Amer J Soc 1924 Allport

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The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social ScienceAuthor(s): Floyd H. AllportSource: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 6 (May, 1924), pp. 688-706Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2764988 .

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THE GROUP FALLACY IN RELATION TO SOCIALSCIENCE'FLOYD H. ALLPORTUniversity f North Carolina

ABSTRACTThe manner fthinkingn terms f the obsoletecrowd-mind heory tillpersists.

Speaking n termsof collectivitys alluring; but it is description, ot explanation.Social organismmetaphors, roup-mindheories,nd the ikenever ead beyond hem-selves,nor serveto reveal causation.The group allacydefined.-Thisfallacyconsists n substitutinghegroupfortheindividual s a principle fexplanation. The groupconceptmaybe phrased n eitherpsychological r "purely social" terms. Illustrations re drawnfrom he followingfields. i. Social conflict.Freudian repression nd dissociation re terms pplicableonlyto individuals. There is a widedivergence fmeaningbetweenmental conflictand socialconflict. 2. Revolution. Here thefallacy s expressedn suchgroup termsas immobilityfsociety nd breakdown f "social habits." These terms re merelydescriptive, rawing ttention way fromthe trulycausal behavior of individuals.3. The theory fthe uper-organic.The conceptofa causal scienceon a purely ocial(non-psychological) lane is untenable,because in all scienceexplanations possibleonlyby drawing pontheconcepts f sciences t moreelementaryevels. In practicealso no one has succeeded nformulating scienceof this ort. Culturehistory s notculture xplanation;much ess s it an adequate explanation f socialchange.The truebasisfor sociologys the social behavior of the socialized ndividual, notherwords,social psychology. Theworkof sociologys to describecollectivities fsocial behavior nd socialchangeresulting romt in terms f the roup, nd to explainthesephenomena n terms f tke ndividual.

The theoryhat crowd ossesses mental ife esultingurelyfrom ggregationnd superadded o thementalprocesses f itsmemberseems ohaveperishedt thehandsofprogressn socialscience. Its ghost, owever, as beenexceedinglyifficulto lay.The convenientnd picturesquemanner f speakingn terms fgroups s wholeshas infiltrated uch f our socialthinking.Thesubtletyf hisnfluence aybepartly xplaineds follows. Whenwe read thata certain rmy aptured city, r a certain ootballteamdefeated rival eam, he anguage, hough otprecise,s notmisunderstood.t is clearthat t is solely he ndividualoldiersorplayerswho combined heir ffortsnd accomplishedhe featdescribed.Whenwe read,however,hatthecrowd ecomes io-

I Readat theDecember,923, meetingftheAmericanociologicalociety.688


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THE GROUP FALLACY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 689lent, motional,r intolerant,r that t thinksn images rlacksreason,we are ndanger fbeingmisled ntothinkinghat t is acrowdmind atherhan heminds f ndividuals hichs account-ablefor hese henomena.So long s the anguages ntendedndaccepted s purely escriptivend metaphoricalo confusionxists.But the transitionrom escriptiono explanation s in such casesvery ubtle, nd not alwaysrecognized.The intangibilityfthephenomenaombines ith he ollectiverabstract seof anguageto produce n error. This error s theattempt o explain ocialphenomenantermsf hegroup swhole,whereas he rue xplana-tion s to be found nly n its component arts, he ndividuals.Such nexplanations in tself alse. Wedonotneed super-mindhypothesiso explainmob ction, fwe buttake he roubleo studythe ndividualnthemobandobserve owheis respondingothestimuli ffordedy thebehavior f his fellows.This neglectedfield f tudys being roughto theforegroundya modernocialpsychology hosedata comprisehe ocialbehavior f the ndivid-ual. The crowd-mindheorys notonly alse; tretardsn a specialmanner hediscovery f the truth. Pointing oward hewholerather han theparts, t withdrawsttention rom he atter ndincites houghtnpreciselyhewrong irection.The influencef the social-mindheorys as widespreads it issubtle. In thevarious uises t hasassumed,t has become maz-ingly rotean. We find counterpartf t in the socialorganismmetaphorfPlato,as wellas in themodern arieties volvedbySpencer, spinas, ndMtinsterberg.n these lluringmetaphorsmuch pace sgiven odeveloping large onceptionhich eadsusnowhere;while he rue riginf ocial rganization,hepsychologyofthe individual, as beencorrespondinglyeglected.We meetwith hecollective rrorgain nthe ocial ystemsfphilosophicalidealists. Here t playsfreelynto the handsofa metaphysicsftheobjectivenature f mind. Professorosanquet, or xample,argues or heexistencef a "generalwill" which ivesdefinitionto individual ills.' We meetwith hefallacy gain n theories fgovernmentndmorals,wheret takesthegarbof national pirit,and absolutismn conceptionsf the tate, he aw,and theright.

I "The Notion f GeneralWill,"Mind I920), pp. 77-8I.


