9/11 and the Advent of Total Diplomacy: Strategic Communication as · PDF file · 2016-09-059/11 and the Advent of Total Diplomacy: Strategic Communication as a Primary ... power

Journalof9/11StudiesVolume38,July2013

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9/11andtheAdventofTotalDiplomacy:StrategicCommunicationasaPrimaryWeaponofWar

ByJérômeGygaxandNancySnow¥The 9/11 attacks were used to justify an institutional revolution meant tocomplete a process of integration and coordination of all the assets of USnationalpowerthroughastrategiccommunication(SC)campaigndeployedonaglobalscale.1The“GlobalWaronTerror”(GWOT)nurturedanarrativeofcrisisassociatedwith this unprecedented public education effort. In order to sell itsapproaches, the United States government relied on a network of “experts”:militaryveterans,high‐rankingofficerssuchasAdmiralsaswellasprofessionaljournalistsandacademicswhocontributedtoforgingaconsensus,or,asMichelFoucaultwouldcallit,a“regimeoftruth”thatclaimsacertaininterpretationtoberightandtrue,whileignoringordiscreditingcriticsanddissentingnarratives.The authors of the present article argue that this revolutionary phase,accomplished through 9/11, is in fact the product of a few decisive formativesteps that traceback toElihuRoot,a formerUSSecretaryofWar(1899‐1904)who, early in the 20th century, sketched the idea that any “control of foreignrelations by democracies” would necessitate an engagement in “populareducation.” Whenhe latercreatedtheUSArmyWarCollege,Rootemphasizedthat themilitary should insert itself in the social fabric of society in order toinfluencepolicyoutcomes.2Wefocushereonthehistoryofafewformativestagesthatrenderedpossiblethedeployment of “strategic communication,” and explain precisely how such aradical transformation operated in conjunction with the development of acounterinsurgencyparadigminthelastfewdecades.WestartbydescribinghowthemilitaryestablishmentandDepartmentofDefense (DoD)managed toedgeouttheStateDepartment(DoS)inthemanagementofPsychologicaloperations(PSYOP)duringtheearlyColdWar;wecontinuebyshowinghowaquasi‐civiliannetworkofsecurityexpertisegainedcovertcontrolof thesepubliceducationalprogramsandnationalsecurityseminars,andhowthesebroadened,unfetteredbyCongressionalscrutiny,asaresultoftheVietnamconflict3;finallyweexplainhow9/11decisivelypushedthis“blueprint”sothattheUSembracedinfluenceasaprimaryweaponofwar,engaginginabattleofnarrativesandjustifyingits

1Themostrecent:JanMelissen,TheNewPublicDiplomacy,SoftPowerinInternationalRelations,NewYork:Palgrave,2005;PhilipSeib,TowardaNewPublicDiplomacy,RedirectingU.S.ForeignPolicy,NewYork:Palgrave,2009;NancySnowandPhilipM.Taylor,RoutledgeHandbookofPublicDiplomacy,NewYork:Routledge,2009;WilliamA.Rugh,ThepracticeofPublicDiplomacy,ConfrontingChallengesAbroad,NewYork,Palgrave,2011.2Theideaof“populardiplomacy”wasusedin1922inthefirstissueofthejournalForeignAffairs,editedbytheCouncilonForeignRelations(CFR)inElihuRoot,“Arequisiteforthesuccessofpopulardiplomacy,”ForeignAffairs,issue1,no.1,1922.3GordonGray,thefirstGeneralArmyOfficertoheadthePsychologicalStrategyBoard(PSB,1951).Inhismemoir,GraymadeclearthatanycontroloverthemilitarybycivilianauthoritywasrenderedverydifficultbytheinstitutionalreformunderH.Truman.InterviewtranscriptbyPaulL.Hopper,OralHistoryrecords,ColumbiaUniversity,ButlerLibrary,December7,1966,p.317.


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right to shape perceptions and attitudes in order to achieve informationdominanceor“fullspectrumdominance.”4We ask towhat extent theUShas succeeded in “selling” its securitynarrative,adopting the weapons that modern revolutionaries used in the past to targetpopulationsacrossfrontiers.Thisdebateis lessaboutanallegedmilitarizationofcivilianprocessesthantheadoptionofquasi‐civilianfunctionsbythemilitary,usingthemilitary‐academic‐industrial network that has flourished over the years to serve this “totalapproach”towardsdiplomacy.5Althoughtheissueofbalanceinthecivil‐militaryrelationhasbeenaddressedbymanyscholars,fewhaveacknowledgedthesocialimplicationsofthisstateof"nowarnopeace"inwhichparamilitaryoperationsbecomethenorm.ThefundamentalissueposedbythenatureoftherelationshipbetweentheacademicexpertsandtheNationalSecurityestablishmentremainslargelyunexamineduntilnow.6The systematic integration and coordination of all instruments of US nationalpower were achievements that US military planners had long aspired to, andwere meant to ensure survival against all types of enemy. We postulate thatattemptstoalterthewarfaremodelprecededbyseveraldecadestherealizationof this grand scheme consequent to the 9/11 events, which functioned as thecatalytic“rational”sparkthatprecipitatedthis“fullspectrumdominance,”i.e.,aUSglobalhegemonyforthe21stcentury.IncorporatingthelatestcommunicationtechnologiesintotheUSnationalsecurityframeworkrepresenteda“conceptualcoup”thatgrantedtheUSwhatitneededtoshapeitsenvironmentaccordingtoitsownpowerstructureandtechnologies,abandoningtheoutdatedstate‐centricwarfaresystemforanew,communicationoriented,netcentricenvironment.74AmyB.Zegart,FlawedbyDesign,theEvolutionoftheCIA,JCS,andNSC,PaloAltoCA:StanfordUniversityPress,1999;LoriLynBogle,ThePentagon’sBattlefortheAmericanMind,CollegeStation:TexasA&MUniversityPress,2004;L.FletcherProuty,TheSecretTeam,theCIAanditsAlliesinControloftheUnitedStatesandtheWorld,NewYork:Skyhorse,2011.5SincetheearlyworkofArthurA.Ekrich,TheCivilianandtheMilitary,1956;followedbySydneyLens,PermanentWar:themilitarizationofAmerica,NewYork:SchockenBooks,1987.TheprominentroleofthePentagoninciviliandiplomacyhasbeenarguedbyNicholasJ.Cull,PeterVanHam,KarenDeYoungandmorespecificallytreatedbyMarkKilbane,“MilitaryPsychologicalOperationsasPublicDiplomacy,”inNancySnowandPhilipM.Taylor,op.cit.chapter15;aswellasbyAbiodunWilliams,“TheUSMilitaryandPublicDiplomacy”inPhilipSeib,op.cit.chapter11;AndrewJ.Bacevich,TheNewAmericanmilitarism,2005.6Amongtheauthorswhodoraisetheproblem:StephenGlain,Statevs.Defense,theBattletoDefineAmerica’sEmpire,NewYork:CrownPublishers,2011;ChristopherSimpson,ScienceofCoercion,Communicationresearchandpsychologicalwarfare19451960,OxfordUK:OxfordUniversityPress,1994.7JohnArquillaarguedthatPearlHarborgavetheUStheopportunitytoperformsucha"conceptualcoup"shiftingitsstrategyfromSeapowertoAirpoweratSea;wecanfindaparallelintheshiftfromaCommandandControlWarfareparadigm(C2W)toafourthgenerationwarfare(4GW)ornetwar,seenasa"battleofthestory"relyingon"influenceoperations"inwhichthemilitaryassumesasocialrole.JohnArquilla,WorstEnemy:TheReluctanttransformationoftheAmericanmilitary,Chicago:IvanR.Dee,2008.


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I.ThebirthofpsychologicaloperationsThe ability to frame events and shape public perceptions has become a policyfield in itself over theyearsdrawing from the researchofmodernpsychology.Many of the techniques of persuasion it engendered trace their origins torevolutionaries livingoutsidethe internationalorderandeagertochallenge itsvalue system.8The founding fathers of what was to become the “science ofcommunication”includedEdwardBernays,CarlHovland,PaulLazarsfeld,HaroldLasswell and Wilbur Schramm, all of whom applied their social influenceresearchtowartimepropagandaefforts.9The organization of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) duringWorldWarIwasbasedonthemilitarymodel;intheinterwarperiod,E.Bernays,headof CPI in Latin America, defined “propaganda” as the “executive arm of theinvisible government,” stressing that the human mind retains the patternsstampedonitbygroupinfluences.Indecision‐making,aperson’sfirstimpulseisusually to “follow the example of a trusted leader.”10Itwas during the SecondWorld War that H. Lasswell pleaded for an “integration of all spheres of thegovernmentwith themilitary.” it came to be seen that influencingpeoplewasmore easily accomplished through group dynamics and the use of “socialnetworks” than by mass media alone.11Lasswell at that time explained that“strategy” should be used to refer to the broad outlines of how diplomatic,economic, military and communication instruments had to be employed inpursuing the objectives of “Total Policy." He believed that: “We know that theworldattention structure isdominatedby themessagegatheringandmessagespreading activities of a few great centers. (….) By continuing to build a non‐Soviet network of specialists in international communications research it ispossibletocontributetotheformationofacommonframeofworldattention.”12Onlylater, in1970,wouldhequestiontheethical implicationsofhiswork,andthe placing of social scientists at the service of “institutions of war andoligarchy.”13

8PaulSharp,“RevolutionaryStates,OutlawRegimesandtheTechniquesofPublicDiplomacy,”inJanMelissen,op.cit.p.106.9EdwardBernays,Propaganda,NewYork:IGPublishing,2005(originallypublishedbyH.Liverlight,1928);HaroldD.Lasswell,Democracythroughpublicopinion,1941;H.D.Lasswell,“TheRelationofIdeologicalIntelligencetoPublicPolicy,”Ethics,vol.53,no.1,1942,pp.25‐34;H.D.Lasswell,“Psychologicalpolicyresearchandtotalstrategy,”ThePublicOpinionQuarterly,Vol.16,No.4,SpecialIssueonInternationalCommunicationsResearch,Winter1952‐1953,pp.491‐500;WilburSchramm,TheScienceofHumancommunication,NewYork,BasicBooks,1963.10EdwardBernays,op.cit.,pp.48,73.11EliuhKatz,“Thediffusionofnewideasandpractices»inSchrammW.,TheScienceofhumancommunication,1963,p.80.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,Lasswellwasdirectingasecretresearchunit,insidetheLibraryofCongresstoassisttheOfficeofWarInformation(OWI)seeWilsonP.Dizart,,InventingPublicDiplomacy:theStoryoftheUSInformationAgency,London,LynneRienner,2004,p.2012H.Lasswell,"PsychologicalPolicyresearchandTotalStrategy"inop.cit.,p.498.13SeeHaroldLasswell,"TheRelationofIdeologicalIntelligencetoPublicPolicy"inEthics,no53,vol.1,Oct1942,pp.25‐34;H.Lasswell"MustScienceservepoliticalpower?"inAmericanPsychologist,1970,no25,vol.2,pp.117‐119.


