5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    1/42

    5. Sanidad vs. CO MELEC, 73 SCRA 333

    Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

    Manila

    EN BANC

    G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

    PABLO C. SAN!A! "#$ PABLTO %. SAN!A!, petitioner,vs.&ONORABLE COMMSSON ON ELECTONS "#$ &ONORABLE NATONAL TREASURER, respondents.

    G.R. No. L-446'4. October 12,1976

    %CENTE M. GU(MAN, petitioner,vs.COMMSSON ELECTONS, respondent.

    G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

    RAUL M. GON(ALES, RAUL T. GON(ALES, )R., "#$ AL*RE!O SALAPANTAN, petitioners,vs.&ONORABLE COMMSSON ON SELECTONS "#$ &ONORABLE NATONAL TREASURER, respondents.

    MARTN, J,:

    The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliinar! in"unction relates to the power of the incubentPresident of the Philippines to propose aendents to the present Constitution in the absence of the interi National

     Assebl! which has not been convened.

    #n $epteber %, &'(), President *erdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential +ecree No. ''& callin for a nationalreferendu on #ctober &), &'() for the Citi-ens Asseblies /barana!s/0 to resolve, aon other thins, the issues ofartial law, the 1 . assebl!, its replaceent, the powers of such replaceent, the period of its e2istence, the lenth of theperiod for tile e2ercise b! the President of his present powers.1

    Twent! da!s after or on $epteber %%, &'(), the President issued another related decree, Presidential +ecree No. &34&,aendin the previous Presidential +ecree No. ''&, b! declarin the provisions of presidential +ecree No. %%' providinfor the anner of votin and canvass of votes in /barana!s/ Citi-ens Asseblies0 applicable to the national referendu5plebiscite of #ctober &), &'(). 6uite relevantl!, Presidential +ecree No. &34& repealed $ection 7, of Presidential +ecreeNo. ''&, the full te2t of which $ection 70 is quoted in the footnote below. 2

    #n the sae date of $epteber %%, &'(), the President issued Presidential +ecree No. &344, statin the questions to besubitted to the people in the referendu5plebiscite on #ctober &), &'(). The +ecree recites in its /whereas/ clauses

    that the people8s continued opposition to the convenin of the National Assebl! evinces their desire to have such bod!abolished and replaced thru a constitutional aendent, providin for a leislative bod!, which will be subitted directl!to the people in the referendu5plebiscite of #ctober &).

    The questions as9, to wit:

    &0 +o !ou want artial law to be continued;

    %0 1 of the Constitution.

    PR#P#$E+ AMEN+MENT$:

    &. There shall be, in lieu of the interi National Assebl!, an interi Batasan Pabansa. Mebers of the interiBatasan Pabansa which shall not be ore than &%3, unless otherwise provided b! law, shall include the incubentPresident of the Philippines, representatives elected fro the different reions of the nation, those who shall not be lessthan eihteen !ears of ae elected b! their respective sectors, and those chosen b! the incubent President fro theebers of the Cabinet. Reional representatives shall be apportioned aon the reions in accordance with thenuber of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a unifor and proressive ratio while the sectors shall bedeterined b! law. The nuber of representatives fro each reion or sector and the, anner of their election shall beprescribed and reulated b! law.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    2/42

    %. The interi Batasan Pabansa shall have the sae powers and its ebers shall have the sae functions,responsibilities, rihts, privilees, and disqualifications as the interi National Assebl! and the reular National

     Assebl! and the ebers thereof. ?owever, it shall not e2ercise the power provided in Article >111, $ection &7l0 of theConstitution.

    4. The incubent President of the Philippines shall, within 43 da!s fro the election and selection of the ebers,convene the interi Batasan Pabansa and preside over its sessions until the $pea9er shall have been elected. Theincubent President of the Philippines shall be the Prie Minister and he shall continue to e2ercise all his powers evenafter the interi Batasan Pabansa is orani-ed and read! to dischare its functions and li9ewise he shall continue to

    e2ercise his powers and preroatives under the nineteen hundred and thirt! five. Constitution and the powers vested inthe President and the Prie Minister under this Constitution.

    7. The President Prie Minister0 and his Cabinet shall e2ercise all the powers and functions, and dischare theresponsibilities of the reular President Prie Minister0 and his Cabinet, and shall be sub"ect onl! to suchdisqualifications as the President Prie Minister0 a! prescribe. The President Prie Minister0 if he so desires a!appoint a +eput! Prie Minister or as an! +eput! Prie Ministers as he a! dee necessar!.

    @. The incubent President shall continue to e2ercise leislative powers until artial law shall have been lifted.

    ).

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    3/42

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    4/42

    issue was a "usticiable one. 1 of the &'(4 Constitution for the reular National Assebl!0 or in $ection &@ of the Transitor! Provisionsfor the National Assebl!0.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    5/42

    isnoer 1' The preroative of the President to approve or disapprove applies onl! to the ordinar! cases of leislation.The President has nothin to do with proposition or adoption of aendents to the Constitution. 19

    111

    Concentration of Powers

    in the President durin

    crisis overnent.

    &. 1n eneral, the overnental powers in crisis overnent the Philippines is a crisis overnent toda! are ore or lessconcentrated in the President. 20  Accordin to Rossiter, /t0he concentration of overnent power in a deocrac! faced b!an eerenc! is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. 1n ost freestates it has enerall! been rearded as iperative that the total power of the overnent be parceled out aon threeutuall! independent branches e2ecutive, leislature, and "udiciar!. 1t is believed to be destructive of constitutionalis ifan! one branch should e2ercise an! two or ore t!pes of power, and certainl! a total disreard of the separation ofpowers is, as Madison wrote in the *ederalist, No. 7(, 8the ver! definition of t!rann!.8 1n noral ties the separation ofpowers fors a distinct obstruction to arbitrar! overnental action. B! this sae to9en, in abnoral ties it a! for aninsurountable barrier to a decisive eerenc! action in behalf of the state and its independent e2istence. There areoents in the life of an! overnent when all powers ust wor9 toether in unaniit! of purpose and action, even ifthis eans the teporar! union of e2ecutive, leislative, and "udicial power in the hands of one an. The ore coplete

    the separation of powers in a constitutional s!ste, the ore difficult and !et the ore necessar! will be their fusion intie of crisis. This is evident in a coparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential s!stes ofovernent. 1n the forer the all5iportant haron! of leislature and e2ecutive is ta9en for ranted in the latter it isneither uaranteed nor to be to confidentl! e2pected. As a result, cabinet is ore easil! established and ore trustworth!than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis ust not onl! be concentrated and e2panded it ust alsobe freed fro the noral s!ste of constitutional and leal liitations. 21 Gohn oc9e, on the other hand, clais for thee2ecutive in its own riht a broad discretion capable even of settin aside the ordinar! laws in the eetin of speciale2iencies for which the leislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad eerenc! powers of theE2ecutive is the release of the overnent fro /the paral!sis of constitutional restrains/ so that the crisis a! be endedand noral ties restored.

    %. The presidential e2ercise of leislative powers in tie of artial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authorit!of the President is saddled on $ection 4 pars. & and %0 of the Transitor! Provisions, thus: 2+

    The incubent President of the Philippines shall initiall! convene the interi National Assebl! and shallpreside over its sessions until the interi $pea9er shall have been elected. ?e shall continue to e2ercisehis powers and preroatives under the nineteen hundred and thirt!5five Constitution and the powersvested in the President and the Prie Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interiNational Assebl! to elect the interi President and the interi Prie Minister, who shall then e2ercisetheir respective powers vested b! this Constitution.

     All proclaations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts proulated, issued, or done b! the incubentPresident shall be part of the law of the land, and shall reain valid, bindin, and effective even afterliftin of artial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless odified, revo9ed, or superseded b!subsequent proclaations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incubent President, orunless e2pressl! and e2plicitl! odified or repealed b! the reular National Assebl!.

    /1t is unthin9able,/ said Gustice *ernande-, a &'(& Constitutional Convention deleate, /that the ConstitutionalConvention, while ivin to the President the discretion when to call the interi National Assebl! to session, and9nowin that it a! not be convened soon, would create a vacuu in the e2ercise of leislative powers. #therwise, withno one to e2ercise the lawa9in powers, there would be paral!-ation of the entire overnentalachiner!./24 Paraphrasin Rossiter, this is an e2treel! iportant factor in an! constitutional dictatorship which e2tendsover a period of tie. The separation of e2ecutive and leislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinctobstruction to efficient crisis overnent. The stead! increase in e2ecutive power is not too uch a cause for as thestead! increase in the anitude and cople2it! of the probles the President has been called upon b! the *ilipinopeople to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and econoic crisis5acrisis reater than war. 1n short, while conventional constitutional law "ust confines the President8s power as Coander5in5Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, !et the facts of our political, social, and econoicdisturbances had convincinl! shown that in eetin the sae, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to

    ta9e eerenc! easures 2

    1>

     Authorit! of the incubent

    President t to propose

    aendents to the Constitution.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    6/42

    &. As earlier pointed out, the power to leislate is constitutionall! consined to the interi National Assebl! durin thetransition period. ?owever, the initial convenin of that Assebl! is a atter full! addressed to the "udent of theincubent President. And, in the e2ercise of that "udent, the President opted to defer convenin of that bod! in utterreconition of the people8s preference. i9ewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose aendents to theConstitution lies in the interi National Assebl! upon special call b! the President $ee. &@ of the Transitor! Provisions0.

