45. Ang Bagong Bayani-OfW v. COMELEC

7/21/2019 45. Ang Bagong Bayani-OfW v. COMELEC

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronymOFW), represented herein by its secretary-general,MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SADROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALISTASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCALAUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATEBUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENTFOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACTWORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and othersunder "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No.3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NGDEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAYHAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" ofOmnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]

BAYAN MUNA , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NGDEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANGPILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONALFEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONGBAYANI ORGANIZATION,respondents.

Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

Chan Robles & Associatesfor Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.

Cruz Cruz & Navarrofor Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.

Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for The TrueMarcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.

Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.

Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law Officefor Chamberof Real Estate Builders Asso.


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Mcaskell Equila & Associatesfor Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW).

Juan Carlos T. Cuna forPartido ng Masang Pilipino.

Buag Kapunan Migallos & Perezfor Aksyon Democratiko.

Tonisito M.C. Umalifor Liberal Party.

Antonio Dollete & Associatesfor Partido ng Masang Pilipino.Yulo and Bello Law Officesfor LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.

Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law Office and Antonio RBautista & Partnersfor Bagong Bayani Org.

The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the presentpetitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. ThisResolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, includingthose herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list systemwas intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not themainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded thecase to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiaryhearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected thesubmissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system iswithout any qualification, open to all. According to the Court, such position does notonly weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it alsoprejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead ofgenerating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, itwould further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. The Courtstressed that the very reason for the establishment of the party-list system is the

fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should havemore in law. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give themnot only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to beelected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply togive them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. The Statecannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this socia

justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some guidelines to assist the Comelec in itswork of conducting summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants.


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SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OFCOMELEC OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHTBEFORE THIS COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65 OFRULES OF COURT. Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed

respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both theConstitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before thisCourt in a verified petition for certiorariunder Rule 65.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. These cases present an exception to therule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy andadequate remedy. It has been held that certiorariis available, notwithstanding thepresence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, wherepublic interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case isindubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentiallyinvolves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE GLOSSED OVERTO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. Procedural requirements "may beglossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves theprinciple of social justice . . . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, orwhen the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorariis the only adequate andspeedy remedy available."

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE; MOTIONFOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 1(D), RULE 13 THEREOF.

The assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission enbanc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibitedpleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO FORMULATE GUIDINGAND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES ORRULES. These cases raise transcendental constitutional issues on the party-listsystem, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, orrules." acCTIS

6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. Underthe Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from theparty-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House ofRepresentatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered nationalregional, and sectoralpartiesor organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under theparty-list system. Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the


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participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinentprovision below: . . . Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list elections.

7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of theparty-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to partiesthat consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seatin Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past

elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we counttheir votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they werealways third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in theAssembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assemblyeven if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentiallythe mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."

8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 alsoprovides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoralpartiesor organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party"

is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to thepoint, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocatingan ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct ofgovernment and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoptionregularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidatesfor public office."

9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED. "Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number ofpeople in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope

Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed groupRather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented"as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor,peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderlyhandicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. "Lackof well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiableelectoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit ofgovernment. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with

the "marginalized or underrepresented."

11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; WHERELANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS

TERMS. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to thepeople, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so byenabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with thisintent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enableFilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors


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organizations and parties, . . ., to become members of the House ofRepresentatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be appliedaccording to its express terms.

12. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE LIMITED, QUALIFIEDOR SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATION. While theenumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, itdemonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented

under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory constructionthat words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and theirmeaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which theyare associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limitedqualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY SOURCE FROM WHICH TOASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR PURPOSE IS LANGUAGE OF PROVISIONITSELF. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is thatthe primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the

language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which theconstitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. Inother words, verba legisstill prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used isunclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction andinterpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission orConvention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of theprovision being construed.

14. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION; WHEN A LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY VIOLATES OR

IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS ACTION CAN BE STRUCK DOWN BYTHIS COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicialagency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or thelaw, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse ofdiscretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities isto apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.

15. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT NOT A TRIER OFFACTS. Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out RespondentMamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using

government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Itis not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factuaallegations.

16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); POLITICALPARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZEDAND UNDERREPRESENTED GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 5 THEREOF. Firstthe political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalizedand underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, itmust show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history


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platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to upliftmarginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membershipshould belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstratethat in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of suchsectors.