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AyearaftertheadoptionoftheNationalSecurityAct1947,theUSInformationandEducationalExchangeActof1948,alsoknownastheSmith‐MundtAct,wasvotedintolaw(PublicLaw80‐402).ThelattermarkedafirststepbytheUnitedStates towards formally managing the field of international informationactivities, later tobe called “public diplomacy.”Under the authority of theAct,the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) became responsible for overseeing “publicdiplomacy initiatives”abroad, independently fromtheStateDepartment(DOS).The act was in fact an early demonstration of mistrust on the part of thelegislative and executive branches toward the Department of State, seen asprone to Communist influence specifically, and to foreign subversion moregenerally.14It was not entirely fortuitous that the Department of Defense soon afterarticulatedtheneedtoestablishanindependentboardto“marshalallassetsofthe government, including overt information activities, to reach the USobjectives."Accordingly,ThePsychologicalStrategyBoard(PSB,April1951)wassetup tooperateas suchan interfacebetween theDepartmentofState (DOS),theDepartmentofDefense(DOD),theCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),andtheNational Security Council (NSC). Its role was to formulate national policy andprovideguidance,aswellastofosterresearch.15Thedominantparadigmatthetime was “Psychological Operations,“ an umbrella name used to describe “asystematicapplication,inpeaceandinwar,bydepartmentsandagenciesofthegovernment of all elements of US national power for the attainment offundamental national objectives.” This type of operation differed from other,moreconventionalmeansofapplyingpower,becausea): itreflecteda“greatersystem,”andb):itemphasizedeffectivemodesofpower(notformal‐traditional).NSC‐68/1 stated that an information program would foster the free world’spsychological resistance to Soviet aggression.16In fact, theKoreanWar (1950‐53), followed shortly by the Indochina wars, presented an unprecedentedchallenge to theUSgovernment’s ability to sustainably rallypublic supportbymeansofpropaganda.Although thePSB encompassed all types of coldwarfare, the official discoursewas that theUnited States, as a democratic state, could only act using “white"propaganda,meaning a communication consisting of truthful informationwithanunconcealedsource.YetsomemajorUSmediaoutletshadacceptedaformofquiet collaboration with the military, often through CIA operating channels,askinginchorustousesubversionasanoffensiveUSweapon.17ThegroupTime‐

14SeeReportoftheSmith‐MundtSymposium,January13,2009.AconsensusemergedthattheActshouldbeabolished,“amendedbythemodernage”(WilliamKiehl),yetthismightmeanamergerofPublicDiplomacyandPublicRelationsactivities,openingpotentialavenuesforaglobalscopeofaction.15ThiswasheadedbyGordonGray,aformersecretaryofthearmy.Toavertbureaucraticconflict,Graythoughtitunnecessarytogiveaprecisedefinitionof“psychologicaloperations.”ScottLucas,“Campaignsoftruth:thepsychologicalstrategyboardandAmericanideology,1951‐1953,”TheInternationalHistoryReview,Vol.18,No.2,May1996,pp.279‐302.16NSC‐68/1,Annex5,““USobjectivesandprogram…”21Sept.1950.17PaulM.A.LinebargerformermilitaryintelligenceduringWWIIauthordabook:PsychologicalWarfare,Nevada,Gateways,1948.Inwhichhedescribestheworkoftheleagueofprofessional


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Life, headed by Henry Luce, began a practice of giving publication space tomilitary experts and consultants. In a 1949 column,Wallace Carrollwrote thefollowinginLife:“Wemustpreparetosupportguerrillawarfareonsuchascaleastheworldhasneverseenbefore.”(Later,duringtheVietnamWar,Lifewouldpublishstoriesundertheheadline“FromtheFilesofNavalIntelligence”writtenwith the help of the DoD.18) According to historian Parry‐Giles, it is preciselyaroundtheKoreanWarperiodthata“militarizationprocess”oftheinformationprogramdidinfacttakeplace.On September 11, 1952, the PSB's “DoctrinalWarfare Panel”met for the firsttime. Itsprioritywasto findwaystotarget foreignelites.19Many“fronts”werequietlysetupbythemilitarythroughtheCIA,whichbegantooperatewiththeburgeoning of the “liberation movement.” The American Committee for theLiberation of the people of Russia (ACLPR), the Committee for a Free Europe(CFE),CommitteeforFreeAsia(CFA),andthe“MiddleEastCommittee”wereallofficially set up as private ventures.Nonetheless, all of themwere, in fact, theresultof amilitary initiativeunderCIAoperational guidance.20To someextentthese developments bore out the remarks of Senator EdwardRobertson,who,whentheCIAwascreatedonJuly7,1947,chargeditwithbeingan“invaluableassettomilitarism.”21ThepathtowardscovertlyinfluencingopinionSubsequent to the June 1948 NSC 10/2, regarded as insufficient by GeorgeKennan,theNSC68seriescalledforanintensificationofcovertoperationsinallfields,steppinguptheroleoftheCIAanditsOfficeofPolicyCoordination(OPC),gradually falling under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence(DCI).22TheJointChiefsofStaff(JCS)atthistimedefinedpsychologicalwarfareas comprising “the planned use of propaganda and related informationalmeasuresdesignedtoinfluencetheopinions,emotions,attitudesandbehaviorsof enemy, neutral or friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support theaccomplishmentofnationalpoliciesandaims,oramilitarymission.”23Civilian aid programs such as the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) soonturned into military assistance programs under the Mutual Security Agency

propagandistssuchasDr.GeorgeGallup,ElmoRoper,Profs.NathanLeitesandHadleyCantrilcenteredonTheAmericanAssociationofPublicOpinionResearch(AAOPR).18W.A.Swanberg,LuceandhisEmpire,NewYork:CharlesScribner’sSons,1972,p.447.19ShawnParry‐Giles,TheRhetoricalPresidency,Propaganda,andtheColdWar,19451955,London:Praeger,2002,p.83.20LiamKennedyandScottLucasfocusonthekeyroleofthesestate‐privatenetworks.SeeLiamKennedyandScottLucas,“PublicDiplomacyandU.S.ForeignPolicy,”inAmericanQuarterly,Vol.57,No.2,June2005,pp.309‐333.21QuotedinDavidM.Barrett,TheCIAandCongress,theUntoldstoryfromTrumantoKennedy,LawrenceKS:UniversityPressofKansas,2005,p.22.22MemofromCharlesR.Norberg(PSB)toJohnSherman(AssistantDirectorOPC),October11,1951;MinutesofmeetingofPSBAdHocCommitteeonCovertActivities,Oct3,1951inPSBSeries,Box13,TrumanArchives.NSC10/2wassupersededbyNSC10/5inOctober1951authorizingworldwidecovertoperations.23ShawnParry‐Giles,op.cit.


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(MSA,1951‐53).24TheMSA,underthedirectionofAverellW.Harriman,RichardBissell,andWilliamH.DraperJr.,fosteredaglobalinfluenceprogramthatservedas a relay for information operations conducted by the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) and its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe(SHAPE).25In 1953, the same year that saw the establishment of the United StatesInformationAgency(USIA)asthepublicdiplomacyarmofthegovernment,thePSB was placed under NSC supervision and subjected to a name change,becomingtheOperationsCoordinatingBoard(OCB).TheOCBharboredthefirstUSStrategicCenter forglobalpropaganda,andreoriented itsefforts towardsafuller privatization with an emphasis on winning domestic public opinion inordertoprevailintheglobalcontest.CertaininternalPSB‐OCBdocumentshavecometolightexposinghowtheUSpropagandaapproachwasinspiredbySovietpractices. In particular, Soviet mastermind Lavrentiy Beria had evidentlyauthoreda“HandbookofTerror”thathighofficialsthoughtitnecessarytokeepsecretandoutof theeyesof thepublic.TheyexpectedtoturnthetableontheSovietsandplaysomeoftheirowntricksagainstthem.26Other,lesssanguinaryreports refer explicitly to a need to transform the cultural patterns of targetaudiences.Thiswasalsothemomentatwhichthegrandstrategistssoughttodistancethegovernmentasmuchaspossible fromalleffortsatpersuasion. InMarch1952,Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens wrote to Frank Wisner: “Possibly some of theforeignorganizationsthatarewellcontrolledbyOPCcanbeusedforpurposesother than those for which they are established. (….) And where OPC controloverforeignorganizationisnotfirm,butmoreinthenatureofinfluence–suchasbigtradeunionasdistinctfromawholly‐ownednewspaper–OPCcapabilitiescanbeexpectedtobegreaterwhenourobjectivescoincidewiththeobjectivesofsuchorganizations.”27This evolution was in part a result of the Jackson Committee findings, whichstated that psychological warfare was inseparable from other aspects of USforeignpolicyandneededtobebettercoordinatedandcentralized.28OneofthemostsignificantchangesthattheJacksoncommitteecalledforwasadecreaseinthe use of official propaganda channels and an increase in the privatizationeffort.

24Inthesummer1951,theMSAhadprovided$7.5billioninforeigneconomicandmilitaryaid.25CharlesHultenattheDoSwasresponsibleforcoordinatingMSAactivitieswiththeUSIS.26MemofromPalmerPutnamtoGordonGray,October18,1951,PSBSeries,Box11,TrumanArchives,Independence.27MemofromViceAdmiralLeslieC.StevenstoFrankWisner,March19,1952,PSBseries,Box14,TrumanArchives.28Namedafteritschair,formerCIAdeputydirectorWilliamJackson.SeeKennethA.Osgood,"WordsandDeeds:Race,Colonialism,andEisenhower’spropagandawarintheThirdWorld"inKathrynC.StatlerandAnchewL.Johns,TheEisenhowerAdministration,theThirdWorld,andtheGlobalizationoftheColdWar,NewYork:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers,2006,pp.5‐6;ShawnParry‐Giles,op.cit.p.134.


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At end of the 1950s, before the USIA had become an interface between thegovernmentandtheprivatesector,PresidentEisenhowerthwartedanattemptto fold the it into the State Department.29Meanwhile, the CIA collaboratedcloselywith themilitaryestablishment, securinga financial and scientific edgeover the DoS. Clark Clifford, Allen Dulles, John McCone, Maxwell Taylor andothersbecamea core aroundwhichwasbuilt a strongnetworkof supporters,including major businesses and universities‐‐the University of Pennsylvania,University of Illinois, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ColumbiaUniversity, the University of North Carolina, Harvard, and others. This selfselected elitewas already developing the “new generation”war plans, namelycounterinsurgency. According to Historian Amy B. Zegart, the OPC “had beentransformed from a small office that conducted ad hoc political informationactivities toavastorganizationthatperformedongoingcovertoperationsonamassive scale.”30With the development of these programs, a newdefinition ofthe role and responsibility of the armed forces emerged, helping the CIA toassume new war planning functions, and allowing it to support paramilitaryoperationsbytheJointChiefsofStaff.31

AtthesametimeastheSovietsweredenouncingtheinstrumentalizationofso‐called assistance programs for the purposes of fomenting anti‐communistsedition, themassivecommunicationseffortonthepartof theUSensuredthatnoonemuch listened to its critics.32PsychologicalWarfarewas a tawdry labelfor these activities, soon to be replaced by the more distinguished term:“StrategicInternationalInformationOperations.”33II.TheParadigmShiftandtheDefenseofCounterinsurgencyWarfareTheescalationoftheVietnamWarduringthedecadefollowingKennedy’sdeathinNovember1963 sawa shift towards the “privatization” of public diplomacypractices. During this period, the military seemed to have succeeded indeveloping its own bodies of “private citizens” to help defend its policies andinduce the American public to accept a protracted war. The public‐privatecollaboration was extensive, and primarily concerned research and scientificexpertise (through think tanks and book publications), as well as informationandnews(mainlythroughTV,radiobroadcastsandmotionpictures).The civilian side of these Information Operations was dubbed “publicdiplomacy,”aphrasecoinedbyEdmundGullionDeanof theFletcherSchoolof

29NicholasJ.Cull,"Howwegotthere"inPhilipSeib,op.cit.,p.31.30AmyZegart,FlawedbyDesign,theevolutionoftheCIA,JCSandNSC,Stanford,StanfordUniversitypress,1999,p.189.31DefensestatedthatpsychologicalwarfareplanshadtobeinconsonancewithmilitaryplansandrequiredguidanceoftheJCS.NavyandAirForcewereprovidingextensivefundsforoutsidestudiesinthefield.32SeeA.M.Rosenthal,“VishinskyasksU.N.forceU.S.tostophelptoanti‐reds”inNewYorkTimes,23.12.51,p.3.33PaulM.A.Linebarger,PsychologicalWarfare,WashingtonDC:Gateway,1954,2ndedition,p.277.


