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policy and public spheres has given this issue or at least references to this

issue a powerful and dangerous role within society. Climate change has been

depoliticised (Swyngedouw 2010) and it has become difficult to challenge or

refute claims relating to it, and even more so to contest policies or projectswhich have been justified in terms of climate change mitigation. However, it is

a particular framing of climate change and climate science that dominates

policy discourse, one which is strongly underpinned by modernist assumptions.

This framing leads to restricted policy responses reflecting particular interests

and socio-political imaginaries. Yet there is little opportunity for public debate

concerning this framing or the assumptions underpinning approaches

to climate policy. This has negative and worrying implications for

democracy.

I will highlight how climate change has been placed at the centre ofjustifications for a diverse range of international, national and local policies,

but that this has occurred without public debate or reflection on how climate

science (or which climate science) is adopted and interpreted and what this

means in particular geographic, social, cultural or political contexts. The

implications of this central position of (a particular framing of) climate change

will be illustrated through considering the ways in which one area of policy

UK planning policy has adapted to reflect commitments to mitigate climate

change. I will show that, where there are planning applications for

developments justified in terms of mitigating climate change (e.g. renewableenergy developments), the importance attributed to mitigation has had

negative impacts on the scope of public participation in planning processes

Furthermore, the positioning of climate change as the key challenge for society

and the environment globally can lead to marginalisation of opponents to

projects justified in terms of climate change mitigation.

The de-politicisation of climate change

Despite a range of views expressed in relation to climate change and the

inevitable uncertainties or ambiguities in climate science, a fragile consensus

has emerged both in relation to the nature of the problem and the arrays of

managerial and institutional technologies to mitigate the most dramatic

consequences (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 215). Over the past two decades, a

climate politics has developed which, through science, media and policy

institutions, has established climate change as the paramount environmental

and social problem facing the world (Szerszynski and Urry 2010). This

framing of climate change has made it difficult to challenge either climate

science or policies relating to climate change without being branded a climate

sceptic or denier. Moreover, individuals who are critical of technologies orpolicies justified in terms of climate change mitigation often receive hostile

reactions (for example, seeNature2010). However, as I will argue, the climate

science and policies which are advanced relate to particular visions of climate

change and how it might be addressed and are far from unambiguous.

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only notes the usual expressions of technical uncertainties [but] also the

methodological uncertainties. Rather optimistically Saloranta (2001, p. 402)

concludes that the goal of Post-Normal Science, namely more effective

problem-solving, has seemingly been achieved by the IPCC. However, Hulmeand Ravetz (2009) suggest that a post-normal approach requires greater

openness, inclusiveness and less centralisation in the production of expert

reports. There appears to be some way still to go before the IPCC can be said

to have fully embraced post-normal science.

Additionally, an inclusive and transparent approach is also needed within

decision-making at regional, national or local levels here a role for extended

peer communities is largely lacking. Questions around how climate science is

framed and interpreted; what its implications are within particular geographi-

cal, social, political or cultural contexts and; how policymakers should respondto the challenges that it poses could all benefit from the inclusion of diverse

voices and interests.

The role of climate change in policy

Climate change now plays a central role within many areas of international,

national and local policy (Rayner 2009). In a similar way to how sustainable

development has previously been described as coloniz[ing] environmental

policy by offering an objective from which one apparently could not wish todiverge (Yearley 1996, p. 133, emphasis in original), so the importance of

mitigating climate change has become an aim which policymakers cannot

reasonably contest. The consensus around climate change and the importance

of reducing emissions combined with the ease by which dissenters can be

discredited as climate sceptics, mean that policies consistently repeat the

mantra of taking urgent action to address climate change. This mantra suggests

that the urgent action needed is clearly identifiable and that there is (at least a

degree of) inevitability in its outcome. Moreover, it is used to justify or

legitimate a range of policies and actions in different areas. For example, in the

United Kingdom climate change is connected to policies relating to inter alia

transport (Department for Transport 2009), energy (HM Government 2007),

health (Department of Health 2010) and business (MET Office 2007).