     Aain, har9in to the dictates of the soverein will, the President decided not to call the interi National Assebl!. 1

    Referendu5Plebiscite not

    rendered nuator! b! the

    participation of the &@5!ear olds.

    &. #ctober &) is in parts a referendu and a plebiscite. The question 5 &0 +o !ou want artial law to be continued; 5 is areferendu question, wherein the &@5!ear olds a! participate. This was propted b! the desire of the Dovernent toreach the larer as of the people so that their true pulse a! be felt to uide the President in pursuin his prora for a

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    7/42

    New #rder. *or the succeedin question on the proposed aendents, onl! those of votin ae of & !ears a!participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as conteplated in $ection %, Article =>1 of the new Constitution. +6 #n thissecond question, it would onl! be the votes of those & !ears old and above which will have valid bearin on the results.The fact that the votin populace are siultaneousl! as9ed to answer the referendu question and the plebiscite questiondoes not infir the referendu5plebiscite. There is nothin ob"ectionable in consultin the people on a iven issue, whichis of current one and subittin to the for ratification of proposed constitutional aendents. The fear of coinledvotes &@5!ear olds and &5!ear olds above0 is readil! dispelled b! the provision of two ballot bo2es for ever! barana!center, one containin the ballots of voters fifteen !ears of ae and under eihteen, and another containin the ballots ofvoters eihteen !ears of ae and above. +7 The ballots in the ballot bo2 for voters fifteen !ears of ae and under eihteenshall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eihteen !ears and above contained in another ballot bo2. And, the resultsof the referendu5plebiscite shall be separatel! prepared for the ae roupins, i.e., ballots contained in each of the twobo2es. +'

    %. 1t is apt to distinuish here between a /referendu/ and a /plebiscite./ A /referendu/ is erel! consultative incharacter. 1t is sipl! a eans of assessin public reaction to the iven issues subitted to the people foe theirconsideration, the callin of which is derived fro or within the totalit! of the e2ecutive power of the President. +9 1t isparticipated in b! all citi-ens fro the ae of fifteen, reardless of whether or not the! are illiterates, feeble5inded, or e25convicts . 40  A /plebiscite,/ on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those /citi-ens of the Philippines not otherwisedisqualified b! law, who are eihteen !ears of ae or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one!ear and in the place wherein the! propose to vote for at least si2 onths precedin the election iterac!, propert! or an!other substantive requireent is not iposed. 1t is enerall! associated with the aendin process of the Constitution,ore particularl!, the ratification aspect.

    >11

    &. There appeals to be no valid basis for the clai that the reie of artial law stultifies in ain the freedo to dissent.That spea9s of a b!one fear. The artial law reie which, in the observation of Gustice *ernando, 41 is ipressed with aild character recorded no $tate iposition for a uffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual libert!, buton certain rounds no total suppression of that libert! is aied at. The for the referendu5plebiscite on #ctober &)reconi-es all the ebracin freedos of e2pression and assebl! The President hiself had announced that he wouldnot countenance an! suppression of dissentin views on the issues, as he is not interested in winnin a /!es/ or /no/ vote,but on the enuine sentient of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their wa! to thepublic forus, voicin out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed aendents and even in the validratification of the &'(4 Constitution, which is alread! a settled atter. 4+ Even overnent eplo!ees have been held b!the Civil $ervice Coission free to participate in public discussion and even capain for their stand on thereferendu5plebiscite issues. 44

    >111

    Tie for deliberation

    is not short.

    &. The period fro $epteber %& to #ctober &) or a period of 4 wee9s is not too short for free debates or discussions onthe referendu5plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. The! are the issues of the da!. The people have been livinwith the since the proclaation of artial law four !ears ao. The referendus of &'(4 and &'(@ carried the sae issueof artial law. That notwithstandin, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previousplebiscites for constitutional aendents. Gustice Ma9asiar, in the Referendu Case, recalls: /nder the old $ociet!, &@

    da!s were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the #fficial Da-ette of the woen8s suffraeaendent to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 43, &'4( Co. Act No. 470. The constitutionalaendent to append as ordinance the coplicated T!dins5Iocials9ows9i was published in onl! three consecutiveissues of the #fficial Da-ette for &3 da!s prior to the scheduled plebiscite Co. Act 7'%0. *or the &'73 Constitutionalaendents providin for the bicaeral Conress, the reelection of the President and >ice President, and the creation ofthe Coission on Elections, %3 da!s of publication in three consecutive issues of the #fficial Da-ette was fi2ed Co

     Act No. @&(0. And the Parit! Aendent, an involved constitutional aendent affectin the econo! as well as theindependence of the Republic was publici-ed in three consecutive issues of the #fficial Da-ette for %3 da!s prior to theplebiscite Rep. Act No. (40./ 4

    %. 1t is worth! to note that Article =>1 of the Constitution a9es no provision as to the specific date when the plebisciteshall be held, but sipl! states that it /shall be held not later than three onths after the approval of such aendent orrevision./ 1n Colean v. Miller, 46 the nited $tates $upree court held that this atter of subission involves /an

    appraisal of a reat variet! of relevant conditions, political, social and econoic,/ which /are essentiall! political and not "usticiable./ The constituent bod! or in the instant cases, the President, a! fi2 the tie within which the people a! act.This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeedin steps in a sinle endeavor,the natural inference bein that the! are not to be widel! separated in tie second, it is onl! when there is deeed to bea necessit! therefor that aendents are to be proposed, the reasonable iplication bein that when proposed, the! areto be considered and disposed of presentl!, and third, ratification is but the e2pression of the approbation of the people,hence, it ust be done conteporaneousl!. 47 1n the words of Gaeson, /a0n alteration of the Constitution proposed toda!has relation to the sentient and the felt needs of toda!, and that, if not ratified earl! while that sentient a! fairl! besupposed to e2ist. it ouht to be rearded as waived, and not aain to be voted upon, unless a second tie proposed b!proper bod!

    1N RE$ME

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    8/42

    The three issues are

    &. 1s the question of the constitutionalit! of Presidential +ecrees Nos. ''&, &34& and &344 political or "usticiable;

    %. +urin the present stae of the transition period, and under, the environental circustances now obtainin, does thePresident possess power to propose aendents to the Constitution as well as set up the required achiner! andprescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals b! the people;

    4. 1s the subission to the people of the proposed aendents within the tie frae allowed therefor a sufficient and

    proper subission;

    pon the first issue, Chief Gustice *red Rui- Castro and Associate Gustices Enrique M. *ernando, Claudio Teehan9ee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Muno- Pala, ?eroenes Concepcion Gr. and Ruperto D. Martin are of the view that thequestion posed is "usticiable, while Associate Gustices *eli2 >. Ma9asiar, *eli2 6. Antonio and Raon C. Aquino hold theview that the question is political.

    pon the second issue, Chief Gustice Castro and Associate Gustices Barredo, Ma9asiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Gr.and Martin voted in the affirative, while Associate Gustices Teehan9ee and Muno- Pala voted in the neative.

     Associate Gustice *ernando, conforabl! to his concurrin and dissentin opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile @' $CRA &40,specificall! dissents fro the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the E2ecutive durin periods of crisis,thus raisin serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose aendents.

    pon the third issue, Chief Gustice Castro and Associate Gustices Barredo, Ma9asiar, Aquino, Concepcion Gr. and Martinare of the view that there is a sufficient and proper subission of the proposed aendents for ratification b! the people.

     Associate Gustices Barredo and Ma9asiar e2pressed the hope, however that the period of tie a! be e2tended. Associate Gustices *ernando, Ma9asiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore be!ond thecopetence and coni-ance of this Court, Associate Gustice *ernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of ChiefGustice Concepcion in Don-ales vs. C#MEEC %& $CRA ((70.Associate Gustices Teehan9ee and MN#F Pala holdthat prescindin fro the President8s lac9 of authorit! to e2ercise the constituent power to propose the aendents, etc.,as above stated, there is no fair and proper subission with sufficient inforation and tie to assure intellient consent or re"ection under the standards set b! this Court in the controllin cases of Don-ales, supra, and Tolentino vs. C#MEEC7& $CRA (3%0.

    Chief Gustice Castro and Associate Gustices Barredo, Ma9asiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Gr. and Martin voted todisiss the three petitions at bar. *or reasons as e2pressed in his separate opinion, Associate Gustice *ernando concursin the result. Associate Gustices Teehan9ee and Muno- Pala voted to rant the petitions.

     ACC#R+1NDH, the vote bein to % to disiss, the said petitions are hereb! disissed. This decision is iediatel!e2ecutor!.

    $# #R+ERE+.

     Aquino, J, in the result.

