Arctic 2014: Canada's Arctic Policy

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CANADA AND FUTURECHALLENGES IN THE ARCTICRob Huebert

September 2014

Polar Initiative Policy Brief Series

ARCTIC 2014: WHO GETS AVOICE AND WHY IT MATTERS

POLAR INITIATIVE

This policy brief series seeks to share with a wider audience the proceedings of the May 2014 conference at theWoodrow Wilson Center that explored emerging challenges facing Arctic governance, analyzed the goals and pol-icies of stakeholder nations, and evaluated means for promoting international cooperation. The conference wasco-hosted under the Wilson Centers Polar Initiative by the Centers Kissinger Institute on China and the UnitedStates, Asia Program, Canada Institute, China Environment Forum, Kennan Institute, and Global Europe Program.

Canada and the United States should continue communicating with one another onmatters related to Arctic sovereignty to avoid political misunderstandings and ensureproper surveillance and enforcement capabilities continue.

Canada needs to ensure it meets NORAD, and the United States, expectations in theArctic, while providing the resources it needs to expand its our Arctic domain awareness.

Canada will need to balance its commitment to the Arctic Council with its commitment toits own foreign policy and to NATO, specically as relates to the situation in Ukraine.

Policy Recommendations


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Polar Initiative Policy Brief Series - Arctic 2014

CANADA AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE ARCTIC2

cast a shadow on the cooperation and goodwillthat was characteristic of the Arctic region fordecades.

The Protection of CanadianArctic Sovereignty

Canada maintains that the Northwest Passage,which links the Pacic and Atlantic Oceans viathe Arctic, are internal waters. The positionof the United Statesthe only state that hasofcially challenged Canada on this issueisthat the Northwest Passage is an internationalwaterway. For decades, discussions about thesovereignty of the Northwest Passage have

been largely theoretical since there has beenvirtually no international shipping due to heavyice. However, as the Arctic warms, there willbe increasingly long periods of open water thatwill allow for more international shipping. If theNorthwest Passage is considered an internalwaterway, Canada can unilaterally determinethe rules that foreign vessels must obey whiletransiting it. If the passage is an internationalstrait, such as the Straits of Malacca or Hormuz,then all vessels must be allowed passage as

long as they meet international standards.Two international processes will soon requireboth the United States and Canada to revisit theNorthwest Passage issue. First, there has beenan ongoing effort by the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) to develop rulesthe PolarCodefor shipping in the Arctic region. Theseefforts do not directly address the internationalstatus of the Northwest Passage, but they willprovide the rules for all shipping that operatesin international waters. What would happen ifan international shipper enters the NorthwestPassage and complies with the Polar Code,but does not comply with Canadian regulation?Would the Canadian Government attemptto enforce its rules and risk provoking thosesupporting the rights of international shippers?

Introduction

Canada is a northern country that had the luxuryof ignoring its own north throughout much of its

history. The erce climate and the vast distancesin the Canadian Arctic have kept other countriesand outside actors from coming to the region.

For more than a century, Canadas Arctic policytended to be ad hoc, reactive, and piecemeal.This policy began to change after the Cold Waras Canadian policymakers saw an opportunityto develop a cooperative international regimethat could foster stronger and more productiverelations among the former adversaries ofthe region; at the same time, policymakerscould promote and protect Canadian interests.Successive Canadian governments have focusedtheir attention on protecting Arctic sovereignty,from Americans, and Arctic security, from theSoviets/Russians. More recently, environmentalthreats are encouraging multilateral cooperation.Canada has pursued this dual track primarilythrough the development of a domestic policyframework and through the creation and supportof new multilateral endeavors such as the ArcticEnvironmental Protection Strategy and the ArcticCouncil. Canada has been very successful inbalancing and protecting both its domestic andinternational interests.

