AReportonCameraSurveillanceinCanada

PartTwo

SurveillanceCameraAwarenessNetwork(SCAN)

December2009

DanielleDawsonPatrickDerbyAaronDoyleChiaraFonioLauraHueyMatJohnson

StéphaneLeman‐LangloisRandyLippertDavidLyon

Anne‐MariePratteEmilySmithKevinWalby

BlairWilkinson

SCANWebsite:http://www.surveillanceproject.org/projects/scanFundedbytheContributionsProgramoftheOfficeofthePrivacyCommissioner,Ottawa,andbytheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.

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TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary ..................................................................................3

Introduction .............................................................................................9

The“Legality”ofCameraSurveillanceinCanada .................................... 11

TheTechnicalContextofCameraSurveillanceinCanada........................ 25

ViewsFromBehindTheCamera’sLens ................................................... 37

UnderstandingPublicPerceptionsofCameraSurveillanceinCanada ..... 51

TheSurveillanceLegacy .......................................................................... 66

CameraSurveillanceinOttawaTaxicabs................................................. 79

CameraSurveillanceintheShoppingCity ............................................... 94

TheTransferandUseofCameraSurveillanceImages ........................... 101

WorksCited.......................................................................................... 117

AppendixA:MapsofProposed“LiveSites” ........................................ 1311

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ExecutiveSummaryInJanuary2009theSurveillanceCameraAwarenessNetwork(SCAN)releasedpartoneofitsReportonCameraSurveillanceinCanada.Sincethereleaseofthatreporttheuseofcamerasurveillancecontinuestoproliferate.Forexample,theOntarioProvincialPoliceareintheprocessofprocuringsurveillancecamerasequippedwithautomatedlicenceplaterecognitiontechnologywiththehopeofprovidingsecurityontheprovinceshighways.AndwhiletheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityunveilsplanstoinstall11high‐techcamerasurveillancesystemsalongitsborderwithCanadaattheSt.ClaireRiver,theCityofVancouverremainstight‐lippedaboutitsintentionstoemploycamerasurveillanceduringandfollowingthe2010Olympics.InthisreportthemembersofSCANcontinuetoundertakeasurveyofcamerasurveillanceintheCanadiancontext.DrawingoninnovativeprimaryresearchthisreportbeginstofillinthepictureofcamerasurveillancepracticesinCanada.Thisreportcontextualizestheproliferationofcamerasurveillancewithsite‐specificcasesstudies,providesinsightintopublicandcameraoperatorperceptionsofcamerasurveillance,andexploresprivacyandcivillibertiesquestionsastheyrelatetothetransferandreproductionofcamerasurveillanceimages.OurworkissupportedbytheContributionsProgramoftheOfficeofthePrivacyCommissioner,Ottawa,andbytheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.Asalwaysouraimistoproduceanaccessiblereportthatisattunedtotherangeofviewsheldaboutcamerasurveillance.Thispartofthereportcomplementsthatreleasedearlierthisyearwiththeadditionofseveralsectionsbasedonrigorousempiricalresearch.Thefollowingsummarizesthemainsectionsofthereport.TheLegalityofCameraSurveillanceinCanada

NoCanadianJurisdictionhasyetpassedlegislationthatexplicitlyaddressespubliccamerasurveillance.Variousfederalandprovincialfreedomofinformationandprivacystatutesprovidebroadauthorityforinformationcollectioninthenameoflawenforcement,butitisunclearwhetherthesestatutesarecapableofspecificallyauthorizingpubliccamerasurveillance.UntiltheCourtshaveanopportunitytoruleonwhetherthisauthorizationisvalid,existingsurveillanceuseis“legal.”

PastSupremeCourtdecisionshavesuggestedthattheuseofpublicsurveillancemayengagesection8oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,whichprotectsagainstunreasonablesearchandseizure.IftheSupremeCourtweretoacceptthatpublicsurveillanceisa“search,”thenthe

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useofsurveillancetechnologywouldbecircumscribedbyarangeoflegalprotectionscontainedwithinsection8.

Applyingsection8oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomswillbedifficultasitwasoriginallydesignedtoprotectagainstthetypeofphysicalsearcheswithwhichthecriminallawhastraditionallybeenconcerned.Surveillance,asaresult,sitsuncomfortablywithinthelegalanalysisdevelopedwithinsection8,whichincreasesthechallengeofsuccessfullyconvincingtheCourtsthattheChartershouldapply.

IftheCourtsacceptthatpublicsurveillanceiscircumscribedbysection8oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,theymayrequirethatanyfuturesurveillanceuserequireawarrant,or,alternatively,thatParliamentmustdefinealegalregimeforpublicsurveillancethatcanthenbeevaluatedbytheCourtsforcompliancewiththeCharter.

Intheabsenceofstatutoryorjudicialauthorityfor,orlimitationson,publicsurveillance,thevariousfederalandprovincialinformationandprivacycommissionershavedraftedarangeofnon‐bindingguidelinesonreasonablesurveillanceuse.Thoughsuchguidelinesarenon‐enforceable,andprovidenosanctionsfornon‐compliance,theirexistenceneverthelessshouldinfluencepatternsofsurveillanceuse,andmaystillbecapableofregulatingsurveillanceintheabsenceofspecificlegalrequirements.

TheTechnicalContextofCameraSurveillanceinCanada

Camerasurveillancehasbecomebigbusiness.Likemanyotherindustries,thosesellingcamerasurveillancemayseethedemandfortheirproductsandservicesdeclineorslowinthesedifficulteconomictimes.However,threeargumentsareputforthtosuggestthatthecamerasurveillanceindustrymayberesilienttoaneconomicdownturn.

Thecamerasurveillanceindustryexploitsourfearsinordertomarkettheirproducts,suggestingthatstate‐of‐the‐arttechnologyiscapableofcreatinga“crimefree”or“worryfree”society.Theseutopianpromisesforma“masternarrativeoftechnology”,thatcanhelpexplainsomepartofthetechnology’sproliferation.

Thecapabilitiesofcurrentcamerasurveillancetechnologiesarediscussed,focusingon:cameratechnologies,varioustypesofsignaltransmission,differentmodesofmonitoringandrecordingthevisual(and/ordigital)dataproducedbycamerasurveillance.

Anydiscussionofthetechnologicalaspectsofcamerasurveillancemustmovebeyondafocusontechnologicalcapabilitiestowardanunderstandingofthe“technicalcontextofcamerasurveillance”.Thisincludes,technologicalcapabilitiesofthecamerasurveillanceassemblage(integrationandinteroperabilityissues),thesocio‐technicalspaceofthecamerasurveillancecontrolroom,aswellasthetrainingreceivedbythecameraoperator(s).

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ViewsFromBehindtheLens:ExploringOperatorPerceptions Surveillancecameraoperatorslisttheft,broadlydefined,asatoppriority.

Operatorsalsoprioritizetheirownpersonalsafety,aswellasthesafetyoftheircolleaguesandothersinthesocialspacetheymonitor.The‘flawedconsumer’‐youth,thehomeless,thedrunkordrugaddicted–areidentifiedasasourceofriskforboththeftandpersonalsafety.

Cameraoperatorsatthreeoftheeightresearchsitesindicatethattheyhavebecomemoreattunedtotheriskofterrorismfollowingthe9/11attacks.Someoftheoperatorssuggestthatfollowingtheterroristattackstheyhavebecomemoreawareof‘MiddleEastern’people.Inshort,theterroristthreatisperceivedasa‘Muslim’threat.

Thecameraoperatorsaremixedinacknowledgingtheemploymentprejudice,biasandstereotypes.Whilesomeareadamantthattheydonotemploystereotypes,othersdescriberemainingindiscriminateasasignificantchallengetodoingcamerasurveillancework.Otherssuggestthatyoucannoteffectivelymonitorsurveillancecameraswithoutrelyingonstereotyping.Theveryterms‘prejudice’,‘stereotypes’,and‘discrimination’arevalueladeninthecontextofcamerasurveillanceresearch,likelyresultingincameraoperatorsdenyingtheuseofsuchstrategies.However,asthissectionrevealsnotalldiscriminationresultsinheightenedscrutinyornegativeconsequence.

Asworkers,thesecuritypersonnelwhomonitorsurveillancecamerasalsohavetheiractivitiesmonitored.Thedigitizationofcamerasurveillancetechnologyopensupthepotentialforthesurveillancecamerafootagefromallcamerastobecontinuouslyrecorded.Byextension,theviewinghabitsofcameraoperatorsaremoreeasilyscrutinizedbysupervisors.Whilethemajorityofcameraoperatorsdobelievethattheiron‐cameraactivitiesareopentoscrutiny,theirresponsesweremixedwhendiscussingwhetherthisbeliefhadaself‐discipliningeffect.

Cameraoperatorshavedifferingopinionsabouttheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillance,withsomequestioningwhethersurveillancecamerasareintendedtobeadeterrentatall.Fromtheperspectiveofthoseoperatingsuchsystems,camerasurveillanceismosteffectiveatexpandingtheirabilitytosee,improvingthemanagementofresources,andreducingfear.Whilesomeoftheoperatorsprovideacritiqueofthetechnologicalequipmenttheyoftenoffersystemupgradesastheobvioussolution.

UnderstandingPublicPerceptionsofCameraSurveillanceinCanada PublicopinionresearchoncamerasurveillanceinNorthAmericahas

primarilybeenundertakenbymarketbasedinvestigationofpoliticalorganizationsandmediaoutletswhichcontinuallydemonstrateconsiderablesupportfortheuseofcamerasurveillance,duetothesystem’sperceivedabilitytoreducecrimeandpreventpossibleterroristactivity.

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TheGlobalizationofPersonalData(GPD)internationalsurveydataisusedtohelpprovideamoreholisticconceptionofpublicperceptionsofknowledgeandeffectivenessofcommunityandin‐storecamerasurveillanceinCanada.

ResponsesindicatethatapproximatelyhalftheCanadianpublicconsidersthemselvestobeatleastsomewhatknowledgeableabouttheuseofvideocamerasasamethodofsurveillanceandthatthevastmajorityoftheCanadianpublicfeelsthatcamerasurveillanceisatleastsomewhateffectiveinitsabilitytoreducecrime.

Comparisonofthewaydifferentdemographicvariablesinfluencepublicperceptionsofcamerasurveillanceresultedinlittlevariation,however,whentheresultstotheeffectivenessquestionswerecross‐tabulatedwithotherquestionsinthesurvey,itwasfoundthatthosewithahighleveloftrustinthegovernmentwerealsomorelikelytothinkcommunitycamerasurveillancetobehighlyeffective.Similarly,thosewithahighdegreeoftrustinprivatecompaniesweremorelikelytobelievein‐storecamerasurveillancewasahighlyeffectivemeansofcrimereduction.

TheSurveillanceLegacy PlanstoimplementcamerasurveillanceinVancouver’sDowntownEastSide

weresuccessfullyresistedbycommunityactivistsin1999and2001.By2008anotherplantoimplementcamerasurveillanceontheCity’sGranvilleMallEntertainmentDistrictwasquietlyshelved.Despitethesevictoriesactivistsfeartheymaybelosingthebattle,convincedthatthe2010VancouverOlympicGameswouldplayanintegralroleintheintroductionandacceptanceofcamerasurveillanceinthecity.

TheexperiencesfromrecentpastdemonstratethatcamerasurveillanceisoneofthelegaciesofhostingtheOlympicGames.FollowingtheSydney(2000),Athens(2004)andTorino(2006)OlympicGamescamerasurveillancesystemswererepurposedtowardgenerallawenforcementand/ortrafficmanagementneeds.

SecurityrequirementsatOlympicvenuesandotherlocalsitesduringthegamesoperateasatrumpcardinthepoliticsofsurveillance.Whilelittleofficialinformationisbeingdisclosedaboutthecamerasurveillanceplansduringandpost‐Olympics,thereissomeevidencethatthereareplansbycityandpoliceofficialtoobtain”legacy”cameras,ensuringthatcamerasurveillancesystemsremainoperationalinVancouverbeyondthe2010games.

Oncethepubliccamerasurveillancesystemsareinplace,itbecomesrelativelyeasytojustifytheircontinueduseonthegroundsthatthepublichasalreadycometoacceptthelossofprivacywithinthemonitoredspacesandthattheirremovalwouldrepresentasignificantwasteoftaxpayerdollars,amongotherforeseeablearguments.

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CameraSurveillanceinOttawaTaxicabs:ACaseStudy Therearefewindependentstudiesoncabcamerasandviolenceagainsttaxi

drivers.FiguresfromWinnipegsuggestadropincriminalvictimizationaftertheintroductionofcameras.

Whilesometaxidriversinterviewedbelievethatcabcamerasdecreasetheprevalenceofrobbery,farejumping,verbalabuse,andcustomermisbehaviour,othersfeelthatcameraswillonlycapturetheimageofasuspectwhenacrimeoccurs.

Ottawataxidriversmobilizedeffectivelytoensurethatcabcameraswereintroducedontermsfavourabletothem;resistanttocameratechnologythattheybelievecanbeusedtospyonthem.Whiledriverstonotappearconcernedthatcamerasareaninvasionofpassengerprivacy,taxilicensingboardsandcabcameratechnologycompaniesfeelsimilarlyinrelationtotheprivacyoftaxidrivers.

Cabcameracompaniesareentrepreneurialandinadditiontocamerasmustselltheveryideaofsurveillance.Thismayrequiremakingclaimsregardingthedeterrenteffectofcabcameras,aswellasthevalueofthefootageinprosecutingcrimes.

ThecaseofcabcamerasinOttawasupportsclaimsthatnewsurveillancemeasuresareoftenimplementedwithoutappropriateconsultationoradequateindependentevaluation.Thisexampledemonstratestheimportanceofinvolvingstakeholderspriortodecision‐making.

CameraSurveillanceintheShoppingCity Camerasurveillanceinmassprivatespacecannotbeconceivedasasecurity

practicealone.Theconflictinggoalsanddemandsoncamerasurveillancearebestillustratedbyexploringsurveillanceincontextualpractice.ThissectionexploressurveillancepracticesinaDowntownMontrealShoppingMall,referredtoas“DowntownPlaza”.

DowntownPlazaemploysexternalprivatesecuritypersonnel,supervisedbyin‐houseemployees,whichleadstominorfrictionduetodifferingperceptionsofwhat“security”entailsandhowitshouldbemaintained.

SecuritypersonnelhavelowstatuswithintheDowntownPlaza,resultinginhighstaffturnoveratalllevels.Theyareorganizedonamilitary‐likehierarchicalstructure;however,thereislittledifferencebetweenthetasksundertakenbythoseateitherend.CameraoperatorsatDowntownPlazaareresponsibleforarangeofactivitiesbeyondmonitoringthecameras,makingitunlikelythattheaveragevisitorwillactuallybewatchedduringtheirvisit.

WhileseveralareasofDowntownPlazaaremonitoredbycamerasurveillance,includingrestroomentrances,therecurrentlyremainsasignificantamountofspacethatisnotundersurveillance.TheimplementationofnewerInternetProtocol(IP)camerasmaymakesurveillanceoftheseblindspotsmorefeasible.

Theoverallofobjectiveofmallsecurity,includingcamerasurveillanceistomaintaintheaestheticsoftheshoppingmall.Thisisachievedbyensuring

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that:shopscomplywiththehoursofoperationsetbymalladministrators,spillsareimmediatelycleanedandoverflowinggarbagebinsareemptied,andvisitorswhodonotfitthedesiredimageofthespacearekeptout.Ironically,whilepromisingpotentialvisitorssecurity,moreattentionisgiventothemallenvironmentandsymbolsoforderthantothepatronswithin.

TheUseandTransferofCameraSurveillanceImages:TheCaseofCrimeStoppers

CrimeStoppersisaprominentcrimepreventionprograminNorthAmerica,withanincreasinglyglobalreach.Theprogramaimstoprovidemembersofacommunitywithananonymousmeansofassistingthepolicesolvecrimes,whichCrimeStoppersadvertisesthroughvariousmediaoutletsandformats.AsoflatecamerasurveillancefootageappearstobearegularfeatureofCrimeStoppersadvertisements,andCrimesStoppersisalsotransferringthisfootagetovideosharingwebsites,suchasYouTube.

Thetransferofcamerasurveillancefootagetopolice,CrimeStoppers,andbeyondposesprivacyandethicalconcerns.First,thispracticeraisesnotificationissues,asthosewhohavetheirimagescollected–includingvictimsandbystanders‐maynotbeadvisedthattheirimagescouldbetransferredto,andpostedby,athirdparty.Second,imagestransferredinerror,andthatareaccompaniedbyacriminalizingnarrativemayhaveadetrimentalimpactonanindividual’sreputationandlivelihood.Finally,thedisproportionateuseofimagesdepictingvisibleminoritiesengagedincriminalactivityispotentiallyharmingtoparticularracialandethnicgroups.

ThereisanapparentincreaseintheuseofcamerasurveillancefootageovertraditionalCrimeStoppersreenactments.Thishassocialimplicationbecausenarrativesdescribingacriminalincidentmaybemorebelievablewhenbackedbycamerasurveillanceimages.Further,thesenarrativesoftenimplyguiltratherthansimplysuggestingthatacriminalactisallegedtohaveoccurred.Therelianceofcamerasurveillancefootage,oftenprovidedbyprivatebusiness,alsoservestonarrowthetypesofcrimesadvertisedonCrimeStoppers,makingbusinessestheimmediatebeneficiariesoftheimagesportrayedbyCrimeStoppers.

Thevolumeofcamerasurveillanceimagestransferredtothird‐partyentities,suchaCrimeStoppersandYouTube,increasesasthesecrime‐fightinginitiativesexpand.Ironically,theproliferationofcamerasurveillanceimagesinCrimeStoppersadvertisementsisatestamenttothefailureofthecamerasdeterrenteffect.

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IntroductionDavidLyonProbablythemostcontroversialsurveillancecamerasinCanadawereinstalledinVancouvertowardstheendof2009,inpreparationfortheOlympicandParalympicWinterGames2010.TheyareasiteofstrugglebetweentheIntegratedSecurityUnitsetuptooverseesafetyandtocontrolcrowdsandtraffic,andgroupssuchastheB.C.CivilLibertiesAssociationwhoareconcernedthatthecamerasmayremaininplaceafterthegamesarecompleted.TheCityofVancouverhasstatedthatthecameraswillbedeactivatedafterthegamesbuttheBCCLAaskswhy,then,hasapermanentcontrolcentrebeenestablishedtocoordinateatemporarymeasure?1Thecontroversyhasotherfacesaswell.Itisnotonlythat,frompreviousexperienceofallkindsofmega‐events,onecanseehowatime‐limitedshowmayhavelong‐termeffects,notnecessarilywelcomedinthecityinquestion.Butalso,themostdenseplacingofthecamerasisinanurbanarea,theDowntownEastSide(DTES),withalonghistoryofsocialdeprivationaswellasdebateovercamerainstallation.Locatedcheek‐by‐jowlwithsomeofVancouver’smostcelebratedtouristareas,suchasGastown,theDTEShasfrequentlybeenviewedasathreattocommerceandazoneinfromwhichthepoor,homelessandstreetpeopleshouldberemovedoratleastcloselycontrolled.Intheearlierdebate,rumblingfromthe1990s,concernswereexpressedthatinadequateattentionhadbeenpaidtoalreadyexistingstudiesofpolicing‐by‐cameraintheUKandtheUSA2thattendedtoshowhowcameraswereameansofsocialexclusion.Moreover,positiveproposalsweremadeastowhatsortsofinitiativescouldbetakentoalleviateconditionswithintheDTES,initiativesthatmightactuallycontributetosocialcohesionandtograssrootsurbanrenewal.Afterall,noonebenefitsfromreportsthattheDTESisthemostdeprivedurbanareainCanada,leastofallthosewholivethere.ItwouldbehearteningifasmuchattentionwaspaidelsewheretothemushroomingarrivalofsurveillancecamerasoncitystreetsinCanadabutsuchinfactisnotthecase.Aswithsomanyothernewdevices,techniquesandstrategiesforkeepingtabsonthepopulation–inbothpublicandprivatespheres–theygenerallyseemtobeacceptedwithoutdemur.Indeed,asweshallseeonceagaininthisreport,inthecaseofsurveillancecameras,publicopinionisgenerallyveryfavourabletotheir

1Seee.g.theCBCreportofDecember72009:http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british‐columbia/story/2009/12/07/bc‐cctv‐concerns‐olympics.html2Seee.g.http://mypage.direct.ca/c/carnnews/cctv.html

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installation.EveninthecaseoftheDTES,plentyofVancouveritesseemsanguineabouttheuseofcameras.Whatismissingfromsomanymediareportsandindeedfromtherationalesofferedbychambersofcommerceandpolicedepartmentsisevidence.Theonusshouldbeonthosethatsetupvideosurveillanceinpublicstreetstoofferreasonswhythesearepreferabletoothermethodsofpursuingthesamegoals.Plentyofrhetoricandpromotionalhypeisavailable,butverylittlebywayofseriousandsolidstudy.Itisveryencouragingthatsomesuchstudies,thatinvokeseriousresearch,havebeenmadeandairedpubliclybygroupssuchasprivacycommissions,especiallyinrelationtotheOlympicWinterGamesinVancouver.3Butitislessthanobviousthatthesearebeingtakenseriouslyamongthosewhomakedecisionsaboutdeployment,eventhoughsomeminorconcessionsmaybemadeinspecificinstances.Nevertheless,theeffortisworthwhile.Wide‐rangingdebateoversurveillancecamerasinCanadiancitiesislongoverdue,eventhoughCanadacurrentlyusesproportionatelyfarfewercamerasthantheUKortheUSA.CamerasarebeingintroducedinpublicspacesinCanadaandweneednotonlygroundedcomparativestudiesfromelsewhere,butalsosomespecificdataaboutwhatisactuallyhappeninginCanada.Policy‐makersandindeedallstakeholdersinareasdeemedpotentialsitesforcamerasurveillanceoweittomembersofthepublictodemonstrateneedandanawarenessofthepossibleconsequencesoftheirinstallation.Thepresentreportisacontributiontojustsuchevidence‐baseddebateovervideocamerasurveillanceinCanada.Whilereferenceismade,appropriately,toexperiencesinsomeothercountries,themainfocusisonwhatishappeninginCanada.Thisreportexaminesanumberofimportantissues,startingwiththeCanadianlegal,technicalandpublicopinioncontextsofcamerasurveillance,andthewaysthatsomeCanadiancameraoperatorsseetheirworld.Somefurtherconcretecasesarethenanalyzed,startingwiththeDowntownEastSideinVancouver.Ottawataxicabcamerasandsurveillanceinshoppingareasareexplored,asistherelationshipbetweentheCrimeStoppersprogramandtheproliferationofcameras.TogetherwiththefindingsoftheSCANreportpartI,releasedinJanuary2009,thispresentreportaimstoinformboththepublicandpolicy‐makers,inareliablebutaccessibleway.Thereportacknowledgesthatundercertaincircumstancescamerasurveillancemaybewarranted,butitwarnsclearlyabouttherisksofseeingcamerasasasilverbullet.Thereportcanonlyclaimtobepartialinitsfindings,thoughwelookforwardtofurtheropportunitiestosharetheworkoftheSCANresearchgroupasnewfindingsbecomeavailable.Whendisagreementarisesaboutsurveillancecameras,asitpresentlyhasinVancouver,itisourhopethatparticipantswillincreasinglybeabletoreachforreportslikethisone,tohelpthemcometodecisionsthatarefairandappropriate.3Seewww.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/ol_20090202_e.cfm

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The“Legality”ofCameraSurveillanceinCanadaMatJohnson

IntroductionExistingCanadianpubliccamerasurveillancesystemsoperatelargelywithinalegalvacuum.NolawshavebeenwritteninCanadatospecificallyaddresscamerasurveillance,andnoCourthasyetconsideredthesubstantivequestionsraisedbytheiruse.Earlyambiguitywithinthelawiscommonforemergingtechnologies.Emergingtechnologiesalsosituncomfortablywithourtraditionalapproachtoquestionsofrightsandliberties,andsurveillanceisnoexception.ManyoftheprotectionsfromtheStateanditspolicepowersguaranteedbythecriminallawweredevelopeddecades,ifnotcenturies,ago.TherightagainstunreasonablesearchesbytheStatewouldbeabsurdifthelawrestricteditsapplicationtotraditionalphysicalsearchesinourmodern,digitalage.However,itremainsdifficulttodeterminetheextenttowhichvarioustypesofmoderntechnologyshouldattractthesameprotectionsastraditionalsearches.Ispubliccamerasurveillanceequivalent,oranalogous,tophysicalsearchesagainstwhichCanadiancitizensshouldbeprotected,absentofsufficientcause?Thequestionofwhethersurveillanceshouldbeunderstoodtobeasearchisfundamentaltothebroaderquestionofwhetherpublicsurveillanceis“legal.”Thisquestionisalsofundamentallytiedtoprivacyissues,andspecificallywhethersurveillanceviolatestheprivacyofthosepersonsunderitsgaze.Theseinterconnectedquestionsarealsoheavilydependentonthedifferentcharacterizationsofsurveillance.Whethersurveillanceisconceivedasabenignpublicsafetytoolorinvasivepolicetechnologyleadstowildlydifferentlegalresults.UntiltheCourtsweighinandchoosebetweenthesecompetingcharacterizations,the“law”willcontinuetobeanopenquestion.Thisdiscussionwillexaminethecurrentstateofthelawasitappliestopubliccamerasurveillance,aswellasthekeylegalissuesitraises.Identifyingthecurrentstateofthelawsurroundingemergingtechnologiesisnevereasy.Normally,the“law”isacombinationofexistinglegislationandanyjudicialdecisionsthatinterpretthelegislation,therelevantcommonlaw,ortheapplicabilitytheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.4Inthecaseofpublicsurveillance,thereareanumberofstatutes,bothFederalandprovincial,whichauthorizeandlimitbroadinformationgatheringpowers,butwhicharenotspecifictosurveillance.Therearealsoanumberofjudicialdecisionsrelatingtoissuesanalogoustosurveillance,butnotdirectlyonpoint.ThisdiscussionwillfirstexaminethestrengthsandlimitationsofrelatedstatutesbeforeturningtohowtheCourtshaveruledonanalogousquestionsinthepast.

4CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,PartIoftheConstitutionAct,1982,beingScheduleBtotheCanadaAct1982(U.K.),1982,c.11[Charter].

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ThesepriordecisionssuggesthowtheCourtswillapproachsimilarquestionsinthefuture.Finally,thevoluntaryguidelinespublishedbythevariousCanadianprivacycommissionerstofillthelegalvacuumwillbereviewed.Thesevariouslegalconsiderationsdemonstratethequestionablelegalfoundationsonwhichpubliccamerasurveillancesystemsrestandthat,absentfutureParliamentaryactiononthisissue,afutureCourtmaylimittheauthoritythatsuchsystemspresentlyenjoy.

ThePublic‐PrivateDistinctionBeforeturningtothespecificlegislationandjudicialdecisionswhicharerelevanttopublicsurveillance,itisimportanttoconsiderthequestionofwhoisoperatingthesurveillancesystem,asthiswillhavebearingonthelegalregimethatisapplied.Whilethisdiscussionwillfocusonthelegalimplicationsofpublicsurveillancebypublicactors,differentruleswillapplydependingonwhethertheoperatorsofthesurveillancesystemarepublicorprivateactors,andwhetherthesurveillanceisconductedinpublicorprivatespaces.IntermsofprivatesurveillancebypublicactorsisregulatedbytheCriminalCode,whileprivatesurveillancebyprivateactorsiseithergovernedbytheguidelinesofPIPEDA5(assumingthesurveillanceisforacommercialpurpose),ortreatedasaprivatematter(suchasinacasewhereanindividualinstallssurveillancesystemsintheirownhome).Identifyingthelegalrequirementsforpublicsurveillanceismuchmorechallenging.Whileprivatesurveillanceclearlyimplicatesprivacyrights,publiccamerasurveillanceisnotsostraightforward.Inconsideringtheapplicationoftheruletoprivateandpublicactorsengagedinpublicsurveillance,thekeydistinctionisthattheCharteronlyappliestopublicactors(byvirtueofs.32oftheCharter).ThismeansthatanyCharterlimitationsapplyonlytothepoliceorotherstateagents,andanyprivateactorsactingontheirbehalf.PrivateactorswhooperatepublicsurveillanceindependentlyoftheStatearesubjecttodifferentrules.Thosewhoconductsurveillancefor“commercialpurposes,”aresubjecttotherequirementsofPIPEDA,whileexistinglawdoesnotgovernprivateactorswhoengageinnon‐commercialpublicsurveillance,suchasprivatecitizens.Unlessspecificallynoted,theremainderofthisanalysiswillfocusonpublicsurveillancebypublicactors,giventhatthisiscategoryofsurveillancethattendstogeneratethemostconcern.Nonetheless,manyoftheissuesraisedhereinarerelevanttopublicsurveillancebybothpublicandprivateactors,evenifonlyindirectly.

LegislationNoCanadianlegislaturehaspassedlegislationthatexplicitlyaddressesorauthorizestheuseofpubliccamerasurveillanceintheirjurisdiction.Theclosest

5PersonalInformationProtectionandElectronicDocumentsAct,S.C.,2000,c.5[PIPEDA].

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suchpieceoflegislationistheCriminalCode,whichauthorizessurveillanceinthecontextofcriminalinvestigations,6butthisformofsurveillanceisfocusedonsingleindividualsororganizations.ThepossibilityforexpandingtheapplicationoftheCriminalCodewillbeexaminedattheendofthissection.InadditiontotheCriminalCode,thereareotherfederalandprovincialstatutesthataretangentiallyrelatedtoissuesraisedbycamerasurveillance.However,noneofthesestatutesarecapableofprovidingclearguidanceforallactorsorforallcircumstanceswherepubliccamerasurveillanceisemployed.

FederalStatutesTheFederalGovernmenthaspassedtwostatutesthatarerelevanttosurveillanceissues.Bothlawsregulatesomeaspectsoftheuseofsurveillance,butneitherdoessocomprehensively.

ThePrivacyAct7ThePrivacyActisafederalstatutegoverningthecollectionanduseofpersonalinformationbytheFederalGovernment,aswellasprovidingaccesstothatinformation.ThePrivacyActisrelevanttosurveillancetotheextentthatsurveillancefootageisconsidered“personalinformation”,buttheAct’sapplicationislimitedtothecollectionofinformationby“governmentinstitutions”.8Inpracticalterms,thismeansthatthePrivacyActwillonlybeapplicabletosurveillanceconductedbytheRCMP(orotherfederalagents),andnottomunicipalorprovincialpoliceforces.Despiteitslimitedapplicability,thePrivacyActhasservedasthebackdropforoneofthefewadministrativerulingsonthelegalityofsurveillance.In2001,GeorgeRadwanski,theformerFederalPrivacyCommissioner,wasaskedtoruleonwhetheranRCMPsurveillanceprograminKelowna,BritishColumbia,compliedwiththePrivacyAct(Radwanski2001).ThoughthisrulingwasconcernedwiththePrivacyAct,itsconclusionsarebroadlyrelevanttothelegalityofpublicsurveillanceandwillbereferredtothroughoutthisdiscussion.CommissionerRadwanskifoundthatthesystem’srecordingcapabilitiesviolatedsection4ofthePrivacyAct,whichstates:

Nopersonalinformationshallbecollectedbyagovernmentinstitutionunlessitrelatesdirectlytoanoperatingprogramoractivityoftheinstitution.9

Radwanskiinterpretedthistomeanthatgovernmentinstitutionsmust“collectonlytheminimumamountofpersonalinformationnecessaryfortheintendedpurpose”andthatanycollectionrequires“demonstrableneed.”Thenowformer6CriminalCode,R.S.,1985,c.C‐46atPartIV.1.7PrivacyAct,R.S.C.,1985,c.P‐21.8Ibid.,s.4.9PrivacyAct,supranote4ats.4.

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CommissionerfoundthattheKelownasurveillancesystemengagedin“wholesalemonitoring”andthat,byrecordingcontinuously,thesystemunnecessarilyrecordedthousandsofinnocentcitizensengagedinactivitiesunrelatedtothemandateoftheRCMP.Whilepreventinganddeterringcrimeisanimportantpoliceobjective,RadwanskiconcludedthattheprogramdidnotmeettherequirementsofthePrivacyAct(Radwanski2001).InresponsetotheCommissioner’sinvestigation,theRCMPceasedthepracticeofcontinuousrecording;beginningtorecordonlywhenaviolationlawwasdetected.CommissionerRadwanski,whileacknowledgingthatthischangebroughtthesystemintotechnicalcompliancewiththePrivacyAct,arguedthatevenanon‐recordingcamerasurveillancesystemdidnotrespectthespiritoftheActandorderedthatthecamerasberemoved.TheRCMPandtheSolicitor‐Generalrefusedtoremovethecameras(Radwanski2002).Inresponse,CommissionerRadwanskiattemptedtoenforcehisfindingthroughtheCourts,buthisapplicationwasdismissedontechnicalgrounds.10Assuch,thescopeoftheapplicabilityofthePrivacyActremainsunclear:theRCMPacknowledgedthatcontinuousrecordingwasinconsistentwiththeAct,butdisagreedaboutthecomplianceofnon‐continuousrecordings.Untilthecourtsinterpretthescopeofsection4,itwillcontinuetobeunclearwhichviewiscorrect.Nevertheless,itisclearthatthePrivacyActimposessome,albeitlimited,restrictionsonthesurveillanceactivitiesoftheRCMP.

PersonalInformationProtectionandElectronicDocumentsAct(PIPEDA)TheFederalGovernmenthasalsoenactedPIPEDA,11whichisdirectedattheuseandcollectionofpersonalinformationfromcommercialactivities.WhilethisActrepresentsasignificantstepforwardforinformationprivacyinCanada,itisonlycapableofdefiningacceptableinformationgatheringpracticesbyprivateactorsinvolvedincommercialactivities.PIPEDAonlyappliestoorganizationsthatcollectinformation“inthecourseofcommercialactivities”whileexpresslyexcludingfromitsambitanygovernmentinstitutionscoveredbythePrivacyAct.12Asaresult,PIPEDAisnotapplicabletotheRCMPoranyotherprovincialormunicipalpoliceforce.Furthermore,itwilllikelynotbeapplicabletoanyotherpublicinterestgroupengagedinsurveillanceonbehalfofthepolice,unlessthegroupisseekingprofitoranothercommercialbenefit,suchasprivatesecurityfirms.PrivateactorsthatcollectinformationforprofitwouldbesubjecttoPIPEDA.

10Canada(PrivacyCommissioner)v.Canada(AttorneyGeneral),2003BCSC862,[2003]9W.W.R.242,14B.C.L.R.(4th)359.11Supranote2. 12Ibid.ats.4.

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PIPEDAplacesstringentrestrictionsonthecollectionofpersonalinformationwithoutknowledgeorconsent,whichincludesvideosurveillance.13ItisunlikelythatanysurreptitioussurveillancewillmeetPIPEDA’srequirements,thoughsurveillancesystemsthatareclearlyidentifiedmaybepermissible.FormerPrivacyCommissionerRadwanskiwasparticularlycriticalofcommercialsurveillance,arguingthatwherethereisademonstrableneedforsurveillance,itshouldonlybeconductedbylawfulpublicauthorities.Hearguedthat“[t]hereisnoplaceinoursocietyforunauthorizedsurveillanceofpublicplacesbyprivatesectororganizationsforcommercialreasons.”14 Takentogether,thePrivacyActandPIPEDAregulatesurveillanceconductedbytheRCMPandprivateentitiesforcommercialpurposes.ProvincialstatutesandthecommonlawarecapableofaddressingsomeofthegapsleftunregulatedbytheFederalprivacyregime,althoughnotallareaddressed,andprotectionscanvarybetweenprovinces.

ProvincialFreedomofInformationandPrivacyStatutes

FreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct(FIPPA)EveryprovincehasitsownFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct(FIPPA),whichimposerestrictionsontheabilityofprovincialinstitutiontocollectandusepersonalinformation.OntariohasbothaFIPPAandtheMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct(MFIPPA),whichcontainnearlyidenticalsectionsoninformationcollection.ForthepurposeoftheseActs,“provincialinstitutions”includeprovincialandmunicipalpoliceforces.However,theActsallowsignificantexceptionsforthepurposesof“lawenforcement”,anditisunderthisauthoritythatsomeexistingmunicipalsurveillancesystemspurporttooperate.Forexample,subsections38(2)and39(1)(g)oftheOntarioFIPPAallowpersonalinformationtobecollectedfromindividualswithouttheirknowledgeorconsent,solongasthisisdoneforlawenforcementpurposes.15ItissignificantthatthevariousFIPPAsdonotcontainrestrictivelanguagecomparabletosection4oftheFederalPrivacyAct,whichstipulatesthat“nopersonalinformationshallbecollected…unless”certainconditionshavebeenmet.16ThereisnosimilarclauseintheFIPPAs,imposingcomparablepre‐conditionsthatmustbesatisfiedtojustifyinformationcollection.WhileCommissionerRadwanskiinterpretedsection4ofthePrivacyActasanenablingclause,thevariousprovincialactscannotbeinterpretedinasimilarfashion.

13Thisprohibitionincludesvideocameras(Seee.g.Radwanski2001a;PIPEDA,supranote2ats.7.)14UnpublishedLetterfromCommissionerRadwanskitoInformationandPrivacyCommissionerfortheNWTElaineKeenanBengts,ibid. 15FreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct,R.S.O.1990,c.F.31;MunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct,R.S.O.1990,c.M.56[MFIPPA].16Supranote4ats.4.

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Asaresult,suchActswouldseemtoprovideblanketauthorizationforcollectinginformationthroughsurveillancebyprovincialinstitutions,atleastuntilaCourtrulesotherwise.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatitisnotclearwhethertheseActsauthorizeunfetteredandunlimitedsurveillancepowers,especiallyinlightoftheCharter’sprohibitiononunreasonablesearchandseizure.Therearetwoargumentsthatcouldbeusedtochallengepubliccamerasurveillancebyprovincialinstitutions.First,itcanbearguedthattheSupremeCourthasheldthattheCharterdemandsthatthelawauthorizewarrantlesssearches,thatanysuchlawmustbereasonable,andthatthesearchitselfmustbereasonable.17Thisstandardhasgenerallybeeninterpretedtomeanthat“reasonableandprobablegrounds”isrequiredbeforeasearchcanbeinitiated.Arguablypubliccamerasurveillancedoesnotmeetthisstandard,asitdoesnotfocusonindividualsorprioractivitiesthatgiverisetoindividualizedsuspicion.Ontheotherhand,itisunclearwhethercamerasurveillanceconstitutesa“search”withinthemeaningoftheCharter.18Ifpubliccamerasurveillanceisnota“search”,thenFIPPA,oranyofitsotherprovincialcounterparts,willbeimmunetothisconstitutionalargument,atleastwithrespecttoitsabilitytoregulateinformationcollectionthroughsurveillance.Thequestionofwhetherpublicsurveillanceisa“search”isfundamentaltothevariousCharterissuesandwillbediscussedmoreextensivelyintheChartersection.Thesecondargumentagainstinterpretingtheprovincialfreedomofinformationstatutesasablanketauthorizationforcamerasurveillancecanbederivedfrombasicprinciplesofadministrativelaw.Itispossibletoarguethatthelegislaturecouldnotpossiblyhaveintendedtograntunlimitedauthorityforthecollectionofinformationrelatedforthepurposesoflawenforcement,andthatanysuchauthorityshouldbeexercisedonlywhenitisreasonabletodoso,andeffectiveinmeetingitsstatedobjectives.Wherebroadpowersarecreatedbythestate,thelegislationshouldbeinterpretedtoexcludeanyunreasonableorineffectiveexerciseofthatpower.Itremainsanopenquestionwhethersurveillanceiseffectiveincombatingcrime,whilethereasonablenessofpubliccamerasurveillanceisdoubtfulgivenhowwideanetitcasts.CommissionerRadwanskicharacterizedcamerasurveillanceasaprogramof“wholesalemonitoring,”thecostsofwhichoutweighitsbenefits(Radwanski2001).Ifthisaccuratelycharacterizescamerasurveillanceitsusewouldnotbereasonable.However,givenconflictingevidencerelatedtotheutilityofcamerasurveillanceitisunclearwhethersuchanargumentwouldfindtractionintheCourts(seeTaylor2002).

ProvincialPrivacyActsBritishColumbia,Manitoba,NewfoundlandandLabrador,andSaskatchewanallhaveprovincialPrivacyActs.19Thesestatutesshouldbeconsultedifsurveillanceisoperatinginthoseprovinces.TheseActsmaybeuseful,butcontainsimilarlaw17Seee.g.R.v.Collins,[1987]1S.C.R.265at278.18Seee.g.R.v.Kang­Brown,2008SCC18,[2008]1S.C.R.456[Kang­Brown];R.v.Tessling,[2004]3S.C.R.432[Tessling]. 19PrivacyAct,R.S.B.C.1996,c.373[B.C.PrivacyAct];ThePrivacyAct,R.S.S.1978c.P‐24;PrivacyAct,C.C.S.M.c.P125;PrivacyAct,R.S.N.1990,c.P‐22.