Furthermore, it has been connected to controversial policy areas such as

nuclear energy (HM Government 2008) and played a role in increasing

support for previously unpopular policies. For example, Bickerstaff et al.

(2008) have shown that framing nuclear energy in terms of emissions reduction

and climate change mitigation (re-branding it as a low carbon technology) led

to increased public support or less public opposition for the technology

(although the result was described as a reluctant acceptance). As such, climatechange holds valuable discursive power to potentially legitimate a range of

policies. Therefore the instances where, and methods by which, this concept is

referred to are significant. Justifying a preferred policy in terms of climate

change appears to restrict the possibilities to credibly contest its value or

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relevance. The ways in which this concept is mobilised and the ends which it is

called upon to justify must therefore be scrutinised.

It has been noted that currently the dominant policy approaches to

addressing climate change reflect modernist and capitalist assumptions (Brookset al. 2009, Doyle and Chaturvedi 2010, Swyngedouw 2010, Szerszynski and

Urry 2010). Whilst it could easily be contended that current levels of GHG

emissions are a result of practices in the industrialised world and are connected

to capitalist ways of life; the policy architecture around climate change insists

that this excessive state is not inscribed in the functioning of the system itself,

but is an aberration that can be cured by mobilizing the very inner dynamics

and logic of the system (privatization of CO2, commodification and market

exchange via carbon and carbon-offset trading) (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 223).

As such the dominant policy framework around climate change stems fromand perpetuates the cultural and economic position of Northern, industrialised

states (Doyle and Chaturvedi 2010). It demonstrates a commitment to

capitalism, economic growth and minimising disruption to industrialised

economies. As Szerszynski and Urry (2010, p. 4) comment: Any description

and prediction of climate change and its impacts is entangled with specific

imaginaries of how society is, and how it ought to be; similarly even the most

apparently technical of suggested responses will carry with it certain ideas of

society.

This commitment to maintaining the status quo reflects the position ofEcological Modernisation (EM) which has been described as having come to

dominate environmental policy debates since the 1980s (Hajer 1995, Mol

and Spaargaren 2000, Barry and Paterson 2004). EM is, broadly speaking, a

mechanism for challenging the traditional assumption that economic growth

and environmental sustainability cannot coexist happily and that pursuing

either one will be to the detriment of the other (Mol and Spaargaren 2000,

Barry and Paterson 2004). Accordingly, EM suggests that although modern

institutions may need to adapt they do not need to or should not be

overthrown (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). Clearly, from the perspective of

industrialised economies EM offers an attractive approach. As noted by

Sutton (2004, p. 150): ecological modernisation is a political programme,

which promotes a particular way of dealing with environmental issues at the

expense of others. This political programme is especially attractive to

northern governments as it is much less threatening than radical Green

politics.

Within this context policies relating to climate change are formulated in

ways which are non-threatening to industrialised states economies and ways of

life. This simultaneously limits the range of policy options to be considered and

further restricts debate in this area. Here extended peer communities could playan important role in questioning and/or challenging the framing of climate

change and the dominant assumptions about its policy implications. They

might also provide insights into particular social, political, cultural or ethical

contexts.

Environmental Politics 217

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It should be noted that environmental organisations and non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) do offer alternative and (at times) more radical

framings. For example, Greenpeace have called for an Energy Revolution

which would require fundamental changes in the way we generate energy, inthe way we live and travel and in our behaviour in general (Greenpeace 2007,

p. 3) and the climate justice movement draws attention to social justice aspects

of climate change and calls for policies which address inequalities in the

impacts of climate change as well as uneven responsibility for its causes (see

Bali Principles 2002). However, to date such alternative framings have not led

to radical change or action and have had little impact on mainstream policy

discourses. Given that they do not sit comfortably with dominant framings of

climate change they have struggled to receive policy attention. This may appear

to be at odds with vocal policy commitments to tackling climate change,however it can also be seen to illustrate the post-ecologist zeitgeist which

