OPEN MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2016

CAMPUS LAW CENTRE

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH

Shehaj………………..……………………………………………………………….…Appellant

v.

State…………………..………………………………………………………………Respondent

FEBRUARY 2016

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

1

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents…………………….……………………………………………………...2

Index of Authorities……………………………………………………………………….....3

Statement of Jurisdiction…………………………………………………………………......5

Statement of Facts……………………………………………………………………………6

Issues Raised…………………………………………………………………………………7

Summary of Arguments……………………………………………………………………...8

Arguments Advanced……………………………………………………………………….10

Prayer………………………………………………………………………………………..22

2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Statutory Authority;

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Text Books Referred:

Indian Penal Code, Dr Hari Singh Gour

Textbook on Indian Penal Code, K D Gaur

Criminal Law,Pillai

Law of Crimes,Ratanlal & Dheerajlal

Indian Penal Code, Kelkar

Cases Referred:

Smt. Paniben v State of Gujarat 1992 CriLJ 2919

Amol Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 5 SCC 468

State of Andhra Pradesh v P. Khaja Hussain (2009) 15 SCC120

K. Ramchandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor 1976CriLJ1548

Smt. Laxmi v Om Prakash & Ors (2001) 6 SCC 118

Ram Manorath v State of UP (1981) SCC (2) 654

Nallapati Sivaiah v Sub-Divisional Officer 2007 15 SCC 465

Atbir v Govt (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 9 SCC 1

Kikar Singh v State of Rajasthan 1993 SCR (3) 696

Keshavlal v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2002 SC 1221

3

Chanda Ram v State Of Chhatisgarh SC 2013

Sridhar Bhuyan v State of Orissa (2004) 11 SCC 395

Chandrasen Maruti Dhotre v the State Maharashtra 2005 SC

Om Prakash & Ors v State: DHC 2014

Krishna Tiwary AIR 2001 SC 2410

Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory of Chandigarh 1989 SCR (1) 941

Narayanan Nair Raghavan Nair v The State Of Travancore-Cochin AIR 1956 SC 99

Dharman AIR 1957 SC 324

Sukbhir Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 327

In Re Marana Goundan v Unkown (1941) 1 MLJ 364

Jagriti Devi v State of Himachal Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 771

Keegan (1893) Cr No. 38 of 1893

Ninaji Raoji Bhaudha v State of Maharashtra 1976 SCR (3) 428

Panchanun Tantee (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 97

Websites Referred:

www.indiankanoon.com

www.manupatra.com

www.google.com

4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant has filed an appeal to this Hon’ble Court of Punjab & Haryana to review the

judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge.

The Hon’ble High Court has the jurisdiction to hear the matter under Section 374 (2)

of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Section 374 Appeals from convictions

(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or

on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years

has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same trial, may appeal

to the High Court.

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Inayat K Sidhu, professor, Punjab University and Shehaj Singh Sidhu, chemist shop

owner were married on 19 December 2012 after two years of relationship.

2. They set up their matrimonial house in Chandigarh. After few years their relationship got

strained and regularly quarrelled over frivolous issues.

3. On 12 January 2015 they had a major quarrel and Shehaj slapped Inayat. On 20 January

2015 Inayat left her matrimonial house with elder daughter Nimrat and started living with

her father Mandeep. Shehaj kept his younger daughter Barkat with his sister Deepa and

prevented Inayat from seeing the child.

4. On Valentine’s Day i.e. 14th February 2015 Shehaj sent roses for Inayat along with a

letter apologizing for his behaviour and accusing her father Mandeep for messing up their

relation. He asked her to explain to him to remain away from their family matters

otherwise he had other means to get back at him.

5. During a noon Inayat went to Deepa’s house and forcefully took Barkat with her. Shehaj,

in a drunken state, reached Mandeep’s house with a gun and threatened them that he will

kill them if his children are not returned soon.

6. After 2 days Shehaj and Mandeep happened to meet at a market place, started quarrelling

and grappled with each other. Both fell down. In heat of passion Mandeep slapped Shehaj

saying he would kill him.

7. Shehaj in a fit of rage took a stick lying nearby and gave a blow on the stomach of

Mandeep who fell down instantly. He was suffering from enlarged spleen. He died the

next day at the hospital.