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enforcementexceptionsastheirFreedomofInformationcounterparts.20However,allfourPrivacyActslimitthelawenforcementexception,demandingthatanyuseofsurveillancebyapeaceofficernotbe“disproportionatetothegravityofthecrimeorthemattersubjecttoinvestigation”.21Giventhegeneralnatureofcamerasurveillancesystemsitmaybepossibletoarguethatsuchsystemsaredisproportionate.Further,provincialprivacylegislationmakesexplicittheabilityofsurveillancesystemstoviolatepersonalprivacy.22TheBCPrivacyActempowersanindividualtosueforcompensation(referredtoasanactionabletort)wheretheirprivacyhasbeeninvaded.Itdoesnotrequireproofofanyspecificdamage,23whichmeansthatitisnotnecessarytoshowthatharmwascausedbysurveillance.Thisisimportantbecauseitidentifiestheactofsurveillanceitselfasawrongthatrequirescompensation.Thecommonlaw,inthealternative,requiresanactofcommunication(essentiallythepublicationoftheinformationthatwascollectedinviolationofthatindividual’sprivacy),whichcausesharm,inordertochallengeanysurveillanceorotherviolationofprivacy.ThisdistinctionthereforebroadensthescopeoftheremedyavailableunderprovincialPrivacyActsandmayprovideanavenueofreliefforthoseaggrievedbysurveillance.

CriminalCodeSubsection184(1)oftheCriminalCodemayalsoaffectthelegalityofthepubliccamerasurveillance.Thesubsectionstates:

Everyonewho,bymeansofanyelectro‐magnetic,acoustic,mechanicalorotherdevice,wilfullyinterceptsaprivatecommunicationisguiltyofanindictableoffenceandliabletoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingfiveyears.24

Whilethisseemstoplacerestrictionononlytheinterceptionofprivatecommunications,twocourtcaseshaveinterpretedthissectionmorebroadly.25Thissectionregulatesinvestigativesurveillance(suchasphonetaps,videosurveillance,etc.),andcouldbeinterpretedtoincludepubliccamerasurveillance,muchaswasdonewithparticipantsurveillanceinR.v.Duarte.26Suchanapproachreliesheavilyontheviewofsurveillanceasaninvestigativetoolofthepolice,similartoothertypesofsearches.

20Seee.g.B.C.PrivacyAct,ibid.ats.2.21Ibid.ats.2(2).22Ibid.ats.1(4).23Ibid.ats.1(1). 24Supranote3ats.184(1).25SeeDrukenv.R.G.FewerandAssociatesInc.(1998),171Nfld.&P.E.I.R.312atpara.43(Nfld.S.C.(T.D.));Morganv.AltaFlights(Charters)Inc.,2005FC421,271F.T.R.298atpara.22.26[1990]1S.C.R.30[Duarte].

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Interpretingsection184oftheCriminalCodetoincludepubliccamerasurveillancewoulddemandthatthepolice,oragentsactingonbehalfofthepolice,obtainawarranttoinstallsurveillancesystems,andbesubjecttotherequirementsofPartIV.1oftheCriminalCode.Whilesuchaninterpretationrequiresconsiderablejudicialflexibility,itwouldprovideaconsistentnationalstandardfortheuseofcamerasurveillance.Forthosewhocharacterizesurveillanceasapolicetool,incorporatingpubliccamerasurveillancewithintheCriminalCodeisthepreferredoption,whetherthroughlegislativeenactmentorthroughjudicialinterpretation.IncorporatingpublicsurveillanceintotheCriminalCode,whetherthroughlegislativeamendmentorbyjudicialinterpretation,wouldensurethatrulesforpublicvideosurveillanceareappliedconsistentlyacrossCanada.

JurisprudenceGiventheCharterissuesthatcanpotentiallyberaisedbytheuseofpubliccamerasurveillance,itwilllikelybetheCourtsthatdeterminethelegalityortheappropriateuseofsuchtechnology.BeforeturningtoCharterconsiderations,therelevantcommonlawprovisionsthatmayimpacttheuseofcamerasurveillancewillbeexplored.Aswillbeseen,thecommonlawislargelysilentonsurveillance,andhaslittletosayregardingbroaderissuesofprivacy.

CommonLawCommonlawisthebodyofjudge‐madelawthatunderpinsCanada’slegalsystemandwhichestablishesprecedentandguidesfuturejudicialdecisions.Giventherecentemergenceofpublicsurveillanceasalegalissue,therehavebeenfewopportunitiesforcommonlawtodeveloponthesubject.Inoneofthefewdecisionswhereanappellatecourthascommentedontheissue,theOntarioCourtofAppealsuggested,“nothingatCommonLawprohibitsasearchthroughuseofavideocameraandtape.”27Thisviewappearstobecorrect,withanylegalimpedimentstopubliccamerasurveillancearisingfromtheCharterandnotbecauseofcommonlaw.Despitethelimitationsofthetraditionalcommonlaw,therehavebeensomerecentdevelopmentswhichmaystillprovideforsomemeasureofindividualredress.Inparticular,theemergenceofthetortofinvasionofprivacyinanumberofprovinces,hasthepotentialtobeofuseinthisarea.Suingforinvasionofprivacywouldallowformonetarydamageswhereprivacyhasbeenviolated.Unfortunately,therearesignificantlimitationsontheabilityforthistorttoaddresspublicsurveillance.Thefirstlimitationisthatitisunclearwhethersuchatortinfactexists(itisthenatureofthecommonlawtoremainuncertainuntilanumberofcourtshavehadtheopportunitytoconsiderthesameissue).28Thesecondlimitationisthatanactionfor

27R.v.LeBeau(1988),62C.R.(3d)157at181.28ForareviewofthistortinOntario,seeSomwarv.McDonald’sRestaurantsofCanadaLtd.(2006),263D.L.R.(4th)752atpara.22(Ont.Sup.Ct.J.).

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invasionofprivacyisquitenarrow,andisfocusedondamagesresultingfromcommunicatingtheinformationobtainedthroughtheprivacyviolation,notfortheactofrecordingitself.Asaresult,ifanindividualhastheirpicturetakeninpublic,butnothingmore,thenthetortwouldbeunavailable.Ontheotherhand,ifanindividualweretosellthatpicture,thenitwouldbepossibletosue.Thisdistinctionlimitstheutilityofthistortinthecaseofsurveillance,inthatmanywouldarguetheveryactofsurveillanceshouldbeofconcern,withanyresultinguseofsurveillancefootageasecondaryconsideration.Givenhownewthisareaoflawis,nodefinitiveconclusionsmaybedrawnotherthanthatanyuseofsuingforinvasionofprivacywilllikelyonlybeabletoaddressthemostegregiousviolationsofprivacy.Nevertheless,theuseofthistortmayrepresentalastresortforthosewhoopposetheuseofsurveillancecameras(seeBezanson1992;and,Moreham2002).

ApplicationoftheCharterItistheinterpretationofsurveillanceinlightoftheCharterthatwilllikelydeterminethelegalityofanypublicsurveillancesystem.NotonlywilltheCourtsdeterminewhetheranyparticularsurveillancesystemisCharter‐compliant,buttheCourtswillalsodeterminewhetheranypurportedauthorizationforsurveillanceunderanyofthestatutesdiscussedearlierislegitimate.Section8oftheCharterisconcernedwithsearches,andthequestionofwhetheraparticularactivityconstitutesasearchwithinthemeaningofthesectionisfundamentalanddeterminativeoftheultimateresult.Section8specificallystates:

Everyonehastherighttobesecureagainstunreasonablesearchandseizure.

Thissectionhasbeenconsistentlyinterpretedtoprotecta“reasonableexpectationofprivacy”forCanadians.Traditionally,theprotectionagainstunreasonablesearcheshasbeenprimarilyconcernedwithphysicalsearches,and,inparticular,withdeterminingwhenahome,placeofbusiness,oranindividual’sperson,canbesearchedbytheState.Withtheadventofnewformsoftechnology,thescopeofwhatweconsidertobea“search”hasexpanded.Section8hasbeenheldtoprotectagainstaudioandvideosurveillance,29againsttheuseofdrugsnifferdogs,30againstphonetaps,31andagainstGPStrackingdevices.32

29Duarte,supranote23;R.v.Wong,[1990]3S.C.R.36at47[Wong].Itshouldbeemphasizedthatthesetwocasesonlydealtwithprivateaudioandvideosurveillanceinthecontextofinvestigatingspecificoffences,andnotwithanytypeofpublicsurveillance.30Kang­Brown,supranote15;R.v.A.M.,2008SCC19,[2008]1S.C.R.569[A.M.].31Duarte,supranote23;R.v.Garofoli,[1990]2S.C.R.1421.32R.v.Wise,[1992]1S.C.R.527[Wise].(SeeBoa2007foramoreextensivediscussionoftheSupremeCourt’sapproachtonovelsearchtechnologies.)

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Toconstituteasearchwithinthemeaningofsection8,theparticularactmustviolateanindividual’sreasonableexpectationofprivacy.Ifthisexpectationisbreached,thenthesearchmusthavebeenreasonablesoastonotviolatetheCharter.Section8presumesthatanyactivitythatisdeterminedtobeasearchandwasconductedwithoutawarrantisunreasonable,andtheonusisonthegovernmenttoprovethatthesearchwasauthorizedbylaw,thatthelawisreasonable,andthatthesearchitselfwasconductedreasonably.33Usingthisapproach,awiderangeofpolicesearcheshavebeenfoundtobereasonableintheabsenceofawarrant,thoughthesehavegenerallybeenrestrictedtosituationsofemergencyandpublicsafety,wherethereisnotimetoappearbeforeajudge.Thevitalquestioninsection8iswhetheraparticularactivity,toolortechnologyconstitutesasearch.Ifitdoes,section8willapply,requiringthatthesearchbereasonable.Iftheactivityisfoundnottobeasearch,thensection8doesnotapply,andtherewillbenoCharterrestrictionsontheuseoftheactivityortechnologyinquestion.Thequestionofwhethertheactivityconstitutesasearchiscomplex,contextspecific,andrequiresthatanindividual’sreasonableexpectationofprivacybebreached.Thisisbothsubjectiveandobjective:anindividualmustsubjectivelyexpectprivacy,andthisexpectationmustbeobjectivelyreasonable.34Surveillancedealswithinformationalprivacy,atypeofprivacyidentifiedasdeservingprotectionbytheSupremeCourt.Whetheranexpectationofinformationalprivacyhasbeenbreacheddependsonthemeaningfulnessoftheinformationcollected.Themorethatthecollectedinformationrelatesto“intimatedetailsofthelifestyleandpersonalchoicesoftheindividual,”themorelikelyitwillbethatanindividual’sreasonableexpectationofprivacyhasbeenbreached.35Inthecaseofpubliccamerasurveillance,thisanalysiswillbecomplicatedbythepublicnatureofthetechnology.Itisdifficulttoreconciletheideathatanindividualhasanexpectationofprivacywhiletheymoveaboutinpublic,capableofbeingseenbyanybodywhoshouldchoosetolook.Infact,thetraditionallegalviewisthatanindividualdoesnothaveanyexpectationofprivacywhilemovingaboutinpublic.However,therehavebeenanumberofrecentcaseswhichsuggestthatincertainsituations,despitebeinginpublic,anindividualstillsenjoysameasureofprivacy;courtshavereferredtothisasa“diminished”expectationofprivacy.TherehavealsobeenanumberofrecentBritishandEuropeancasesthathaveidentifiedaspectsofpubliclivesthatshouldneverthelessbegrantedameasureofprivacy,whichwillberelevanttoanyfutureconsiderationbyCanadiancourts.36

33Collins,supranote14.34R.v.Edwards,[1996]1S.C.R.128[Edwards].35Tessling,supranote15atpara.25. 36Seee.g.vonHannoverv.Germany,no.59320/00,[2004]E.C.H.R.294(Eur.Ct.H.R.)(preventingthepublicationofphotostakeninpublic);Peckv.TheUnitedKingdom,no.44647/98,[2003]E.C.H.R.44atpara.59(Eur.Ct.H.R.)[Peck](releaseofsurveillancerecordingofindividualattemptingtocommitsuicideonpublicstreet);P.G.andJ.H.v.TheUnitedKingdom,no.44787/98,[2001]E.C.H.R.550atparas.56‐58[P.G.andJ.H.](“Private‐lifeconsiderationsmayarise,however,onceanysystematicorpermanentrecordcomesintoexistenceofsuchmaterialfromthepublicdomain.”);Campbellv.MGN

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FormerSupremeCourtJusticeGérardLaForestsuggestedthatitisthecontinuousnatureofsurveillancethatisproblematic.HearguedthatwhileCanadians“maynothaveareasonableexpectationthatthepolicewillneverobserveouractivitiesinpublicspaces,…surelyitisreasonabletoexpectthattheywillnotalwaysdoso.”37Inadditiontolookingattheeffectofsurveillancecameras;forinstance,whethertheycreatea“chillingeffect”onparticulartypesofactivity,Courtswillalsolikelylooktothenatureoftheinformationcollected.SurveillancerecordingswilllikelybeofparticularconcerntoCourtsduetotheirpotentialtoconveyintimatedetailsaboutindividuals,especiallyascomputersprovidetheabilitytocollate,compareandanalyzerecordingstogether,allowingnewconclusionstobedrawnfromwhatwouldotherwisebemeaninglessinformation.38Anyadditionalconnectionstobiometricsystemswilllikelybemetwithevengreaterconcern.TheCourtswilllikelyfollowoneoftworecentSupremeCourtdecisions.ThecasesofR.v.TesslingandR.v.Kang‐Brownhighlighttworesultsthatcanbeobtainedutilizingsection8.InTessling,theCourtconsideredwhethertheuseofForward‐LookingInfrared(FLIR)camerasconstitutedasearch.ThepolicehadflownoveraresidentialneighbourhoodinahelicopterequippedwithFLIRtechnology,whichallowsheatsignatureswithinbuildingstobeidentified.Thiscameraiscapableofidentifyinghightemperatures,whichareoftenindicativeofthepresenceofamarijuanagrowoperation.TheCourtcharacterizedtheseheatsignaturesas“meaningless,”thereforeMr.TesslinghadnoreasonableexpectationthattheywouldnotbecollectedbytheState.BecausetheuseoftheFLIRcameradoesnotviolateareasonableexpectationofprivacyitisnotasearch;thus,section8oftheCharterisnotapplicable.39Incontrast,theSupremeCourtconsideredtheuseofsnifferdogsinthetwocompanioncasesofR.v.Kang‐BrownandR.v.A.M..Inthesecases,thepolicehadtakensnifferdogsintoaschoolandabusstation.Thepolicedidnothaveanyspecificsuspicionthatdrugswouldbefound,butinbothcasesthedogsidentifiedthepresenceofdrugs,whichledtoarrests.InKang‐Brown,thoughtheresultiscomplexduetothefactthatfourdifferentJusticeshaddifferentviewsastotheoutcome,theCourtunanimouslyacceptedthattheuseofthedogsconstitutedasearch.JusticeDeschamps,notedthattheodorsemanatingfromthebagrevealed

Ltd.,[2004]2A.C.457(H.L),(theCourtrecognizeda“reasonableexpectationofprivacy”(atpara.21)andLordHoffmanarguedthatmerelybeinginpublicdoesnotimplythatanindividuallosestheirexpectationofprivacy(atpara.74));Douglasv.Hello!Ltd.,[2005]4AllER128(claimanthasaprivacyinterestsinphotographstakeninpublic,partlybecause“aphotographismorethantheinformationyougetfromit”);seealsoMoreham2002.37LegalOpinionfromJusticeGérardLaForesttoGeorgeRadwanski,FederalPrivacyCommissioner(5April2002),online:OfficeofthePrivacyCommissionerofCanada<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr‐c/opinion_020410_e.asp>[LaForestLegalOpinion].38Theresultingprofilesareoftenreferredtoashumanmosaics.Seee.g.Paton‐Simpson2000;Nissenbaum1998;andSteeves2008. 39Tessling,supranote15.

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thattheindividualwaslikelytohavecomeintocontactwithacontrolledsubstanceeitherasauseroratrafficker,ortohavebeeninthecompanyofdrugusers.Thenatureofthisinformationwas“verypersonal,”andthereforeengagedsection8oftheCharter.40TheCourtwillneedtodeterminewhetherpubliccamerasurveillanceismorelikeFLIRtechnologyortheuseofsnifferdogs.Bothinvolvesituationswhereinformationiscollectedasitemanatespublicly,butdifferastotheirinformationalcontent.Inanyfuturecaseconsideringtheconstitutionalityofpublicsurveillance,asignificantquestionthatwillneedtobeaddressediswhichofthesetwoanalogiestheCourtsbelieveismoreappropriate.IftheCourtdeterminesthatsurveillanceconstitutesasearch,theinquirydoesnotendthere.Thesecondquestioniswhetherthesearchwasconductedreasonably.Inhislegalopinion,JusticeLaForestconcludedthatifsurveillanceisfoundtobeasearch,“thenitfollowsalmostinexorablythatitviolatessection8oftheCharter.”41JusticeLaForestreachesthisconclusionbecauseofthelackofstatutoryauthoritythatspecificallyprovidesforpubliccamerasurveillance.Despitethepresenceofanumberofinformationcollectionstatutes,nonearelikelysufficienttoauthorizesurveillanceifitfallswithintheambitofsection8.Therequirementsimposedbysection8arerigorous,andcannotlikelybesatisfiedbybroadinformationcollectionauthority,suchasprovincialFIPPAlegislation.TheCourtmayimposeawarrantrequirementfortheinstallationofcamerasurveillanceifitdeterminesthatsurveillancepracticesconstituteasearch.Asmentionedearlier,warrantlesssearchesarepresumptivelyunreasonable.Judicialauthorization,ontheotherhand,almostalwaysmakestheresultingsearchconstitutional,assumingthatproperprocedureshavebeenfollowedandreasonablecauseexists.Inthecaseofpubliccamerasurveillance,ajudgecouldberesponsibleforensuringthattheproposedschemeaddressesaspecificpublicsafetyconcernandthatotherenforcementoptionshavebeenconsideredandrejected.Further,suchawarrantwouldlimitthesurveillancesystemtothegeographicareasapprovedbythejudge,andforadefinedperiodoftime.Suchanapproachwouldalsogivethecourtstheabilitytooverseethecollection,retentionanduseofanyfootageorimagescollectedbythesurveillancesystem.Furthermore,thereisprecedentforthistypeofbroaddecision.42Alternatively,theCourtcouldinsistthatParliamentexplicitlyauthorizesurveillancebeforeanysearches,otherthanwherethepolicepossessreasonableandprobablegrounds,arefoundtobeconstitutional.Inpastcases,theCourtshaveauthorized

40Kang­Brown,supranote15atpara.175;A.M.,supranote27.41LaForestLegalOpinion,supranote34. 42InR.v.Duarte,supranote23,forinstance,theCourtinterpretedsection178.11(1)oftheCriminalCode(nowsection184(1))toincludeparticipantsurveillance,andthatusingthisinvestigatorytoolrequiresawarrant.TheCourtcouldpotentiallydothesamewithpubliccamerasurveillance.

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novelinvestigativetechniquesintheabsenceoflegislativeauthority.However,inKang‐BrownapluralityofSupremeCourtJusticesrefusedtodoso,arguingthatlegislatorsareinabetterpositiontobalancethevariousconsiderationsandintereststhatarerelevanttoquestionsofsearchandseizure.43OnceParliamentdefinesalegislativeschemeforsurveillancetheCourtscanevaluatewhetherthelawisChartercompliant.IftheCourtweretofindthatsurveillanceconstitutesasearch,itismostlikelythattheywouldimposeawarrantrequirementforitsuseorrulethatitisunconstitutionalwithoutlegislativeauthority,thoughthisisfarfromcertain.UntiltheCourtshavetheopportunitytofullyconsidertheissue,itisimpossibletopredicttheresultofthisquestionwithanycertainty.Regardless,theforegoingshouldindicatethatsurveillanceraisescomplexlegalissues,whichwillnotbeeasilyanswered.TherearealsoindicationsthattheSupremeCourthassomemisgivingsaboutitsentiresection8approach,44andmaytaketheopportunitypresentedbypublicsurveillancetoreconsideraltogetherthelegalframeworkfornoveltechnologiesthatpresentcomplexprivacyandcriminallawchallenges.

Non‐BindingGuidelinesThecurrentPrivacyCommissioner,JenniferStoddart,hasturnedtonon‐bindingcodesofconductasameansofensuringthatexistingsurveillanceinstitutionsmeetcertainbasicprivacyguidelines.Thisapproachhasbeenadopted,inpart,becauseofherpredecessor’s(CommissionerRadwanski)unfruitfulattemptstodirectlyregulatesurveillance.Thevariousprovincialinformationandprivacycommissionershaveadoptedasimilarapproach.Thesecodesofconducttendtoadoptaproportionalapproachtosurveillance,bymandatingthatsuchsystemsshouldnotbeusedmorethannecessaryinordertoregulateprescribedactivity.ThemoststringentsetofprovincialguidelinesinCanadaispublishedbytheCommissiond’accèssàl’informationduQuébec,whichcontains20“rulesofuse.”Theserulesoutlinestrictconditionsthatmustbeadheredtofortheuseofsurveillancetobe‘reasonable’.Incontrast,Ontario’sguidelinesaremuchmorepermissive.Thisisevidentinthelanguageusedinthetwodocuments:whereQuebec’srulesconsistentlyprovidethatsurveillanceoperators“shall”complywithcertainlimitations,Ontario’sguidelinesprovidethatcertainaspectsofsurveillance“should”berestricted.Inlegalinterpretation,“shall”isamandatorytermwhile“should”isnot.4543Supranote15.44SeeJusticeBinnie’sdecisioninA.M.,supranote27. 45 Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec, “Rules for use of surveillance cameras with recording in public places by public bodies” (June 2004), online: Commission d’accès à l’information <http://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/06_documentation/01_pdf/new_rules_2004.pdf> at 3-6; Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, “Guidelines for Using Video Surveillance Cameras in Public Places” (2001), online: IPC <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/video-e.pdf>.

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Duetothefactthatsuchcodesofconductarenon‐binding,theyarenottechnically“legal”.Therearenosanctionsfornon‐compliance,andsuchcodespermitnobasisforjudicialoversight.However,non‐bindingguidelinesdofillinthegapsleftbylawbydefiningwhatconstitutesreasonablesurveillanceuse.Theyalsoattempttostrikeabalancebetweenconcernsovercivillibertiesandthoseoflawenforcement.Furthermore,suchprovisionsmaybeofassistancetotheCourtsinevaluatingsurveillance.Giventhatsection8oftheCharterprohibitsonlyunreasonablesearchandseizure,itispossiblethatsuchguidelinescouldprovideastartingpointforaCourtindeterminingwhetheranyparticularsearchwasconductedreasonably.

ConclusionAsanoveltechnology,publiccamerasurveillanceraisesissuesthattheCanadianlegalsystemhasnotyethadtheopportunitytofullyconsider.Theonlycasethathasraisedtheseissueswasdismissedontechnicalgrounds.Existingsurveillancesystemsoperateunderthequestionableauthorityofstatutesgrantingbroadinformationcollectionexceptionsforlawenforcementpurposes.Untilsuchaninterpretationischallengedthesesurveillancesystemsremain“legal.”Oncechallenged,theCourtswillhavetowrestlewiththeapplicationofsection8oftheCharter,aconstitutionalprovisionthatwasdesignedtodealprimarilywithphysicalsearches.Ifsection8isfoundtobeapplicable,thenarangeofrequirementswillbeimposedtoensurethattheuseofthetechnologyis“reasonable.”Ifsection8isnotapplicable,thenthestatusquowillcontinuefortheforeseeablefuture.

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TheTechnicalContextofCameraSurveillanceinCanadaChiaraFonioandPatrickDerby

SellingCameraSurveillance:TheMasterNarrativeofTechnologyOflateweareroutinelyremindedoftheuncertaintiesofcontemporarylife.Newsstoriesandmediaimageshelpfuelourinsecuritiesaboutthepossibilityofthenextpandemic,theinternational‘waronterror’,orlocalcrime.Theresponsetothesesourcesofinsecurityhasbeen,inpart,theimplementationofsophisticated

surveillanceassemblages.Thatis,theformationofnetworksofcorporations,agencies,individualsandtechnologiestocollectandanalyzeinformationabout,orotherwisemonitor,theactivitiesofbothhumans(citizens,travellers,workersandconsumers)andnonhumans(animalsandtransportationflow).Camerasurveillancetechnologyhasbeenenrolledineffortstocombateachoftheabovesourcesofinsecurity.Forinstance,inresponsetotherecentoutbreakoftheH1N1virusgovernmentsworldwidearedeployingthermalcamerasinairports,searchingforindividualswithanelevatedbodytemperaturethatmightsuggestinfection(Howell2009).Publicopen‐streetand

privatecamerasurveillancesystemsareoftentoutedasasignificanttoolinthe‘waroncrime’andnowalsointhe‘waronterror’,ascamerasurveillancetechnologiesaredeployedatborders,inairports,andalsoonthecombatfield.

Whilethissocialandpoliticalcontextofinsecuritymayappeartoguaranteethecontinuedandrapidexpansionofcamerasurveillancetechnologies,thereisanothercrisis–theglobaleconomicrecession–thatmightactasacountervailingfactor.DavidMurakamiWood(2009:1)suggeststhat,atleastintheUK,“CCTVmightbeoneofthefirstcasualtiesoftheglobalrecession”.Whilemarketforecastsarealwaystentative,projectionsforonesegmentofthecamerasurveillanceindustry–theInternetProtocol(IP)videomarket–suggestthatthe2009growthratewillslowby66%comparedto2008asaresultofthecurrenteconomicclimate;however,theIPmarketwillstillgrowby15%thisyear.

Forseveralreasonsitisstilltooearlytospeculateontherealimpactthiseconomiccrisiswillhaveonthesurveillanceindustryortheproliferationofcamerasurveillance.First,thedepthofthiscrisisremainsunclear.Whiletimewilltellhow

Figure1:AdvertisementforSamsung’sA1SeriesSurveillanceCamera.

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longthiscurrentperiodofrecessionwilllastanditsimpactonthecamerasurveillanceindustry,intheshorttermmegaeventssuchasthe2010WinterOlypmicandParalympicGamesinVancouverwillhelpcushiontheblow.ThesecuritycostalonefortheVancouverOlympicGamesisexpectedtoreach$1billionCAD(CBCNews2008).WhileitisunclearexactlyhowmuchofthismoneywillbeearmarkedfortheimplementationofcamerasurveillancesystemsatOlympicvenuesandpublicspacessurroundingthem,thereisnodoubtthatcameraswillmakeuppartofthesecurityassemblage(Huey,thisreport;seealsoBoyleandHaggerty2009)46.Further,intheleaduptotheOlympicstheprovincialgovernmentofBritishColumbiaplanstoadd110newred‐lighttrafficcamerasatacostof$20millionCAD(CBCNews2009).

Second,whiletheNorthAmericanautomotivesectoristakingahit,atleastinpart,becausetheyareoutoftouchwiththemarketdemandforsmallerandmoreefficientvehicles,theoppositemaybesaidaboutthecamerasurveillanceindustry.AccordingtoawhitepaperreleasedbyMultiMediaIntelligence,amarketresearchandconsultancyfirm,thecamerasurveillanceindustryisexpandingbecauseofaheightenedemphasisonsecurity,improvementstothetechnologiesandlowerequipmentcosts(Kirstein2008:1).Whilegovernmentandbusinessmayinfactbelookingtocutbackonoperatingcostsinthesedifficulteconomictimestheymustalsocontinuetorespondtoothersourcesofinsecurity,suchasthethreatofterrorismandtheriskofcrime.Thisnewgenerationofcamerasurveillancetechnologiesmayappealtogovernmentandbusinessbecauseit,atleastintheirminds,allowsthemtoachievetheirsecurityneedsatalowercostthanemployinghumansecuritypersonnel,andwithlittleornohumanerror.

Third,urbanareashithardestbythiscurrenteconomiccrisisandthedownturninthemanufacturingsectorwillsoonseektopositionthemselvessothattheycancompeteforcapitalinvestment.AssomeofthecamerasurveillanceresearchfromtheUKsuggestsineffortstoattractconsumers,tourists,and/orbusinesscitiesneedtoengageina“politicsofimage”(Coleman2004).Thatis,theyneedtopresentthemselvesasasafeplacetovisitand/ordobusiness.Thisisachievedthroughurbanregenerationstrategiesthat,asColeman(2004:200)argues,“promotethedevelopmentandfundingofstreetsafetyinitiativesinwhichstreetcamerasurveillancefiguresprominently.”ForaCanadianexampleoneonlyneedlooktothecityofHamilton,Ontario.AsKevinWalby(2006)explainstheopen‐streetCCTVinHamiltonwasinitiatedinconsultationwithbusinessentrepreneurswhoexpressedconcernthatfearofcrimeinthedowntowncorewashurtingeconomicactivityaswellasthesustainabilityofthecity’ssemi‐prohockeyteam.

Itisessentialtosituatecamerasurveillancewithinthisbroadersocial,political,andeconomicframeworkinordertounderstandcamerasurveillanceasanindustryinwhichmanytechnologymanufacturersandsuppliershavevestedinterests.Manyhouseholdbrands,fromPanasonictoSonytoGeneralElectric,haveastakeinthe46Moreinformationaboutthesecuritybuildupforthe2010OlympicGamescanbefoundat:http://www.no2010.com.

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camerasurveillancemarket47.WhileChinaisamongtheworldleadersinproducingsurveillancecameras,withmajorexportmarketsinNorthAmericaandEurope,severalNorthAmericancompaniesarealsoinnovatorsinthefield.LeadingCanadiansecuritytechnologyandsurveillancecameramanufacturersincludeExtremeCCTV(acquiredbyBoschSecuritySystemsin2008)andGeneralElectric(GE)Security.BombardierInc.,oneofthelargestmilitarycontractorsinCanada,alsomanufacturesandsuppliesciviliantransitvehicles(i.e.airplanes,trainsandlightrail)equippedwithonboardsecuritysystems,includingsurveillancecameras.

ExtremeCCTV,basedoutofBurnaby,BritishColumbia,isamanufacturerofcutting‐edgesurveillanceequipmentandanindustryleaderininfraredimagingsolutionsthatallowfortheproductionofclearcameraimagesinalllightandweatherconditions48.ExtremeCCTVwonthe“SmallerExporterAchievement”awardatthe2003CanadaExportAwardsCeremony,onlyweeksafterbeingnamedthefastestgrowinghigh‐techcompanyinthecountry(ExtremeCCTV2003).Further,after10yearsofcontinuousrevenuegrowththecompany’ssalessurpassed$40millionin2007,anincreaseof$13millionfromthepreviousyear(ExportDevelopmentCanada).Althoughnowacompanywithglobalreach,GeneralElectric(GE)hasbeeninoperationinCanadaforover100yearsandwasnamedtheNorthAmericaVideoSurveillanceCompanyoftheyearbyFrostandSullivanin2008.GESecurity,awhollyownedsubsidyoftheGeneralElectricCompanyfocusesonsecurityrelatedinformationandcommunicationtechnology,includingcamerasurveillance(GESecurity).

Despitethecurrentglobalrecessionthecamerasurveillanceindustryremainsbigbusinessandsurveillancetechnologycompaniesinterestedinsellingtheirproductsexploitourfearsandinsecurities.AperusalofcamerasurveillanceadvertisementsandproductbrochuresavailableontheInternetrevealsthatthefearofcrimeandterrorism,andthesearchforsafetyandsecurityareutilizedtopitchcamerasurveillancetopotentialclients.TakeforinstancethefollowingadvertisementsbyExtremeCCTVandSamsung:

Recentworldeventshavedemonstratedtheeffectivenessofvideosurveillanceattransithubs.Camerashelpdetectsuspiciousbehavior,confirmpotentialthreatsandidentifythepeopleinvolved.Inonepre‐dawnmurdercasethatmadeinternationalheadlines,anExtremecamerastrategicallypositionedbyabusstopprovidedkeycriticalevidence,enablingauthoritiestomakethearrest.TheDistrict

47Theleadingmanufacturersofcamerasurveillancetechnologyandequipmentintheworldinclude:AltronixCorporation,AutomaticControlSystem,Bosch,CMSSecuritySystems,GeneralElectricSecurity(Aritech),Ikegami,Panasonic,Pelco,SamsungandSony.48AcompleteprofileofExtremeCCTVInc.canbefoundattheIndustryCanadawebsite:http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/ccc/srch/nvgt.do?lang=eng&prtl=1&sbPrtl=&estblmntNo=234567042917&profile=cmpltPrfl&profileId=1861&app=sold

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Attorneywentonrecordtopraisethe“greatsurveillancecameras”thathelpedsolvethecase(ExtremeCCTV).49

Imagine24/7perfectsafetyandsecurity.SamsungTechwindreamsaworldwheretheword'worry'doesnotexistindictionaries.Toturnourworldintosuchaplace,wearecommittedtoprotectingthesafetyofsocietyanditspropertyatalltimesbyofferingstate‐of‐the‐artsecurityproducts(Samsung).50

Thefollowingadvertisementnarrativesuggeststhatmoderncamerasurveillancesystemsallowsecurityadministratorstofulfilltheirsecurityobligationswhilereducingtheiroperationalbudgets–preciselywhatisexpectedoftheminthesehardeconomictimes.

Achievingtheoptimumlevelofsecurityintoday’sincreasinglycomplexenvironmentisarealandever‐presentchallenge.Securityobligationsaregrowingwhileoperationalbudgetsareshrinking.Perhapsmostcritical,videosurveillancesystemsarereachingmaturity.Newtechnologyisincreasingcapabilitiesanddrivinganewstandardofsecurity.Risksandpotentialthreatsmustbeaddressedwithmorethancameras—theyrequireasystemthatiscompleteandintegrated(GeneralElectricSecurity).51

Astheaboveadvertisementsindicatesecuritytechnologycompaniestapintocontemporaryinsecuritiesinordertopitchandselltheirproducttopotentialclients.Surveillancetechnologiesarepresentedtosecurityadministratorsasapanaceatosecurityrelatedconcernsinthepublicandprivaterealm.Theemphasisisontechnologicalcapabilitiesandspecifications,andthedreamofa‘crimefree’or‘worryfree’societyispromisedasapossibilitythroughinvestmentinstate‐of‐the‐artsecuritysystems,whichincludecamerasurveillancetechnologies.Thisutopianpromiseformsthe“masternarrativeoftechnology”andhelpsexplain,atleastinpart,theproliferationofsurveillancesystems.

UnderstandingtheTechnicalCapabilitiesofCameraSurveillanceSystemsCamerasurveillancetechnologyemergedinthe1960swithslowtechnologicalprogressionforthenexttwodecades.Itwasnotuntilthemid1980sthatcamerasurveillancetechnologybegantoadvanceinquantumbounds(Cieszynski2007).Withtheacknowledgementthattheinformationpresentedwillbebasicandlikely

49http://www.extremecctv.com/markets_transit.php50http://www.samsungcctv.com/product/file_data/CTV/cctv_070726_e.pdf51http://www.gesecurity.com/GESecurity/images/email/804‐3060_VideoPlatform_52129finA.pdf

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outdatedinashorttime,thissectionaimstoprovidethereaderwithgeneralunderstandingofcamerasurveillancetechnologies.

CamerasSurveillancecamerascomprisebothalenssystemandthecameraitself.Toproduceanimagethecameralenscollectslightfromthetargetedscenesandfocusesitintothecameraimagesensor.Thecameraelectronicsthentransformsthevisibleimageintoanelectronicsignalsuitablefortransmissiontoaremotemonitororrecordingdevice(Kruegle2007).

Thereisgreattechnologicalvariationwhenitcomestocontemporarylensesandcameras.Surveillancecamerasmaybeequippedwithfixedfocallength(FFL)lensesthatofferapredeterminedfieldofview(FOV),whetherthatbewide‐angle,medium,ornarrow.Zoomlensesontheotherhandoffermoreversatilitythanfixedfocallenses,allowingthecameraoperatortoremotelymodifytheFOV.Ofcoursenumerousfactors,nottheleastofwhichistechnologicalinnovation,willimpacttheoverallqualityofthezoomcapabilities.Currently,zooming‐inonanitemofinterestnarrowsacamera’sFOV;however,aCanadianresearchteamiscurrentlyworkingtodevelopa“hybrideye”camerathatwouldallowforasharpfocuswhilemaintainingaperipheralview.YorkUniversityprofessorJamesElderandhisresearchteamhavedevelopedaprototypecamerathatisequippedwithtwolenses,onefixedfocallenscapableofprovidingalow‐resolutionwide‐angleviewofanentirescene,theotherazoomlensmountedtoamotorizedpan‐tiltbasethatallowsforasectionofthewiderscenetobeselectedandviewedathighresolution.

Camerasmaybeanalog,digital,orinternetprotocol(IP)(IPCameraswillbediscussedunderthe‘transmission’heading).Analogsurveillancecamerasdominatedthesecuritymarketuntiltheyear2000whendigitalsignalprocessing(DSP)becamemorecommon.DSPcamerasarelessexpensiveandoffermorefeatures(i.e.digital

zoom,higherimageresolution)thantheanalogversions.Thedigitizationofsurveillancecameratechnologyhasalsoledtoinnovationsinautomatedimageanalysis.Softwarealgorithmscanbeincorporatedintodigitalcamerastransformingabasicsurveillancecameraintoa‘smartcamera’(Kruegle2007:122).Whileanalogsystemstransmitimagestosecuritypersonnelfordecision‐making,digital‘smart’camerasanalyzetheimage,automaticallyalertingsecuritypersonnelasrequired.

Figure2:ExampleofaCCTVnetwork.ImageSource:www.securework.co.th

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Thismayinclude,butisnotlimitedtofacialrecognitionanalyticsandautomatedlicenceplaterecognition.

Surveillancecamerasmayalsobeequippedwithpan‐tiltzoom(PTZ),infrared(IR)orthermalinfraredcapabilities.MoreareascanbemonitoredwithPTZcamerasastheoperatorscanremotelycontrolthedirectionofthecamerasgazethroughtheuseofajoystick.WhilesomesurveillancecamerahavePTZcapabilitiesdesignedintotheircasing,otherwisefixedpositioncamerascanalsobesecuredtoanexternalmountthathaspanandtiltcapabilities.Infraredtechnologyallowsforthevisualizationofimagescapturedbythecamerainlowlightorpoorweatherconditionsthroughtheuseofalightamplifiersituatedbetweenthecameralensandthecameraimagesensor.Thermalimagingsystems,ontheotherhand,respondexclusivelytoheatenergyemitted,allowingthecamerastodetecthumansandanyotherwarmnonhumanobject,evenintotaldarkness(Kruegle2007:34).

TransmissionOnceanimageiscapturedbyaremotecameraandconvertedintoanelectronicsignalthatsignalmustbetransmittedtoamonitorforviewingand/orarecordingdeviceforstorage.Methodsoftransmittingthesignalmayalsobeanalogordigital.Whilemanycamerasurveillancesystemshaveupgradedtodigitalcameras,theswitchtodigitalmodesofsignaltransmissionhasbeenslower.Kruegle(2007)indicatesthatmostsystemsstillrelyonanalogtechnologyfortransmittingcamerasurveillancedata.

Themostcommonformofanaloguesignaltransmissionistheuseofcoaxialcable,especiallyforsmallerareaindoorinstallations.Fiber‐Opticwiringgainedprevalenceinthelate1990s,especiallyforoutdoorsurveillancecamerasasthetechnologyallowsthesignaltobetransmittedseveralmileswithlittletonoimagedegradation.WhileFiber‐Opticwiringismoredifficulttoinstallthancoaxialcableitisalsomoredifficulttotapintothesurveillancefeed,makingitamoresecureoption.Severalwirelessanalogtransmissionmethodsalsoexistforinstanceswherecamerasurveillanceneedstocoverevengreaterareaorwherecamerasareplacedinlocationswhereitwouldbedifficulttorunwire.Radiofrequencyandmicrowavetechnologyallowforvideosignalstobetransmittedfromthecameratothemonitorthroughtheatmosphere(Kruegle2007).