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690 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGYThe abstractedocialmindsput back again ntothe ndividual sthe"collective" r"bee-man" fSageret' s well as in the semi-mysticalheories fSidis2 ndTrotter.3A scholarlyttempt o put thesocial-mindypothesispon atenablebasis has recently eenmade by ProfessorMcDougall.4In hisview,which e calls the"GroupMind,"the ocialrealitysallegedto existnot in collective onsciousness orbehavior, utin an organizationr structuref socialrelationshipshich an beconceivedoexist nlyn mental erms. Auniversity,or xample,is not comprisedn its material spects,noreven n itspersonnel.It is systematizedelationf ndividualsndtraditions,ntangible,butreal andmental,nd carried long ndependentlyfparticularindividuals.Our answer o this s, ofcourse, hat, lthough otdependent pon particularndividuals,hisorganizedraditionsdependent ponsome individuals.It exists n theattitudesndconsciousnessfthese eparate ersons,ustas it didinProfessorMcDougall'smindwhile e wasdevelopinghe llustration. o faraswe know,hegroupmind asnoother orm f xistencehan his,namely,n individuals;nor couldwe conceive fit exertingnyeffectponthesocialorder xcept hroughhese gencies.Butperhapshebestway nwhich o dealwith hefallacy nderconsiderations to expose ts inadequacywhenput to thetestofexplanation. Accepting t face value the social psychologyfLe Bon, supposeweproceed, quippedwith heconcepts fcrowdintolerance,motionality,rrationality,ndthe ike, o explain heactualmobphenomenafmodern ociety. We shouldfind hatour termsmerely escribe, heydo notexplain. We areascribingthe actions fthe mobto thingswhichmobsgenerallyo-whichis mere autology.There s at handnomeansfor xplaininghedifferencesn thebehavior fdifferentrowds,inceall are emo-tional, rrational,nd the ike. Why hould heexcitabilityfonecrowd xpresstself nwhippingon-church-goingarmers,hatof

r"Remarquesur a psychologieollective,"ev. hil., XXXVII (I9I9), 455-74.2 "The Source ndAim fHuman rogress,"ournalfAbnormalsychologyndSocial Psychology,IV (I9I9), 9I-I43.3 Instinctsf heHerd n Peace nd War.4 TheGroupMind.


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THE GROUP FALLACY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 69Ianotherrowdn ooting rocerytores,ndthatof till nothernlynchingegroes Thesequestionshrowntoreliefhenecessityofdelving eeper or urnotionsfcausethan erms hich escribethecrowd s a whole. Wemust eekourmechanismsfexplana-tion nthe ndividualsfwhom hecrowds composed.We should arenobetterfwewere odependupon hegroup-mind heoryornotions f cause. The "groupmind inthe enseemployedyits exponentss a staticmind. It is a result, otacause,of ndividual ehavior. It offersoprovisionor xplainingsocial hange-change,hat s, n thegroupmindtself.Onemight,for nstance,sk howsucha change ouldhavebeen producednthe organizedmental ifeof a group s therecent hange romhetraditionndpractice fan alcoholic rato a regimefprohibitionin ourowncountry.For answerso suchquestionswemust urnagainto theresponsesf ndividualsochanging aterialnd socialenvironmentsnd to the influence f leaders, nventors,ndreformers. uch attempts s have beenmade to explain ocialmovementsn grouptermshave beenpurely n the descriptiveplane. Wemayciteas an example pencer's heoryfa progres-sive, iversifyingvolutionf he ocial rganism.Suchmetaphorsaredescriptiveather hanrevealing.Theyexpress,ut theydonot xplain. They resoonpassedby nthe erious ork f eekingcauses.The viewswhichwe have thusfarexaminedre examples fwhat have chosen o call the"group allacy." Thisfallacymaybe defined s the rror fsubstitutinghegroup s a whole s a prin-ciple of explanation n place of the ndividuals n thegroup. Theword group" s hereused n thewidest ense. Two formsfthefallacymaybe distinguished. he first ttemptsts explanationin termsfpsychology,ssuminghat t spossible o havea "grouppsychology"s distinct rom hepsychologyf ndividuals.Thesecondrenouncessychologynd reliesuponsomeother orm fgroup rocess or reatmentf ause ndeffect.Bothformsbolishthe ndividual;and, tmaybe added,both thereforebolish heservices fpsychologys a possible elpmatef ociology.Turningromxplicitollectivemind heories,hetasknow iesbefore sofpointinguta lesseasily ecognizedutwidely iffused


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692 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYinfluencef the fallacy nder onsideration. shallpresenthreeexamples rom he moredynamic hases of sociological heory,namely ocial conflictnd social change. These illustrationsealrespectively iththepsychoanalyticnterpretationf groupcon-flicts, he mechanismfrevolutions,nd the culturalpproach osocial causation.

i. Thegroup allacy n social conflict.-Oneofthemost nterest-ing varieties f the groupfallacy s that which ranslatesmentalconflict ithin heindividual nto terms fdissociation ithinhypotheticalocial mind. Although number f writers avedealt with hispathologicalmetaphor,tsmost laborate evelop-ment ppearsna posthumousork f he ateDr.W.R. H. Rivers.The followingoints ffundamentalesemblancere observed yhimbetween heneurotic erson nd theabnormal ocialorder.First, he auseof hedisorderneachcase iesdeeper han he utermanifestationsrsymptoms.Socialdiagnosis,ike hediagnosisfthepsychoanalyst, ustpenetratentothehiddenforces flife.Theprognosis,ince hederangements complex,s also uncertainin bothcases. Therepressionfoneportionf ociety yanotheris saidto be closely nalogous orepressionnd dissociationntheindividual. In both asestherepressedlementemainsndcausestroublewhen hetension ecomes oogreat. Rivers escribeswoforms fdissociativerocess.The firstsunwitting:he ndividualmerelyurns isbackuponthatwhichs unpleasant. Just s wetend o etdisagreeablexperiencesassout ofour ttention,ooneportion f thegroup theupperclass) preservestspeace ofmindby ignoringhe existence fpoverty, isease, nd kindred vils nthe otherportion. So farthemetaphors obvious. But if the"social mind" inwhich uch dissociationakesplacewereto betaken iterally herewouldresult ridiculousonfusion.Shallwesay,for xample,hat heupper lasseswhodo the uppressingreconscious,while the lowerclasses, incetheyform hematerialwhichs banished rom he ocialmind,rethereforenconscious.Rivers' econd ype fdissociations one nwhich he ndividualdeliberatelyndwittinglyorces ainful xperiencesrom is fieldofconsciousness.The group nalogy s thatthe morefortunateandpowerfullassof ociety deliberatelyepressesutwardmani-


