8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

1/32

Copyright

2008-091

Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor at ANU, UNSW, and the Uni. of Hong KongChair, Australian Privacy Foundation

http://www.anu.edu.au/Roger.Clarke/......../DV/ANPR-Surv {.html,.ppt}

Social Implications of Covert Policing Workshop 7 April 2009

The Covert Implementation

of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in Australia

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

2/32

Copyright

2008-092

Red Light and Speed Cameras

QuickTime and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.QuickTime and a

TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressorare needed to see this picture.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_cameras_in_Australia

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

3/32

Copyright

2008-093

Cynicism about Red Light and SpeedCameras

QuickTime and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

QuickTime and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

QuickTime and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

QuickTime and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

http://www.speedcam.co.uk/

http://fightfines.info/ (Vic)

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

4/32

Copyright

2008-094

Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance

AGENDA Red-Light / Speed Cameras to ANPR

Traffic Applications

Blacklist-in-Camera Architecture

Quality Factors LEAs Operational Applications

LEAs Intelligence Applications

Mass Surveillance ANPR

ANPR Deployments in Australia ANPR Coordination in Australia

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

5/32

Copyright

2008-095

Beyond Red Light / Speed CamerasTo Vehicle Surveillance

Vehicles can be monitored in various ways, e.g.

Manual Inspection of VINs, registration plates

Passive RFID-tags passing control-points

On-Board Transmitters, with self-reportingof GPS-based or other coordinates

Vehicle Registration Data can be monitored:

Cameras were wet chemistry, are now digital

Data Extraction was manual, is now automated

Auto-Lookup of Blacklists is now feasible

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

6/32

Copyright

2008-096

Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

QuickTime and aTIFF (LZW) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

7/32

Copyright

2008-097

Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

A Digital CameraCaptures an image of a motor vehicles 'number' plate

Software

Extracts the registration data (numbers, letters, perhapsother data such as colour and jurisdiction identifiers)

List(s) of Numbers Being SoughtEnables evaluation of the significance of the extracted data

Transmission FacilitiesSends the extracted data and perhaps other data elsewhere

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

8/32

Copyright

2008-098

Traffic Applications Traffic Law Enforcement. Detection and prosecution for:

running red lights driving at a point-in-time speed over the speed limit

Traffic Law Enforcement. Detection and interception of:

Unregistered Vehicles? Driving at an average speed over the speed limit

?? Vehicles owned by currently Unlicensed Drivers

Public Safety. Deterrence of unsafe practices, e.g.

running red lights, speeding? driving unregistered vehicles

?? driving while unlicensed

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

9/32

Copyright

2008-099

Camera& OCR

Tightly-Coupled

Processing

PoliceCars

Alerts

'Blacklist in Camera' ANPR Architecture

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

10/32

Copyright

2008-0910

Camera& OCR

Tightly-Coupled

Processing

Sources ofData-Sets

PoliceCars

Alerts

'Blacklist in Camera' ANPR Architecture

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

11/32

Copyright

2008-0911

'Blacklist in Camera' ANPR Architecture

Camera& OCR

Tightly-Coupled

Processing

Sources ofData-Sets

OperationalPolicing

PoliceCars

Alerts

AlertsOnlyAlerts

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

12/32

Copyright

2008-0912

ANPR Quality Alliances of purveyors and purchasers suggest that

data extraction is accurate and reliable ... BUT ...

Very little evidence is publicly available

There appear to be no independent tests

Many factors reduce reliability, including: the nature and condition of the registration plates the condition of the camera lens the conditions of the light-path and back-lighting

The extraction is by its nature 'fuzzy',and confidence threshholds have to be set

Reliable extraction of the registration data may beas low as 70% even under favourable conditions

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

13/32

Copyright

2008-0913

ANPR Traffic Applications

Some Implications Deterrence of Targeted Behaviour

Targeted Fines and Points Deductions

Substantial Resources Required,in particular Police Cars Downstream

False-Negatives Escape

False-Positives Suffer:

Financial Impacts Licence-Retention Impacts

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

14/32

Copyright

2008-0914

LEAs Operational Applications

Detection and Interception of:

Wanted Vehicles, in particular:

'Reported Stolen'

'Get-Away Cars' Vehicles associated with Persons of Interest

Dependent on:

Real-Time Acccess to ... Real-Time-Maintained Data Sources

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

15/32

Copyright

2008-0915

LEA Operational Applications

Quality Factors and Implications Data-Source Quality Factors are critical,

esp. Accuracy, Precision and Currency

(Rare?) Instances of Large Benefits

(Common?) Instances of Error: High Risk to Vehicle Occupants

because of the Interceptor's Suspicions

Substantial Embarrassment, Confusion

Likelihood of Collateral Police Actions arbitrary vehicle inspection, search

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

16/32

Copyright

2008-0916

LEAs Intelligence Applications

Retrospective Analysis of Vehicle Movements:

Detection of Duplicates

False Registration Numbers

Retrospective Inferences aboutOwner Location and Movements

Retrospective Inferences aboutCo-Location, and Co-Location Frequency, of:

Vehicles

People Real-Time Inferences about Location, Co-Location

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

17/32

Copyright

2008-0917

Mass Surveillance ANPR Architecture

Camera& OCR

OperationalPolicing

PoliceCars

Alerts

AllSightings

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

18/32

Copyright

2008-0918

Mass Surveillance ANPR Architecture

Camera& OCR

Central

Processing& Storage

OperationalPolicing

PoliceCars

Alerts

AllSightings

AllSightings

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

19/32

Copyright

2008-0919

LEAs Intelligence ApplicationsQuality Factors

Unreliable Extraction of Registration Data

Data Collection Speculativei.e. without Due Cause / Reasonable Grounds for Suspicion