17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEYREPRESENT INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and theConstitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with thedeclared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." Inother words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they arepolitical parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of themarginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc

18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LISTSYSTEM. In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay

Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes theexpress constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented inthe party-list system.

19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND SECTSSHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. Furthermore, theConstitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not beregistered." The prohibition was explained by a member of the ConstitutionaCommission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organizationregistering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest

running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of areligious sect as a political party."

20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUSTNOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. Fourth, a party or anorganization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, whichenumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect ordenomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) Itadvocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party ororganization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of itsofficers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan electionpurposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating toelections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased toexist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)preceding elections or fails to obtain at least twoper centum(2%) of the votes castunder the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency inwhich it has registered."

21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A


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PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organizedor an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized bycitizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. Theparticipation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidateis not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective ofthe law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectorsand organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED ANDUNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. Not only the candidate party or organizationmust represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must itsnominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipinocitizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizationsand parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by aretiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist

To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to

the marginalized and underrepresented.

23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATIONAND ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL BENEFIT THE NATIONAS A WHOLE. As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined politicaconstituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulationand enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a wholeSenator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "thenominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particulardistrict . . . ."

VITUG,J., dissenting opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM;SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND SECTORALREPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. Perhaps the present controversy stems from aconfusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives theimpression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-traditionaparties and sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on oneend, is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for

broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the otherpresupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. Thisimpression of sectoral-based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specificsectors to be represented.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO, NAMELY: 1) POLITICALPARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND 4)COALITIONS, CONSTRUED. The party-list system is limited to four groups 1)political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A


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political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platformprinciples or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the mostimmediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominate and supportscertain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party isan organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as thoseenumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes thelabor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and thoseadded by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseasworkers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who sharethe same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concernsCoalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties ororganizations for election purposes.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. A party-listnominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislativedistricts candidates, with the exception of the additional requirement that he be

nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for anyelective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately precedingelection. A nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport torepresent, otherwise, there can be no true representation. A nominee of the youthsector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on theday of the election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he isallowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once elected, party-listrepresentatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do districtrepresentatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide DevelopmentFund (CDF).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES, SECTORALGROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE STATUSOF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE AGENTS. Afeature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups andorganizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" andtheir nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative diesbecomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or theorganization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party cansend another person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the

replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELECupon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches partyaffiliations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoraaffiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for nominationin party-list representative under his new party or organization. EcTDCI

5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECTMUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS OF ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLEADOPTING IT. The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains "effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the


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people adopting it." The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal theelbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniencesinvolved in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain termsand import have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable thanthose avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages. Theponenciaitselfin ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review andtreading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of aconstitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners isunderstandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people themselvesthrough an amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails.

MENDOZA,J., dissenting opinion:

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; MOSTIMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN DETERMINING INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROMWHOM CONSTITUTION EMANATED IS LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED. "The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people fromwhom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." The text

of Art. VI, 5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered,regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Onlyfor three consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and onlywith respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does itallow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, 5(1)(2) provides no basis forpetitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list systemthe purpose is to provide exclusive representation for "marginalized sectors," bywhich term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous culturacommunities, women, and youth sectors.

2. ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONALCONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER GUIDES FAIL AS SAIDPROCEEDINGS ARE POWERLESS TO VARY TERMS OF CONSTITUTION WHENMEANING IS CLEAR. The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been statedby this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, as follows: While it ispermissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of theconstitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of theresulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as saidproceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaningis clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views

of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but theygive us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less ofthe mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument theforce of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from whatappears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how itwas understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understandingthereof.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; SYSTEMS OFREPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL SINGLE-SEAT


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DISTRICT SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. The two systems of representation are notidentical. Party-list representation is a type of proportional representation designedto give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives indistrict elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwidebasis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized andunderrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are elected frommulti-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the"winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% ofthe votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidateneed not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, inthe "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate arewasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent thenthat it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature thatreflects their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized andunderrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urbanpoor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seatsin the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does notguarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.

4. ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONINTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY NOT HAVE THE NECESSARYNUMBER TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT BUT ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TOGIVE THEM A SEAT NATIONWIDE. The deliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission show that the party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized andunderrepresented" sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urbanpoor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a typeof proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not havethe necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous togive them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, 5(1)(2)to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in theirproposals as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked withinthe framework that the party-list system is for the 'marginalized' as termed byComm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, whichhe defined as those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'"

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ISRESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUSCULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. A problem was placed before

the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat districtsystem of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem ofunder representation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation andparty-list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commissionchose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system isreserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communitieswomen, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning ofthe Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seatssystem when it provides in Art. IX, C, 6 that "A free and open party system shall beallowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the


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provisions of this Article."

6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. NO. 7941); SECTION 2 THEREOF,CONSTRUED. What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply states is that the purpose ofthe party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election ofrepresentatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "afull, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possiblerepresentation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives"

shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, 2 does not say that theparty-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalizedand underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-definedpolitical constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactmentof appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What itsays is that the policy of the law is "to promote proportional representation througha party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging tomarginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lackwell-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and

enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while therepresentation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose ofthe law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportionarepresentation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" districtelections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to thesectors mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenouscultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veteransoverseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include othersectors. DHITcS

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J p:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law tothe great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them tobecome veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in theenactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalizedand the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolencebut active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus,allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate districtelections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections woulddesecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into anatrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case


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Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challengingOmnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizationsand parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list electionsPetitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that theparty-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions forregistration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According tothe Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of theseparties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the lastparty w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of thelegal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberationstakes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on

political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the dispositionof these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of theDivisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under ComelecResolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties andorganizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention toparticipate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties andorganizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions forReconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the

party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyondthe deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailedMarch 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that thissystem of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties ororganization to directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism ofproportional representation' in the election of representatives to the Houseof Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission onElections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we mustrecognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoralparties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping


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only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and moreimportantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motionsfor Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petitionpraying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/CoalitionsParticipating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said

certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votescast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter'snominees not be proclaimed. 4On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-

Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination againstsome of herein respondents. 5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualificationcases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date forhearing on April 26, 2001, 6but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7During thehearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to

submit their respective memoranda. 8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFWLabor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,docketed as G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In itsResolution dated April 17, 2001, 10the Court directed respondents to comment onthe Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12

docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.

3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,13

the Court ordered the consolidation ofthe two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to filetheir respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called theparties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec mayproceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list electionsbut barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Thereafter, Comments 14on the second Petition were received by the Court and, onMay 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given inopen court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memorandasimultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address thefollowing issues:

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under thepremises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list


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elections.

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized andunderrepresented' sectors and organizations.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion inpromulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16

The Court's RulingThe Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to theComelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolutionsatisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in thisDecision. ASCTac

First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 isimproper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in theordinary course of law. 17The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitionersshould have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or forcancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of ComelecResolution No. 3307-A 18dated November 9, 2000. 19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec OmnibusResolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as itallowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under

both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be broughtbefore this Court in a verified petition for certiorariunder Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by RespondentCommission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being aprohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec aPetition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of hereinrespondents. 22The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of thependency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, forthere was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proventhe urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formallyresolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because theComelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on thematter quite clear.

In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that certiorarishall lieonly in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23It has beenheld that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies


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"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, andin case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with publicinterest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-listsystem, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or

rules." 25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice . . . when the decisionsought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgentand certiorariis the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion ofpolitical parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of thequestioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to theparticipation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of theSolicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitutionand RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. Itargues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regionaand sectoral parties or organizations." 29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, privaterespondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on theground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitutionprovides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through aparty-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties oorganizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, politicaparties may be registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, orcoalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-listsystem as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered underthe party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registrationboards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or othersimilar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers inaccordance with law." 30


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During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian SMonsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regionaparty, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party inMindanao." 32This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms

Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO.

Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ngUNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE.

Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mgapartido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provisionwas to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistentlyplace third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34

He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, wefound out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votesnationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always thirdor fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. Butthis way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if theywould not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially themechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registerednational, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ."

Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoraparty or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as"an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles andpolicies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediatemeans of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of itsleaders and members as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation ofpolitical parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major politicalparties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representativesat the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled toparticipate in the party-list system.

"xxx xxx xxx"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate inthe party-list elections.