Blu hdorn (2007) suggests characterises late-modern societies. He contends that

the post-ecologist turn is a complex cultural transformation in which much

more inclusive understandings of eco-politics are superseded by technical and

managerial approaches which are symbolically empty, i.e. which deal with

short term and narrowly defined problems, but are no longer inspired by any

comprehensive ecological alternative to the established socio-economic system

(Blu hdorn 2007, pp. 262264). Furthermore, Blu hdorn (2007, p. 272) argues

that not only is this illustrated through a lack of political will for radical ortransformational policies, but it is also apparent in the responses of the wider

public who are seen to simultaneously acknowledge that radical and effective

change is urgent and inescapable and resolve to sustain what is known to be

unsustainable. Whilst there is an acknowledgement of the unsustainability of

ecological, social and cultural systems, society is firmly committed to

maintaining the current capitalist system which is seen to offer optimal

conditions for the realisation, expression and experience of the consumer-Self

(Blu hdorn 2007, p. 261). Therefore, whilst individuals might declare commit-

ments to societal and lifestyle changes to address the challenges of climate

change, there may be limited support for policies which require radical

transformations or which are perceived to challenge the capitalist under-

pinnings of late-modern society. This represents what Blu hdorn (2007) has

termed the simulative nature of contemporary eco-politics and may go some

way to explaining why, despite the political consensus around the urgency of

climate change, there has been little by way of meaningful action or change and

little support for more radical policy recommendations.

The ways in which public and policy preferences are shaped then becomes

an important area to consider. The dominant framing of climate change may

have emerged through an influential role of commercial interest groupstogether with societys preference for preserving the capitalist system.

Alternatively (or simultaneously) it may have come about through political

elites shaping the agenda to avoid consideration of more radical framings. A

third consideration is that peoples preferences for maintaining the status quo

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may have been shaped through subtle forms of power which have influenced

individuals perceptions of their own interests and preferences (Lukes 2005). In

this way, although current framings of climate change lead to limited policy

responses which serve to uphold unsustainable social structures, messagesconveyed through political, social and cultural media shape peoples

perceptions so that they would consider the maintenance of the status quo

to be in their interests and thus do not challenge political institutions upholding

this. The importance of scrutinising how messages relating to climate change

are conveyed to, and received by, wider society and what assumptions are

implicit within these messages is therefore vitally important.

The following section will draw on one example of an area where policy

reflects the depoliticised nature of climate change, its central justifying role and

the modernist presumptions underpinning policy. It will be shown thatreferences to climate change (reflecting particular modernist framings) can be

used to play a dangerous role in upholding the status quo and preventing

meaningful dissent.

Low carbon energy

In 2003 the UK government published a white paper entitled Our energy

future creating a low carbon economy (DTI 2003) in which key challenges

relating to energy production and use were set out. The first challenge relatedto the threat of climate change and in response a target for the UK to reduce

carbon dioxide emissions by 60% by the year 2050 was set. The second

challenge was in responding to the decline of UK-sourced energy supplies, (i.e.

oil, gas, nuclear and coal). It was suggested that by the year 2020 three quarters

of the UKs energy may be expected to be imported, hence there were concerns

over security of supply and a diversification of energy supply sources was

reported as necessary. The third challenge was to update the UKs energy

infrastructure. Particularly this meant upgrading or replacing old plants, and

this was to be done at least partly through new, renewable technologies.

As well as the above challenges, the white paper acknowledged four goals

for UK government policy. These were:

. to put ourselves on a path to cut the UKs CO2emissions by some 60%

by about 2050, with real progress by 2020;

. to maintain reliability of supplies;

. to promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, helping to raise

the rate of sustainable economic growth and improve our productivity;

and

. to ensure that every home is adequately and affordably heated. (DTI2003)

