosophical significance

of

Wittgenstein's

rejection

of

the

Augustinian conception,

both for traditional

empiricist

views of

meaning

and for

the

contemporary

"language

of

thought" hypothesis

advanced

by

Fodor

and

others29:

[Tlhere

is

a

standing

temptation

to

endow

such

alleged

mental

signs

with the

power

of

generating

their

own

meanings

-

to

think of them

as

'self-interpreting'.

The old

imagist theory

of

meaning

[fails]

to

acknowledge

that

images

do not determine

their

own

application,

but

there

is

a

more

recent

trend

which

seems

to

suffer from

essentially

the

same

problem:

[the

'language

of

thought'

doctrine. This

is

appar





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WITTGENSTEIN AND

ANIMAL

MENTALITY

129

ently]

the

idea that there

are

privileged signs

which

terminate

questions

of

mean

ing .... Wittgenstein's question about such a system of signs would be how it

acquires

a

meaning

...;

and he would

suggest

that

it

can

only

be the

use

made

of

these

signs.

But then

why

not

apply

the

use

conception

directly

to

the

natural

language

and

cut

out

the intermediate

step?

...

Wittgenstein's

point

is the

logical

one

that

meaning

cannot be

got

from

syntax

....

The

traditional

empiricist

supposes,

in

effect,

that

the child

comes

to

a

natural

language equipped

with

a

repertoire

of

mental

images

which

are

somehow

intrinsically

meaningful,

and

that words

come

to

have

meaning

for the child

by being

linked

to

these

images;

the

language

of

thought

theorist

in effect

replaces imgages

with

syntactically

characterised

sym

bols

in

a

mental

medium and

regards

the task

of

the child

as

that

of

linking

these

mental

symbols

with the

spoken

symbols

to

which he is

exposed:

both

types

of

view

assume,

mistakenly,

that

meaning

and

understanding

can

be determined

by

what

are

after

all

only (logically)

further

signs.30

We

now

have the

case

for

attributing

to

Wittgenstein

the thesis that

thought

without

language

is

impossible,

a

point

that extends not

only

to

children

but

to

animals. Without

language,

the

argument

goes,

thought

would

presumably

require

mental media

intrinsically

endowed

with

meaning,

an

inconceivable

hypothesis

on

Wittgenstein's

view.31

Thus

Wittgenstein's philosophy

of

language,

with

the

help

of

a

plausible

empirical assumption,

may appear

to

suggest

that there is

no

animal

thought.

Our

investigations

also

suggest

a

major

challenge

to

anyone

wishing

to

ascribe

languageless

thought

to

animals:

Either

(1)

identify

the

nonlinguistic

vehicles

of

thought

and

explain

how,

contra

Wittgenstein, they

acquire meaning

or

(2)

explain why

there

is

no

need

to

do

so?why,

in

particular, Wittgenstein's

arguments

about the

indeterminacy

of

"mental

signs"

do

not

devastate

their

claim.

V. Making Sense

of

Wittgenstein's

Statements About Animals

We have

seen

an

argument

that

Wittgenstein's

philosophy

of

language

pre

cludes animal

thought.

As

mentioned

in

the

Introduction,

several

philosophers

have taken his position to support scepticism about the mental states of

animals

generally.

Yet

numerous

passages

in

Wittgenstein's

texts

suggest

a

more

balanced

view.

One finds

Wittgenstein

saying

the

following

about animals in the

Investiga

tions.

Dogs

cannot simulate

pain

(250),

suggesting

that

they

can

have

pain.

"We

do

not

say

that

possibly

a

dog

talks

to

itself

(357),

apparently

precluding

a

canine

"language

of

thought"

that

never

gets

expressed publicly.

The

natural

expression

of

an

intention

is

visible

in "a cat

when

it

stalks

a

bird;

or a

beast

when

it

wants

to

escape"

(647).

A

dog

can

be

afraid

his

master

will

beat

him,

but

not

that

his

master will beat him tomorrow

(650).

We

can

imagine [pre

sumably,

realistically]

an

animal

angry,

frightened,

happy,

unhappy,

startled?

but

not

hopeful

(174).

"A

dog

believes his

master

is

at

the

door,"

but

not

that

his

master will

come

the

day

after tomorrow

(ibid).

Somewhat

paradoxically,

"[i]f

a

lion could

talk,

we

could not

understand

him"

(223).