Historically,camerasurveillancesystemswereproprietarynetworks,closedandcontrolledbysecuritymanagers;hencethenameclosedcircuittelevisionsurveillance(CCTV).However,developmentsinLocalAreaNetworks(LAN),WideAreaNetworks(WAN),andtheIntra‐andInternethaverevolutionizedvideotransmissioncapabilitiesbycreatingcomputernetworkswithglobalreachandprovidingadigitalbackbonethatcanbeusedtotransmitvideoand/oraudiovirtuallyanywhereintheworld(Kruegle2007).Thismeansthatsurveillancecameraimagescannowbepotentiallytransmittedtoanycomputingdeviceanywhereonthenetwork.AdvancementsinWiFitechnologyalsomeansthatcamerasandmonitoringdevicescanpotentiallycommunicatewirelesslyworldwide,oratleastwhereWiFiorotherwirelesstechnologyisavailable.The

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camerasurveillanceequipmentcommunicatesopenlyoverabasicnetworkinfrastructureusingtheInternetProtocol(IPv4),allowingmanyuserstocontrolthecamera(s)remotelyandmonitorthescenecapturedbythecamera(s)fromanycomputerpluggedintothenetwork52.Opencircuittelevisionsurveillance(OCTV)systems,suchasthosetransmittedovertheInternetarevulnerabletohackersandaplethoraofviruses.Thesystemsmustbesafeguardedusingpasswordprotection,virtualprivatenetworks(VPN)orWiFiprotectedaccess(WPA),andencryptionstandardssuchasthedigitalencryptionstandard(DEA)oradvancedencryptionstandard(AES).

MonitoringTheuseofa“switcher”isrequiredwherethecamerasurveillancenetworkbeingmonitoredemploysmorethanonecamera,allowingtheimagesfromthecamerastobeviewedononeormoremonitoringdevice.Therearevarioustypesofswitcherscurrentlymarketedforandemployedwithinthesecurityindustry.Standardswitchersmaybemanual,sequential,oralarming.Manualswitchersconnectonecameratoonemonitororrecordingdeviceatanygiventime.Whilesequentialswitchersrotatethroughvariouscamerasdisplayingthemsequentiallyonamonitoringdevice,alarming(orsignalinput)switchersautomaticallydisplaytheimagesfromacamerawhenthecamera’salarmingmechanismistriggered.Forinstance,camerasmaybelinkedtoamotiondetectorsothatwhenmotionissensedthecamera’simagesareautomaticallydisplayedonthemonitoringscreen,overridingwhatimageswerepreviouslyselected,ortheimagesmaybeautomaticallytransmittedtoarecordingdevice.

Moresophisticatedcamerasurveillancenetworkstypicallyemployamicroprocessor‐controlledswitcher.Mostmanufacturersofsuchswitchersmakecomputer‐operatedconsolesthatintegratethefunctionsoftheswitcherandpan‐tiltjoystick.Suchsoftware‐programmableswitchersprovideflexibilityandexpandabilitynotavailablewithStandardswitchers.Thesoftwareallowsforsystemstobeeasilyreconfiguredandforsuchfunctionsas‘automaticscanning’,whereacameracontrolledbythesoftwarerandomlymovesthroughitsfullpan,tilt,andzoomranges.Amongthenumerousotherfeaturesofferedbymicroprocessor‐controlledswitchersistheavailabilityofpre‐setcamerapositionsthatcanbeenactedatthepressofabuttonorthetriggeringofanalarm.Multiplexersareutilizedwhentheimagesfrommorethanonecameraneedtobedisplayedonasinglemonitoringscreen.Multiplexersworkbymemorizingtheimagedatacapturedbynumerouscameras,compressingthedata,anddisplayingthescenesfrommultiplecamerasonasinglescreen.Upto32separatescenescanbedisplayedonasinglescreen.Themultiplexercanalsobeconfiguredsothatthevideoimages

52Forreadersinterestedinsurveillancethemedart,thewebsiteeyesoflaura.orgisaninteractiveblog/artexhibitthatallowsviewerstotakecontrolofanIPsurveillancecamerafromtheirpersonalcomputers.ThecameraisinstalledontheroofoftheVancouverArtGalleryandoverlookstheimmediatevicinityofthegallery,andprovidesaparticularlyclearviewofHoweSt.,betweenRobsonandGeorgia.

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fromdifferentcamerasaredisplaysequentially.Theresolutionoftheimagesdisplayedonthemonitoringscreendecreaseswitheveryadditionalsceneadded.

Varioustypesofscreenscanbeusedtodisplaycamerasurveillanceimages.Untilthelate1990sthemostpopularscreensutilizedwerethenine‐inchmonochromecathoderaytube(CRT)monitors(Kruegle2007).WhilenumeroussurveillancesystemsstillutilizecolourCRTmonitors,digitalliquidcrystaldisplaymonitors(LCD)havegainedpopularitybecauseoftheirsmallersize,aswellastheirpopularusepersonalcomputerandlaptopsscreens,especiallyascamerassurveillancemovestowardanopensystemusingtheInternet.Themostrecentmonitortechnologytoenterthesecuritymarketistheplasmascreen.Theadvantagesoftheplasmascreenareitsbrightnessandhighcontrastratio,makingitidealforusewhereinfraredsurveillancecameratechnologyisemployed.Plasmamonitorscanbeproducedinmuchlargersizesthanothertypesofmonitors‐somemeasuringupto80inchesdiagonally(ibid.)‐andareavailableinhighdefinition(HD).Further,thetransmissionofcamerasurveillanceimagesoveranopensystemsuchastheInternetalsomeansthatsurveillancefootagecanalsobedisplayedonWiFienableddevicessuchashandheldcomputersandpersonaldigitalassistants(PDA),orevencellularphones.

RecordingandPrintingInstantaneously,animageiscapturedbyasurveillancecamera,transmittedtoanddisplayeduponamonitoringscreentobescrutinizedbyacamerasurveillanceoperator.However,atthesamemomentaneventrevealsitselfonthescreenitdisappearsforever,unlessarecordoftheeventismade.Untilrecentlyvideocassetterecording(VCR)wasthedominantmeansofrecordingcamerasurveillancefootage.VCRrecordingrequiredtheuseofmanyvideocassettesandthespacetostorethem.Searchingcassettesforevidencewasalengthyprocessandduplicatingtheimagesresultedindegradation.Today,mostcamerasurveillancesystemsutilizedigitalvideorecorders(DVR).Evensiteswhereanalogequipmentisstillinuseconverterscanbepurchasedtodigitizeandcompressthefootageforrecording.DVRtechnologyallowsforimagestoberetrievedmorequickly,andduplicationcanbeachievedwithnodegradation.ThenewestgenerationofDVRsarenetworkvideorecorders(NVRs),whichallowforthedigitalrecordingofsurveillancefootagefromnumerousnetworkedcamerasandDVRs.Securityadministratorsalsousehard‐copyvideoprinterstopreservesurveillanceimages.Hard‐copyvideoprinterscaptureandprintstillimagesfromcamerasurveillancefootage.Securitypersonnelmayoperatetheprintermanuallyoritmaybeconfiguredtoprintwhenanalarmedcamerahasbeentriggered.

BeyondTechnologicalCapabilities:TheTechnicalContextThusfarwehaveexaminedthebroaderpoliticalandeconomiccontextinwhichcamerasurveillancetechnologyiscurrentlyproliferating,andhaveexplored,ingeneralterms,thetechnologicalcomponentsofcamerassurveillance.Camerasurveillancesystems,however,equatetomorethanthesumoftheirtechnicalparts.Camerasurveillanceissocio‐technical,meaningthatboththetechnicalandthe

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socialcontributetotheshapingofcamerasurveillanceoutcomes.Thus,anydiscussionofthetechnicalaspectsofcamerasurveillancemustpushbeyondamerelytechnologicalfocustowardwhatwerefertoasthetechnicalcontextofcamerasurveillance.Inadditiontothetechnicalcapabilitiesofthecamerasurveillanceassemblage,thetechnicalcontextreferstothesocio‐technicalspaceofthecamerasurveillancecontrolroom,aswellasthetechnicalskillsofthecameraoperators.

TechnologyandControlRoomDynamicsAllaspectsofthetechnicalcontextvaryinrelationtothedifferenttypesofspaceswherecamerasurveillanceiscommonlyemployed.Inpublic(i.e.open‐street,parks,etc.)andsemi‐publicspaces(i.e.shoppingmalls,entertainmentvenues,universities,etc.)surveillancecameraimagesmaybemonitoredfromlocalcontrolroomsorfromacentralizedpolicestation.Inprivatespaces(i.e.shops,banks,homes,etc.)controlroomsarerarelyutilized,orcameraoperatorsforthatmatter.Finally,surveillancecamerasdeployedinthecontextofpublictransportationsystems,fromairportstotrainstotaxicabsisevenmoremultifacetedas

cameraimagesmaybemonitoredfromacentralizedcontrolroom,fromonboardthetransportvehicleonly,orevenonlybydownloadingthestoredimages.

Mostcontrolrooms–whetherlocalorcentralized–areverysimilar,hostingworkingconsolesequippedwithcomputerslinkedtodisplayscreens.Typicallyonlyafewoperatorswillberesponsibleformonitoringseveralscreens53,traversingthecameras–iftheyarenotfixed,thatis–andzoomingtheminonobjectsandpersonsofinterest.Thephysicalaspectsofthecontrolroom,fromthelightingtothesizeandshapeoftheroom,aswellastheconfigurationofthemonitoringareaneedtobetakenintoaccount.Thetasksoftheoperatorsarebothphysicallyandpsychologicallydemanding;theactofmonitoringseveralmonitorsisquitetaxing.Assuch,itiscrucialnottoundervaluethe“realitiesofacontrolroomculture”(Smith2004:391).

Attentionneedstobepaidtosuchthingsasthealienatingandmonotonousnatureofcamerasurveillancework,aswellasoperatorresistance.Cameraoperatorsroutinelybreakthemonotonyoftheirdaybyusingthecamerasfor“unofficial”

53Insomecasesfewscreensmaybeutilizedbuteachscreenwillhostimagesfromseveralcamera.Thisisachievedthroughtheuseofmultiplexers.SeeFigure3above.

Figure3:TownCentreCameraSurveillanceControlRoom.ImageSource:www.barco.com

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ends.AtaCanadiansurveillancesite–ashoppingmall‐researchedbyoneoftheauthors,surveillancecamerasaresometimestrainedontelevisionsetssothatthecameraoperatorscanwatch“HockeyNightinCanada”(Derby2007).Alloftheabovedemonstratethelimitsofhumanoperatedcamerassurveillanceschemes,andanyattemptatunderstandingcamerasurveillancecannotignorecontrolroomdynamics.

Whilethephysicalaspectsofthecontrolroomarepartofthe“visible”technologicalenvironmentwherecameraoperatorswork,thereisalsoalesstangibletechnicalcontext.Thisincludestheelectronicnetworkemployedtotransmitcamerasurveillancedata,thesoftwarerelieduponforsmoothintegrationofdisparatecomponents,andmore.Generally,thetechnologicalinfrastructureofacamerasurveillancecontrolroomalsoconsistsofsoftware,databases,mobilephones,aswellasotherelectronicdevices.

Itmustbeborneinmindthatwhileacameraoperator’smonitoringbehaviourisenabledbytheirskillsitisalsoinfluencedbythetechnologyitself.Ascamerasbecomemoresophisticated–considerthe‘smartcameras’describedabove–algorithmsincreasinglyautomatethesurveillanceprocessrequiringlesshumanintervention.Automationcantakethelesssophisticatedformof“auto‐scanning”,whereaPTZcameraautomaticallyandrandomlyrotatesandzoomsthroughitsfullrangeofmotion,capturingimageswithinitfieldofview,tothemoresophisticateduseofintelligentscenemonitoring,whichanalysestheminutedetails–atthepixellevel–ofthescenetoalterthecameraoperatorofpre‐determinedevents.Alertingtheoperatorofitemsleftbehindorofvehiclestravellingthewrongwayonaone‐wayroadarejustsomeofthecapabilitiesofsoftwareenabledsurveillancecameras.

Whilethetechnologycanenablesurveillancecameraoperatorsitmayalsobeahindrance.Likealltechnologicaltoolscamerasurveillancesystemsarenotcompletelyreliablewithtechnicalproblemsarisingquitefrequently.ThismaybeespeciallysoinCanadawherecamerasandtheirwiringareexposedtoinclementweather.Camerasurveillancesystemsrequireregularinspection,preventativemaintenance,aswellasthereplacementand/orupgradeofvariouscomponents,toensuretheassemblagessmoothfunctioning.AsLynseyDubbeldstatesit,whilethetechnicalartifactisapreconditionfortheexecutionofcamerasurveillance,itmightalsobealimitbecausesuchsystemsdonotalwaysfunctionproperly(2004:137).Asaconsequence,thetechnicalcontextgoesbeyondsimplymechanicalissuestoexploringthenumeroustechnicalproblemsthatcameraoperatorsroutinelyface,andtheimpacttheseproblemshaveontheeffectivenessofcamerassurveillance.ConsideroneexamplefromaCanadianuniversitycampus.Anewcamerainstalledinthefallmonthsbrokedownwhenthewinterweathercausedthenewlylaidwiringtocontractandbreak.Becausethewinterweatherprecludedthecamera’simmediatereplacementthecamerasecuritydivisionlostvisualsurveillanceofoneofthecampus’maingrounds,creatingablindspotofseveralacres(Derby2007).

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OperatorTrainingCameraoperatortrainingisalsoacomponentofthetechnicalcontext.Usuallytheirtraining,iftheyreceiveany,istechnical,focusingonthehowthecamerasystemworks.Itshouldnotbetakenforgrantedthatthosebehindthecamerasandmonitoringthescreenshavecomprehensivetraining.Insomecasestrainingconsistsmerelyoflearningthelocationsofcamerassothatitemsorpersonsofinterestcanbeeasilylocatedandtrackedwiththecameranetwork.Acameraoperator,interviewedbyoneoftheauthors,indicatedthatplayingvideogamesmoreeffectivelypreparedhimtooperatesurveillancecamerasthantheactualtraininghereceived(Derby2007).

Despitetheobviousneedfortrainingcameraoperatorsintheareasofprivacyanddataprotectionfewappeartohavebeenexposedtorelevantprivacylegislation.Althoughoftenbeingresponsiblefordeterringandpreventingcrime,orprovidingincreasedsecurity,fewcameraoperatorsreceivedanycriminologicaltrainingfromwithintheorganizationforwhichtheywork;however,manyworkinginthisrealmmayhavepost‐secondaryeducationincriminologyorpolicing.Further,despitethepotentialconsequencesofcamerasurveillance,especiallywithregardtothediscriminatoryandexclusionarymannerinwhichitisoftenemployed,operatorsreceivenotrainingonitssocialimpacts.

Codesofpracticecanbeusedtoensurethatcamerasurveillancesystemsarerunethicallyandwithintheparametersofthelaw.IntheCanadiancontext,wheremostcamerasurveillanceappearsinsemi‐privateandprivatespaces,suchcodesofpracticearerare.Specifically,acodeofpracticeshouldincludetopicssuchashumanrights,privacyanddataprotection,discrimination,andpurposespecificuseofthecameras.Withtheaboveidentifiedneednotwithstanding,camerasurveillancetrainingtendstoremainnarrowlyfocusedontheequipment,operatingandreporting/recordingprocedures,andgeneraloperatorresponsibilities.

ConclusionInsum,whileitisimportanttounderstandthetechnicalcapabilitiesofcamerassurveillance,itisincorrecttoassumethattheriseofcamerasurveillanceistechnologicallydriven.Inordertounderstandtheproliferation,andeventheimpact,ofcamerasurveillancewemustunderstandcamerasurveillanceinitssociotechnicalcontext.

Atamacro‐levelcamerasurveillanceiscurrentlymarketed,sold,andprocuredinasocialandpoliticalclimateofinsecurity.Thecamerasurveillanceindustryistappingintopublicfearsofcrimeandterrorism,andthequestforsecurityinordertoselltheirproducts.Thenarrativeoftenprovidedisthatcamerasurveillancesystemsprovideatechnologicalsolutiontothevarioussocialandsecurityconcernsofmoderneverydaylife.Theemphasistendstobeplacedonthetechnologicalspecs,aswellasthepromisethatthesetechnologicalsystemscanprovideautopianworry‐and‐crimefreesociety.

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Camerasurveillancesystemscompriseofanassemblageofdiverse–andsometimesincompatible–technologiesandequipment,fromcameratechnologytothevarioustransmission,monitoring,andrecordingtechnologies.Howthesetechnologiesareassembledandimplementedreliesonhumandecisionsthataremadeinparticularsocialandculturalclimate.Insomesocieties,culturalandsocialconcernsaboutprivacywillhaveanimpactonhowcamerasurveillancetechnologieswillbeintegrated.

Atamoremicrolevelcamerasurveillanceoutcomesareshapedbyboththesocialandthetechnological.Thecamerasurveillancecontrolroommustbeviewedasasociotechnicalenvironment,andattentionneedstobegiventothecontrolroomculture,aswellastheinteractionbetweenhumanoperatorandmachine.Finally,cameraoperatortrainingsuffersfromanemphasisonthetechnical,whetherthisisabouttheoperationandmaintenanceofthecamerasurveillanceequipmentorthetechnicalprocessofreportwriting.However,giventhepossibleconsequencesofcamerasurveillanceforsomesegmentsofthepopulation,itisimperativethattrainingaboutthehumanrightsandsocialimplicationsofcamerasurveillancealsobeprovidedtocameraoperators.

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ViewsFromBehindTheCamera’sLens:ExploringOperatorPerceptionsPatrickDerbyManyperspectivesandthemesarepresentedthroughoutbothpartsofthisreportoncamerasurveillanceinCanada.Forinstance,discussionsaboutinformedconsent,deterrence,andcameraeffectivenessareprovidedfromacademicperspectives,whilethemesofsecurityandfearofcrimeareanalysedthroughpublicperception.Thissectionseekstoprovideyetanotherviewpointonsomeofthethemessurroundingcamerasurveillance–thatofthecameraoperator.DrawingoninterviewsconductedwithsurveillancecameraoperatorsateightsitesintheprovincesofOntarioandQuébec,thissectionprovidesreadersaglimpseoftheperceptionsheldbythoseoperatingthesetechnologicalsurveillancesystems.Specificallyexploredaretheviewsofcameraoperatorsontheprioritizationandtargetingofrisks,theissueofterrorism,operatorprejudice,operatorscrutiny,andcameraeffectiveness.Whilethisisnotanexhaustivelistofthethemesthatcouldorshouldbediscussedwithcameraoperators,thesediscussionsdoprovideawindowthroughwhichtoexaminethehumandynamicsofcamerasurveillancepractices,aswellasinsightintohowcameraoperatorsthinkaboutandunderstandtheirwork.

ResearchMethodsThedatapresentedinthissectionwascollectedaspartofasmall‐scalegraduateresearchprojectundertakenbytheauthortoexplorefactorsinfluencingcameraoperatordecision‐making(Derby2007).Aspartofthatresearchprojectinterviewswereconductedwithsurveillancecameraoperatorsateightinstitutionalsites.Thesitesthatmakeuptheresearchsamplearecomprisedofbothpublicandsemi‐publicinstitutions54,andweredeliberatelychosenfortheirdiversity.Wheretheopportunitypresenteditselfatparticularsites,interviewswereconductedwithasecondcameraoperator.Interviewswereconducedinasemi‐structuredmannerwiththeuseofaninterviewguidetoensurethatthelineofquestioningwasconsistentacrosssites.Attheendofeachinterviewtheresearchparticipantswerealsoaskediftherewhereanyimportantquestionsorthemesthatwereneglectedintheinterview.Manyoftheparticipantsusedthisopportunitytoprovideadditionalinformation,examples,andinsomecasessuggestareasforfurtherresearch.Questionsposedtotheparticipantswereopen‐endedandtheintervieweeswereprovidedasmuchtimeasrequiredtorespond.Asaresult,theaveragelengthofinterviewswas2hoursand

54Thesitesthatmadeupthesampleforthisresearchincluded:twodowntowndepartmentstores;alargesuburbanshoppingmall;asmalldowntownshoppingplaza;adowntownuniversitycampus;amuseum;agovernment‐runcasino;andapolice‐runcentretownopen‐streetcamerascheme.

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15minutes,andproducedapproximatelyfourhundredpagesoftranscriptsandnotes.Codingofthetranscriptswasconductedintwophases.Thefirstphaseconsistedofthe‘initialcoding’,whichwasverydetailed,andattemptedtogenerateimaginativeideas(Charmaz2004).Thesecondphaseofcodingemphasizedanexplorationofthemostcommonandrevealingthemes.Thisrequiredthatsomeofthethemesbefurtherdividedorcombinedinordertocreatenewonesorimproveuponoldones(ibid.).Whatispresentedinthissectionarethemostprevalentthemesthatemergedduringthoseinterviews.Whiletheresearchermustinevitablyundertakesomeanalyticwork,carewastakentoremaintruetotheethnographicmethod.Thus,asmuchaspossible,thedataispresentedinthewordsofthecameraoperatorswhoparticipatedinthisresearch.Theyhavebeenprovidedpseudonymstoprotecttheiridentities.

PerceptionsOnInstitutionalRisksWhenaskedtodescribethetopthreecrimeorsecurityrisksfortheinstitutioninwhichtheywork,thecameraoperatorsinterviewedprioritizedthefollowingconcerns,whichhavebeengroupedintothreebroadriskcategories:theriskoftheft;therisktopersonalsafety;andmanyoftheoperatorsidentifiedthe‘flawedconsumer’asrisky.Cameraoperatorsidentifiedtheftassomethingthatrequirestheirattention.Includedundertheumbrellacategoryoftheftaresuchbehavioursasshoplifting,stealing,creditcardfraud,priceswitching,violatingdiscountpolicy,skimming[stealinginformationfromdebitorcreditcards],andcheating,whicharesitespecific.Whilesomeparticipants,suchasthosewhoworkatshoppingmalls,simplyidentifieddealingwiththeft,inthisbroadsense,asapriority,cameraoperatorsatdepartmentstoresweremorelikelytobreakdownthe‘theft’categoryandfurtherprioritizethesesub‐divisions,asthefollowstatementfromMichaeldemonstrates.

There’stheobvious‘shoptheft’,that’sprettybig.Although,it’snotnecessarilyjustexternalshoptheft,it’sinternal–employees‐aswell.Idon’tknowifyouwanttoclassthosetwodifferently,butwedo.Third,Iwouldsayprobablyfraudulenttransactions,thingslikethat.Like,maybenotnecessarilyfraudpersebutpeopledoingthingslikeusingotherpeople’screditcards.Stufflikethat!Tryingtogetbetterdealsonthingsoncertaindays,youknow.[That’s]prettymuchthetopthree.

(Michael,DowntownDepartmentStore)Cameraoperatorsalsoprioritizedtherisktopersonalsafety.Whilecameraoperatorsexpressedconcernforthepersonalsafetyoftheusersofthesite(i.e.consumerspatrons,etc.),inmostcasesthecameraoperator’sfeltthattheir

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personalsafety55andthesafetyoftheirsecuritycolleagueswereatrisk.Someparticipantsdescribedinadequaciesinthesecurityproceduresattheirsite,whichmayplacethematadditionalrisk.WhileoperatorsJamesandXavier,indicatedthattheyhadnomeansofidentifyingindividualswhogainaccesstotheirsiteorthepublicparkinggaragebelowthesmalldowntownshoppingmalltheymonitor,Andreindicatedthatthecasinoheworksathasnometaldetectorsatitsentranceandthatthesecurityagentshavenoweaponstosecurethesitefromarmedrobberies.Prevalentamongparticipantswastheperceptionofriskwhenconfrontingusersofthespace,betheyshopliftersorloiteringyouth.ThefollowingstatementfromShawn,fromadowntowndepartmentstore,summarizestheconcernsexpressed,andindicatesthatinsomecasessecuritypersonnelwillnotrisktheirpersonalsafetytoconfrontsuspectsiftheydonothavethestafftobackthemup.

It’sdangeroustohavesometimesonlytwoorthreesecurityofficersworkingwhenyouhavesometimestenguyswalkinandyouhavetogooutthereandstoptheseguys.Sometimesyou’reoutnumbered.Sometimessecurityofficersseethecrimecommittedbuttheycan’tdoanythingaboutitbecausetheydon’thaveenoughstaffonbackup.

(Shawn,DowntownDepartmentStore)

Itshouldbenotedthatwhilecamerasurveillanceoperatorsandsecuritypersonneloftenworkwiththepoliceandrelyupontheirservices,callstopoliceusuallydonotoccuruntilanarresthasbeenmadeortheallegedculprithasbeendetainedinthefirstinstancebysecuritystaff.Insomesituationspolicearecontactedwhereapersonhasbeenaskedtoleaveorhasbeenbarredfromapremises,howeverrefusestooblige.Thus,asdescribedabovebyShawn,understaffedandillpreparedsecuritypersonnelarerequiredtomakequickassessmentsaboutthepotentialhazardsofintervention.Further,forliabilityreasonssomesecurityandsurveillancestaff(predominantlyatsiteswherecontractedsecurityagentsareemployed)areforbiddenfromintervening.AsBarry,whoworksatamuseum,explained,hisroleislimitedto“observing”and“reporting”.Whilealmostallofthesurveillancecameraoperatorsinterviewedinsistedthatbiashadnoplaceintheirwork,thereundoubtedlyweresomesocialgroupsthatweredeemedtobea‘risk’or‘potentialrisk’toparticularinstitutionalsettings,andassuchweredeservingofmoreattentionfromthecameraoperators.Inordertoremainconsistentwithpreviousacademicliterature,thesegroupsarereferredtohereas‘flawedconsumers’(Bauman1997;McCahill2002).‘Flawedconsumers’arethosewhodisruptthenormativeimagesofthe‘idealuser’ofaparticularsocialspace,forinstance,ahomelesspersoninashoppingmall.55Whileatmanysites,suchascasinos,open‐streetschemes,oruniversitycampuses,thecameraoperatorsremainsafelyconfinedtothecontrolroom,atothersites,particularlyshoppingmallsanddepartmentstores,thecameraoperatormustoftenleavethecamerasunmonitoredtointervenewhenincidentsarise.

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Richard,fromadowntowndepartmentstore,andIan,fromthelargesuburbanshoppingmall,respectivelydescribed‘shitheads’or‘crackheads’asthosewholook“stoned,high,crackedout”,or“lookalittlehaggard,likelifehasn’tbeenaseasyonthemasmost”.Thecameraoperatorsperceivedthisgroupasadoublethreatinthesensethattheybelievedtheseindividualswerepresentatthespacestheymonitoredinordertosupporttheirdrughabitsbyengagingindrugdealsorthefttofinancetheiraddiction.Richardalsodescribedthisgroupasasafetyrisktosecuritypersonnelandtoothersinthesocialspace.

Nineoutoftenofthemhaveneedlesorweapons.It’sastereotypebutthey’reeasilyidentifiablebasedontheirbehaviours.Caseinpoint,recentlywehadanindividualinthestorewhowasdoingdrugs…visiblyseenwithneedlesandpipes,lightingstuffinthestore.Thatisanumberonepriority,becauseweknowthatthey’recarrying[havedrugsintheirpossession].Weknowchancesarethey’rediseased.InthislocationnineoutoftenpeoplehavetheABCs,allHeps[allformsofHepatitis]andAIDS.

(Richard,DowntownDepartmentStore)Cameraoperatorsandsecuritystaffalsotargetthosewhoarevisiblyintoxicatedbecausetheir‘unpredictable’behaviourposesa‘risk’totheotherusersofthespace,aswellasaliabilityfortheorganizationbecauseoftheirimpairedcoordinationandbalance.

Youcanusuallytellwhensomebody’sdrunkasopposedtomaybehavingabeerortwo.Youcantellifsomebody’sintoxicated.You’llautomaticallywatchthem.It’snotnecessarilyatheftissue,itcouldevenbeahealthandsafetyissue.Iftheyhappentocomeintothestoreandhurtthemselves,firstofallit’sgoodtoseebecauseyougottagohelpthem,Imeanyougottagivehimfirstaid,andsecondofall,Imean,that’saprettybigliability.

(Michael,DowntownDepartmentStore)

Loiteringyouth,suspectedorknownmembersofgangs,andthehomelessalsoformpartofthe‘flawedconsumer’group.Thepresenceofyouthgangsisperceivedtopresentsafetyrisksfortheusersandstaffinmostofthesocialsettingsresearchedandespeciallysitesofconsumption,suchasdepartmentstoresandshoppingmalls.Moreimportantthanthe‘realrisk’thatyouthand/oryouthgangspresentistheperceptionthatthisgroupgeneratesaclimateoffearwithinthesocialspace.Surveillancecameraoperatorsindicatedthattheyworkhardtoreducelevelsoffear.Ingeneral,loiteringyoutharemonitoredandexcludedasmuchaspossiblefromtheretailsettingsresearchedbecauseofthebelief,asIansuggested,that“idlehandsgetintrouble”.Inthecontextofthemuseum,childrenaremonitoredtoensurethattheydonotdamageartefacts;however,theyaretypicallytreatedwithvelvetgloves.Finally,whilemostcameraoperatorsappearedtotakeamoreliberalstancewhenitcametothehomeless,thisgroupwasmonitoredforanyindicationofinappropriatebehaviour.Incaseswherethehomelessindividualdoesnothingtowarrantintervention,mostcameraoperatorsindicatedthattheywould“leavethembe”,unlesstheyreceivedcomplaintsfromotherswhooccupythesocialspace.

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PerceptionsOn9/11andtheTerroristThreatWhiletheinitialresearchprojectforwhichtheseinterviewswereconducteddidnotseektoexploretheimpactthattheSeptember11thterroristattackshashadonpracticesofsurveillanceorsecuritization,cameraoperatorsfromthreeoftheeightsitesresearcheddidmakereferencetothisevent,andterrorismmoregenerally.Thefirsttoexpresstheinfluencethatthe9/11attackshavehadwasXavier,whoworkedatagovernmentcomplexhousingasmalldowntownshoppingplazathathemonitored.Whileitmaynotcomeasasurprisethatthoseworkingtosecuregovernmentofficesmayraiseterrorismasaconcern,thefactthatthisconcernwasexpressedagainbycameraoperatorsatalargesuburbanshoppingmallandauniversitycampusaremoresurprising.However,mostsurprisingfromtheconversationswithXavierandhisco‐worker,James,isthedisparitybetweentheperceptionseachpresentedontheissueofterrorisminapost‐9/11world.Inlightofthefactthattheissuewasraisedduringthecourseoftheresearchinterviews,theimpactthat9/11hashadatthesesites,aswellasitsimpactontheperceptionsofcameraoperatorswhoworkwithinthemareherebrieflyexplored.First,withregardtothesecuritizationoftheresearchsites,itisdifficulttodeterminewhethersecurityhasincreasedacrosstheboardfollowingtheSeptember11thterroristattacks.WhileJamesandXavierbothagreethatfollowingtheattacksthenumberofsecurityguardsassignedtoaccess‐controldutieswithinthegovernmentcomplexhaveincreased,themallcomplexitselfhasnotincreaseditssecurity.Jamesindicatedthatdespitethecurrentgeneralstateofgovernment“paranoia”aboutterrorismandhintsthattheseparticulargovernmentdepartmentsmaybetargeted,relativelylittlehasbeendonetosecuresuchbasicthingsastheundergroundparkinggarage.Acrossalloftheothersitesresearchedforthisstudyitappearedthattheircamerasurveillancesystemswereeitherrecentlyupgraded,intheprocessofbeingupgraded,orupgradingwasintheplansforthenearfuture.However,atnositewastheimpressiongiventhatthesurveillancesystemswereexpandedorimprovedasadirectresultof9/11.Infact,severalcameraoperatorsindicatedthatthesiteshaverecentlyreducedthenumberofsecuritystaff.Paulindicatedthattheratioof‘protectionofficers’tostudentsontheuniversitycampushemonitorshasbeenreduced,whilethenumberofsurveillancecamerashasincreasedinrecentyears.Andrealsopointedoutthattherecentcamerasystemupgradesatthecasinohaveledtothesurveillancepersonnelfearingjoblosses.TheSeptember11thterroristattacks,andthosewhichfollowed,havehadanimpactontheperceptionsofsomeofthesurveillancecameraoperatorsinterviewed.Someoftheresearchparticipantsexpressedrealconcernthattheirsitescouldpotentiallybeatargetforterrorism,andspecificallyindicatedthattheterroristthreatisa“Muslim”threat.ThefollowingexcerptfromaninterviewwithIan,thecameraoperatoratasuburbanshoppingmall,expresseswellthesentimentfoundatthethreesiteswheretheoperatorsspokeoftheirconcernsregardingterrorism.

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Since9/11youbecomemoreawareofMiddleEasternpeople;tendtowatchthemalittle,paycloserattentiontothembecauseyouneverknowwhensomething’sgoingtohappenhere.

Isthatafear?Thatsomethinglikethatcouldhappenatthismall?

Ohsure,thisisoneofthebusiestmallsin[thecity].There’smoretrafficthroughherethentherestofthemalls.IhavepeoplethatI’vemet[whoworkretail]andtheywentofftoworkatothermallsandtheycomebackhereandsaythisone’sbyfarbusier.It’sgotpublictransportattachedtoit.

Soit’smadeyoumorecautious,especiallysince9/11?

Yeah.

(Ian,LargeSuburbanShoppingMall)WhileJamesandXavierbothagreedthattheyhavebecomemorevigilantwithregardtoterrorism,theydebatedamongstthemselvesfromwheretheriskcomes.

Xavier:Weknowthatterrorismisnotaparticulargroupofpeople,youknow.Itcouldbe‐Idon’tknow,man–It’smostlybasedonMuslims…James:You’reenteringtrickygroundthere,butthat’sokay,it’syourhole.It’snotallreligionrelated,lookattheguyinOklahoma56.He’s…Xavier:No,that’sadifferentstory…James:That’sterrorism…Xavier:No,itis,but,it’snotbasedonwhatisreallygoingonrightnow[inapost‐9/11world].That’sme;thisiswhat’sgoingonrightnow…James:You’retalkingaboutitasiftherewasabigclashbetweenwesternandeasterncultures.Xavier:Whatever,that’sme.I’mtalkingaboutmostoftheterrorismpeoplethatexplodethemselvesorputbombsinplaces,they’remostlyMuslimpeople.ThisiswhatI’veseen.

(JamesandXavier,SmallDowntownShoppingPlaza)

56James’commentaboutthe“theguyinOklahoma”isinreferencetoTimothyMcVeigh.McVeighwasconvictedandsentencedtodeathforhisroleinthe1995bombingofaU.S.FederalGovernmentbuildinginOklahomaCity.UntilSeptember11,2001,theOklahomaCitybombing,describedasa‘domestic’terroristattack,wasconsideredthedeadliestattackonU.S.soil.

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PerceptionsOnPrejudice,BiasandStereotypingItisclearfromtheexcerptsabovethatfollowingtheattacksthatdownedtheWorldTradeCentretowers,andintheshadowofthe‘waronterror’thatensued,to‘lookMuslim’istowarrantadditionalscrutinyfromthoseresponsibleforprovidingsecurity,includingsurveillancecameraoperators.Butwhatabouttherolesthatprejudice,biasandstereotypingplaymoregenerally?Themajorityofcameraoperatorsinterviewedforthisresearchacknowledgedthatstereotypingoccurs.However,whilesomeopenlyadmittedits‘usevalue’,otherswerenotasforthcoming,andstillothersout‐and‐outdeniedtheemploymentofstereotypesandprejudice.Severalofthecameraoperatorsintervieweddescribed“remainingindiscriminate”asoneofthechallengesofdoingsurveillancework,whileothersindicatedthatstereotypinghas“usevalue”.James,whoworksatasmalldowntownshoppingplaza,isoneofthefewoperatorstoopenlyacknowledgesdiscrimination,suggestingthatifonedidnotemploystereotypestheywouldbe“lookingateverybody”,alludingtothefactthatthiswouldbeaninefficientwayofmonitoringsurveillancecameras.IncontrasttoJames,themajorityofoperatorsindicatedthatlearningtoridthemselvesofprejudiceisachallengingskillthatneedstobeacquiredinordertobeaneffectivesurveillancecameraoperator.Andrestatesthatthefirstthingtaughttonewsurveillancepersonnelatthecasinois“nottohavestereotypes”,whileMichaelsuggestedthatwhenhefirstbeganworkingsecurityinthedepartmentstorehethoughthewouldbeabletotellwhowasgoingtosteal,butinsiststhatsincebeginninginthislineofworkhehaslearnedthat“it’snotlikethat”.Paradoxically,bothusingandnotutilizingstereotypes,prejudice,anddiscriminationcanbeviewedasaninefficientwaytoconductcamerasurveillancework.Eitheronediscriminatesandallowseveryonenotmeetingthediscriminatingcriteriatoescapescrutiny,ortheymakeanattemptatremainingindiscriminateandperhapsbecomingoverloadedwithvisualstimuli.WhileRichardseemstoechotheneedforsurveillancecameraoperatorstoridthemselvesofpreconceivednotionsregardingwhoislikelytocommitcrimeor“betrouble”,hedoesacknowledgethathehashisownbiasesthatguidewhoandwhatheisgoingtowatch,insistingthattheywillvaryfromsitetosite,dependingonthedemographic.Richardalsoexplainedthatbiasesandstereotypesareformedandreinforcedbythefactthatthosewhoarewatchedendupstealing.

Thatpersonstole,soIamgoingtowatchthenextpersonthatissimilartothatperson.Oh,thatpersonstoletoo.SoIamgoingtokeepwatchingsomeonewhohasthosesimilar[characteristics].It’sabsolutelyreinforcing,that’swhytypicallywewatch‐quoteunquote‐‘shitheads’andthat’swhywehavethe‘shitheadscale’57;becausetheykeepstealing.Theymaybethenicestpeopleintheworld,it’snothingpersonal.

57The‘shithead’scalewasdescribedtotheresearcherasaninformalscalethatrankedindividualsbasedonthenumberofundesirablecharacteristicstheypresented(i.e.colourofskin,wearing

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(Richard,DowntownDepartmentStore)Stillothercameraoperatorsinsistedthattheydidnotdiscriminatewhilecarryingouttheirsurveillanceactivities.Frank,whomonitorsthecamerasofanopen‐streetsurveillancesystem,indicatedthatheisananti‐discriminationactivistandthathehasbeeninvolvedinthemovementforseveralyears.Shawngoesevenfurthertostatethatthedepartmentstorecompanyheworksforwouldnever“pinpointonegroupofpeopleand[say]they’regonnasteal”,andthatifthesupervisorevercaughtsecuritypersonnelconductingtheirworkinsuchawaytheywould“befired”.Ofcoursetermssuchas‘prejudice’,‘discrimination’,and‘stereotypes’arevalueladen,anddiscussionsabouttheirusewithcameraoperatorsislikelytoresultinthepresentationofadesirableself.Thatis,becausethesetermsareoftenthoughtofnegativelynoonewishestoadmittothem.Butitappearsthatdiscriminatorycategoriescannotbeavoidedandneednotnecessarilybebasedoncruderacial,ethnicorgendercharacteristics.Manymoreofthecameraoperatorswerewillingtoacknowledgetheirabilitytodiscriminatebetweensuspiciousbehaviouralcharacteristicsfromthenon‐suspicious.Beingtoosociablewithadepartmentstorecashier,lookinglostonacampus,orappearingtoavoidcasinocamerasareallbehavioursthatsurveillancecameraoperatorsusetoassesssuspiciousness.Travellinginagroupisalsoabehaviourthatappearstograbtheattentionofmostofthecameraoperatorsinterviewed.Whilediscriminationbasedonbehaviourindicatorsmaybemoreacceptablethanifitwerebasedoncrudeindividualindicators,suchasraceorgender,thesearebynomeansexclusivecategories.Inasignificantnumberofsituationstheyareconsideredtogether.AsthefollowingstatementbyFrank,theanti‐discriminationactivist,indicates,bothtypesofcharacteristicsaresometimesevaluatedtogether,andinsomecasesonemaycanceltheotherout.Thisstatementalsosuggeststhatnotallracialorethnicdiscriminationresultsinheightenedscrutinyornegativeconsequence.

TherearequiteafewAsiansnowinthecentrecore.Nowtheytendto,myperception,travelingroups,asfriends.Othergroupsdon’ttravelinthiskindofapackorherd,orwhatever.Sothat’snotunusualforme.Iwouldn’tnecessarilypaymuchattentionifIcouldidentifythosepeopleasbeingAsianbecausethatmightbepartoftheirculturetotravelwithmanyfriendsasopposedto…otherethnicgroups.

(Frank,Open‐StreetInitiative)

PerceptionsOnBeingWatchedThemselvesShawn’ssuggestionabovethatifacameraoperatorgotcaughtprofilingtheywouldbefiredopensathemethathasnotbeenemphasizedintheliteratureoncameracamouflagepatternedclothing,orabaseballcap,etc.).Themorecharacteristicsanindividualpresented,thehighertheyrankedonthescaleandthemorelikelytheyweretobescrutinized.Ironically,thiswastheonly‘objective’criterionpresentedatanyoftheresearchsites–withtheexceptionofthecasino‐thatmayhaveservedtoguidethesurveillantgazeofcameraoperators.