The white paper described improvements in energy efficiency as the

cheapest and safest way of meeting the objectives. However, renewable energy


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was seen to be an important component. Additionally, the white paper raised

the possibility of investment in a new generation of nuclear power plant. The

subsequent 2007 energy white paper (HM Government 2007) estimated that

the UK would need between 30 and 35 giga watts (GW) of new generatingcapacity over the next 20 years. The white paper stated that the government

must set the market framework for investment in new generation and that this

must be done in such a way as to encourage a low carbon mix. Thus whilst

fossil fuels were acknowledged to have continued importance, renewable

sources of energy were emphasised along with the possibility of investment in

new nuclear build. As noted above, in recent policy documents and

consultations nuclear energy has been framed as a low emissions (or low

carbon) technology and consequently as potentially having a valuable role to

play in efforts to mitigate climate change (see HM Government 2007).In 2009 the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) published

The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan. This reiterated and expanded on many

of the earlier commitments and set out the UKs plan for delivering emission

cuts of 18% on 2008 levels by the year 2020. As in earlier white papers it

highlighted the important role of energy efficiency measures, however

it continued to stress the value of investing in renewable and nuclear energy.

It emphasised the importance of maintaining security of energy supplies as well

as the value of creating economic opportunities through new green industries.

The energy future envisaged within the 2003, 2007 and 2009 white papersaddresses a number of concerns, (i.e. energy security, economic factors and

emissions reductions). Whilst they place emphasis on the importance of low

carbon transitions, the challenges discussed and solutions identified highlight

the centrality of modernist and economic rationales. Improvements in energy

efficiency and reduction in energy demand, which may be crucial for tackling

climate change, are largely sidelined in favour of pro-development solutions

focused on building new infrastructure and creating new investment

opportunities.1 This clearly reflects the ethos of EM. UK energy policies

have emerged out of a pro-development worldview which centres on a

modernist faith in science and technologys ability to address contemporary

environmental (or economic) challenges. Policies to develop renewable energy

capacity might have found their justifications through references to creating

new domestic industries and providing new sources of investment whilst also

diversifying UK energy supplies and reducing reliance on international

imports. However, climate change provides a worthy (depoliticised) cause

which is mobilised to present a strong rationale for energy policies, and one

which is very hard to credibly contest. Climate change is not the only or

main driver behind investment in and policy support for new renewable

energy infrastructure but it provides the most robust rationale.It is important to highlight the dominant modernist underpinning of energy

and climate change policies which emphasise the importance of meeting current

(and growing) energy demand, rather than reducing energy demand through

societal and individual lifestyle changes. Whilst the latter would require a

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fundamental transformation in societal structures within industrialised

countries, the former enables policymakers to vocalise strong policy commit-

ments to addressing climate change whilst avoiding major disruption or

challenges to the status quo. Policymakers therefore have vested interests infocusing on energy security and production and remaining largely silent in

relation to reducing energy demand and consumption. This also offers some

explanation to the lack of attention given to the topic of peak oil within policy

circles. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that global oil

production could reach its peak within the first half of the twenty-first century,

after which point it is expected to go into terminal decline (Bardi 2009). This

might provide strong incentives to re-evaluate patterns of energy use and

dependence on oil. However, current policy in industrialised countries is largely

silent on this topic. Moreover, governments have challenged peak oil theories(Bardi 2009) or, it has been suggested, even actively concealed evidence relating

to peak oil (Monbiot 2011). Instead energy policies, discussed in the context

of climate change, are presented as being faced by challenges of lowering

emissions but importantly through means which do not threaten, or call into

question current societal structures.

Out of this context renewable energy has been framed as a key component

in the national strategy for addressing climate change through reducing

emissions. Currently there is a UK target that 15% of the UKs energy

(including for electricity, heat and transport) should come from renewablesources by the year 2020 (HM Government 2009). In Scotland there is a more

ambitious target that 50% of demand for Scottish electricity and 11% of

Scotlands heat should come from renewable sources by 2020 (Scottish

Government 2008). Accordingly, the planning system has adapted to reflect

these commitments.