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Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, contemporaneously with theestablishmentoftheEdwardR.MurrowCenterforPublicDiplomacy.34The first pamphlet produced by the Murrow Center described the practice ofpublic diplomacy as: “the influence of public attitudes on the formation andexecution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of internationalrelations beyond traditional diplomacy . . . [including] the cultivation bygovernments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of privategroups and interests in one country with those of another . . . (and) thetransnational flow of information and ideas." Even before Gullion's use of thetermpublicdiplomacy,theconcept itrepresentshadhardlybeensettled,35andappeared to be largely a cover for what the government could not fit intotraditional diplomacy.36Furthermore definition became ever more blurred asthe USIA engaged alongside CIA programs and fronting institutions in severalcovertactivitiesthatescalatedattheturnofthe1960s,particularlyinSoutheastAsia.37AciviliancoverformilitaryeducationalactivitiesThePSB‐OCB,untildismantledbyPresidentKennedyin1961,helpedfosterandfinancethefieldofBehavioralResearch.Itsdirectors,GordonGrayandRaymondB.Allen,hadgonefromandtoleadinguniversitypositions.Manyprofessorsandsocialscientistswereenrolledas“paidconsultants”asthemilitarysettledonapractice of allocating contracts to specific private institutions.38 The RANDCorporation, originally organized by the Air Force in 1946, had become anindependentnot‐for‐profitorganizationtwoyearslater,withHansSpeier(“Thefuture of psychologicalwarfare,” 1952) as chief of its social science division.39TheCouncilfortheDefenseofFreedom(CDF,1951),theForeignPolicyResearch

34Murrowdiedatage57inApril1965afterheadingtheUnitedStatesInformationAgencyfrom1961‐1964.35Theconceptsthatpredatethetermarethoseofpopulardiplomacy,followedbycitizendiplomacy,initiatedbyPresidentEisenhower.TheWhiteHousesummitonCitizenDiplomacyin1956ledtotheestablishmentofPeople‐to‐peopleInternational.SimilarsummitswerereinstatedinJuly2006andFebruary2008.36AccordingtoM.Baldyga,whenEdmundGullionmintedtheterm“publicdiplomacy”hewastryingtobringintoonephrasealltheactivitiesoftheUnitedStates’public‐privategovernmentalinteractionswiththeworld.SeePanel1,2009Smith‐MundtSymposium,historyoftheSmith‐MundtAct,January13,2009,p.17.37GarryS.Messinger,TheBattlefortheMind,Amherst,UniversityofMassachusettsPress,2010,pp.162,177.38Prof.FrederickBarghoorn(YaleUniversity);WalterRostow(CenterforInternationalStudies,MIT,Boston);SamuelL.Sharp(AmericanUniversity);WilliamPhillips(SchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies,WashingtonD.C.);BryceWood(SocialScienceResearchCouncil);ArthurWhitaker(UniversityofPennsylvania);JohnGardner(VicePresidentofCarnegieCorp.)HerbertHyman(ColumbiaUniversity,NY);GabrielAlmond(Princeton,CenterforResearchinInternationalRelations.);HenryKissinger(Harvard,Boston)tonameafewexamplesofwhatIrvingLouisHorowitzcalled“Thecivilianmilitarists”inSidneyLens,Permanentwar:ThemilitarizationofAmerica,NewYork,SchockenBooks,1987,p.49.39Setuptoestablishanarsenalofideastohelpcopewithnationalsecurityproblems.SeeSaulFriedman,“TheRandCorporationandourpolicymakers,”TheAtlanticMonthly,September1963,pp.61‐68.


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Institute (FPRI, 1955) at the University of Pennsylvania, the National StrategyInformationCenter(NSIC,1962)andtheCenter forStrategicand InternationalStudies(CSIS,1962)werebutafewexamplesofthecivil‐militarysymbiosis.The concepts of “protracted conflict” and “counterinsurgency warfare” werescientifically developed at these national security centers. In fact, many“psychological operations” (PSB/OCB) were elaborated under the guidance oftheir psychologists and social scientists. Meanwhile, “counterinsurgency” wasdefinedas: “thetechniqueofusing, inappropriatecombination,allelementsofNationalPowerinsupportofafriendlygovernmentwhichisindangerofbeingoverthrownbyanactivecommunistcampaign.”40The correspondence of some of these experts is an invaluable resource inattempting to understand this relationship between private industry and themilitary, none more so than that of FPRI deputy director Colonel WilliamKintner, an active Army officer assigned to the Plans Division, Office of theAssistantChiefofStaffforMilitaryOperations.The first National Military‐Industrial conference took place in March 1955,sponsored by the defense industry and the various branches of the ArmedForces.Apermanentyear‐roundprogramwasinstitutedin1959attheNationalWarCollegeinWashington.UnderthepresidencyofFrankR.Barnett,theFPRIsupplied the substance of the program for the Institute for American Strategy(IAS),whoseobjectivewastoawakenthepublictothe“all‐encompassingnatureoftheSoviet‐Communistchallenge.”BarnettlaterassumedthepresidencyoftheNSIC.The strategy seminars were authorized by the JCS and sponsored by the IAS,funded by the CIA through the Richardson Foundation. The third iteration ofthese was held in Pittsburgh on 15 April 1961 on the topic of “FourthDimensionalWarfare.”Duringthesession,Col.Kintner,speakingaschiefoflongrange planning for the US Army, advocated an “integrated national strategy”basedonmilitarypower to “turnbackcommunismandextend the frontiersoffreedom.”Inessence,theseforeignpolicyinstitutesfunctionedascommunicationbridges.A fewyears laterF.Barnett's letterswould share their achievementswithCol.Kintner:“Wehavenowestablishedanation‐widedistributionnetfor(a)books,filmsandothereducationalmaterialsrelatingtoCommunistAffairsand(b)thebrochuresandprogramoutlinesofresponsiblegroupsmeetingthechallenge.”

We do have effective constituents among 12 trade associations,3000clergymen,85Universityscholars,2000highschoolteachers,4000 lawyers, 75 editors and publishers, and 2000 NationalWarCollege reserve alumni with and for whom we have organized

40SeeFletcherProuty,op.cit.p.476.ProutyservedasthechiefofspecialoperationsfortheJointChiefsofStaffduringtheKennedyyears.


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forumsonnationalsecurityandCommunism.”41Inanotherpieceofcorrespondence,Barnettdidnothingtoconcealhisprideregardingthe levelof cooperationbetween thewarcollegesand theprivatesector,writing:“Wedon’twanttoimposeontheAdmirals;butonceor twice a year it may be feasible to “advertise” our nationalsecurityproductwiththeirhelp,especiallybeforeaudiencesoftopbusinessmenandbankers.42

The role of CSIS merits further study. Created by Chief of Naval operationsAdmiralArleighBurke,itwasco‐chairedbyRichardV.Allen,thefutureNationalSecurity Adviser to Ronald Reagan. 43 Admiral Burke spoke out repeatedlyagainstcivilians'attemptstodictatethecourseofmilitarystrategyinVietnam.44Most of the money financing CSIS came from conservative philanthropicorganizationsand foundations.Thebiggestdonorswere theultra conservativeScaife foundation, and Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia. After itsfoundation CSIS had instituted a “Middle East project” aswell as a “Near Eastproject.” In 1967 it issued a major study on Islamic fundamentalism, soon tobecomeaprominenttopicundertheleadershipofWalterLaqueur(ChairmanoftheResearchCouncil),aformeremigrantfromGermanywho,afterhavingbeena leading anti‐communist expert, became a leading specialist on “internationalterrorism.”TheUSIA collaborationwith theCIA in thepublishing industrywas channeledthroughanentitycalledOperationsandPolicyResearchInc.(OPR)whoseboardof directors includedHaroldLasswell, thenPresidentof theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation.Thisprovidedacoverthroughwhichitcouldsecureoutsideassistanceunfetteredbyofficialconnections.45SenatorsGeorgeMcGovernandJ.WilliamFulbrightwerethemostvocalcriticsofthese manipulations, and of those who were using the “tactics of fear” topromoteworst‐casescenarios.46Inthespringof1961,SenatorFulbrightreadamemo to the Congressional Record denouncing this civilian veneer of themilitary establishment.47The move led to a frontal collision between J. W.

41LetterfromF.BarnetttoWilliamR.Kintner,21September1966,inKintnerPapers,Box6,HooverInstitute,StanfordCA.42LetterfromF.BarnetttoOmarPace,17September1966,inKintnerPapers,Box6,HooverInstitute,StanfordCA.43ArleighBurkewasalsothepresidentoftheKoreanCulturalandFreedomFoundation,formedinJuly1964tofinanceRadioFreeAsia,whichstarteditsactivitieson15.08.1966.SeeMarieMcNair,“TheAdmiralnevertookdowntheflag,”TheWashingtonPost,03.08.64.44TheEveningStar,10.07.64.45From1967on,USIAfinancedtheOPR’sunpublicizedcontracts.ThefirstbookwasTarget:TheWorld,editedbyEvronKirkpatrick,andpublishedbyMcMillan,1965;Kirkpatrick,wasaformermemberoftheStateDepartment’sOfficeofIntelligenceresearch,andthehusbandofJeanneKirkpatrick,whopublishedStrategyofDeception:AStudyofWorldwidecommunisttactics,NewYork:FarrarStraussandCo.,1964.46TheWashingtonPost,10.05.71,p.13.47Thisincludedvariousprojectssuchas"ProjectAlert"financedandsupportedbytheNavyLeagueoftheUnitedStates.SeeSeymourMartinLipsetandEarlRaab,Thepoliticsofunreason,RightWingextremisminAmerica,17901970,NewYork:Harper&Row,1970,p.314.


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Fulbright, backed by J. F. Kennedy, and Strom Thurmond (R.‐South Carolina),supportedbythemilitarycadre.48

Despite Kennedy’s backing of Senator Fulbright in public, the Kennedyadministration was, more discreetly, supportive of CIA‐backedcounterinsurgency operations that utilized the USIA and its popular head,Edward R. Murrow, appointed by Kennedy ostensibly for his gold standardreputation in wartime international broadcasting and American journalism.Directed by the Kennedy White House, Murrow’s USIA participated incounterinsurgency courses through the Foreign Service Institute and the U.S.Army Special Warfare School in Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. As the agencyresponsibleforchairingthePsychologicalCoordinatingCommitteeforLaosandVietnam, the USIA became heavily involved with applying counterinsurgencydoctrine to Southeast Asia, serving as a member of the CounterinsurgencyCommittee Special Group headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS)GeneralMaxwellTaylorinchargeofalltheplanningofcovertactionsinthe region.49 Murrow’s USIAwas also the propaganda sponsor for US‐backedSouth Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem. 50 Despite his background intraditional journalism, Murrow fully embraced his role as a governmentpropagandist.Fromtheendofthe1960suntilthemid‐1970s,aseriesofdisclosuresfocusedonthe “Pentagon Papers” revealed, though only partially, how the CIA and themilitary had dissimulated in their influence campaign by camouflaging itwiththese private bodies, thus avoiding legislative oversight. The Church andOtis‐PikeCommissionsthatweresetuptoshedlightontheseactivitiesfailedtofullyexposetheworkingmechanismsofthisschemeandpreventedanydismantlingof thestructuresof thiscivil‐militaryapparatus,whichmerelywaitedpatientlyforReagantoreinstatethem.51Although the Vietnam War was revealed to be an open failure in terms ofInformation Operations, the amount of effort expended in attempting toinfluenceworld public opinionwas unparalleled. Because “counterinsurgency”was a paramilitary area of operation, it required the closest coordination of48YoungprofessorGabrielKolkowouldbecomeoneoftheacademicsleadingthechargetocuttiesbetweentheDoDandUniversities.SeeWillLissner,“U.ofPennsylvaniadropssecretresearchforU.S.,”NewYorkTimes,05.11.1966,p.1,3;SenateCongressionalRecord,11.08.61,p.14448.49InOctober1964,ArmyChiefofStaffHaroldK.Johnsonviewedcounterinsurgency(COIN)as“themajormissioninforseablefuture”inAnnMarlowe,“Afghanistan:America’swarofperception”inPolicyReview,no167,June‐July2011,pp.19‐35.GeneralTaylorlaterbecamepresidentoftheInstituteforDefenseAnalysis(1966‐1969)ataboutthesamsperiodhewasaSpecialConsultanttpthePresidentandChairmanoftheForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoard(1965‐1969).50“MurrowattheUSIA,”DigitalCollectionsandArchives,TheMurrowCenter,TuftsUniversity,http://dca.lib.tufts.edu/features/murrow/exhibit/usia.html51JamesW.McCord,alieutenantcolonelintheAirForce,CIAandFBIofficertestifiedinfrontoftheSenateWatergateCommitteethattheWhiteHousehadbeentryingsince1971togetpoliticalcontrolovertheCIAassessmentsandestimatesinordertomakethemconformtopolicyobjectives.ThismeantthatintelligenceproductscouldthenbeforcedtoaccordtheDoDneeds,futureweaponsneeds,andwouldgivetheillegaltacticsanationalsecuritycover.


