Allen SocraticParadox

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The Socratic ParadoxAuthor(s): R. E. AllenSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1960), pp. 256-265Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708198 .

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THE SOCRATIC PARADOX

BY R. E. ALLEN

Mostpeople hink hatknowledgeas neithertrengthorauthority orpower fcommand;hat hough manmayhave t, t can be overpowered-by anger, y pleasure nd pain,sometimesy love,often y fear-asthought were omepoor lave, o bedraggedbout twillbythepassions.Is thatyour iew, rotagoras?Orwouldyounotrathergree hatknowl-edge sa thingfbeauty ndpower,nvincible;hat nce manknows oodfromvil,nothingnearth ancompel im oactagainst hatknowledge-Wisdom eing ufficientohisaid?

Protagoras52b-c

Therehas beenremarkablenanimitymong cholars s to whatSoc-ratesmeant y saying hatVirtues Knowledge,hat pEr' is OrtaTTT)L. Inessence,hedoctrinettributedohim s this:abstract,udgmentalnowl-edgeofvalue, imilar o theknowledgehatgold s yellow, hatfire urns,thatthesquareof two s four, ecessitatesertain inds faction:knowl-edge ofthe essential natureofvirtue,of its definition,ntails virtuousbe-havior.

Thisview fSocrates'meaning as beenheldbymany ritics,nd townsthedistinguishedupport fAristotle.'But ftakenbaldly,tisuntenable,

andmoreover,atentlyo. It may be thatfor pure pirit,o know hegood s todo it; buthuman eings resomethingessthanpure pirits.Acommonxperiencefthemoral ife, nd onewhich as exerciseduropeanethical nquiryince tsinception,s that of the selfdivided n conflictfmotives.We lovewhatwehate, ongforwhatwefear, rgentlyeekwhatwe wouldmost void. We do those hings eought ot odo,and do themin somesense knowingly.The man does not existwhoseprinciples,tsome ime, ave not beencorruptedyhispassions;no onebuta creaturewithoutmotions oulddeny his, nd Socrateswas bothpassionate ndwise.

Thetraditionalnterpretationsunbelievable.What, hen, id Socratesmean?

Epistemologistsavecommonlynderstoodknowledgeto meanknowl-edgeof facts nd their elation, nowinghat omethings true. But inordinaryiscoursehere s anotherense ftheword,hesense nwhichweknowhow oplaytennis,r bakecakes, rcrackokes. Thisassociation fknowledge ith bility s primitive.Both can and know arederived

fromhesameroot,2n

association hich urvivesntheGerman onnen,and narchaic nglish sage. GertrudeheQueen, escribinghedrowning

ofOphelia, elateshow,for littlewhile, heair in her' armentsuoyedherup:

1Cf. E.N. 1145b23ff.For a clearmodernxpression,ee RichardRobinson,Plato'sEarlierDialectic Oxford,953),14.

2 OE.D., s.v. can' and know'; phonetically,ompareheScots ken,'whichretains heancientssociationfability ndknowledge.

256



THE SOCRATIC PARADOX 257

Which ime hechantednatchesf oldtunes;As one ncapable fherowndistress,Or ikea creature ative nd ndued

Unto hatelement.Similarly,haucer's ranklin, simpleman, onfesses,

I ne canno termes f astrologye.

Bacon'sfamous ictumKnowledgesPower' must aveseemed ohis con-temporariesilmost commonplace. tymologically,osaythat manhasknowledges to suggesthathe knowshow to act;3 and thissame con-nectionsfoundn Greek. E7TrTaraatwith he nfinitivesidenticaln mean-

ing ndgrammaticalorm ith heEnglishknowhow o and the nfinitivewith onnen r avoir. Thenoun 7TL'YT?)bL?) mayhavethe amemeaning,4ndthis s significant.