    Se"r"te O#o#/

    CASTRO, C.J.:, concurrin:

    *ro the challene as forulated in the three petitions at bar and the rounds advanced be the $olicitor Deneral inopposition thereto, as well as the aruents adduced b! the counsels of the parties at the hearin had on #ctober ( and, &'(), three vital issues readil! pro"ect theselves as the centers of controvers!, nael!:

    &0 1s the question of the constitutionalit! of Presidential +ecrees Nos. ''&, &34& and &344 political or "usticiable;

    %0 +urin the present stae of the transition period, and under the environental circustances now obtainin, does thePresident possess power to propose aendents to the Constitution as well as set up the required achineries andprescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals b! the people;

    40 1s the subission to the people of the proposed aendents within the tie frae allowed therefor a sufficient and

    proper, subission/

    1

    *irst 1ssue

    The threshold question is not at all one of first ipression $pecificall! on the atter of proposals to aend theConstitution, this Court, in Mabana vs. ope- >ito ( Phil. &0, inceptivel! announced the dictu that5

    Proposal to aend the Constitution is a hihl! political function perfored b! the Conress in itssoverein leislative capacit! and coitted to its chares b! the Constitution itself. The e2ercise of this

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    9/42

    power is even independent of an! intervention b! the Chief E2ecutive. 1f on rounds of e2pedienc!scrupulous attention of the "udiciar! be needed to safeuard public interest, there is less reason for

     "udicial inquir! into the validit! of a proposal than into that of a ratification.

    1n tie, however, the validit! of the said pronounceent was eroded. 1n the assessent of the Court itself5

    The force of this precedent has been wea9ened, however, b! $uanes vs. Chief Accountant of the $enate & Phil. &0, Avelino vs. Cuenco 5%@&, March 7 and &7, &'7'0, Tanada vs. Cuenco 5&3@%3, *ebruar! %, &'@(0, and Macias vs.Coission on Elections 5&)7, $epteber &7, &')&0.

    222 222 222

    1n short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Conress5actin as a constituent assebl!5violates the Constitution isessentiall! "usticiable, not political, and, hence, sub"ect to "udicial review, and, to the e2tent this view a! be inconsistentwith the stand ta9en in Mabana vs. ope- >ito the latter should be deeed odified accordinl!. The Mebers of theCourt are unanious on this point./ Don-ales vs. Coission on Elections, et al, 5%&'), Noveber ', &')(, %& $CRA((7, ()5((0.

    The abandonent of the Mabana vs. ope- >ito doctrine appears to have been copleted when, in Gavellana vs.$ecretar!, et al. 54)&7%, March 4l, &'(4, @3 $CRA 430, si2 ebers of the Court concurred in the view that the questionof whether the &'(4 Constitution was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article => Aendents0 of the &'4@Constitution is inherentl! and essentiall! "usticiable.

     As elucidated therein, with e2tensive quotations fro Tanada vs. Cuenco &34 Phil. &3@&05

    ... the ter 8political question8 connotes, in leal parlance, what it eans in ordinaril! parlance, nael!, aquestion of polic! in atters concernin the overnent of a $tate, as a bod! politic. 1n other words, inthe lanuae of Corpus Guris $ecundu supra0, it refers to 8those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided b! the people in their soverein capacit!, or in reard to which fulldiscretionar! authorit! has been deleated to the eislature or e2ecutive branch of the overnent.8 1t isconcerned with issues dependent upon the wisdo, not lealit!, of a particular easure.8

     Accordinl!, when the rant of power is qualified, conditional or sub"ect to liitations, the issue on whether or not theprescribed qualifications or conditions have been et, or the liitations respected, is "usticiable or non5political, the cru2

    of the proble bein one of lealit! or validit! of the contested act, not its wisdo. #therwise, said qualifications,conditions or liitations 5 particularl! those prescribed or iposed b! the Constitution 5 would be set at nauht./ Gavellanavs. E2ecutive $ecretar!, supra0.

    $o it is in the situation here presented. The basic issue is the constitutional validit! of the presidential acts of proposinaendents to the Constitution and of callin a referendu5plebiscite for the ratification of the proposals ade. Evidentl!,the question does not concern itself with the wisdo of the e2ercise of the authorit! claied or of the specificaendents proposed. 1nstead the inquir! vel non is focused solel! on the e2istence of the said power in the President 5a question purel! of lealit! deterinable thru interpretation and construction of the letter and spirit of the Constitution b!the Court as the f inal arbiter in the delineation of constitutional boundaries and the allocation of constitutional powers.

    *or the Court to shun coni-ance of the challene herein presented, especiall! in these parlous !ears, would be toabdicate its constitutional powers, shir9 its constitutional responsibilit!, and den! the people their ultiate recourse for

     "udicial deterination.

    1 have thus no hesitanc! in concludin that the question here presented is well within the peripher! of "udicial inquir!.

    11

    $econd 1ssue

    The ain question stands on a different footin it appears unprecedented both here and elsewhere. 1ts solution, 1 believe,can be found and unraveled onl! b! a critical assessent of the e2istin leal order in the liht of the prevailin politicaland factual ilieu.

    To be sure, there is an ipressive arra! of consistent "urisprudence on the proposition that, norall! or under noralconditions, a Constitution a! be aended onl! in accord with the procedure set forth therein. ?ence, if there be an!such prescription for the aendator! process as invariable there is because one of the essential parts of a Constitution isthe so5called /constitution of sovereint!/ which coprises the provision or provisions on the odes in accordance withwhich foral chanes in the fundaental law a! be effected the sae would ordinaril! be the controllin criterion for thevalidit! of the aendents souht.

    nfortunatel!, however, durin the present transition period of our political developent, no e2press provision is e2tant inthe Constitution reardin the aenc! or aent b! who and the procedure b! which aendents thereto a! beproposed and ratified fact overloo9ed b! those who challene the validit! of the presidential acts in the preises. This isso because there are at least two distinctl! in the transition fro the old s!ste of overnent under the &'4@Constitution to the new one established b! the &'(4 Constitution.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    10/42

    The first stae coprises the period fro the effectivit! of the Constitution on Ganuar! &(, &'(4 to the tie the National Assebl! is convened b! the incubent President and the interi President and the interi Prie Minister are chosen Article =>11, $ections & and 4J&K. The e2istence of this stae as an obvious fact of the nation8s political life was reconi-edb! the Court in Aquino vs. Coission on Elections, et al. 573337, Ganuar! 4&, &'(@, )% $CRA %(@0, when it re"ectedthe clai that, under the &'(4 Constitution, the President was in dut! bound to convene the interi National Assebl!soon after the Constitution too9 effect.

    The second stae ebraces the period fro the date the interi National Assebl! is convened to the date theDovernent described in Articles >11 to 1= of the Constitution is inauurated, followin the election of the ebers of the

    reular National Assebl! Article =>11, $ection &0 and the election of the reular President and Prie Minister,. This is asit should be because it is reconi-ed that the President has been accorded the discretion to deterine when he shallinitiall! convene the interi National Assebl!, and his decision to defer the convocation thereof has found overwhelinsupport b! the soverein people in two previous referenda, therein ivin realit! to an interrenu between the effectivit!of the Constitution and the initial convocation of the interi National Assebl!, which interrenu, as aforesaid,constitutes the first stae in the transition period.

     Aainst this factual bac9drop, it is readil! discernible that neither of the two sets of provisions ebodied in the Constitutionon the aendator! process applied durin the said first stae. Thus, $ection &@, Article =>11 Transitor! Provisions0provides5

    /$ec. &@. The interi National Assebl!, upon special call b! the interi Prie Minister, a!, b! a a"orit! vote of all itsMebers, propose aendents to this Constitution. $uch aendents shall ta9e effect when ratified in accordance with

     Article $i2teen hereof./

    Patentl!, the reference to the /interi National Assebl!/ and the /interi Prie Minister/ liits the application thereof tothe second stae of the transition period, i.e.,., after the interi; National Assebl! shall have been convened and theinteri Prie Minister shall have been chosen.

    pon the other hand, the provisions of Article =>1 Aendents0, to wit5

    $ECT1#N &. &0 An! aendent to, or revision of, this Constitution a! be proposed b! the National Assebl! upon a vote of three5fourths of all its Mebers, or b! a constitutional convention.

    %0 The National Assebl! a!, b! a vote of two5thirds of all its Mebers, call a constitutional conventionor, b! a a"orit! vote of all its Mebers, subit the question of ceilin such a convention to the electoratein an election.

    $EC. %. An! aendent to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified b! a a"orit! of thevotes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three onths after the approval of suchaendent or revision.

    unequivocall! conteplate aendents after the reular Dovernent shall have becoe full! operative, referrin as the!do to the National Assebl! which will coe into bein onl! at that tie.

    1n the face of this constitutional hiatus, we are confronted with the dilea whether aendents to the Constitution a!be effected durin the aforesaid first stae and, if in the affirative, b! who and in what anner such aendents a!be proposed and ratified.

    $usceptibilit! to chane is one of the hallar9s of an 1deal Constitution. Not bein a ere declaration of the traditions of anation but ore the ebodient of a people8s hopes and aspirations, its strictures are not unalterable. The! are, instead,d!naic precepts intended to 9eep in stride with and attuned to the livin social oranis the! see9 to fashion andovern. 1f it is conceded that /the political or philosophical aphoris of one eneration is doubted b! the ne2t and entirel!discarded b! the third,/ then a Constitution ust be able to ad"ust to the chanin needs and deands of societ! so thatthe latter a! survive, proress and endure. #n these verities, there can be no debate.

    +urin the first stae of the transition period in which the Dovernent is at present 5 which is understandabl! the ostcritical 5 the need for chane a! be ost pressin and iperative, and to disavow the e2istence of the riht to aendthe Constitution would be sheer political heres!. $uch view would den! the people a echanis for effectin peacefulchane, and belie the oranic conception of the Constitution b! deprivin it of its eans of rowth. $uch a result obviousl!could not have been intended b! the fraers of the fundaental law.