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political, economic, psychological and military actions. The USIA’s deepinvolvement in psychological warfare operations during the Vietnam Warpresupposedthatittargetnotonlyforeignbutdomesticaudiences.TheclashbetweenFulbrightandthemilitaryovertheconflationofcivilianandmilitary activities continued for at least a decade, with former CIA Director,SenatorWilliamH. Jackson,actingasFulbright’sprincipaladversary.Fulbright,aschairmanoftheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,wantedtoshieldculturefrominformationactivities,andopenlycriticizedwhatheviewedasa“salesman”mentality. He espoused democracy by example instead of indoctrination. Forhim,the“hard‐sell”hadbeen,andremained,counterproductive.52As the Vietnam War ended, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),originally formed in 1950 as a private citizens committee, was reformed(1976).53ItwasaddedtotheseveraldozensimilarorganizationscoordinatedbytheAmericanSecurityCouncil(ASC),akindofcentralcommitteetothemilitary‐academic‐industrial network, composedpredominantlyof retiredhighmilitaryofficers,suchasAdmiralsRadford,StevensandWilliamC.Mott.54Followingthewar, the boundaries between military and civilian activities became moreblurredthanever.ShapingthenewinternationalterrorismparadigmAs soonas theVietnamwithdrawalnegotiationswere concluded, civil‐militarythinktanksrushedtopublicizetheirresearchexaminingtheprecedingdecade,claimingthatAmericansecuritynolongerrestedonthedefenseofterritory.Thenotion of security itself was definitively altered. The major function of themilitary, as Samuel P. Huntington expressed it, was no longer to deteraggression,but to supportdiplomacy.As anewprophet aswell as aPentagonconsultant, he claimed that the strategic concept of the next decade had to bedefined by thework of themilitary.55An elite group that included Paul Nitze,Eugene andWaltRostow, James Schlesinger andRichardV.Allen, all ofwhomwere members of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) after 1976,

52J.WilliamFulbrightpublishedabookentitledThePentagonPropagandamachine(1970)inwhichhenotedthatsincethemid1960s,themilitaryhadexpandeditscivilianpropagandaactivities.SeeGarryS.Messinger,op.cit.p.180.53TheCommitteeonthePresentDanger,foundedbyPaulNitze,aformersecretaryoftheNavy,deputy secretary of defense and drafter ofNSC‐68was soon to become very influential in thepublicdebate.TheoriginalCPDwasheadedbyJamesB.ConantandboastedformerheadoftheOSS(formerCIA)WilliamJ.Donovanasamember.54“TheForeignPolicyResearchInstitute”inRemparts,August1966,pp.39‐40.SeealsotheDraftwrittenbyFrankR.Barnett,titled:“CouncilforthecommonDefense,”Nov25,1969thatdetailalltheinitiativesandgrassrootscomponentsofthe“publicinformationnetwork.”FolderBarnett1968‐69,KintnerPapers,box6,HooverInstitute,StanfordCA.55SamuelP.Huntington,“Aftercontainment:Thefunctionsofthemilitaryestablishment,”AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,vol.406,TheMilitaryandAmericanSociety,Mar.1973,pp.1‐16.TheUSCombatDevelopmentCommand(CDC,1970)entitled“Manandthe1990environment”predictedthatinthefuture“themajorportionofthearmy’seffort(wouldbe)devotedtoanaccomplishmentofquasi‐civilianfunctions.”QuotedinPeterWatson,WarontheMind:theMilitaryusesandabusesofPsychology,NewYork,BasicBooks,1978.


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warnedthatinertiaandpassivityinthefieldofNationalDefenseandthelackofinvestment in new warfare doctrines would lead to growing instability andinsecurity.56A formerArmy Intelligence officer duringWorldWar II,HenryKissinger,whohad been picked out by Nelson Rockefeller while Cold War advisor toEisenhower,graduallybecameashiningstarunderpresidentsNixonandFord.Acting asNational SecurityAdviser and Secretary of State,Kissingerbecameamemberofallprominentmilitary‐academiccenters,andapivotalfigureinlayingout the framework for responding to “international terrorism“ with a War‐Terror‐Crimediscourse.57Assuch,hecontributedtosettingupaNationalCentertoCombatTerrorism(NCCT)within theDOS inDecember1974,andmanaged,with thehelpof JohnSchlesinger, to force the issueof a transformationof theintelligence apparatus. 58 By marginalizing the function of the NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE), seen as an obstacle to freedom of action by theexecutive branch, and more specifically the Pentagon, Kissinger furthered aprocessalreadyunderway,namelythepoliticizationof“intelligence.”59The “framing” of terrorism in terms of an “international conspiracy” between1972and1976wasrenderedfeasiblethroughamobilizationofalltheseassets.The military had improved its capacity to lobby Congress, to overwhelm itsopponents, and todraw favor for its new “network centric” doctrines, tailoredfor a “deterritorialized” approach to securitywith RAND and CSIS as the coreinstitutionsresponsible for thisgradualredesignofpublicdiplomacy.FrankM.Stanton,chairmanoftheRANDboardoftrusteesandpresidentofCBS,directedthe committee responsible for redesigning the information program afterVietnam(StantonPanel,1975).60The phenomenon of “Terrorism Studies,” monopolized by experts, fed thegeneralaswellastheofficialpolicydiscourse,andeventuallybuiltaconsensusintheformofaunifiedapproach,underwaywellbeforeRonaldReagan’sascenttopower in1980.61Threeyearsearlier,YonahAlexanderhad started toedit ajournalcalledTerrorism,ayearbeforeWalterLaqueur,inhisTerrorismReader,established a grand narrative of political violence.62Laqueurwas one of thosewhoadvocated resorting to violence and covert actions against terrorists (TheAgeofTerrorism, 1987). The JerusalemConference on International Terrorism56TheCPDhadthreeco‐chairmen:HenryH.Fowler,LaneKirkland,DavidPackard.EugeneV.Rostow,ChairmanoftheExec.Comm;PaulH.Nitze,ChairmanofPolicyStudies.GeneralCounselMaxM.Kampelman,Exec.committee:RichardV.Allen,EdmundGullion,RitaE.Hauser,CharlesBurtonMarshall,JohnP.Roche,DeanRusk,RichardJ.Wahlen.57JosephCampos,TheStateandTerrorism,2007,p.33.58Dr.LewisHoffackerledthisbody.59UnderPresidentFord,KissingerandthePresidentialForeignAdvisoryBoard(PFIAB)convincedthePresidenttoengageanoutsideteam,team‐B,tochallengeCIAintelligenceestimates.Theofficeofnationalestimate(ONE)wascloseddown.60TheCommissionontheOrganizationoftheGovernmentfortheConductofForeignPolicyendorsedtherecommendationsoftheStantonPaneltorestructureUSIA.PL92‐325,ThereportwasissuedJune28,1975:http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20213.pdf61JasonFranks,RethinkingtheRootsofTerrorism,NewYork:Palgrave,2006.62JohnCollins,andRossGlover,CollateralLanguage:Auser’sguidetoAmerica’sNewWar,2002,p.178.


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(JCIT) in the summer of 1979 contributed to establishing the ideologicalfoundationofthefuturewaronterrorism.Itbearsnotethattheissueofterrorism,asitwasdefined,wasinsomewaysthefulfillmentofademandcomingfromthecoldwarriorsandtheNationalSecurityestablishment; they were looking for ways to bypass legislative restrictionsplacedonthefreedomofexecutiveactionafterVietnam.63

RonaldReaganandtheStrategicCommunicationoffensive

According to former USIA officials, the Reagan administration, underneoconservative influence, triedharder thananyof itspredecessors toconverttheagencyintoapartisanideologicalweapon.ThedoubleIranian‐Afghancrisisin 1979‐1981 revived US security commitments to an area spanning from thePersian Gulf to South‐East Asia. Ronald Reagan, building on Nixon andKissinger’s preparatorywork, undertook a strategy tomarket discourse aboutthe defense of the free world against “international terrorism.” The issue notonly became the central point of his domestic policy, but the focus of aninternational campaign of persuasion, or “truth projection.” The experts werecentraltothiseffort.Organizedasinformalnetworks,theyprovidedguidanceforleadership,helpingtocoordinatethecommunicationeffortandmakeitcohesiveandconsistentforaglobalaudience. Public diplomacy and the USIA were placed at the service of theseobjectives.UnderCharlesZ.Wick,theUSIAextendeditstieswiththeCIAandthePentagon.64JeremiahDenton(R‐Alabama),whochairedthehearingsofthe1981to1986SubcommitteeonSecurityandTerrorism(SST),laidthefoundationsinCongress of what, according to historian Gold‐Biss, became the “conspiracytheory argumentation,” creating the illusion of a “seamless web of violence”against the West. So‐called experts such as Claire Sterling, Arnaud deBorchgrave,andRobertMoss,stillverymuchactivetoday,craftedthenarrativeof “terror as an international conspiracy.”65The National Security DecisionDirective NSDD77 (January, 1983) explained that US public diplomacy wasmeanttocounterSoviet“activemeasures,”atermdenotingcovertanddeceptiveoperations in support of Soviet foreign policy, and the new special planninggroup for public diplomacy (SPG), now under NSC authority, soundedsuspiciouslylikearebirthoftheOCB.AyearlaterNSDD130statedtheOverallobjective:“International information isan integralandvitalpartofUSnationalsecuritypolicyandstrategyinthebroadsense.Togetherwithothercomponentsof public diplomacy, it is a key strategic instrument for shaping fundamentalpolitical and ideological trends around the globe on a long‐term basis andultimatelyaffectingthebehaviorofgovernments.”66

63EricHershbergandKevinW.Moore,CriticalViewsofSeptember11:AnalysesfromAroundtheWorld,2002,p.48.64TheReportoftheUnitedStatesAdvisoryCommissiononPublicDiplomacy,headedbyLeonardL.Silverstein,statedthatpublicdiplomacywasindispensabletoUSnationalsecurityand,wiselyused,couldlessenthepossibilityofmilitaryconflict.SeeR.T.Arndt,ThefirstresortofKings:AmericanCulturalDiplomacyintheTwentiethCentury,2005,p.527.65MichaelGold‐Biss,TheDiscourseonTerrorism:PoliticalviolenceandtheSST,19811986,1994.66DatedMarch6,1984athttp://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23‐2213t.gif