It has usuallybeen upposed hatSocrateswas a radical ntellectualistin moralpsychology;ut the connectionfknowledge ith bility ndhisexplicit (and repeated) association of knowledgewith art,TExv-?,5uggestsa differentiew. It suggestshatSocratesmeant y Virtue sKnowledge'thatthosemenare virtuous ho possess he artof intelligentiving,whoknowhow o be virtuous,r possessmoral bility. If he did mean his, he

majorobjectiono thetraditionalnterpretations avoided, or o speakofa man'sknowledge,n thisconcreteense, s overcomey passion r desireis to speaknonsense.When manacts againsthis better udgment,edemonstrateshat,whateveris professions,e doesnotreally nowhow olive correctly. he pleasuresnd fears, assions nddesires fmortal ifearea material lement,atient o theknowingoul. Virtue sesthem s apotter seshis clay; andthemanwhocannotwork lay s no potter.Theknowledge hich s virtues not merelyn abstract r theoreticalnder-standingfvalue,but the capacity rpractical bility o exhibit nder-

3Knowledges also associatedwith tance r posture. In English,weunder-standor standunder thing. The German tands hrought (ver-stehen).TheGreek tands o or at or by t (&L'-o.raaOat, assuminghatthis s properly erivedfrom he sta- rootfound n 'stand' and stehen'). In each case, the rootmeta-phor eems o be that of taking p a physical osture oward thing, f puttingone's elf n a positiono act. I am ndebtedo Prof.N. J. DeWitt or his emark.

4Mr. JohnGould (Plato's Ethics [Cambridge, 955], 15) summarizes rof.BrunoSnell's urvey f pre-Platonicses of brorT'4L'q as follows: 'ETrt(ralia and

trYTL/77, like roctaand unlike tyvKEotvndovvetvaL,ave as their rimary ean-

ing efficiencyn practice,' ractical ntelligence;ometimes enoting restrictedtechniqueability nsome pecial ield), ometimesgenerallyntelligentpproachto iving.... 'E=ar'TV- doesnot mply ontemplationfan object, utunderstand-ing, n the ense f ability oact."

5Cf. on 537d, 38aff., harm. 65d, uthyph. 4c,Rep. I 342c, 35a,Euthyd.289c, rot.345a. This ist s by no means xhaustive.



258 R. E. ALLEN

standingn action.6 f this s true, he Socratic aradox s far esspara-doxical.

If one wereto offer parameteror hetraditionalnterpretationf'Virtue s Knowledge'twouldbe, to knowwhatvirtues, s to be virtu-ous.' Aswe haveseen, his s false o thecomplexityfhuman ature ndits elf-division. better arameters, to knowhow o bevirtuousstobevirtuous,'incevirtues notmerely matter ffactualknowledge,utofpracticalbility.

This conclusions notwholly riginal.Mr. JohnGould, n a recentbook,Plato's Ethics,has defendedt withadmirable igorand lucidity.Buthe goesontoerect pon t an interpretationhich s more uestionable,

onewhich,ntheremainingagesof thispaper, propose o criticize.Mr.Gould's nterpretations essentiallyylean: ound ractice oesnotrequireound heory,ranytheory. Knowinghow'needhavenoadmix-ture f knowing hat.' Theknowledge hich ocrates alued s not udg-mental rabstract: t is intelligentbility, ndthatonly. " ForSocratesandPlato,to achieve perq's not o arrive t a validethical heory,uttoattainvalidmoral ehavior (op.cit., . 13).

It follows hat hetraditionaliewmisunderstoodheproblem ocratessethimselfo solve. His wasnottheproblemfthe udgeorcritic, acedwith hetaskofdefiningn objective riterionfmoralbehavior. t wasratherheproblemfthemoral gent, acedwith heexigenciesfaction.The moral im s insome ense 'given' (p. ix); theproblemfethicssnot odiscoverne's im,butto attain t.

There eemsnoquestionnthese arly ialogues f ooking or n objectivejustificationormoralbehavior: heassumptionppears o be thatmoralbehavior . . justifies tself, nd the problem s how to achieve it . ...There is nothing o farto suggest hat 6rtor4u is in any way to be under-

stood as . . . contemplation f moral truth . . . It represents ather amoralassurance, erhapswithout bjectiveustification,ut sufficientomakeaction ollowpp.20-21).