Planning for renewable energy in the UK

In the United Kingdom planning is a devolved matter meaning that

England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own planning

systems directed by the devolved administrations. Each set of planning

policies assert commitments to sustainable development and addressing

climate change (see, for example, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2005,

Scottish Government 2010). Climate change policy has been described as

having an overarching nature and it has been advised that it is important

that proper weight is attached to climate change policy in relation to other

planning considerations (Arup and Partners 2010, p. 111). Planning policies

emphasise both that planning has a central role to play in addressing

climate change and also that climate change must be a central considerationin planning decisions (see Scottish Government 2010, Welsh Assembly

Government 2010).

Whilst environmental stewardship is presented as being an important

component of the planning system, enabling development is a key objective.


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For example, Scottish planning policy states that the central purpose of the

planning system is increasing sustainable economic growth (Scottish

Government 2010, p. 1). The modernist underpinning of the planning system

is clear within planning policies. For example, the recent modernisation of theScottish planning system had four principal goals, namely: strengthening the

involvement of communities; speeding up decisions; reflecting local views

better; and allowing quicker investment decisions (Scottish Executive 2005).

Whilst on the one hand these goals reflect commitments to public engagement

and democratic accountability, on the other hand they reflect modernist goals

of enabling development through speeding up the planning process and

allowing quicker investment decisions.

Within this pro-development context there is an important role to be played

by renewable energy. The strong policy commitments to developing renewableenergy discussed above are reflected within planning policies across the UK. For

example, it is stated that Development plans should support all scales of

development associated with the generation of energy and heat from renewable

sources, ensuring that an areas renewable energy potential is realised and

optimised (Scottish Government 2010, p. 37), and that planning policies should

be designed to promote and not restrict renewable and low-carbon energy and

supporting infrastructure (Department for Communities and Local Govern-

ment 2007, p. 14); furthermore, it is stated that planning policies should provide

for renewable and low carbon energy sources at all scales (Welsh AssemblyGovernment 2010, p. 48). As such, in response to policies and targets emphasising

the importance of developing renewable energy capacity the planning system has

developed an explicit bias in favour of renewable energy projects.

However, the planning system is simultaneously legitimated by claims to its

democratic character and planning policies across the UK frequently reassert

the importance of public involvement in planning processes (e.g. Office of the

Deputy Prime Minister 2005, Scottish Government 2010); this includes the

right of members of the public to make representations relating to particular

planning applications. This situation can lead to an uncomfortable combina-

tion of commitments to development and public involvement. At times the

goals of developing renewable energy capacity and reflecting public views in

planning processes and decisions may be in conflict with one another. How

these goals are met or traded off is therefore a crucial consideration.

Public responses to renewable energy

Much has been written about public opposition to renewable energy

developments (particularly wind power) and it has frequently been asserted

that this is responsible for slow rates of development (Bellet al. 2005, Breukersand Wolsink 2007, Devine-Wright 2007, Elliset al. 2007, Peel and Lloyd 2007,

Barry et al. 2008). The literature on this subject and policy responses

routinely frame public opposition as an obstacle or problem which needs to be

overcome in order to achieve national targets for renewable energy capacity

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(Aitken 2010b). This has led to a conviction that there is a planning problem

impeding the development of renewable energy (Elliset al. 2009). Planning has

been viewed as a barrier to the expansion of wind energy (Elliset al. 2009,

p. 523) and a discourse has emerged which portrays the planning system as anobstacle impeding the goals of sustainability. Significant emphasis has been

placed on how planning processes can be made more efficient and approval

rates can be increased (e.g. BWEA 2004, 2008).