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The single individual who best personifies this strategy is Ray Cline. A

high‐rankingmemberoftheCIAfrom1949to1966,hethenmovedtotheCSIS.Regularlyinterviewedbythemedia,hecontributedtoarticlesandbookssuchasTerrorism,theSovietConnection,withYonahAlexander(1984).67Together,theyshapedaperceptionthattheSovietUnionwasbehindaformidableconspiracyofterror.AnotherprominentexpertisAnthonyH.Cordesman,whocurrentlyholdstheArleighA.BurkeChairinStrategyatCSIS.HewasaprominentmediasourceduringtheFirstGulfWar’sOperationDesertShieldandOperationDesertStorm.CordesmanistheauthorofdozensofbooksonterrorismandnationalsecurityandisarecipientoftheDepartmentofDefenseDistinguishedServiceMedal.68More study should be devoted to the US government response in the field ofinformationoperationstoSovietinterventioninAfghanistan.TheCouncilfortheDefense of Freedom, created in 1951 for the purpose of helping mobilizeresistance to communist aggression in Korea, under the name of the CouncilAgainstCommunistAggression,generatedanewaffiliate:“TheCommitteeforaFreeAfghanistan”(CFA,1981).TheCFAheadquarterssharedabuildingwiththeconservativeHeritagefoundation,whichwasbusyinvestingimmeasurableeffortandfundsinordertoshapepublicperceptionsofsecurityandcounterterrorism,exploitingasmuchasitcouldtheinstrumentofpublicsurveys.69TheCFA’sexecutivedirectorin1981wasKarenMcKay,aformermajorintheUSArmy.CFA’sactivitiesincludedanextensiveinformationprogramthatincludedaweeklynewsletter,monitoringcommunistAfghans,identifyingSovietviolationsof human rights and financing humanitarian projects, including treatment ofvictims inUShospitals.According to its own strategicplan,CFAwas “theonlymajor organization working on all major fronts to mobilize public opinion inAmerica,andintherestofthefreeworld,insupportoftheAfghanfighters.”70OnFebruary16th,1983,sixofthemmetprivatelywithPresidentReaganintheOvalOffice,ameetingarrangedbytheCFA.71TheliaisonwiththeUSgovernmentwasmadepossiblethroughtheNationalEndowmentforDemocracy(NED,1983),anindependently created program that boasted as board members no less than

67YonahAlexanderisnowDirectoroftheInternationalCenterforTerrorismStudies(ICTS).Inarecentop‐edco‐authoredwithDr.MiltonHoenigfortheJerusalemPost,hewarnsthatAlQaedaismotivatedtoavengethedeathofOsamaBinLadenandcouldaspiretostrikewithanucleardevice.Publishedat:http://www.potomacinstitute.org/on16.08.2011.68http://csis.org/program/burke‐chair‐counterinsurgency69TheheadofthepresidentiallyappointedCommissionforPublicDiplomacy,theoversightbodyforUSIA,wasEdwinFeulner,Jr.,presidentofthe(Scaife‐funded)Heritagefoundation.SeeStevenLivingston,TheTerrorismSpectacle,SanFranciscoCA:WestviewPress,1994,p.161.AccordingtoLivingstonitappearedthattheHeritageFoundation,initsefforttoinfluencetheFBIguidelines,wasdeclaringwaronanyandalldissentfromofficialpolicy.70“AStrategyplantodefeatSovietaggression,”CFA,January1983.71JoséDesloge,“FreeAfghanistanReport,”TheCommitteeforafreeAfghanistan,no.5,May1983.MovieswereproducedbytheUSIAfeaturingactorKirkDouglasfrom1982to1984,withtitlessuchas:“ThanksgivinginPeshawar,”“AfghanistanintheHiddenWar.”SeeNicholasJ.Cull,“Filmaspublicdiplomacy:theUSIA’scoldwarattwenty‐fourframespersecond,”inKennethOsgoodandBrianC.Etheridge(ed.),TheUnitedStatesandPublicDiplomacy,newdirectionsinculturalandinternationalhistory,2010,p.279.


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Kissinger,LaneKirkland,presidentoftheAFL‐CIO,andDanteFascell,headoftheHouseForeignAffairsCommittee.72The independent “Committee for the Free World” (CFW, 1981), chaired byDonaldRumsfeld,wasadvocatingasimilarlyambitiouscalendar to theCFA. InitsApril1986Newsletter,theCFWdeclared:“Wehavetheopportunitytoletthebrave mujahideen of Afghanistan know that their incredible resistance to theSovietsisnotvain,thatitisnottheendbutthebeginning.”73

The experts from all these ostensibly non‐governmental institutions‐‐Cordesman, Burke, Cline, Possony, Alexander, Kissinger and many others‐‐managed to create extensive informal networks, providing guidance forleadership and helping to coordinate the communication effort, shaping anofficial narrative on “international terrorism” and making it cohesive andconsistent for a global audience. All of the para‐state institutions, and mostnotably the CSIS, provided convenient “cover” for services to three primarygroups: first of all to the major media, by creating instant access to formerofficials who were presumed to have inside information; second, to thegovernment, by conducting semi‐official activities that would be publiclyembarrassingifconductedbygovernment;and,third,totheCIAandthemilitarybyprovidingsupport for“friendlyexperts”whocouldthuschanneltheirviewsthroughthemainstreammedia.

OnMay17,1984Senator JesseHelms,whowould laterbe instrumental in thedissolutionoftheUSIAin1999,introducedamemberoftheKnessettotheU.S.Senatefloor,Mr.MichaelKleiner.Kleiner’sargumentwasthatthefuturesecurityofIsraelwasintimatelyrelatedtothestrengthoftheUnitedStatesastheleaderof the freeworld.Heexplained to theSenatemembers that: “Soviet sponsoredterrorism and Soviet backed revolutionary guerrillamovementswere creatinganenvironment inwhich Israel isunable to survive.”Kleinerwaspleading forthealliancebetween Israeli andAmerican conservatives, todefend themselvesagainsttheenemiesoffreedom(intheMiddleEast).74

MeremonthsbeforethesuddenSovietcollapse,RayClinewasalertingthepublictoGorbachev’s allegedhiddenagenda in theMiddleEast. If theDepartmentofState’sannualreporton“patternsofglobalterrorism”rarelymentionedIslamicterrorist groupsbetween1983and1990, threeweeks after the Iraq incursionintoKuwaitinAugust1990,BruceHoffman,aRANDterroristexpert,announcednothing less than that the center of international terrorism had shifted fromMoscow to Baghdad.75In the meantime, the Goldwater‐Nichols Defense Act

72NEDwaslegallyaprivate,not‐for‐profitorganizationfundedbyCongressthroughtheUSIA.Ithadfourcoreinstitutions:theCenterforInternationalprivateenterprise,thefreetradeunioninstitute,andtheInternationalRepublicaninstitute.SeeDavidK.Shipler,“USAidforGlobalpluralism,”NewYorkTimes,01.08.86,pp.1,16.73“CultureWarII,”TheNation,18April1981,p.42.74CongressionalRecordSenate,17May,1984,S5911.75BeauGrosscup,TheNewestExplosionsofterrorism,Farhills,N.J.,NewHorizonPress,1998,p.387


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(1986)proposedto furtherunify themilitarywhilegiving theChairmanof theJointChiefsofStaffmoreinfluenceonthepolicyprocess.76TheEndoftheColdWarandtheShifttowardthecorporatemodelAt the end of the Cold War, the State Department seemed to gradually losegroundinitsattemptstoleadforeignpolicyinitiatives.TherapidcollapseoftheSovietUnionofferednewopportunities fora “corporate”offensive,and for themultibillion dollar security industries as the agenda was soon to turn to thequestionof“politicalIslam”aftertheWorldTradeCenterAttackinearly1993.77ThesefirstattemptedassaultsononeoftheTowersposedaseriouschallengetothe official story that would later be promoted. As some authors andindependent inquirers have already explained, the main culprit, Sheik OmarAbdel‐Rahman,washimselfaCIAasset,whileotherallegedkeyorganizerswereFBIinformants.Notonlythat,theFBIhelpedtoprovidetheexplosives.78Meanwhile, following these attacks, in 1994, the International Broadcast ActreorganizedtheUSIAintofourbureaus,withadecisiveshifttowardtheprivatesector. The leading offensive was to be in Egypt, and aimed at developing anepicenter for a future and much anticipated technological revolution throughproponentsofmodernizationwithinMubarak’sentourage.79Republican Senator Jesse Helms, acting as Chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee (1995‐2001), was the key broker of this transition. TheusualcriticskepttargetingtheStateDepartment’sallegedinabilitytoprioritizeits current and long‐term goals. 80 In 1997, Paul Wolfowitz, with DonaldRumsfeld,charteredtheProjectforaNewAmericanCentury(PNAC),callingforthe pursuit of US global leadership and a remaking of the Middle East.81Thedocument bespeaks its origin in amoment of unilateralism and triumphalismduetotheUSColdWarvictory.Attheinstitutionallevel,anotherphenomenonwastakingplacesimultaneously.Beginning under the Reagan‐Bush presidency, a proliferation, which furtherweakened theDoS, of political appointees at levelsbelowunder‐secretarywas

76TheimplementationoftheActisanongoingproject,pleadingfortheintegrationofforcesalsocalledjointness,carriedoninJointVision2010(1996)andJointVision2020(2000)77RevolvingaroundEdwardDjerdjian’sspeechatMeridianHouse,inWashingtonD.C.,June2,1992.78AhmedNafeezMosaddeq,Warontruth,9/11Disinformationandtheanatomyofterrorism,Northampton,MA:OliveBranchpress,2002,pp.34‐38.79NivienSaleh,ThirdWorldCitizensandtheinformationtechnologyrevolution,NewYork,Palgrave,2010.80JohnsonChalmers,Nemesis:ThelastdaysoftheAmericanRepublic,NewYork,MetropolitanBooks,,2006,p.117.Whetherornotthisplayedintothehandofthemilitaryafter9/11isuncertain;theabolitionofUSIAcertainlygavemorelatitudetothePentagonthough.J.HelmsreceivedtheDepartmentofDefenseMedalforDistinguishedPublicService,thehighestawardgiventononcareerfederalemployees,onOctober30,2002.81TheoriginalideawascontainedinP.Wolfowitz“Blueprint”of1993,leakedtothePress,whicharguedfortheprotectionoftheneworderandU.S.militarydominance.


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takingplace.ProfessionalForeignServiceOfficerswerereplacedwith“clients,”establishingapracticeofpoliticalpatronageandgreaterobedience.82BytheendoftheClintonpresidency,thewholeapparatushadbeendelocalizedtoward the private‐corporate sector, in which the Pentagon was playing anactivepartthroughitsquasi‐civiliannetwork,boostedinthepreviousdecadebytheSDIandotheranti‐missiledefenseprojects.AccordingtoHelenLaville:“TheUSIAmay have expired in 1999, but its demise, far from signaling the end ofKennan’s concept of political warfare, opened the way to a more diverse andmoreaggressivesystem,withventuresbasedintheWhiteHouse(TheOfficeofGlobalCommunication)andthePentagon(theOfficeofSpecialPlans)sometimescomplementing, sometimes challenging, those emanating from the DoS or theCIA.”83ContrarytoprevailingassumptionsthattheUSIAwassacrificedattheendofthenineties,evidencesuggestsratherthattheUSIAwassimplynottailoredforthenewnetworkenvironment.84In April 1999, PDD‐68 mandated the creation of an International PublicInformation Co‐ordinating Group (IPICG), bringing together representativesfromallmajoragencies (DoS,DoD, JCS,USAID,NSC) to coordinate informationactivities.85Thevisioncontained in thisdocument isprobablyas revolutionaryaswasNSC‐68atthetimeofitscreationinApril1950,andasambitious:ittriedtoharnesstheenormouspotentialoftheUSgovernmenttoplan,coordinate,andimplement “strategic influence”campaigns togarnersupport for itsworldwidepolicies. It is significant that the DoD was the agency that developed andprovided thedraftof thenational IPIstrategy to theDoS.Sixmonths later, theUSIAwaswellonitswaytobeingdismantledasanagency,anditsremainswereburied in the DoS.86USAID would remain a prominent channel for strategicinfluenceinthefollowingdecades,pushedtothefront linesduringtheWaronTerror.87 That same year the Secretary of Defense claimed that in accordancewith the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010 thetransformationof themilitarywasunderwaytoassure informationsuperiorityandbattlefielddominancefordecadestocome.8882DavidCorn,“ALookattheStateofState,”TheWashingtonPost,10.01.1993,p.1.83HelenLavilleandHughWilford,TheUSgovernment,citizengroupsandtheColdwar:theStatePrivatenetwork,NewYork:Routledge,2006,p.11.84SeetheseminalworkofRANDexpertsJohnArquillaandDavidRonfeldt,NetworksandNetwars,NationaldefenseResearchInstitute,RAND,2001.Theconceptofcyberwar(1993)andnetwar(1996)wereelaboratedintheirbookInAthena’sCamp,1997.85PubliclyavailableinformationabouttheIPICGislimitedandthedirectiveremainsclassified.TheWhiteHouseNationalSecurityStrategyforaNewCentury,December1999endorsedPDD68andtheIPIstructure.SeeN.J.Cull,“Howwegetthere”op.cit.,p.42.86ReportoftheDefenseScienceBoardTaskForceonmanagedinformationdissemination,OfficeoftheundersecretaryofDefenseforacquisition,Technologyandlogistics,Washington,October2001.87SeethetestimonyofJeffreyGrieco,AssistantAdministratorforlegislativeandPublicAffairs,atUSAID,quotedintheSmith‐MundtSymposiumreport,January13,2009,p.9.88WilliamS.Cohen,MessageoftheSecretaryofDefenseathttp://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr1999/msg.html/