Also,

a

"dog

cannot

be

a

hypocrite,

but neither

can

he be

sincere"

(229).

Here is

a

clue

to

interpret





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130 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

ing

some

of

these

passages:

"Can

only

those

hope

who

can

talk?

Only

those

who

have mastered

the

use

of

a

language.

That is

to

say,

the

phenomena

of

hope

are

modes

of

this

complicated

forms of life"

(174).

In

Zettle

one

reads the

following.

Dogs

feel

fear,

but

not

remorse

(518).

"Only

someone

who

can

reflect

on

the

past

can

repent"

(519).

Here is another

general

clue: Certain

concepts

apply

only

to

those who

possess

a

language

(520).

We

cannot

say

that

a

dog

means

something by

wagging

its tail

(521).

Moreover,

we

"should

hardly

ask

if the crocodile

means

something

when it

comes

at

a

man

open

jaws.

And

we

should

declare that

since the

crocodile

cannot

think

there

is

really

no

question

of meaning

here"

(522,

emphasis

added).

"There

might

be

a

concept

of fear

that had

application

to

beasts,

and hence

only

through

observation.

...

The verb

that would

roughly correspond

to the word

"to

fear"

would then

have

no

first

person

and

none

of its forms

would be

an

expression

of fear"

(524).

On

the basis of

behavior

under

certain

circumstances,

we

can

say

[presumably,

justifiably]

that

someone

is sad?a

point

that

applies

to

dogs

as

well

as

persons

(526).

Let

us

take these

passages

together.

(Absent

a

special

reason

to

think

otherwise,

it is

assumed

that

what

Wittgenstein

says

of

one

species

of

animal,

he

means

to

apply

to

other

species.)

Wittgenstein

has asserted?in

each

case

either directly or in his indirect, ironic way?that animals can have pain, be

afraid

(though

in

one

place

he

speaks

of

a

specialized

concept

for

application

to

animals),

as

well

as

angry,

happy,

unhappy

or

sad,

and

startled;

they

can

want

something

and

express

an

intention,

and

even

believe

something.

On

the

other

hand,

Wittgenstein

denies that animals

can

talk

to

themselves,

have

fears

or

beliefs

about

tomorrow

or

the

day

after,

hope,

feel

remorse

or

regret

and

reflect

on

the

past,

demonstrate

hypocricy

or

sincerity,

mean

something

by

an

action

or

gesture,

or

think.

And,

if

they

could

speak,

we

would be unable

to

understand

them. Do these claims form

a

coherent

body?

Are

they compatible

with what

we

know

of

Wittgenstein's

philosophy

of

language?

Let

us

begin

with the

most

easily

handled mental

states

and

work

up

to

the

hardest. First of

all,

Wittgenstein

ascribes

sensations

to

animals. These

pas

sages

from

ettel

shed

some

light

on

the theoretical basis:

"The

concept

of

pain

is characterized

by

its

particular

function

in

our

life"

(532);

"Pain has this

position

in

our

life;

has these

connections"

(533).

These

functionalist-sounding

passages

tersely

convey

Wittgenstein's

view of

sensations

as

states of

an

individual

that

are

typically

expressed

by

behavior

in certain

recognizable

circumstances.

While

pain

is not reducible to

pain-behavior

(as

in

behavior

ism),

neither

is

it

reducible

to

some

"inner,"

private

state

that

happens

to

cause

certain kinds of behavior (as for some dualists). That

pain

is

typically

expressed

by

certain

kinds

of behavior is

an

essential

part

of

the

concept.

Here

is the

link

to

animals: Creatures

whose

behavior

in

certain

circumstances

suggest

that

they

are

in

pain,

do

have

pain?and

similarly

with other sensations.

Wittgenstein

also

ascribes

a

considerable

variety

of emotional

states

to





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WITTGENSTEIN AND

ANIMAL

MENTALITY 131

animals,

such

as

fear,

anger,

and

sadness.

He

provides

a

bridge

between

sensations

and

certain emotions:

"Only

surrounded

by

certain

normal mani

festations of

life,

is there

such

a

thing

as an

expression

of

pain.

Only

sur

rounded

by

an even more

far-reaching particular

manifestation of

life,

such

a

thing

as

the

expression

of

sorrow or

affection. And

so

on"

(534).

The

behavior,

more

generally

the form

of

life, necessary

to

express

emotions

may

be

some

what

more

complex

than

that

expressive

of

sensations,

but the

behavior of

dogs

and

many

other

higher

animals

invites the

ascription

of

certain

emotions. But

with what limits?