Canada now faces renewed challenges in theArctic as forces continue to fundamentallytransform the region and threaten Canadascarefully created balance of interests. Meltingice, new transportation technologies, and aglobal increase in demand for natural resourceshave drawn non-Arctic nations such as China

and India to the vast potential of the Arcticregion. Russia, a traditional Arctic power, isincreasingly prioritizing its north for its futureprosperity and security. However, problems andchallenges far from the region are disconcerting-ly and increasingly making their way into Arcticaffairs; the conict in Ukraine has begun to


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Protection of ArcticSecurity: NORAD

The North American Aerospace Defense

Command (NORAD), designed for defenseand deterrence against Soviet bombers andmissiles, has provided for the joint defense ofNorth American airspace since 1957. In 2006 theUnited States and Canada recognized the needto modernize the agreement, and decided toeliminate the requirement to renew it at regularintervals. In what is being called NORADNext, U.S. and Canadian ofcials have begun toaddress the issue of how to improve Arctic andmaritime domain awareness through NORAD,

acknowledging that the melting ice-cover willmake the region more accessible to maritimetrafc. Russias resumption of bomber patrols in2007 over the high Arctic, up to Canadian, U.S.,and Norwegian aerospace boundaries, are areminder of the need to maintain this deterrencecapability.

NORAD Next will involve the modernization andexpansion of NORADs existing surveillancesystems, including updating the North Warningsystem (formerly the DEW Line), a series ofradar sites that run from Alaska to Greenland,which was last updated in 1985. BeyondNORAD Next, Canada will also need to developan expanded Arctic maritime surveillancesystem, which will require a mix of satellitesystems, new ground-based radar systems,and unmanned aerial vehiclesall of which arecurrently under discussion by the government.While Canadas RadarSat II has already provenvery capable in ship detection, the Canadiangovernment has committed to the nextgeneration of Earth observation satellite. Thecollection of additional intelligence will requiredata fusion from all of these systems in order tounderstand the full surveillance picture.

Or would it simply accept such actions, butrisk facing a domestic reaction for failing toprotect Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Secondly,Russia has moved to increasingly assert its

control over its northern waterwaystheNorthern Sea Route. It has encouraged inter-national shippers to use the route, but underits own terms; if an international shipper doesnot meet these terms, it is not permittedpassage. Will its actions eventually provokean American response protecting internation-al shipping rights that, while directed againstRussia, would inevitably impact Canada? Itwould be impossible for the United States totake a position against the Russians and ignore

Canadian efforts to assert the same type ofcontrol.

Canada and the United States must resolvethis politically sensitive issue sooner ratherthan later. Canada needs to be attuned to U.S.concerns regarding the freedom of navigation,but it is equally important that the UnitedStates recognizes the unique environmentof the Northwest Passage, both in terms ofthe environment (protection from spills andaccidents) and Canadian political sensitivities.

Canada can best respond to these newdevelopments by building on its existingcapabilities for surveillance and enforcementof Canadian laws and regulations in order toreassure its American allies. The more condentthe United States can be of Canadas ability toachieve comprehensive domain awareness ofthe region, the better the United States can beassured of protecting its northernmost ankfrom international threats that may develop in

the future. In return, the United States shouldnot actively seek to undermine CanadasNorthwest Passage positions internationally.


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Russian action in Ukraine. The result would bean Arctic Council with seven NATO membersand Russia, which would signicantly reduce theeffectiveness of the Arctic Council in the short

term and likely in the long term as well. Sucha situation would also be a blow to CanadianArctic policy, since Canada was the creator ofthe Arctic Council and places it at the centerof its Arctic foreign policy. At the same time,Canada has been one of the most vocal criticsof Russian intervention in Ukraine. It is difcultto see how Canada could oppose the addition ofthe two Arctic neutrals.

Canada has a difcult policy route to follow. Itmust reconcile the need to foster cooperationamong the entire Arctic communityincludingRussiawith its need to demonstrateopposition to states that use or support the useof military force to disassemble existing states.It may not be able to do both.