Mr.Gouldconcludes romhisthatSocrateswas a moral ubjectivist,though I would iketo add) in a peculiar ense. A modernubjectivistwoulddeny hatmoral tatementsan be trueorfalse, rmore han m-perativesrexpressionsffeelingndattitude.But forMr.Gould's oc-rates, hetruth fmoraludgmentss notdenied,imply ecause heques-tionoftheir ruth oesnotarise. Moralknowledge,hich s ability, an

nomorentheordinaryensebe true hanability oplaytennis rdancejigs can be true. Socrateswas, nthisview, subjectivistecausehewasnot an objectivist.Buthewasnotan objectivist,fMr.Gould s correct,in ustthesense hatthenumbereven s notpurple; t is notpurple e-

6Strictly,heability o be virtuouss notvirtue,nymore hantheability oplaytenniss playingennis. Socrates ssumes hatwheremoral bility xists twillbe actualized ueto theftotA.qoatsr truewish' ofmenforthegood. Mr.Gould'sdiscussionf this op. cit., h. ii) is excellent,ndthereadernterestednpursuinghismatter urthers advised oconsultt.




cause it is not any color at all, not because it is red. The traditional n-terpretation,n forcing ocrates to take a stand in the disputeovermoralobjectivity, as made himanswer a question whichhe did not,and under

the circumstances ould not, ask. For on Mr. Gould's view, E`rLTo7FL?1 con-sistssolely in behavior,not in judgments:

Does 'Plato suggest hat rto-7-' is to be thought fas evinced n action,as

a mannerof acting,or as a prior tate of minduponwhichaction follows?Is 'knowing' a mannerof behavingor of thinking? . . . I believe thatPlato would answer,however ittle in our terms: a manner of behaving(p. 30).

Mr. Gould's Socrates,then, o far as moralsat least are concerned, s, like

ProfessorRyle, a logical behaviorist, man who believesthat,"when wedescribepeopleas exercisingualities ofmind,we are notreferringo occultepisodesofwhichtheirovertacts and utterances re effects;we are refer-ring o thoseovertacts and utterances hemselves."

There is much nMr. Gould's interpretationhat is suggestive nd pene-trating, nd it supplies a welcomecorrective. But in its implications t isverynearly as one-sidedas the view it is designed to replace. In whatfollows shall argue that it misrepresentshe nature of Socratic dialectic,that it neglects ocrates' genuinebelief n the relevanceof moraltheory omoralpractice, nd that it misunderstands is estimateof the inner ife ofthemoralagent. The upshot ofthisdiscussionwillbe that bothMr. Gouldand the traditionalview are right n what theyaffirm,rongonly in whatthey deny; that the properparameter for Virtue is Knowledge' is, 'toknowhow to be virtuous, nd to knowwhat virtue s, is to be virtuous.'No prioritywill be assigned to 'knowing how' or 'knowing that'; bothare parts of thesameprocess, nd in Socrates'thought,mutually mplicated-indeed, perhapshardlydistinguished.

A. SOCRATIC DIALECTIC

The traditional nterpretationiewed the questions What is Justice?'and 'What is Courage?' as questionsfortheory, emanding n answer,notdirectly n action. Nevertheless heyhad directpracticalbearing,for f aman is to behavemorallyhemustknowwhatmoralbehavior s, and ifhe isto knowwhenhe succeeds,orwhen he fails,he mustknowwhat it is he isaimingat.8 Reflection n moralprinciple s notaccidental to morality, ut

7Gilbert yle,Concept fMind NewYork, 949),25.8 Prof.Ryle ndMr.Gouldwouldhere bject hatpracticalbility eednot n-

volveanyabstract r judgmentalnowledget all. A traditionalistouldreplythatthismaywellbe true, utthat n thespecial ase ofmorality,t least, t isirrelevant:ormoral ctions,o useKant's anguage,reactions onenotonly sduty equires,utalsobecause uty equires. fthedeonticxpressioneemsnap-propriateor Greek, hesamepointmaybe putin anotherway: actionunder-takenwithouteflectionnandknowledgefmoral rinciples,nomatter owwellit succeedsn attaining commendablend, tself omoremoral hanthatof abrute nimal's.We do notpraise piders or pinning ebs, r dogsforburying

bones,hough emay dmirehe killwithwhichhey oit.



260 R. E. ALLEN

of its essence. Dialectic, Socrates' technique of question-and-answer nsearch of definitions,imed at moral improvement;t did so by aiming attruth.

Mr. Gould disagrees, incein hisview Socrateswas not in any way con-cernedwithmoraltheory. The virtuousman,hemaintains,n face ofmoraldecision, possesses an inward convictionor assurance very like that of amaster-weaver t his loom. The goal of dialectic s to producethat assur-ance,9 and its instruments ad hominem rgument. Addressing tself o aparticular ndividual n a particular ituation, ialectic producesa convic-tionpeculiarly nd personallyhis own. There is no questionhere of moralrules or universal principles, hough t is no accident that dialectic shoulduse as its methodthe search for definitions.Socrates' ethics was not de-scriptive, ut normative, nd its definitionsre disguisedrecommendations,' persuasive definitions,' efinitionswhich redirect ttitudesby redefiningterms.