Wittgenstein

bars the attribution

to

animals of emotions

(as

well

as

cognitive

states

and character

traits)

that

require

a

complexity

of

cognition

available

only

to

those

with

language.

Without

language,

it would

seem

impossible

to

form the

thought

of

the

day

after

tomorrow,32

to

reflect

in

depth

about the character of

one's

actions,

to

talk

to

oneself.

And without

language?and

a

sufficiently complex

form of

life?one

could

not

be sincere

or

hypocritical,

mean

something by

a

gesture

or

action,

or

hope.

One

implication

is

that

language

is needed for mental states

referring

to

significantly

distant

points

of

time. Without

(implausibly)

denying

that

animals

can

anticipate

or

remember,

Wittgenstein suggests

that

their

sense

of

time is

very

limited.33

So

he

grants

to

animals those emotional states

that

are

vindicated

by

the

appro

priate

behavior and forms

of

life. This is

presumably

how

he also

regards acting

with an intention and the corresponding desires, as with a cat stalking a bird.34

But do

intentions

not

require

beliefs,

like

"There is

something

ahead

to

be

stalked?" For that

matter,

don't

various

emotions?

If

the

dog

fears his

master

will

beat

him,

must

he not

believe

his

master

might

do

so?

And

Wittgenstein

says

(indirectly,

of

course)

that

a

dog

can

believe his master

is at

the door. But

there is

no

way

around

it:

To

believe

that

p,

one

must

think that

p.

Belief

entails

thought (dispositional,

ifnot

occurrent).

Yet the

previous

section

developed

a

strong

case

that


of

language precludes

animal

thought?a

thesis

evidently supported by

the crocodile

passage.

What's

going

on?

This passage from Kenny provides what we need:

There

are

thoughts

which

only

a

language-user

can

have,

as

well

as

thoughts

which

animals

can

share:

a

dog

can

believe that his

master

is

at

the

door,

but

not

that

his master

will

come

the

day

after

tomorrow,

because

he

cannot

master

the

complicated language

in

which alone such

a

hope

can

be

expressed.

A

languageless

individual,

human

or

animal,

can

think

that

p

only if

the

thought

that

p

is

expressible

by

her

nonlinguistic

behavior.

A

dog

shows

that

she

believes

her

owner

is

at

the door

if,

at

the sound of

jingling

keys,

she rushes

up

to

the

door,

showers

affection if

it is her

owner,

acts

surprised

or

suspicious

if it

is

someone

else,

and

so on.

Nothing

a

dog

could

do

(sci-fi

aside)

could

show

that she

believes

her

owner

will

be

showing

up

after

New

Year,

or

that she

believes

in

God?and

it is

plausible

to

require

for

such

thoughts

the

conceptual

rocket

of

language.

But if

Wittgenstein

makes

room

for

simple

animal

thoughts,

why

does

he

assert

that "since the crocodile

cannot

think

there

is

really

no

question

of





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132

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

meaning

here."

Let's focus

on

thought,

since

if

thought

is ruled

out,

so

is

meaning.

Why

can't

a

crocodile think

"There's food"

nonlinguistically?

Is

Wittgenstein distinguishing

between the

differing

capacities

of

different ani

mals:

Dogs

can

have

simple thoughts,

but

crocodiles

cannot?

That is

one

possibility,

since

reptiles

are more

primitive

than mammals

and exhibit

less

nuanced

behavior.36

Another

possibility

is

that

Wittgenstein

meant

"think in

language" by

'think.'This

reading

resolves the

tension,

on

the

assumption

that

nonlinguistic

thoughts

do

not

mean

anything,

since

they

are

not

signs

for

anything

else.

On the other

hand,

it is

debatable whether that

we

should

attribute this

assumption

to

Wittgenstein;

after

all,

even

nonlinguistic

thoughts

have

content.

A third

possibility

is

that his remark

simply represents

a

lapse,

an

inconsistency

with his overall

view of

animals,

thought,

and

lan

guage.

For

Zettel

is

a

far

less

edited work

than the

Investigations

and

Wittgen

stein's

voluminous

writings

contain much that

was

experimental. Probably

not

all

of what he would consider

garbage

made it

to

the

garbage

can.

But

no

further

speculation

about

this remark is

in

order.