    1t sees, however, that the happenstance that the first period would coe to pass before the convocation of the interiNational Assebl! was not anticipated, hence, the oission of an e2press andate to overn the said situation in so faras aendents are concerned. But such oission throuh inadvertence should not, because it cannot, neate thesoverein power of the people to aend the fundaental charter that overns their lives and their future and perhapseven the ver! survival of the nation.

    pon the other hand, it is clear fro the afore5quoted provisions on the aendator! process that the intent was, instead,to provide a sipler and ore e2peditious ode of aendin the Constitution durin the transition period. *or, whileunder Article =>1 thereof, proposals for aendent a! be ade directl! b! the reular National Assebl! b! a vote of atleast three5fourths of all its ebers, under $ection &@ of Article =>11, a bare a"orit! vote of all the ebers of theNational Assebl! would suffice for the purpose. The rela2ation and the disparit! in the vote requireent are revealin.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    11/42

    The can onl! sinif! a reconition of the need to facilitate the adoption of aendents durin the second stae of thetransition period so that the interi National Assebl! will be able, in a anner of spea9in, to iron out the 9in9s in thenew Constitution, reove iperfections therein, and provide for chaned or chanin circustances before theestablishent of the reular Dovernent. 1n this contest, therefore, it is inutile speculation to assue that the Constitutionwas intended to render ipotent or ar the effectuation of needful chane at an even ore critical period 5 the first stae.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    12/42

    1n the liht of this ilieu and its iperatives, one thin is inescapable: the proposals now subitted to the people for theirratification in the forthcoin referendu5plebiscite are factuall! not of the President the! are directl! those of the peopletheselves spea9in thru their authori-ed instruentalities. The President erel! forali-ed the said proposals inPresidential +ecree No. &344. 1t bein conceded in all quarters that sovereint! resides in the people and it havin beendeonstrated that their constituent power to aend the Constitution has not been deleated b! the to an!instruentalit! of the Dovernent durin the present stae of the transition period of our political developent, theconclusion is ineluctable that their e2ertion of that residuar! power cannot be vulnerable to an! constitutional challene asbein ultra vires. Accordinl!, without venturin to rule on whether or not the President is vested with constituent power asit does not appear necessar! to do so in the preises the proposals here challened, bein acts of the soverein peopleno less, cannot be said to be afflicted with unconstitutionalit!. A fortiori, the concoitant authorit! to call a plebiscite and toappropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not onl! because the President, in e2ercisin said authorit! has actedas a ere alter eo of the people who ade the proposals, but li9ewise because the said authorit! is leislative in naturerather than constituent.

    111

    Third 1ssue

    ittle need be said of the claied insufficienc! and ipropriet! of the subission of the proposed aendents forratification fro the standpoint of tie. The thesis cannot be disputed that a fair subission presupposes an adequatetie lapse to enable the people to be sufficientl! enlihtened on the erits or deerits of the aendents presented fortheir ratification or re"ection. ?owever, circustances there are which unista9abl! deonstrated that the is et. Even if

    the proposal appear to have been forali-ed onl! upon the proulation of Presidential +ecree No. &344 on $epteber%%, &'(), the! are actuall! the cr!stalli-ation of sentients that for so lon have preoccupied the inds of the people andtheir authori-ed representatives, fro the ver! lowest level of the political hierarch!. ?ence, unli9e proposals eanatinfro a leislative bod!, the sae cannot but be said to have been ulled over, pondered upon, debated, discussed andsufficientl! understood b! the reat asses of the nation lon before the! ripened into foral proposals.

    Besides. it is a fact of which "udicial notice a! well be ta9en that in the not so distant past when the &'(4 Constitutionwas subitted to the people for ratification, an all5out capain, in which all the deleates of the ConstitutionalConvention reportedl! participated, was launched to acquaint the people with the raifications and wor9in of the news!ste of overnent souht to be inauurated thereunder. 1t a! thus well be assued that the people in eneral havesince acquired, in the least, a wor9in 9nowlede of the entiret! of the Constitution. The chanes now proposed the ostsubstantial of which bein erel! the replaceent of the interi National assebl! with another leislative ar for theDovernent durin the transition period until the reular National Assebl! shall have been constituted do not appear to

    be of such cople2it! as to require considerable tie to be brouht hoe to the full understandin of the people. And, infact, the assive and wide5ranin inforational and educational capain to this end has been and still is in full swin,with all the edia the barana!, the civic and sectoral roups, and even the reliious all over the land in actin and oftenenthusiastic if not frenetic involveent.

    1ndeed, when the people cast their votes on #ctober &), a neative vote could ver! well ean an understandin of theproposals which the! re"ect while an affirative vote could equall! be indicative #f such understandin andLor an abidincredence in the fidelit! with which the President has 9ept the trust the! have confided to hi as President andadinistrator of artial rule

    1>

    Conclusion

    1t is thus ! considered view that no question viable for this court to pass "udent upon is posed. Accordinl!, 1 vote forthe outriht disissal of the three petitions at bar.

    *ERNAN!O, )., concurrin and dissentin:

    These three petitions, the latest in a series of cases startin fro Planas v. Coission on Elections continuin with theepochal resolution in Gavellana v. E2ecutive $ecretar! and followed successivel! in three crucial decisions, Aquino v.Ponce Enrile Aquino v. Coission on Elections, and Aquino v Militar! Coission,  anifest to the sae deree thedelicate and awesoe character of the function of "udicial review.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    13/42

    concurrin opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, 1 ust dissent fro the proposition set forth in the able and scholarl! opinionof Gustice Martin that there is concentration of power in the President durin a crisis overnent. Consequentl!, 1 cannotsee ! wa! clear to acceptin the view that the authorit! to propose aendents is not open to question. At the ver!least, serious doubts could be entertained on the atter.

    &.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    14/42

    down breaches of the peace. Ever! sub"ect, whether a civilian or a soldier, whether what is called a servant of theovernent,8 such for e2aple as a policean, or a person in no wa! connected with the adinistration, not onl! has theriht, but is, as a atter of leal dut!, bound to assist in puttin down breaches of the peace. No doubt policeen orsoldiers are the persons who, as bein speciall! eplo!ed in the aintenance of order, are ost enerall! called upon tosuppress a riot, but it is clear that all lo!al sub"ects are bound to ta9e their part in the suppression of riots./  16

    Coitent to such an approach results in ! inabilit! to subscribe to the belief that artial law in ters of what isprovided both in the &'4@ and the present Constitution, affords sufficient "ustification for the concentration of powers in theE2ecutive durin periods of crisis. The better view, considerin the "uristic theor! on which our fundaental law rests is

    that e2pressed b! Gustice Blac9 in +uncan v. Iahanao9u: /eislatures and courts are not erel! cherished Aericaninstitutions the! are indispensable to our overnent. 17 1f there has been no observance of such a cardinal concept atthe present, it is due to the fact that before the forer Conress could eet in reular session anew, the presentConstitution was adopted, abolishin it and providin for an interi National Assebl!, which has not beenconvened. 1' $o 1 did view the atter.

    %. Nor did 1 inore Rossiter in ! Aquino v. Ponce Enrile opinion. Reference was ade to the first chapter on his wor9 onConstitutional +ictatorship where he spo9e of artial rule as /a device desined for use in the crisis of invasion orrebellion. 1t a! be ost precisel! defined as an e2tension of ilitar! overnent to the civilian population, thesubstitution of the will of a ilitar! coander for the will of the people8s elected overnent./  19$ince, for e at least, theRossiter characteri-ation of artial law has in it ore of the coon law connotation, less than dul! indful of the "uraleffects of its inclusion in the Constitution itself as a leitiate device for copin with eerenc! conditions in ties ofrave daner, but alwa!s sub"ect to attendant liitations in accordance with the fundaental postulate of a charter8ssupreac!, 1 felt "ustified in concludin: /?appil! for the Philippines, the declaration of artial law lends itself to theinterpretation that the Burdic9,

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    15/42

    *or e li9ewise, that equall! einent scholar Corwin, also invo9ed in the opinion of the Court, while no doubt a partisan of d stron Presidenc!, was not averse to constitutional restraints even durin periods of crisis. $o 1 would interpret thise2cerpt fro the fourth edition of his classic treatise on the Presidenc!: /A reie of artial law a! be copendiousl!, ifnot altoether accuratel!, defined as one in which the ordinar! law, as adinistered b! the ordinar! courts, is supersededfor the tie bein b! the will of a ilitar! coander. 1t follows that, when artial law is instituted under national authorit!,it rests ultiatel! on the will of the President of the nited $tates in his capacit! as Coander5in5Chief. 1t should beadded at once, nevertheless, that the sub"ect is one in which the record of actual practice fails often to support the nicetiesof theor!. Thus, the eplo!ent of the ilitar! ar in the enforceent of the civil law does not invariabl!, or even usuall!,involve artial law in the strict sense, for, as was noted in the precedin section, soldiers are often placed sipl! at thedisposal and direction of the civil authorities as a 9ind of suppleentar! police, or posse coitatus on the other hand bereason of the discretion that the civil authorities theselves are apt to vest in the ilitar! in an! eerenc! requirin itsassistance, the line between such an eplo!ent of the ilitar! and a reie of artial law is frequentl! an! but a hardand fast one. And partl! because of these abiuities the conception itself of artial law toda! bifurcates into twoconceptions, one of which shades off into ilitar! overnent and the other into the situation "ust described, in which thecivil authorit! reains theoreticall! in control althouh dependent on ilitar! aid. *inall!, there is the situation thatobtained throuhout the North durin the Civil

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    16/42

    v. Castillo,&(

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    17/42

    decrees. Constructive criticis is to be welcoed not so uch because of the riht to be heard but because there a! besoethin worth hearin. That is to ensure a true ferent of 1deas, an interpla! of 9nowledeable inds. There arethouh well5 defined liits, #ne a! not advocate disorder in the nae of protest, uch less preach rebellion under thecloa9 of dissent..