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Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not meanhowever, that any political party or any organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must beconsistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in theConstitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides asfollows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more thantwo hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall beelected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of theirrespective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-listsystem of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum ofthe total number of representatives including those under the party list. Forthree consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half ofthe seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided bylaw, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenouscultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may beprovided by law, except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member ofthe Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision

was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provisionwas discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shallhopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine powerto our people in the legislature." 35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. I t is, in fact,interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided bylaw"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of theConstitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in thiswise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportionalrepresentation in the election of representatives to the House ofRepresentatives through a party-list system of registered national, regionaland sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enableFilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituenciesbut who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriatelegislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of theHouse of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop andguarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest


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possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House ofRepresentatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats inthe legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresentedto Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportiona

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable"the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriatelegislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized andunderrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in aparticular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does itallude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers tothe representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified bythe enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urbanpoor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youthveterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of themarginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and tofeign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent themarginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36

Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization mustbe "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectorsorganizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionallyidentifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit ofgovernment. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified withthe "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under theparty-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only


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by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them tobecome veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy ofthe implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizensbelonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . , to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language ofthe law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party

list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may registeras a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system byfiling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election apetition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participatein the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party ororganization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching theretoits constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may

require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,urban poor, indigenous culturalcommunities, elderly, handicapped, women,youth, veterans,overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is notexclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can berepresented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutoryconstruction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection withand their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases withwhich they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute maybe limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38

The Party-List System Desecratedby the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the SolicitoGeneral submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-listsystem to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, itcontends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argumentthat even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias

Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipinocitizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresentedsectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives.

The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to themarginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claimthat even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit ofthe party-list system.


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Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hoveldwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. Theinterests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position totreat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and withadmirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the OraArgument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not jointhe party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tinyminority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark realityis that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than theirnumerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanatefrom the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly fromthe number and amount of one's bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst arethe majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them thatthe party-list system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but

genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent thespecific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice inCongress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-listsystem truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine changeVerily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farmhands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participatedduring the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them bydisabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in thecongressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians andvested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were setaside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normallycontrolled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-listelections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard thefundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system

44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gainrepresentation in the House of Representatives through the simplest schemepossible. 45Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have nevergotten a foothold within it those who cannot otherwise win in regular electionsand who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, itwould be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it thoseprivileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood whencompared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders


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to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsidersonly, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without suchspecial privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the"outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not forthe non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remainingseats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the

chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of thelaw to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of theunderprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to theprejudice of the intended beneficiaries. HDAaIc

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied andprostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannotlet that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate everydiscussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under theparty-list system.

Refutation of theSeparate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug andVicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers ofthe Constitution as culled from their deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that theprimary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is thelanguage of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which theconstitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46

In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words usedis unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of constructionand interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission orConvention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of theprovision being construed. 47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated inCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48that "the debates and proceedings ofthe constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reasonand purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as saidproceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaningis clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the viewsof the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but theygive us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less ofthe mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument theforce of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from whatappears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how itwas understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understandingthereof."


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Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couchedin clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuantthereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-listrepresentation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find itsprovisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resortedto.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plainwords. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electingcongressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectorsorganizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but whocould contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation thatwill benefit the nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well defined

Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to theproceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely expresstheir individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning

and purpose of the constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must beapplied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to

appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, itseems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSGas its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalizedand overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by thisCourt on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of al

judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not toreinvent or second-guess it. 50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outrightdisqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPCLP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they havebeen accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in theMay 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage ofgetting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred polwatchers . . . ." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to theparty-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for thepurpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section


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26 of Republic Act No. 7166.

What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factuadetermination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in theparty-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw

sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resourcesand privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51It is not equipped toreceive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given anopportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in thisDecision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be electedunder the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for thelatter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 partiesand organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with therequirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down thefollowing guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelecin its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent themarginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Inother words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents andseeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of itsmembership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it mustdemonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose theinterest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and theConstitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with thedeclared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." Inother words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they arepolitical parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of themarginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and othersimilarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, asthe following quote shows:

"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political


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party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresentedsectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN:

Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52

Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay

Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes theexpress constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented inthe party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstratedby the following discussion during the deliberations of the ConstitutionaCommission:

"MR. OPLE. . . .