That

leaves

only

the

famous

statement

about the

lion.37

Wittgenstein

is

emphasizing

that there

must

be sufficient

overlapping

among

forms of

life for

one

lifeform,

say

humans,

to

understand

another,

say

lions.

For

meanings

within

a

language

are

grounded

in

shared

forms

of life and

explanations

of

meaning depend on common dispostions to react in certain ways to

particular

signs

(as

discussed

above).

But

Wittgenstein exaggerates

the distance between

humans and lions.

If

a

lion could

speak,

we

could

probably

understand

much

of what it

had

to

say

about

food,

safety,

lust,

and other

matters.

What is

most

unfortunate about

the

remark,

though,

is that it invites the

misreading

that

Wittgenstein

thinks lions

have

a

language

of

thought

that

they

cannot

express

in

words. Taken

in

the

right

way,

however,

the remark is

largely

consistent

with other

remarks

about animals.

Now

we

can

reconcile the

nonsceptical

thrust of

Wittgenstein's

remarks

about animals with his overall philosophy of language

as

discussed in the

previous

section.

Strictly

speaking,

what

was

established there

was

not

that,

for

Wittgenstein,

animals cannot think. The

point

was

that neither

language

(which

animals

lack)

nor

"signs

in

the

head"

(which

are

semantically

inert)

could

serve as a

vehicle of

animal

thought?some

other

account

would

be

needed. The

necessary

account

is

that animal

thought

is attributable

on

the

basis

of behavior

that,

in

the circumstances and

given

the form of

life,

is

expressive

of

what

we

would

naturally

take

to

be

thought.

So

not

only

does

Wittgenstein

not

have

a

sceptical

blind

spot

about

animals;

his

attributions

to

animals

are,

for the

most

part,

quite

commonsensical.38

VI. EPILOGUE: WHERE MIGHT

ONE GO

WITH

WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITION?

With

this

reading

of

Wittgenstein

on

the

mental

states

of

animals,

how

might

one

respond philosophically?

One

possibility

would be to

reject

it and work





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WITTGENSTEIN AND

ANIMAL

MENTALITY 133

within the

language-of-thought

theory.

From this

standpoint

one

could attack

the

PLA

and

other

theses

of

Wittgenstein's approach.

However,

there

is

argu

ably

no

convincing

response

from that

camp,

to the

Wittgensteinian challenge

to

explain

how

signs

or

structures "in the

head"

acquire

meaning.

If,

on

the

other

hand,

one

follows

the broad strokes of his

philosophy

of

language,

one

can

avoid both radical

scepticism

and

the

language-of-thought approach.

But

what

would be the

next

move?

Here is

just

a

suggestion:

Break

from

Wittgenstein's

purely

linguistic

conceptual

investigations

and

"go

empirical."

Linguistic

and

conceptual analy

sis

can

assist

us

in

understanding

the

logical

ties

between

various

concepts,

such as belief and thought, or desire and consciousness. That tells us little

about actual

animals,

however.

Empirical investigations

not

only provide

relevant

factual

data

about

which

animals

satisfy

the

requirements

for

posses

sion of

particular

mental

states,

but

also

stimulate

philosophical

thesis

forma

tion.

Perhaps surprisingly,

the

importance

of

empirical study

is

suggested

by

several features

of

Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Consider

the thesis

that

an

animal's

form of life

is

crucial

to

what mental

states

can

be attributed

to

it.

This

entails

that

we

need

to

know about

an

animal's form of

life to know

about

its mental

states.

While

Wittgenstein

relies

on his own everyday observation, such casual looking is insufficiently rigorous

for

any

serious

attempt

to

understand

animal mentation in detail.

Now

consider

Wittgenstein's handling

of

particular

mental states such

as

pain

or

fear. Recall

two concise

statements

quoted

above from

Zettel:

"The

concept

of

pain

is

characterized

by

its

particular

function

in

our

life"

(532);

"Pain

has

this

position

in

our

life;

has

these connections"

(533).

Whether

one

may

call

Wittgenstein

a

functionalist

may

depend,

more

than

anything

else,

on

one's

precise

definition

ofthat

term. In

any

event,

we

can

agree

that in

characterizing

a

mental

state he

describes

its

role in

the

subject's

life;

like

functionalists,

he

emphasizes

inputs

(circumstances)

and

outputs

(behavior).