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surveillance;adiscussionregardingtheperceptionsofcameraoperatorsonhavingtheirworkmonitored.Itisquestionablewhethercamerasurveillanceproducestheself‐discipliningeffectassumedunderthepanopticmetaphor.Perhapsbeingsubjecttopotentialmonitoringthroughsurveillancecamerasdoesnotdetercitizensfromengaginginunwantedbehaviour.However,itmustalsobeborneinmindthattheautomaticfunctioningofpowerdescribedbyBenthaminhiswritingsonthepanopticprisondidnotendwiththesubjugationoftheinmate.ThearchitecturaldesignofthePanopticonalsosubjectedsubordinateprisonguardstothesameconditionsofvisibilityinrelationtotheirsupervisorortheheadinspector(Bentham,1995).Interestingly,Shawnwasnottheonlysurveillancecameraoperatortosuggestthathisactionswerepotentiallymonitoredbyhissupervisors,makingitnecessarytoexplorethedegreetowhichcurrentcamerasurveillancetechnologyallowsforthemonitoringoftheoperator’sactionsonandoffofthecameras,aswellastheirownperceptionsonbeingwatched.Currentelectronicanddigitaltechnologies,suchasthoseemployedbycontemporarycamerasurveillancesystems,makeitnotonlymucheasiertomonitortheactivitiesofthegeneralpopulation,butalsotheactivitiesofsurveillanceworkers,bothonandoffcamera.Inadditiontoregularin‐personsitevisitstoensurethatsecurityofficersarenotsleepingonthejob,technologysuchas“registeredwands”canbeusedtomonitorsecuritystaff.Someofthecameraoperatorsinterviewedindicatedthattheirdutiesmayincluderoutinephysicalpatrolsoftheenvironment,whichrequiresthattheycarryanelectronicwandthatregistersitsinteractionswithelectronicdevicesstrategicallyplacedthroughoutthepremise.Theelectronicinformationrecordedtothewandcanthenbedownloadedtoacomputerandreviewedbythesupervisortoensurethatthesecurityofficersareconductingtheirpatrolroundsappropriately.Whilethisexampledescribeshowtheoff‐cameraactionsofsecuritypersonnelcanbemonitored,contemporarydigitaltechnologiesalsopermitsupervisorstopotentiallyscrutinizewhatthecameraoperatorchoosestowatch.Thiscanbeaccomplishedinreal‐timeorafterthefact.Fibre‐opticandIP(InternetProtocol)technologiesnotonlyallowthecameraoperatortomonitorwhatisgoingoninreal‐timefromthesecuritycontrolroom,butsupervisorsorotherindividualsthatformpartofthesurveillanceassemblagemayalsoremotelymonitorwhattheoperatorisviewinglive.Insomecasesthecameraoperator’ssupervisor,orevenmanagersfromtheheadoffice,hundredsofkilometresaway,canoverridethelocalcameraoperator’scontrolofthecameras.Further,thedigitizationofsurveillancecameratechnologiesrecentlymeansthatthemassstorageofcamerasurveillancefootageisnowpossible,andimagesareeasierthanevertoretrieveandreview.Cameraoperatorsatseveraloftheresearchsitesindicatedthatthefootagecapturedbyeachoftheircamerasisrecordedandstored

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forvaryinglengthsoftime.Insimpletermswhatthismeansisthatthewatchinghabitsofcameraoperatorsarenowrecordedandstoredforpotentialviewingbytheirsupervisor(s).Richard,thesecuritysupervisorforadowntowndepartmentstore,indicatedthathisstaffisawarethattheyshouldnot“zoominonsomethingstupidbecausethere’snopoint…Theytapeit[theCCTVfootage]foramonthandif[they]doit,I’mgoingtoknow”.Richard’sclaimthathewillfindoutisunlikelygiventhattheparticularcamerasystemheisresponsibleforconsistsof60‐70cameraseachofwhichisconstantlyrecorded.Surely,itwouldbeimpossibleforRichardtoreviewthefootageretroactivelytomonitorthesurfingbehavioursofthecameraoperatorshesupervises.Norcanonesupervisor,asAndrefromthecasinoexplained,“catcheverylittlething”.However,supervisorsmaynotbetheonlyonesmonitoringthewatchinghabitsofthecameraoperators.Severalresearchparticipantsindicatedthatothersmightalsocomeintothesecurityofficeandcatchthemmisusingthecameratechnology;betheymanagersfromheadoffice,colleaguesfromotherdepartments,ormembersofthepublic.Inothercasesitmaybeafellowoperatorwhoinformallyaddressesthemisuseofthesurveillanceequipment.Regardlessofwhethereveryinstanceofcameramisuseisidentified,whatisimportantiswhetherthecameraoperatorsbelievetheiractionstobemonitoredandwhetherthisbeliefservestorestraintheinappropriateuseofthesystem.Whilethemajorityofcameraoperatorsdidbelievethattheiron‐cameraactionswereopentoscrutiny,theirresponsesweremixedwhendiscussingwhetherthisbeliefwasenoughtokeepthemfromusingthecamerasinwaysdeemedinappropriate.Despiteacknowledgingafearthathisactionswouldbecaught,Ianindicatedthathestilloccasionallyzoomsinon“bucksomelookingwomen”.Shawn,however,insistedthatthecamerasareusedforbusinesspurposesonly,suggestingthatifonewishestowatchattractivewomen,they“cangetonthefloor[ofthedepartmentstore]andwatchthatkindofstuff”.Foroneoperatortheknowledgethathison‐camerawatchingbehaviourwasopentoscrutinywasnotonlyenoughtodissuadehimfrominappropriatelyusingthecameras,buthisfearofhavingwhatheiswatchingmisinterpretedhasservedtoconstrainwhoheiswillingtowatchforlegitimatepurposes.

Ithinkthatfemalescouldbesuspectsthesameasmen.However,I’mnotcomfortable…becauseI’mbeingmonitored.SomeoneelsemayhaveadifferentideaofwhyI’mlookingatoneindividualandmaynotunderstandthefactthatthatperson’sacriminal,orwhatever.IthinkitsomewhatlimitswhatIdolookatbecauseofthefearthatitmightbemisunderstoodbysomeoneelsewho’snotthere.

(Frank,Open‐StreetSurveillanceInitiative)Similartothesurveillanceofcitizensinpublicandsemi‐publicspacesitappearsthatcameraoperatorknowledgethattheiractionsmaybemonitoredhasnot–at

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leastinmanycases–hadaself‐discipliningeffect.Thedegreetowhichcameraoperatorsselfgovernwhatandwhomtheymonitorbasedontheknowledgethattheythemselvesarepotentiallybeingwatchedappearstovarybyindividualoperator.

PerceptionsOnTheEffectivenessofCameraSurveillanceWhileacademicevaluationsontheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillanceexist,nostudyhasdiscussedperceptionsofsurveillancecameraeffectivenesswiththeindividualswhooperatethem.Thisresearchaskedcameraoperatorshowtheyunderstandormeasuretheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillancetechnology.Whilethefollowingisnotanexhaustivelistofthewayscameraoperatorsindicatedthattheymeasurethesuccessandfailureofthesystem,itdoesaddressthosewhichmostcommonlyemerged,specificallytheirviewsondeterrence,observationcapabilities,andfearreduction.Themajorityofoperatorsdidnotperceivecamerasurveillancetohavemuchofadeterrenteffect.Ontheonehand,whilethemoreoptimisticofcameraoperatorsbelievethatthecamerasdohaveadeterrenteffectwhenthecamerasarenoticed,theyalsoacknowledgedthatmostcitizensdonotseethecamerasand/orthesignagewarningthatcamerasareinuse.Ontheotherhand,pessimisticcameraoperatorsquestionedwhethercriminalscaredthattheywerepotentiallybeingmonitored,statingthatwhilepeopleknowthatthecamerasarethere“peoplestilldowhatpeoplewanttodo”.Themajority,however,believedthatthecameraspotentiallydeterthosewhoare‘first‐timers’oramateurs,whiledoingverylittletodiscouragethehabitualorprofessionalcriminalorcasinocheats.Inadditiontotheseperspectives,somecameraoperatorsgosofarastosuggestthattheydonotbelievethatcamerasareintendedtodetercriminalordeviantbehaviour.Theysupporttheirpositionbyindicatingthatinenvironmentssuchasdepartmentstores,signsarerarelyerectedtowarnthatcamerasareinuseandthatoverrecentyearssurveillancecamerashavebeenreducedinsize,makingthemlessconspicuous.Thisleadsintoexaminingasecondpurposeforsurveillancecameras‐simplyimprovingobservation.Itisinthedomainofimprovingobservationandthemanagementofresourcesthatoperatorsapplaudtheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillance.Almostalloperatorsinterviewedappearedtoagreethatcamerasurveillanceallowsthemtoseeandmonitorthingsthattheysimplywouldnotbeabletoseeatgroundlevel.Notonlydocamerasprovidetheoperatorwithabettervantagepoint,andapanoramicviewofthespaceundersurveillance,italsoallowsfortightzoomsinordertoseewhatonecouldnotseewithoutthemediationofthetechnology.ThefollowingstatementbyShawnsumsupwelltheoverallsentimentbymostCCTVoperatorsinterviewed.

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WellIthinkit’sveryeffectivebecauseyouandIcouldn’tgetcloseenoughtoseealotofstuffcomparedtothecamera.Ithinkthecamerahelpsustogetcloserthanever,especiallyifits[encased]inadome.Theydon’tknowwherethecamera[is]pointing,soitcouldberightontopofthem,pointingdirectlyovertheirhand,seeingwhattheirhandisdoing.Where’stheirhandgoing?Youcansee.Ifyou’restandingbehindthemyouseetheirhandgointheirpockets,butyoudon’tknowexactlywhatthey’redoingwiththeirhand,right.CCTVispartofthetoolsthatsecurityusestogetalotofpeoplebecausetheycansayforafactthatthatindividualdidpickit[anitem]upwithhislefthand,lookatitandwithhisrighthandplaceitinhispocketandexitthestore.Theycantellyouexactlywhathappened.

(Shawn,DowntownDepartmentStore)Thecameraoperatorsalsoexplainedthateveniftheyarenotcertainofwhatyousawinreal‐time,camerasurveillancetechnologyallowsthemtogobackandmonitortheincidentagain.Theparticipantsalsosuggestedthatrecordedfootagecouldbesubmittedtothecourtsincorroborationwith,orinlieuof,eyewitnesstestimony.However,someparticipantsdidraiseconcernsregardingtheuseofcamerasurveillancefootageasanalternativetoeyewitnesstestimony,especiallyasitrelatestotheinterpretationofrecordedimage.Barrysuggestedthatattherightcameraanglethecameraoperatorsmightmisinterpreteventhemostbenignbehavioursasmalignant.Afewoftheparticipantsalsodiscussedtheabilityofcamerasurveillancetoimpactperceptionsregardingtheprevalenceofcrime,aswellasreducethelevelsoffearamongthosewhouseorworkwithinsocialspaces.Whilenotallsitesexpressedthereductionoffearasaprimaryobjectivefortheirsurveillancesystemsitappearsthatthecamerashavehadthiseffectatsomeofthelocations,atleastfromtheperspectiveoftheoperators.Frankpointedoutthatwhiletheopen‐streetsurveillanceschememaynotbedeemedtobeaneffectivetoolifmeasuringitssuccessagainsttheimpactithashadonthecity’scrimerateorthenumberofarrestsmadewiththeassistanceofthesurveillancecameras,itmaybeconsideredsuccessfulinthesensethatthereisaperceptionamongcitizensthatthecamerasareeffective(alsoseeDawson,thisreport;andLeman‐Langlois2009),thusfearhasbeenreduced,especiallyamongthosewholiveandownbusinessesinthecity’sdowntowncore.Atthecasino,patronsareaskedtocompleteacustomersatisfactionsurveywhich,accordingtoAndre,revealsthatthesurveillancecamerasprovidetheclientswithasenseofsecurity.Someoftheoperatorswhoapplaudedthesurveillancecamerasalsoprovidedacritiqueofthetechnologystatingthatwhilethesystemisgreatwhenfunctioningproperlythereareoftenequipmentbreak‐downsandcrashesthatinterferewithitseffectiveness(seealsoFonio,thisreport).Operatorsalsosuggestedthatinsomecasestheequipmentusedcouldservetoconstrainthesurveillantgaze.Whetheritisbecausetheviewingmonitorsaretoosmalltomakeoutdetailsorthesurveillancecamerascannotberotated,whatthehumanoperatorcando(orview)islimitedbythetechnology’scapabilities.

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Youcoulddoabetterjobthanapatrolofficeratviewingstuff,butyourboundariesaresetonthosecameras.Let’ssayyouhaveacamerathatyoucan’trotate,butyetthere’ssomethingthat’shappeningbehindthecamera.Youcan’tseeitbecauseyoucan’trotate[thecamera].Yourboundariesaresetonthatcamera.

(Barry,Museum)Thereverse,however,isalsotrueinthesensethatthetechnologymaybeunder‐employedbytheoperatorsbecausetheysimplydonotknowhowtousethesystemtoitsfullpotential.Anexampleofthiscouldbefoundatthesmalldowntownshoppingplaza,whereintheopinionsofJamesandXavierthecameraswerenotappropriatelyinstalledbyhumantechnicianspreventingtheeffectivemonitoringoftheloadingdockandtheparkinggarage.Anotherinstancecanbefoundattheopen‐streetsitewherebureaucraticlinesofcommunicationhinderpromptresponsestocrimesinprogress.Interestingly,therecommendationsmadebytheresearchparticipantstoimprovethesurveillancesystemstheymonitoredfocusedonupgradingthetechnologyusedattheirsites.

ConclusionThissectionexploresmanyofthethemesidentifiedbyotherresearchersinthisreport,thistimefromtheperspectiveofcameraoperators.Whilecameraoperatorsidentifycontextspecificformsoftheft(i.e.shoplifting,employeetheft,orcasinocheating)asaprimaryriskthatrequiresmanagement,theyalsoprioritizeensuringthephysicalsafetyofothers,includingthemselvesandcolleagues,withinthesocialspacesthattheymonitor.Operatorsindentifyspecificgroups,commonlyreferredtobyscholarsas‘flawedconsumers’(e.g.youth,drunks,drugaddicts,andthehomeless),asbeingaprominentsourceoftheserisksandworthyofheightenedscrutiny.ConversationswithcameraoperatorsrevealthattheSeptember11thterroristattackssensitizedthemtothethreatofterrorism.Someoftheoperatorsviewthesitestheymonitorassusceptibletosimilarattacks.Forsomeoftheoperatorsincreasedvigilancemeansbecomingmoreawareandsuspiciousofpeople,especiallymen,whoappearMiddleEastern.Inshort,theterroristthreatisviewedasa“Muslim”threat.Whilethisandotherexamplesofferedinthissection,provideaclearindicationofprofilingandtherelianceonstereotypes,thecameraoperatorsweresplitwithregardtheirwillingnesstoacknowledgeprejudice,discriminationandstereotypingbasedoncrudecategoriessuchasraceandgender.Thisreticencecanbepartiallyexplainedbynegativeconnotationsappliedtosuchterms.Itisapparentthatmonitoringcamerasrequiresonetodiscriminatebetweendifferentvisualstimuli,betheycrudechoicesbasedononesappearanceormorecomplexassessmentsofwhatconstitutessuspiciousbehaviour.Whileitshouldbenotedthatnotallracialorethnicstereotypingresultsinheightenedscrutinyornegative

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consequence,thisdoesnottakeawayfromthefactthatsomegroupsaredisproportionatelymonitoredbycameraoperators.Sowhatsortsofformalaccountabilitystructuresarebuiltintocamerassurveillanceassemblagestoaddresspotentialproblemsofracialprofilingorsexualvoyeurism?Basedonthisresearch,theshortanswerappearstobethattherearenone.Ensuringtheethicaluseofsurveillancecamerasfallstothemoralcompassofindividualoperators.Whilethesamecamerasurveillancetechnologiesthatproduceandrecordtheimageswithinthecamera’sfieldofviewalsohavetheabilitytomakevisiblethemonitoringhabitsofcameraoperators,givenlimitedresourcesandthesheeramountfootagethattheywouldberequiredtoreview,itisunlikelythatsurveillancesupervisorswouldundertakesuchataskwithanyregularity.Further,despiteacknowledgmentfromcameraoperatorsthatothersmayviewtheiron‐cameraactivities,inmanycasesthiswasnotsufficienttodissuadeinappropriatecamerause.Finally,withcamerashavinglittleself‐discipliningeffectsontheirownactions,thissectionexplorescameraoperators’perceptionsregardingtheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillance.Notsurprisinglycamerasoperatorsweremixedintheiropinionsonthecamera’sabilitytodetercrime,whilesomeevenquestionedwhetherdeterrencewasevenanaim.Insteadmostoperatorsinsistedthatcamerasurveillanceismosteffectiveatimprovingobservation,assistingintheareaofresourcemanagement,andreducingfearofcrime.However,manyofthecameraoperatorsalsoprovidedacritiqueofthetechnology.Theyindicatethatwhilethesystemsaregreatwhenfunctioningtheyexperiencenumerousmalfunctionsthatnegativelyimpacttheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillanceattheirsites.Furtherthissectionrevealsthatwhilethecameratechnologyemployedimpactstheoverallallsuccessofhumancamerasurveillanceworkers,humandecisionsandabilitiesprecludetheuseofthetechnology’sfullpotential.Broadlythissectionrevealstheinterplaybetweenthesocialandthetechnical.Fromitsinventiontoserveaspecificsocialpurpose,toitsimplementationwithinaspecificsocialspace,andfinallytothemannerinwhichitisthoughtofandusedbythosewhooperateit,camerasurveillancetechnologyissociallyconstructed.Thesocialnatureofcamerasurveillanceworkmustbeborneinmindinordertounderstandsurveillancepractices,aswellaswhatguidesthe‘selectivegaze’ofcameraoperators.

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UnderstandingPublicPerceptionsofCameraSurveillanceinCanadaDanielleDawsonIntroductionCamerasurveillanceisincreasinglybeingimplementedasamechanismofcrimereductionandcriminalapprehensionwithintheprivatesector,policeservices,andgovernmentagenciesonaninternationalleveldespitelackofdefinitiveevidencethatthesesystemshavetheabilitytoreducecrime(see,forexample,ShortandDitton1999;Philips1999;WelshandFarrington2002;HierandGreenberg2007).Studiesofcamerasurveillancehavebeenlimitedintheirabilitytocontributetoadiscussionofwhethercamerasurveillanceiseffectiveandwhyitiscontinuingtobeimplementedattheexpenseofcitizens’taxdollarsandgovernmentallocationoffundsandresources.Asforpublicopiniononcamerasurveillance,researchinNorthAmericahasbeenleftprimarilytomarketbasedinvestigationofpoliticalorganizationsandmediaoutlets.Theseevaluationsofpublicopinionvarywidelyinmethodandapproachbuthavemanagedtopaintabroadpictureofpublicattitudestowardtheuseofcamerasurveillanceinpublicspaces.MediaandMarketBasedOpinionPollingonCameraSurveillanceinCanadaMediaandmarketbasedopinionpollingdemonstratesconsiderablesupportfortheuseofcamerasurveillance.Positivepublicresponseisreportedlyduetothesystem’sperceivedabilitytoreducecrimeandpreventpossibleterroristactivity.58Suchlooselyconductedtypesofopinionpollingaresomewhatunreliablefortwomainreasons.First,mediaandmarketbasedopinionpollingofcamerasurveillancearegenerallyprecededbysomeheavilypublicizedtragiceventinwhichcamerasurveillanceispresentedtothepublicinapositiveway.Forinstance,in1993,ablurryimageof2yearoldJamesBulgerbeingabductedfromashoppingcentreinBootle,Englandwasloopedinthemediaandcametobeconsideredbythepublicastheprimaryinvestigatorytoolinthesearchforthemissingchild.Assuch,whentheBulgercasewassolved,camerasurveillancewasheraldeda‘silverbullet’forcrimesolving(Marx1992).Second,thewordingandplacementofquestionswithinthesepollsoftenleadsrespondentstoanswermorefavourablytowardssurveillancecamerasasasolution(seeDitton2000).Forexample,whenquestionsreferringtocamerasurveillanceareprecededbyquestionsregardingcrime,fearandsecurity,responsesconsistentlyshowgreatersupportfortheuseofcameras(ibid).

58SeeTable6.1in“CameraSurveillanceinCanadaReport:PartOne”,p.43,availableat:http://www.surveillanceproject.org/projects/scanreportedinWiecekandSaetnan2002.

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Acleargapexistsintheliteraturesurroundingcamerassurveillanceamplifyingtheneedformoreextensiveresearchthatcanofferacomprehensivepictureofpublicperceptions.Thissectiondiscussesthehomogenousdefinitionofcamerasurveillance,issuesaboutprivacy,andpublicknowledgeofthetechnology.TheGlobalizationofPersonalData(GPD)internationalsurveydata,madeavailablebytheSurveillanceProject,isusedtohelpprovideamoreholisticconceptionofpublicperceptionsofcamerasurveillanceinCanada.TheGPDSurveyLaunchedin2003,theGPDProjecttracedtheeffectsthatnewusesofpersonaldata,inrelationtomobility,globalization,andgovernance,haveonordinarypeople.Thisincludesresearchintothewaysthatpersonaldataarebeingsystematicallycollectedtoinfluence,manage,sort,categorizeorotherwiseprocessvariousaspectsofsociallifeviatheproliferationofsurveillancesystems.Recently(2006),theGPDconductedaninternationalsurveyofninecountriestogaininsightintotheresponseofordinarycitizenstotheincreasedflowofpersonaldata.Thisisthefirstmajorcross‐nationalstudythatdealswithissuessurroundingsurveillanceandprivacy.ThedetailedanalysisoffocusgroupinterviewsconductedinCanada,Brazil,China,France,Hungary,Japan,Mexico,SpainandtheUSA,coupledwithintensebackgroundresearchoneachcountrygaveshapetoaquestionnairedesignedtorevealpublicattitudestowardincreasingsurveillancemethods.Oneofthetopicsaddressedinthesurveyispubliccamerasurveillance.Giventheincreasinguseofcamerasasamechanismofsurveillanceonaninternationallevel,theGPDProject’sinclusionofquestionsregardingcamerasurveillanceisofparticularrelevance.Asurveyofsuchmagnitudeprovidestheopportunitytobuildamorecomprehensiveframeworkforunderstandingtheriseofcamerasasasystemofsurveillanceandtheresponseitelicitsacrossdifferentculturalsettings.Thecomprehensiveapproachofthesurveyprovidesauniqueopportunitytostudypublicperceptionsofcamerasurveillanceandtogaininsightsintotheformationofsocialpolicyonaninternationallevel.Thispaperexploresthefindingsoftheinternationalsurvey’squestionsregardingcamerasurveillance,usingaCanadianperspectiveasaguide.Comparisonofthewaydifferentdemographicvariablesinfluencepublicperceptionsofcamerasurveillanceaswellasthecross‐tabulationofcamerasurveillancequestionswithotherrelevanttopicsexploredbythesurveyoffersanin‐depthunderstandingofthepublic’sopinionaboutcamerasurveillancethanhithertorealized.KnowledgeofCameraSurveillanceQuestion1.4ofthesurveyregardingcamerasurveillanceasked:“Ingeneral,howknowledgeableareyouaboutClosedCircuitTelevision(CCTV)inpublicspaces?”Wouldyousayyouareveryknowledgeable,somewhatknowledgeable,notveryknowledgeableornotatallknowledgeable?”TheresultsshowthatjustunderhalfofCanadianrespondents(45.7percent)classifythemselvesasbeingatleast

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somewhatknowledgeableaboutclosedcircuittelevision.Thus,whileaslightmajorityofrespondentsfeelthattheyarenotveryknowledgeableaboutCCTVinpublicspaces(54.3percent)thelargestconcentrationofrespondentsfeelthattheyaresomewhatknowledgeable(36.6percent)(seefigure2).DemographicvariablesrevealsomeofthedifferencesinCanadianresponsesregardingtheirknowledgeaboutcamerasurveillance.RegionalcomparisonsuncoverslightvariationsintheresponseofCanadians.Forthepurposesofcreatingastatisticallysignificantrepresentationofthepopulation,Canadawassplitintosixregions:BritishColumbia;Alberta;ManitobaandSaskatchewan;Ontario;Quebec;andtheAtlanticProvinces.ThestrongestclaimofknowledgeabilitycomesfromBritishColumbia(seeFigure3).ThisisperhapsduetotheextensivebodyofcamerasurveillancesystemsalreadyinuseinBritishColumbia(Walby2006).ThelowestlevelsofknowledgeabilitywerereportedinQuebec(31percent)with9.8percentclaimingtobeveryknowledgeableandonly21.2percentclaimingtobesomewhatknowledgeable.ThisprovidesaninterestingcontrastsinceQuebechasalsoutilizedsystemsofcamerasurveillanceforanumberofyearsforthepurposesofcrimedeterrenceanddetectionandfortheapprehensionofcriminals(ibid).

Figure3:CanadianKnowledgeofPublicCameraSurveillancebyRegion

Whenbrokendownbygender,someinterestingtrendsemergeinthedata.Malesaremorelikelytoclaimtheyareveryknowledgeableandsignificantlylesslikelytostatethattheyhavenoknowledgeatall(seefigure4).Thistrendwasalsofoundonaninternationalscale.ThemajorityofothercountriesinvolvedinthesurveydemonstratedthesametypeofpatternexceptfortheChinesewhodisplayedlittletonovariationinresponserateswhenbrokendownbygender.

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Figure4:CanadianKnowledgeofCameraSurveillancebyGender

Onlynegligibledifferencesarosefromthestudyoftheotherassesseddemographicvariables.Thedifferencesforagebreakdownsweremostlymarginal.Thestrongestindicatorcamefromthosebelongingtothe65+agebracketwhowerethemostlikelytorespondthattheyhadnoknowledgeofcamerasurveillanceatall.NootheragegroupsstandoutintheCanadiansample(seefigure5).

Figure5:CanadianKnowledgeofCameraSurveillancebyAge

Again,therewerenegligibledifferenceswhensplitaccordingtoethnicity.WithinCanada,45.4percentofthosewhoidentifiedthemselvesasCaucasianfelttheywereatleastsomewhatknowledgeableaboutpubliccamerasurveillance.WhilethosewhoidentifiedasBlack/Africanwerethemostlikelytosaythattheywerenotknowledgeableaboutcamerasurveillance.Onlymarginaldifferenceswereexistentamongsttheotherdocumentedgroups(seeFigure6).

Figure6:CanadianKnowledgeofCameraSurveillancebyEthnicity

Whenquestion1.4wasbrokendownbyrespondents’highestlevelofformaleducationcompleted,slightvariationsinresponsewererenderedvisible.Those

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whosehighestlevelofformaleducationwasgradeschoolorsomehighschoolwerethemostlikelygrouptoanswerthattheyhadnoknowledgeatallaboutpubliccamerasurveillance(43.2percent).Thosewiththehighestdegreeofformaleducation,thosewithaGraduateDegree,werethemostlikelytosaythattheywereveryknowledgeableaboutpubliccamerasurveillance(15.2percent).Othervariationswithineducationwereonlymarginal.Inrelationtotheothereightcountriesinvolvedinthesurvey,theCanadianresponsesitsinthemiddle.ClaiminglessknowledgeaboutCCTVisMexico,Japan,BrazilandHungary.ClaimingslightlymoreknowledgethanCanadianswastheUSA,France,SpainandChina(60percent),whichclaimedthelargestamountofknowledge(seefigure7).Thefactthatrespondents’answersweremoreheavilyconcentratedbelow50percentindicatesalackofknowledgeofcamerasurveillanceacrosstheboard.Thefactthat60percentoftheChinesefelttheywereatleastsomewhatknowledgeableaboutcamerasurveillanceisperhapsindicativeofthewidespreaduseofCCTVinChina59,aswellasoftheurbanoriginofallChineserespondentsasthatiswheremostofthecamerasreside(LiangandHuili2007).

Figure7:KnowledgeofCameraSurveillanceInternationally

EffectivenessofCommunityCameraSurveillanceGPDsurveyquestion20.1askedrespondents:“Somecommunitiesandprivatecompaniesareusingsurveillancecameras,alsoknownasClosedCircuitTelevisionorCCTVstomonitorpublicplacesinordertodetercrimeandassistintheprosecutionofoffenders.Inyouropinion,howeffectivearecommunityCCTV(suchasoutdoorcamerasinpublicplaces)inreducingcrime?Aretheyveryeffective,somewhateffective,notveryeffective,ornotatalleffective?”ResponsetothisquestiondemonstratedthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofrespondentsfromtheninecountriessurveyedbelievethatCCTVisatleastsomewhateffectiveatreducingcrime.59 Take Beijing for example, which is reportedly home to more than 263 000 systems of camera surveillance for the purpose of monitoring public spaces (Liang and Huili 2007).

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AmongthecountriesthatstandoutthemostbasedontheirresponseareHungary,BrazilandMexico.HungarydemonstratesthestrongestresponseinfavourofcommunityCCTVsabilitytoreducecrimewith90.5percentofrespondentsbelievingittobeatleastsomewhateffective.ThisisfollowedbyBrazil’s81.9percentresponseinfavourofcommunityCCTVseffectivenesswith44percentbelievingittobeveryeffective.Thisisthehighestrecordednumberofresponsesinthe‘very’categoryfoundinallotherquestionsrelatedtocamerasurveillance.TheoverwhelmingmajorityofMexicans(84.3percent)alsoholdthebeliefthatcamerasurveillanceisatleastsomewhateffective.TheoverwhelmingmajorityofrespondentsbelievecommunityCCTVtobeatleastsomewhateffective(seeFigure8).SimilarresponseshavealsobeenreplicatedbypreviousresearchonpublicopinionintheUKwhere80percentofrespondentsbelievethatcamerasurveillancewouldhavesignificantimpactoncrimereduction(Spriggsetal.2005)(Formoreexamplesofsimilarresultsseealso:Dixon,LevineandMcAuley2003;HonessandCharman1992;andPhillips1999whoeachreportthatcommunityresponsetocamerasurveillancehasbeenpredominantlypositivewhichiscorrelatedwiththepublicbeliefthatcamerasurveillanceisaneffectivemeansofcrimedeterrenceanddetection).

Figure8:InternationallyPerceivedEffectivenessofCommunityCameraSurveillance

WithinCanada,onlyminimalvariationsemergeinresponsetoquestion20.1onaregionallevel(seefigure9).

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Figure9:TheCanadianPerceivedEffectivenessofCommunityCameraSurveillancebyRegion

Whenbrokendownbygender,nosignificantdifferencesarevisible.WomenarealmostequallyaslikelytorespondthatcommunityCCTVsareveryeffective(females18.7percent,males18.4percent),somewhateffective(females59.2percent,males55.3percent),notveryeffective(females19.5percent,males22.4percent)ornotatalleffective(females2.7percent,males3.9percent)asmales.Theothereightcountriesinvolvedinthesurveydemonstratethesamepatternofnegligibledifferences.Whenbrokendownbyage,againvariationsareonlymarginal(seefigure10).

Figure10:CanadianPerceivedEffectivenessofCommunityCameraSurveillancebyAge

Foreducation,thestrongestindicatoramongstCanadianscamefromthosewhosehighestlevelofformaleducationwasgradeschoolorsomehighschool.Thisgroupwasthemostlikelytorespondthatpubliccamerasurveillancewaseffective(91.3percent)with27.1percentclaimingittobeveryeffectiveand64.2percentrespondingthatitwassomewhateffective.Forethnicity,thosewhoidentifiedasSouthAmericanIndianwerethemostlikelytocitecommunityCCTVasbeingatleastsomewhateffectiveatreducingcrime(85.3

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percent).Theblack/AfricangroupweretheleastlikelytobelievecommunityCCTVwaseffectivewithonly39percentcitingitassuch.Oftheremaining61percent,39percentthoughtitnotveryeffectiveand22percentnoteffectiveatall(seefigure11).

Figure11:PerceivedEffectivenessofCommunityCameraSurveillancebyEthnicity

Resultsfromquestion20.1werecrosstabulatedwiththeresultsfromquestion1.4inanattempttounderstandifknowledgeofCCTVwasanindicatorofhoweffectiveonebelievescommunityCCTVtobe.ThedatasuggeststhatthosewhoclaimedtobeknowledgeablewerejustaslikelytoclaimtheeffectivenessofCCTVasthosewhoclaimedtobenotknowledgeableatall.Seventy‐eightpointtwopercentofthoseclaimingtobeveryknowledgeableaboutpublicCCTVrespondedthatitwasatleastsomewhateffective.77.4percentofpeoplewhoclaimedtohavenoknowledgeofpublicCCTVwhatsoevermadethesameclaimaboutitseffectiveness.Assuch,knowledgeofpubliccamerasurveillanceisnotagoodindicatorofwhethertherespondentwillthinkitisaneffectivemeansofdeterringcrime.Responsesfromquestion20.1werecross‐tabulatedwithquestion5whichasked:“Whatleveloftrustdoyouhavethatyourgovernmentisstrikingtherightbalancebetweennationalsecurityandindividualrights?”VeryhighandreasonablyhighlevelsoftrustthattheCanadiangovernmentisstrikingtherightbalancebetweennationalsecurityandindividualrightscorrespondswithbeliefsthatcommunityCCTVsareeffectiveatreducingcrime.OftheCanadianswhobelievedcommunitycamerasurveillancetobeveryeffective,60.2percentofthemalsohadveryhighorreasonablyhighlevelsoftrustintheirgovernment.Correspondingly,oftheCanadianswhoclaimedthatcommunitycamerasurveillancewasnotatalleffective,62.5percentofthemhadfairlyloworverylowlevelsoftrustintheirgovernment.Thissuggeststhatthosewhohavetrustintheirgovernmentaremorelikelytothinkthatthegovernmentwouldnotemployasystemthatisincapableofperformingtheserviceitisdesignedtoprovide.EffectivenessofIn‐StoreCameraSurveillanceTheperceivedeffectivenessofin‐storecamerasurveillanceismeasuredbyquestion20.2whichasked:“Somecommunitiesandprivatecompaniesareusingsurveillance

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cameras,alsoknownasClosedCircuitTelevisionorCCTVs,tomonitorpublicplacesinordertodetercrimeandassistintheprosecutionofoffenders.Inyouropinion,howeffectivearein‐storeCCTVs?Aretheyveryeffective,somewhateffective,notveryeffective,ornoteffectiveatall?”Anoverwhelmingmajorityofrespondentsbelievein‐storeCCTVstobeatleastsomewhateffectiveatreducingcrime.Responsesindicatethatpeoplearemorelikelytothinkofin‐storeCCTVsasbeingslightlymoreeffectivethancommunitycameras.Thisperceptionexistsonaninternationalscale(seeFigure12).

Figure12:InternationallyPerceivedEffectivenessofIn‐StoreCameraSurveillance

RegionaldifferenceswithinCanadaareminimal.TheAtlanticProvinces(89.3percent)believein‐storecamerasurveillancetobeatleastsomewhateffective.ThisisfollowedtightlybyBritishColumbia(87.9percent),Ontario(87.4percent),Alberta(86percent),Manitoba/Saskatchewan(84.6percent),andQuebec(83.2percent)eachbelievingin‐storecamerasurveillancetobeatleastsomewhateffective.Assuch,alltheregionsofCanadaareinagreementthatin‐storecamerasurveillanceisaneffectivemeansofcrimereduction.Whenbrokendownbygender,theresponseratesforquestion20.2arealmostequal(seefigure13).Fromaninternationallevel,thesametrendisdemonstratedinmostoftheothercountriesinvolvedinthesurvey,exceptforintheUSA,ChinaandJapan,wheregendermaybeconsideredamorestatisticallysignificantindicatorofperceptionsofeffectivenessforin‐storecamerasurveillance.

Figure13:PerceivedEffectivenessofIn‐StoreCameraSurveillancebyGender

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Thereislittledifferencebetweenagegroupsasthevastmajorityofrespondentsinagreementthatin‐storecamerasurveillanceisaneffectivemeansofreducingcrime(seefigure14).Thistrendhasbeendemonstratedinotherresearchonthetopicwhichsuggeststhatagehasaninfluenceonthewaycitizensfeelaboutcrime.Forexample,theelderlytendtofearcrimemoreandarethereforemorelikelytoanswerfavourablytowardcameras(seeLeman‐Langlois2009).

Figure14:PerceivedEffectivenessofIn‐StoreCameraSurveillancebyAge

Intermsofethnicity,thosewhoidentifiedasAsian/PacificIslander(84.4percent),Caucasian(87.3percent)andthosefrommixedethnicbackgrounds(81.9percent)hadthemajoritythinkingin‐storeCCTVisatleastsomewhateffectiveatreducingcrime.Ontheotherhand,thosewhoidentifiedasBlack/African(58.6percent)orSouthAmericanIndian(69.1percent)werefarlesslikelytobelievethein‐storecamerasurveillanceisaneffectivemeansofcrimeprevention(seefigure15).

Figure15:PerceivedEffectivenessofIn‐StoreCameraSurveillancebyEthnicity

Whencomparingquestion20.2withquestion1.4regardingknowledgeofpubliccamerasurveillance,nostrongconnectioninresponsescouldbemade.Thosewhoclaimedtobeveryorsomewhatknowledgeableaboutcamerasurveillancewereaslikelytoclaimthatthemethodwasaseffectiveasthosewhoclaimedtobenotveryornotatallknowledgeable.Nocorrelationbetweenknowledgeandperceivedeffectivenesscouldbemade.