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THE GROUPFALLACY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 693festations f thediscontentamong he lowerclass]which ocialwrongs rouse." Freudhimselfnvites onfusionn thisfield yapplying o the individual termborrowed rom ocial usage,namely, ensorship.Andat this ointRivers ounds note fcau-tionagainst iteralnterpretationhichhe himselfoesnotheed.The persistencef herepressedlement,esays, s common o boththeneuroticndividualnd the bnormal roup. Tensions re thuscreated reakingorth s hysterical ehavior n the ndividual ndcatastrophichangen the ocialorganism. Anotherype foutletinthe ndividuals furnishedy the ymbolismfdreams, hich reelsewhere hown by Rivers to be analogousto the symbolismemployed y the repressed action f the social order. Thus aprimitive ribe ubjugated y a morepowerfuleople preservedtheir eligiouseremonies,ut gavethem disguisedharacter oas to concealfromheconquerorsheir ruemeaning. Hanginghatedpersonneffigys anotherxample fthe social useofsym-bolism o release eeling ithoutncurringunishment.The simi-larity f such mechanismso the ndividual reamprocess s notto be questioned.We have no justification,owever,or llegingdissociationnd symbolismobe mechanismsfan "overindivid-ual," or a "social mind." Wehave here collection f ndividualinhibitions.A mentalconflictxistsbetween truggle esponsesagainst heoppressorsn the onehand, nd avoidance fpunish-ment n theother. It is really struggleetweennger ndfear.But this onflictnd ts release hroughymbolismie, ofar s themechanismfexplanationsconcerned, holly ithin he ndividual.To expandthesemechanismso theproportionsf dissociationwithin socialmind s todestroyheirignificance.Parenthetically,e areremindedfa contemporarynstance fsocial conflictndevasion o which he collective iewpointmightbeamusinglypplied. There s saidto bean unwrittenaw of en-sorshipdhered obymanagersf ow-classheatricals. t is this:that ny stage oke,no matter ow salacious tsmeaning,maybeallowed opassif t hasalsoa differenteaningntelligibleo thosewhoaretoopureminded ocomprehendheother. Thisarrange-ment s indeedconvenient,or t permitsheclergymannd therouetositsidebyside nthefrontow, achenjoyingheperform-


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694 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYancefrom is ownangle,while hetranquilityf thesocialmindremains erenely ndisturbed!That thepathologicalorm f hegroup allacyeads npreciselythewrong irections evident poncloser nalysis f therelationbetween ocial conflict nd mentalconflict.A significantacttaught s throughsychoanalysiss thatonehorn f thedilemmapresentnmental onflictsusually ocial ncharacter. It consistsof system f ocialized abitsnculcatedn the ndividualhroughstimulationy others,ndstrivingnopposition otheunmodifiedegoistic rives. Wedeny urselvesmmediateravingsecausetosatisfyhemwould nfringeponthe needsand desires fothers.Were t notfor hisdenial, n overt ractual conflict ouldresultbetween urselves nd othermembers fsociety. To avoidsuchsocialconflicthe socialized eactionsnhibit heunsocialized,ndbetween hem ngendern the ndividual mental onflict. Some-times t is fearof the social environmentather hansocializedhabitswhich epresentshesocial forcen theconflict.Thus inRivers'example fveiledceremonials,he ower lass,notdaringto risk vert ocial ombatwith heirmasters,evelopnthemselvesa mental onflict etween ate and fearwhich inds tsrelease nsomedisguisedmanner. On theother and,when hemembers ftheupper lassshutout of their onsciousnesshe miseriesfthelower,his ehavior olds way nlynthe bsence fovert onflict.When hemassesrise nrevolt,he sceneof theconflicts at onceshiftedrom ithin hemind f he ristocrato thefield foutwardcombat etweenroups.Ateveryurn,herefore,ocial ndmentalconflictre inverselyelated n their ccurrence.The more theconflicties within he ndividual,he ess t lies within hegroup,and vice versa. Instead,therefore,f usingthe mechanism findividual eurosis o explain onflictn terms fthegroup s awhole,wemust onclude hatthatmechanisms precisely he onewhich annot e used nthatmanner. Mentalconflicts surelynimportantonceptforunderstandingocial causation; but theinterpretationust lwaysbe through collectivityf ndividualconflicts,nd never s a phenomenonf hegroup s such.2. Thegroup allacy n the heoryfrevolution.-I wishnowto callyour ttentiono a theorywhich epresents orenearly hanthe