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Three years prior to 9/11, Barry Fulton, under CSIS patronage, concluded hisbookReinventingDiplomacyintheInformationAgewith:“ThetimehascometobringUSdiplomaticreadinesstothestandardsetbythePentagon.”89A few months prior to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, a CSISpublication entitled “To Prevail” stated that: “the State Department’s culturedevalues public diplomacy.” 90 Its author asserted that the private sector’sparticipation should be developed, as should covert activities for theimprovementofintelligencecapacity.III.Theadventoftotaldiplomacyafter9/119/11openedadecisivephaseofU.S.institutionalreforms,fittingandreflectingpreexisting “frames of reference” and “narratives” shaped over the precedingdecades. According to the psychologicalwarfare paradigm, one of the primarygoalsoftheterroristattacksontheUSwastoinfluenceperceptionsandalterthebehavior of one ormore target audiences. As Gary L.Whitley stated in 2000:“Technological developments make it possible to subject all people, fromordinary citizens to strategic leaders, heads of state, or military leaders, to acomplexPSYOPoffensive,”themaintaskofwhichistooverwhelmtheaudiencethroughtheuseofterrortactics.Thewaytheattacksoftheplanesweresynchronizedproduceda“total“impacton the audience, too suddenly overwhelmed to engage in a reflection on theunderlying reasons for such extraordinary events.91Theoretically, at least, theamplitudeoftheattackscouldhavediminishedtheneedfortheUSgovernmentto “sell“ its counterterrorism effort.92As psychologists have shown, the use ofthistypeofmoraljudgmentnotonlymakestheenemyappearmoredangerous,but such judgments, by their intuitive and emotional nature, inhibit consciousinterferenceandreasoning.93 US public diplomacy’s first initiative after 9/11 was a successful informationcampaigntolinktheattackfirsttoOsamabinLadenandAl‐Qaeda,thentoIraqand SaddamHussein. The effortwas led on three fronts: by the Pentagon, theCouncilonForeignRelations,andbytheprivatesecuritythink‐tanks.94Overall,these efforts were fueled by the new military doctrines of “Information

89BarryFulton,ReinventingDiplomacyintheinformationage,CSISpanelreports,1998.90KurtCampbell,ToPrevail:AnAmericanStrategyfortheCampaignAgainstTerrorism,CSIS,2001.91GaryL.Whitley,“PSYOPOperationsinthe21stcentury,”USArmyWarCollege,StrategyResearchProject,2000,p.10.92A.Axelrod,SellingtheGreatWar,themakingofAmericanpropaganda,2009,p.217.93PeterLiberman,“AnEyeforanEye:Publicsupportforwaragainstevildoers,”InternationalOrganization,vol.60,no.3,Summer2006,p.692;BruceBongar,op.cit.94DavidHoffman,“Beyondpublicdiplomacy,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.81,No.2,March‐April2002;LeonardMark,“Diplomacybyothermeans,”ForeignPolicy,no.132,Sept.‐Oct.2002;PeterG.Peterson,“PublicDiplomacyandthewaronterrorism,”ForeignAffairs,Sept‐Oct2002,pp.74‐94.


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Operation”(IO)and“StrategicCommunication”(SC).95Thesewereoftenequatedtopublicdiplomacy,definedas:“FocusedUSGovernmenteffortstounderstandandengagekeyaudiencesinordertocreate,strengthen,orpreserveconditionsfavorable for the advancement of US Government interests, policies, andobjectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages,and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of nationalpower.”96The rhetoric of war, as it has since developed, instantiates a specificunidimensionalscaleofvaluesthateffacesthecomplexityofthesephenomena,marginalizinganyattempttoquestiontheofficialnarrative.97WilliamBennett’sWhyweFight(2002)wasareiterationofDanielPipes’thesisonthesubversiveactions of Islam, alleged to threaten the security of the United States. Bennettstated that: “There is no question that Islam is at war with the West andspecificallywithAmerica.”98Scoresofotherspublicationswere foundedon the“Good vs. Evil” rhetoric and rested entirely on official sources, such as YosriFouda and Nick Fielding’sMasterminds of Terror (2003); David Cortright andGeorgeA.Lopez’sUnitingagainstTerror (2007),RonaldKessler’sTheTerroristWatch (2007) and Lee Hamilton, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins’ State of theStruggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism (2007), to name just afew. 99 Almost all attacked “unpatriotic” dissidence, equated with “Anti‐Americanism,”achargeleveledattargetsincludingliberalmedia,theACLUandleftistintellectuals.As the National Security document NSS2002 claimed, there was now a singlemodel fornational success, valid for everyone.Anti‐Americanismsoonbecametheimputedrationaleaswellasaconvenientlabelforanyonewhocriticizedthepoliciesdescribedabove.TheUSgovernmenthadno intentionofre‐examiningtheveracityor falsenessof itsunderlyingassumptions,notably theonestatingthatterrorismisbydefinitionanevilconspiracyagainsttheWest.100

95DepartmentofDefense,JointVision2020(2000)andDoDInformationRoadmap(2003)regardInformationOperationsasamilitarycorecompetencywiththesocialnetworkingsitesconsideredasholdingparticularpowerforIO.96DoD,2006,citedin“Foundationsofeffectiveinfluenceoperations,aframeworkforenhancingArmycapabilities,”RAND,RANDArroyoCenter’sStrategy,DoctrineandResourcesProgram,2009.97McCauleyClark,“WarversusJusticeinresponsetoterroristattacks,competingframesofandtheirimplications,”inBruceBongar,PsychologyofTerrorism,2006,pp.56,62.98WilliamJ.Bennett,Whywefight:MoralClarityandtheWaronTerrorism,WashingtonDC:Regnery,2002,p.78.99YosriFoudaandNickFielding,Mastermindsofterror,thetruthbehindthemostdevastatingattacktheworldhaseverseen,NewYork,Arcade,2003;DavidCortrightandGeorgeA.Lopez,Unitingagainstterror,cooperativenonmilitaryresponsestotheGlobalterroristthreat,CambridgeMA:MITPress,2007;RonaldKessler,TheTerroristWatch,Insidethedesperateracetostopthenextattack,NewYork:CrownForum,2007.RonaldKessleracknowledgesthehelpofFBIassistantforpublicaffairsJohnMiller.MilleristheonewhomanagedtoreachBinLadenin1998andobtainaninterview.100BrendonO’ConnorandMartinGriffiths,TheRiseofAntiAmericanism,NewYork:Routledge,2005.


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The existence of a US “hidden agenda”, behind the ambition of nudging Islamtowardswesternmodernity,wasacknowledgedbytheDefenseAdvisoryBoardreport(2004).Thecounterterrorismdoctrinetookituponitselftotargetspecificconstituenciesandadversariesonaglobalscale,tryingtoplaythemoffagainsteachotherandtherebyconvincemoderategroupleaderstorallytothecauseofmodernizationandchangeandrejectfundamentalists,presentedasviolentandimmoral.101This therefore further exposes some of the flaws in the officialnarrative for the entire American intervention. Overall, it undermines thelegitimacyofitsintenttobringitsvalues,ostensiblydemocracyandfreedom,tothoseregions.ThenewdoctrinereinstatedtheideologyofAmerican“truthfulness”atthecoreofthis“narrativeofpower,”or“regimeoftruth,”aphrasethatMichelFoucaultused to describe“a fabricated reality based on the workings and interests ofthosewhoconstituteandarticulatethis‘truth’.”102Thisconceptualapproachwasalmost identicaltoHaroldLasswell’sowndefinitionofa”totalstrategy“duringWorldWarII.

Integratingallinstrumentsofpower Inthemonthsfollowingtheattacks,aconvergenceofvoicesinthemediasharedandpromotedsimilarinterpretations,suggestingtheneedto“gobeyond”publicdiplomacy, and make it operate at the level of military “strategiccommunication,” an approach now advocated by number of scholars such asWilliamA.Rugh,KeithReinhardorPeterG.Peterson,whorecommendmarket‐corporateproceduresasameanstowinthewaronterror.Tacklingtheproblemfrom a different perspective, Shaun Riordan, Jan Melissen and the presentauthorsarefarmorecautious,andstresstheshortcomingsofsuchanapproach,includingproblemsofauthorityandcontrol,aswellasaccountability.ThePentagoninsistedthat itbeatthecoreof the integrationprocess,drawingitselfmore fully into foreign policy activities, seeking to frame events and setagendasbyadoptingapre‐emptivemediaposture.The latestMilitaryDoctrineandStrategicCommunicationdocumentsareaimedatperceptionmanagement,in otherwords a PSYOP conducted at the strategic global level. In contrast toinformationoperations,itmaybeaimedataglobalaudienceanddoesnotneedtobeassociatedwithamilitarycampaign.103An early attempt at fusing public diplomacy and public affairswas aborted in2002, when the Pentagon abandoned its Office of Strategic Influence (OSI)101EffortshavebeenmadetousethehorrorsattributedtoAlQaedainlocalandinternationalmediatoinfluencetheMuslimpublic.EricSmithandTomShanker,Counterstrike,theuntoldstoryofAmerica’ssecretcampaignagainstAlQaeda,NewYorkTimesBooks,2011.102JosephH.Campos,TheStateandTerrorism,HomelandSecurity,Burlington:Ashgate,2007,p.121.103AccordingtotheDefenseScienceBoard:“Theworld’salmostinstantaneousaccesstonewsandinformationmakesitnearlyimpossibletolocalizeanyinformationcampaign”inDSB,reportoftheDefenseScienceBoardTaskForceontheCreationandDisseminationofAllFormsofInformationinSupportofPsychologicalOperations(PSYOP)inTimeofMilitaryConflict,2000,p.11


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project. The leak from inside the Pentagon disclosed such an early trial atexercising “full spectrum capabilities,” with the DOD capable of pursuing itsprojectsthroughmultiplechannels.Thisfailuredidnotdissuadeitfromplantingpro‐military narratives and source expertise in news media programs acrossAmericaandaroundtheGlobethroughtheInternet,untilexposedagainbytheNewYorkTimes in2008.104TheU.S.ArmyCentralCommandsoonafterclaimedthatitwasreadytodeploybloggersovertheInternetasitwoulddowithtroopsonthegroundaccordingtotheirnewsecuritydoctrineclaimingthatthebattlesofthepresentandnearfutureareofwords,narrativesandconcepts.105

LessandLessdissentremainsastothescopeandmeanstobeusedinordertowinthiswaronterror.Fewseemtodoubt,forexample,thatciviliansarestillincontrol of the policy making as cogently presented in the words of militaryhistorianssuchasThomasOwensMackubin.106Manythinktanks, includingtheCSIS,suggestthecreationofanonprofit,nongovernmentalinstitutiontopursuepublicdiplomacyefforts.TheRANDcorporationwaselectedtoconductasurveyof existing reform and improvement proposals, a task it completed in 2008withouttangibleresults.The2007CSISCommissiononSmartPowerarguedthatinanycase,“maintainingU.S.militarypowerisparamounttoanysmartpowerstrategy.”107ConsideringtheenormoussizeofdefensespendingandthebudgetallocationtoUS private contractors and corporations, “what is good for themilitary seemsnowalsogoodforAmerica.”108TheDoDbudgetandresourcesfarsurpassothergovernment departments and agencies. This affects not only the StateDepartment, but also the CIA, as an independent purveyor of strategicinformation. The DoD now channels 80% of the funding for the intelligencebusiness, thanks to its giant private quasi‐civilian network.109 To assure itscontinued success, former Army generals are enrolled on a regular basis asUniversity teaching staff, following in the steps of the rehabilitation of theReserveOfficers’TrainingCorps(ROTC)oncampuses,bannedsince theendoftheVietnamconflict.110