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Resultsfromquestion20.2werecross‐tabulatedwithquestion6whichasked:“Whatleveloftrustdoyouhavethatprivatecompanieswillprotectyourpersonalinformation?”Thiscomparisonmadevisibleatrendwhichsuggeststhatthehighertheleveloftrustonehasforprivatecompanies,themorelikelyoneistothinkin‐storeCCTVwillbeeffective.Eightypointfourpercentofpeoplewithaveryhighleveloftrustinprivatecompaniesthoughtin‐storecamerasurveillancetobeatleastsomewhateffectiveatreducingcrime.Ofthatnumber,32.8percentthoughtittobeveryeffective.Correspondingly,62.8percentofCanadianswhoreportedhavingaverylowleveloftrustinprivatecompaniesbelievein‐storecamerasurveillancetobesomewhateffective.Ofthatnumber,only13.3percentthoughtittobeveryeffective.Thisrelationsuggestsaconnectionbetweenthewaypeoplethinkaboutprivatecompaniesandhowpeopleperceivein‐storecamerasurveillance.Themoretrustapersonhasinaprivatecompanyseemsindicativeofhoweffectivetheybelievein‐storecamerasurveillancetobe.InterpretingtheDataApresentationofthefindingsfromtheGPDsurveydemonstratesseveralpointsthatworktowardprovidingamorethoroughunderstandingofpublicperceptionsofcamerasurveillance.TheresponsesshowthatapproximatelyhalftheCanadianpublicconsidersthemselvestobeatleastsomewhatknowledgeableabouttheuseofvideocamerasasamethodofsurveillance.Further,responsestellusthatthevastmajorityoftheCanadianpublicfeelsthatcamerasurveillanceisatleastsomewhateffectiveinitsabilitytoreducecrime.CanadawasshowntodivergemostwidelyfromBrazil,HungaryandMexico,andexhibitansweringpatternsthemostsimilartoFrance,SpainandtheUnitedStates.Sowhatdoesthisinformationtellusaboutwhatthepublicthinksaboutcamerasurveillance,orhowtheCanadianpublicfeelsabouttheimplementationofcamerasurveillanceintheirarea?Toanswerthisquestion,itishelpfultoconsidersourcesofinformationregardingpublicopiniontowardcamerasurveillancethathavebeencompletedintheUK,previousCanadianresearch,GPDfocusgroupsinCanadaandresistancetoimplementingsurveillanceatCanadiansites.ThewidespreaduseofcamerasurveillanceintheUKmakesittheleadinguserintheworld.TheperceivedsuccessoftheseschemeshasmadeUKsystemsthebasisofmanyexistingCanadianschemes(Walby2006).WhilethereareseveraldifferencesbetweentheuseofcamerasurveillanceintheUKandCanada,theextensivebodyofliteratureavailableonthesystemsintheUKmakesitausefulpointofreference.ResearchfromtheUKworkstocomplimentandextendexistingCanadianresearch.Inanattempttomeasurethelevelofsupportfortheinstallationofsurveillancecamerasinpublicareas,theHomeOfficesurveyoftheUK(2005)askedhowrespondentswouldfeelifanewCCTVsystemwereinstalledintheirarea.Responsewasmeasuredonascalerangingfrom‘veryhappy’to‘veryunhappy’.Thelevelofsupportwaspositivewithabout82percentofpeoplerespondingthattheywouldbeatleast‘fairlyhappy’aboutinstallation(Spriggs,etal.2005).Thishasbeena

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consistentresponseamongstsurveyscompletedintheUK.Forexample,BennettandGelsthorpe(1996)foundthat64percentofrespondentsfromCambridgethoughtCCTVtobea‘good’or‘verygood’idea.Similarly,Ditton(1998)foundthat69percentofpeopleinterviewed‘didn’tmind’beingwatchedbyCCTV.Thismajority,whichwasinfavouroftheimplementationofCCTVintheirownneighbourhoods,wasalsooftheopinionthatcamerasurveillancehastheabilitytoreducecrime(Spriggsetal.2005).Astrongrelationshiphasbeenfoundbetweentheperceivedeffectivenessofcamerasurveillance,andtheattitudetowardinstallationinone’sarea.IntheUK,respondentsaremorelikelytobehappyaboutinstallationintheirareaiftheybelievethetechnologytobeeffectiveatitsproposeduses.WhetherapositivecorrelationcanalsobefoundamongstCanadianresponsescannotbeascertainedfromtheGPDProject’sselectionofquestions.OtherNorthAmericanresearchhashelpedtodemonstratethispoint.Socialscienceandopinionpollshavedemonstratedthatwhileaboutonethirdofparticipantsrecognizecamerasurveillanceasathreattoprivacy(Leman‐Langlois2009),thisisnottosaythatthesesamerespondentsdonotsupporttheimplementationofCCTVsystems,aspeopleseemtobewillingtotradingprivacyforsecurity(seeWells,AllardandWilson2006;Lyon2003).AnexaminationofthefocusgrouptranscriptsthatguidedtheformationoftheGPDProject’squestionnaire,helptobothsupplementandchallengethenotionthatCanadianattitudessurroundingtheimplementationofcamerasurveillancewouldmimicthepositiveperceptionsoftheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillanceatreducingcrime.Giventhenatureofthequalitativeresearch,thefindingsfromthefocusgroupscannotbeconsideredtobeastatisticallysignificantrepresentationoftheCanadianpublic.However,forexploratorypurposes,thetranscriptsprovidevaluableinsightintotheperceptionsoftheCanadianpublic.TranscriptsfromthefocusgroupsrevealmuchaboutthewaythatCanadiansdefinecamerasurveillance.Thedialoguesuggeststhatordinarypeopledonotpaymuchattentiontocamerasurveillance.Areadingofalltheavailabletranscripts(fourfocusgroupsbasedinTorontoinMayof2004averagingabout7memberspergroup)revealthatpeopleeasilypointtoseveralwaysthatsurveillancecamerasareused,butexamplesrarelyincludepoliceorgovernmentoperations.Themostcommonlycitedschemesareprivatesystemsbelongingtoapartmentbuildings,banks,malls,conveniencestoresandthoseusedbyemployerstomonitortheiremployees.Ononlyoneoccasiondidaparticipantspeakaboutthecamera‐monitoredstreetsofLondonwithoutbeingpromptedbythemoderator.Thissuggeststhatpeoplearelikelytothinkofpubliccamerasurveillanceasprivatemonitoringasopposedtothesocialmonitoringofapublicspacebygovernmentorpoliceofficials.Thereareupwardsof14systemsofcamerasurveillancecurrentlyinuseinCanada60andthisestimateispredictedtoincrease.By2003,thereweremore

60 Current evaluations tell us Hamilton, London, Peterborough, Sturgeon Falls, Sudbury, Thessalon, Toronto, Thunder Bay, Windsor Ontario (ON), Edmonton Alberta (AB) Antigonish Nova Scotia (NS),

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thanfourmillionpubliclyorprivatelyownedcamerasinoperationintheUK(McCahillandNorris2003)whichmayprovetoserveasanindicatorofthedirectionofCanada(Walby2006).AreadingofthefocusgrouptranscriptsimpliesthatCanadiancitizensareunawareoftheextenttowhichgovernmentandpoliceforcesareusingcamerasurveillanceasaproposedmethodofcrimecontrol.Thisworkstofurtherilluminatethedichotomybetweenalackofpublicawarenessandtheperceptionthatcamerasurveillanceiseffectiveinitsproposeduses.Whendiscussionshiftedtotheusefulnessofcamerasurveillance,therewasgenerallypositiveconsensus,reflectiveofthedatafromtheGPDsurvey.However,whenpromptedtotalkaboutthewidespreadimplementationofsurveillancecamerasintheparticipant’sowncity,responseswithinthefocusgroupswererarelysupportive.Participantsexpressedfeelingsofuneaseabouttheideaofbeingpersonallymonitoredinapublicplace.Therefore,whiletheresponsesinthesurveyindicatethatitiscommonplacetobelievecamerasurveillanceisasuccessfulcrimedeterrent,theextenttowhichCanadiancitizensfeelpositivelyabouttheimplementationofcamerasurveillanceintheirareaisuncertain.Further,thisimpliesthatwhenrespondingtoquestionnairesparticipantsfailtoacknowledgethatthesesituationsmayapplytothem.Thismixofpublicperceptionsmaybepartiallyaccountedforbythevariationsinapproachesusedtostudythetopic.Asmentionedabove,theinformationprovidedtoparticipantsandtheorderinwhichquestionsappearonasurveycanhavesignificantinfluenceonthewayquestionsaboutcamerasurveillanceareanswered(Ditton2000)whichsuggeststhatpublicsupportforcamerasurveillancemaybeexaggerated(ibid;DittonandShort1999;Graham1998).OtherquestionsappearingontheGPDProject’ssurveycalledattentiontoviolentvictimization,propertytheft,threatstocivillibertiesandinvasionofprivacywhichhavebeenshowntoimpactparticipantresponsetoquestionsaboutcamerasurveillance(ibid).Similarly,thequestionsinthesurveyregardingcamerasurveillancementionCCTVbeinginstalled‘inordertodetercrimeandassistintheprosecutionofoffenders’.Positiveresponsemaybearesultthistypeofquestioning.Withinthefocusgroupsettinghowever,participantswereoftenprobedtotalkaboutprivacyandcivilrightsissuespriortoexpressingtheiropinionsaboutcamerasurveillanceandmaybeindicativeofwhytheresponsesreflecteddifferentialattitudes.FurtherevidencesuggestingthatthepublicmaynotbesoacceptingoftheimplementationofcamerasurveillancecomesfromCanadianexampleswhereCCTVinitiativeshavealreadybeenputintooperationandbeenresisted.Inthelate1990s,thepublicofBrockvilledemonstratedsubstantialoppositiontothelocalCCTVproject(Walby2006).SimilarpublicreactionsledtheChiefofPoliceinGuelphtorejecttheimplementationofCCTVinitiativesthere(ibid).

Kelowna British Columbia (BC), Montreal and Baie-Comeau Quebec (QC), operate open-street camera surveillance programs with many more locations having used systems in the past or are considering/have considered the implementation of a system (Walby, 2006: 6).

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Ithasalsobeensuggestedthatpositiveassessmentsofcamerasurveillanceareatleastsomewhatdependentuponthepublic’slimitedandinaccurateknowledgeofthecapabilitiesofcamerasurveillance(HonessandCharman1992).Thismaybepartiallyexplainedbypublic’srelianceonmediaoutletstoformtheiropinion(Reiner1997;NorrisandArmstrong1999).Thefunctionsandcapabilitiesofcamerasurveillanceareoftendisproportionatelyportrayedbythemedia,givingthepublicafalsesenseoftheabilityofthesesystemsatreducingcrime(ibid).Sincecamerasurveillanceisperceivedasaneffectivetoolofcrimedeterrenceanddetection,itsnumerousconsequencesforcivilandprivacyrights,freedomofmovement,andfreedomofassociationaswellastheinsufficientevidenceforthesuccessofitsproposeduses,areoftensidestepped.Atatimewhenthepaceoftechnologicalchangefarsurpassestherateofpolicyandregulationalterations,theincreasingimplementationofcamerasurveillancemaybenegativelyassessed.Socialsorting(Lyon2003),operatorbias(Walby2005;Norris2003),functioncreep(Hier2004),andthequestionedabilityofcamerasurveillancetoactuallyreducecrimeshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenconsideringtheimplementationofsuchsystems.Whilemoreresearchisrequiredtodeterminethesocialandethicalconsequencesofcamerasurveillance,thesethingsarecertainlyworthconcerninthedebatesurroundingtheimplementationofcamerasurveillance.InCanada,theoversightofthesesystemshappensatthefederalandprovinciallevel.ThePrivacyActof1983,andthePersonalInformationProtectionandElectronicDocumentsAct(PIPEDA)of2006aremeanttoprotectthecitizens’righttoprivacy.InOntario,theprivacycommissionersetoutguidelinestotheuseofCCTVsystems(IPC2001).Signageisheavilyreliedupontoensurepublicnotificationandconsent,buttheguidelinesfailtoensurethesignsincludeappropriateinformationorthatsignsareplacedinalocationsuitableforviewingpurposessuchthatpropernotificationandinformedconsentareachieved(Lippert2009a).Lackofinformedconsentproblematizestheuseofcamerasurveillanceandissuggestiveoftheneedtorevisitcurrentapplicationsofpolicyinregardstocamerasurveillance.WhiletherighttoprivacyhaslongbeenabackdroptothehistoryofWesternculture(Gallagher2004),thecurrentsocialclimate,inapost‐9/11risksociety,isdominatedbyapublicthatismorewilling–astheywouldsay‐‐totradeprivacyforsecurity(Lyon2003).Withthemajorityofrespondentsbelievingthatcamerasurveillanceisatleastsomewhateffectiveatreducingcrime,thesuccessoftheCCTVinitiativecomesfromthedocumentedincreaseinthepublic’ssenseofsecurity(Lai2007).Thisperceivedeffectivenessalsoseemstobetherootthepoliticalagendaininducinginthepublicafeelingthatsomethingisbeingdoneaboutcrime(Norris,McCahillandWood2004).However,whatiscriticaltoademocraticsocietyistheneedforrestrictionsandlimitationstobesecurelyinplacewhenitcomestoanytypeofsocialmonitoringdevice.Thesethingsshouldbe

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accomplishedpriortotheimplementationofcamerasurveillance,andnottheotherwayaround.ConclusionAnalysisoftheGPDsurveyresultsprovidesthecriticalmeansforunderstandingpublicattitudestocamerasurveillanceinCanada.Forknowledgeofcamerasurveillance,demographicvariablesrevealedsomedifferencesbyregion,whereBritishColumbiansclaimedthemostknowledgeandQuebecclaimedtoknowtheleast.Genderalsoplayedaninterestingroleinrespectstoactingasanindicatorofknowledgeofcamerasurveillancewithwomenclaimingtohaveconsiderablylessknowledgeonthematter.Whileage,ethnicity,andeducationwerealsoexplored,thesevariableshadveryminimalimpactontheresults.Withrespectstotheperceivedeffectivenessofcamerasurveillance,alargemajorityofcitizensareoftheopinionthatcamerasurveillanceisaneffectivewaytoreducecrime.Withsuchastrongmajorityinagreement,littledemographicvariationcouldbeascertained.Whentheresultstotheeffectivenessquestionswerecross‐tabulatedwithotherquestionsinthesurveyhowever,somerelationshipscouldbedetermined.Itwasfoundthatthosewithahighleveloftrustinthegovernmentwerealsomorelikelytothinkcommunitycamerasurveillancetobehighlyeffective.Similarly,thosewithahighdegreeoftrustinprivatecompaniesweremorelikelytobelievein‐storecamerasurveillancewasahighlyeffectivemeansofcrimereduction.WithrespectstoallthreeGPDquestionsdirectlyrelatingtocamerasurveillance,CanadawasshowntodivergethemostgreatlyfromBrazil,HungaryandMexico(whowerethemostlikelytoclaimbothknowledgeablityandthegreatesteffectiveness)anddemonstratedansweringpatternsthemostsimilartoFrance,SpainandtheUnitedStates(whowerethemostconservativeintheirclaimsofknowledgeabilityandeffectiveness).Additionalavenuesofresearchindicatethatthepictureisnotasstraightforwardasthenumbersportrayhowever.Furtherresearchintotheattitudesofcitizensinregardstobeingpersonallyaffected(ornot)bypubliccamerasurveillancesystemswillhelptoascertainamorenuancedunderstandingofthepictureinatimewhencamerasurveillanceisfastbecomingapredominantmethodofsocialmonitoring.

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TheSurveillanceLegacy:WhatHappenstoVancouver’sCameraSurveillanceSystemsAfterthe2010Olympics?LauraHueyPreviousresearchonproposalstoinstallpubliccamerasurveillancesystemsinVancouverrevealsthissiteasacontestedspaceinthepoliticsofsurveillance(Haggertyetal.2008).Attemptsbypolicetoimplementclosedcircuittelevisioncameras(CCTV)intheCity’sDowntownEastside(DTES)weresuccessfullyresistedbyresidentsandlocalactivistsin1999and2001.In2005thefocusofpoliceeffortsshifted,andtheCity’sGranvilleMallEntertainmentDistrictwasproposedasapotentialalternativesite.Politically,theMallisinmanywaysanideallocationforimplementingaCCTVsystemthatmightotherwisebecontroversial.Thespaceisconcentratedwithliquorlicenseseatsthatcontributetohighratesofcrimeanddisorder,anditisinhabitedbyshoppersduringthedayandclub‐goersatnight,thusthereisnoonecommunitythatwouldbesufficientlyaffectedbypoliceoversighttoengendervocalopposition.AlthoughthepoliceplanfortheEntertainmentDistrictproceededtoanearlydevelopmentstage,by2008ithadbeenquietlyshelvedwithnopublicexplanationsprovided.Onthesurface,thisactionseemedtomakelittlesense;withcrimeanddisorderratesspirallingupwardsontheMall,thepoliceappearedtohaveanexcellent‘testcase’fortheimplementationofapublicsurveillancesystem.Warylocalactivistsfearedthatalthoughthepoliceplanappearedtohavebeenabandoned,thatitwouldberesurrectedunderadifferentguiseintheverynearfuture.Indeed,withthe2010OlympicsinVancouverlooming,theypredictedthatthepolicewouldusetheGamesastheperfectvehicleforimplementingacamerasurviellancenetworkthroughouttheCity’sstreetsthatwouldcontinuetooperatelongaftertheOlympicswereover.Suchapredictionisnotwithoutmerit;astheexamplesofAthens,SydneyandTorinosuggest,securityinfrastructure–includingsystemsforenhancedelectronicmonitoringofcitizens–isoneofthemany‘legacies’ofhostinganOlympicgames(BoyleandHaggerty2009;Samatas2007).UsingdocumentsacquiredthroughprovincialandfederalFreedomofInformationlegislationandinterviewswithlocalstakeholders,Iexplorethepotentialforsurveillancesystemstobeoneoftheenduringlegaciesofthe2010OlympicGames,situatingthislikelydevelopmentwithinthecontextoftheongoingbattleoverpublicsurveillanceintheCityofVancouver.Thisreportispresentedinfiveparts.First,Iprovideabriefoverviewofthemethodsusedtoacquirethedatapresentedhere.ThesectionfollowingprovidessomehistoricalcontextforunderstandingthepoliticsofpublicsurveillanceinVancouver.Thethirdsectionexaminesthe‘surveillancelegacy’ofrecentOlympicGamesinprevioushostcities.LookingattheexamplesofferedbyTorino,Athens

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andSydney61,wefindthatinadvanceoftheGames,hostcitiesviewpublicsurveillancesystems,as‘legacy’infrastructuretobeconvertedforroutinepolicingpurposesoncetheGamesareover.Inthefourthsection,Ilookattheavailableevidencetoassesswhether,ortowhatextent,itislikelythatsurveillancesystemsimplementedforthe2010Olympicswillbeconvertedintoalocalpolicingresourceformoremundane‘criminalthreats’oncetheGamesareconcluded.Thepaperconcludeswithabriefreviewofthematerialpresentedandsomefinalremarks.

MethodofInquiryMyinterestinpublicsurveillanceinVancouverbeganinearly2000inresponsetotheVancouverPoliceDepartment’s(VPD)proposaltoinstallCCTVcamerasintheCity’sDowntownEastsideneighbourhood(Haggertyetal.2008).Forthisstudy,weconductedinterviewswithproponentsoftheplan(policeandlocalbusinessinterests),aswellaswiththosearrayedagainstit(localcommunitygroups,arearesidentsandcivillibertiesorganizations).Ourresearchwastemporarilyabandonedin2001whenthepolicequietlykilledtheirplans,onlytoberesurrectedin2007followingtheannouncementthattheVPDwerelookingattheGranvilleMallEntertainmentDistrictasanalternativesite(Haggertyetal.2008).Itwasduringaninterviewin2007withtwolocalprivacyactiviststhatthespecterofthe2010OlympicswasfirstraisedtomeasanexplanationforwhytheVPDproposalfortheEntertainmentDistrictappearedtohavebeensetaside.ThetwoactivistssuggestedthattheVPDwasnowengagedinanelaborateshellgame,withthe2010GamesprovidinganappropriatevehicleforintroducingandmaintainingasurveillancesystemthatwouldbeotherwiseunpalatabletotheresidentsoftheCity.ItwasalsoduringthisdiscussionthatIwasfirstintroducedtotheconceptof‘legacy’cameras–surveillancesystemsaspartoftheinfrastructuretobeownedandusedbyanOlympichostcity.In2008,IdecidedtoexploretheextenttowhichtherewasanymerittotheclaimsofprivacyactiviststhatthepolicewouldusetheOlympicsasa‘trumpcard’intheongoingbattleoverpubliccamerasurveillance.Through2008andtheearlypartof2009IusedprovincialFreedomofInformation(FOI)legislationinanattempttouncoverthecurrentstateoftheVPDEntertainmentDistrictproposalandanypost‐OlympicsplansforsurveillancecamerasinstalledinVancouverforthe2010Games.FederalAccesstoInformation(ATI)legislationwasusedtomakeasimilarquerytotheRoyalCanadianMountedPolice(RCMP),whoarecoordinatingsecurityfortheeventwithprovincialandcivicofficials.ArequestforinformationwasalsofiledwithcityofficialsconcerningcivicplansforCCTVtobeusedat‘livesites’(entertainmentvenues)tobeestablishedinthedowntowncoreduringtheGames.Thisdataissupplementedbyrelevantcommentsextractedfrominterviews

61IhaveoptednottoexaminetheBeijing2008gameshere.WhileitisthecasethattheChinesegovernmentusedtheOlympicsasavehicletoimplementoneofthemostcomprehensivestate‐runsurveillancesystems,China’shumanrightsrecordandlackofcivilprotectionsdoesnotmakeitacomparableexample.

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conductedin2008foranotherstudyIconductedonpolicinginVancouver(HueyandQuirouetteforthcoming).And,tofleshouttheconceptof‘legacycameras’morefully,informationwascollectedonCCTVsurveillancesystemsusedforpreviousGames,aswellastheirpost‐Gamesuseinformerhostcities.UsingInternetsearchengines,availableonlinematerialwasgatheredfromanumberofsources,includingmediareportsandsecuritycompanypromotionalblurbs.

VancouverandthePoliticsofCameraSurveillanceIn1999theVancouverPoliceDepartmentbegandevelopingaproposaltoutilizecamerasurveillanceasameansofaddressingwhatwaspubliclyreferredtoasan‘open‐airdrugmarket’intheCity’sDowntownEastsidecommunity.TheplanproposedcalledfortheinstallationofcamerasinpublicspaceswithinandimmediatelyadjacenttotheintersectionofMainandHastings,whichwascitedas‘groundzero’fortheCity’sdrugtrade(Fredericks1999).Withitshighratesofcrime,lackoflegitimateeconomicactivityandgenerallydilapidatedphysicalcondition,theDTEShaslongbeenconsideredbymanyresidentsofVancouverasacompletelydysfunctional,ifnotentirelylawlesscommunity.In1999,theVPDofferedwhattheytooktobeanentirelyviablesolutiontotheDTES’problems:theysoughttoinstallapublicCCTVsystemconsistingofsixteendomedsurveillancecameras,toutingamongotherpotentialbenefits,thepresenceofsuchcamerasasalikelydeterrenttocrimeanddisorder(Fredericks1999).InadvanceofbringingtheirproposalforwardtotheVancouverPoliceBoard,thepoliceinstalleda‘testcamera’ontheroofofabanklocatedonacornerofMainandHastings.Oncediscovered,this‘testcamera’provedtobeapublicrelationsdisasterforthepoliceandhelpedtogalvanizelocalcommunityresistancetothelargerproposal(Haggertyetal.2008).Localresidentsandabroadarrayofcommunitygroupslaunchedavocalandultimatelysuccessfuloppositiontotheplanatcommunitymeetings,inthemediaandinrepresentationstothePoliceBoard.Thepolicehadclearlyunderestimatedtheabilityoflocalopponentstoorganizeaneffectivecounter‐movement.Inthefaceofpublicoppositiontotheplan,theVancouverPoliceBoardrecommendedthattheproposalbereturnedtotheVPDfor‘furtherstudy.’In2001,aftercommunitygroupshadbeguntohopethattheplanforapublicsurveillancesystemintheDTEShadbeenabandoned,anewproposalwasputforward.Communitygroupsandprivacyactivistsagainrallied.LikelyrealizingthattheywouldbeunabletoovercomelocaloppositiontoanyproposaltoimplementapublicsurveillancesystemintheDTES,in2005aseniorVancouverpolicecommanderwentbeforethePoliceBoardtorecommendwithdrawingtheDTESproposalinfavourofexploringthepotentialforinstallingCCTVinotherneighbourhoods.Privacyadvocatestermedthismove‘neighbourhoodshopping’,andwaitedtoseewhatstrategythepolicewouldemploynext(Haggertyetal.

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2008).Thewaitwasbrief;byfallof2006,newsemergedthattheVPDhadfoundanewneighbourhood.Throughoutthe1990stheCityofVancouver’sdowntowncoreunderwentsubstantialredevelopment.AreassuchasYaletownandGranvilleSouthbecameresidentialsiteswithhigh‐risecondominiumcomplexesandlocalamenities,whiletheCity’sGranvilleStreetpedestrianMallwaszonedasanentertainmentdistrictwithanemphasisonluringcustomersthroughthedevelopmentofanight‐timeeconomy.Inordertosupportthe‘EntertainmentDistrict’concept,VancouverCityCouncilapprovedanadditional1,000liquorlicenseseatsfortheareain1998(GordonandBarth1998).Thiswasfollowedin2003byCityCouncilapprovinganincreaseintheoperatinghoursofliquorestablishmentsintheEntertainmentDistrict.By2006,approximately25,000visitorsanightwerecongregatingalongtheGranvilleMalltovisitoneofthe5,000liquor‐licensedseatsnowconcentratedinasixblockstripoftheCity’sdowntowncore(Bohn2006).Withnight‐timepartiersconsumingquantitiesofalcoholinanumberofmulti‐seatvenuesdenselyconcentratedinasmallarea,theratesofcrimeanddisorderintheurbancorebegantoincrease.BetweenAprilandOctober2006alone,policeofficialsreportednearlyninehundred62liquorrelatedinfractions(CBCNews2006).GiventheopenlyexpressedinterestofpoliceleaderstosearchforanalternativesiteforapublicCCTVsystem,itisoflittlesurprisethatbyNovember2006itemsbeganappearinginlocalmediaabouttheVPD’sbeliefintheneedforacamerasurveillancesystemintheEntertainmentDistrict(Bohn2006;Bermingham2006;Colebourne2006).Citinganincidentinwhichapoliceofficer’slegwasbrokenduringafightontheGranvilleMall,aseniorVPDInspectorstatedthatcameraswerenecessarybecauseliquor‐fueledoffenses,includingthe“assaultingofpoliceofficersha[d]becometoocommon”(Bohn2006:B1).TheInspectorfurtheradded,“Webelievewecanreducethedisorderwehaveherewiththatkindofsystem…peoplewillchoosenottodothings,becausetheyrealizethey’rebeingmonitored”(ibid:B1).TheVPD’sthenChiefConstablewasquotedassayingthatsuchaninitiativewouldreceivewidepublicsupport:“Whatwe’rehearingisahugemajorityofpeoplearesupportiveofCCTV”(Bermingham2006:A30).InabandoningtheirplansforinstallingapublicsurveillancesystemintheDowntownEastsideinfavourofsittingcamerasthroughouttheGranvilleMallEntertainmentDistrict,theVPDwereshowinganewfoundpoliticalsavvy.Withspiralingcrimeratesinthedowntowncore,publicoutcryoveropendisorderintheMall,substantialbusinesscommunitysupportforthecamerasandnoidentifiableresidentgroupsinopposition,theEntertainmentDistrictrepresentedaperfecttestsiteforCCTV.Tolendfurthersupportforthepropositionthatpubliccamerasurveillancesystemswouldbeaviablemeansofaddressingdowntowncrimeanddisorderissues,theVPDsoughtouttheexpertiseofpolicefromtheUK,hostinga62Includingissuingoffenders310ticketsfordrunkenness,246ticketsforintoxicationinapublicplace,194forconsumingalcoholinapublicplaceand113forpublicurination(CBCNews2006).

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BritishdelegationpriortoappearingbeforethePoliceBoardwiththeirrecommendationthatanewproposalforpublicCCTVshouldbedeveloped.InNovember2006,approvalforafull‐blownstudyandsubsequentproposalforcameraswasforthcomingfromthePoliceBoard.TheVPD’sPlanningandResearchsectionweretaskedwithpreparingafinalreport,includingbudgetestimatesandimplementationtimelines,tobereceivedbythePoliceBoardforMay2007.Thedeadlinepassed,andbyJanuary2009nosuchreporthasyettobepubliclyproduced.Localprivacyactivistsbeganspeculatingthatthelooming2010OlympicGamesinVancouvermightexplainwhyVPDplanshadonceagainappearedtohavebeenabandoned.InJanuary2008,thepublicexecutionofalocalganglandfigureintheCity’sdowntowncoreledtorenewedcallsforapublicsurveillancesystem.Somewhatironically,whilepoliceinvestigatorspursuedleads,includingreviewingcamerasurveillanceimagesfromasmanyasthirtyprivatelyownedcamerasfixedatpointsatoradjacenttothesiteofthemurder,itwaslocalpoliticianswhoraisedthespecterofevenmorecameras(BaronandKeating2008;Bolan2008).Afterthekilling,VancouverCityCentreMemberforParliament,HedyFry,wasquotedinlocalmediaascallingforamulti‐prongedapproachthatwouldincludepublicCCTVcameras.AccordingtoFry,“Itcouldn’thurttohave[cameras]”(BaronandKeating2008:A1).VancouverMayorSamSullivan,headoftheCity’sPoliceBoard,advisedreportersthat“thereisdefinitelyaplacefor[publicCCTVcameras]”(ibid).TheMayor’sstatedrationalewasthatalthoughhedidnotbelievethatcameraspreventcrime(apointalsoraisedinoppositionbyprivacyadvocates),heopinedthattheirvalueliesinbeing“veryeffectiveathelpingtoprovecrimes,andtofollowuponprovidingevidenceoncrimes”(ibid.).Theinstallationofapubliccamerasystemwassomethingthatwouldbe“discussedinthefuture”,theMayoradded(ibid).Inresponse,alocalgroupopposedtopublicsurveillancecondemnedsuggestionsthatcameraswouldhavehadanydeterrenteffectinrelationtothisorothercrimes,noting:

CCTVtechnologywon’tstartrollingwhensomehidden‘gangsterradar’goesoff.Infact,whoeverwouldbesittingbehindthebanksofcameraswatchingthecitystreetswouldprobablybegluedtotheactivitiesofeverydaycitizensawholelotmorethantheyeverwouldthelikesofScarpino,orhiskillers(VPSN2008).

Notablyabsentfromthevoicesinthispublicdiscussionwerethoseoflocalpolicerepresentatives.Again,privacyandpublicspaceadvocatesintheCityreadthisabsenceasanominoussign.InOctober2008,anti‐surveillanceactivistsweredealtanotherseriousblow.TheB.C.provincialgovernmentannouncedthatitwouldprovidethecitiesofVancouverandSurreywithuptoonemilliondollarsinfundinginordertoimplementa‘pilotproject’thatwouldemployCCTVin‘highcrime’areas(Fournier2008).ThisannouncementwasmetwithconcernbytheprovincialPrivacyCommissionerwho

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wrotepubliclytotheAttorneyGeneralandtheSolicitorGeneralurgingthatthatpublicsurveillancebeemployed“not[as]acure‐all…[but]onlyasalastresort”(Loukidelis2008:2).Civillibertiesgroups,beleagueredbythepressofsomanyconcernspost‐9/11andinthebuild‐uptotheOlympics,wereleftscramblingbythisunforeseendevelopment.ItappearedthatwhethertheprovincialgovernmentdirectlyfundstheuseofcamerasinVancouver’sdowntowncore,orthecityinheritsand/orcreatesCCTVsystemsthatwouldbere‐purposedaftertheGames,theymightbelosingthebattleagainstcamerasurveillanceand,despitetheirbestefforts,theinstallationofapublicsurveillancesystemwouldbeaninevitabledevelopment.Eitherway,localprivacyactivistsremainedconvincedthattheGameswouldplayanintegralroleintheprocessbyservingasameansofintroducingthecamerasand,onceinplace,conditioningthepublictoaccepttheirpresence.

Surveillanceasa‘Legacy’ofPreviousOlympicGamesPrivacyactivists’worriesconcerningtheuseofthe2010Gamesasameansofintroducingpermanentpublicsurveillancesystemsarenotwithoutsubstance.TheexamplesofferedbyformerOlympichostcitiesstronglysuggestthatsurveillancesystemsareviewedbyOlympicorganizersandtheirsupportersasanintegralpartofthepost‐Games‘legacy’oftheOlympics.Withinthissection,Ibrieflyexaminetheinstallationandpost‐GamesuseofpublicCCTVsurveillancesystemsinthreeformerhostcities:Sydney,TorinoandAthens.Forthesummer2000OlympicGamesinSydney,Australia,organizerscontractedHoneywellSecurityandothersupplierstoinstallaCCTVsystemusingmultiplexersandtime‐lapsevideo‐recorderstocoverOlympicvenuesandidentified‘highsecurityrisks’(Honeywell2008;Pelco2008).Theirgoalwastoprovide“atotalsolutiontomonitorandreportonallactivities”(Honeywell2008).Tothisend,onehundredandtwentycameraswereinstalledattheOlympicStadium,approximatelytwohundredmorewerelocatedthroughoutotherOlympicvenues,sixtywereplacedinOlympicprecinctareasincludingwalkwaysandcarparks,fortywereinstalledinDarlingHarbour,fifty‐sixattheSydneyOperahouse,andfortyattheSydneyFerryWharf(ibid).Anadditionalfifty‐fourcameraswereplacedatelectricalsubstationsinordertopreventpossiblesabotagethatmightdisruptthegames(ibid).And,toensuresurveillancecoverageofmajortouristareasoutsideofOlympicvenues,sometwoyearspriortotheGamesfiftyCCTVcamerasweresitedthroughouttheCity’scentralbusinessdistrict(ibid).Intheirpromotionalmaterials,Honeywell(2008)proudlyboaststhattheir“buildingautomation,fireandsecuritysystems,suppliedfortheSydney2000OlympicGames,willbenefitAustraliansfordecadestocome.”And,indeed,itisandwill.InpreparingfortheGames,organizersclearlyperceivedthecontinuedpublicuseofcamerasurveillancepost‐eventasadesirableOlympic‘legacy’uponwhichtheycouldbuildanexpandedsystem.Notsurprisinglythen,oncetheSydneyGamesdrewtoaclose,many,ifnotallofthecamerasremainedinplace(CBC2008),and

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CCTVinstallationsinSydneyarecontinuingtoexpandthescopeandbreadthofsurveillancethatcitizensaresubjectto.InJanuary2008,SydneyCityCouncilapprovedtheexpenditureofanadditional$3.5milliontoupgradetheirexistingsurveillancesystem,whichconsistsofapproximately82digitalcamerasintheCity’score(CityofSydney2008).ThesurveillancesystemoriginallyimplementedforOlympicsecurityisnowusedforsignificantlymoremundanepolicingpurposes.AccordingtoapressreleasefromtheSydneyCityCouncil,theenhancedsystem“allowstheCitytohelppoliceinthedetectionandinvestigationofawidearrayofcrimesincludingalcoholrelatedcrime,anti‐socialbehaviour,stealingandotherstreetoffences”(ibid).Forthe2006WinterGamesinTorino,Italy,thefirstupgradestoexistinginfrastructurewereenhancementstoperimetersecurityattheTorinoairport.Thenewlyinstalledten‐kilometre‘SecureFence’camecompletewithCCTVcamerasalongthefenceline(SecureMarine2008).Shoulda‘shock’bedetectedorotheralarmconditionbesensed,thecameraswereprogrammedtopointinthecorrespondingdirectionandfollowtheintruder’smovements(ibid).ThesewereonlythefirstofoverfivehundredcamerasinstalledfortheGamesinTorinoandsevenotherlocationswhereOlympicvenuesweresited(IndigoVision2008).TheTorinosystemwascomplementedbyanotherfourty‐fourcamerasinstalledaspartofamorecomplextrafficmanagementsystem(CST2006).YetanotherCCTV‐basedsystemwasinstalledpriortothegamesbyHPsystemsforMetroTorino;thissystemusesfivehundredandfiftycameraslocatedontrains,intunnelsandthroughoutmetrostations(HP2008).ThehubofTorino’sOlympicCCTVsecuritymatrixwasa‘controlcenter’whereoperatorsreceivedimagestreamsfedfromtheremotelocations(IndigoVision2008).AftertheTorinoOlympics,manyofthesurveillancecamerasinstalledfortheGamesremaininoperationorwereotherwise‘repurposed’.Insomeinstancesitisclearthatdesigndecisionswithrespecttoagivensystemwereintendedtoservebothcontemporaneousandsubsequentcrimecontrolpurposes.Forinstance,duringtheimplementationoftheMetroTorinosystem,TorinoPoliceasked“iftheycouldalsoreceiveimagesfortheirowncriminalsurveillancepurposes”(HP2008).Alinkwasaddedtothepolicestationinordertopermitthepolicetobeableto“viewthesamereal‐timeimagesontheirownworkstation”(ibid).Ithasbeenargued“the2004AthensGamessetthebenchmarkfortheapplicationofsecuritytechnologyforanOlympicGames”(BoyleandHaggerty2009).Certainly,asthefirstsummerOlympicGamestobeheldafterSeptember11,2001,securityissuesrelatedtotheGameswerepredominantinorganizers’minds.Thus,bythetimetheGameswereoveronAugust30,2004,theGreekgovernmenthadspentapproximately$365millionUSDonasecuritysystemthatincludedacentralizedcommandcentreandnetworkcomprisedof67subsystemsfeaturing130fixedand5mobilecommandcenters,asecuredigitaltrunkradionetwork,biometricidentificationcards,approximately1800CCTVcamerasoperatinga24/7feed,andanoverheadsurveillanceblimpequippedwithinfraredsurveillance(Samatas2007,

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2008).Micro‐phoneequippedcamerasweresitedapproximatelyevery50meters,notonlyatOlympicvenuesbutthroughouttheAthenscitycentre.Thenetworkalsoincludedcamerasin‘hightarget’areasastheAthensairport,thecity’smetrosystem,theseaportofPiraeus,andafurther1200camerasweresitedalongnationalhighways(Samatas2008).AlthoughsecurityfortheGameswasostensiblytheprincipalconsiderationinerectingthisnetwork,itwasclearthatOlympicorganizerswerealsoconsideringpost‐Gamesuses.Forexample,Samatas(2008:348‐9)citesthenGreekMinisterofPublicOrderYiorgosVoulgarakis’justificationoftheexpenseofthesystem:“WhatmattersisthataftertheOlympicGameswewillfindourselveswithverysophisticatedsystemsthatwillallowustopoliceOlympiccitiesverywell.”IndigoVision(2008),whichsuppliedthecamerasthatranontheSiemensATMdatanetwork,alsoacknowledgedthatpost‐Gamesusewasafundamentalconsiderationfororganizers:“AswellasprovidingsecurityfortheOlympics,thesystemhadtobeinuselongaftertheOlympicflamehadbeenextinguished.BychoosinganIP‐solution,theAthensauthoritiescanbeconfidentthatthesystemwillremaininservicelongafterthe2012Olympics.”Followingthecompletionofthe2004Olympics,theGreekgovernmentappliedtotheHellenicDataProtectionAuthority(DPA)tokeepthecamerasinplacefor‘trafficmanagementpurposes’(Samatas2008).Thisextensionwasgrantedforaperiodofsixmonths;afurtherextensionpermittedtheuseofcamerasto2007(ibid).SubsequentinspectionsofthesystembyDPApersonnelfoundthatanumberofcamerasusedbypolicewerebeingoperatedincontraventionoflocation,signageandotherstatedconditions(ibid).In2005,theDPAimplementednewrulesthatseverelylimittheuseofcamerasinpublic(ibid).Despitetheserestrictions,in2006aDPAinvestigationturnedupanumberofpost‐OlympicCCTVcamerasbeingoperatedinpublicspacesillegallybyofficials,andin2007policewerefinedbytheDPAforusingCCTVcamerastomonitorstudentprotest(ibid).Astheexamplesoftheprevioushostcitiesreferencedhereillustrate,surveillanceisoneofthemanylegaciesofhostinganOlympicsGames.Indeed,eventorganizersjustifytheexpenseoferectingcamerasurveillancesystemsasnotonlynecessaryforprovidingsecurityfortheevent,butasanusefulexpenditurethatwillbenefitcitizens“fordecadestocome”(asHoneywell(2008)proclaimedofitsSydneyinstallation).Onceasurveillancesystemisinplace–asSydney,TorinoandAthensdemonstrate–itiseasilyadaptedformoremundanepurposes,suchasroutinecrimecontrolandtrafficmanagement.Indeed,ifwelookattheparticularexampleofSydney,post‐Olympics,theCitycentre’scamerashavebeenutilizedlargelytorespondtominoroffencesand/orpublicdisorderissues.

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The2010OlympicsandtheIssueof‘LegacyCameras’InrelationtothesituationinVancouver,theOlympicGamesrepresenttheworstcasescenarioforprivacyandpublicspaceadvocates:securityrequirementsatOlympicvenuesandotherlocalsitesclearlyoperateasatrumpcardinthepoliticsofsurveillanceinawaythatcrime,trafficandothersortsofargumentspitchedbypro‐surveillanceadvocatesdonot.Indeed,attemptsatlimitingtheabilityoforganizerstotakeproactivemeasurestoensurethesecurityofathletesandattendeesatthiseventwouldbewidelyseenasfoolishness,particularlyinasecurity‐consciouspost‐9/11world.Framedinthislight,surveillanceandtheattendantlossofprivacyinpublicspacesthattheOlympicswillentail,becomes,formanycitizens,anacceptable‘costofdoingbusiness.’Atpresent,activistsandthepublicalikeareunawareoftheextenttowhichtheywillbesubjecttosurveillanceduringoraftertheGames.Asofthiswriting(March2009),detailsastoOlympicsecurityarestillcloselyguardedsecrets.InApril2008mediareportsstatedthattheVancouverOlympicGamessecretariathadstoppedrecordingminutesofitsmeetings,andtheVancouverOrganizingCommitteeforthe2010Olympics(VANOC)stoppedprovidingminutesofitsmeetingstothegovernmentsecretariat,minutesthatwouldlikelybesubjecttofreedomofinformationrequests(Tromp2008).AsofNovember2008,nopublicannouncementshavebeenmadeastowhatcompanieshavebeenawardedthetenderforsurveillancesecuritytechnologyandinstallation,soeventhebrandsandmodelstobeusedareunknown.InJanuary2009,afterhavingpreviouslyconfirmedtheirparticipationona‘Privacyandthe2010Olympics’panelheldatthe10thannualPrivacyandSecurityconference,representativesfromboththeRCMPandtheVPDwithdrew.Bothorganizationscitedscheduleconflictsasthereasonfortheirrespectivewithdrawals.Ofthelittleinformationthathasbeenreleased,wedoknowthattheRCMP–theleadsecurityagencyfortheGames–intendstoinstallaCCTVnetworkconsistingofhundredsofcameraslocatedatapproximatelyonehundredOlympicvenuesandtouristsites(CBCNews2008).IthasalsobeenreportedthattheRCMPareintendingtoemploycamerasthatwillutilizefacerecognitiontechnologyinordertotrackvisitorsattheGames(Akin2008).TheOfficeoftheInformationandPrivacyCommissionerofBritishColumbiarevealedthattheyhadsoughtandobtainedagreementthatimagescapturedbyCCTVcamerasduringtheevent,wouldbe“availableonlytokeypeople”,althoughthenumberofindividualsdesignatedas‘key’isunknown,andassurancesregardingretentionofimagesisnotpubliclyavailable(CBCNews2008).AstowhatplansareinplacetorepurposecamerasinstalledfortheOlympics,againpoliceagenciesareprovidingfewdetails.ArequestforinformationtotheRCMPinJune2008onpotentiallegacycamerashadyettoyieldanyinformationbyFebruary2009.DuringadiscussiononJanuary21,2009withaRCMPofficeronthestatusofmyrequest,Iwasinformedthatsearchesforrelevantdocumentshadjustbeen

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completedthepreviousday.However,IcouldanticipateanothertwomonthdelaybecausethedocumentsfoundwouldhavetobevettedbytheIntegratedSecurityUnitbeforerelease.Inaninterviewwithamemberofacommunityorganizationthathadbeenactivelyopposedtopreviousattemptstoinstallpublicsurveillance,Iwasinformedthattheirowneffortsatuncoveringtheextenttowhichcameraswouldberepurposedhadalsoyieldedlittlenewinformation:

Therewillbelegacycameras,which,ofcourse,surprisesnoonewho’sthoughtaboutit.Theextentofthelegacycamerasisnotknown.WeweretoldthattheVancouverPoliceDepartmentwillcommandeerseveraldozen.WhenIwastoldthat,personally,Ilaughedoutloud.Isaid,“Well,therestmustbegoingtotheRCMPbecausethere’sashitloadmore”…so,there’salittleshellgamegoingon.