Within both policy and academic discourse this has informed an approach

to understanding local opposition which essentially views it as a problem or

obstacle to be overcome. It is routinely argued that the majority of the public

are supportive of policies to support the development of renewable energy

capacity and hence that local opposition to particular proposed developments

represents a deviation from real public opinion (Aitken 2010b). Perhaps theclearest illustrations of this thinking are NIMBY (not in my back yard)

explanations of opposition to renewable energy. Here it is presumed that

individuals are supportive of renewable energy as a general concept but object

to particular proposed developments in their area (Warrenet al. 2005). Such

explanations view objectors as rational, individualistic actors and overlook the

range of complex contextual, social or personal factors shaping public

responses (Devine-Wright 2005). NIMBY explanations have been widely

renounced in the academic literature, yet remain widely mobilised for

example, actors within particular planning conflicts have been observed to referto NIMBY explanations either to explain other peoples opposition or to refute

that they themselves are NIMBYs (Burningham 2000, Elliset al. 2007, van der

Horst 2007, Barryet al. 2008). This is significant as it illustrates that opposition

to desirable policy goals is framed as a problem, or as deviant from real

public opinion not simply in abstract academic discussions but also on the

ground within particular planning debates. Accordingly, it appears that

opposition to policies or projects justified in terms of climate change mitigation

may be becoming socially unacceptable.

This overlooks the range of motivations and experiences behind public

opposition to renewable energy developments. For example, opposition may:

. be grounded in local knowledge and concerns relating to particular

features of the local environment (Aitkenet al. 2008, Aitken 2009);

. stem from awareness of controversy around scientific or policy claims

regarding the potential contribution of renewable energy in tackling

climate change (e.g. Ellis et al. 2007); or

. relate to perceived injustice or inequity in the benefits accruing from

developments (Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Elliset al. 2009).

Renewable energy remains a contested subject matter (Devine-Wright and

Devine-Wright 2006) and it is perhaps inevitable that proposed developments

will not be greeted with unanimous public support. Moreover, opposition can

be based on a variety of valid concerns and relevant knowledge. The dominant


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framing which presents opposition as deviant therefore overlooks a potentially

valuable resource of knowledge and insights or extended facts (Funtowicz

and Ravetz 1993). However, instead of seeking to address public concerns and

incorporate public viewpoints the current approach appears to be focused onovercoming or avoiding public opposition. This illustrates a worrying

conception of the planning system which sees it not as a democratic forum

for mediating public views, but rather as a bureaucratic system for legitimising

and facilitating government policies.

Moreover, despite arguments that public opposition to renewable energy

developments represents an obstacle to meeting national targets, the power or

influence of members of the public in planning processes relating to

renewable energy developments appears to be limited (Aitken et al. 2008,

Aitken 2010a). For example, whilst planning processes, particularly publicinquiries, have previously been described as provid[ing] crucial institutional

spaces for challenges to the status quo (Cowell and Owens 2006, p. 405)

recent analyses have suggested that in relation to renewable energy

developments public inquiries are instead serving to uphold the status quo

and protect government policies from challenge (Aitken et al. 2008). Arup

and Partners (2010) found that whilst local authority planning departments

vary, planning inspectorates determining appeals increasingly rely on climate

change considerations in justifying their decisions. Government policies can

be seen to have an untouchable status in planning processes (Aitken et al.2008) and can be used to close down debate and limit opportunities for

public participation.

Cowell and Owens (2006) provide a range of examples of instances where

public inquiries have previously been used to call into question dominant

policy assumptions and to effect change (for example in relation to road

transport or minerals planning). However, in the case of renewable energy this

does not appear to be so. This might be due to the particularly strong policy

commitments relating to renewable energy development or the depoliticised

nature of climate change which has made it difficult to credibly contest policies

justified in terms of climate change mitigation.

Yet despite limited evidence that objectors are powerful actors in planning

processes, opposition to renewable energy developments continues to be

presented as an obstacle to be tackled or overcome in order to meet targets and

address the challenges of climate change. This has important implications for

democratic accountability. There is an evident conviction that projects which

address climate change are necessary and appropriate. Yet there is little public

debate around how climate change can most effectively be addressed, or

concerning the implications of dominant policy approaches to climate change.

Therefore the questions of whether particular projects or policies are the mostappropriate for addressing climate change are left largely unanswered or even

unasked.

