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AGAN v. NUEVAG.R. No. 155018

TINGA; Dec 11, 2003

NATURE

FACTS- Property in Cagayan de Oro, 2033 sqm, registered in the name of sps. Nueva, was sold by Diosdada (wife), withconsent of Andres (hubby), under a pacto de retro, for Php 21k to Philadelphia Agan.- Nuevas failed to repurchase property within the 6-mo period.- When Diosdada died, the property was extra-judicially partitioned. Andres sold his interest in the property to hischildren. Since the title to the property was allegedly destroyed in the fire that razed the property and killedDiosdada, title was reconstituted in the name of the children.- Agan filed a petition with the RTC for consolidation of ownership against the spouses Nueva. In their answer, theNuevas said that the pacto de retro sale was actually an equitable mortgage, the fair market value of the propertybeing Php 81,320.- Trial ensued. RTC ruled in favor of Agan, consolidating ownership in Agan. But there was a second paragraph:

"However, the vendors can still exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days fromreceipt of this decision pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil Code."

- Nuevas consigned with the court the redemption price since Agan refused to accept it.- Agan filed a petition for relief from the decision. She argued that she did not find it necessary to file anappeal from the said decision considering that the grant of the third-day period to redeem the property is a meresurplusage and hence, unenforceable and illegal in view of the court's order consolidating ownership of the

property in her favor. Agan prayed for the court to delete the said portion of the decision.- The RTC granted this and deleted the 2nd paragraph of the dispositive portion.- The Nuevas filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA ruled in favor of the Nuevas, saying that thecircumstances that will make a relief from the decision of the RTC proper are not present. CA said that the opinionof a party on the incorrectness of a decision of a court is not a ground for relief from the decision. The properremedy would be appeal.

ISSUESWON petition for relief from the decision is proper

HELDNO.- Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity. It is granted only in exceptional cases. It is an act of grace. Itis not regarded with favor. For relief to be granted the petitioner must show that the judgment or final order wasentered, or the proceeding thereafter against him was taken, through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusablenegligence.

- The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, pertainsgenerally to one of fact, not of law. In Guevara v. Tuason & Co., the Court held that the "word 'mistake,' accordingto its signification in the act referred to, does not apply, and never was intended to apply, to a judicial error whichthe court in question might have committed in the trial referred to. Such errors may be corrected by means of anappeal. The act in question can not in any way be employed as a substitute for the said remedy." The Court inGuevara elaborated:

. . . the erroneous opinion of one of the parties concerning the incorrectness of the judicial decision of thecourt can not constitute grounds for the said relief. For example, the court renders judgment in a matter against the defendant. The said defendant believes at the time that said judgment is correct and understands that an appeal would be useless and therefore he does not interpose the same. Later hebelieves firmly that the said judgment was incorrect, as indeed it was, and that he committed a mistakewhen he believed that it was correct. This, although it constitutes a mistake of the party, is not such amistake as confers the right to the relief. This is so because in no wise has he been prevented frominterposing his appeal. The most that may be said is that by reason of an erroneous interpretation of thelaw he believed that all recourse of appeal would be useless.

- The above illustration applies equally in this case where petitioner believed that an appeal from the Decision of the RTC would be "unnecessary."

- Moreover, the Court is not convinced that petitioner sincerely believed in her theory that the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the RTC decision was surplusage. Had it been so, she would have moved to rectify thealleged error immediately, not after respondents had offered to repurchase the property in question. Her failure tofile a motion for reconsideration or to appeal before the lapse of the reglementary period constitutes an acceptanceof the trial court's judgment, and her rationalization now appears to have been made only on hindsight.- Petitioner submits that the RTC had no jurisdiction to allow the respondents to repurchase the property, such judgment purportedly being contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. This contention has no merit. If there were anyerror at all in the Decision of the RTC, the same would be a mere error in judgment, not one of jurisdiction.- There is no ambiguity at all in the decision that would warrant clarification. If at all, the ambiguity is merelyostensible. At first blush, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision declaring the consolidation of ownership of theproperty in petitioner, on one hand, and granting respondents thirty (30) days to repurchase the property, on the

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other, appears inconsistent. The dispositive portion, however, also makes reference to the third paragraph of Article1606 of the New Civil Code. Taken together, it becomes obvious that the consolidation of the property in petitioneris subject to the suspensive condition of respondents' failure to repurchase within the thirty-day period.

Disposition Petition DENIED.