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THE GROUP FALLACY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 695one ustdiscussed type f hegroup allacyommonnsociologicalwriting.This stheformulaor evolutionseveloped y ProfessorEllwood., At the outset,however, et me state that ProfessorEllwoodhas alwaysbeen a staunch pponent f the group allacy,andhas doneno ittle ervice or herecognitionfthe ndividualnsocialscience. Even in thetheory hich cite there reportionsindicatinglearly hat he ndividual as notbeen overlooked.With hese rovisionsnmind,etmeattemptostateProfessorEllwood'sview. The basisofsocial revolutions,ccording o thistheorys the rise of immobilityf the institutions f society.Through hort-sightednessr selfishnterest he persons n powerin these nstitutionslock the normal rocesses f social change.Governmentsecomedespotic nd exert oo rigid censorship.Religion nd education ikewisemay becomeultra-conservative.Reactionarynd intolerantublic entiment ay foster n immo-bility fthesocialorder. Sooner r ater, s the conditionsf ifechange, heforcespposinghese nflexiblenstitutionsccumulateuntil heoldhabits reoverwhelmed. o quotethe uthor:

The breakdownf the old habit inanother lace theterm social habit"isused]maybesudden, nd the ociety, eing nused otheprocess freadjust-ment nd perhaps argely acking n socialmachinery herefor,s unable forgreater rless ength ftime o reconstructts habits nd institutions.Thereensues . . . a period fconfusion . . . in whichcompeting . . . classesstrive or hemastery. fthebreakdown. . . . concerns abits nd nstitutionswhich ffecthe ystem f ocialcontrol, e have thedisorders hich ssentiallycharacterize socialrevolution.The conception fferedbove is drawnessentiallyn terms f thegroup as a whole. The social orderbecomes rigidand inelasticuntil demolished by convulsive social change. The dynamicsinvolvedarepurely n terms fneededchange,resistance o change,and final overthroweadingto temporary haos-all these as phe-nomena of the group itself. So far as quoted above we find noattemptto portraythe causes underlyinghisstruggle orchange,such, for example, as the blocking of instinctiveor prepotent

responses nvolved n the economic and family ifeof themembersI An Introductiono SocialPsychology,p. I70-74; see also an articlen theAmericanournal fSociologyorJuly,905.


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696 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYof society. These, of course, re phenomena f the individual.The group-widespectof social nelasticity,hough escriptivelytrue,s not he ausalfactor. Not ackof hangetself, utthwart-ingof ndividual esponses,roducestruggle. Therehave, n fact,beenrevolutionsrecipitatedychangesn nstitutions,ather hanby mmobility.AccordingoMartin, evolutions not sign f heunyieldingharacterf ocialcontrols,ut oftheir eryweakening,a condition hich ivesthe restless roletarian chance o asserthimself.Social nelasticitys therefore descriptiveoncept; itdoes notpenetrate o the evelofexplanation.A furtherraceof thegroup allacy urks n thephrase socialhabits." A sudden hange n thegovernmentestroyshe habitsof ocietynd brings onfusion,ntilhabits fresponseoward henewregime re earned. Strictlypeaking here re, ofcourse, o"socialhabits"; but onlya collection fhabitsof individuals.'Shallwethen aythatpost-revolutionaryisorders dueto ack ofhabituationf the individuals o thenewtypeofgovernment?Such ack ofhabituationodoubt xists againwehavea descrip-tive truth);but the causeof theconfusioniesratherntheunre-strained ollowingy individuals f whatever actions erve heirown nterests,nd n thenewoppressionsnd revolts ausedbythetemporaryccession fa tyrannousictatorship.Again ausationis discoverednterms fthendividual.A realdangerurks ntheprefixingf the term social," not merely o theword "habit,"buttoanyterm enotingpsychologicalrocess.In fairnessoProfessorllwood et menowquotea portion fhisaccountwhich hows hathe wasbynomeanswhollynsensibletothebasic ndividual actors,nd nwhich uchfactors rerecog-nized, lthough he anguage s notwholly ree rom heconfusionjustdescribed. His account ontinues:

[The party frevolt]s composedngeneral fthose ndividualswhom hechanged onditions fsocial lifehave mostaffected,n otherwords, f thoseindividuals nwhomthe old social habitsset least easily, nd whose nterestthereforeies in another djustment.I It mustnot be overlooked hat there re "socialized" (or sociallymodified) abitsof ndividuals. But that s not the meaning f "social habits"as used in thepresentcontext.


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THE GROUP FALLACYAND SOCIAL SCIENCE 697Andagain,n a footnote: The motivationcause] frevoltn argemasses fmen s alwaysack of daptation."