This protection is a foundation of a freesociety

Retention Periods unclear and possibly very long

Use of Probabilistic (Speculative) Data Miningin order to generate suspicions

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

20/32

Copyright

2008-0920

ANPR Deployments in Australia In most States and Territories, one or more agencies

has deployed or at least piloted ANPR

300-400 cameras acquired, some currently

operational One longstanding application exists:

NSW RTA Safe-T-Cam for trucks

24 fixed-location cameras since 1989

relatively recently migrated to ANPR

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

21/32

Copyright

2008-0921

Features of

ANPR Deployments in Australia Every Single Deployment Lacks:

Explicit Legal Authority

Public Justification Public Information

Public Consultation

Operational Transparency

Effective Regulatory Control Effective Privacy Laws

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

22/32

Copyright

2008-0922

Submissions expressing serious concern aboutprivacy:

APF

OFPC

OVPC

QCCL

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

23/32

Copyright

2008-0923

OVPC: "The whole concept of an individuals right toanonymity is sacrificed: it is no longer possible to drive on apublic road anonymously, even if one is doing nothing wrong"

OFPC: "ANPR can result in the routine collection of the personalinformation of large numbers of people. For many of these people,there may be no cause for suspicion and hence no reason to

collect information about them. A widespread ANPR system maypermit government agencies to track a large number of vehicles(and individuals), revealing where individuals have been, when andpotentially with whom. Other than in specific circumstances, thisdoes not seem to be information that government agencies would

routinely need to know about members of the community ... TheOffice would caution against establishing infrastructure thatcould [be] used in such an expansive and invasive manner"

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

24/32

Copyright

2008-0924

Recommendations of the Qld Parliamentary Committee:

[because there is no current justification,]further research of the road safety benefits of ANPR

[because the proposal is so privacy-intrusive,]crucial legislative safeguards ... to protect ... privacy

[because quality is low,]the resolution of technical problems that prevent ANPRdevices reading some number plate designs

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

25/32

Copyright

2008-0925

Coordinative Activitiesby Crimtrac

The national LEA information systems operator(e.g. fingerprint, DNA databases)

Given $2.3m for an 'ANPR Scoping Study' 2007-08

Privacy Issues Analysis conducted Nov 2007 "We have not yet determined exactly the extent to

which we would capture all data. It may well bethat we only capture hot list data"(Transcript of Evidence to Qld Parltry Travelsafe

Committee, 14Mar 2008, p. 17) PIA and Consultation (Jun-Nov 2008)

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

26/32

Copyright

2008-0926

Crimtrac's PIA Consultation PaperJune 2008

" ... the system will collect and store ... all sightings of all vehiclepassengers"

A 'National Automated Vehicle Recognition System' (NAVR)

"data-matching to identify alerts would take place centrally ..."

"sightings would be collected for all vehicles passing a camera site,and would contain an overhead image of the vehicle at sufficientresolution so that the driver or passenger could be identified ifappropriate

"[from] 300 fixed and 100 mobile to 4000 fixed and 500 mobilecameras"

"all ANPR data would be held for five years"

an indicative 70 million sightings per day implying 127 billionphotographs and associated metadata over a rolling 5-year cycle

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

27/32

Copyright

2008-0927

Crimtrac's Untrustworthiness

The position established in May 2008 isinconsistent with the statements of mid-Mar 2008

Committed to Mass Surveillance ANPR

Expressly Facilitative of Mass Surveillance No Consideration of the negative consequences

PIA Report withheld, despite anunderstanding it would be published

Scoping Study Report withheld

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

28/32

Copyright

2008-0928

Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle SurveillanceConclusions

LEAs are implementing ANPR covertly

i.e. without full public information,without oversight, without express authority

LEAs are using Mass Surveillance ANPR,not Blackist-in-Camera architecture

Crimtrac is implementing the facilitativemechanism for Mass Surveillance ANPR

After initially adopting some degree ofopenness, Crimtrac is operating covertly

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

29/32

Copyright

2008-0929

Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle SurveillanceImplications

For LEAs

A further step in the slide into untrustworthiness

Greatly increased risk of behaviour above the law

Greatly increased risk of serious public distrustFor Australian society

A profound reduction in civil liberties

A groundbreaker for a surveillance society

A major contributor to social breakdownand anarchic behaviour

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

30/32

Copyright

2008-0930

Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance

Policy Implications

ANPR is a litmus test of the Rudd Government'scapacity to withstand the backroom pressure

put on it by the law enforcement community The Australian public wants law enforcement

agencies to have appropriate technology andappropriate powers ... but not to the extent

that freedoms and democracy are undermined

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

31/32

Copyright

2008-0931

Counterveillance Principles1. Independent Evaluation of Technology

2. A Moratorium on Technology Deployments

3. Open Information Flows

4. Justification for Proposed Measures

5. Consultation and Participation6. Evaluation

7. Design Principles1. Balance

2. Independent Controls3. Nymity and Multiple Identity

8. Rollback

8/2/2019 ANPR-Surv

32/32

Copyright

2008-0932

Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor at ANU, UNSW, and the Uni. of Hong KongChair, Australian Privacy Foundation

http://www.anu.edu.au/Roger.Clarke/......../DV/ANPR-Surv {.html,.ppt}

Social Implications of Covert Policing Workshop 7 April 2009

The Covert Implementation

of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in Australia