This view seems tenable only because Mr. Gould assumes (and does notargue) that definitionsre incapable of beingtrueor false. But this is amiodern, r at least post-Aristotelian,hesis,and Aristotlehimself howedinstructive esitationon the issue. As forPlato, there s no evidence thathe ever viewed definitions merelynominalor stipulative, s he would have

had to if he had accepted this view. Socrates and Thrasymachus, o takeonly one example, are not in the Republic quarreling verthe meaningofthe word 'justice,' but over Justice,over the nature of somethingwhichexists. Definition, or Plato, is real definition;t articulatesthe structureof reality, nd is as capable of truthor falsity s any othertype of state-ment. If this were not true, the method of hypothesis n the middle dia-logues, and the method of collection and division in the later, would beunintelligible; nd in the absence of strong videnceto the contrary,whichMr. Gould has not produced,we must also suppose it true of the early

period. The dialogues,from irst o last, assume that definitions the goalof nquiry, ot ts nitium, nd that to achievedefinitions to achieve knowl-edge of reality.

This view of definitions important ora correctunderstandingf the'particularity' ofSocratic argument. Dialectic involvesno proof, nd littlededuction;as Mr. Gould rightly emarks, t is a direct appeal to the manhimself. But though he process of arguments particular, dapted to theindividual addressed,the product s not. The goal of moral inquiry,forSocrates, s self-knowledge, nowledgeof one's own humannature and its

needs. But dialectic is universal, n this' ense: it seeks to define,not myjustice,oryours,but Justice; and this implies hat, howevermuch one manmay differrom nother, here s a point nwhichall menare one. In self-knowledge,particularity,'we touchtheuniversal. This is worth laborat-ing. All men possess self-knowledge,oweverdimly, nd it is forthis rea-

9Mr. Gould appearsto believe hat onlythosewhohavemoralability anpossess hisconviction,o that dialectic,n producingonviction,roducesmoralability s well. But inwhatway s the conviction hichmarks hewiseman sub-jectively ifferentrom hatwhich o oftenmarks hefool?




son that ironywas so markeda feature fSocrates' character. His was thehumorofthemanwho knowsthat his opponent n argument s wrong, ndalso knowsthat, despite his protestations,he opponentknows it too. In

Socratic ronywe find ne rootofPlato's theory fRecollection, hetheorythat thetruth f all things s always in the soul. This much s clear: argu-ment, n such a theory,mustalways at bottombe ad hominem, or ts pur-pose is not to lead on to novelty,but to clear away obscurities rom ome-thingwhich has always been thereto be seen.10

Mr. Gould is able to ignorethe analytic and judgmental character ofdialectic only by treating he moral aim as a 'given.' But this seems ec-centric. In the latterpart of theVth century, orceof events and fermentof ideas had subjected themoral code ofGreece to doubtful crutiny;mo-rality-any moralitybeyond the appeal to force and naked passion-de-manded justification nd defense. The debate of Socrates and Thrasy-machus over the nature of Justice s a debate over the moral aim, overwhat is worth ivingfor. It is not a debate over means to an end alreadyagreedupon. The moral aim,for ocrates, s clear: it is spiritualperfection,virtue, state of the individual soul which s identicalwithself-knowledgeand self-mastery. This conclusion, nd its corollaries, o farfrombeinga' given,'was forged n the face ofhot dispute, nd of themost intense nd

painfulself-questioningnd self-doubt.Mr. Gould, then, rrs n rejecting he traditionalview ofthe roleof dia-lectic; he errsno less in what he puts in its place. In his view, the aim ofdialectic is to produce con'viction r assurance, though not the convictionor assurance that certainpropositions re true. But even if it be grantedthat a conviction f this kindexists, t has littleto do withPlato, who dis-tinguishes nowledgefrombeliefand defines t by its ability to 'render anaccount' and by its fieldof objects. Those objects are Forms,Formswhichpertain o moral no less thanmathematical nquiry. Mr. Gould avers that,