The criticismhich have ventureds thereforeargely ques-tionofemphasis. No fault an be foundwith uchwritings aninteresting,nd evenvaluable, ieceofdescription.My only om-plaint s that t tends unconsciouslyo thewriter) o usurptheprerogativefexplanation.As such t leads us away from hedis-covery f true ausationwhichies,not ngroups, ut n persons.Muchwriting,fear, oth nsociologynd socialpsychology,ar-takesof this rrornmethod.3. Thegroupallacyn the heoryfthe uper-organic.-Turningnowfrom hesemental orms fthegroup allacy, emay examineone which enouncessychologicalxplanation.This s the uper-organichypothesis evelopedprincipally y Professor roeber.'This theorys concerned ith hesocialas such; that s, with hesuper-organic. study f ndividuals ivesus a knowledge nlyof ndividuals; t canneverrevealto us thereality forganizedsocietyn itself. The data of thesuper-organiconsist fculture

inthebroadestense, bodyof"super-organicroducts" carriedalongfromndividualoindividual ndfrom roup ogroup nde-pendent fthenature fthesendividualsndgroups." ProfessorKroebernsists hatwe must tudy he aws ofdevelopmentndchangenthese ataalone. He affirmshatboth nalysis descrip-tion) nddeterminationfprocess explanation)repossiblewhollywithinheplaneof thesuper-organic. ulture,n otherwords,sexplicablentermsf tself. It is true hathesuggests psychologyfor hestudy fsuper-organicrocesses. He demands, owever,"notan individualr 'psychic' sychology,uta socialor super-psychic' sychology;nshort, ociology" as he conceivest).Fromthestandpointfthepsychologistpsychologyuchasthat ust specifiedas no existence. I do notbelieve t everwillexist. Forpsychologys a study f the ndividual;to extend tsprincipleso arger nitss,as we haveseen, o confuseheirmean-ing. To extend hem o entitieswhich renot evenorganics tomakethemwholly nintelligible.We do notconsider reasonedargumento be dentical ith he hinkingehavior hich roduced

I "ThePossibilityf SocialPsychology,"mericanournalf ociology,XIII(I9I3), 633.


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698 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYit. It is theproduct fa psychologicalrocess, ot theprocessitself. In the amewayculture,eing ssentiallyecordedhought,is a product, ota process. Whateverheterminologymployed,Professorroeber as effectuallyurned isback uponpsychologyas aid insociologicalxplanation.Thefreedomf he uper-organicromependenceponorganicand ndividualciences rofessor roeber asesupon classificationof sciencesntofour lanesorlevels. The data of thesesciencesare, respectively,he norganic,heprovincefphysicsnd chem-istry; thevitalorganic, epresentedy physiology;thementalorganic,onstitutinghefield fpsychology;nd the uper-organic,which reto betreatedysociology.Thebiologistssaidtoacceptlife ndinquire nto ts formsndprocessess such. Organicifemay, t is true, e reduced o theelementaryasis ofphysicsndchemistry.But that snotthemain askofthebiologist; ince,fit were, iologywouldnotdifferromhysics rchemistry. imi-larly,psychologyhould cceptthe mental s suchand analyzetheprocesseswithin hisfield,gnoringhephysiologicallementsto which mental phenomena re reducible.Finally sociologytreats fthe rganizedroductsfmentalife, eekingnthese loneits material fanalysis ndexplanatoryrocess.As a criticismf this rgument,shallendeavor o showthatthe eparationf ciencesnto hese istincttratasapparentatherthan real. The sciences eallyoverlapone another,nd possesscertain ieldsncommon etweendjacenthighernd ower lanes.Thisrelationship aybe statedpreciselys follows:Thephenom-ena studied y anyscienceare approachablerom wodifferentviewpoints.The firsts thatofdescription,hesecond sexplana-tion. A complete rogram or ny science mbodies oththeseforms fapproach.Nowtheessential act s that n thehierarchyof sciences hefield fdescriptionf one science ecomes hefieldofexplanationor he ciencemmediatelybove t. Notallof thedescriptive aterial fthe ower cience susedbythehigher;butonly hatwhichs relevant o theexplanationf thedata studiedby thehigher cience. Let us illustratey tracing hroughhishierarchysingle xample f mportancen thepsychologicalevel,namely hereflex rc concept.


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THE GROUPFALLACYAND SOCIAL SCIENCE 699First, hephysiologistotes hatwhen stimulus,uch s a pinprick,sapplied oa sensoryerve nding certainmuscle ontrac-tionfollows. He notes lso certain ropertiesfthisevent, uchas latenttime, efractoryhase,and inhibitionf otherreflexesby thisone. These are descriptivespectsof thatphysiologicalunitcalled thereflexrc. By theaid of themicroscopee is alsoabletodescribeuchminute eaturess the ynapse. But the hysi-ologistmustnotbe content ithmere escription;e must xplain.In order o do thishe must orrow ertain rinciplesromhe owersciences, hysics nd chemistry.Thus to account or eural rans-mission nd the ction f he ynapse e employs he awsof lectro-chemical hange, olarization nd combustion.The existence fan intermediatecience, uch as organic hemistry,roveshowclosely he organic s dependent pon the norganic or ts causalprinciples.Description s thus carried n physiologicalerms,explanationn physicochemicalerms. But we call this sciencephysiology.The psychologistn turn s attracted y thefield f humanbehavior. He observes hehigherntegrationsfresponse,uch semotions, abits, ndthought,heirpeedofoperation,ndabilityto nhibit rreinforceneanother. He isinterestedot o muchnthereflexs a detached hysiologicalnit s he s in whatresponse(involvingsually patternfreflexes)s linked p throughynap-ticfunctions ith particulartimulus. The realm fphenomenadescribed y thepsychologisthus transcendsn scopeand com-plexityhatof ts ower onstituentcience, hysiology.But how

aboutexplanation?It willbe seenthatfor rinciplesfcausationin the tudy fbehaviorwemustdescend irectlyo thereflexrclevel, nd acceptas explanatorytsconditionsnd characteristicsas describedythephysiologist.nstincts nd emotions re con-ceived sreflexatterns,nvolving ore r ess nnate o-ordinationsof ynapses. Learningndthoughtnvolveelectionmong eflexesand fixation-aprocess xplained y change fresistancet thesynapse. Nervetransmission,ltered esistance,nd correlationat the synapseare thereforeonceptions hichbelong n twosciences. For thephysiologisthesewords redescriptivefthingswhichuniversallyccur. To explainthemhe mustdescendto


