Αριστοτέλης Μετά τα Φυσικά 1045α] [1] ἡ δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν νεκροῦ δύναµις καὶ ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὄξους: γίγνεται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἡµέρας νύξ. καὶ ὅσα δὴ οὕτω µεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, εἰς τὴν ὕλην δεῖ ἐπανελθεῖν, οἷον εἰ [5] ἐκ νεκροῦ ζῷον, εἰς τὴν ὕλην πρῶτον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω ζῷον: καὶ τὸ ὄξος εἰς ὕδωρ, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως οἶνος.

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς εἰρηµένης περί τε τοὺς ὁρισµοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθµούς, τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι; πάντων γὰρ ὅσα πλείω µέρη ἔχει καὶ µὴ ἔστιν οἷον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν [10] ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ µόρια, ἔστι τι αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώµασι τοῖς µὲν ἁφὴ αἰτία τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ γλισχρότης ἤ τι πάθος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον. ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισµὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσµῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ ποιεῖ ἓν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ διὰ τί [15] ἓν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά, οἷον τό τε ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, αὐτό τι ζῷον καὶ αὐτὸ δίπουν; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ἔσονται κατὰ µέθεξιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ᾽ [19] ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, ζῴου καὶ δίποδος, καὶ ὅλως δὴ οὐκ ἂν [20] εἴη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἀλλὰ πλείω, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν; φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὕτω µὲν µετιοῦσιν ὡς εἰώθασιν ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀποδοῦναι καὶ λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν: εἰ δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγοµεν, τὸ µὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ µορφή, καὶ τὸ µὲν δυνάµει τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐκέτι ἀπορία δόξειεν ἂν [25] εἶναι τὸ ζητούµενον. ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀπορία ἡ αὐτὴ κἂν εἰ ὁ ὅρος εἴη ἱµατίου στρογγύλος χαλκός: εἴη γὰρ ἂν σηµεῖον τοὔνοµα τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου, ὥστε τὸ ζητούµενόν ἐστι τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ τὸν χαλκόν. οὐκέτι δὴ ἀπορία φαίνεται, ὅτι τὸ µὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ µορφή. [30] τί οὖν τούτου αἴτιον, τοῦ τὸ δυνάµει ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, παρὰ τὸ ποιῆσαν, ἐν ὅσοις ἔστι γένεσις; οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον ἕτερον τοῦ τὴν δυνάµει σφαῖραν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σφαῖραν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ὕλης ἡ µὲν νοητὴ ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητή, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ µὲν [35] ὕλη τὸ δὲ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ κύκλος σχῆµα ἐπίπεδον. ὅσα δὲ µὴ ἔχει ὕλην µήτε νοητὴν µήτε αἰσθητήν, εὐθὺς ὅπερ ἕν τί [εἶναί] ἐστιν ἕκαστον,

[1045β] [1] ὥσπερ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι, τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν—διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς ὁρισµοῖς οὔτε τὸ ὂν οὔτε τὸ ἕν—, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι εὐθὺς ἕν τί ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ ὄν τι—διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον τοῦ [5] ἓν εἶναι οὐθενὶ τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄν τι εἶναι: εὐθὺς γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ὄν τι καὶ ἕν τι, οὐχ ὡς ἐν γένει τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῷ ἑνί, οὐδ᾽ ὡς χωριστῶν ὄντων παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν οἱ µὲν µέθεξιν λέγουσι, καὶ αἴτιον τί τῆς µεθέξεως καὶ τί τὸ µετέχειν ἀποροῦσιν: οἱ δὲ συνουσίαν [10] [ψυχῆς], ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων φησὶν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήµην τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ψυχῆς: οἱ δὲ σύνθεσιν ἢ σύνδεσµον ψυχῆς σώµατι τὸ ζῆν. καίτοι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ πάντων: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἔσται ἢ συνουσία ἢ σύνδεσµος ἢ σύνθεσις ψυχῆς καὶ ὑγιείας, καὶ τὸ τὸν χαλκὸν εἶναι τρίγωνον [15] σύνθεσις χαλκοῦ καὶ τριγώνου, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι σύνθεσις ἐπιφανείας καὶ λευκότητος. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι δυνάµεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας ζητοῦσι λόγον ἑνοποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν. ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ µορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, δυνάµει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὥστε ὅµοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ [20] ἑνὸς τί αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι: ἓν γάρ τι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ δυνάµει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕν πώς ἐστιν, ὥστε αἴτιον οὐθὲν ἄλλο πλὴν εἴ τι ὡς κινῆσαν ἐκ δυνάµεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν. ὅσα δὲ µὴ ἔχει ὕλην, πάντα ἁπλῶς ὅπερ ἕν τι.