"a troublesomedea whichwemust bandonis thesupposition hat&UrC7q,

inPlato's writings, ases its claimto acknowledged upremacynthesphereof ethics (and humanbehaviorgenerally)on being n touchwithobjectivetruths robjectivevalues " (p. 11). But surely, o abandonthe objectivityof rtTWT' is to abandonPlatonism. Whatever lse itmaybe,thetheory fForms s a theory f deals, ideals which erve as themain aim ofmoralas-piration and lend to moral activity ts very meaning. The essence of Pla-tonismis its firm nd unswerving ffirmationf the objectivityof thoseideals, their ndependence f humanbeliefsand attitudes nd the world of

temporalfact; and the relevanceofthem, nd ofknowledge fthem, o thecourseofhuman ife. This conclusion s as true, n a differentay, ofthe

10Mr. Gould, ightly,onnectshead hominemharacter fdialecticwith hefact hatPlatowrote ialogues,ottreatises.Butthedialogue orm oesnot mplythatPlatothoughthatphilosophicalruth acks ystem,till ess thattheres notruth obeknown;timplieshat ruth,f tis tobe recovered, ust e recoveredoutofone's elf. Forthisprocess,uestionings vital, ndthereforeot doctrinebutdialogue,hedramaticnterplayf mindwithmindnconversation,s perhapsthebest ubstituteor onversationtself.



262 R. E. ALLEN

earlydialogues as of the middle. The Socratic positionwas indeliblyob-jective, thoughnot in Plato's sense. It did not assertthe existence fspe-cificallymoralobjects; but it did assumethat there s a truth nmoralsno

less than in mathematics, truthvitally relevant o the livingof a humanlife.11

B. MORAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE

Dialectic is theprimemethodofmoralexhortation orSocrates. If, asI have argued, it attempted o obtain moral improvement y exhibitingmoraltruth, henthe relevance of moraltheory o moral practice s estab-lished. But that relevance could have been establishedon independentgrounds, ince t is implicit nthe notionofrTXV1.

Mr. Gould regards EXv-1erely s 'practical aptitude'; but spidershavea practicalaptitudeforweb-spinning,houghnotthe art of spinningwebs.A better ommenltaryn theword'smeaning s the firsthapterof the Meta-physics,whereArtor Wisdomis straightforwardlyiewed as practical sci-ence,concernedwith the concrete pplication of universalprinciples. Aris-totle's reatment frEXv-7erely choesthat of Plato intheGorgias (500eif.,cf.503e), a dialogue not laterthanthe earlymiddleperiod. Therethe de-fining haracter of Art, as distinct frommere knack' and 'experience'

(rpt3,8qnd E'pratpta) is that it inquires ntothe nature of its obj ct and thecause of itsbehavior, nd is able to render n account. The notionofintel-ligentpracticedivorcedfrom -heorys Rylean; it is not Platonic.'2

Socrates' missionas an ethical teacherwas, in effect,o raisemenfromthelevel of moral E,u7rapi1a to the level ofmoralrEXv-.Every man, n a root,minimal ense,knowshow to live or he wouldnotbe alive; buthis ability ssusceptible fdegree, nd thekeyto successful iving s reflection.So longas menlive by custom nd habit,following lifeof conventionwhichtheydo not understandand therefore annot justify, hey live blindly. And

those who live blindlycannot live well. These are the men who, to usePlato's word, have mere c4tretpia. Their skill in living may be likened tothat of theunreflectiveook,who can bake a cake-sometimes an excellentcake-but cannotgive a recipe. It is characteristicf thiskind of knowl-

11 n supportfthis onclusion:t s reasonableo suppose hatPlatoviewed hetheoryf Forms s merelyn extensionr consequencefSocrates'moralphilos-ophy, hephilosophyfPlato's ownearlydialogues. f,as Mr.Gouldmaintains,theearlydialogues utforward typeofmoral ubjectivism,hen heres a revo-lutionn doctrineetween heearly nd middle eriod, revolution hich lato,

strangelynough,llows ooccur uitewithoutomment.12 'ETrt-rL , in theearlydialogues,maymean eitherbility r factual nowl-

edge. The brothersn theEuthydemus,orexample, laimto knoweverything(294aff.,f.278a,where ri7Trapiatquals theabstractrvv6cvat); theyhave factualknowledgef suchthingss thenumber f stars n the sky, nd grains f sand ontheseashore; ndtheyknowhowto do everything-toance, o vaultswords, ocobble ndsew-fortheir nowledges universal.Thisdiscussionxhibitsn am-biguityn commonsuageofwhich ocrateswas probably naware: he dual as-pects fknowledgeereheld nsolution,nified,n histhought,nd this hemistrymadenatural iseasy ssociationfknowledgendart.