Conclusion

The Arctic is becoming a more complicatedregion for Canada, which to date has beenvery successful in protecting and promoting its

Arctic interests. To a certain degree, Canada hasbeen able to harvest the low-hanging fruit:the establishment of the Arctic Council and theCouncils creation of a search-and-rescue treatywere easily agreed on. New pressures fromoutside the region are now forcing Canada todeal with difcult issues.

As climate change causes increased meltingof Arctic ice, international shipping will l ikelymigrate to northern waters, including the

Northwest Passage, which will pose difcultiesfor Canadas relationship with the United States.At the same time, Canada and the United Statesneed to work together on the redevelopmentand modernization of NORAD. If Canada candemonstrate that it is serious about improvingand expanding its current surveillance and

To compliment these new intelligencecapabilities, Canada must have the ability torespond to Arctic situations that may arisefrom the increase in international activity. This

could run the gamut from an environmen-tal emergency caused by a vessel to illegalactivity such as smuggling, necessitating newvessels for the Canadian Coast Guard andRoyal Canadian Navy as well as new aircraft forthe Royal Canadian Air Force. The governmentis currently committed to building one newicebreaker, six to eight Arctic Offshore PatrolShips (AOPS), and a replacement for its existingeet of CF-18 ghter aircraft. However, theseprograms face substantial political hurdles and

increased costs for improvements, thus testingCanadas commitment to the region evenfurther.

Protection of Canadian ArcticSecurity: NATO

Canadas vision for the Arctic may be at oddswith its NATO commitments. The Harpergovernment does not see a role for the alliancein the region, placing it at odds with some of

its European alliessuch as Norway, whichhas been pushing to expand NATOs role in theArctic. Canada does not currently see a militarythreat in the region and, thus, does not see theneed to expand NATOs role there.

Canadian opposition to expanding NATOsmission has prevented the alliance fromexpanding its mandate northward. Recentevents in Ukraine, however, threaten toreopen this issue. Finland and Sweden aredebating possible membership in NATO; bothare currently members of the Partnership forPeace, but do not belong to the alliance. Therewas similar debate in both countries followingthe 2008 Russia-Georgia conict. There wouldbe increased tension between Russia and theother Arctic nations should either or both ofthese states seek full membership as a result of


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over its actions in the Ukraine. Cooperation willbecome increasingly less likely if the conictin Ukraine continues for any length of time.Ironically, Russia and Canada have the closest

interests regarding the control of their Arcticwaterways, but the growing tensions betweenthe two countries will prevent any meaningfulcoordination of their policies.

How Canada balances the conictingrequirements of its Arctic policy will beincreasingly difcult, and will likely be substan-tially less successful than it was in the last 15years. Canada can expect to pay much moreand get much lessin the coming decade.

enforcement capability in the region, Canadamay be able to take responsibility for its role inNORAD and at the same time provide a quidpro quo for the United States regarding the

Northwest Passage. There is no guarantee thatthis will happen. Canada may face circumstanc-es where it provides substantial resources toredevelop its capabilities with NORAD, but stillfaces an open challenge by the United Statesregarding the status of the Northwest Passage.This will be an enormous political challenge forany Canadian government.

Canada also faces challenges in its relationshipwith Russia, particularly over the balancing actof cooperating with Russia on Arctic policywhile simultaneously harshly critiquing Russia

Rob Huebert is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the Universityof Calgary and the associate director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He has been

a senior research fellow at the Canadian International Council and a fellow with Canadian Defenceand Foreign Affairs Institute. In November 2010 Huebert was appointed as a board member ofthe Canadian Polar Commission. Huebert has taught courses at Memorial University, DalhousieUniversity, and the University of Manitoba. His research interests include international relations,strategic studies, the Law of the Sea, maritime affairs, Canadian foreign and defense policy, andcircumpolar relations. His work has appeared in International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy,Isuma-Canadian Journal of Policy Research, and the Canadian Military Journal. He also comments onCanadian security and Arctic issues in both the Canadian and international media.

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Arctic 2014: Canada's Arctic Policy