The

emphasis

on

function

recommends

turning

to

cognitive

ethology.40

Allen

and H?user

illuminate the connection

between

an

emphasis

on

func

tion

and

cognitive

ethology:

Ethology

is

the

study

of

animal behavior

within the context

of

evolutionary theory.

In

particular,

an

animal's behavior

is

examined in

light

of

its function and

its

evolution....

Questions

about the function

of

a

particular

behavior

are

commonly

answered

by explaining

how the

behavior

in

question

contributes

to

the fitness of

the

organism.

...

A mental

state

will be

adaptive

insofar

as

its

content

provides

for

appropriate

links between

environment and

behavior. Mentalistic

terms

thus

pro

vide a natural

vocabulary

for

cognitive

ethologists

to frame their

hypotheses.

Interestingly,

a

philosopher

at

the forefront

of

bringing

the

philosophy

ofmind

to

bear

on

cognitive

ethology?Daniel

Dennett?sees himself

as

redoing

Wittgenstein's

attack

on

"private

objects"

in

an

empirically

well-informed

way.42

This makes

sense.

Not

only

does

Wittgenstein's

approach

not

support





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134

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

scepticism

about

the mental life of animals

(as

is

commonly thought).

Its

emphasis

on

forms

of

life,

and the function of

mental

states

within

them,

invites

anyone

seriously

interested

in animal

mentation

to

abandon

the

a

priori

armchair

and

head

for

a

posteriori

jungle.43

George Washington

University

Received

April

28,

1993

NOTES

1.

Bernard E. Rollin

writes

that,

for

"Wittgenstein,

...

thought

is

constituted

by

the

social

system

of

conventional

signs

one

is

brought

up

in;

without such

a

system

[which

animals

lack]

there is neither

thought

nor

concepts;

there

can

be

no

private

language,"

(The

Unheeded

Cry:

Animal

Consciousness,

Animal

Pain,

and

Science

[New

York:

Oxford

University

Press, 1990],

p.

137).

With

somewhat

less historical confidence

and

specificity,

Peter

Singer

writes

that "there

is

a

hazy

line of

philosophical

thought,

deriving perhaps

from

some

doctrines associated

with

...

Wittgenstein,

which maintains

that

we

cannot

meaningfully

attribute

states of

consciousness

to

beings

without

lan

guage,"

(Animal

Liberation,

2nd

ed.

[New

York: New

York

Review, 1990],

p.

14).

See

also the discussion of

Frey

in

note 3.

2.

Ludwig

Wittgenstein,

Philosophical

Investigations,

trans.

G.E.M.

Anscombe

(New

York:

Macmillan,

1953).

3.

R.G.

Frey,

for

example, explicitly

invokes

the PLA

in

arguing

that animals

are

not

self-conscious,

a

thesis that

serves

as

a

premise

in

an

argument

that animals

lack

desires

(Interests

and

Rights:

The

Case

Against

Animals

[Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1980], pp.

101-10).

The

argument

of

the book

is

that animals lack interests

and for that

reason are

almost

entirely

excluded from

serious

moral consideration.

4.

Against

this traditional

view,

Saul A.

Kripke

provocatively

argued

that

the

"real"

PLA

occurs

before

243,

with the

most

critical

passages

leading

up

to

202,

which contains

the

argument's

conclusion

that

it is

impossible

to

obey

a

rule

privately

(Wittgenstein

On Rules and

Private

Language

[Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard

University

Press,

1982]).

Kripke's position

has been refuted.

See,

e.g.,

Colin

McGinn,

Wittgenstein

on

Meaning

(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), ch. 2; Malcolm Budd, "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Interpreta

tion and

Rules,"

Synthese,

vol.

58

(1984);

and G.P.

Baker and P.M.S.

Hacker,

Scepticism,

Rules and

Language

(Oxford:

Blackwell, 1984),

ch.

1.

Two

arguments

against

Kripke

seem

decisive.

First,

as we

will

see,

the

sections

preceeding

243

do

not

rule

out

a

practice

of

applying

a

sign

privately,

but

only

set the

stage

for such

an

argument

(see

McGinn,

p.

92).

Second,

while the last

sentence

of

202

is

a

conclusion of the

PLA,

it

belongs

in

the

vicinity

of

377-81.

This is

revealed

by

a

manuscript

of

the

Investigations,

Part

I,

in

which the material of

sees.

1-217 is

almost

identical with the final but

does

not

contain

the drafts of

201-3.