In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and eveninternational networks of members and supporters, in order tocircumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in

emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving theirinspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, willthat also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD.

If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition,then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction." 54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA.

When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he isnot, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may beelected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent theirgroup.

REV. RIGOS.

Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia niKristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera." 55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sectsshall not be registered." 56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of theConstitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religiousorganization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here againsta priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of areligious sect as a political party." 58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:


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"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or associationorganized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign politicalparty, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of itsofficers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisanelection purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating toelections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails toobtain at least two per centum(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency inwhich it has registered." 59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group forviolation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These lawsinclude Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to"enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of Representatives."A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be

disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized oran entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-listsystem, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizensand operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. Theparticipation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidateis not only illegal 60and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objectiveof the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresentedsectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; itsnominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall benominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen ofthe Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a periodof not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization


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which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the dayof the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of theelection.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) duringhis term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalizedand underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of theyouth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban pooror the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the Statepolicy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituencythe nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactmentof appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Linaexplained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of aparty, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . ." 61

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipinocitizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations andparties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contributeto the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the

nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle thatthose who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is onesuch tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses ofour people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute andthe prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It isan invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the

other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open toall. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalizedand underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of theparty-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead ofenabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate theirmarginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of theConstitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, amockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people


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empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of theConstitution and the makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED toimmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of theparty-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this DecisionConsidering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-listelections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and

organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify forseats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submitto this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrainfrom proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain inforce until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliancewith the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt

thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buenaand Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.

Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.

Vitug andMendoza, JJ ., see dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., andSandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente

M. Mendoza.

Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.

Separate Opinions

VITUG,J., dissenting:

The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People

Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in acleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participationin daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of asingle party in power a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VISection 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter

THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSEUNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THERATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATSALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS


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PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR,PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN,YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C

Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seatsin the Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenouscultural communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from aselected list of names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors wouldcontinue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, theywould have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their representation inCongress.

Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for thelegislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the

terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). First, the system should only apply tothe election of 20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives,second, it would prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme, andthird, it would allow participating parties and organizations to be represented invoter's registration boards, board of election inspectors, parties and organizations orsimilar entities.

On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for theElection of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, andAppropriating Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis forCOMELEC Resolution No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules andRegulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List Representatives through theParty-List System." In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the sectors wererequired, to test, for the first time, their political mettle in an open electoral contestwith other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list system. While theelections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public unawareness ofan electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections, however, weredifferent. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied forregistration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Sixof these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG

PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NGDEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY,NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.

The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the groundthat their participation does not level the playing field for less known and lessorganized sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery.Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectorsas well as other parties but only on the condition that the latter field sectoracandidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the disqualification of the largemajor political parties and groups which do not represent any "genuine" sectora


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interest.

A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into theelectoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on thequalifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list systemInstead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for thesystem's focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 ofR.A. 7941 reads

"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election ofrepresentatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list systemof registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations orcoalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to themarginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, andwho lacked well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute tothe formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit thenation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open

party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation ofparty, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, byenhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, andshall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), ofthe 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first headed byCommissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats inCongress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to

appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal wasopposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimitingthe sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats forthe marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development intofull-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further thesectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, wasapprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in anelectoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with thebigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the

basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating inthe party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to beautomatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanentseats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise that theparty-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. Thisproposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under theparty-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the requirednumber of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal forpermanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system tothe sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was


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able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for threeconsecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which timethey would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and bracethemselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran politicagroups.

The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors themonopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the

statutory imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the numberof seats that may be gained by a party or organization. 1Votes garnered in excess of6% of the total votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three seats.

There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law thatdisallows major political parties from participating in the party-list system and, atthe same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.

Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character ofthe party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a combination

of proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectorarepresentation. The first, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for noother reason than to open up the electoral process for broader participation andrepresentation. Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes that everyunderrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoralbased representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of theConstitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to berepresented. In holding that the party list system is open only to theunderrepresented and marginalized sectors, theponenciaplaces much reliance onSection 5 of R.A. 7941:

"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as aparty, organization or coalition for purposes of th

Documents

45. Ang Bagong Bayani-OfW v. COMELEC