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700 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYprinciples ormulateds descriptiveaws n physics nd chemistry.For thepsychologisthese eurologicalonceptionsre explanatory.Since hey reofuniversalccurrence,e eaves heir eeper xplan-ationto thephysiologist,ndapplies hem irectlys explanationsofthehigher henomena hich sychologyescribes.'Turning ow to the ociologist, e find hatthedata which edescribeseach hehighest oint fbreadth ndcomplexity. heyembrace ollectionsf ndividualsn organized ocieties,heprod-uctsofsuch organizations,nd the changeswhichthey ndergo.This s, ndeed, vastfield or escriptivenalysis. Yet for xplan-ation ociologys in ts turn ependentponthedescriptiveormu-las of the science ust below t,namely sychology.Just s psy-chology as to seek ts causationwithin he units reflex rcs) ofwhich tsmaterial,ndividual ehavior,s composed;so sociologymustfind ts explanatory rinciplesn the units individuals) fwhichocietyscomposed. Theformulationsf ndividualehaviorwhich sychologyxplains t a deeper evelsociology ccepts ndusesas toolsfor xplanation.Thus socialcontinuityanbe under-stoodonly hroughhe oncept f earning; ocialcontrol emandstheknowledgef nstinctive echanismshroughhich overnmentand othernstitutionsoerce ndividual ehavior; whileprogressandculturalhange estargely pon nvention,hichsin turn hethought rocess f ndividuals.

I At this oint ome eferencehould e made o the ariouschoolsfpresent-daypsychology. he arguments presentedbove sfromheviewpointf hebehavior-isticmovement. he membersf the ntrospectivechool, ho nalyze hepattemof consciousnessccompanyingehavior,dmit reelyhat heir pproachs purelydescriptive,nd that ll explanationf consciousrocesses ustbe inphysiologicalterms. Upon his oint hey rethereforenperfectccordwith hebehaviorists.third chool, hatof modern unctionalism,r purposive sychology,re dissentersfrom hereflexrc hypothesis. hey xplain sychologicalhenomenan terms fdistinctly ental rpsychic rinciplemposed pon he rganicmechanisms iffromwithout.Thosewho phold his iewwould robablyindt easy obelieven groupmind s an entity istinctromheorganism. erhaps rofessor roeber asbeeninfluencedy this lder nimisticotion fpsychologyn developingis ccount fsuper-organiconsistingurelyf he ocial s such,nd ndependentf he ndividual.Believersn the urposiveiewmightlsoprojectt downwardnd onsiderhat newcausal ntitynters hehierarchyith rganicife. This s the vitalist" onceptioninbiology.


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THE GROUP FALLACY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 70ITo recapitulate: thesociologist escribes ocial or collectivephenomenandexplainshem ntermsf ndividual ehavior;thepsychologistescribes ehavior nd explainst in terms f reflexmechanisms; hephysiologistescribeshe reflexmechanismndexplainst interms fphysical ndchemicalhanges.Whereas rofessorroeber epresentsescriptionndexplana-tionuponthe ameplane nthehierarchyf ciences,he rgumentjust advancedwouldprovethat theexplanatory ortion feachscience s derived rom hedescriptive ortion fthescienceustbeneatht. Overlapping,ather han eparation,ftheplanesofthesciences eems,therefore,o be the rule. A sociologys ascience fpure uper-organicsims tostepentirelyut ofthehier-archy f scientific ethod. It doesnotoverlap, ut spushedup,detached romtsmoorings,ndcutoff romtsexplanatoryupportin psychology.Consequently purelyhypotheticalet ofsocialdynamicssprojected yProfessor roeber s awaiting uture is-covery, nytrue nderstandingfwhich as thus arbeenrevealedneitherntheoryor npractice. Iftheforegoingnalysisssound,

thetheory fsuper-organicausation ailsby thevery tandarduponwhichtsclaim or xistence as based.Anthropologistsayperhaps akeexceptionotheremarkhatno causalprinciplesan be discoveredn thepurely ocialorder,andmayrefer othe awsofculturalynamics,ecentlystablishedby ethnology. n fairness o them hisclaimmustbe examined.It is true hat awsofculture rowthndchange avebeenworkedout. Thesearewell summarizedyProfessorgburn nder uchtopicsas curveof cumulative rowth, iversification,iffusion,independentiscovery,ulturalnertia,urvivals,ndculturalag.'It is true lsothat hese onceptsre statedwhollyntermsfcul-ture tself. It ismycontention,owever,hat hey refundamen-tallydescriptiveather hanexplanatory.The dynamicswhichthey nvolve annotbe truly nderstood ithout ecourseo thepsychology f the individual. Thus ProfessorOgburnfreelyemploys sychologicalactorsn explaininghemechanismf cul-tural nertia nd culturalag.' Social hange.