InAugust2008,IutilizedthemediumofaFreedomofInformation(FOI)requesttoquerytheVancouverPoliceDepartmentastothestatusoftheCCTVstudyfortheGranvilleEntertainmentDistrict.IalsosentaseparatequeryregardingoperationalplanstoacquirecamerasfromtheRCMPoncetheGameshadconcluded.Inparticular,whatIsoughtwasdatarelatedtotheclaimraisedbylocalprivacyactiviststhattheVPDhadquietlyshelvedtheGranvilleMallprojectinfavourofinheritinganalreadyestablishedpublicsurveillancesystem.OnSeptember8,2008,Ireceivedthefollowingreply:

IconfirmthattheVPDiscurrentlyholdingthisprojectinabeyancependingdevelopmentsofthejointOlympicorganizingCommittee.Iunderstandthatthiscommittee,comprisedofvariousstateholders[sic]includingtheRCMP,currentlyhasitsownproposalforfunding,installationanduseofCCTV.DependingonthesuccessanddegreeofimplementationofthejointOlympicorganizingCommittee,theVPDCCTVprojectmaybereinitiated(VPDInformationandPrivacyOffice2008).

WhatwasnotrevealedinthecorrespondencereceivedfromtheVPDisthefactthattheywerealsoactivelypursuinganotheravenuethroughwhichtoobtain‘legacycameras.’Internetsearchesconductedinthesummerof2008revealedthattheCityofVancouverhasalsoreleasedplanstoutilizeCCTVinpublicspacesduringtheOlympics.Cityofficials’planscalledfortheestablishmentof‘livesites’inthecitycentre–publicgatheringandentertainmentspaces–withinwhichtheywouldutilizebagsearches,magneticscannersandvideosurveillanceforareasecurity(mapsoftheproposed‘livesites’canbelocatedintheAppendix).Theproposedcamerasurveillancecomponent,ifimplemented,wouldconsistof24‐hourCCTVsurveillancewithineachdesignatedlivesite,behindentertainmentstagesand“ofthestreetssurroundingthelive‐sites”(Lowe2007:6).CityofVancouverreportsrevealthatthe‘livesites’willbelocatedatGeorgiaStreetandattheDavidLamPark(Lowe2007;Rudberg2008).TheGeorgiaStreet‘livesite’willencompasssome80,800squarefeetofpublicspaceinthedowntowncore,allofittobeunderthegazeofCCTVcameras(Rudberg2008).TheDavidLam‘livesite’willconsistofa

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further100,400squarefeetofpublicspacesubjecttoa“securityoverlay”,includingcamerasurveillance,“deployedtomonitorattendees”(Rudberg2008:4).AFOIrequestwassenttocivicofficialsinAugust2008askingforfurtherdetailsastoanypotential‘legacy’plansforproposed‘livesite’cameras.InJanuary2009thisrequestyieldedconfirmationofthefactthattheCityandtheVancouverPoliceDepartmentareintendingtoinstallcamerasintheCity’sdowntownthatwouldhave“potentiallegacycomponents–post2010”(VPDofficialscitedinCityofVancouver2009).Includedinreleaseddocumentswerebothemailcorrespondenceandmeetingminutesthatindicatepoliceconcernsoverbudgetaryandtechnicalspecificationsnecessaryforensuringtheoperationof“CCTVcamerasfortheGamesandbeyond”(ibid).TheminutesofameetingonOlympicssecurityat‘livesites’onFebruary11,2008notethattheVPDhasaskedforfundingonpublicdomaincamerasandmonitoringthathasnotyetmaterialized,but…[withOlympicsfunding]themonitoring[ifdoneattheEmergencyOperationsCentre(EOC)site],shoulditbecomeareality,mayworkforbothLiveCitysitesandforVPDingeneral”(ibid.).SubsequentminutesfromaJuly10,2008meetingstatethatitisthepositionoftheEOCthatthe“biggestlegacy”ofplanstocreateacentrallymonitoredCCTVsystematthedowntown‘livesites’is“asolidcontrolroom/monitoringhubatEOCforpost2010needs”(ibid).Inshort,itistheintentionofpolice,civicplannersandOlympicofficialstomakesurethatCCTVisoneoftheenduringlegaciesofthe2010OlympicGames.PrivacyadvocatesrightlyworrythatoncesurveillancecamerasareoperationalinpublicspacesduringtheOlympics,itwillbeextremelydifficultforthoseopposedtocountertheircontinuedusageforotherpurposespost‐Games.Indeed,asoneprivacyadvocateexplained,“we’regonnahavetofight[thecameras]onthebackend,whichistheworstpossiblefightyoucanhave.”Battlingcamerasurveillancepost‐Gamesrepresents‘theworstpossiblefight’foranti‐surveillanceactivistsforseveralreasons.First,thereareeconomicargumentsinsupportofretaininganoperationalsystem.Havingalreadypaidforequipmentandinstallation,itbecomessignificantlyeasiertoconvinceCanadiantaxpayerstotoleratetheircontinueduseonthegroundthatdismantlingthesystemwouldrepresentwaste.Asonefrustratedprivacyactivistexclaimed,“it’sadonedeal.Andwhatareyousuggesting?Weshouldwasteallthismoneywe’vealreadyspentthatbelongstotaxpayers?…sinceyou’vespentthemoney,youwantthesecurity.”Second,activistsareconcernedthatoncecamerasareinplace,citizenswillhavecometoaccepttheirpresenceandbelessconcernedabouttheimplicationsoftheircontinueduse,thusbecomingcomplicitinthefurthererosionoftheirprivacy.Athirddifficultyactivistsraisewhenfacedwiththespecteroffighting‘legacycameras’isgroundedinthelegalconceptofestoppal.Asacivilrightslawyerexplained,“you’restoppedessentiallyfrombringingacomplaintbecauseyou’veacquiescedforsolong.”WhilethesurveillancelegacyoftheOlympicsinprevioushostcitiesrightlyraisesconcernsamongprivacyandpublicspaceadvocatesthatfightingafullyoperationalcamerasurveillancesystemwillbedifficult,localhistoryisalsoillustrativehere.

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Examiningpastpoliticalfightsovercivicpoliciesthatinfringeoncivillibertiessuggeststhatonceapolicyorpracticeisinplace,itoftenremainsso.Indeed,oneprivacyactivistwrylynotedthatthisisincreasinglythecasebecausecivicofficialshavelearnedfrompreviousbattlestobypasspublicdebatethroughthesimpleexpedientofinstallinga‘test‐project’andthenannouncingitas‘successful’:

ifyouwantanythingtohappen,youavoidanypublicdiscussionofit,andyoumakeapilotproject…andthen,onceit’sadonedeal,youdon’tengageinanypublicdiscussion.Youjustannouncethatyou’renowrollingoveryourquote‐unquotesuccessfulpilotprojectintothenewprogram.

Inmanyways,theOlympicsrepresenttheabsoluteperfecttestcaseforbothcamerasurveillanceandhowtobypasspublicdebateontheimplementationofsecurityinfrastructure.

ConcludingRemarksInthebattleoverproposalstoimplementpubliccamerasurveillanceinVancouver,proponentshavebeenunsuccessfultodatebecauseoftheabilityofprivacyandpublicspaceadvocatestomounteffectivecommunityresistance.Toavoidfurtherdefeats,proponentsofpublicsurveillancehaveadaptedtheirstrategiesinordertocounterconcernsidentifiedbyresisters.First,theysoughtaneighbourhoodthatwouldlackanidentifiable‘community’capableofgeneratingresistanceandthensoughtmediaattentionforthe‘crimeproblems’policefacedinthatareaoftheCity.ThenCCTVproponentshitonwhatisseenasanearlyunassailablejustification:the2010Olympics.Ithasbeenrecentlystatedthat“securityinitiativesimplementedforanevent,whethertheybeCCTVsystems,public‐privatepolicingpartnerships,legalchanges,screeningtechnologies,orinformationaldatabases,allhavewaysofbeingre‐rationalizedforotherusesoncetheiroriginalapplicationcontexthasdisappeared”(BoyleandHaggerty2009:19‐20).Abriefexaminationofthedevelopment,implementationandsubsequentpost‐OlympicsusesofsurveillancesystemsinthreeformerOlympichostcities–Torino,SydneyandAthens–offerssupportforBoyleandHaggerty’sclaim.Astheexamplesofthesecitiessuggests,suchmega‐eventsastheOlympicsare“consciouslyleveragedasdevelopmentalopportunitiesforlong‐termsecuritylegacies,providingthejustificationandfinancesforsecurityandsurveillancesurgesthatareintendedtoleaveaninfrastructureofurbansurveillance”(ibid:25).WithrespecttoVancouver’shostingofthe2010Olympics,theGamesrepresentanear‐perfecttrumpcardintheCity’songoingbattleoverpublicsurveillance.Asanti‐surveillanceadvocatesarealltooaware,publicsecurityisviewedasnecessarytothesmoothfunctioningoflarge‐scaleevents,andpublicsupportforsuchsecurityisnotlikelytobedissuadedbyfearsastotheuseofsuchsystemspre‐,duringorpost‐event.OncepublicCCTVsystemsareinplace,itbecomesrelativelyeasyto

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justifytheircontinueduseonthegroundsthatthepublichasalreadycometoacceptthelossofprivacywithinsurveilledspacesandthattheirremovalwouldrepresentasignificantwasteoftaxpayerdollars,amongotherforeseeablearguments.Indeed,theneedforsuchjustificationsmayevenbecomemootfollowingtheintroductionof‘test’CCTVsystemsundertheprovincialgovernment’snewplansforaddressing‘crimecontrol.’Inshort,despitethebesteffortsofanti‐surveillanceadvocates,itappearsthatapermanentsystemofpublicsurveillancesysteminVancouverisaforegoneconclusion.

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CameraSurveillanceinOttawaTaxicabs:ACaseStudyKevinWalbyandAaronDoyle

Introduction:CabDrivingandCameraSurveillanceCabcamerashavebeenhighlytoutedbytaxilicensingboardsandsurveillancetechnologycompaniesasprovidinggreatersafetyfordrivers.Inthissectionofthereport,wediscusstheevidenceavailablesofarontheeffectivenessofthesecameras,discusssomeexploratoryinterviewswithdriversaboutthepotentialcostsandbenefitsofthecamerasandalsoexamineanexampleoftheprocessbywhichcabcamerashavecometobeimplemented(inthecityofOttawa).Wehavetwokeyconclusions:first,theevidenceabouttheeffectivenessaboutthecamerasislimitedatthistime.Second,itisimportanttoensureathoroughprocessofconsultationtakesplaceamongkeystakeholdersbeforeimplementingcabcameras.Accordingto2006figuresfromStatisticsCanada,thereare47,185Canadianswhoworkinthetaxi,limousineandchauffeurindustry.Morethan38,000ofthesepeopledrivetaxi.Whilethepublicmaythinkoftaxiworkassimplydrivingaroundinacarallday,itisoneofthemostriskyoccupationsforcriminalvictimization.Driversarehighlyvulnerabletoassaultandrobberyastheyareawkwardlyimmobileinthefrontseatofthetaxiwiththeirbacktothepassengers.Whenmakingdecisionsaboutwhomtopickup,driversmustquicklyassesspassengersbytheirtrustworthiness(HamillandGambetta2006;Toiskallio1998).Thedrivermustevaluatewhatthepassengersaysanddoesbasedonwhetherthesewordsandgesturessignalapersonwhoisrisky(GambettaandHamill2005).Pickingupa‘badfare’canresultinviolenceorevendeath.AstudybyStenning(1996)foundCanadiantaxidriversarevictimizedtwentytimesmorethantheaveragecitizen.Taxidriversfaceoccupationalhomicideataratefourtimeshigherthanpolice.EightyfivepercentofdriversinStenning’sstudyhadexperiencedsomeformofvictimizationotherthanfarejumping63.Onethirdhadbeenrobbed.Fifteenpercentreportaweaponbeingusedagainstthem.Gilbert’s(2005)researchontaxidrivingintheUSAsuggeststheoccupationalhomicideratefortaxidriversisactuallysixtimeshigherthanthatofpolice.OnereportfromtheNationalInstituteofOccupationalSafetyandHealth(1996)suggeststhattaxidriversintheUSAfaceanoccupationalhomicideratesixtytimeshigherthanthenationalaverage.Elzinga(1996)foundsimilarpatternsintheNetherlands,showingthatlikelihoodofvictimizationfortaxidriversincreaseswithcitysizeandfrequencyofnightshiftwork.Manyfactorsexplainthesehighlevelsofdrivervictimization:forexample,workingalone,workinginaconfinedspacedealingwithacontinualturnoverofstrangers,handlingcash,pressuretopickupfarestocovercosts,havingtodrivepassengerstodimlylitandoutoftheway

63“Farejumping”referstowhenacustomertakesaridebutthenfleesthecabwithoutpaying.

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places,andworkingatnight.Seventyfivepercentoftaxihomicidesoccuratnight(Knestaunt1997).Ninetyfivepercentofrobberiesandeightyninepercentofassaultsoccuratnight(SeattleTaxiReport2004).Itisdifficulttoknowwhetherthesefiguresaredeflatedsincepolicedonotalwaysidentifyvictimsascabdrivers.Sometimestwoormorecrimesarerecordedunderonecategory.Taxidriversdonotoftenreportvictimizationbecausetheyfeelthepolicewilldonothing.Thetimeittakestofileacomplaintistimeofftheroad,whichmeanslessincome.Mostexistingresearchregardingtaxidrivervictimization,however,wasconductedbeforesurveillancecamerasbecamecommonplaceintaxis.IncabseverywherefromLittleRocktoSanFrancisco,fromWinnipegtoNewYork,industryrepresentativesarepursuingcabcameraswiththeideaoftryingtoprovidesafetytodriversandsecuritytocustomers.Thesecamerasrecordaseriesofimages,usuallyonepersecond,whichareaccessibleafteranincident.InNorthAmericancities,camerashavebeenusedincabssince1997.HavingsurveillancecamerasintaxicabsisnotonlyaNorthAmericantrend–cameraswereinstalledinBeijingtaxisbeforethe2008summerOlympics.Somecitiesstartoutpermittingbutnotmandatingcabcameras;othersadoptcamerasforthewholefleetstraightaway,makingthemmandatoryforalllicensedtaxis.Somecabcompanyownersadoptcamerastoattractdriverstotheirfleet.Notanycamerawilldo,however.Softwaremustbecompatiblewithpolicecomputers.Hardwaremustpreventunsolicitedaccesstotheimages.Lightingcanimpacttheimagequality.Cameratechnologycompaniesthusspecializeinprovidingnotjustthetechnologybutthetrainingforinstallation,thesoftware,thesignage,andmore.

CabCameraUsageinCanadaCabcamerasareoperationalorbeingpursuedinmanyCanadiancities.InFebruaryof2005,VerifEyeTechnologiesinstalledsevenhundredcabcamerasinNorthDelta,BritishColumbia.TheVancouverTaxiAssociationinstalledHoneywellFareViewandVerifEyecamerasinoverfivehundredtaxisin2006.EightVancouverdrivershadbeenkilledintheprevioustwelveyears.AReporttotheMinisterofTransportationandHighways(1999)hadcalledforcabcamerasyearsearlier.AsofMarch31,2009,alltaxicabsinVictoriaandsurroundingareamusthaveacamera.ThetwolargestcabcompaniesinPrinceGeorgeusecameras,asdothetwolargestcabcompaniesinWilliamsLake.ThecameracontractsinVictoria,PrinceGeorgeandWilliamsLakearewithVerifEye.CabsinBritishColumbiaaresubjecttoprovince‐wideregulation,whereasitismorecommonelsewhereinCanadaformunicipalitiestoregulatesuchmatters.Inparticular,thishelpsexplainthewidespreadadoptionofcabcamerasintheprovinceofBritishColumbia(PassengerTransportationBoardruling2008).InSaskatoon,UnitedBluelinedecidedtomountdigitalcamerasinonehundredandfifteencabsinJuly2008.GaryDickson,Saskatchewan’sInformationandPrivacyCommissioner,questionedtheinitiative.AccordingtotheCityTreasurer’soffice,

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therewerenocabcamerasinSaskatoonasofMarch2009.Therehasbeendiscussionregardingwhethershieldsbetweenthedriverandthepassengershouldbemandatory‐ithasbeenlefttoindividualcabownerstodecide.InJanuary2008,cabdriversinEdmontonfacedpubliccomplaints(Diotee2008)regardingpoorserviceandnotbeingontheroadenoughatnight.Edmontontaxi‐driverssaidmoreofthemwouldbeworkingifcamerasand/orshieldswereinstalledforprotection(Ruttan2008).TheEdmontoncabcommissionconsideredmakingshieldsandcamerasmandatoryin2005butfacedresistancefromcabofficialsconcerningcostofinstallation.Driversalsobelievedthecameraswoulddolittleinthecaseofaseriousattack:“Camerasarenotgoingtostopourheadsfrombeingblownaway,”saidonedriver(Landry2008).TheChiefLiveryOfficerfortheCityofEdmonton,whomakesdecisionsaboutcertainkindsofpropertyrelatedtotravel,saidthat,asofMarch2009,cabcamerasinEdmontontaxisarepermittedbutnotmandated.ThereareonlyaboutfifteencamerasinEdmonton’sfleetofapproximatelytwelvehundredregulartaxicabs.Allthirty‐fiveofEdmonton’sAccessibleTaxivehicleshavemandatedoperationaldigitalvideorecordingdevices.Therehavebeennoinstanceswherethecameraimageswereusedtohelpsolveacrimeorsimilarincident.TheCityofEdmontonpassedaregulationmakingitmandatorytohavesafetyshieldsinstalledinalltaxisbytheendofMay2009.CabsinMississauga,OntarioweremandatedtoinstallcamerasasofOctober2005.WhileVerifeyeTechnologiesinstalledsixhundredtwentycameras,aboutfifteenoperatorsoptedfortheHoneywellFairviewcameras.Thecostatthattimewas$850perunit.TheCityofMississaugaiscurrentlyretrainingalldriversforrobberyprevention.InLondon,Ontario,theCityCouncil’senvironmentandtransportationcommitteeacceptedaproposaltomakecabcamerasmandatoryon11December2007.“It’sagooddayforcabbiesinLondon,”saidcouncilorStevenOrser,aformertaxidriver,and“it’sabaddayforthecriminalsthatwanttorobcabs”(Maloney2007).London’sTaxicab&LimousineLicensingby‐lawL‐126‐256statedthateachcabmustbeequippedwithafullyoperationalsecuritycamerasatisfactorytotheCityClerkby31October2009.AccesstotheinformationfromthecamerawillbelimitedtotheLondonPoliceServiceforlawenforcementpurposes.However,atpresent,nocameratechnologyhasbeenapproved,andnocontracthasbeenstruck,becausetheCityofLondoniswithoutamanageroflicensing.CabcamerashavealsobeenconsideredmanytimesinHalifax,NovaScotia.TheHalifaxRegionalMunicipality,TaxiandLimousineAdvisoryCommitteeconsultedwithJerryKozubaloftheManitobaTaxicabBoardinMarchof2006aboutsafetyandsurveillanceissues,Mr.KozubalbeingoneoftheforemostproponentsofcabcamerasinCanada(seebelowregardingtheWinnipegcase).Inthewinterof2006theHalifaxTaxiandLimousineAdvisoryCommitteerequestedMr.GaryJollymore,memberoftheHalifaxTaxiDriversAssociation,toconductasurveyregardingcamerasandshieldsintaxicabs.Twohundredfourteentaxidriversresponded.Driverssuggestedtheydidnotwantcamerasorshieldstobemademandatory,butwouldlikefinancialassistancetocoverthecostofthesafetyequipment/installationifadriverdiddecidetoinstallashieldorcamera(Halifaxregionalmunicipality,taxi

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andlimousineadvisorycommitteeminutes,May112006).AsofMarch2009,themovetointroducecabcameraswasstillstalledinHalifax.TheCityofMonctoninNewBrunswickhasalsoconsideredcabcameras,butthereisnoplanneddateforinstallation.

ClaimsAboutCabCamerasThereisalackofindependentresearchconcerningcabcamerasurveillance.Yetthereisnoshortageofreportsproducedbytaxilicensingboardsandcameratechnologycompaniesregardingthepurportedefficacyofcamerasinreducingtaxidrivervictimization.Therearethreemajorclaimsaboutcabcamerasmadebythecompaniesthatsellthem.Thefirstclaimisthatcamerasareusefulbeforeanypotentialincident,asadeterrent.Thesecondclaimisthatcamerasareusefulduringanincident–thedrivercanpointoutthecameratotheassailant.Thethirdclaimisthatcamerasareusefulafteranincident,inapprehendingandprosecutingattackersandthieves.Thoughtherehasneverbeenadefinitivestudypublished,manyclaimshavebeenmadeaboutthedeterrenceeffectthatcabcamerascanhave.OnesetoffiguresconcerningreductionofvictimizationduetocabcamerascomefromWinnipeg,Manitoba.ThemurderofdriverPritamDeolon17July2001ledtoacampaigntomakeshieldsandcamerasmandatory.WinnipegPoliceServicecrimestatisticsindicatethatthereweretwentyfewerreportedtaxicabrobberiesin2002comparedto2001–areductionofseventyonepercent.WinnipegPoliceServicecrimestatisticsfor2003indicateafurthereightpercentreductionintaxicabrobberies.Meanwhile,during2003,reportedcrimeinWinnipegactuallyincreasedbytenpercent:“althoughcrimeingeneralhasincreasedinWinnipegandothermajorcitiesinCanada,taxicabcrimeandtaxicabdriverriskhasbeenreducedsignificantlyduetotheuseofthein‐cabcamera”(HarriesandKozubal2004).Winnipegpolicealsoreportedanincreaseinarrestrateswithrespecttotaxicabrobberiesandassaults,thearrestratebeingthirtyfivepercentin2001andsixtysixpercentin2003,aftercamerainstallation.OvereightysixpercentofWinnipegtaxicabdriversreportedinasurveythattheyfeltmuchsaferbecauseofthecabcamera.TheManitobaOmbudsmanfoundthecamerasandpoliceprotocolforaccessingstoredinformationdidnotviolateprivacylegislation.Whileviolenceagainstcabdriversisarealityinallcities,notallcabdriversfavourcamerainstallation.Driverssaytheycanstillberobbedoutsidethecaroratthedriver’swindowinthecamera’sblindspot.TheCabDriversWelfareAssociationofHamiltonformedinJanuaryof2008underthebanner‘shieldsnotcameras’,referringtoplasticpartitionsthatcanbeusedtopreventattacks.Thoughshieldspreventthrough‐the‐seatstabbings,passengerscanstillreacharoundtheshieldunlessitisafullpartition.Butthefullpartitionpreventsdriversfromcommunicatingwithpassengers;shieldswererejectedforthisreasoninVancouverbecausedriversarguedsuchpartitionsarenot“touristfriendly”(SeattleTaxi

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Report2004)andlimittheabilityofdriverstoearnthetips,whichareakeypartoftheirincome.AnintensedebateaboutthebenefitsanddrawbacksofcabcamerasplayedoutinWindsor,Ontario,inthesummerof2008,withtheWindsorLicensingCommissionarguingthatcameraspreventviolentattacksandindependentcabdriversarguinginsteadthatcameraswouldincreasejobstressinvariousways.AWindsorcabdriversaidhewouldresistcamerainstallation:“I’mnotputtingonein…Ifsomeoneisgoingtoattackmeorrobme,thecamerajustgivesthemanotherjobtodo‐‐getridofthecamera”(Puzic2008).Whileitisanopenquestionwhethercabcustomerspreferoropposethecameras,onesurveybyHempelandTöpfer(2004)inNorwayfoundthatfortysevenpercentofOslotaxipassengersthoughtcamerasurveillancewasagoodthing,whiletwentyfivepercentwereneutralandtwentyeightpercentthoughtitwasabadthing.Publicopinionconcerningwhethercamerasurveillanceisagoodorbadthinginaparticularspacemaydependonhowmuchprivacyisexpectedinthatspacetobeginwith.Cabcameracompaniesworkhardatsellingsurveillancetechnologytomunicipalitiesandtaxilicensingboards.Forexample,VerifEye,responsibleforcamerasinover45,000taxisinseventycitiesandtwentycountries,isaskilledmarketerofitscameras.VerifEyeisgoodatsellingtheideaofsurveillanceasnecessity,andisthecompanythatprovidedthecamerasforcabsinOttawa.BelowwediscusstheprocessofimplementingthecamerasinOttawaasitofferssomeinsightsconcerningwhatconstitutesathoroughconsultationprocess.Studiesshowtaxidriversareatightlyknitgroupandtaxiworkinvolvesahighlevelofworkersolidarity(Hoffman2006;Mathew2005).Thissolidarityamongstcabdriversemergedfront‐and‐centerindebatesconcerningsurveillancecamerasinOttawacabs.In2007‐2008,theCityofOttawaproposedtoinstallcamerasinOttawataxis,atthedrivers’expense.Taxidriversrefusedinstallation,andstagedprotestsatCityHalltodemonstratetheirfrustration.Didthedriversfeelthecameraswouldviolatetheirprivacyortheprivacyoftheircustomers?Notso.Infact,varioustaxidriverunionsinOttawahadbeencallingforcamerassince1997.CabdriversinOttawaarenotoverwhelminglyfororagainstcamerasurveillanceintheirvehicles.Somecabdriverswespoketodescribethecamerasasuseless(eg.‘real’thievesknowhowtofindtheblindspots)whileotherdriversarguethatcamerasprotectthemagainstclaimsbypassengersregardingsexualassault.TheOttawacabcameraprotestsinsteaderuptedsimplyovertheprocessthroughwhichtheparticularcameraswereselectedandpurchased.Itseemsfromthisexamplethatworkerperceptionsofautonomy,controloverworkconditionsandcontroloverdecision‐makingabouttechnologyiskeyinsuchsituations.Inotherwords,itisveryimportanttoconsultadequatelywiththedriversbeforeanydecisionismadewithregardtoimplementingcamerasurveillanceintaxicabs.Atthispointweshouldexplainhowwegatheredourinformation.Weinterviewed31femaleandmaletaxidriversinOttawa,aswellasTorontoandWinnipegaspart

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ofalargerresearchprojectonriskandwork.TwelveofthedriverswerefromOttawa,fourofthedriverswerefromToronto,andfifteenofthedriverswerefromWinnipeg.Sixteenofthedriversweremale,andfifteenofthedriverswerewomen.Ourinterviewsfeatureaveryhighproportionofwomencabdrivers,aswomenconstitutelessthanfivepercentofthetotalnumberoftaxidriversinNorthAmerica,butwewereinterestedintheirexperienceinparticularaspartofthelargerstudy.However,astheconcernissometimesexpressedthattaxidrivingisparticularlyunsafeforwomen,itmaybeappropriatetopayparticularattentiontotheviewsofwomendriversinastudyofataxisecuritymeasure.Nevertheless,becauseofthenatureofthesample,ourinterviewsshouldthusbetreatedasexploratory,ratherthanasasurveyrepresentingtheviewsofalldrivers.InOttawa,intervieweeswerecontactedthroughthetaxiunionaswellasthroughalocaleaterywheremanyofthemaledriverseatlunch.InWinnipeg,theintervieweeswerecontactedthroughthetaxilicensingboard.Interviewstypicallylastedbetween40‐70minutes.Taxidriversareatoughgrouptointerviewgiventhattimeofftheroadcoststhemmoney.ThefirstauthorattendedtwodaysofprotestbytaxidriversatOttawaCityHallinFebruaryof2008andmadefieldnotes.Wehavealsocollectednewspaperarticlesconcerningtaxidriversandvictimizationaswellascabsandcamerasurveillance.Finally,withamoreacutefocusontheOttawacase,wefiledanaccesstoinformationrequestwiththeCityofOttawaconcerningtheircorrespondencewiththeVerifEyecabcameracompany.SeveraloftherequesteddocumentswereredactedundertheMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyActforthefollowingreasons:“prejudicessignificantlythecompetitivepositionorinterferessignificantlywithcontractualorothernegotiationsofaperson,groupofpersons,ororganization;couldreasonablybeexpectedtobeinjurioustothefinancialinterestsoftheCity;couldreasonablybeexpectedtoprejudicetheeconomicinterestsofaninstitution,”andavarietyofotherstatedreasons.

CabDrivers’ViewsonCameraSurveillanceTaxidrivershavenumerousopinionswhenitcomestocabcameras.Anumberofdriverssaytheyusethecamerastodetercustomersfromengaginginrowdybehaviour.Discussingtacticssheusestomanagecustomerbehaviour,afemaletaxidriverfromOttawasaid“theyoungergeneration,theywouldask,‘Isthatacamera?’AndIwouldsay,‘Whatdoyouthink?’Justtokeepthemontheirguard”.Thecamerasaresometimesusedasatoolfortaxidriversinotherways.CommentingontheprevalenceoffarejumpingandrobberyinWinnipeg,afemaletaxidriverfromthatcityfelt“sincewegotthecameras,peopledon’tstiffmeanymorelike,youknow,ridewithoutpaying”.Cameraswerepreferredovershieldsbymostpeopleintheindustry,thedriverssaid,sinceshieldsdonotprovidemuchprotectionanddecreasetheabilityofthedriverstokeepaneyeonthecustomerorengagetheminconversation.Whilesomedriversfeelthecameraisadeterrent,othersfeelitisonlyusefulforestablishingalistofsuspectsincaseofassaultorrobbery.“Shieldsdon’t

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reallydonothingandtheyneverreallywilldoanything.Ithinkthecamerawasthebestinstrument…ifsomething’sgoingtohappenit’sstillgoingtohappen,butatleasttheoddsarethatthey’regoingtocatchtheguys,”saidanotherfemaledriverfromWinnipeg.InMayof2006,forinstance,aTorontocabdriverwasstabbedtodeathdespitethecabbeingequippedwithacamera.JonathanForder,thesuspect,waseventuallycaughtinVancouver.Notallcabcamerasareequallysophisticated.Somecamerasprovideonlygrainyimages,whileothersprovideadirect,digitalfeedtothecabcompany.The“fishbowl”perspectiveofsomecamerascandistorttheimage.Peoplewhotrytorobcabdriversmaybeawareofwaystoworkinthecamerablindspots,althoughothersmaynotunderstandthetechnology.Forexample,amaleTorontotaxidriverwhohadbeenusingcamerasinhistaxiforalmostadecadetoldusthattwothieves“sawthecameraontheinsidewindow,welltheysmasheditdownbutwhattheydon’trealizeisthat’sonlythelens.It’sdigital.Itgoesrightintoacomputerboxsoherewe’vegotpicturesofthemsmashingthecameralens”.Thissamedriverhadinstalledseveralprivatecamerasonhiscar:

ThereasonIhavetheexternalcameraisIsaidinmyownmind,ifI’mgoingtoberobbedwhereamIgoingtoberobbedfrom?I’mgoingtoberobbedfromthebackseat,usuallyfromthebackpassengersideoriftheydon’trobmefromtherethenthey’regoingtorobmefromoutside.Ifthey’regoingtorobmefromoutsidewherearetheygoingtoapproach?Theyhavetoapproachthedriverside.SowhatIdoisifI’moutatnightandsomebodyapproachesthedriverside,allIgottodoiseithermanuallyactivatethecamerabypushingabuttonorjustpushmymeteron.

Whereassometaxidriversfeelthecamerasprovidemoresafety,otherdriversfeelthecamerascannotdeterrealviolence.InthewordsofanotherfemaletaxidriverfromWinnipeg,“ifsomebodyisreallycrazyondrugsorwantstodosomethingstupidhedoesn’tcareifthecameraistakinghispicture”.Driversarealsoconcernedwiththefinancialcostsofcameras,whichareonaverageabout$1,000regardlessofthecameracompany(moredetailsonthecostofOttawacamerasarediscussedbelow).Driversalwaysendupshoulderingalargepartofthiscost.OnemaletaxidriverfromOttawa,withsixteenyearsofexperience,said:

Thecostisonyourplate,youhavenochoiceifit’smandatoryyouhavetopay,whichistoobad.Ifitwasbeingsubsidizedor…iftherewasaplanwhereyoudidn’thavetopayit,ifyouhadtopayacertainpercentageandthegovernmentorthecitywouldpayaportionthatwouldbeagoodthing,buttopayitallonyourownit’sabadthing.

Oftenthechoicetoinstallcamerasincabsisnotuptoindividualdrivers,butisamatterdecideduponbyunions,taxiregulationboards,andmunicipalgovernments,asintheOttawacase.EventhoughtheOttawataxidrivers’unionhadbeenaskingforcamerasforoveradecade,in2007theCityofOttawapursuedcameraswithoutconsultingtheunionaboutwhattechnologyandwhatsetofcostsbestsuited

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drivers.Inresponse,Ottawadriversmobilizedoppositionaroundtheissuesofaccountability,cost,andprivacy.

OttawaCabCameras:TheStorySoFarAswithothertypesofsurveillancecamerasdiscussedelsewhereinthisreport,thepushtointroducesurveillancecamerasintotaxisoftenfollowshighlypublicizedcrimes.ThefirstcallforcamerasinOttawacabscamein1997.ThreedriversfromBlueLineTaxiwererobbedintheBywardMarketlateonaSaturdaynightinJuly1997.Thedriversweregivenfakeaddresses,andafterafewblocksthesuspectsdemandedmoneyatknifepoint(Rogers1997).Driversproposedasurveillancesystemthatwouldhaveincludedsatellitetracking,apanicbuttonactivatedcamera,andanoverheadvideoscreendisplayingadvertising.Thehopewasthattheadvertisingwouldpayforthecameras.Thiswasaunion‐leddriveforcameras.Driverspreferredthisproposalovertheprovisionofsafetyshields,whichwereavailableintheircontract,sincetheseshieldspreventcommunicationwithcustomers,importantforgeneratingtips,anddonotpreventattacksfrombehind.MarcAndreWay,generalmanagerofCapitalTaxi,saidatthetimehewasskepticalofthecamerasandalsoworriedwhethercustomerswouldappreciatetheviolationofprivacy.AtthispointweshouldprovidesomebackgroundontheparticularcamerasinquestionintheOttawacase.GeraldManleyofTorontoinstalledasmallcamerainhistaxiin1997–thefirstinNorthAmerica.Oneyearlater,cameraswereinmorethan500cabsworldwideincountriesincludingtheUnitedStates,Australia,NewZealand,theUnitedKingdomandMexico.ThedeveloperofthatcabcameratechnologywastheToronto‐basedVerifEyeInc.TheVerifEyetechnologywasinnovativeinthatthecamerarequirednospooloffilm–allimageswerestoreddigitallyinasmallcontrollerunitseparatefromthecamerainsidethevehicle,downloadableuponrequest.VerifEyetechnologyincludestheTaxicamModel1000,equippedwithaninfraredilluminator,whichcanseeinthedarkevenwhenabrightlightisdirectedatit.Thecompany’scamerasareMicrosoftWindowscompatiblesotheimagescanbestoredandtransferredinstandardbitmapformat.Proprietaryimagetransferprotocolismeanttopreventunauthorizedaccess.VerifEyearguedthatsincecameraswereeverywhereelse–inbanks,cornerstores,etc.–havingcamerasincabsdidnotupsetone’sreasonableexpectationofprivacy(vanStraaten1998).Thecameracanbe‘triggered’intorecordingwhenadoorisopened,abuttonispressedorthemeterstartsrunning.ThereisalsoaG‐triggeroption,whichisasensorthattriggersthecamerawhenthecarmovesorstopsabruptly.TheG‐triggerbecamecontentiouswhentheCityofOttawaproposeditforthecity’scabsbecausedriversbelievedthistechnologycouldbeusedtospyonthemandcontroltheirwork.Eventhoughmunicipalities,licensingboardsanddriversthemselvesoftendesirecameraimplementation,theentrepreneurialdriveofVerifEyealsoseemstoplayanimportantroleintheprocess.VerifEyetakesaproactiveapproachto

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marketing,focusingonmunicipalgovernmentsandlicensingboardsthatsettaxiregulations.OnNewYear’sof2000,twotaxidriversweremurderedinToronto,andtherewasapushforcamerastobeinstalledinallcars.FollowinginthefootstepsofToronto,theOttawaBlueLinedrivers’union,Ottawa’slargesttaxicabdriversunionatthetime,calledonthecitytorequirecamerasintaxis.Stabbingsoftaxidriversin2004,inCornwall,promptedOttawa’staxidriverstopressagainforsafety/securityinitiatives,includingcameras.Atthistime,therewasanamalgamationofdisparateOttawataxiunionsintoLocal1688oftheCanadianAutoWorkersUnion.InNovember2002,TorontopoliceforthefirsttimepostedphotosfromcabcamerasontheTorontoCrimeStoppersWebsite,partoftheir“RobaCab‐YouwillbeNabbed”program.In2005,CityofOttawaofficialsandBlueLineTaxiproposedcamerasandglobalpositioningsystem(GPS)tracking.Whiledriversagreedwiththecameras,theythoughttheGPSsystemwasatacticfortheCityandthecompanytokeeptrackofthem,whichwouldbeaninvasionofdrivers’privacyaccordingtotheunion(Weeks2005a).Mr.HanifPatni,thepresidentandchiefexecutiveofCoventryConnection,Ottawa’slargestcabcompanywith1,500drivers,saidGPSwouldbeusedmainlywhendriversencounteredsometrouble.Thecostofeachcamerawasestimatedat$850,whilethecosttodriversforGPSwasestimatedatover$2,00064.Asurchargeandfareincreasewasproposedtohelptaxidriverscovertheircostsforcamerainstallation.TheCity’scommunityservicescommitteemovedforratificationon5November2005,approvingtheCity’sTaxiBy‐Law(No2005‐481).March1st2008wassetasaninstallationdeadlineforthecameras.DebatesaboutthecamerastookplaceatthesametimeEdmontontaxidriverHassanMohamudYussuf,41,wasfounddeadinthetrunkofhisYellowCabinJulyof2005(Kent2005)–agrimreminderofthedangerstaxidriversface.Callsforcamerasdonotonlycomefromtaxiunionsortaxilicensingboards.SarahMcCarthydied27November2005inOttawa,afterbeingdraggedmorethanakilometrebyataxicab.Sarahandsomeofherfamilymembershadbeendrinking,

64Atthesametimethatthetaxicabcameraswereproposed,theCityofOttawa’sby‐lawservicesdepartmentproposedacompulsorytrainingschemefornewdriversandmandatoryrefreshercoursesforexperienceddrivers.Existingdriverswouldhavetotakesensitivitytrainingeveryfiveyears.YusefAlMezel,presidentofCanadianAutoWorkers,Local1688,respondedtotheCity’sproposalbyarguingnewdrivers“willnotgetthetrainingfromacourseorgoingtoaschooltogettolearnhowtoservethepublic,orhowtodealwiththepassenger”(Weeks2005b).Olderdrivers,itwasargued,werealreadycustomerserviceprofessionalssodidnotrequirethisadditionaltrainingandassessment.Athree‐weekcourseatAlgonquinCollegeinOttawawasallthetrainingrequiredforcertification.TheCity’strainingproposalwaspartofalargerprojectofharmonizingtaxiby‐laws.Therewereinconsistentby‐lawsremainingfromtheformermunicipalitiesthatmakeuptheamalgamatedcityofOttawa(Weeks2005c).Onecontentiousissueatthistimewastheideaofcollapsingthethree‐zonetaxisystemintoasinglezone.Taxidriverswereonlylicensedtoworkinonezone,andcouldnotworkacrosszones.