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    18/42

    deliberations/ and /puts in proper for the questions of aendent upon which the people are to pass/5for ratification orre"ection. 1+

    @. The Court in Tolentino thus re"ected the aruent /that the end souht to be achieved is to be desired/ and in den!inreconsideration in paraphrase of the late Claro M. Recto declared that /let those who would put aside, invo9in rounds atbest controversial, an! andate of the fundaental purportedl! in order to attain soe laudable ob"ective bear in indthat soeda! soehow others with purportedl! ore laudable ob"ectives a! ta9e advantae of the precedent andcontinue the destruction of the Constitution, a9in those who laid down the precedent of "ustif!in deviations fro therequireents of the Constitution the victis of their own foll!./

    This sae apprehension was echoed b! now retired Gustice Cali2to #. Faldivar in his dissentin opinion in the Ratificationcases 14 that /we will be openin the ates for a siilar disreard to the Constitution in the future.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    19/42

    . 1f proposals for constitutional aendents are now deeed necessar! to be discussed and adopted for subittal tothe people, strict adherence with the andator! requireents of the aendin process as provided in the Constitutionust be coplied with. This eans, under the teachin of Tolentino that the proposed aendents ust validl! coefro the constitutional aenc! vested with the constituent power to do so, nael!, the interi National Assebl!, and notfro the e2ecutive power as vested in the Prie Minister the incubent President0 with the assistance of theCabinet 2 fro who such power has been withheld.

    1t will not do to contend that these proposals represent the voice of the people for as was aptl! stated b! Coole! /Me voiceof the people, actin in their soverein capacit!, can be of leal force onl! when e2pressed at the ties and under the

    conditions which the! theselves have prescribed and pointed out b! the Constitution. ... .26

    The sae aruent was put forward and re"ected b! this Court in Tolentino which re"ected the contention that the/Convention bein a leislative bod! of the hihest order and directl! elected b! the people to spea9 their voice0 issoverein, in as such, its acts ipuned b! petitioner are be!ond the control of Conress and the Courts/ and ruled thatthe constitutional article on the aendin process/ is nothin ore than a part of the Constitution thus ordained b! thepeople. ?ence, in continuin said section,

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    20/42

    The artial law clause of the &'(4 Constitution found in Article 1=, section 12 , as stressed b! the writer in his separateopinion in the Referendu Cases,&7 /is a verbati reproduction of Article >11, section &3 %0 of the &'4@ Constitution andprovides for the iposition of artial law onl! 8in case of invasion, resurrection or rebellion, or iinent daner thereof,when the public safet! requires it and hence the use of the leislative power or ore accuratel! 8ilitar! power8 underartial rule is liited to such necessar! easures as will safeuard the Republic and suppress the rebellion orinvasion0/. +

    &&. Article =>11, section 4 %0 of the &'(4 Constitution which has been held b! the a"orit! in the Referendu Cases to bethe reconition or warrant for the e2ercise of leislative power b! the President durin the period of artial law is but a

    transitor! provision. Toether with the artial law clause, the! constitute but two provisions which are not to be consideredin isolation fro the Constitution but as ere interal parts thereof which ust be haroni-ed consistentl! with the entireConstitution.

     As Coole! restated the rule: /effect is to be iven, if possible, to the whole instruent, and to ever! section and clause. 1fdifferent portions see to conflict, the courts ust haroni-e the, if practicable, and ust lean in favor of a constructionwhich will render ever! word operative, rather than one which a! a9e soe words 1dle and nuator!.

    This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will be presued tohave e2pressed theselves in careful and easured ters, correspondin with the iense iportanceof the powers deleated, leavin as little as possible to iplication. 1t is scarcell! conceivable that a casecan arise where a court would b!e "ustified in declarin an! portion of a written constitution nuator!because of abiuit!. #ne part a! qualif! another so as to restrict its operation, or appl! it otherwise

    than the natural construction would require if it stood b! itself but one part is not to be allowed to defeatanother, if b! an! reasonable construction the two can be ade to stand toether. +6

    The transcendental constituent power to propose and approve aendents to the Constitution as well as set up theachiner! and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals has been withheld fro the President PrieMinister0 as sole repositor! of the E2ecutive Power, presuabl! in view of the iense powers alread! vested in hi b!the Constitution but "ust as iportantl!, because b! the ver! nature of the constituent power, such aendents proposalshave to be prepared, deliberated and atured b! a deliberative assebl! of representatives such as the interi National

     Assebl! and hence a! not be antitheticall! entrusted to one an.

    *orer Chief Gustice Roberto Concepcion had observed before the elevation of the l'(& Constitutional Convention thatthe records of past plebiscites show that the constitutional aenc! vested with the e2ercise of the constituent powerConress or the Constitutional Convention0 reall! deterined the aendents to the Constitution since the proposals

    were invariabl! ratified b! the people+7

     thus: /althouh the people have the reserved power to ratif! or re"ect the actionta9en b! the Convention, such power is not, in view of the circustances attendin its e2ercise, as effective as one ihtotherwise thin9: that, despite the requisite ratification b! the people, the actual contents of our fundaental law will reall!be deterined b! the Convention that, accordinl! the people should e2ercise the reatest possible deree ofcircuspection in the election of deleates thereto ... /  +'

    &%. Martial law concededl! does not abroate the Constitution nor obliterate its constitutional boundaries and allocation ofpowers aon the E2ecutive, eislative and Gudicial +epartents. +9

    1t has thus been aptl! observed that /Martial law is an eerenc! reie, authori-ed b! and sub"ect to the Constitution.1ts basic preise is to preserve and to aintain the Republic aainst the daners that threaten it. $uch preise iposesconstraints and liitations. *or the artial law reie fulfills the constitutional purpose onl! if, b! reason of artial laweasures, the Republic is preserved. 1f b! reason of such easures the Republic is so transfored that it is chaned in

    its nature and becoes a $tate other than republican, then artial law is a failure worse, artial law would have becoethe ene! of the Republic rather than its defender and preserver./40

    11. #n the question of the Court8s "urisdiction to pass upon the constitutionalit! of the questioned presidential decrees: let itbe underscored that the Court has lon set at rest the question.

    The trail was bla-ed for the Court since the benchar9 case of Anara vs. Electoral Coission when Gustice Gose P.aurel echoed .$. Chief Gustice Marshall8s /cliactic phrase/ that /we ust never foret that it is a Constitution we aree2poundin/ and declared the Court8s /solen and sacred/ constitutional obliation of "udicial review and laid down thedoctrine that the Philippine Constitution as /a definition of the powers of overnent/ placed upon the "udiciar! the reatburden of /deterinin the nature, scope and e2tent of such powers/ and stressed that /when the "udiciar! ediates toallocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert an! superiorit! over the other departents . . . but onl! asserts thesolen and sacred obliteration entrusted to it b! the Constitution to deterine conflictin clais of authorit! under the

    Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controvers! the rihts which the instruent secures anduarantees to the/.

     At the sae tie, the Court li9ewise adhered to the constitutional tenet that political questions, i.e. questions which areintended b! the Constitutional and relevant laws to be conclusivel! deterined b! the /political/, i.e. branches ofovernent nael!, the E2ecutive and the eislative0 are outside the Court8s "urisdiction. 41

    Thus, in Don-ales, 42 b! a unanious Court0 and in Tolentino  4+ b! the required constitutional a"orit!0, the Court hassince consistentl! ruled that when proposin and approvin aendents to the Constitution, the ebers of Conress.actin as a constituent assebl! or the ebers of the Constitutional Convention elected directl! for the purpose b! nothave the final sa! on whether or not their acts are within or be!ond constitutional liits. #therwise, the! could brush aside

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    21/42

    and set the sae at nauht, contrar! to the basic tenet that outs is it overnent of lawso not of en, and to the riidnature of our Constitution. $uch riidit! is stressed b! the fact that, the Constitution e2pressl! confers upon the $upreeCourt, the power to declare a treat! unconstitutional, despite the einentl! political character of treat!5a9in power/. 44

     As aplified b! forer Chief Gustice Concepcion in Gavellana vs E2ecutive $ecretar! 4 b! a a"orit! vote0, /when therant of power is qualified, conditional or sub"ect to liitations. the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications orconditions have been et, or the liitations b! e2pected, is "usticiable or non5political, the cru2 of the proble bein oneof lealit! or validit! of the contested act, not its wisdo #therwise, said qualifications, conditions and liitations5particularl! those prescribed or iposed b! the Constitution would be set at nauht/.

    The fact that the proposed aendents are to be subitted to the people for ratification b! no eans a9es the questionpolitical and non5 "usticiable since as stressed even in Gavellana the issue of validit! of the President8s proclaation ofratification of the Constitution presented a "usticiable and non5political question

    $tated otherwise, the question of whether the eislative actin as a constituent assebl! or the ConstitutionalConvention called fol5 the purpose, in proposin aendents to the people for ratification followed the constitutionalprocedure and on the aendin process is perforce a "usticiable question and does not raise a political question of policeor wisdo of the proposed aendents, which if $ubitted, are reserved for the people8s decision.