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702 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYA rich ield, ut ittle xplored,ies aheadfor heelucidationfcultural evelopmentnpsychologicalerms. Though thnologistsmaywell ose patiencewith hepovertyfattemptshus armade,the fact that there re great possibilitiestill remains.A fewillustrations ayherebe inplace.First, s to theoriginndprogressf culture,nvention, termlightly sed by ethnologists, ust be explainedn psychologicalrather han cultural erms. The needorprepotentrivebehindinventive ehavior xists nly n individuals. In manner fpro-cedure nventions but a variation f trial-and-errorearning,shortened y theimplicit andommovementsf thinking.Theculture ase short-cutsndividual nventive ehavior; but it isabsurd osaythat tcantaketheplaceofsuchbehavior. Wefindlearningfthischaracterxtendinghroughast reaches ftimefrom he arliest olithic ulture own o themodernmachinehop.As another xamplewe may cite theuniversalultural atterndescribed yDr. Wissler. The origin f thisuniversal atternsinscrutablentilwe conceive ts variouspartsas means fortheadaptationf heprepotent,r nstinctive,eeds fman. Thus theinnate esponsesfstrugglenddefenserebeing hedevelopmentof suchculture roductss governmentndwarfare. The hungerdrivegivesrise to property,cientificnowledge,nd materialculturen tools, hough hese fcourse erve therneeds s well.Familyand socialsystemsre evolved argely s satisfactionsfsexual nterests.The speech omplex,hroughhecontroltgivesover thers,erves ll theprepotenteeds.A third haseofculture xplanationies ntheproblem f con-tinuity.In its most essentialnature, ultures not a groupofsuper-organicroducts. It is distinctlyrganicnd ieswithin heindividual. Socialcausation ies not n a tool,but in thesociallyinculcated abitsofconstructingndusing he tool. This themehas been mmortalizedn MarkTwain'sstory f theConnecticutYankee. Culture pon descriptivelanemaybe studiedtlarge.This is thetaskoftheanthropologist.n an explanatoryense,

however,t mustbe soughtwithin he ndividual. Explanationfthis ort s a partof theprogramf the ociologist.The theoryfthesuper-organics a well-meantutfutile ttempt o transplant


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704 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGYlarger nd more omplicatedetsofrelationshipsnown s groups, s he is anindependentndividual. Theterm, ndividual, as tschiefmeritndistinguish-ingbetween hemembersf group. Asan "individual," partfromgroups,"he is nothing ut an organic eing. He ishardly mental eingunless n idiotmaybe called such.The "individual" s a social myth, xcept s he is a member f a "group."As a result f ntersocialtimulationemovesupfrom hebiological evel. Theinterstimulationhat occursbetweenhim and members f the group,not asmere ndividuals ut as persons, xplainshim morethananyothermethod fapproach an do. His experiencesot s an individualmong therndividuals,butas an interstimulatingnitof a group, ivehim ttitudes, senseofvalues,inshort, ersonality.He is moregroup-madehan ndividual-made.In thepresence f a crowd person cts differentlyhan he does beforethe ndividuals,akenone by one,who composethe crowd. He sometimesresponds o thegroup s a whole nwaysmuch uperiorohisresponseso thememberss individuals; gain,heresponds noccasion o thewhole nwaysofwhichhe would be ashamed f he weremeetingndividuals s such. In anysocialsituation, person esponds o a number fcircumstances,of which hegroup tselfmay alwaysbe one."' The "group" is notwholly fallaciouson-cept.The individual s a set ofrelationshipsargely hysical nd physiological.The person s a set ofrelationshipshat are more,namely, ocial. A smallgroup, uchas theprimaryroup,s a set oforganized ersonalityelationships.A largegroup s inparta set oforganizedmallgroup ndofpersonal elation-ships. An appreciation f a smallgroup s essential o an understandingflarger ocialgroups. We getan idea of a nationalgroup ontaining hundredmillionpeople althoughwe knowpersonally ot more than a fewhundredindividuals, ecausewe are members ffamily, ommunity,nd other mallgroups. The concept fthegroupsusefulngivingnunderstandingf ocietyinits arger spects.I cannot gree hat ocialpsychologys the tudy implyfthe ocialbehav-iorof the ndividual;neithers it the behavior f ndividual roups. It is thestudyof the intersocialtimulationhat occursbetweenmembers fgroups,that s,ofpersonswithboth "individual"and "group" traits.

ALEXANDER A. GOLDENWEISERNewSchoolfor ocialResearchIn discussingrofessor llport's aper want osimplify y taskby draw-inga fewdistinctions. i) It isunjustifiableoidentifyheorganic rorganis-mic theories fsocietywiththenotionof a social psyche. NeitherBagehotnorHobbes,who adhered o theorganic heory, elieved na socialsuper-soul,whileHerbertSpencer,perhapsthe leading exponent f the organic heory,1F. C. Bartlett,sychologyndPrimitiveulture,. ii


