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Fundamental Concepts of International Politics
Spring 2015
Prof. H. Steven Green
Toyo UniversityFaculty of Law
Lecture 4May 6th 2015
Security Dilemma (Rev.),
“Games”
Today’s Plan
1. Review of 3 Basic Concepts2. Review of PD and Security Dilemma3. “The Long Shadow of the Future”4. Ethics and IP5. 3 Views of the Role of Morality in IP
(1) 3 Basic Concepts for Theorizing, Review, 2
CONCEPT EXAMPLES
1. Actors
2. Goals
3. Instruments
Match the words below with the correct concept.
Japan, safe drinking water, navy, negotiation, Al Qaeda, trade, stopping AIDS, military security, Toyota, United Nations (UN),
suicide bombing (自爆テロ ), sanctions (制裁 ), army
3 Basic Concepts for Theorizing
CONCEPT EXAMPLES
1. Actors Japan, Al Qaeda, Toyota, UN,
2. Goals safe drinking water, stopping AIDS, military security
3. Instruments navy, negotiation, trade, suicide bombing, sanctions, army
PD and the Security Dilemma
SECURITY DILEMMAWhy did Athens and Sparta go to war?
COOPERATEIf Sparta stops
Corinth
DEFECTIf Sparta does not
stop Corinth
COOPERATEIf Athens does not
help CorcyraPeace… but not security
Sparta & Peloponnesian
League stronger
DEFECTIf Athens helps
Corcyra Athens & Delian League stronger
WAR
PD in-class game
You are the leader of a country.You feel threatened by the rise of another
country’s power.Your goal is to maximize your country’s power.
PD in-class game• Play ONCE with 5 different people• Show your choice with scissors and paper
(paper = cooperate, scissors = defect)• Record your results• Everyone starts with zero points
PD in-class game
If B plays paper(cooperate)
If B plays scissors(defect)
If A plays paper
(cooperate)
If A plays scissors(defect)
PD in-class game
If B plays paper(cooperate)
If B plays scissors(defect)
If A plays paper
(cooperate)A&B: 20 B: + 50 points
A: - 50 points
If A plays scissors(defect)
A: + 50 pointsB: - 50 points
A&B: -25 points
PD in-class game
You are the leader of a country.You feel threatened by the rise of another
country’s power.Your goal is to maximize your country’s power.
The Security Dilemma
SD = Two (or more) countries enter a conflict (e.g. war) even though none of the countries wants conflict.
Cause: When one state feels insecure in relation to another state, it may try to increase its security by increasing its military power and/or joining a military alliance.
• The other state interprets these actions as threats and increases its military power, which…
• The first state believes are threats.
The Security Dilemma ReviewThucydides & realists:
Athens’s and Sparta’s decision was rational (合理的 ).
The security dilemma makes war inevitable.Always and in all cultures.
PD Game 2• Play FIVE TIMES with 1 person.• Show your choice with paper and scissors• Record your results• Everyone starts with zero points
PD in-class game
If B plays paper(cooperate)
If B plays scissors(defect)
If A plays paper
(cooperate)
If A plays scissors(defect)
PD in-class game
If B plays paper(cooperate)
If B plays scissors(defect)
If A plays paper
(cooperate)A&B: 20 B: + 50 points
A: - 50 points
If A plays scissors(defect)
A: + 50 pointsB: - 50 points
A&B: -25 points
War is Not Inevitable (Maybe) 戦争は決して避けられないものではない (かも。。。)
• When people or governments disagree we need to know if they are playing one game or more.
• A “game” is a situation where people or governments want different things and have to cooperate or compete to get them.
• In one “game” (i.e. a single issue) where BOTH sides will probably lose some power, defection is the best strategy (協力しない方がいい ) because states really cannot trust each other.
War is Not Inevitable戦争は決して避けられないものではない
• In many games (i.e. issues), we can learn to trust each other.
WHY?
States can develop trust for each other by using the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy
• IF A defects, B will defect• If A cooperates, B will cooperate
In other words…• If A threatens B, then B will threaten A• If A does not threaten B, then B will not threaten
AAND…
Tit-for-tat strategy
…both states learn that the most rational strategy (一番合理的な戦略 ) is to cooperate.
Leaders must think about the future.
• Sparta feared the rise of Athens.• Athens believed war was inevitable
so…Athenian leaders decided they could
not trust the Corinthians or the Spartans
• If country X believes it cannot trust country Y, then country X will act as if the “game” is over, so…
• The most rational strategy is to defect
Athens did not trust Sparta or Corinth, so it acted as if the game were over (and Sparta did not trust Athens so…)
When does defection occur?