    The substantive question presented in the case at bar of whether the President a! leall! e2ercise the constituent power vested in the interi National Assebl! which has not been ranted to his office0 and propose constitutional aendentsis preeinentl! a "usticiable issue.

    Gustice aurel in Anara had dul! en"oined that /in ties of social disquietude or political e2citeent, the reat landar9sof the Constitution are apt to be forotten or arred, if not entirel! obliterated. 1n cases of conflict, the "udicial departentis the onl! constitutional oran which can be called upon to deterine the proper allocation of powers between the severaldepartents and aon the interal or constituent units thereof/.

    To follow the eas! wa! out b! disclaiin "urisdiction over the issue as a political question would be "udicial abdication.

    111. #n the question of whether there is a sufficient and proper subittal of the proposed aendents to the people:Prescindin fro the writer8s view of the nullit! of the questioned decree of lac9 of authorit! on the President8s part toe2cercise the constituent power, 1 hold that the doctrine of fair and proper subission first enunciated b! a siple a"orit!of b! Gustices in Don-ales and subsequentl! officiall! adopted b! the required constitutional two5thirds a"orit! of theCourt in is controllin in the case at bar.

    &. There cannot be said to be fair and proper subission of the proposed aendents. As ruled b! this Court in Tolentinowhere /the proposed aendent in question is e2pressl! saddled with reservations which naturall! ipair, in reateasures, its ver! essence as a proposed constitutional aendent/ and where /the wa! the proposal is worded, readtoether with the reservations tac9ed to it b! the Convention thru $ection 4 of the questioned resolution, it is too uch of aspeculation to assue what e2actl! the aendent would reall! aount lo in the end. All in all, as alread! pointed out inour discussion of ovants8 first round, if this 9ind of aendent is allowed, the Philippines will appear before the worldto be in the absurd position of bein the onl! countr! with a constitution containin a provision so epheeral no one9nows until when it will bet actuall! in force/, there can be no proper subission.

    1n Tolentino a solitar! aendent reducin the votin ae to & !ears was struc9 down b! this Court which ruled that /inorder that a plebiscite for the ratification of an aendent to the Constitution a! be validl! held, it ust provide the voter not onl! sufficient tie but aple basis for an intellient appraisal of the nature of the aendent per se as well as itsrelation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to for a haronious whole,/ and that there was no proper$ubission wherein the people are in the dar9 as to frae of reference the! can base their "udent on

    %. The now Chief Gustice and Mr. Gustice Ma9asiar with two other ebers 7) raphicall! pointed out in their "ointseparate opinion that the solitar! question /would see to be uncoplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life8s veritiesthat thins which appear to be siple a! turn out not to be so siple after all/. 47

    The! further e2pressed /essential areeent/ with Mr. Gustice Conrado >. $anche-8 separate opinion in Don-ales /on theiniu requireents that ust be et in order that there can be a proper subission to the people of a proposedconstitutional aendent/ which reads thus:

    ... we ta9e the view that the words 8subitted to the people for their ratification8, if construed in the liht of

    the nature of the Constitution a fundaental charter that is leislation direct fro the people, ane2pression of their soverein will 5 is that it can onl! be aended b! the people e2pressin theselvesaccordin to the procedure ordained b! the Constitution. Therefore, aendents ust be fairl! laidbefore the people for their blessin or spurnin. The people are not to be ere rubber staps. The! arenot to vote blindl!. The! ust be afforded aple opportunit! to ull over the oriinal provisions, coparethe with the proposed aendents, and tr! to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their consciencesuest, free fro the incubus of e2traneous or possibl! insidious influences.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    22/42

    overnent, in subittin an aendent for ratification, should put ever! instruentalit! or aenc! withinits structural fraewor9 to enlihten the people, educate the with respect to their act of ratification orre"ection. *or, as we have earlier stated, one thin is subission and another is ratification. There ustbe fair subission, intellient. consent or re"ection. 1f with all these safeuards the people still approve theaendent no atter how pre"udicial it is to the, then so be it. *or the people decree their own fate.  4'

    Gustice $anche- therein ended the passae with an apt citation that / ... / The reat en who builded the structure of ourstate in this respect had the ental vision of a ood Constitution voiced b! Gude Coole!, who has said 8A oodConstitution should be be!ond the reach of teporar! e2citeent and. popular caprice or passion. 1t is needed for stabilit!

    and steadiness it ust !ield to the thouht of the people not to the whi of the people, or the thouht evolved ine2citeent or hot blood, but the sober second thouht, which alone, if the overnent is to be safe, can be allowedefficienc!. 222 222 222 Chanes in overnent are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montain sa!s: All reatutations sha9e and disorder state. Dood does not necessaril! succeed evil another evil a! succeed and a worse8./ 49

    Gustice $anche- thus stated the rule that has been adopted b! the Court in Tolentino that there is no proper subission /if the people are not sufficientl! affired of the aendents to be voted upon, to conscientiousl! deliberate thereon, toe2press their will in a enuine anner. ... ../ 0

    4. *ro the cople2 and coplicated proposed aendents set forth in the challened decree and the plethora ofconfused and confusin clarifications reported in the dail! newspapers, it is anifest that there is no proper subission ofthe proposed aendents. Nine '0 proposed constitutional aendents were officiall! proposed and ade 9nown asper Presidential +ecree No. &344 dated, $epteber %%, &'() for subittal at the /referendu5plebiscite/ called for this

    coin $aturda!, #ctober &), &'() wherein the &@5!ear and under &5!ear5 olds are en"oined to vote notwithstandintheir lac9 of qualification under Article >1 of the Constitution. *orer $enator Arturo Tolentino, an ac9nowlededparliaentarian of the hihest order, was reported b! the newspapers last #ctober 4 to have observed that /there is nourenc! in approvin the proposed aendents to the Constitution and suested that the question reardin charterchanes be odified instead of as9in the people to vote on hurriedl! prepared aendents/. ?e further pointed out that/apart fro lac9in the parliaentar! st!le in the bod! of the Constitution, the! do not indicate what particular provisionsare bein repealed or aended/. 2

     As of this writin, #ctober &&, &'(), the paper toda! reported his seven5pae anal!sis questionin aon others theproposed rantin of dual leislative powers to both the President and the Batasan Pabansa and rear9in that /Thisdual leislative authorit! can ive rise to confusion and serious constitutional questions/. +

     Aside fro the inadequac! of the liited tie iven for the people8s consideration of the proposed aendents, there can

    be no proper subission because the proposed aendents are not in proper for and violate the cardinal rule ofaendents of written constitutions that the specific provisions of the Constitution bein repealed or aended as well ashow the specific provisions as aended would read, should be clearl! stated in careful and easured ters. There canbe no proper subission because the vaueness and abiuit! of the proposals do not sufficientl! infor the people ofthe aendents for, conscientious deliberation and intellient consent or re"ection.

    7. 1 of the Constitution

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    23/42

    nder Aendent No. , there is a eneral stateent in eneral that the unspecified provisions of the Constitution /notinconsistent with an! of these aendents/ shall continue in full force and effect and nder Aendent No. '. theincubent President is authori-ed to proclai the ratification of the aendents b! the a"orit! of votes cast. 1t hasli9ewise been stressed b! the officials concerned that the proposed aendents coe in a pac9ae and a! not bevoted upon separatel! but on an /all or nothin/ basis.

    @.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    24/42

    . . . E bod! cae out when thePresident e2press his desire to share his powers with other people.

     Aware of this, a five5an Coittee ebers of the Philippine Constitution Association P?1C#N$A0 headed b!$upree Court Gustice Antonio Barredo proposed on Gul! %, the establishent of 8$anunian Pabansa8 or 8BatasanPabansa8 which would help the President in the perforance of his leislative functions. The proposed new bod! willta9e the place of the interi National Assebl! which is considered not practical to convene at this tie considerin the

    constitution of its ebership.

    pon learnin the proposal of Gustice Barredo, the countr!8s 7%,333 barana! asseblies on Auust & suested that thepeople be consulted on a proposal to create a new leislative bod! to replace the interi assebl! provided for b! theConstitution. The suestion of the barana! units was ade throuh their national association, Pabansan Iatipunann a Barana! headed b! Mrs. Nora F. Patines. $he said that the people have shown in at least si2 instancesincludin in the two past referenda that the! are aainst the convenin of the interi National Assebl!. $he also saidthat since the people had ruled out the callin of such assebl! and that the! have once proposed that the Presidentcreate instead the $anunian Pabansa or a leislative advisor! bod!, then the proposal to create a new leislativeust necessaril! be referred to the people.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    25/42

    The federation of Iabataan Barana!, also nuberin 7%,333 units li9e their elder counterparts in the Iatipunan n aBarana! also asserted their own riht to be heard on whatever plans are afoot to convene a new leislative bod!.

    #n Auust ), a eetin of the national directorate of PIB was held to discuss atters pertainin to the stand of the PIBwith reards to the convenin of a new leislative bod!. The stand of the PIB is to create a leislative advisor! council inplace of the old assebl!. Two da!s after, Auust , the Iabataan Barana! held a s!posiu and ade a stand whichis the creation of a bod! with full leislative powers.