In this context, framing energy policy in terms of climate change mitigation

(as opposed to alternative economic framings) provides a robust justification

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for the expansion of renewable energy capacity and one which it is very difficult

to challenge or refute. In this context opposition to renewable energy projects is

not viewed as a valid expression of public concern within a democratic

institution but rather as a harmful obstruction to an agreed upon policy goal.The focus is on finding ways of overcoming or avoiding opposition rather than

seeking to address, incorporate or reflect public concerns. Furthermore, the

pro-development and pro-renewables position underpinning the planning

system creates limits to the possibilities for public participation and debate.

Cautionary discussion

The depoliticised nature of climate change and its framing as the paramount

environmental and social problem facing global society have given it a uniquepowerful position. The widespread agreement that action must be taken to

mitigate climate change has resulted in a range of policies focusing on

emissions reduction. However, it is a particular framing of climate change and

mitigation which has come to dominate. Policy typically follows modernist

approaches favouring innovation, development and technological fixes.

Climate change and potential solutions have been framed in ways which

reflect the interests of Northern industrialised economies. Whilst widespread

lifestyle and behavioural changes appear necessary, current policies emphasise

the need for investment in new clean technologies and innovative approachesto supplying current (and growing) energy demands. In comparison, policy-

makers remain largely silent in relation to energy consumption and reducing

demand through lifestyle and societal changes. The policy approach taken

largely serves to protect the status quo and minimise disruption to modern,

capitalist lifestyles. This restricted framing of the issue limits opportunities for

debate concerning the implications of climate change for societal structures or

regarding alternative (more radical) approaches to addressing the challenges of

climate change. This effectively sets limits to democracy by defining the scope

of public debate.

Given the difficulty associated with credibly challenging claims relating to

the necessity of addressing climate change, it is possible to justify a wide range

of policies through connecting them to this goal. In the case of planning for

renewable energy in the UK it is clear that the framing of the development of

renewable energy as a key component of the governments strategy for

addressing climate change justifies and perpetuates the discrediting of

opposition arguments. A planning problem is perceived since the desired

outcome has been agreed upon (more renewable energy) and the planning

process is conceptualised as a vehicle through which this outcome should be

reached. In this context the planning system is no longer viewed as an inclusiveand essentially democratic institution for mediating disputes and reflecting

public views but rather as a system for legitimising existing policies and

reinforcing existing priorities. Public opinion where this takes the form of

public opposition is not valued as an opportunity to reflect and incorporate


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different points of view and sources of knowledge, but instead is discredited

and treated as an obstacle to the globally important goal of climate change

mitigation.

The dominance of narrow, modernist framings of climate change serves toshut down debate and alternative framings are largely excluded from public

and policy discourse. Moreover, despite vocal commitments to addressing

climate change, society is largely unwilling to make significant sacrifices and

lifestyle changes in order to meet this goal (Blu hdorn 2007). Therefore, more

radical framings are not advanced since they are perceived to be adverse to

individuals and societys interests. One must therefore consider how peoples

perceptions of their interests have been shaped, and in particular how the

dominant framing of climate change has been advanced and maintained

through social, political and cultural media.References to climate change can be used to justify a wide range of policies

and projects and to limit the scope for public debate and dissent. Assumptions

implicit in the mobilisation of climate change, and in decisions around which

policies or projects climate change is called upon to justify and the implications

that this has for broader social and political institutions warrant scrutiny.

Public debate and dissensus have important roles to play in questioning how

policy decisions are made and in examining the social, political or economic

interests implicit in climate science and related policies. In particular, dissent

has a valuable role to play in challenging the modernist assumptionsunderpinning current policy approaches and drawing attention to alternative

framings.

Acknowledgements

I thank the three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, andthe ESRC for funding this research (award number PTA-026-27-2236).

Note

1. Parallels can be drawn with the way in which planning has responded to the threatof flooding. White and Howe (2002) have noted that the pro-developmentunderpinning of the planning system has resulted in a system which favoursdevelopment with measures to protect against flooding instead of precautionaryapproaches which would help to prevent future flooding. They suggest that this pro-development approach has fostered an environment susceptible to flooding.

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