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theytriedtogetintoacab,andthecabdriverdidnotfeelcomfortablewiththeconductofthepotentialcustomers.Sarahsomehowbecamestuckunderthevehicle.ThepoliceandtheCrownAttorneyjointlydeterminedthatMcCarthy’sdeathwasanaccident,andtherewasnotenoughevidencetolaychargesagainstthedriver.Demandinganinquestintoherdeath,McCarthy’sfamilyrequestedthatcamerasandGPSunitsbecomemandatoryforOttawataxis(Proudfoot2006).“ThisisnotjustforSarah,buttohelpprotectcabdriversandthewholeindustryfrombeingvictimized”saidMcCarthy’suncle.ThefamilyofSarahMcCarthycametoOttawaCityHall19April2006tourgethetaxibusinesstobringingreatersafetymeasures,includingcabcameras.McCarthy’sauntalsodemandedvisionchecks,annualcriminalrecordchecksanddrugtestingfordrivers,anddrivertraining(Dare2006).McCarthy’sparentswrotetotheOttawaCitizenandarguedfortheimportanceof“globalpositioningsystemswithanemergencycallbutton;camerasandaudiorecording;asilentflashing‘callpolice’alertinthetaxis’back,andrearsensorsonalltaxivans…Sarah’sdeathwaspreventable”(PamandSeanMcCarthy2007).ThisunfortunateaccidentprovidedafurtherimpetusforallstakeholderstopursuecabcamerasinOttawa.Inordertounderstandtheevents,itisnecessarytoexaminehowtheCitycametopurchasecamerasfromVerifEye.Beforeanycorrespondencewiththetaxiunion,twocabcameracompaniesactuallycametoOttawainthesummerof2007forequipmentdemonstrations.OneofthesewasVerifEye;theotherwasEagleEyeTechnology.TheCitysenttheinvitationforanin‐vehiclecamerademonstrationon18May2007.TheCitydecideduponVerifEyebecausethecompanyprovidedaninstallertrainingplan.VerifEyewasalertedon14September2007thattheyhadbeenawardedthecontract.VerifEyequestionedwhetherthefifteen‐dayimageretentionperiodwasnecessary,andtheCityresponded“yes”withoutexplainingthejustificationforthis.Theissueofimageretentioneventuallybecameamajorstumblingblockinnegotiationswiththetaxiunion.OrdersforonethousandonehundredandsixVerifEyecameraunitsandG‐triggerswerebeingprocessedon26October2007.TheCitywasalreadytryingtoschedulethetrainingforcamerainstallationtechnicianson6November2007.VerifEye’scamerasystemhasasetofcolouredlightsthatindicatethestatusofthecamera,sothetrainingwouldbefortechnicianswhowouldinstallthecamerasbutalsocabcompanyownerstorelaytodrivers.On22November2007,Mr.WalkerofVerifEyewroteinanemailtotheCity“experiencehastaughtusthateducatingthedriver’sonthecorrectoperationofthecamerasisveryimportant…wefindthatdriversaregenerallymorereceptivetothecamerasiftheycanbeassuredthattheimageswillonlybedownloadedintheeventofa‘seriousincident’andonlyforpurposesofacriminalinvestigation”.AllofthisindicatesthattheCityandVerifEyehadnointentionsofconductingconsultationswithOttawataxidriversasitregardsthetypeandpriceofcamera.Theapproachinsteadwastomakeadealandthenenlistsupportfromthedriversafterthefact.

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Drivers,municipalpoliticiansandotherstakeholdersseemedtobeinsupportoftheintroductionofcabcamerasinOttawain2007.“Thetaxienvironmentisaverydangerousenvironment,fordriversworkinglateatnightespecially,”saidHanifPatni,presidentandchiefexecutiveofCoventryConnections,whichoperatesBlueLineandCapitalcabs(DeRosa2007).OttawaCouncillorAlexCullensaid“I’msorrytosayithascometothis,thatthisiswhatneedstobedonetoprotecttaxicabdrivers,butitappearstobethetrendintheworldwelivein”.Daysbefore,anOttawacabdriverwasrobbedatgunpointandforcedintothetrunkofhiscab.On5July2007,acitycommitteevotedtorequireallOttawataxistohavecameras,emergencybuttons,andtheothersafetymeasuresrecommendedafteraninquestintothedeathofSarahMcCarthy(Rupert2007).Recommendationsincludedincreasedtrainingfordriversinconflictmanagement,equippingallcabswithGPS,installingemergencybuttonsthatactivatecameras,andflashersoutsidesignalinganeedforpoliceassistance.Whereasearliercameraequipmentcostestimateswerecloserto$1,000,thenewcamerasrequiredtocomplywiththerecommendationswouldreportedlycost$3,000.ThoughOttawacabdrivershadlongsoughtaftercabcameras,theyhadnotsoughttheG‐triggertechnology(whichswitchesthecamerasonandoffwithanyabruptstartsorstops)sincethistechnologyputscontrolovermonitoringmoreinthehandsoftaxicabcompanies.WiththeG‐triggertechnology,driversfelttheywouldnotknowwhentheywerebeingmonitoredsincetheywouldlackcontroloverwhenthecamerabecameoperational.ThisanimosityovertheG‐triggertechnologyandtheassociatedcostseruptedintotwodaysofprotestatCityHallinFebruaryof2008.Whenitcametimefortheby‐lawrequiringcamerastobeconsideredbyCityCouncil,almost600taxidriverscrowdedCityHalltoprotest.“I’vebeendoingthisnowforabout24yearsandIhaven’tseenourpeoplesoangrybefore,”saidMohamadAlsadi,anationalrepresentativeoftheCAWunion.“Idon’tbelieveitisaboutdriversafety,”saidMr.Alsadi,“Ibelieveitisgoingtobeusedasawitch‐huntandthey’regoingtouseittodisciplinedriversforminorinfractions”(Bird2008).Ratherthanpickingupfaresonthemorningof13February2008,manyOttawataxidriversprotestedinaconvoysnakingfromCoventryRoadtoCityHall.CoventryConnections,whichoperatesthetwolargestcabcompaniesinOttawa,supportedtheunionandtheirclaimsthatthiscabcamerasurveillancepackagewasnottheoneforOttawadrivers.PresidentandchiefexecutiveofCoventryConnectionsHanifPatniarguedthepriceofthecameraswasmoreexpensivethanpromised,andthatthesecostswouldnotbecoveredadequatelybytheproposedfareincrease.Inastatementduringthecouncilmeeting,OttawaMayorLarryO’Brienputcustomersecurityaheadofdriversafety.Thiscomment“promptedoutrageandshoutsof‘f‐‐‐you’asabout60driversfiledoutofcouncilchambersbeforethe16tosevenvoteinfavourofthecameraswastaken”(Rupert2008).O’Brien’sremarkswerecriticizedbytaxiunionleaderYusefAlMezel,whoaccusedMr.O’Brienoftreatingcabdriverslikesecond‐classcitizensduringaheatedexchangeoutsidecouncilchambers.Mr.AlMezelsaid“Wearehardworkingtaxpayers,andtheyaretreatinguslikecriminals”.Anotherreasonthattheuniondugintheirheelswasthattaxidrivershadfaced

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fortyby‐lawmodificationsbetween2004and2008,makingforwhattheysawasanundueamountofworkregulation.Thereweretwocentralissuesbehindtheprotests.First,cabdriverswereangrythattheproposedexpenseofthecameraswasgrowingwhiletheproposedfareincreaseremainedthesame.Attheprotest,Mezelshoutedtothecrowdofdrivers“Theypickedthemostexpensivecamera,andwehavetopayforit.Thisisunfair”.Inaninterview,onemaletaxidriverfromOttawasaid“theCityalwayssaidabout200‐300bucks,nowtheysay1500bucks”.Akeyproblemwasthat,aswediscussbelow,theCityhadalreadynegotiatedthetypeandcostofthecameratobeinstalledwithoutconsultingdriversaboutwhattheypreferred.Second,taxidriverswereconcernedabouttheG‐triggercomponentoftheVerifEyecamerasystem.G‐triggeractivatesthecamerawhenthedrivermakesaquickturnorstop–whichhappensallthetimeduringadayornightofdriving.Cabdriversfelttheywouldbeundersurveillancemorethantheyhadbargainedfor.Attheprotest,onedriveraddressedthecrowd:

Youseethisbluebox.ThisisaGPSenabledbox,whenyoumoveyourcar,theywillbetrackingyoureverymove,24hoursaday.Seethiscable.Welearnedaboutthisinthemeetingtoday.Thecitywantstoputthisinallyourcars.ItisaG‐trigger.WhenyoumoveyourcaritwilltriggertheGPSandthecamerasandyouwillbeundertotalsurveillance.Theywanttoputthisinyourcars.Didtheyaskyou?Didtheyaskyouifyouwanttopayforthis?Firstitisthecameras,thenthisG‐trigger,whatwillitbenext,thecars,thetires,themeter…theywanttoownitallandmakeuspayforit.[Someoneinthecrowdyells‘itlookslikeanoose’].

TaxidrivershadalsoheardrumoursthattheCityhadoriginallypurchasedthecamerasforthebuses.InNovember2007,OCTranspodidrunapilotcameraprojectintwohundredsixtyfivebuses.AccordingtooneOttawadriver,“thebusislongandtheimagewasnotclearsotheytransferred[thecameras]tothetaxis”.ThisbuscameracontractwasnotwithVerifEye,asmanyhadsuspected.65

65CityofOttawaTransitServices’plannedasixmonthtrialofevent‐triggeredsurveillancecamerasfortwohundredsixtyfivebusesinNovember2007.“Amoreviableoption”thancameraswaseventuallysettledupon,saidNancySchepersinareporttotheTransitCommittee13November2007,butnotbeforetheCityofOttawaspentatleast$250,000onaDrivecampilotprogramforsixmonths.Withexpensesforwirelessinfrastructureandtechniciantraining,thecostwascloserto$350,000.TheestimatedfullcostofequippingallOCTranspobuseswithcameraswouldbe$2.65millionplusoperatingcosts.Schepers’reportstatedthattheinitiativewaslooselyconnectedtoTransportCanada’santi‐terrorismfundinginitiativeaftertheMadridtrainbombings,thoughfundswerenotavailableatthistime.Thefundswerethusdrawnfromthe2007and2008capitalbudgets.Schepers’rationalesforthecameraswere“todetectterroristbehavior,”“interveneinotherundesirablebehavior…andavarietyofpublicordertransgressionincludingdrunkenness”.Thedocumentalsostates“cautiouspeoplemigratetoareascoveredbycameras.Theircautionandvigilancereducerisk”.

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Ottawataxidriversthreatenedtostrikeifcityofficialsdidnotrespondtotheirdemands.DriversfelttheG‐triggertechnologyremoveddrivercontroloverwhenthecamerabecameoperational.Driverswantedacamerathatbecameoperationalonlywhentheswitchwasflippedorthecardoorwasopened.Thispositionwasreachedafteranemergencyunionmeeting13February2008.“We’regoingtoaskforasimplecamerawithoutanyfeaturesthatspyonthedriver,”saidYusefAlMezel,“wewillalsoaskforthosepicturestobedownloadedonlybythepolice,andonlyiftherearecriminalcharges”(RupertandBird2008).Onecabdriverattheprotest,whohadbeenassaultedandrobbedthedaybefore,argued“thecameraisnotenoughtoprotectme”.Thepositionofthedriverswasthatthecamerashelpkeepdriverssafe,but,ifthecameraswouldbeinstalleditshouldbeontermssetbythetaxiunion.TheCitywascriticizedfornotcrackingdownonso‐called‘banditcabs,’whichwereunlicensedanduninsured66.DeputycitymanagerSteveKanellakoswasalsodealingwithclaimsthattheCityhadnotconsultedtheOntarioOfficeoftheInformation&PrivacyCommissioneraboutcameraimplementation.DuringFebruary2008,threeOttawacabdriverswererobbed.Allthreeoftherobberiesoccurredatnight.MohamadAlsadi,thenationalrepresentativefortheCanadianAutoWorkers,expressedaninterestinmeetingwithOttawaPoliceChiefVernonWhiteabouttheviolence.Whenaskedforacomment,ChiefWhiteargued“Ithinkcamerasareahugedeterrenttopeoplecommittingrobberies”(Seymour2008).Alsadimaintained“we’renotconfidentthecameraaloneisgoingtodothetrick,”citingdriverapprehensionaboutspying.LargelyleftoutofthedebatebetweentheunionandtheCitywerepublicconcernsregardingprivacyforpassengers.OneopinionpieceintheOttawaCitizendidlament“Iwouldnotwanttohaveacamerarecordingmyconversations,facialexpressionsormannerismswhileIwasridinginataxi.Itisnotonlyaninvasionofprivacyforthetaxidriverbutalsoforpassengers.Ottawacouncilmembersmighthavegiventhoughttothisissue,butinalllikelihood,theyhavetheirownagenda”(LaRocque2008).Duetopressurefromtheunion,andduetothefacttheypushedforwardwiththeVerifEyecontractbeforeconsultingthetaxiunion,theCityofOttawahadtostrikeabargainwithallstakeholdersonMay132008.TheCityagreedwithalloftheunion’sdemandsandthustheprocessresultedinsubstantialcoststotheCity.VerifEyereduceditspriceperunitto$1185.TheCityreducedthecostofthecamerastodriversfrom$1185to$700perunit,meaningtheCitywasonthehookfor$485perunit.The$700figuredoesnotaccountforequipmentmaintenanceandreplacement,absorbedbytaxidriversthemselvesovertime.TheG‐triggerwasabandoned,butthedoortrigger,taximetertrigger,andemergencybuttontriggerwereretained.Inaddition,thestoragedevicewaslimitedtooneweekworthofmemoryinsteadoftwo.TheCityagreedthatcabcamerapictureswouldonlybedownloadablebythepolice.AdditionalamendmentstotheTaxiBy‐Lawincludedatenpercentsurchargeonthedroprateof$3.30,eventhoughtheCityacknowledged66InSeptember2007,theCityofOttawadidissuefinesinonehundredandtwelve“illegaltaxi‐service”offences.

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cabswereonlyeligibleforasevenandahalfpercentsurcharge.Thetaximeterratesalsoincreasedtwocentsperkilometer.VerifEyewaspaidinfull,minusthecostsoftheG‐trigger,whichtheyabsorbed.TheCity,astheyputitinonebudgetcommuniqué,“donated”$100,000toitselftooffsettheshortfallbytakingmoniesfrom“excessprojectedrevenues”.Planstorecuperatethefundsincludedcreatinga$35surchargeonataxidriverandplateholderfees,increasingplatetransferfees,aswellasintroducingstiffertaxibrokerlicensefees($7,255forbrokershavingonehundredormorecabs).DrivershadtoinstallthecamerabeforeJuly31st2008;otherwisetheunitcostwouldbecome$750.TheCityofOttawaboastedthatitsperunitcosttotaxidriverswascheaperthaninWindsor($975),Toronto($1,200)andVancouver($1,280).Noticesconcerningthecollectionofpersonalinformationweresoonpostedinallcabs.Oncetheunionwasappeased,andthecamerashadbeenshipped,theproblemscontinued.InMay2008,Mr.WalkerofVerifEyeofferedthreefreeunitstoonecabcompanyinchargeofinstallationsotosettleanissuethecompanyhadwiththerateofpayfortechniciansresponsibleforcamerainstallation.InJuly2008,duringtheinstallationperiod,theunionbecameconcernedabouthealthproblemsassociatedwiththeinfraredcomponentofthecamera.Mr.WalkerofVerifEyestressedthattheexposurewas“1000timeslessthantheguidelines”suggestedwasharmful.ByAugust2008,itbecameapparentthateithertheinstructionsforcamerainstallationwerefaultyortheinstallerswerepoorlytrainedsincethecamerasweretriggeringwhentheyshouldnothavebeen,whatMr.WalkerofVerifEyereferredtoas“triggeringanomalies”.VerifEyehassoldcabcamerasinToronto,Seattle,Windsor,Chicago,andelsewheretheworldover.TherearemorethanthreethousandcabswithVerifEyecamerasinQueensland,Australia.ThereareovertwentythousandVerifEyecamerasinNewYorkcabs,withthisnumberexpectedtogrowtothirtyfivethousandbefore2010.Whilethecontractsarelucrative,therearemanycabcameracompetitors.Forinstance,basedinRichmond,BritishColumbia,DigitalDispatchSystemsInc.offersverysimilartechnology.DigitalDispatchclaimsthattheircamerasystem,whichcanbelinkedtoGPS,storesmoredata.Vehicleanddriveridentificationcanbeembeddedintothefile.Thereisanemergencyuploadfeaturedriverscanusetosendphotostothecompanyinreal‐time,whichcanbeforwardedontopolice(Schick2002).WhileVerifEyehasalmostidenticaltechnology,andeithercompanycanproduceasimilartechnologyoncetheotherhasintroducedit,thefieldofsellingsurveillanceisacompetitiveone.Everycontractmatterstowhetherthestart‐upsurveillancetechnologycompanywillfloporflourish.AsSkokandBairdargue(2005),emergingtechnologycanprovideacompetitiveadvantagetocabcompanyownerswhoseektoincreasethesizeoftheirfleet.Yetthereisonlyashortwindowofopportunitybetweenthetechnologybecomingeconomicallyviableandmainstream.Itisinthisshortwindowwherecabcameracompaniesaimtomaketheirmoney.

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ConclusionFewindependentstudiesexistconcerningcabcamerasandviolenceagainstdrivers.BasedonalimitednumberofinterviewswithfemaleandmaletaxidriversinthreeCanadiancities,wecanclaimthatsometaxidriversbelievethatcabcamerasdecreasetheprevalenceofrobbery,farejumping,andverbalabuse.Otherdrivers,however,feelcabcamerasdonothingbutprovideanimageofasuspectaftervictimizationoccurs.Thereareafewcaseswhere,despiteoperationalcamerasbeinginstalledinthecab,anassailantfatallyvictimizedadriverwithaknifeorgun.Thevideoimageonlyprovidedgroundsforprosecution–itdidnotkeepthedriveralive.Duetohighlevelsofworkersolidarity,taxidriversmobilizequicklyandeffectivelywhenfacedwithadecisionmadebymunicipalgovernmentthatthetaxiuniondisagreeswith.WiththecaseofcabcamerasinOttawa,taxidriverssoughttoachievetheintroductionofcamerasontermsmorefavourabletothemselves.DriversdidnotwantG‐triggertechnology.Driverswantedreducedcostsofinstallationandafareincreasethatwouldhelpcovertheexpense.Privacyofcustomerswasnotanissuepersefordrivers.Taxilicensingboardsandcabcameracompaniesalsodonotseemtothinkcabcamerasconstituteaviolationofprivacyforcustomersordrivers.Entrepreneurialcabcameracompaniesmustsellcameras,butalsotheideaofsurveillanceasacrimecontroltool,whichrequiresmakingclaimsabouttheeffectivenessofthecamerasfordeterrenceandtheusefulnessoffootageinprosecutions.However,independentstudiesthatsupporttheseclaimsarescarce.OurtworeportsfortheSurveillanceCameraAwarenessNetworkdemonstratethatcamerasandothernewsurveillancemeasurestendtobeimplementedwithoutappropriateconsultationoradequateindependentevaluation,whichisdemonstratedbythecaseofcabcameraimplementationinOttawa.OuraccesstoinformationdatademonstratethattheCityandVerifEyehadnointentionsofconsultingOttawataxidriversasitregardsthetypeandpriceofcamerabeforeadecisionwasmade.AstheOttawaexamplesuggests,itisveryimportanttoconductthoroughconsultationsandfullyinvolvestakeholderspriortodecisionstoimplementsuchcameras.

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CameraSurveillanceintheShoppingCityStéphaneLeman‐LangloisandAnne‐MariePratte

IntroductionAneverincreasingproportionofourdailyactivitiesareconductedinwhathasbeentermed“massprivate”property,ahybridspacecombiningsomeofthecharacteristicstypicalofprivatepropertyandsomeusuallyassociatedwithpublicspaces.Massprivatepropertiesmakeextensiveuseofsurveillance,andcamerasurveillanceinparticular;yetthesesurveillancepracticeshaveattractedlessattentionthanthatofpublicspaces.Inthissection,welookatsurveillancepracticeswithinalarge(200shops)modernshoppingmalllocatedindowntownMontreal.Ourobjectiveistocomparecamerasurveillancetootherformsofsurveillanceandotheractivitiestakingplaceinthe“massprivatespace”oftheshoppingcity.

MassPrivatePropertyasLifeSpaceNewsurveillanceopportunitiesandactivitiesinmassprivatepropertysettingsdonotencroachonourcapacitytoconductourdailyactivitieswithoutbeingseen.AsisthecasewithsurveillanceontheInternet,itisourdailyactivitiesthatareconductedmoreandmoreinsiteswheresurveillanceismoreintense.Thoughwecanstillmakeuseofmostpublicspaceswheresurveillanceislow,wechoosemoreandmoretogatherinshoppingmalls,indesignerprivategardensownedbyofficetoweroperators,inretailoutletlotsandother“lifestyle,”“bigbox”or“power”centres.Environmentallyandgas‐priceconsciouscitydwellersandsuburbanitesalikemayelecttoliveinprivatetownswhereapartmentbuildings,shops,restaurants,daycarecentres,parksandotherrecreationalareasmergeintoasinglelargecomplex.So‐called“gatedcommunities”areanotherexampleofthistrend.Inallthesecasessurveillanceisnotalesserevilwelearntoaccept;itisafeaturewelookfor.Inshort,whetherbychoice,byforceorbychance,moreandmoreofourlivesarebeingledinsettings–virtualandreal–wheresurveillancecapacitiesarenaturallymoredeveloped.

Theexpansionofmassprivatepropertyistheresultofourincreasingpreferenceformanaged,‘clean’and‘secure’spaces.Weenjoythesanitizedandconvenientatmosphereofthemall,wheretheweatherisentirelypredictableandthegoodsandservices—andrestrooms—wemayneedarecloseby.Newtrends,including“mallwalking”andsocialeventsandmeetings,allheldinvariousclimate‐controlledagoras,illustratethisratherwell67.Competingmallsnowaddzoos,amusementpark‐stylerides,andevencampfiresinordertodrawvisitors.

Agingpopulationscanonlyintensifythetrend,butdemographicsnotwithstandingtheriseofmassprivatepropertyalsohastodowiththeculturalbackgroundofthe“risksociety.”Intherisksociety,risksmustbeidentifiedandmanaged.Fromthe

67Formoreonthevarioustypesofvisitorsfoundinshoppingmalls,seeBlochetal,1994.

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pointofviewofvisitors,whoseeneitherthepracticalmethodologiesofsecuritynortheactualriskmanagementpracticeslocalagentsengagein,symbolsoforderbecomethekeyelementfortheirevaluationofthepremises.Fromthisviewpoint,minutelyorderedspacesappearinfinitelymorepredictable—andsafer—thanthedisorganized,irregularsocialandarchitecturalmosaicofpublicspaces68.

Inthecourseofourresearchwehavegathereddataonmanyaspectsofsurveillancepracticesinmassprivatespaces.Oneratherconventional—indeed,unavoidable—ofsuchpracticesistheuseofcamerasurveillance,whichisaveryimportantaspectofeverydaysecurityworkontheresearchsite.Nearlyeverymassprivatepropertytodayisequippedwithsurveillancecameras,formanyreasons,includingrequirementsfrominsurancecompanies,theirlowercostscomparedtohumanagentsontheground,andageneralculturaltrendtowardsthequestfortechnologicalsolutionstovarioussituationspresentedassecurityproblems.Camerasurveillanceinmassprivatespacescannotbeconceivedofasasecuritypracticealone.Itmustbelocatedinthemeshofcultural,politicalandadministrativestringsmentionedabove.Theconflictinggoalsanddemandsoncamerasurveillanceinpracticeisbestillustratedthroughadescriptionofanactualsurveillancesite.

TheResearchSite“DowntownPlaza”(apseudonym)hasamixofmajorretailers,shopsandrestaurantsonmultiplelevelstotallingalittleunder30000m2,intheheartofMontreal.Itstwolowerfloorsareconnectedtotheundergroundcity69,andtoahightrafficsubwaystation.BecauseofthiscentralpositionDowntownPlazaseesmorethan200000visitorseachday;onspecialoccasionsthenumberraisesclosetoamillion(800000duringboxingdaysales).Theplazaisalsoconnectedtoothernearbyshoppingcentresonitstwosides,andhasitsfrontentranceonbusySt.Catherinestreet.

Thisareaofthedowntowncorehaslowcrimeratesandismostlyfrequentedbyofficeworkers,touristsandshoppers.Allhousingintheareaisextremelyexpensiveandonlyavailableinluxuryhigh‐risebuildings.Beinginacentralpositionitalsodrawsmanyoutoftowntouristsandsuburbanfamilies.Inthewinteritservesasanimportantlinktotheundergroundcityandcommutersoutnumbershoppersduringrushhour.Strangelythecentreonlyopensat10h00,whichmeansthatmostshopsandrestaurantsentirelymisstheearlyrushhourtraffic,withcommuterswalkingthroughclosedshopsontheirwaytowork.

Shopsontheplazaoffergoodsandservicesinthemiddleofthepricescaleandattractyoungadultswithdisposableincome.Thesiteitselfisstructuredwithrectangularlevelsorganizedaroundawidecentralmallreachinguptoaglassroof.

68Thoughofcoursethereisatrendtowardsthemicromanagementofpublicspacesaswell,forinstancethroughbusinessimprovementdistricts;seeBewley‐Taylor,2006andHuey,2007.69Theundergroundcitycomprises32kmofcorridorsandundergroundsquareslinkingmajorbuildingsinthedowntowncore.

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Otherlevelsarevisibletovisitorswalkingneartheedgeofeachfloor.Thecentralmallalsohasescalatorsandaglasselevator.Likemostmoderncommercialspaces,DowntownPlazaisdesignedtomaximizetheproportionofthepremisesvisitorsareexposedto,inordertodrawtheirattentiontoconsumergoodsandservicesavailable.Subwayuserswhoenterthefrontdooraretakenthroughdozensofshopsandadvertisementsontheirwaytotheirtrain.

Fromthestreettheplazaadvertizesitsshoppingopportunitiesinsidebutalsoarangeofothereventsandactivitiessuchasfestivals,exhibitions,itsmorethan30restaurantsandthefactthatthesubwaysystemmaybeaccessedbywalkingthroughthemall.Walkersbyarealsoinformedthatfreewi‐fi(wirelessinternet)accessisavailableinsideandthattheymayloungeaboutandhavecoffeewhilesurfingtheweb.

PrivateSecurityandModesofSurveillanceTheownersofDowntownPlazahavecalledonaprivatesecuritycontractorforsurveillanceandordermaintenancebuthaveputoneoftheirownemployeesinchargeofsupervisingtheprovidedsecuritystaff.Underthatsystem,DowntownPlazacansetthesecuritystaffprioritiesandinterventionmethods,whileoutsidesecuritypersonnelaretaskedwithimplementation.Thisisasourceofminorfrictionsincethecorporationandthecontractsecuritystaffdonothavethesameperceptionofwhatsecurityconsistsoforhowitshouldbemaintained.WhileDowntownPlazamanagementprefersaconciliatory,low‐keyapproachtosecurityissues,manysecurityagentspreferaclearerantagonisticapproachinwhichtheirauthoritypredominates.

Ithasbeennotedelsewherethatthetypeoforderthatissoughtinmassprivatespacesisnotquitethesameasthatusuallyconceivedofinrelationtopublicspaces.Orderingpublicspacesisaccomplishedmostlythroughinformalsocialcontrolseffectedbyordinarycitizens,andbypolicewhenthisisperceivedasinadequatebyasufficientlypowerfulentityorallianceofentities(anindividual,citizengroups,police,politicians,chambersofcommerce,etc.).Itgenerallyconsistsofinformalandformalsanctioningofimmoral,dangerousordestructiveconduct.Bycontrast,inprivatespacesorderaimsatmaximizingconsumptionbehavioursandprotectingassets,acombinationthatWakefield(2005)hastermedthegovernanceofmassprivatesites,encompassingscoresofvariousmissions—amongwhichconventionalsecurity(theabsenceofdanger)isfarfromthemostimportant.

Loader(1999)hasshownthattheriseofprivatesecurityinthe1980sand1990swastheresult,amongotherfactors,ofaconsumerculturethatincreasinglypresentedsecurityasaconsumergoodbyindustrialandstateactors.Intheshoppingcity,securityisinfactoneofthethingsbeingexplicitlyofferedtovisitorsbymalloperators.ThoughthisisnotthecaseinDowntownPlaza,manymalloperatorsplacetheircontrolroominplainviewofvisitorsasaformofcorporateadvertisementthatsecurityistakenseriously—andalsoperhapsasadeterrenttowould‐betroublemakers.Todatethereisnoempiricalresearchthatmight

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enlightenusonwhetherostensiblesecurityisinfactdirectlymaterialtoconsumers’selectionofaparticularsitefortheirvariousactivities.

SecurityPersonnelStatusandFunctionsIntheDowntownPlazaorganisationalstructure,securitypersonnelhavelowstatus,roughlyonparwithmaintenancestaff.Theirpayratesreflectthis,individualagentsreceiving$13perhourofwork,comparedto$10formaintenancestaff.Maintenancepersonnel,however,benefitfromrelativelyquicksenioritypayraises,upto$15perhour.Bycomparison,themostseniormemberofthesecuritystaffatthePlazahasworkedatthissitefor20yearsandearnsoneextradollarperhour.Thislowrewardforseniorityisonereasonwhy,asiscommonintheprivatesecuritysector,mostemployeesdonotseetheircurrentworkasacareerandarenotlikelytostayverylong.Somehaveloftiergoalsofbecomingpoliceofficersandothersaresimplydiscouragedbytheextremelylimitedopportunitiesforupwardmobility.Thisproducesanextremelyhighturnoverrate,typicaloftheprivatesecurityindustry,whichinturnhasequallytypicalconsequences:1)individualsareutterlyreplaceableandthereforecontinuetoreceivelowpay;2)whateverexperienceindividualsgarnerisinevitablylosttotheorganisationasawhole;3)thereisneithersufficienttimenorfinancialincentivestotrainnewrecruitsbeyondthebasics;4)themostcapableemployeesareusuallytheonesleavingearlyforhigherstatusjobsoutside(e.g.thepolice).Interestingly,thishighturnoverratecharacterizesnotonlylowlevelemployeesbutallstaff,tothetopoftheshorthierarchicalladder:overthelast20yearsthePlaza’ssecuritychiefhaschangedeverytwoyears,onaverage.

Despite,orbecauseoftheirloworganisationalstatus,thelocalcontingentofsecurityagentsisstructuredinamilitary‐likehierarchy,completewithamilitary‐soundingrankingsystem.Theprivatesecurityfirm’stoppersononthesiteiscalleda“captain”andhas“sergeants”underhisorders.Sergeantsmake40centsmoreperhourthantheirsubordinates,whoarereferredtoaspatrolagents.Thecaptainisrarelyonsiteandalloperationaltasksareperformedbysergeantsandpatrolagentsindifferently.Byandlarge,theonlydifferenceinthedailytasksofsergeantsandagentsisthattheformerhavetheaddedresponsibilityororganizingshifts.Allwearratherstandardprivatesecuritystyleuniformsbutsergeantssportshoulderpatchesindicatingtheirfunctionas“supervisor.”

Inthisgroup,bothpolicing(usuallyintheformofacollegeeducationinpolicingprograms),andmilitarybackgroundsareunderstoodashighlyrelevantexpertiseandgreatlyimpactanindividual’ssocialstatus.Amongotherthings,higherresponsibilitiesaregivenonthebasisofthisstatusratherthanonseniorityorexperience.

RangeofActivities(Staff)Onaveragedays,thePlazaispatrolledbyatleast3securityagents,plusoneremaininginthecontrolcentre,wherehecanmonitorcamerafeedsbutalsohasothertasks.Atnightonlytwostaffremain,onedoingroundsonthefloorsandoneinthecontrolroom.Bothoftheseagentsareunderapparentsurveillance

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themselves:theoneonthefloormustfollowprogrammedroundsandreportatbarcodestationsinordertocompletehispatrols(seealsoDerby,thisreport).Thecontrolroomisitselfundervideosurveillance,acameradomeplainlyvisible,hangingfromtheceiling.Inpractice,however,littlesurveillanceofsurveillantsactuallytakesplaceanditisunclearwhetherrecordingsmadeinthecontrolroomareeverwatched,bywhomandforwhatpurpose.Sinceourobservationsshowthatcontrolroomrulesareroutinelyignored,itissafetoassumethatwhateversurveillancetakesplacedoesnothaveconcreteconsequencesforthestaff.Atthesametime,thoseengaginginforbiddenactivities(e.g.usingthecomputerforpersonalpurposes)usuallytrytopositionthemselvesastoavoidthecamera’sgazeortohidethecomputerscreen.

Physicalsurveillance,throughfootpatrols,takesplaceinthepubliclyaccessiblemall,intherestrictedareasbetweenandbehindshops,aswellasaroundalargeloadingdockalsoservingthreeotherbuildings.Agentsoncontrolroomdutyfrequentlyasktochangepositionwiththoseonfootpatrolduty,thelatterbeingperceivedaslessboringandclosertothe“action.”

CameraSurveillanceThePlazahasalittleunder100camerasinstalled,themajorityofwhicharestaticandpointedinfixeddirections,secondedbyafewmorecapablePTZcameras.Thefeedsfromthecamerasaremultiplexedtowardsahalfdozensmallvideoscreensinthecontrolroom,fouratatime,alternatingevery3seconds.SeparatemonitorsaresetupforcloseranalysisofaselectedcameraandforPTZcontrolifavailable.Theselectedimageisalsosenttothesecuritychief’soffice,shoulds/hedesiretomonitorasituation.Thefeedfromeachcameraisrecordedonharddrivesandkeptfor2weeks.Despitecontrolroomrulesforbiddingregularsecuritypersonnelfromwatchingrecordedimages,theycommonlydosoiftheyfeelitisnecessary.

Thecamerashavebeeninstalledinsidethemallinordertocovermostshopfrontentrances,elevatoraccesspoints,escalatorsandundergroundpassagestowardsotherbuildingsorthesubwaysystem.Somecamerasareaimedatthemainentrancesfromtheoutsideofthebuildingandprovideaviewofthesidewalkaroundthecity‐blockwidestructure.Yet,despitetheapparentlyextensiveuseofcameras,asubstantialproportionofthe30000m2ofthePlazaremainsoutofview,fortechnological,architecturalandmarketingreasons(largebillboardsandspecialeventmaterialshunginfrontofcameras,forinstance).PlansarebeingmadeforamoreadvancedIPsystemwithmorecamerastobeinstalledinthenearfuture.

Figure4:restroomcamera

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Everycameraishousedintheusualsemitransparentpolycarbonatedome,hidingitsangleofview.Theonlyexceptionsaretherestroomcameras(seefig.1)which,afterlitigationfrompatronswhofelttheprivacywasbeinginvaded,havebeenmadevisible(seeillustration).Thenewcamerasareplainlyvisiblefromthedooroftherestroomsandpointtothecommonareadirectlyinfrontoftheentrance.Stallsandurinalsremainoutofview.

ObjectivesAspreviouslynoted,theoverallobjectiveofmallsecurityinthePlazaisthemaintenanceofanenvironmentcapableofmaximisingconsumptionbehaviours.Thishasthreefacets.Firstandforemost,theenvironmentismadeofthe200shopsandrestaurantsthatrentspaceinthemallandwhoseindividualfrontentrancesmakeuptheoverallaestheticofthesite.Becauseclosedshops,withtheirgatesand/orshuttersdown,areunsightlyandunpleasantforvisitors,thetenants’contractsstipulatethattheymustopenandclosewiththemall’sgeneralopeninghours(10:00to21:00).Consequently,oneofthesecurityservice’smaintasksistomakesurestoreownersrespectthisruleandactuallyopenandcloseontime.At10:00andagainat21:00,camerasaretrainedonstorefrontsandverifythattenantsarecomplyingwithPlazamanagementrules.

Second,thequalityoftheenvironmentalsodependsontheoverallgoodmaintenanceofthesite,includingthefastcleanupofspillsandtheimmediateemptyingoffullgarbagebins.Animportantaspectofthevideomonitoringisthedetectionofsuchmishapsandthequickdispatchofmaintenancecrews.Duringlunchhourthe30plusrestaurantfoodcourtiscloselywatchedforoverloadedgarbagebins.

Third,theenvironmentisalsomadeupofthepeoplewhoenterthepremises.Cameramonitoringaimsatkeepingoutthreekindsofvisitors;first,therearethosewhodonotrespecttherulesofthemall,includingrowdygroups,drunksandpanhandlers.Second,categoriesofpersonswhomhavebeendeemed“unfit”tobeinthemall,suchasthehomeless,vagrantsanddrifters.Whendetected,membersofthesefirsttwokindsofvisitorsareexpelledfromthepremisesasquicklyaspossible.Manyrepeatundesirableshavehadtheirphototakenandarenowonawatchlistpostedonthewallnearthemonitoringequipment.

Thefinalcategoryismadeupofthosewhoactuallycommitcrimes,mostlyshoplifters,pickpocketsandtherareviolentaggressor.Ingeneral,ifacrimeisdetectedorreporteditmustbebroughttotheattentionofthesecuritychief,whothendetermineswhetherpoliceshouldbecalledorifexpulsionissufficient.Sometimes,policeareinvitedintothecontrolroominordertoconductspecialoperationsagainstmembersofthelastcategory.Thisisamixedblessingformanagement,whoseepoliceactionasbothpotentiallydeterrentforcriminalsbutalsorathermoreintenseandbrutalthanthelow‐keyapproachtheytendtoprefer.

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PracticeInpractice,camerasurveillanceisdilutedamongaseriesofvarioustasks,withthemajorityhavinglittletodowithsecurity—thatoftheemployeesofthemall,thevisitorsorthegoodsonsale.Inadditiontowatchingthemonitorsandthesuccessive3secondclipsofvideo,24atatime,lookingfordelinquenttenants,drunksandoverflowingbins,theagentisalsoresponsibleformanagingaloadingdockusedby4largebuildings,whichinvolvesrecordingthelicenseplatenumberofeachvehicle.Heisalsoalertedtotheuseofmanyrestrictedorprotecteddoorsinthemall,amongwhichareemergencyexitsandtheroomreservedforbreastfeedingmothers.Heisalsolikelytowriteactivityreportsandtoengageinvariousconversationswithpeopleintheroom—thoughtherulesstipulatehemustbealone.

Inreality,averagevisitorsareunlikelytobeactuallywatchedduringanyportionoftheirvisit,simplybecauseofthelimitedattentiongiventoordinarylookingpersons.Byandlarge,theseaofmiddle‐classlookingvisitorsgoesbyundifferentiatedandonlyself‐identifyingpersons,throughtheirdressorbehaviour,standoutandarewatched.Theyaresortedoutandfollowed,andeventuallyexpelledifdeemednecessary.

Thatsaid,forthemostpartcontrolroomdutiestendtogivefarmoreimportancetotheenvironmentthantothevisitorswithin.Thatis,inaway,theparadoxofmassprivatepropertysecurity:itdrawsinvisitorsbypromisingadequate,ifnotperfectsecurity,throughtechnologyandothersurveillanceactivitiesthatareinfacttargetedtoenvironmental,symbolicformsof“order”(suchascleanliness)andnotatallatsecurityrisks.Atthesametime,securityrisksareextremelylowandthevisiblesecuritymeasuresareonlyappreciatedbecausepatronshaveanexaggeratedperceptionoftheirrisk—basedinpartonthecleanlinessofthepremises.Whatisbeingproducedisatheatreofsecuritythatisasartificial,andasdisconnectedfromrealityastherestoftheshoppingcity.

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TheTransferandUseofCameraSurveillanceImages:TheCaseofCrimeStoppersRandyLippertandBlairWilkinsonThissectionexploreshowcamerasurveillanceimages70areusedbypolice‐supportedCrimeStoppersprogramsthroughacasestudyofCrimeStoppersadvertisements71inOntario.Privacyandrelatedimplicationsoftheuseofsurveillanceimagesarediscussed,inparticularthetransferofimagesfromprivatesurveillancesourcestopoliceandthentoCrimeStopperswebsiteadvertisementsand/orthevideosharingwebsite‘YouTube’72.Thissectionalsodiscusseswhobenefitsfromthetransferanduseofcamerasurveillanceimages,andwhomaybeharmedbythispractice.

CrimeStoppersProgramsCrimeStoppersisarguablythemostwell‐knownandestablishedpolice‐supportedcrimepreventionprograminCanada,theUnitedStates,andincreasinglyglobally.Theprogramnowoperatesin20countriesincludingIndia,theNetherlands,andSouthAfrica(CrimeStoppersInternational2009).InNorthAmericaeachprogramcoversaspecificgeographicalarea,suchasacityorcounty.InCanadatherearemorethanonehundredsuchprogramsandmorethanonethousandintheU.S.(CrimeStoppersInternational2009).NoothercrimepreventionprogramisasprevalentinNorthAmericancitiesandtownsthanCrimeStoppers.Symbolicofthisprogram’sprominenceandwidespreadacceptancebylocalgovernmentsandbusinesses,motoristsonmajorroadwaysenteringOntariocitiesandtownsarelikelytoencounteranearbillboard‐size‘CrimeStoppers’sign,withatollfreetelephonenumberatitsbasetoencourage‘tips’.CrimeStoppersalsohasexpandedintoprogramsspecificallydesignedforschoolchildren,campusesandseniors(Lippert2002).CrimeStopperspurportstobea“partnershipofthepublic,policeandmediathatprovidesthecommunitywithaproactiveprogramforpeopletoassistthepoliceanonymouslytosolvecrimes”(TorontoCrimeStoppers2009).Significantly,Crime

70 Weuse‘image’torefertobothCCTVvideofootageandstills.71Weuse‘advertisements’ratherthan,forexample,‘newsreleases’or‘appeals’sincethereisevidence(seeCarriereandEricson1989;Lippert2002)theirintentisoftenasmuchaboutpromotingormarketingCrimeStoppers(anditssponsors)inanattempttogenerate‘tips’generallyoraboutcertaintypesofcrime(e.g.,drug‐relatedcrime)thantogeneratetacticalinformationtosolveaparticularcrimeorcapturespecificcriminalsdepicted.Toillustratethispoint,only3ofthe130advertisementsinthisstudyclaimedasuspecthadbeenapprehended.72YouTubeappearedin2005partiallyasaresultofashiftinvideotechnologycomprisinginexpensivecamcorders(i.e.cellphonecameras)andeasiertousevideosoftwarecoupledwiththerapidproliferationoftheavailabilityofhigh‐speedInternetconnectionsanddramaticallyincreasedmemorystoragecapacity.