     A nationwide claor for the holdin of eetin in their respective localities to discuss ore intelleentl! the proposal to

    create a new leislative bod! was ade b! various urban and rural $anunian Ba!ans.

    Nuerous requests ade b! soe ebers coin fro (@ provincial and )& cit! $B asseblies, were forwarded to the+epartent of ocal Dovernent and Counit! +evelopent +DC+0.

    #n Auust (, ocal Dovernent $ecretar!, Gose A. Rono ranted the request b! convenin the '& eber NationalE2ecutive Coittee of the Pabansan Iatipunan n a $anunian on Auust &7 which was held at $ession ?all,6ue-on Cit!. 1nvited also to participate were &4 Reional *ederation Presidents each coin fro the PIB and the PIIB

     Actuall!, the e2tent of ! active participation in the events and deliberations that have culinated in the holdin of theproposed referendu5 plebiscite on #ctober &), &'(), which petitioners are here see9in to en"oin, has been oresubstantial and eaninful than the above report iparts. Most iportantl!, aside fro bein probabl! the first person topublicl! articulate the need for the creation of an interi leislative bod! to ta9e the place of. the interi National

     Assebl! provided for in the Transitor! Provisions of the Constitution, as suested in the above report, 1 iht sa! that 1was the one ost veheent and persistent in publicl! advocatin and urin the authorities concerned to directl! subitto the people in a plebiscite whatever aendents of the Constitution iht be considered necessar! for theestablishent of such substitute interi leislature. 1n the aforeentioned session of the E2ecutive Coittee of theIatipunan, 1 discourse on the indispensabilit! of a new interi leislative bod! as the initial step towards the earl! liftin of artial law and on the fundaental considerations wh! in our present situation a constitutional convention would besuperfluous in aendin the Constitution.

    Moreover, it is a atter of public 9nowlede that in a speech 1 delivered at the Coral Ballroo of the ?ilton ?otel in theevenin of Auust &(, &'(), 1 denounced in no uncertain ters the plan to call a constitutional convention. 1 reiterated thesae views on $epteber (, &'() at the initial conference called b! the Coelec in the course of the inforation andeducational capain it was en"oined to conduct on the sub"ect. And loo9in bac9 at the subsequent developents up to$epteber %%, &'(), when the Batasan Ba!an approved and the President sined the now ipuned Presidential

    +ecree No. &344, it is but huan for e to want to believe that to a certain e2tent ! stron criticiss and resolute standaainst an! other alternative procedure of aendin the Constitution for the purpose intended had borne fruit.

    1 ust hasten to add at this point, however, that in a larer sense, the initiative for all 1 have done, was not altoether inealone. The truth of the atter is that throuhout the four !ears of this artial law overnent, it has alwa!s been ! faith,as a result of casual and occasional e2chanes of thouht with President Marcos, that when the appropriate tie doescoe, the President would soehow a9e it 9nown that in his "udent, the situation has alread! so iproved as toperit the ipleentation, if radual, of the constitutionall! envisioned evolution of our overnent fro its present stateto a parliaentar! one. Naturall!, this would inevitabl! involve the establishent of a leislative bod! to replace theabortive interi National Assebl!. 1 have 9ept tract of all the public and private pronounceents of the President, and itwas the result of ! readin thereof that furnished the iediate basis for ! virtuall! precipitatin, in one wa! oranother, the ateriali-ation of the forthcoin referendu5plebiscite. 1n other words, in the final anal!sis, it was thePresident8s own attitude on the atter that ade it opportune for e to articulate ! own feelins and 1deas as to how the

    nation can ove eaninfull! towards norali-ation and to publicl! raise the issues that have been ventilated b! theparties in the instant cases.

    1 would not be huan, if 1 did not consider !self privileed in havin been afforded b! +ivine Providence the opportunit!to contribute a odest share in the forulation of the steps that should lead ultiatel! to the liftin of artial law in ourcountr!. 1ndeed, 1 a certain ever! true *ilipino is an2iousl! loo9in forward to that eventualit!. And if for havin voiced thesentients of our people, where others would have preferred to be cofortabl! silent, and if for havin ade public whatever! *ilipino ust have been feelin in his heart all these !ears, 1 should be sinled out as entertainin suchpreconceived opinions reardin the issues before the Court in the cases at bar as to preclude e fro ta9in part in their disposition, 1 can onl! sa! that 1 do not believe there is an! other *ilipino in and out of the Court toda! who is not equall!situated as 1 a .

    The atters that concern the Court in the instant petitions do not involve erel! the individual interests of an! sinle

    person or roup of persons. Besides, the sta9es in these cases affect ever!one coonl!, not individuall!. The current ofhistor! that has passed throuh the whole countr! in the wa9e of artial law has swept all of us, sparin none, and theproble of national survival and of restorin deocratic institutions and 1deals is see9in solution in the inds of all of us.That 1 have preferred to discuss publicl! ! own thouhts on the atter cannot ean that ! colleaues in the Courthave been indifferent and apathetic about it, for the! too are *ilipinos. Articulated or not, all of us ust have our ownpreconceived 1deas and notions in respect to the situation that confronts the countr!. To be sure, our votes and opinions inthe5 a"or political cases in the recent past should ore or less indicate our respective basic positions relevant to theissues now before s. Certainl!, contendin counsels cannot be entirel! in the dar9 in this reard. 1 feel that it ust havebeen precisel! because of such awareness that despite ! 9nown public participation in the discussion of the questionsherein involved, none of the parties have souht ! inhibition or disqualification.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    26/42

     Actuall!, althouh it a! be difficult for others to believe it, 1 have never allowed ! preconceptions and personalinclinations to affect the ob"ectivit! needed in the resolution of an! "udicial question before the Court. 1 feel 1 have alwa!sbeen able to appreciate, full! consider and dul! weih aruents and points raised b! all counsels, even when the!conflict with ! previous views. 1 a never be!ond bein convinced b! ood and substantial ratiocination. Nothin hasdelihted e ore than to discover that soebod! else has thouht of ore weiht! aruents refutin ! own,reardless of what or whose interests are at sta9e. 1 would not have accepted ! position in the Court had 1 felt 1 wouldnot be able to be above ! personal pre"udices. To ! ind, it is not that a "ude has preconceptions that counts, it is hiscapacit! and readiness to absorb contrar! views that are indispensable for "ustice to prevail. That suspicions ofpre"udent a! li9el! arise is unavoidable but 1 have alwa!s aintained that whatever iproper factors iht influencea "ude will unavoidabl! alwa!s appear on the face of the decision. 1n an! event, is there better uarantee of "ustice whenthe preconceptions of a "ude are concealed;

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    27/42

    The fifth is that in the sae anner that the E2ecutive power conferred upon the E2ecutive b! theConstitution is coplete, total and unliited, so also, the "udicial power vested in the $upree Court andthe inferior courts, is the ver! whole of that power, without an! liitation or qualification.

    222 222 222

    222 222 222

    *ro these incontrovertible postulates, it results, first of all, that the ain question before s is not in

    realit! one of "urisdiction, for there can be no conceivable controvers!, especiall! one involvin a conflictas to the correct construction of the Constitution, that is not conteplated to be within the "udicial authorit!of the courts to hear and decide. The "udicial power of the courts bein unliited and unqualified, ite2tends over all situations that call for the as certainent and protection of the rihts of an! part!alleedl! violated, even when the alleed violator is the hihest official of the land or the overnentitself. 1t is, therefore, evidence that the Court8s "urisdiction to ta9e coni-ance of and to decide the instantpetitions on their erits is be!ond challene.

    1n this connection, however, it ust be borne in ind that in the for of overnent envisaed b! thefraers of the Constitution and adopted b! our people, the Court8s indisputable and plenar! authorit! todecide does not necessaril! ipose upon it the dut! to interpose its fiat as the onl! eans of settlin theconflictin clais of the parties before it. 1t is inrained in the distribution of powers in the fundaental lawthat hand in hand with the vestin of the "udicial power upon the Court, the Constitution has coevall!

    conferred upon it the discretion to deterine, in consideration of the constitutional preroatives ranted tothe other +epartents, when to refrain fro iposin "udicial solutions and instead defer to the "udentof the latter. 1t is in the ver! nature of republican overnents that certain atters are left in the residualpower of the people theselves to resolve, either directl! at the polls or thru their elected representativesin the political +epartents of the overnent. And these reserved atters are easil! distinuishable b!their ver! nature, when one studiousl! considers the basic functions and responsibilities entrusted b! thecharter to each of the reat +epartents of the overnent. To cite an obvious e2aple, the protection,defense and preservation of the state aainst internal or e2ternal aression threatenin its ver!e2istence is far fro bein within the abit of "udicial responsibilit!. The distinct role then of the $upreeCourt of bein the final arbiter in the deterination of constitutional controversies does not have to beasserted in such conteplated situations, thereb! to ive wa! to the ultiate preroative of the peoplearticulated thru suffrae or thru the acts of their political representatives the! have elected for thepurpose.