edge that it is inarticulate; hough one can perform,ne cannotrender naccountof how oneperforms.But thegenuine rtistknowsbothwhat to doand what to say.13 He can render n account of hiswork because thereare

in it formal onditions boutwhich he can judge truly. There is an essen-tial structuremplicitn thegoal he seeksto realize, nthe materialhe workswith, n the instrumentsnd techniqueshe uses. An essentialfeature fart,as distinctfromknack, s the possessionof abstractknowledge, nowledgeof facts and theirrelation. The artistcombines his knowledgewith con-cretecapacity in action,and these two sides of graspand capacity are dis-tinct. A personwho can bake a good cake may be unable to providearecipe, nd as everybride upposedlyknows, personwith a recipemaynotbe able to bake a good cake. But thoughgraspand capacity are distinct,theyare complementary.Knowingwhat one is doingand knowinghow todo it are parts ofthe same process.

The Platonic view of art,then, s best explicatedas a formof appliedscience, like engineering r, to use a favoriteGreek example,medicine.Moral skill, if it is to be more than 'knack' and 'experience,' demandsmoral science.

There is no questionhereof saying, first earn moraltheory, nd thengo and be moral.' Socrates'respondents erealready engaged n themoral

life, incemenbynature searchfor heir own souls' good; that search is ofthe essence,not an accident,of humanexistence. A man cannotput him-selfoutside he moralcontext, eyondgoodand evil,for heclaim ofmoral-ity,on Socratic principles,s theclaimofhumannature on itself. Thus theappeal ofmoraltheory s not to a minddivorcedfrom ction (or passion);there s no suchmind, nd if therewere,moralprincipleswouldbe meaning-less to it, since theywould not issue from ife. Everyonebeginswith agrasp of those principles; if they did not, Socratic dialectic would havenothing t could say to them. But theirgrasp is dim and uncertain, nd

thereforerring, nd it was this flaw that dialectic aimed to correct. ForSocrates,moral theoryand moral behavior were distinguishable lementsof a singleactivity, n activitywhicheveryman,willy nilly, s committedto pursue.

C. THE INNER LIFE

My final bjection o Mr.Gould's interpretationsthat tprovidesno ustestimateof the place of moral inwardnessn Socrates' thought. ErtOTLt0J,

he holds, s purely mannerofbehaving. But onlythe body behaves,and

thereforehisview is not Platonic. Plato would have understood, s log-ical behavioristsike Mr. Gould and ProfessorRyle cannot, hose followersof the HyperboreanApollo,whose divinegifts nabled themto leave theirbodies periodically nd to journeyoverthe wholeworldto survey t. Inhoweverpeculiara way, theseshamansanticipated n theirown experiencePlato's theory hat the soul is immortal nd able to exist alone by itself,'apartfrom nd prior o thebody. This is a metaphysical octrine;but it is

13Alcib. I 140e, ach. 190c, rot.314b,Meno86b.



264 R. E. ALLEN

intimately onnectedwith Plato's moral theory. Just as the soul is inde-pendentof the body, so is the selfindependent f bodilybehavior. Plato

does not definemoralityby referenceo action or (scarcely less external)disposition o action. The moral ideal is an internalorder of soul, fromwhichright ction follows. It has often een remarked hat forPlato, thereis no such thing s just action; there re onlyactionsdoneby justmen. Toidentify irtuewith manner f behaving sto mistakeconsequent or ause.And virtue s knowledge.14