8. Mandeep gave a statement to the Magistrate regarding fight and the knowledge of Shehaj

about enlarged spleen. As opposed to hospital records which stated he was taken by an

ambulance to the hospital, he stated that a stranger took him in his car. There was no

specific endorsement regarding his mental and physical fitness made by the duty doctor.

9. During trial an eyewitness stated that it was Mandeep who first slapped Shehaj and

started the fight. Trial court relying on dying declaration of Mandeep convicted Shehaj

for murder and sentenced him for life imprisonment.

10. Shehaj challenged the conviction by filling a criminal appeal before Punjab & Haryana

High Court relying on the deposition of the eyewitness.

6

ISSUES RAISED

1) Can the contradictory and infirm dying declaration of the deceased be relied upon

for conviction under section 302 of Indian Penal Code?

2) Whether the whole act of sudden fight falls under Exception 4 of section 300 of

Indian Penal Code?

3) Was the injury caused by the accused of such a nature as contemplated by section

299 of Indian Penal Code?

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1) Can the dying declaration of the deceased be relied upon for conviction under

section 302 of Indian Penal Code?

Statement under Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act is a very relevant kind of evidence

when the last statement(s) of the deceased are the only basis of conviction.

But a contradictory statement by the deceased which presents a factual error renders such a

dying declaration doubtful.

The deceased said that a stranger took him to the hospital but hospital records showed that it

was the ambulance that took him to the hospital.

Absence of a certificate of mental and physical fitness by the doctor further makes it

unreliable.

2) Whether the whole act of sudden fight falls under Exception 4 of section 300 of

Indian Penal Code?

All the 4 ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, that is:

The act committed was without premeditation.

It was committed in a sudden fight.

It was committed in the heat of passion.

It was committed without the accused having taken undue advantage or acted in a

cruel or unusual manner,

Are clearly present in the present case, that is:

1. The deceased and the appellant happened to meet at the market place by

chance.

2. There was a sudden fight, both unarmed grappled with each other and fell

down.

3. The deceased slapped the appellant which created the heat of passion.

4. The appellant neither used any lethal weapon nor previously carried any; a

single blow was given with the handy stick available.

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The whole act thus falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

3) Whether there was any intention or knowledge to cause an injury as contemplated

by section 299 of IPC?

Section 299 of IPC makes a homicide culpable to the accused if either he had

1. Done an act with the intention of causing death or

2. Intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or

3. Knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death.

In the present case:

1. The appellant did not intend to cause the death of the deceased at all, as

the whole act took place instantly without any pre-planning.

2. The appellant used only a handy stick to defend himself when the

deceased slapped him shouting that he would kill him.

3. The appellant did not have any special knowledge about the special health

condition of the deceased.

4. The single blow given by the appellant was targeted randomly and not

intentionally.

Therefore, all the elements of section 299 are ruled out.

9

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1) That the dying declaration given by the deceased contains contradictory

statements and hence cannot be relied upon.

32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is

relevant 1 —Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who

cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot

be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case,

appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—

(1) when it relates to cause of death. —When the statement is made by a person as to the cause

of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in

cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant

whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under

expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his

death comes into question.

The deceased gave a statement in his dying declaration (which formed the basis of conviction)

that the injury was caused by the appellant and with the specific knowledge about his spleen

disease.

And this statement about knowledge of his act being likely to cause death made the case fall

under Section 3002.

1 Indian Evidence Act, 18722 Indian Penal Code, 1860

10

The reliability of the dying declaration itself is doubtful

1. Absence of fitness certificate on the endorsement by doctor renders it unsafe to rely on

the dying declaration.

2. The dying declaration was made by the deceased in Hindi but was translated in English

by the Magistrate recording the same. Such a dying declaration cannot be believed.

3. In view of the injury suffered by the deceased due to the alleged blow on the enlarged

spleen, deceased would not have been in a position to make a statement, let alone a

coherent one (MOST SIGNIFICANT SYMPTOM OF SPLEEN RUPTURE IS

UNCONSCIOUNESS AND RESLESSNESS3)

4. The Magistrate committed a serious irregularity in "not putting a direct question to the

injured whether he was capable mentally to make any statement”.

5. The deceased made a contradictory statement regarding who brought him to the hospital.

Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat 4 :

Court while stating that a dying declaration is entitled to great weight however cautioned

to note that the accused has no power to cross-examination.. Such a power is essential for

eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also

insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence

of the Court in its correctness and was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a

product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit

state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants.