They

appear

after drafts

of the bulk

of

what

is

commonly regarded

as

the

PLA(243ff)

(See

Baker

and Hacker

for

immaculate

scholarship

on

this

interpre

tational

issue.)

5.

Again,

contra

Kripke,

who

thinks

the

sections

on

rule-following

establish

the

impossibility

of

private

languages

before

sec.

243.

See

note

4.

6.

Wittgenstein

stresses

that the

meaning

of

'pain'

is

not

taught

by

mere

ostensive

definition.

Teaching

the

use

of the

term

requires

proper

stage-setting

(which

allows

the

learner

to

grasp

what is

being

singled

out)?a

point,

argued

in

sees.

1-64,

that

applies

to

all

terms.

Such

stage-setting,

Wittgenstein

argues

in

the

PLA,

is

possible

only

in

a

public

language.

But

given

such

stage-setting,

a

word for

a

sensation

may

be

ostensively





8/20/2019 27744613 (OO)



MENTALITY 135

defined

no

less

than the

name

for

a

piece

of

furniture

or

a

color

(sec.

288).

(See

Anthony

Kenny,

Wittgenstein

[New

York:

Penguin,

1973], pp.

182-84 for an excellent discussion

of this

point.)

Of

course,

once a

child understands the

meaning

of'pain,'

she

will

not use

it

incorrectly

(as

opposed

to

deceptively)

in

her

own

case

(sec.

246).

For

a

discussion of the difference

between

genuine

sensation words

such

as

'pain'and

words for

private objects,

see

Malcolm

Budd,

Wittgenstein's

Philosophy

of Psychology

(London:

Routledge,

1989),

pp.

58-59.

7. Thomas

Nagel

("What

is it

Like

to

Be

a

Bat?",

Philosophical

Review,

vol. 83

[1974],

pp.

435-50)

and

Frank Jackson

("Epiphenomenal

Qualia,"

Philosophical Quarterly,

vol.

32

[1982], pp.

127-36)

argue

for

a

special

kind of

fact,

the

fact of "what

it

is

like"

to

have

a

certain

experience?which

is

irreducible,

in

principle,

to

facts

expressible

in

physical

terms.

See also

Ned

Block,

"An

excerpt

from 'Troubles

with

Functionalism',"

reprinted

inWilliam G. Lycan, Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 444-68. For

functionalist

responses

to

qualia-based

arguments,

see,

e.g.,

Laurence

Nemirow,

"Physi

calism

and the

Cognitive

Role of

Acquaintance,"

in

Lycan,

Mind and

Cognition,

pp.

490-99

and

Daniel

C.

Dennett,

Consciousness

Explained

(Boston:

Little,

Brown and

Co.,

1991),

ch.

12,

"Qualia

Disqualified,"

pp.

369-411.

8.

See

Kenny,

op.

cit.,

p.

179.

9.

The

common

misreading

is

discussed

lucidly

in

Kenny,

op.

cit.,

pp.

191-94.

10.

Ibid.,

p.

207.

11.

See,

e.g.,

sec.

265.

Cf.

Zettel,

eds.

G.E.M.

Anscombe and

G.H.

von

Wright,

trans.

G.E.M. Anscombe

(Oxford:

Blackwell, 1967),

secs.

546-48. For

interpretations along

the

same

lines,

see

Kenny,

op.

cit.,

pp.

191-94

and

Budd, op.

cit.,

pp.

55-56.

12. In discussing toothache, for which there are criteria of identity, Wittgenstein

suggests

his adherence

to

Quine's

dictum:

'But it

seems as

if

you

were

neglecting

something.'

But what

more can

I do than

distinguish

the

case

of

saying

T

have

toothache' when I

really

have

toothache,

and the

case

of

saying

the

words without

having

toothache?

I

am

also

(further)

ready

to

talk of

any

x

behind

the words

so

long

as

it

keeps

its

identity

("Notes

for

Lectures

on

'Private

Experience'

and

'Sense

Data',"

Philosophical

Review

77

[3]

[1968],

p.

297,

second

emphasis

mine).

13.

Budd,

op.

cit.,

p. 59,

last

emphasis

added.

See also David

Pears,

The

False

Prison:

A

Study of

the

Development of

Wittgenstein's Philosophy

(Oxford:

Clarendon, 1988),

vol.

2,

ch.

15,

for

a

very

in-depth

discussion.