More precisely, irtue s self-knowledge,nd it is self-knowledge hichprovidesthe measure of Socratic inwardness. In the First Alcibiades 5 itis argued that to know what we ourselves re (Tt 7TOT' iofv avToc) we must

know the Self Itself avTo TavTo, 129b 1), plainly a universal n which ndi-vidual selves are grounded nd fromwhich they derive theirnature. Thisview is not explicit n any otherearly dialogue; but dialectic,with ts uni-versality f definition,resupposes t, and so does Socrates' ethics,which s-sumesthat men nseeking heirown self-perfectioneek a universal, n idealharmony n which truggle nd contention re reconciled. In self-knowledge,then, merely elative good is transcended,nd the individual s seento begrounded n something eeperthan himself. The First Alcibiades morethanhints that the ideal is no mere essential structure, ut an existent,God.The self, n findingtself, inds onsiderablymore, nd in so doing t passesbeyond ethics,forwhich the good is merelypossible, o religion,wherethepossible is actual. This is why friendship, typeof self-knowledge ainedby gazing intothe eye of another oul, is also a formof communionwithand knowledge f thedivine.16

14 It maybe objected hatMr. Gouldfindsn theconvictionr assurancef thevirtuousman kind f subjective ruth,' la Kierkegaard,ndquoteswith ppro-val Kierkegaard'samous uestion,What is truth ut to livefor n idea?' This

mighteem o ntroducehe nteriorityhat ocratic thics emands,ut t doesnot,and cannot onsistently. ocrates ould not well have been both a Rylean, orwhom nowledgef ourselvesnd otherswould e exhaustedntheir ehavior,nda Kierkegaardian,orwhom ny knowledgef behavior ouldonlybe 'possibilityknowledge,'rrelevanto the subjective ruthwhich s Faith. I thereforessumethat,forMr. Gould, assurance' means assured behavior,' nd that the abovecriticismtands.

It is perhapsworthwhileere o hazard remark n thetendency, hich s be-comingvermore opular, o introduce ierkegaardianhemesnto he nterpreta-tion ofSocrates. Socrateswas no voluntarist;here s no hint nywheren the

dialogues,r nGreek iteratureenerally,hat iving or n idea,passion or t,com-mitmento it, could ver erve o make t true. Socrateswas aware hat t is pos-sible o be intenselynd passionately rong,nd suggesthathe wouldhavefoundKierkegaard'sotion ftruth uiteunintelligible. e was not, herefore,proto-existentialist,nymore hanhe was a proto-logicalehaviorist.

15The genuinenessfthisdialogue as beendisputed,hough ot, think, ncompellingrounds.SinceMr.Gouldcites hedialogue or upport, assumeheagrees.But see A. E. Taylor, lato (NewYork,1950),522ff.

16Alcibiad. 132cff.




Plato's continualomparisonfthemind o the eye,of intelligenceosight,s mostsignificant:t is fruit f the assumptionhat theprimaryfunctionfboth ies n directndimmediatepprehension. ut theobject

of self-knowledge,nso far s it maybe called object,' snotmerely een:it s possessed.Theunity f he oul'svisions inextricablyssociatedwitha unity f ife. Theethicaldeal s oneofwholeness,n which hevariousandoftenontendinglementsn ournature nite nthe service fa singlecommonnd. The ideal s notunlike hatofKant's HolyWill, hewillofa personalityo perfectlynited hatno illicitnclinationan ever rise odisturbt. Ideally, he elf rsoulhas in t nocompartments,o unit acul-ties,no fissureso divide ntentionrom elief. Knowledge f themoralideal,self-knowledge,mplies unity fpersonalityn the service fthatideal. To know hegood s then o do it; formoralncapacitys themarkof a soul nconflict,Tacus, and ofthe gnorance hichTa'TcrYntails.

It follows romhis thattheparameter,to knowhowto be virtuous,and to knowwhat virtue s, is to be virtuous,' rovides nlya surfacemeaning orthedictum hatVirtue s Knowledge.Virtue mpliesbothgrasp nd capacity;but both re rootedn a form f intuitiono funda-mental hat t touches very orner f theself, n intuition hich ntailsthecompletentegrationf the personality.t followshattheres a di-

mensionfmeaningntheSocratic aradoxwhichmustremain arkanddifficulto understand;or he paradox ssuesfrom depth fexperiencewhich ewhaveattained,ndno one,notevenPlato in hisdescriptionsfBeauty tself ndthe Good,has adequately haracterized. ocratesper-hapsknew s wellas anyman thefull xtent fhis paradox, new hat twas obscure nd must emain o. Butthisdidnot ndicate heuselessnessofconceptualxplication.ntuition,e appears o havefelt,must ontin-uallybe associatedwith nalysis,nd bothwith ife;and in the union fthese lements,ll wouldbe enriched.

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