    1ndeed, these fundaental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is 9nown in Aerican constitutional lawas the political question doctrine, which in that "urisdiction is unquestionabl! deeed to be part and parcel of the rule oflaw, e2actl! li9e its apparentl! ore attractive or popular opposite, "udicial activis, which is the fullest e2ertion of "udicialpower, upon the theor! that unless the courts intervene in"ustice iht prevail. 1t has been invo9ed and applied b! thisCourt in varied fors and ode of pro"ection in several oentous instances in the past, Barcelona vs. Ba9er, @ Phil. ($everino vs. Dovernor5Deneral, &) Phil. 4)) Abueva vs.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    28/42

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    29/42

    authoritarianis eans, in the final anal!sis, that the fundaental source of authorit! of our e2istin overnent a! notbe necessaril! found within the four corners of the Constitution but rather in the results of periodic referendus conductedb! the Coission on Elections in a anner well 9nown to all of us This, as 1 see it, is perhaps what the President eansb! sa!in that under the new Constitution he has e2tra5ordinar! powers independentl! of artial law 5 powers sanctioneddirectl! b! the people which a! not even be read in the lanuae of the Constitution. in brief, when we tal9 of the rule oflaw nowada!s, our frae of reference should not necessaril! be the Constitution but the outcoe of referendus calledfro tie to tie b! the President. The sooner we ibibe this vital concept the ore intellient will our perspective be inivin our support and lo!alt! to the e2istin overnent.

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    30/42

    avoid a coplete paral!sis of law5a9in and resultin anarch! and chaos. 1t is li9ewise conceded that the provisions of$ection 4 %0 of Article =>11 invest the President with leislative power for the duration of the transition period. *ro thesepreises, it is safe to conclude that in effect the President has been substituted b! the people theselves in place of theinteri Assebl!. $uch bein the case, the President should be deeed as havin been ranted also the conatepreroative of proposin aendents to the Constitution. 1n other words, the force of necessit! and the conate nature of the act "ustif! that the departent e2ercisin the leislative facult! be the one to li9ewise perfor the constituent functionthat was attached to the bod! rendered ipotent b! the people8s andate. 1ncidentall!, 1 re"ect ost veheentl! theproposition that the President a! propose aendents to the Constitution in the e2ercise of his artial law powers.nder an! standards, such a suestion cannot be reconciled with the 1deal that a Constitution is the free act of thepeople.

    1t was suested durin the oral, aruent that instead of e2tendin his leislative powers b! proposin the aendentto create a new leislative bod!, the President should issue a decree providin for the necessar! apportionent of theseats in the Reular National Assebl! and call for an election of the ebers thereof and thus effect the iediatenorali-ation of the parliaentar! overnent envisaed in the Constitution. 1, the reular National Assebl! a! call a ConstitutionalConvention or subit such a call for approval of the people, $ection &@ of Article =>11, in reference to interi National

     Assebl!, does not rant said bod! the preroative of callin a convention, one can readil! appreciate that the spirit of theConstitution does not countenance or favor the callin of a convention durin the transition, if onl! because such aprocedure would be tie consuin, cubersoe and e2pensive. And when it is further noted that the requireent as tothe nuber of votes needed for a proposal is onl! a a"orit!, whereas it is three5fourths in respect to reular Assebl!,and, relatin this point to the provision of $ection % of Article =>1 to the effect that all ratification plebiscites ust be held/not later than three onths after the approval/ of the proposed aendent b! the proposin authorit!, the adoption ofthe ost siple anner of aendin the charter, as that provided for in the assailed Presidential +ecree &344 suestsitself as the one ost in accord with the intent of the fundaental law.

    There is nothin strane in adoptin steps not directl! based on the letter of the Constitution for the purpose of aendinor chanin the sae. To cite but one iportant precedent, as e2plained b! Mr. Gustice Ma9asiar in his concurrin opinionin Gavellana %, the present Constitution of the nited $tates was neither proposed nor ratified in the anner ordained b!the oriinal charter of that countr!, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual nion.

    1n brief. if the convenin and operation of the interi National Assebl! has been effectuated throuh a referendu5plebiscite in Ganuar!, &'(4, and ratified e2pressl! and ipliedl! in two subsequent referenda, those of Gul!, &'(4 and*ebruar!, &'(@, wh! a! not a dul! held plebiscite suffice for the purpose of creatin a substitute for that Assebl!; 1tshould be borne in ind that after all, as indicated in the whereas of the ipuned Presidential +ecree, actuall!, theproposed aendents were initiated b! the barana!s and sanunian ebers. 1n other words, in subittin theaendents for ratification, the President is erel! actin as the conduit thru who a substantial portion of the people,represented in the Iatipunan n Ma $anunian, Barana! at Iabataan Barana!, see9 the approval of the people asa whole of the aendents in question. 1f all these ean that the soverein people have arroated unto theselves thefunctions relative to the aendent to the Constitution, 1 would reard !self as totall! devoid of leal standin toquestion it, havin in ind that the ost fundaental tenet on which our whole political structure rests is that /sovereint!resides in the people and all overnent authorit! eanates fro the./

    1n the liht of the foreoin considerations, 1 hold that Presidential +ecree No. &344 does not infrine the Constitution, ifonl! because the specific provision it is supposed to infrine does not e2ist in leal conteplation since it was coevall!ade inoperative when the people ratified the Constitution on Ganuar! &(, &'(4. 1 a full! convinced that there is nothinin the procedure of aendent contained in said decree that is inconsistent with the fundaental principles ofconstitutionalis. #n the contrar!, 1 find that the +ecree, in issue confors adirabl! with the underl!in tenet of ourovernent 5 the sovereint! and plenar! power of the people.

    #n the issue of whether or not #ctober &), &'() is too pro2iate to enable the people to sufficientl! coprehend theissues and intellientl! vote in the referendu and plebiscite set b! Presidential +ecree &344, all 1 can sa! is that whileperhaps ! other colleaues are riht in holdin that the period iven to the people is adequate, 1 would leave it to thePresident to consider whether or not it would be wiser to e2tend the sae. Gust to avoid adverse coents later 1 wishthe President orders a postponeent. But whether such postponeent is ordered or not, date of the referendu5plebiscite an!where fro #ctober &), &'() to an! other later date, would be of no vital iport.

    1n conclusion, 1 vote to disiss all the three petitions before s.

    MAASAR, J., concurrin and dissentin:

    $ince the validit! or effectivit! of the proposed aendents is to be decided ultiatel! b! the people in their sovereincapacit!, the question is political as the ter is defined in Tanada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al. &34 Phil. &3@&0, which is a barto an! "udicial inquir!, for the reasons stated in #ur opinion in Gavellana, et al. vs. E2ecutive $ecretar!, et al. 54)&7%0Tan, et al. vs. E2ecutive $ecretar!, et al. ,4)&)70 Ro2as, et al. vs E2ecutive $ecretar!, et al. 54)&)@0 Monteclaro,

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    31/42

    etc., et al. vs8 E2ecutive $ecretar!, et al. 4)%4)0 and +ita et al. vs. E2ecutive $ecretar!, et al. 5

  • 8/20/2019 5. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 Scra 333

    32/42

    The Constitution rants Conress e2clusive power to control subission off constitutional aendents.*inal deterination b! Conress their ratification b! three5fourths of the $tates has ta9en place 8isconclusive upon the courts.8 1n the e2ercise of that power, Conress, of course, is overned b! theConstitution. ?owever, A whether subission, intervenin procedure for Conressional deterination ofratification confors to the coands of the Constitution, call for decisions b! apolitical departent ofquestions of a t which this Court has frequentl! desinated 8political.8 And decision of a 8politicalquestion8 b! the political departent8 to which the Constitution has coitted it 8conclusivel! binds the

     "udes, as well as all other officers, citi-ens and sub"ects of ... overnent. Proclaation under authorit!of Conress that an aendent has been ratified will carr! with it a solen assurance b! the Conressthat ratification has ta9en place as the Constitution coands. pon this assurance a proclaiedaendent ust be accepted as a part of the Constitution, learnin to the "udiciar! its traditional authorit!of interpretation. To the e2tent that the Court8s opinion in the present case even b! ipliedin assues apower to a9e "udicial interpretation of the e2clusive constitutional authorit! of Conress over subissionand b! ratification of aendents, we are unable to aree.

    Rel!in on this doctrine enunciated in Colean v. Miller supra this Court, in Mabana v. ope- >itol, 7 spea9in throuhMr. Gustice Pedro Tuason, ruled that the process of constitutional aendent, involvin proposal and ratification, is apolitical question. 1n the Maban case, the petitioners souht to prevent the enforceent of a resolution of Conressproposin the /Parit! Aendent/ to the Philippine Constitution on the round that it had not been approved b! the three5fourths vote of all the ebers of each house as required be Article => of the &'4@ Constitution. 1t was claied that three40 $enators and eiht 0 ebers of the ?ouse of Representatives had been suspended and that their ebership wasnot considered in the deterination of the three5 fourths O5 ore 1n disissin the petition on the round that the questionof the validit! of the proposal was political, the Court stated:

    /1f ratification of an aendent is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question.The question to steps copleent each other in a schee intended to achieve a sinle ob"ective. 1t is to be noted thataendator! process as provided in $ection 1 of Article => of the Philippine Constitution 8consists of onl!0 two distinctparts: proposal and ratification.8 There is no loic in attachin political character to one and withholdin that character frothe other. Proposal to aend the Constitution is a hihl! political function perfored b! the Conress in its sovereinleislative capacit! and coitted to its chare b! the Constitution itself. .../ At paes 75@, 1talics supplied.0

    1t is true that in Don-ales v. Coelec, ' this Court held that /the issue whether or not a Resolution of Conress, actin asa constituent assebl! 5 violates the Constitution is essentiall! "usticiable, not political, and h