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THE GROUP FALLACY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 705neverusedtheconcept fa socialpsyche; infact, ll of hiscausal interpreta-tionsworkwiththeindividual, s theultimate reativepsychic nit. (2) Adiscussion f thetheory fa socialpsyche t thistime s strictlypeaking nanachronism.Two generationsgo men ike Steinthal nd Lazarus had heldthistheory. They wereviolently ttackedby Wundt,who was himself ttimes ccusedofentertainingheconception ewas combating. Whilethis snot the place to pursue hesubject, believethis accusation o be unmeritedand based on a misunderstandingfWundt'smeaning.However hismay be, at thepresent imenosociologistrsocialpsycholo-gist,withinmyknowledge, ntertains hetheory f a socialpsyche xcept n apurely unctionalense. Society cts as if t had a psyche, ut as a matter ffact, llpsychic rocesses akeplace n ndividualminds-where lsecouldtheytakeplace?Apartfrom his, rofessor ilport's apercontains hefollowingwo sser-tions: (i) All causes in history re lodgedin individuals: onlyindividualsoriginate hings; and, (2) while t is possibleto describe ocialphenomenanpurelysocial terms, ny attemptto explain social phenomenanecessarilyrequires psychological echnique. Similarly, sychological henomena anonlybe explainednphysiologicalrneural erms ndbiological nes nphysico-chemical erms.I do notthink hat t is either heoreticallyustifiablermethodologicallyserviceable oregard he ndividual s theonlycauseofhistorichange. It istrue hatevery lement fculture, hethermaterial rotherwise,t some timeor otherfound ts beginningn an idea, originatedn an individualmind.Therefore,fonlywe had theknowledgewe couldtrace ll elements fcultureback to suchpsychological eginningsn the mindsof individuals. On theother and, fwhatwe are nterestedn are thechangesnculture r n ndivid-uals at any giventime nd place,socialand cultural actors t onceemerge shaving causal significance.A great individual ike Napoleon or Lenin orHomermaybe treated s an historic ause or a complex fhistoricauses, nsofaras he has originated legal codeor won battlesorwritten greatepicorconceived nd carried ut a social revolution.But suchan individual imselfis of coursetheproduct f his time, hat s, his education nd socialsetting.Whatever is nborn bilitiesmay be,thespecificontent f hismind s contri-butedby the existing ulture. He is thereforeaused by it. Similarly,neculturalfactor,while of courseworking hrough sychologicalhannels,willcausally ffect r transformther ultural actors.It is thereforemerely questionof drawing line through hehistoricprocess t thepoint n which ur nterestscentered. If whatwe are nterestedin is the ndividual s a causal factornhistory,henwegrant he ndividual,however roduced,ndhe henceforthecomes source fcultural ransforma-tion. If, on the otherhand,we are bentupon exploringhepossibilitiesfcultural r social causation, hen we postulate hese factors s givenat anyparticularime ndplaceandmayutilize hem s unitswhich hemselvesause


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706 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGYfurtherransformationsn the cultural rocess. As contrasted iththeabso-lutistic iewsofhistorywhich xplain ll happenings ither hrough he ndi-vidualor throughhegroup ndthen ollow pthese xplanationss farback aspossible n searchof"first auses,"the viewofhistory ere ndicatedmay bedesignateds relativistic.As to the distinction etweendescriptionnd explanation, s drawnbyProfessor llport, cannotregard t as justifiable. Modern cience onceivesof explanation s conceptualized escription.Also, t tends to substitutehequestionhow? or hequestionwhat? WhenCarlPearsontellsus thatmatteris non-matternmotion, hisrevelationmpressesne as somewhat hockingfwhatonepurportso nquires whatmatters. But ifone's nterests directedtowardhowmatter ehavesrtoward he behavior f"something"whichmightaccountfor heknown ropertiesfmatter, henPearson's tatementeemsnolonger onfusing.If so much s granted,t stillremains ruethattwowaysofdescribingrexplaining henomena re alwaysopen: either ocial factsare described rexplainedsociologically, sychological nes psychologically,iologicalonesbiologically,nd physicochemicalnes physicochemically,r,socialfacts redescribed rexplained sychologically,sychologicalnesbiologically,iologi-cal onesphysicochemically,ndphysicochemicalnesofnecessitytillphysico-chemically,fnot nterms fpureconceptual bstraction. Now,bothofthesemodesofapproach eemtheoreticallyustifiablend have certain dvantagesas wellas defects. If a fact n one level s explainedn unitterms f the amelevel,theadvantageof theprocedureies n thefactthat theautonomy fthelevel s preservednd themysteryorat leastpuzzle)ofthetransformationfits termsntothoseof anotherevel avoided. Again,thismode ofprocedurepreserves conceptualdiversityn the universe. This is hailedby some asdesirable nd rejectedby others s reprehensible. f, on the otherhand, afact n one evel s explained yunitfactors rom notherevel, his eadstoanultimate onceptual nificationf theuniverse,o a monistic orld-view.Thisalso is welcomed y someand abhorred y others. Again,thismodeofpro-cedurehas thedisadvantage, r whatto someat least seems uch,ofnotonlyexplainingutexplainingway. Thus,when socialfact s explainednpurelypsychologicalnit erms,heres no more ocialfact eft, nd whena psycho-logical ne sexplainednbiological nit erms,heresnopsychologicalact eft,andwhen biological ne sexplainednphysicochemicalnit erms,heresnobiological act eft.Differencesf taste apart, t seemsfairly bvious thatbothmethodsofprocedurere theoreticallyustifiablend are likely o bring n thefuture stheyhavebroughtn thepasteverrichernsightntothe nature fphenomenaand of ourthinkingbout them.

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Amer J Soc 1924 Allport