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Stoppersrepresentativesconsistentlyasserttheprogramisindependentofparticularpoliceservices:“Ours,likeotherprograms,isnotapoliceprogram...ItisapublicprogramthatisrunbyaBoardofDirectors.ThatisordinaryconcernedcitizenswholiveinYorkRegionandvolunteertheirtime”(CrimeStoppersofYorkRegion2009).CrimeStoppersseekstogenerateinformationaboutcrimebyadvertisingthroughvariousmediaoutletsandformats,includingradio,print,andtelevision.Thesemarketingeffortsaredesignedtoencouragepersonstoanonymouslysubmitinformation(a‘tip’)aboutcriminalactivitytoCrimeStoppers,whereitisscreenedand,ifdeemedappropriate,passedtopolice.Ifinformationisprovidedthatleadstoanarrestorseizureofpropertyorillegaldrugs,the‘tipster’isofferedamonetaryreward(Lippert2002).Fromtheinceptionoftheseprograms,advertisementshaveoftenadoptedtheformofa‘CrimeoftheWeek’.Suchformatstendtoconsistofanarrativedescribingaparticularincidentofcriminalactivity.By2000suchadvertisementswereappearingonlocalCrimeStopperswebsites(Lippert2002)and,morerecently,camerasurveillanceimages(primarily‘stills’)seemtobearegularfeaturewithinthem.CamerasurveillancefootageisalsobeingtransferredbyCrimeStopperstowebsitessuchasYouTubeforthesamepurpose.Belowisatypicalexampleoftheformer:

LockerTheftandFraudsFebruary7,2008TheOttawaPoliceServiceneedsyourhelpintheinvestigationofatheftfromalockerinanEastEndgymandthesubsequentfraudulentuseofthevictim'screditcard.OnDecember11th2007atabout1pmthevictimattendedtheNewbodyDimensionsGymlocatedat1800StLaurentBlvd.Sheenteredthewoman'slockerroomandshebegantoplaceherbelongingsinanemptylocker.Whileshewasdoingthisafemaleinthelockerroomplacedherselfdirectlybehindthevictimandbegantostareather.Thevictimfeelinguncomfortableplacedherbelongingsinthelockerandshewalkedtothemirrorstocombherhair.Againthefemalesuspectfollowedthevictimandthisledtothevictimleavingthelockerroom.Whenthevictimreturnedtoherlocker,shewasunabletoopenhercombinationlock.Afterthegymstaffcutthelockthevictimnoticedthatherpursewasmissingfromthelocker.Asubsequentpoliceinvestigationrevealedthatthefemalesuspectwasnotaregisteredmemberofthegymandthatshehadpurchasedadaypasstoworkout.Thevictim'screditcardwasusedinseveralstoresnearthegymshortlyafterthetheft.

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Surveillancevideoatthegymandinthetargetedstoresidentified3femalesuspects.Theyaredescribedas:1‐Oliveskinnedfemale(whowasinthegym),heavyset,longdarkhairtiedinabun,inhertwenties,redshortsandawhitet‐shirt.2‐Blackfemale,slim,earlytwenties,longblackwavyhairwearingagrey3/4‐lengthcoat.3‐Blackfemale,slim,earlytwenties,longblackstraighthair,darkcoat,wearingglasses.The2blackfemaleswerenotseeninthegymandaresuspectedofbeingaccomplices.ThreeImages(clickonimagesforlargerversions)Ifyouhaveanyinformationregardingthisincident,oranyothercriminalactivity,callCrimeStoppersat613‐233‐TIPSortollfreeat1‐800‐222‐8477.CrimeStoppersdoesnotsubscribetocalldisplay,wewillnotrecordyourcallandyouarenotrequiredtotestifyincourt.Ifyourinformationleadstoanarrestoracharge,youcouldqualifyforacashrewardofupto$2000

(NationalCapitalAreaCrimeStoppers,2008).

PreviousResearchDespiteitslong‐standingpresenceandexpansionsincethelate1970s,CrimeStoppershasreceivedlittleempiricalscrutiny(butseeCarriereandEricson1989;Lippert2002).Claimsofsuccess,whichareprominentlydisplayedonCrimeStopperswebsites,haveneverbeensubjectedtocarefulstudy.Thus,therehasneverbeenastudyusingcontrolstodeterminewhethertheprogramismoreeffectiveinreducingcrimethanpoliceappealstothepublicforinformationaboutanincident(seeLippert2002).Moreimportantforpresentpurposes,existingstudieslookingintoitsworkings,includingitsadvertisements,largelypredatetheincreaseduseofsurveillancecamerasbyprivateandpublicinstitutions,aswellasprivatecitizens.Givenitspopularity,CrimeStopperswillserveasaclearwindowintopolice‐relatedtransferanduseofimagesproducedbysurveillancecamerasforthepurposeofcrimereduction.Trendsandissuesidentifiedinthiscontextwillundoubtedlyhavebroaderrelevance.

MethodologyForthiscasestudywefirstexaminedthewebsitesofregionalCrimeStoppersprogramsinOntariofor‘CrimeoftheWeek’orequivalent(e.g.,‘crimefile’)

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advertisements.OnlythoseadvertisementsfromofficialOntarioCrimeStopperswebsitesfromearly2004throughearly2008thatcontainedcamerasurveillanceimages(eitherstillsorfootage)wereselected.73Thisresultedin130CrimeStoppersadvertisementscomprisingsurveillanceimagesandadjacenttextforanalysis.Wealsodrewonthe2000‐2001datasetusedbyLippert(2002)tocomparesaturationofcamerasurveillanceimagesinCrimeStoppersadvertisements.AtleasttwoOntarioCrimeStoppersprogramshavebeguntotakeadvantageofYouTubeasameansofuploadingcamerafootageandcrimere‐enactmentsas‘CrimesoftheWeek’orequivalentfordisplay.Toexplorethisrecenttrend,alltwenty‐seven(27)instancesoftheuseofsurveillancecamerafootageonYouTubefrom2007‐2008associatedwiththesetwoOntarioCrimeStoppersprogramswereselected.Keyfeaturessuchastypesofcrime,inherentcriminalmeaning,andapparentcamerasurveillancesource,wereidentifiedforboththeCrimeStopperswebsiteadvertisementsandYouTubesurveillancefootage.Theimageanalysisalsoentaileddeterminingwhetheritdisplayedpersonalinformationaboutavictim,thirdpartyorsuspect.Inthreecases,wherethesourcesoftheimageswereidentified,thenotificationarrangements(i.e.,camerasurveillancesignage)wereinvestigated.

PotentialPrivacyIssuesPotentialprivacyissuesstemmingfromtheuseandtransferofcamerasurveillanceimagesconcernsthirdpartytransferofinformation.ThisbecomessalientintheCrimeStopperscontextintwoways:(1)transferofimagesofallegedcriminalactivityheldbythirdparties(e.g.,aretailbusiness)topoliceandthesubsequenttransferofimagestoCrimeStoppersandthenYouTube;and(2)theinclusionofidentifiablethirdpartiesinimagesreleasedpubliclyinadvertisements(eitherwithcooperationofnewsmediaoranotherwebsite)onCrimeStoppersorYouTubewebsites.CrimeStoppersisanon‐profitorganizationwithcharitablestatus.Asnotedabove,CrimeStoppersclaimstobeindependentofpolicetogenerateinformationfromthoseunwillingtotestifyincourtandwhowishtoremainanonymous(seeLippert2002).Thus,thetransferofthesurveillanceimagefrompolicetoCrimeStoppersistantamounttotransfertoathirdparty.OncepostedtoaCrimeStopperswebsite,imagescanbetransferredtoanyonewithInternetaccessandaninexpensivestoragedevice(i.e.,harddrive).Theirtransferandsubsequentusesthenbecomeunlimited.Whileitcanbearguedcamerasurveillanceimagesaremoreaccuratethanmeresketchesandphysicaldescriptionsinsomecases,andthusjustifiablyusedinanattempttosolvecrimes,whereincludedinimages,thirdpartiescanalsobebetteridentifiedandinadvertentlyassociatedwithcriminalincidentsthatcouldbedetrimentaltotheirreputationsandlivelihoods.73ThesedataaredrawnfromabroaderstudyofCrimeStoppersadvertisementsthatisinprogressandencompassesprogramsinOntario,AustraliaandtheUnitedKingdom.

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Transferofsurveillancecameraimagesfromthirdpartiestopoliceislinkedtonotificationissuesbecausepotentialsubjectsofsurveillanceshouldbemadeawarethattheirpersonalinformation(i.e.,theirimage)isbeingcollected,stored,andpotentiallytransferredtopolice,CrimeStoppers,andbeyond.Althoughsection7.(1)(b)ofPIPEDAstatesthatalackofnotificationisacceptablewhenthe“collectionisreasonableforpurposesrelatedtoinvestigatingabreachofanagreementoracontraventionofthelawsofCanadaoraprovince74”thisinformationisalsogatheredandtransferredforotherendssuchasdemographicanalysis(FutureShop,2009)andCrimeStoppers’marketing(i.e.,advertisements).Furthermore,guidelinesforusingsurveillancecamerasinandbyprivateorganizationsrecentlyhavebeenmadeavailablethroughtheOfficeoftheFederalPrivacyCommissioner,oneofwhichisforaprivateorganizationtoerectsignagetocommunicatethepresenceofsurveillancecameras(OPC2008).Manybusinessesdeploycamerasurveillancesystems,butdonoterectsignsnotifyingpersonsofthepresenceandpurpose(s)ofsurveillancecameras.Althoughaminorityofbusinessesandorganizationshavesignsinplaceinformingthoseenteringofsurveillancecamerasandthepurposesforwhichpersonalinformationisbeingcollected,typicallythissignageisexceedinglyvagueandaimedonlyatdeterringcertainbehaviours.Thus,signagetypicallyattemptstocommunicatetothoseenteringthebusinesstheyarebeingwatchedshouldtheydecidetoengageintheft,robbery,orvandalism,orthatthesurveillancecamerasinplacewillpreventtheirownvictimizationwhileonthepremises.However,evensignserectedsolelytodeterbehaviourdonotprecludethepossibilitythatcustomerswhoreadthesignsassumelessertransgressions(e.g.,theftandvandalism)willbehandledby‘in‐house’securityandinformalmeasures(awarning,astoreban)andnotbroughttotheattentionofpoliceandCrimeStoppers.Itiswellknownthatmanyprivatebusinessesseektoavoidbadpublicityassociatedwitharrestingandprosecutingcustomerscaughtshopliftingorengaginginvandalism.Thus,evenwhereitisinplace,itisnotself‐evidentfromsignagethatpolicewillbegivendirectaccesstocamerasurveillanceimagesasamatterofcourseorthattheseimageswilllaterbetransferredtoCrimeStoppersandYouTubewebsitesshouldanincidentdeemedtobecriminalinnature.Whereimagesofthirdpartieswerecapturedandwheretheorganizationorbusinesscouldbeidentified,notificationeffortsofthebusinessorbusinessfranchiseorchainweresought.Threehighlyrecognizablenationalchains(asupermarket,agasolinestation,andanelectronicsretailoutlet)werepresentinCrimeStoppersadvertisements.Whiletheoutletssubsequentlyexaminedwerenotthosedepicted,itisreasonabletoassumethesignagepolicyforsurveillanceisuniformacrossaretailchain.Inthefirstinstance,anationalgrocerychainwasexamined.Atoneoftheirstoresasignwaspresentonbothautomaticdoorsateachentrance.Thesignread“PLEASEBEADVISEDourstorehasvideosurveillancefor74Thissectionseemstoreferonlytoreactionarysurveillanceinresponsetospecificcriminalincidentsinanarea,ratherthantocontinuousblanketsurveillanceofpremises.

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bothourcustomerprotectionandtohelpkeeppriceslow.”Thesesignsarefoundontheentrydoorsbeloweyelevelanddisappearbehindthedoorframeasthecustomerapproachesandthedoorsslideopen.Thegasstationfeaturedsignsonthepumpsatwaistlevelthatread:‘Thisareaisundervideosurveillance’.Inthethirdinstance,anationalelectronicsretailoutletwasvisited.Nosignagewasdetected.Theonlyevidenceofsurveillancecameraswasasomewhatominousglobepresumablycontainingasurveillancecamerahangingfromtheceilingmorethanametreoverheadimmediatelyinsidetheentranceandotherglobesthroughoutthestore.Whilethegrocerystoreandgasstationsoughttonotifythecustomerofsurveillance,thisisnottruefortheelectronicsstore.Inallthreecaseslegislativeauthorityforthecollectionofpersonaldatawasnotprovided.Thelackofsignageattheelectronicsretailoutletmaymeanthisprivateretailchainassumesthoseenteringtheirestablishmentunderstandsurveillancecameraswillbepresentandtheirpurposes.Alternativelyitmaymeanthatthecorporationlacksknowledgeofprivacyguidelinesconsistentwithfederalprivacylegislation(OPC2008).ThetransferofthecamerasurveillanceimagefromaprivatebusinesstopoliceandthenCrimeStoppersraisesthepossibilityoferrorswithharmfuleffects.Thisrealitywasseenin2002whenaCanadianCharteredbankinWinnipegerroneouslytransferredtwoimagesofacustomerthoughttohavecashedstolencheques.TheimageswerethentransferredbypolicetoCrimeStoppersandincludedinonenewspaperadvertisement.Thepersonidentifiedasengagedinthiscrimethenlaunchedacomplaintwiththefederalprivacycommissioner(OPC2002).Oncetheerrorwasrecognized,CrimeStoppers,withthenewspaper’scooperation,arrangedforaretractiontobeprintedaweeklater:However,inthemeantime,manypeoplehadrecognizedthecomplainant'simagefromthefirstarticle.Severalfriendsandfamilymembershadcalledtoinquireabouthertroublewithpolice,andshealsobecameawarethatotheracquaintanceshadbeguntoentertainsuspicionsabouthercharacter.Believinghergoodnametobeintegraltoherabilitytosecureworkinclients'homesandworkplaces,thecomplainantwasveryworriedthattheincidentmightadverselyaffectherreputationandherbusinessandwasmostupsetthatsuspicionsaboutherhadbeenallowedtogatherforafullweek(OPC2002).

Thecomplaintwasjudgedtobewell‐foundedfollowingtheinvestigation.TheCommissionerstated:“Thedecisioncausedthecomplainantembarrassmentandworryaboutherreputationandherlivelihood”andthat“thebankshouldhavetakenduecaretoensurethattheinformationwasaccuratesoastominimizethepossibilityofawrongdecisionwithadverseconsequences”(OPC2002).Itisunknownhowmanyothershavebecomethevictimsofsucherrors.Thisisbecauseuponlearningofanindividual’scriminalassociationsduetoviewingaCrimeStoppersadvertisementnoteveryonewillcontactthatindividualtoinformthemofthisassociation.ThoseindividualswhobecomeawaretheirimagehasbeendisplayedinerrormaynotknowhoworwanttocomplaintothePrivacyCommissioneraboutpowerfulinstitutions(e.g.,privatecorporations,police,and

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CrimeStoppers).Itremainsunclearwhetherandhoworganizationsthatusesurveillancecamerasandstoretheirimagesexercise‘duecare’intransferringimagestopolicebeforetheyaretransferredtoCrimeStoppersandbeyond.ItisvitaltorecognizethathadthesurveillanceimagesbeenalsopostedontheCrimeStoppersorYouTubewebsites,manymorepersonsmayhaveviewedorcopiedtheimagestootherwebsitesore‐mail,thusmakingtheintendedeffectofasimple‘retraction’likelyimpossibleoratleastexceedinglymoredifficulttoaccomplish.Aswell,theaccelerationoftimebetweenimagecaptureanditsuseinanadvertisementonawebsitepotentiallyreducestimetoidentifyerrors(incomparisontostagingcrimere‐enactmentsbyCrimeStoppers‐seebelow).Furthermore,whilemostpeoplewouldnotseektheseimagesthroughInternetbackdoors,theystillareavailableasarchivedwebsitesfor,attheveryleast,severalyears.UsingtheInternetArchive,camerasurveillanceimagesrelatedtocrimesdatingbacktoJune10,2004wereretrievedfromthearchivedwebsiteofoneOntarioCrimeStoppersprogram(InternetArchive2009).Itcanbeassumedthat,otherthanserious‘coldcases’,thetransgressionstowhichtheimagesreferhavebeendealtwithinthecourtsandthatthosepersonsdepictedmayhavebeenlongagoacquittedofthecrimestheyareallegedorassumedtohavecommittedorarenolongerprosecutableduetotheirsummaryoffencestatus.Thepolicethemselvesmaynothavethemeanstoknowwhethertheimageisaccurate.Furthermore,ifitisanorganization’spolicytoforwardallimagestopoliceforprosecutionpurposes,customersshouldbenotifiedofthis,andoftheveryrealpossibilitythattheirpersonalinformationwillbetransferredinerror.ThedistributionanddisplayviaCrimeStoppers,whosepersonnelundoubtedlytakeimages’accuracyatfacevalueiftransferredfrompolice,andthentoYouTubeandbeyondraisesthepotentialforseriousharmtothosewhoseimagescometobeassociatedwithcriminalactstheydidnotcommit.Thisiswhythirdpartytransfer–especiallywithoutpropernotification–isaseriousprivacyissue.

YouTubeandWebsiteAdvertisementFindingsAcursoryexaminationofcamerasurveillanceimagesinadvertisementsrevealsthatthereiscurrentlysignificantuseofsuchimageswithin‘CrimeoftheWeek’orequivalentadvertisementsandthispracticeisincreasing.CrimeStoppersisalsoincreasinglyusing‘YouTube’(andrelatedformats)todisplaysurveillancecameraimagesundertheCrimeStoppersbannertoencourage‘tips’fromthepublic.

IncreasedUseofCameraSurveillanceImagesThepresenceofcamerasurveillanceimagesinCrimeStoppersisexpanding.ThoughsuchimagesmayhavebeensparinglyusedbyatleastoneCrimeStoppersprograminadvertisementsinthelate1980stoencourage‘tips’,therehassincebeenamarkedincrease.Camerasurveillanceimagesareonlymentionedonceinapreviousanalysisfromthisperiodandnotasacentralfeatureofadvertisements(CarriereandEricson1989:69).Basedonasampledrawnfromastudyin2000‐2001,

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surveillancecameraimagesarepresentinasmallproportionof‘CrimesoftheWeek’advertisementsinsomeprogramsandaltogetherabsentinothers.Butthiscurrentanalysisrevealsthatsuchimagesnowfigurelargerinprograms.Itwasfoundthat21.6percentofadvertisementsfromOntarioCrimeStoppersprogramscurrentlyusesurveillancecameraimages.TheCrimeStoppersprogramscoveringthelargesturbanregionsofYork,PeelandToronto,elicitedover25percentimagesaturation.Thisisundoubtedlyduetogreateravailabilityofsurveillancecameraimagesinurbanareas.Whileonly4of48TorontoRegionalCrimeStoppersadvertisements(8.33%)usedcamerasurveillanceimagesbasedonthe2000‐2001sample,by2007‐2008,30of116(25.9%)ofTorontoCrimeStoppersadvertisementsusedimagesfromsurveillancecameras.Moreover,previouslyTorontoCrimeStoppersadvertisementsfortelevisionadoptedtheformofre‐enactments(seeCarriereandEricson1989;Lippert2002)butnowthisprogram’swebsitestatesthata‘televisedre‐enactmentorsurveillancevideoofthecrimeisshownontelevision’(TorontoCrimeStoppers2009;emphasisadded)ratherthantraditionalre‐enactmentsexclusively,thussuggestingthattheuseofcamerasurveillanceimagesisnowroutinepractice.CrimeStoppersofYorkRegionincludessurveillanceimagesin72.1percentofitsadvertisements.AlthoughouranalysiswasunabletouncoverthenumberoftimestheadvertisementswereviewedtheYouTubedatashowsanaverageofover9000viewswitharangeof18views,foranewrelease,to130,005,forayear‐and‐a‐halfoldmurdercase.Assignificantachangeasthismightbeacrossprograms,itisinterestingtonotethatsofarOntariolagsbehindCrimeStoppersoperationsinothercountries.IntheUnitedKingdomthepercentageofadvertisementsusingcamerasurveillanceimagesis28percent(n=60)andinAustraliaitis48percent(n=120).Table1:InternationalCrimeStopperAdvertisements

CrimeStoppersProgram(ByCountry)

Advertisements

Advertisementswithcamera

surveillanceimagespresent

CamerasurveillanceImage

Saturation

Canada(Ontario) 603 130 21.60%

Australia 244 120 49.20%

UnitedKingdom 209 60 28.70%

Total 1056 310 29.40%

ThisflowofsurveillancecameraimagesfrompointofcapturetopolicetoCrimeStoppershasbeenacceleratedbythemovetodigitizationofcamerassurveillancetechnologies,suchthattheproductsofsurveillancecamerasarenoweasilytransferredtoaCrimeStopperswebsitewheretheyaredisplayedwithorwithout

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anaccompanyingnarrative.Whilebanalatfirstglance,theincreaseduseofcamerasurveillanceimagesissignificantforseveralreasons.Thereisevidencefromempiricalresearchthatpersonsplacemorestockintelevisionnewscoverage(YouTubeistelevisual)thanradioorprintmedia(Ericson,etal.1991).SomeadvertisementswerepostedtotheCrimeStopperswebsitesas‘newsreleases’,andinsomecasesthemade‐for‐televisionadvertisementwaspresentonthewebsite.Audiencestendtoadopta‘seeingisbelieving’(Doyle2003;seeEricsonetal.1991:23)or‘thecameraneverlies’adage.Thismeansthatsurveillanceimagescanmakeacriminalincidentdescribedinanadvertisementmorebelievablethanaccountswithoutimages.OneissueraisedbyCrimeStopperspostingofcamerasurveillancefootageonYouTubeistheirauthenticdepictionofviolence,asseenin5ofthe27(18.5%)instances.Interestingly,thiscontravenesYouTube’s“communityguidelines”whichforbidssuchdepictions(YouTube2009b).Inamoretechnicalandmundanesenseinmanyadvertisementscamerasurveillanceimageswerefounddominatingaccompanyingtext,andinotherinstancesdisplacedtextentirely,leavingonlyadescriptionoftheimageandthe‘crime’.Ofthe27instancesofCrimeStoppersdisplayingsurveillancecamerafootageonYouTube,ninelackedawrittennarrativeintheinformationsidebarofthewebpage.Thenarrativeinallbutoneofthenineinstanceswasincorporatedasavoice‐overintothefootage.Thesurveillanceimageisplainlybecomingthefocalpointorcentrepieceofadvertisedincidents.Putdifferently,thecamerasurveillanceimageisincreasinglyshoulderingmoreoftheworkofgenerating‘tips’thanbefore.Whilepotentiallytrivialonthesurfacethisissignificantforanumberofreasons,nottheleastofwhichisthatthishelpslimitthekindsofcrimesdisplayedasadvertisementstoanarrowrangeofactivitiesthatcanbecapturedbysurveillancecameras.ItmaybethatCrimeStoppers’increasingdependenceonthesurveillanceimageforadvertisementcontentsolidifiesthepracticeidentifiedinpreviousresearchofpromotingonlyanarrowrangeof‘streetcrimes’(seeCarriereandEricson1989;Lippert2002)totheneglectofothertypes(seebelow).Inthisway,theresultsoftheanalysismirrorsearlierfindings.Forexample,noCrimeStoppersadvertisementsinthesampleportrayeddomesticviolence,corporatemalfeasance,orcrimesbypolice.Comparedtotheadvertisementsdeployingstillsurveillanceimages,theYouTubeadvertisementscontainedagreaterpercentageofviolentacts,inparticularhomicide.Thehomicideswerecaughtbywhatappearedtobeprivately‐ownedsurveillancecameras.Thelackofadvertisementsdetailingdomesticviolence,corporatemalfeasance,andcrimesbypoliceisalsoproblematicasitdepictscertaintypesofcrimeasmoreprevalent,forexample,robbery,whileignoringorotherwiseimplyingothercrimeswithharmfulimpactsonvictimstobelessprevalent.Totheextentthatadvertisementsincreasinglyuseanddependoncamerasurveillanceimages,thefactthatmostcameras(i.e.,privateand‘open‐street’surveillancecamerasystems)areoperatedbybusinesses,thepolice,andothergovernmentinterests,meanstheseother

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seriouscrimesarelikelytoincreasinglybeignored.Itisunlikely,forexample,abusinesswillturnoversurveillanceimagesthatmayimplicateitselfincorporatemalfeasance.Moreover,itisimportanttonotethatcamerasurveillanceimagesonlyprovidethemostobviousinformation,thatiswhataparticularsubjectlookedlikeinacertainlocationatagiventime,whileall“otherinformationneedstobecoaxedoutofthem‐orreadintothem”(Phillips1997:29).Intheonecaseinwhichnotextualoraudionarrativewaspresent,thesurveillancefootage,haditnotappearedinaCrimeStopperscontext,couldbebestdescribedasdepictingatransactionbetweenagasstationcashierandcustomer.Indeed,13ofthe27(48.1%)instancesofCrimeStopperssurveillancefootageonYouTube,and100of130(76.9%)imagesinadvertisementsdisplayedonCrimeStopperswebsitesrevealednoactionsthatwereobviouslycriminalinnature.Moreover,mostoftheCrimeStoppersadvertisementsdeployedtheimagewithanarrativethatimpliedguiltratherthansuggestingthecriminalactwasalleged.WhilethepoliceandCrimeStoppershaveavestedinterestinavoidingfalsearrests,itispossiblethatothersmayuseimagesthathavebeenassignedacriminalmeaningthroughCrimeStoppersinnefariousways.TheanonymityoftheInternetcouldallowforthesubsequentpostingofsurveillancefootagetodamagethereputationorlivelihoodofanotherbyassociatingthemwithcriminalactivity.

CrimeStoppersExpansionAsrevealedinaTorontoCrimeStoppersYouTubevideo,CrimeStoppersadvertisingusingcamerasurveillanceimagesispermeatingotherpublicareas.In2007,TorontoCrimeStoppersstartedthe‘UndergroundAlert’programinTorontoTransitCommission(TTC)SubwayStations,entailingthedisplayof‘crimefiles’onLCDtelevisionscreensintheSubwayStations.AccordingtothepressreleasedisplayedontheYouTubepage‘UndergroundAlertenablesauthoritiestomessagemillionsofcommutersimmediatelyfollowingacrimeinanattempttocatchthesuspect.’(YouTube2009).Withthepotentialformillionsofcommuterstoviewthefootage,thisnewCrimeStoppersprogramunderscorestheimportanceofprotectingprivacyrights.

PrivacyandThirdPartiesWhatprivacyandrelatedissuesareraisedfromthereleaseofthispersonalinformationtothirdparties?CrimeStoppersisathirdpartytowhichcamerasurveillanceimagesaresystematicallytransferred.WhileboththeOntarioMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct(MFIPPA)andFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct(FIPPA)75containprovisionsthatallowforthedisclosureofpersonalinformationtothirdparties,indoingsothe

75Sincethiscasestudyisrelevanttoprovinciallyratherthanfederallyregulatedorganizations,provincialratherthanfederallegislationisreferencedhere.

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dignityandrightsofindividualswhosepersonalinformationisbeingreleasedissupposedtobesafeguarded.Careissupposedtobetakenwhendistributingthisinformation.Morespecificallyconcerningcamerasurveillanceimages,theidentifyingfeaturesofvictimsorthirdpartiescouldberemovedthroughdigitaltechniquessuchasblurringfaces.

DeterrenceIronically,eachuseofsurveillancecameraimagesinCrimeStoppersadvertisementsthatseek‘tips’supportspreviousresearchthatfailstofindconclusiveevidencethatcamerasurveillancesystemsareaneffectivedeterrent.Thus,theinclusionofeachsurveillanceimageinaCrimeStoppersadvertisementisagrowingtestamenttothefailureofsurveillancecamerastodeterorto‘stopcrime’ontheirown.ThisassumedlackofdeterrencewasacknowledgedduringaninterviewwithaBusinessImprovementAssociationrepresentativerespondingtotheprospectofestablishing‘open‐street’closedcircuittelevisioncameras(CCTV)inthearea:“Peoplecommitbankrobberiesallthetime.Everyoneknowsthatalmosteverybankhascamerasurveillanceandyetpeoplegointherewithoutevenaskimask;it’snotaguaranteeatallthatstuffwon’thappen”(Interview1).Theeffectivenessofsurveillancecamerastoreducecrimeorevensecurecriminalconvictionsiscurrentlyunknown,thoughthereisreasontodoubtitseffectiveness(see,forexample,therecentSmithcasebelow).InoneinstanceofcamerasurveillancefootageonYouTubethesuspectwasapparentlycarefultoavoididentificationbyrobbingaconveniencestorewhilewearinghisjeansinsideout,apillowcaseoverhishead,andnoshoes.Insteadofbeingdeterred,thispersonsimplyinnovatedtoavoidsubsequentidentification.TheuseoftheseimagesinCrimeStopperssystematicallycallsintodoubtoneofthecommonlystatedjustificationsforimplementingsurveillancecamerastocollectpersonalinformationinthefirstinstance.

WhoBenefitsandWhoisHarmed?WhobenefitsandwhoisharmedthroughtheincreaseduseofcamerasurveillanceimagesinCrimeStoppers?Asnotedearlier,oneconsequenceoftheincreaseduseandrelianceuponsuchimagesisthatonlycertaintypesofcrimeareadvertised.Camerasurveillancesystemsareincreasinglypresentineverydaylife,buttheyarenoteverywhere;theyaretypicallynotinprivateofficesandhomescapturingeverydayworkordomesticpractices.Thissystematicallydecreasesthepossibilityofincludingcrimesoccurringinthesesites,eveninagenericmanner.Withre‐enactmentsplacesandpersonsthatcameraslegallycannot(e.g.,bathroomstalls),ordonot(e.g.,privateresidence)surveilcanstillbedepicted,thusencouraging‘tips’aboutthatincidentorlikeincidents.Thus,typesofcrimedepictedinthe‘CrimesoftheWeek’suggestcertaingroupsbenefitmorethanothersduetothedeploymentofcamerasurveillanceinadvertisements.Table2showsthetypesofcrimesreportedas‘CrimesoftheWeek’orequivalent.Ofthe130advertisements,93(over70%)depictedcrimescommittedagainst

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businesses(PropertyCrimesagainstBusiness).TheYouTubedatahadagreaternumberofnon‐businessrelatedcrimes,andanequalnumberofhomicidesandcrimesagainstbusiness(11each,seeTable3).However,noneoftheimagesappearedtobetakenfrom‘open‐street’orpublicsurveillancecameras.Whilethismaybedueinparttothelimitednumberof‘open‐street’camerasurveillancesystemsinCanada,itissignificantthatbusinessesareplainlytheimmediatebeneficiariesoftheuseofcameraimagesbyCrimeStoppers.Table2:CrimeTypesinAdvertisementsonCrimeStoppersWebsites

Crime Number ApproximatePercent

ChildAbduction 1 >1

CreditCardFraud 5 4

FirearmsOffence 1 >1

PhysicalAssault 5 4

Property(Business/Non‐violent) 24 18.5

Property(Business/Violent) 69 53

Property(Citizen/Non‐Violent) 9 7

Property(Citizen/Violent) 6 4.5

Property(Public/Non‐violent) 2 1.5

SexualAssault/OtherSexRelatedCrime 8 6

Table3:CrimeTypesDepictedonYouTube

Crime Number ApproximatePercent

Homicide 11 41

PhysicalAssault 1 3.5

Property(Business/Non‐violent) 7 26

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Property(Business/Violent) 4 15

Property(Citizen/Non‐Violent) 2 7.5

Property(Citizen/Violent) 1 3.5

SexualAssault/OtherSexRelatedCrime 1 3.5

Giventheincreasingcredencegiventotheauthenticityof(‘seeingisbelieving’)camerasurveillanceimages,ifvictimsareunawareofthepossibleexistenceoftheseimages(thepresenceofsurveillancecameras)inagivencontexttheymaydecidetonotreportaparticularcrime.Alackofnotificationtothoseunawareofthecameras’presencemayleadtocrimesagainstpersonsnotbeingreported.Citizen’s,unawarethattheimagesproducedbysurveillancecamerasarebeingrecorded,mayfeeltheyhavenocorroboratingevidencetosupportreportsofbeingvictimized.Whileitisimportanttonotifythepublicofsurveillancecamerastogain‘informedconsent’,thisnotificationisalsorequiredtomakeindividualsawarethattheirvictimizationorthevictimizationofothersmayhavebeenwitnessedandrecordedbysurveillancecameras,assistingtheminreportingsuchincidents.TheuseofcamerasurveillanceimagesontheCrimeStoppersandYouTubewebsitesraisesadditionalprivacyconcernsinrelationtovictims.Ofthe130advertisements(seetable4),32(24.6%)containedimageswithavisiblethirdpartyorvictim.Inonlytwoofthese32images(6.3%)wasintentionaldistortionordigitaleditingused.Ineightofthe32(25%)imagesthevictimorthirdpartyisclearlyidentifiable.Sincetheseadvertisementsprovidedadescriptionofthesuspect,thereadermaydistinguishbetweensuspectandvictim/thirdparty.However,theinclusionofthirdpartiesandvictimsmayelicitotherconcerns.Whileitmaybethatthirdpartiesareincludedbecausetheyarealsowantedforquestioningabouttheincident,noneoftheadvertisementsappealtotheseotherpersonstocomeforwardtopoliceorCrimeStoppers,anditcanbereasonablyassumedthatvictimswouldhavealreadyprovidedastatementtopolice.ComparedtotheadvertisementsonCrimeStopperswebsites,theYouTubecamerafootagesoughttohidetheidentitiesofthirdpartiesandvictimstoamuchgreaterextent.However,ofthefilesdisplayingthirdpartiesorvictims,9of20(45%)didnotusesomeformofintentionaldistortion.Itispossiblethatifapprehendedthesuspectmayseekretributionagainstoneofthethirdpartiesbelievingtheywerethe‘tipster’.ThisfailuretorenderthirdpartiesanonymousstarklyconflictswithCrimeStoppersstatedfocusonanonymization(seeLippert2002).Table4:VictimandThirdPartyVisibility

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ThirdPartyandVictimVisibility

Count Approx.Percent(totalfiles)

Image‐ThirdParty:FaceVisible‐distinguishable 6 4.5

Image‐ThirdParty:Visible‐nofacevisible 7 5.5

Image‐Victim:Distorted 1 >1

Image‐Victim:FaceVisible‐Distinguishable 2 1.5

Image‐Victim:FaceVisible–Indistinguishable

1 >1

Image‐Victim:Visible‐facenon‐visible 13 10

Video‐Victim:Visible‐facevisible‐‘non‐distinguishable’

1 >1

Video‐Victim:Distorted 1 >1

TotalThirdParty/Victim 32 24.5

Ofthe44suspectsidentifiedintheYouTubesurveillancefootage,13(29.5%)suspectswereWhite,20(45.5%)wereBlack,5(11.4%)wereothervisibleminorities,andthe‘race76’of6(13.6)wasunidentifiable(duetodisguiseorpoorvideoquality).ThehighpercentageofcamerasurveillancefootageselectedfordisplaythatdepictsBlacksandothervisibleminoritiescommittingcriminalacts(56%)ispotentiallyharmfultothesealreadydisadvantagedgroups.ThesedepictionscanfuelracistsentimentsasseeninsomecommentsleftbyYouTubeusersinrelationtothisfootage.TheracisttoneofcommentspostedontheTorontoCrimeStoppersYouTubepagepromptedtheorganizationtomakethefollowingstatementonitswebsite:

Wehadaretirededucatorwritetousabouttheracistremarksonsomeofthecomments…wedon’tsupportracisminanyway‐‐wedosupportfreespeech…andwewouldliketousethiscommentsectiontoeducateasmuchaspossible…andgeneratetipstosolvethiscrimeandmanyothers…pleaseberesponsibleinyourpostings…racistcommentscancomebacktohauntyouattimesofjobinterviewsetc…betolerantofall…standupforthegood,andcorrectthewrong.

(YouTube2009d)76Althoughthesecategoriesarecontestedand‘race’istobeunderstoodasasocialconstruction,CrimeStoppersadvertisementsoftenusethesecategoriestodescribesuspects.

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Aspreviouslymentioned,surveillancecamerascaptureaverylimitednumberofcrimetypesandtendnottocapturecorporatecrimeanddomesticviolence.TheuseofsomeimagesonCrimeStoppersandYouTubetotheneglectofothercrimetypesservestobenefitcertaingroups,whilepotentiallyharmingothers.

TheSmithCaseConsidertheSmithcaseinrelationtotheuseofsurveillancecameraimagestosolvecrime.CriminalchargeswererecentlydroppedagainstSmithandasecondpersonwhowasdepictedinsurveillancefootagepostedtoYouTubebypolice(Dimanno2009).Thefootage,ofashooting,wasviewedsometenthousandtimes(Ibid.).DespitebeingaviolationofYouTube’s“TermsofUse”(YouTube2009c),thisfootagemayhavebeendownloadedbyindividualusers(viaprogramssuchasGetTubeandKeepVid),potentiallypreservingtheimageinacriminalcontext.SimilarlytheimagemaybepreservedattheInternetArchive.ThereproductionofthesurveillanceimageisevidentgiventhatanInternetsearchdisplaysseveralotherwebsiteswherethisvideoisduplicatedorlinkedto.Thisisparticularlyimportantinthecaseofthesecondaccusedthatmighthavehadnoknowledgeoftheshootingsabouttohappen.Theduplicationofthisfootagemayremainavailableforviewinglongafterthechargeshavebeendroppedagainstthesuspects,potentiallyimpactinglifechances(e.g.,employment,personalrelationships).

ConclusionThissectionexploredtheuseofcamerasurveillanceimagesbypolice‐supportedCrimeStoppersprograms.Since2001therehasbeenasignificantincreaseinthevolumeofsurveillancecameraimagesusedbyCrimeStoppersinitsadvertisements.MorerecentlyCrimeStoppershasalsobegunpostingsurveillancefootageonthevideosharingwebsite‘YouTube’.Thisincreaseduseraisesprivacyandotherissues.InthepastsuchimageshavebeenerroneouslysharedwithpoliceandCrimeStoppersandtheerrorwasnotidentifiedandrectifiedpriortotheiruseinadvertisements.Suchoccurrenceshavepotentialtodetrimentallyimpactaperson’sreputationandlivelihood.Thereisnowlessdelaybetweenthecaptureofvideofootageanditssubsequentreleaseinadvertisements,thusthereislessopportunitytoidentifyerror.Further,imagesinCrimeStoppersadvertisementsoftenappearwithoutmaskingtheidentityofthirdpartiesandvictims,presentingseriousprivacyandethicalconcernsastheseindividualbecomeimplicatedinacriminalincident.Questionsaboutappropriatenotificationarealsoraisedbysucharrangements.IndividualsshouldhavetheoptionofavoidingsituationswheretheirimagemaybecapturedandpotentiallypostedtotheInternet.CrimeStoppers’useofsurveillancecameraimagesalsocastsskepticismoverclaimsthatcamerasurveillancehasadeterrenteffect.Itrevealsinstanceswherecrimewascommitteddespitethepresenceofacamera.Finally,anincreaseddependenceonimagesfromsurveillancecamerasovertraditionalre‐enactmentshasthepotential

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tonarrowtherangeofcrimesportrayedinCrimeStoppersadvertisements.Suchanarrowingofthetypesofcrimewillundoubtedlyservetobenefitmostlyprivatebusinessratherthanthegeneralpublic.Finally,ourresearchrevealedthatthecamerasurveillanceimagespostedonYouTubebyCrimeStoppersdisproportionatelyportrayvisibleminoritiesasengagedincriminalactivity.Thisisatroublingpracticethatispotentiallyharmfultothewellbeingofthespecificracialorethnicgroupsdepicted.

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AppendixA:MapsofProposed“LiveSites”

Georgia Street ‘live site’

Source: Rudberg 2008

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David Lam ‘live site’

Source: Rudberg 2008