Reaffirmed in Amol Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 5 & State of Andhra Pradesh v

P. Khaja Hussain 6 .

3 MODI’s Medical Jurisprudence4 1992 CriLJ 29195 (2008) 5 SCC 4686 (2009) 15  SCC120

11

K. Ramchandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor 7

This Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and deceased was in a fit state

to make the declaration.

In Smt. Laxmi vs.Om Prakash & Ors 8 : it was held:

If in a given case, a particular dying-declaration suffers from any infirmities, either of its

own or as disclosed by other evidence adduced in the case or circumstances coming to its

notice, the Court may as a rule of prudence look for corroboration and if the infirmities be such

as render the dying-declaration so infirm as to prick the conscience of the Court, the same may

be refused to be accepted as forming safe basis for conviction.

Ram Manorath v State Of U.P 9 :

It was held in a case that the dying declaration should be subject to close scrutiny and proved

beyond reasonable doubt in respect of all relevant circumstances of the case.

It has been held in Nallapati Sivaiah v Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur 10 :

(i) That the dying declaration has been recorded by Judicial Magistrate, by itself is not a

proof of truthfulness of the dying declaration, which in order to earn acceptability has

still to pass the test of scrutiny of the court.

7 1976CriLJ1548.

8 (2001) 6 SCC 1189 (1981) SCC (2) 65410 2007 15 SCC 465

12

(ii) Safeguards which must be observed by a Magistrate when recording a

dying declaration includes satisfying himself that the declarant is in a proper mental

state to make the statement.

(iii) Magistrate must also obtain the opinion of the doctor, if one is available, about the

fitness of the patient to make a statement.

Appellant’s case: there is nothing on record to show that Magistrate made any

attempt to contact duty doctor to ascertain physical and mental condition of the

patient.

The Supreme Court in Atbir v. Govt. (NCT OF Delhi) 11 summed up the legal principles

governing a dying declaration as follows:-

(i.) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence

of the court,

(ii.) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of

making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or

imagination,

(iii.) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration

cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated

The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence;

(iv.) Where the dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without

corroborative evidence.

It is therefore humble submitted before the Hon’ble Court that dying declaration

(pointing out towards the knowledge the accused had) is full of infirmities and

contradictions.

(2) The act of the accused falls under Exception 4 to section 300 of IPC.

11 Atbir V. Govt.(NCT of Delhi) (2010) 9 SCC 1

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Exception 412:—

Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden

fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having

taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

It was held in Kikar Singh v State of Rajasthan 13 that in order to bring an act under

Exception 4 all the 5 ingredients have to be essentially proved, that is

Without premeditation

In a sudden fight

In the heat of passion

Upon a sudden quarrel

Without the offender having been taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or

unusual manner.

Appellant’s case:

Mandeep (deceased) and Shehaj (appellant) happened to meet at a market

place by chance14.

There occurred a sudden quarrel with mutual provocation from both sides

and the deceased slapped the Appellant which made him pick up the stick

in the heat of passion15.

The appellant did not take undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual

manner as:

1. He just picked up the handy stick (not a deadly or fatal weapon)

that was lying nearby on the ground.

2. There was only a single blow.12 Section 300, Indian Penal Code, 186013 1993 SCR (3) 69614 Statement of facts, page 615 Statement of facts, page 6

14

3. And the blow was a random hit in the heat of passion, not directed

to a particular organ.

4. Appellant did not have any knowledge about the deceased’s

enlarged spleen.

The High Court of Rajasthan in the same case held that:

The occasion for sudden quarrel must not only be sudden but the party assaulted

must be on an equal footing in point of defense, at least at the onset.

Here in this case both the deceased and the appellant were unarmed and guelled

with each other.

In Keshavlal v State Of Madhya Pradesh 16

He had some altercation with Kamlabai where after he picked up a knife and stabbed

her with the result she sustained a deep wound of cutting the vital inner parts of her

body. The accused was held to be given the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300.

In Chanda Ram v State Of Chhatisgarh 17 :

There was a scuffle between 2 people and the appellant, in the meanwhile, struck the head of one

of the persons with a tekani (piece of wood) used for supporting bullock carts. He fell down

immediately. The neighbors shifted him to his house, thereafter to the District Hospital and, from

there, to another hospital where he died, nearly four hours after the incident.