14. Or so the argument goes. For an unusually clear and promising suggestion for

how

to resist

the

PLA

(from

someone

largely

sympathetic

to


of

mind),

see

Colin

McGinn's review

of

Malcolm

Budd,

Wittgenstein's Philosophy

of

Psychology

(Journal

of

Philosophy,

vol. 89

[1992],

pp.

433-36).

15.

Rollin,

op.

cit.

16.

Ibid.,

p.

140.

17.

Ibid.

18.

Ibid.

19.

Ibid.,

pp.

140-41.

20.

Ibid.,

p.

141.

21.

McGinn

comments that "it

seems

there

is

a

standing

temptation

to endow

such

alleged

mental

signs

with the

power

of

generating

their

own

meanings

?

to think

of

them

as

'self-interpreting'"

(Wittgenstein

on

Meaning,

p.

118).

This

statement

clearly

applies

to

Rollin

(see

op.

cit.,

pp.

140-41).

McGinn

also

succintly

notes

that

"Wittgen

stein

[rejects]

the idea

that

understanding

consists

in

the

presence

to

consciousness

of

some

sort of 'intentional

object',

on

the

ground

that such

a

mental

act

is neither

necessary

nor

sufficient

for

meaning

a

sign

in

a

particular

way" (op.

cit.,

pp.

96-96).





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136

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

22.

Rollin

specifically

implicates

the

PLA

in

his

example

(op.

cit.,

p.

141),

so

he is

not

just disputing

Wittgenstein's general philosophy

of

language

(which does

reject

the

possibility

of

private

signs,

in

the sections

on

rule-following).

23.

Ibid.

24.

Ibid.

25.

Ibid.,

p.

142.

26.

Note that

a

public language

(in

this

sense)

need

not,

strictly speaking,

involve

a

multiplicity

of

language-users.

A

language

that had

only

one

user,

and whose

terms

referred

to

public objects

(e.g., idiosyncratic

groupings

of

flora),

would

qualify

as

a

public

language

so

long

as

there

were a

practice

that

allowed for

correction

(say, by

consulting

a

picture

book

matching

terms

to

flower

clusters).

On the

possibility

of

a

"Robinson

Caruso"

satisfying Wittgenstein's

criteria

for

meaningful language,

see

Budd,

"Wittgen

stein on Meaning, Interpretation and Rules," p. 319, Baker and Hacker, op. cit., ch. 1,

and

McGinn, op. cit.,

pp.

78-79.

Rollin

apparently

takes

Wittgenstein

to

rule

out

such

solitary

languages

in

ruling

out

private

ones.

Thus

he thinks the PLA

precludes

a

dog's

having

a

solitary language

of

any

kind,

even

one

whose

terms

referred

to

public objects

such

as

food.

If

Wittgenstein

does rule

out

such

a

possibility

(on

this

see

below),

it

is not

simply

because

the

dog

would

be

working

in

isolation.

27.

Here is

some

independent

confirmation

of

Wittgenstein's scepticism

about

animal

language:

"[Animals]

do

not

use

language?if

we

except

the

most

primitive

forms

of

language,"

(Philosophical Investigations,

sec.

25).

While

the

qualification

is

intriguing,

little will

be made

of

it.

In view

of

Wittgenstein's

work

as a

whole,

the

most

radical

thesis attributable

to him

is

that

some

animals

might

have

"proto-language"

or

what

is

language

in

some

limited

(and

not

very

literal

sense)

sense.

This

interpretation

is

faithful

to

Wittgenstein's

requirements

of

rule-following

and

possible

correction

of

misuse

(and

what

we

know about animal

behavior).

28.

Philosophical

Investigations,

sec.

32. Cf.

sec.

1.

29. See

e.g.,

J.A.

Fodor,

The

Language of

Thought

(Sussex:

Harvester

Press,

1975).

30.

McGinn, op.

cit.,

pp.

118-19

31.

One

might

argue

for another

way

that

mental

representations

could

conceivably

support

languageless

thought:

They might

be used

according

to

rules that

admitted

of

public

criteria

and correction. But

any

detailing

of this

alleged possibility

would

reveal

that

it

adds

up

to

a

language.

32. Or

so

Wittgenstein

thinks.

Mary Midgley

reviews

evidence that animals

can

count

days

and

urges

us

to

regard

this

as

an

empirical,

as

opposed

to

conceptual, question

(Animals

and

Why

They

Matter

[Athens,

Georgia:

University

of

Georgia

Press,

1984],

p.