104ThisisconfirmedbythepaperMichaelDorangaveduringthe2009Smith‐MundtSymposium,pleadingfortheneedto“getbacktotheinfluencebusiness,”andaskingfortheUStocreatenetworkspromotingitsstrategicinterests.SeeCraigWhitlock,«SomaliAmericancaughtupinaShadowyPentagoncounterpropagandacampaign»inWashingtonPost,July8,2013.105GeneralRayOdiernoinaconferencemediatedbyMargaretWarnerfromCSA‐PBSNewshour,pleadedfora“completegovernmentalapproach”attheArmyWarCollegeconferencetitled«ThefutureofAmericanlandpower»,http://www.carlisle.army.mil/banner/article.cfm?id=2916106ThomasOwenMackubin,USCivilmilitaryrelationsafter9/11:RenegotiatingtheCivilMilitaryBargain,NewYork:Continuumbooks,2011.107RichardL.ArmitageandJosephS.Nye,Jr.,CSISCommissiononSmartPower:ASmarter,moresecureAmerica,WashingtonDC:CenterforInternationalandStrategicStudies,2007.108P.W.Singer,CorporateWarriors,theriseoftheprivatizedmilitaryIndustry,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2003.109TheWashingtonPostrecentlydrewachartofalltheseconnections,underthetitle:“TopSecretAmerica.”http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top‐secret‐america/110ElisabethBumiller,“AfterWarRoom,HeadingIvyLeagueClassroom”inNewYorkTimes,May7,2012,pp.A1,12;seeofficialwebsite:http://www.goarmy.com/rotc.html


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Many now implicitly accept the extralegal intelligence and security measuresthat give the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) created on August 27,2004fullaccesstoallintelligenceassets(NSA,CIA,DIA),actinglikeapanopticondesigned to allow the security establishment to observe all subjectssimultaneously.111The Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP)within theNCTCillustrateshowthemilitary“influences”policyoperationsandhowithasbecomeentitledtointegrateallinstrumentsofnationalpower,escapinganyscrutinybyCongress or the American people due to its interagency nature.112A GlobalEngagementandStrategicCommunicationInteragencyPolicyCommittee(IPC)isnow under the National Security Council Authority. The long‐term strategicplanning depends upon the national security staff (NSS). The Plans and PolicyDirectorate (J‐5) develops policy guidance, strategic plans, as well ascommunicationthemesandnarrativesforseniorleadership.113All this seems to indicate that the Department of State is indeed slowlyacquiescingtothestandardssetbythePentagon,notsomuchbycedingall itsground, but by using amilitary style strategic communications approach. ThiswasevidentinthetenureofKarenHughes,who,atthetimeofherappointmentasUndersecretaryofStateforPublicDiplomacyandPublicAffairsinSeptember2005,heldaTownHallmeeting forState Departmentemployees inwhich shedescribed her plans to improve the US image abroad in militaristic phrases,outlininga“rapid‐responseunit”and“forward‐deployregionalSWATteams”to“formulate amore strategic and focused approach to all our public diplomacyassets.”114Therefore,iftheDoSstillprovidesguidance,itdependsonthemilitarycommandforthelongtermstrategicplanning.115AccordingtohistorianStephenGlain, if “militarization” is takingovermanyof the traditionaldiplomacy fields,suchasforeignaidprograms,itisthecivilianelitesthataretoblame.116

Under Obama, government agencies have begun to engagemore activelywiththe blogosphere, exploiting new avenues of influence with the DoS’s “DigitalOutreachTeam”andtheDoD’s“Newmediaoperations.”Ablueprintisincludedin the Department of State’s 2010 Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy,whichstressesachangeinapproachbytheBureauofInternationalInformationPrograms (IIP) to take into account the trends towards mobile telephonetechnologies,socialnetworks,andsocialmedia.117

111NSA'smostrecentprogramofinterception,named"Prism,"wasexposedbyEdwardSnowden’sSecurityleakageofdocuments.Itconfirmsthemassiveandinvasivenatureofthesurveillancestillunderway.112TheIntelligencereformandterroristpreventionact(IRTPA),ExecutiveOrder13354,August27,2004113SeeNationalFrameworkforStrategicCommunication,atwww.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf114NancySnow,«TheResurgenceofU.S.PublicDiplomacyafter9/11,»inTheImpactof9/11ontheMedia,Arts,andEntertainment.TheDaythatChangedEverything?Volume4.AnInterdisciplinarySeriesofVolumesontheImpactof9/11.Serieseditor,MatthewJ.Morgan.Chapter6.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009.115SeeSaraB.King,“MilitarySocialInfluenceintheGlobalInformationEnvironment:ACivilianPrimer”inAnalysesofSocialIssuesandPublicPolicy,Vol.11,No.1,2011,pp.1‐26116StephenGlain,op.cit.p.407.117http://www.state.gov/r/iip/


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InJune2011,theDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)openedaprogramforthedevelopmentofanewscienceofsocialnetworks.118Bytheendof 2011, the State Department have already spent some $70 million oncircumventioneffortsandrelatedtechnologies.119LibbyLiu,headofRadioFreeAsia, has confirmed the existence of cross‐border technologies used for“subversion.”We are a far cry from the “white,” that is, verified and genuine,communicationadvocatedbythegovernment’smanual.Andthereisapriceforthis considerable distance between the cup and the lip: it affects Americancredibility,andnotforthebetter.The United States and Israel are not only unwilling to alter their commonunilateralapproachtoterrorism,they intendtosell it toothernationsthroughtheir networks.120Israel has managed to secure the United States’ supportthrough the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC, 1963), the“Conference of Presidents,” the JINSA and WINEP, sustaining the strategicpartnershipmore efficiently than any other lobby through expertise and non‐profit channels.121The Obama administration has been pressured to keep theformer course of action and prevented from engaging inwhat he promised inCairo, including the opening towards a fairer policy that responds to the longPalestinian struggle for self‐determination.122Furthermore, theUS governmenthas barely acknowledged the complex reasons behind the so called IslamistupsurgeagainstthetyrantsintheArabSpring,anotherpatentdemonstrationoftheforcesofinertiawherestrategicinterestsareatstake.123Theserevolutionarymovementsweresubjecttoselective“mediatization”insidethe United States, with scarce or no reporting about the demonstrationsoccurring in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and Israel, all close US allies, andfocusing instead on Iran, Syria, and North African countries. When thesedemonstrations seemed to gain ground on US soil in autumn 2011, coveragecame close to disappearing from the mainstream media. The network ofexpertiseplayedapartinthis.TheRANDandCSISspecialistsproduced,almostdaily, books and reports on the “new generations” of Al‐Qaeda recruits and

118Theweb,includingyoutube,andvideogames.RecentexamplesshowhowDCComicsismarketingmilitaryproductsformassconsumptiontokidsandteenagers.TheUnitedStatesCentralCommand(USCENTCOM)PublicAffairsOfficehasactivelyengagedintheblogosphereinordertoreachnewpublics.Manyexpertsuseblogsasanon‐transparentsourceofinformation.119JamesGlanzandJohnMarkoff,“U.S.underwritesinternetdetouraroundcensors,”TheNewYorkTimes,12.06.11,pp.1,8.120JohnEsposito,UnholyWar:TerrorinthenameofIslam,2002,p.154;IyanathulIslam,“Anti‐AmericanismintheMuslimworld,asceptic’sguide”inO’Connor,BrandonandMartinGriffiths,TheRiseofAntiAmericanism,2005,p.83.121TheJewishInstituteforNationalSecurityAffairs(JINSA)whichisnon‐profit,nonpartisanorganization,publishedinitslatestissueofTheJournalofInternationalSecurityAffairs,no21,Fall‐Winter2011anaccountofitsSymposium9/11+10.ThismixescriticismsofObamaandaccusationsagainstIran.122TherecognitionofthePalestinianStatebyUNESCO,followedbytheUSwithdrawalinOctober2011illustratesthepointandhasbeengreatlydamagingfortheUS.123MarkMazettiandScottShane,“OldArabtiesmayharmnewones,”NewYorkTimes,18.03.11,p.8.


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affiliates after the apparent execution of Al‐Qaeda's leader, Bin Laden.124Noreexaminationof theGrandNarrativeoccurredat this critical time; rather, thespecialists produced new “versions” of the crisis discourse, adopting the “Al‐Qaedaaffiliates” label,whichwassupposedtodemonstratetothebroadpublictheextraordinarysurvivalabilityoftheterrornetworkinspiteofthelossofitsfigurehead.125The existenceof a classified strategy, “MuslimWorldOutreach,” that identifiesIslam as a national security level challenge encourages misperception and adistortedviewof Islamitself.Further inquiriesshouldbemadetoexplainhowthisfitsintothehistoricascendencyofIslamasarevolutionaryideologyinsidethe United States. Edward Saïd exposed a long time ago the extent to whichstrong anti‐Arab and anti‐Muslim sentiments have affected US policy towardsthe Middle East in the past.126USAID, now working with the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS), serves as a cover channel for programs targetingAmerican and foreign Muslims. 127 A recent academic report on terrorismprosecutionhasovertlyaccusedUSlawenforcementagencies,includingtheFBI,ofmanufacturinga“homegrownthreat.”128 So,inspiteofObama’swillingnesstoinitiatea“newbeginning,”assignaledinhisCairo Speech (June 2009), his administration has pursued efforts to deploy aglobal architecture of “shadow” Internet and mobile phone systems thatdissidentscanpotentiallyusetounderminetheirgovernments.Suchprojectsareaimed at creating lines of communication that are sustained outside officialavenues. 129 Although military in nature, the project has profound civilianimplications. The concept of “citizen diplomacy” is riding high at themoment,andmightwellreplaceatarnishedpublicdiplomacyconcept.130Becauseofthis,theUSArmyclaims its share in theexerciseof “citizendiplomacy” through itsforcesontheground,usingnewregionalmodelsofinteragencyintegrationthatcontinuetobetestedinAfricasince2007.131

124CatherineHerridge,“AlQaeda2.0behindfresh9/11terrorthreat?”;CSISwebsiteadvertisingthebook:ThefutureofAlQaedaandAssociatedmovements(AQIM)http://www.csis.org/publication/confronting‐uncertain‐threat125ForadetailedanalysisofthecrisisdiscourseseeStuartCroft,Culture,CrisisandAmerica’sWaronTerror,Boston,CambridgeUniversityPress,2006126NancySnow,PropagandaInc.,op.cit,p.17.127KarenDeYoungin2009Smith‐MundtSymposium,Panel2“America’sbifurcatedengagement.”128“Targetedandentrapped,manufacturingtheHomegrownthreatintheUnitedStates,”CenterforHumanRightsandGlobalJustice,NewYork,NYUSchoolofLaw,2011.129The“Opentechnologyinitiative”isdirectedbythe“NewAmericafoundation.”130InterventionbyColonelChristopherKolenda,“CitizenDiplomacyandtheroleofthemilitary”attheUSSummitandinitiativeforGlobalCitizenDiplomacy,TheUSCenterforCitizenDiplomacy,November17,2010.131AFRICOMwascreatedin2007anditisnotexcludedthatthismightbeappliedtoothergeographicalregions.