The Supreme Court in these facts applied Exception 4.

16 AIR 2002 SC 122117 SC 2013

15

This Court in Sridhar Bhuyan v State of Orissa 18 reaffirmed the same and held as under:-

For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it has to be established that the act

was committed 1) without premeditation 2) in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a

sudden quarrel 3) without the offender having taken undue advantage and 4) not having acted in

a cruel or unusual manner.

Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or

some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have

originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal

footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide

committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the

whole blame be placed on one side.

In Chandrasen Maruti Dhotre v The State Maharashtra 19

A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that

one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have

taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult

to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter.

In Om Prakash & Ors v State 20 :

The assaults were made at random. Even the previous altercations were verbal and not physical.

It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused Appellants had come prepared and armed for

attacking the deceased....This goes to show that in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel

followed by a fight the accused persons had caused injuries on the deceased, but had not acted in

cruel or unusual manner. That being so the Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is clearly applicable.

18 (2004) 11 SCC 39519 SC 201320 DHC 2014

16

In case of Krishna Tiwary and Anr v State of Bihar 21

where the accused had inflicted knife blows in the heat of passion without any premeditation and

without any intention that he would cause that injury, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the case

was covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC.

In Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory of Chandigarh 22 it was held:

The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started

the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what

is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender

must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue

advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the

moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he

would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.

In Narayanam Nair Raghavan Nair v State of Travancore-Cochin 1956 SC 23 it was held:

There is no undue advantage when a man stabs a person who makes no threatening gestures.

Appellant’s case: the deceased made a threatening gesture by saying that he would kill the

appellant while slapping him24.

In the case of Dharman v State of Punjab 25 it was held that:

21 AIR 2001 SC 241022 1989 SCR (1) 941

23 AIR 1956 SC 9924 Statement of facts, page 625 AIR 1957 SC 324

17

The case fell under Exception 4 to Section 30026 in the case of a sudden fight, without pre

meditation and injuries caused in the heat of passion, without any undue advantage taken by the

offender, although there were already legal proceedings pending between both the parties.

Appellants case: the previous estranged relations between the appellant and he deceased does

not in any way make an inference that the appellant had pre planned the incident or tried to take

any undue advantage during the incident.

It was the deceased who slapped the appellant first, the same being corroborated by the eye

witness’ testimony 27 indicates no prior planning or pre meditation by appellant.

In Sukbhir Singh v. State of Haryana 28 the Court observed:

All fatal injuries resulting in death cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for the purposes of not

availing the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC. After the injuries were inflicted and the

injured had fallen down, the appellant is not shown to have inflicted any other injury upon his

person when he was in a helpless position. It is proved that in the heat of passion upon a sudden

quarrel followed by a fight, the accused who was armed with Bhala caused injuries at random

and thus did not act in a cruel or unusual manner.

In Re Marana Goundan v Unknown 29 , 1940, Lakshmana Rao, J held that:

It is difficult to hold that the appellant intended or knew that by kicking on the abdomen as he

did he was likely to endanger life..

26 27 Statement of facts, page 628 (2002) 3 SCC 32729 In re (1941) 1 MLJ 364

18

Appellant’s case summarized based on facts and supported by above cited authorities:

1. All the ingredients of Exception 4 are present in the case.

2. The statement of the deceased about knowledge of his enlarged spleen is already

questionable and has been dealt with under the issue regarding reliability of the dying

declaration.

3. As he also made a factual error in saying that a stranger took him to the hospital whereas

it was the ambulance that brought him to the hospital.

4. Also whether he was fit to record statement or not is doubtful as the doctor’s

endorsement doesn’t state anything about the physical and mental state of the deceased.

5. It was the deceased who slapped the appellant first; the same being corroborated by the

eye witness’ testimony indicates no prior planning or pre meditation by appellant.

6. There is no proximate relation between the letter (written by the appellant to his wife

mentioning about the deceased) and the act.

7. Mentioning about the deceased (father-in-law) twice in the letter indicates of a foul play

on the part of the prosecution, questioning the credibility of the letter.

8. The regular quarrels between the appellant and his wife were on frivolous issues30 with

no interference of the deceased.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the act falls under Exception 4 to

Section 300, IPC and hence out of Section 302/304 IPC.