58).

33.

Wittgenstein

overestimates

what

is

required

for

remorse

and

hope,

however.

(Midgely

concurs

[op.

cit., p.

57].)

Think

of

a

dog

looking

at

the

crying

child

he

just

nipped,

or

watching

eagerly

for

scraps

from dinner.

Wittgenstein's

treatment of

remorse

(which

he

associates

with

repenting)

and of

hope

may

be tied

to

his

religious

preoccu

pations.

For

a

glimpse

of the

latter,

see

O.K.

Bousma,

Wittgenstein:

Conversations

1949-1951,

eds.

J.L.

Craft

and

Ronald

E.

Hustwit

(Indianapolis:

Hackett,

1986)

and

Ray

Monk,

Wittgenstein:

The

Duty of

Genius

(New

York:

Penguin,

1990).

34.

If

Wittgenstein

ascribes desires

to

some

animals,

then his

philosophy

does

not

stand in the

way

of

conferring

significant

moral status to those animals, on ethical views

whose value theories

emphasise

desire-satisfaction.

35.

Kenny,

op.

cit.,

p.

150.

36.

And

sec.

534

of the

Investigations

(discussed

above)

suggests

that

Wittgenstein

might

hold that

we

may

ascribe sensations

to

some

animals

to whom

we

cannot

realistically

ascribe

emotions.





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MENTALITY 137

37.

For

a

thorough,

but

overly sympathetic

discussion of

this

remark,

see

John

Churchill,

"If

a

Lion

Could

Talk,"

Philosophical Investigations,

vol.

12

(1989),

pp.

308-24.

38.

Does this

interpretation

partially

vindicate Rollin?

He is

surely

mistaken

in

his

reading

of,

and

attempt

to

take

on,

the

PLA

as

it

applies

to

animals. But

on

my

account

Wittgenstein

can

agree

with Rollin

that, say,

a

dog

can

think there is food

nearby.

Still,

Rollin's idea that the

dog's

mental

images

are

endowed with

meaning,

that

they

are

vehicles of

thought,

is

entirely

at

odds

with

Wittgenstein's

view. The two

views meet

only

at

the conclusion.

39. The

camp's

champ,

Jerry

Fodor,

embraces the

Augustinian

conception

(see

above),

apparently

contenting

himself

with

the

assertion

that

language learning

has

to

be this

way

(op.

cit.,

p. 64;

cited

in

McGinn,

op.

cit.,

p.

119).

In

an

otherwise excellent

article,

Colin Allen and Marc D. H?user note theWittgensteinian challenge but decline to take

it

on

in

discussing

the "internal

representations"

of

animals

("Concept

Attribution

in

Nonhuman Animals:

Theoretical and

Methodological

Problems

in

Ascribing

Complex

Mental

Processes,"

Philosophy

of

Science,

vol. 58

[1991], pp.

221-40).

But

none

of their

arguments

depends

on a

language-of-thought

view;

drop

the

term

"internal,"

which

makes

us

think of

private

things

in

the

head,

and

a

Wittgensteinian

could

probably

go

along

with their

arguments.

(See

below.)

40.

For

the

record,

a

language-of-thought

theorist could make the

same

move

to

cognitive

ethology.

I

simply

wish

to

draw

a

Wittgensteinian

line

to

this

empirical

discipline.

41.

Allen and

H?user,

op.

cit.,

p.

224.

Their work

represents

an

outstanding

effort

to

use

the

philosophy

of mind and

cognitive ethology

to

enrich and advance each other.

For

an

extraordinary,

philosophically

well-informed

ethological study

of

vervet

monkeys,

see

Dorothy

L.

Cheney

and Robert

M.

Seyfarth,

How

Monkeys

See

the

World:

Inside the

Mind

of

Another

Species

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1990).

42.

Dennett,

op.

cit.,

pp.

462-63. Dennett

argues

that

the

descriptive language

and

method needed

in

cognitive

ethology

are

provided

in his

intentional

systems

theory

(The

Intentional Stance

[Cambridge,

MA: MIT

Press,

1987],

ch.

7).

43.

This

paper

was

presented

to

the

Department

of

Philosophy,

George

Washington

University

on

October

2,

1992.1

thank those

present

for

their comments.

Special

thanks

are

due

to

Andy

Altman for

helpful suggestions

he made

in

earlier

stages

of

this

paper.

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