4. Arguments against Externalism

We shall look at two kinds of cases in which our beliefs are the product of reliable epistemic processes yet we would not want to say that they amount to knowledge. This would entail that a reliabilist account cannot successfully distinguish knowledge from true belief.

4.1 Knowledge and rationally motivated action

Uri as a reliable clairvoyant although he does not know that he is. From time to time certain beliefs pop into Uri ‘s head, beliefs that he think are spontaneous and unfounded, yet beliefs that are in fact the result of his clairvoyant powers. (In the film Ghost (1990), Oda Mae Brown attempts to fleece the recently bereaved by posing as a medium and pretending to speak to their loved ones again. Oda Mae does not believe that she actually has this ability even though it turns out that she does.) One day Uri wakes up with the unlikely belief that the Pope is shopping at the Bullring in Birmingham. It turns out that he is; and given Uri’s reliable clairvoyant powers, his believing so is no accident. On an externalist account, therefore, Uri knows that the Pope is in town even though he has no reason for believing this to be so. This claim is problematic since such an account does not respect the essential connection between knowledge and rationally motivated action. Your action should be guided by what you know; this, however, is not so with Uri. We can see this if we consider another belief that Uri has, the belief that the Prime Minister is also in town. He believes this because his friend tells him so, although he is not totally convinced that his friend is right given that at times he is some what unreliable; nevertheless, Uri believes him (with reservation). Let us consider what Uri would do if he were forced to bet a substantial sum on one or other of these dignitaries being in Birmingham: who would he bet on? It would be rational for him to bet one the Prime Minister because at least this bet has the (albeit weak) support of his friend’s testimony. Even such shaky testimony should incline him not to bet on the Pope given that he has no reason at all to think that he is in town. Now, though, we can see that such a bet has troubling consequences for the externalist. We have claimed that Uri should act on a belief that is only fairly reasonable (that bases on his friend’s testimony rather than on something that he know to be true. In such a case, the externalist does not respect the plausible connection between knowledge and rational action we should act according to what we know externalism, therefore, is misguided.

You may have qualms about this example because it involves clairvoyance; we can, though, formulate analogous scenarios involving less contentious epistemic abilities. When watching TV detective dramas such as Missomer Murders or Columbo, I always have a hunch who the murderer will be early on in the episode, and my hunch is almost always correct. I am not, however, aware of any good reasons that back up my predictions and thus, if asked, I would not bet on them being correct. Perhaps, thought, I am not just lucky; I may be good at unconsciously picking up subtle clues that the director gives the viewer. The murderer may always wear clothes of a certain colour, or be listening to music when he or she is first encountered. If this is the case, then my methods for identifying the guilty party are reliable, and thus the externalist is faced with the problem we noted in the previous paragraph: he would have to accept that it is sometimes rational for me not to bet on things that I know to be true.