(3) That there was no intention and no knowledge as to cause such injury which would

cause death.

299. Culpable homicide 31 —whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of

causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause

30 Statement of facts, page 631 Indian Penal Code, 1860

19

death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the

offence of culpable homicide.

First and the second clauses of the section: intention apart from the knowledge

Third clause: knowledge alone and not intention.

Illustration (c) - A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is

behind a bush; A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an

unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or

to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.

Definition of “Knowledge” - It connotes a bare awareness of the consequences of his

conduct.32

Both the expressions “intent” and “knowledge” postulate the existence of a positive

mental attitude which is of different degrees. The mental element in culpable homicide

i.e. mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and

knowledge. If that is caused in any of the aforesaid three circumstances, the offence of

culpable homicide is said to have been committed.

32 Jai Prakash v. State 1991 2 SCC 32

20

In PunchanunTantee33:

The accused having received great provocation from his wife, pushed her with both arms

so as to throw her with violence to the ground and after she was down, slapped her with

his open hand. The woman died on account of the rupture of the spleen which was

diseased. It was held he was guilty of causing hurt.

Furthermore, Illustration (c) of Section 299 provides that although A is doing an

unlawful act , he is not guilty of culpable homicide because he has no knowledge that he

is likely to cause death, in the same manner Appellant although caused death of the

deceased an did an unlawful act, he is not guilty of culpable homicide since he had no

intention or knowledge to cause death.

In Jagriti Devi v State of Himachal Pradesh 34 it was held:

Expressions "intention" and "knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental

attitude. It was further held that when and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same

would be a case under first part of Section 304 and if it is only a case of knowledge and

not intention to cause murder by bodily injury, then the same would be a case of second

part of Section 304

Appellant’s case :

33 (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 9734 (2009) 14 SCC 771

21

1. No such intention on the part of the Appellant, either to cause death of the deceased or to

cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

2. Intention is a chief and dominant intent, however as provided in the facts the Appellant

and the Deceased happened to meet each other at the market place.

3. The blow by the Appellant was given by a stick , which as defined above is a thin piece

of wood , on the stomach of the accused , which is on a non-vital part of the body35

4. It was a response to the slap thrown by the Deceased, which was an act of private

defence, supports the fact that there was no intention on the part of the accused as

highlighted in first two clauses of Section 299.

In case of Keegan (1893) Cr No. 38 of 1893:

Accused threw his stick which such force that it hit the deceased on the head and made a

punctured wound which caused his death, it was held that the offence committed

amounted to voluntarily causing hurt and not culpable homicide not amounting murder.

In several cases of similar facts where a woman died from a chance kick in the spleen not

known to be diseased inflicted by her husband on provocation, and the husband had no

knowledge or intention that the act was likely to cause death, it was held that the husband

was not guilty of culpable homicide but a lower offence.

The Supreme Court in Ninaji Raoji Bhaudha v State of Maharashtra 36 held that:

Where there is no evidence as to any intention on the part of the appellant either to cause

death or have the knowledge that such injuries would be likely to cause death, it would

not be justified to convict under section 302 or section 304 of IPC.

35G. Narayanaswamyvs State By Inspector Of Police36 1976 SCR (3) 428

22

Definition of “stick” – a thin piece of wood.37

Appellant’s case: Stick neither being a lethal weapon nor was it carried before hand by

the appellant.

As regards the knowledge clause, this is to be dealt with more seriousness

1. The Appellant had no knowledge of the enlarged spleen of the Deceased (discussed in

the Issue no 1).

2. The fact that a stick was struck on a non-vital part of the body i.e. stomach38 substantiates

the claim that there was no knowledge on the part of the Appellant that such a blow is

likely to cause death.

3. Even objectively speaking a stick blow on the stomach is not likely to cause death of a

healthy person.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that none of the ingredients of section 299

are present in the act of the appellant.

PRAYER

37Oxford dictionary38G. Narayanaswamyvs State By Inspector Of Police

23

WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited the

Councel for the Appellants most humbly and respectfully requested that this Hon’ble Court to

adjudge and declare that:

1. The present appeal is maintainable.

2. The death occurred in a sudden fight without any intention or knowledge on the part of

the accused.

The court may also be pleased to pass any other order, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in

light of justice, equity and good conscience.

Counsel for Appellant

24