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Thecredibilityvs.efficiencyissue TheongoingjuridicaldebatebetweentheDoSandDoDwillaffecttheboundarieswithin which policy makers will operate in the future. 132 The field ofpsychological warfare has developed tremendously over the years throughmilitary investment. It now includes content analysis, survey research, scalingtechniques,diffusionstudies,referencegrouptheories,andmotivationresearch.This trend accompanies a gradual disappearance of neat separations betweenthedomesticandinternationalspheres,openinga“netwar”definedasa“modeof conflict at societal levels, short of traditionalmilitarywarfare, inwhich theprotagonists use the network forms of organization and related doctrines,strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.”133A network’sstrengthdependsonfivelevelsoffunction:organization(designlevel),narrative(storybeingtold),doctrinal(strategiesandmethods),technological(informationsystems in use) and social (personal ties to assure loyalty and trust).134Suchnetworksaremadeofcivilians,butarebuiltbyandwithmilitarytechnologies,allowinggroupstoappearleaderless.All the lessons learned from the advertising industry, however, namely thatmarketingshouldbespecializedandcarefullytargeted,thatthemessageshouldbedecoupledfromtheparentcompanyorsource(thegovernment),andthattheuseofnon‐verbalsymbolsisaseffectiveasverbalcommunication,havefailedtoovercome the crude reality that the objective seems to be the pursuit of apermanentwar.135Somecriticshavepointedtostructuraldeficiencies,followingwhatRichardArndtcalledthedefeatofthe“intellectuals”insidethebureaucraticstructure after 1976.136 Others accused the Neorealist politicians of havingdestroyedthecredibilityoftheUnitedStatesbyenteringintodamagingallianceswith autocrats. 137 Still others blame the neoconservatives for their rigidunilateraldoctrinalcommitmenttomilitarysupremacy.Paul Sharp, Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi have stressed the importance ofinternalfactorsinexplainingthefailureofpublicdiplomacy.Accordingtothem,theAmericanpublicandCongressarenotsufficientlyinformedaboutUSforeignpolicy actions. The “instrumentalization of truth” contributes to widening thegapbetweenwhatthegovernmentsaysitisdoingandwhatitreallydoes.Aidedby the Internet and the fundamental shift in how people get and consumeinformation,theUSshouldstarttorecognizethat ithasnoownershipovertheconcepts of democracy, liberty or freedom, and that it should therefore stopclaiming moral superiority. Such a bold step would necessitate a shared

132CharlieSavage,“ObamaAdviserdiscussesusingmilitaryonterrorists,”NewYorkTimes,24.09.11,p.6.133RonfeldtandArquilla,citedinDavidMartinJones,GlobalizationandtheNewTerror,Cheltenham,EdwardElgar,2004,p.140.134ibid.135PeterVanBurenisthemostrecentexampleofaformerStateDepartmentmemberofaProvincialReconstructionTeam(PRT)recountingthefailureofpublicdiplomacyeffortsinIraq.PeterVanBuren,WeMeansWell,HowIhelpedlosethebattleforHeartsandMindsoftheIraqiPeople,NewYork,MetropolitanBooks,2011.136R.T.Arndt,op.cit.,p.418.137S.Riordan,theNewDiplomacy,2003,p.36.


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commitment to revisiting US national myths as well as a collective educationeffort. The problem thus appears to be systemic and dependent on the hegemonicpowerstructureoftheUSinformationandcultureindustries.138Aformerpresssecretary toGeorgeW.Bush called this “thepermanent campaign,” a “nonstopprocess seeking to manipulate sources of public approval.” The locutionsthemselves indicate that America’s public diplomacy and strategiccommunicationeffortsreflectfundamentallydomesticaspectsofitsculture,andthus fail to resonate with foreign audiences. 139 As Michael Mann rightlyobserved: “the notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless,sinceciviliansweretheleadingmilitarists.”140Publicdiplomacyitselfwaspartofabroaderoperationalconception,onlydescribingthecivilianfacetofatotalUSstrategiceffort.141ConclusionThe process through which the United States government has graduallyprivatized its functions is impressive. The architecture of this “soft power“ or“smartpower”asacomponentofmilitarystrategyisundeniablyunique,andhasservedasasupportforhardmilitarypowersince9/11.However,thisevolutionhasexperiencedbothprogressandsetbacks.142The psychological warfare concept as a total policy was born in the “thinkfactory”oftheSecondWorldWar.Itwasawartimeconcepttosupportwartimeaims,andthuswasincapableofconjugatingtransparencyandtruthfulnessinthemeans deployed to reach these goals. 143 The United States set up aninfrastructure of power after the war that gradually expanded researchconductedon“psychologicaloperations.”Theterm“psychologicalwarfare”wasitself a cover name to designate a “strategy” that proceeded to integrate allcomponents of policy together, in order to achieve power by coordinating alltheseelements.TheVietnamWarwasadecisivesteponthis longpathbecauseitvalidatedforthemilitarythetheorythatnotonlywouldfuturewarsbefoughtandwoninthecivilianarena,butthatthearmyitselfmustgaincontrolofthiscivilianbattleandnotletciviliansdecideitforthem.

138NancySnow,PropagandaInc.:SellingAmerica’sculturetotheWorld,2010,p.54.139ScottMcCellan,WhatHappened:InsidetheBushWhiteHouseandWashington’scultureofdeception,WashingtonDC:PublicAffairs,2008,p.63.140MichaelMann,IncoherentEmpire,2003,p.9.TheDefenseDepartmentemploystodayaround700,000civilians,withabudgetof$700billion,cutforthefirsttimesinceWorldWarIto$525billioninthe2013budget.141InLiamKennedyandScottLucas,op.cit.p.313142JérômeGygax,“Strategiccultureandsecurity,Americanantiterroristpolicyandtheuseofsoftpowerafter9/11”,TheRoutledgeHandbookofTransatlanticSecurity,editedbyJussiHanhimäki,Georges‐HenriSoutouandBasilGermond,NewYork,Routledge,2010,pp.231‐249143BenjaminGoldsmith,“SpinningtheGlobe?U.S.PublicDiplomacyandForeignPublicOpinion,”JournalofPolitics,Vol.71,no.3,July2009,p.864.


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Overtheyears, through investment inresearch, themilitaryhasdevelopednotonly the necessary networks and the ability to control them, but also a widearrayofthinktanksandprivateclientsthatproduceideasandcontentandpostthemonthe“seamless”web.ItwasacceptedbypsychologicalexpertsaftertheSecondWorldWarthatinfluence“followedgroupdynamicsandpeerpressure.”Samuel Huntington was prescient when he declared in 1973 that futurestrategies would have to be designed by the military authorities rather thancivilians. As thepower to spreadand shapemessaging shifted to themilitary,civilian leaders increasingly sought to use and develop that “power” to theiradvantage. Like the military, they learned to use the CIA to channel theirobjectives with the help of the JCS. The CIA and DoD find collaborativeapproaches fruitful in thenewparamilitary environment of counterinsurgencyandcounterterrorism.Yet, throughout these efforts to define “terrorism” as an objective reality, a“truth”congenialtotheirownidentity,USpolicymakersovertheyearsseemtohave been trapped in a dilemma that prevents them from achieving eithercredibilityorefficiencyusingadeceptiveapproach.TheopeningofanewgenerationofculturalcentersinJakarta,thecapitalofthemostpopulated Islamiccountry, Indonesia, lastwinter, reflects thenewfaceofUS diplomacy, a mere commercial showcase.144 The Obama administration,despite its good intentions, has missed its opportunity to reevaluate pastpolicies, and has therefore failed to change their course. A June 13, 2012 PewGlobalAttitudesProject survey shows thatObama’smedian favorability in theMuslimmajoritycountrieshasdroppedfrom34%in2009,theyearofhisCairospeech, to 15%. In Pakistan alone, support for Obama (7%) is comparable toPresident GeorgeW. Bush during his last year in office (2008). Much of thisdisfavorcentersontheunpopularmilitarypoliciessuchasdroneattacksandkilllistsnowadvocatedbyObamaasa"continuationofthewaronterrorbyotheradministrationmeans."145Over the last half century, it seems that themilitary has become involved notonly in policy implementation, but also in policymaking, with a devastatingimpactonvalues,andontheUScapacitytoretainitsfunctionasarolemodelinthe long run. Formany observers, the US government’s rhetoric and behaviorbear a striking resemblance to those of official enemies. RAND has beenadvocatingtheuseofterrortocounterterrorforyears.146Forsome,theUnitedStates is just themirror image of its enemies, projecting its own “self” on theunknown.147Allthesepointscombined,fromthefailuretoaddressspecificlong‐time political problems, to the untruthfulness of these policies and the144named“@america,”theyarerunbylocalcommercialrepresentatives.SeeNorimistuOnishi,“USupdatesthebranditpromotesinIndonesia,”inNewYorkTimes,06.03.11,p.6.145“GlobalOpinionofObamaSlips,InternationalPoliciesFaulted,”PewGlobalAttitudesProject,June13,2012.http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global‐opinion‐of‐obama‐slips‐international‐policies‐faulted/146TomH.HastingsNonviolentResponsetoTerrorism,2004,p.178.147KenBoothandTimDunne,WorldsinCollision:TerrorandtheFutureofGlobalOrder,2002,p.273;ArndtpointedoutthattheUSeventuallyadoptedthesametacticsastheSovietsduringtheColdWar,inArdnt,op.cit.p.456.


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misrepresentationof Islam,not tomention theGWOT itself, offera reasonableexplanation for the alleged failure of the American public diplomacy effortgradually replaced by strategic communication paradigm. 148 The situationfurthermore confirms a rise of corporate‐ledmilitary contractors in service toAmerican democracy that risk altering core principles and values andthreateningthefoundationofAmerica’sconstitutionalpremises.149Obama'sshowofresistanceagainstthemilitarypressuresexertedonhispolicy,notablyhisannouncementoftheneedtoclosethepost‐9/11era,hasbeenmethead on by the CSIS and other upper echelonmilitary speaking through theirprivatemediachannels.150Yet,allattemptstoengageinaradicalreorganizationofpowerdistributioninWashingtonhavesofarfailed.Evenifciviliansarestilltheoretically inchargeofpolicy‐making, thepolicyblueprintsandtheso‐callededucationaleffortseemtolieinthehandsoftheJointChiefsofStaff,withtheCIAasitsoperationalarm,inaprogramdesignedbyandfortheinterestsofthefastexpandingNationalSecurityApparatus.151

¥NancySnowisaprofessorintheCollegeofCommunicationsatCaliforniaStateUniversity, Fullerton. She holds several adjunct faculty appointments atuniversities in Japan, Malaysia and Israel. She is author or co‐editor of manybooksonthesubjectof informationwarfare,propagandaandpublicdiplomacysince9/11.JérômeGygaxhasaPh.D.inInternationalRelationsfromtheGraduateInstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies,GenevaandiscurrentlyanAssociateResearch Fellow at the Pierre du Bois Foundation. His research interestsencompass cultural and public diplomacy, intelligence and security issues. HisresearchhasbeensupportedbytheSwissNationalScientificFoundation(FNS),Grantnumber:PBGEP1‐139815.

148Thesocalled“terroristrings”intheUnitedStateshavebeenuncoveredmostlythroughentrapment,andmembershavebeenchargedforthemostpartunderlawsofconspiracyandperjuryratherthanonthebasisofanyaction.149AlexCarey,TakingtheRiskoutofDemocracy:CorporatePropagandaversusFreedomandLiberty,Sydney:UniversityofNSWPress,1995.150AnthonyH.Cordesman(CSIS)criticizedPresidentObamainMarkLandlerandMarkMazzetti,"ForObama’sGlobalVision,DauntingProblems"inNYT,May25,2013;FrankGaffneyasPresidentandFounderoftheCenterforSecurityPolicy(CSP)formerassistantsecretaryofDefenseunderReagan,appearonGlennBeckshow.http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2010/08/24/frank‐gaffney‐with‐glenn‐beck‐shariah‐stealth‐jihad‐2/andsigninganeditorialfortheWashingtonPost,title«WhosesideisObamaon?Apatternofsoft‐pedalingU.S.responsetoterrorismpromptsquestions»,April,30,2013.151ThelatestCyberIntelligenceSharingandProtectionAct(CISPA),HR3523wassponsoredbyMikeRogers,formerofficerintheUSArmyandFBIspecialagent,ChairmanoftheHouse,PermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence(HPSCI).

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