• Thucydides believed Athenians and Spartans could not avoid the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
(But he did not call it the “prisoner’s dilemma.” He called it natural!)
• For realists, anarchy creates a permanent PDBut… is the PD really permanent?
Is cooperation impossible?
PYE: Thucydides ignores human errors.• Corinth thought Athens would not fight• Athens reacted too harshly in Potidaea
(Athensは Potidaeaに厳しい反応を示した。)
These bad decisions made war:NOT the logic of anarchy
PD is not inevitable
• The security dilemma increases the risk of war but…
• Human behavior is voluntary (自発的 )• States can choose to cooperate: They can
choose to “play many games” with each other or…
• They can play different games.
“The long shadow of the future”
New Game: Play once with 5 people
If B plays paper(cooperate)
If B plays scissors(defect)
If A plays paper
(cooperate)
If A plays scissors(defect)
New Game: Play once with one person
If B plays paper(cooperate)
If B plays scissors(defect)
If A plays paper
(cooperate)A&B: +100 points B: + 50 points
A: 0 points
If A plays scissors(defect)
A: + 50 pointsB: 0 points
A&B: + 50 points
Stag Hunt
• Two hunters can either hunt one stag together or hunt rabbits separately.
• Stags provide more food, but...• Hunting a stag is difficult and requires patience and
cooperation.• It is easy to catch a rabbit, but the rabbit provides
less food.• The hunters must cooperate to get the most food.
Stag Hunt
• Cooperation requires patience and trust.• Patience: The hunters must wait quietly for a very
long time until a stag comes.• Trust: It is easy to catch a rabbit, so it is tempting to
quit waiting, hunt a rabbit and enjoy the rest of the day.
Stag hunt: DiscussionWhat are some examples of “stag hunt” in
international politics? What are examples of issues in which coordination
produces the BEST result for both sides?
Examples of stag hunt
• Environmental issues• Nuclear disarmament• Trade agreements • Fighting pirates
Who fights the pirates?• US Navy is most advanced and powerful in the
world• US can project (i.e. send) its sea (and air) power
anywhere in the world at anytime.• The US Navy could fight pirates successfully alone.But it does not.
Fighting piratesDifferent types of governments coordinate to fight pirates
Other countriesCooperate
Other countriesDefect
USACooperates
Coordinated fight by everyone: Decrease in number of pirate attacks, lower costs for everyone, benefits of cooperation.
USA fights without help (expensive, risky).Other countries get free benefit of safer seas (but difficult to get all pirates.)
USADefects
Other countries fight without help (expensive, dangerous).USA get free benefit of safer seas (but difficult to get all pirates.)
Everyone fights but only when their own ships are threatened. Increase in number of pirate attacks.
International cooperation and ethics• All states agree that pirates are a threat to the
international system. • No disagreement about interests or ethics.• Easy to cooperate. So…
Easy to imagine INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
Why do states cooperate or at least keep talking?
Not all IR “games” are PD
• In PD the only way to “win” is if the other side loses completely.
• But not all “games” in IR are PD because…Power is not always zero-sum.
1. Collect information, think carefully, talk with other states as much as possible
• Diplomats and leaders talk often• Foreign policy professionals collect
information (including spying)
How can states avoid the logic of the PD?
2. Create and participate in international society (i.e. practice liberalism)
• Create & join IOs, NGOs• Participate in free trade deals• Allow people to visit other countries and
allow people to visit your own
How can states avoid the logic of the PD?
YES• Cooperation created domestic society, so it
can also create international society• IOs, NGOs, trade, exchanges of people can
create conditions for cooperation• Successful cooperation creates more
cooperation• Create other games (i.e. other issues, such
as trade, that are stag hunts.)
Can International society solve the PD?
International Society For liberalism:
IOs + NGOs = INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
International society REDUCES risk of war from the security dilemma.
What do realists say about this idea?
NO• Cooperation and FORCE created domestic society, (history
of state-building is violent) so international force will happen.
• Trade does not always prevent war: The world was more globalized BEFORE World War I than after it (until 1990): Nations that traded still went to war (The ancient Greek world was a world of trade)
• Cooperation and understanding do not always prevent war: Europeans cooperated and understood each other for hundreds of years and still had many wars with each other. See also: Israel and Palestine
Can International society solve the PD?