[1045a] [1] and the actual matter of the living body becomes by degeneration the potentiality and matter of the dead body, and water the matter of vinegar; for the one becomes the other just as day becomes night.All things which change reciprocally in this way must return into the matter; e.g., if a living thing is generated from a dead one, it must first become the matter, and then a living thing; and vinegar must first become water, and then wine.

With regard to the difficulty which we have described1 in connection with definitions and numbers, what is the cause of the unification? In all things which have a plurality of parts, and which are not a total aggregate but a whole of some sort distinct from the parts, there is some cause ; inasmuch as even in bodies sometimes contact is the cause of their unity, and sometimes viscosity or some other such quality.But a definition is one account, not by connection, like the Iliad , but because it is a definition of one thing.

What is it, then, that makes "man" one thing, and why does it make him one thing and not many, e.g. "animal" and "two-footed," especially if, as some say, there is an Idea of "animal" and an Idea of "two-footed"?Why are not these Ideas "man," and why should not man exist by participation, not in any "man," but in two Ideas, those of "animal" and "two-footed"? [20] And in general "man" will be not one, but two things—"animal" and "two-footed." Evidently if we proceed in this way, as it is usual to define and explain, it will be impossible to answer and solve the difficulty.But if, as we maintain, man is part matter and part form—the matter being potentially, and the form actually man—, the point which we are investigating will no longer seem to be a difficulty. For this difficulty is just the same as we should have if the definition of X2 were "round bronze"; for this name would give a clue to the formula, so that the question becomes "what is the cause of the unification of 'round' and 'bronze'?"The difficulty is no longer apparent, because the one is matter and the other form. What then is it (apart from the active cause) which causes that which exists potentially to exist actually in things which admit of generation? There is no other cause of the potential sphere's being an actual sphere; this was the essence of each.3

Some matter is intelligible and some sensible, and part of the formula is always matter and part actuality; e.g., the circle is a plane figure.4 But such thing5 as have no matter, neither intelligible nor sensible, are ipso facto each one of them essentially something one;

[1045b] [1] just as they are essentially something existent: an individual substance, a quality, or a quantity. Hence neither "existent" nor "one" is present in their definitions. And their essence is ipso facto something one, just as it is something existent.Hence also there is no other cause of the unity of any of these things, or of their existence; for each one of them is one and "existent" not because it is contained in the genus "being" or "unity," nor because these genera exist separately apart from their particulars, but ipso facto.

It is because of this difficulty that some thinkers1 speak of "participation," and raise the question of what is the cause of participation, and what participation means; and others speak of "communion"; e.g., Lycophron2 says that knowledge is a communion of the soul with "knowing"; and others call life a combination or connection of soul with body.The same argument, however, applies in every case; for "being healthy" will be the "communion" or "connection" or "combination" of soul and health; and "being a bronze triangle" a "combination" of bronze and triangle; and "being white" a "combination" of surface and whiteness. The reason for this is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potentiality and actuality.But, as we have

said,3 the proximate matter and the shape are one and the same; the one existing potentially, and the other actually. [20] Therefore to ask the cause of their unity is like asking the cause of unity in general; for each individual thing is one, and the potential and the actual are in a sense one. Thus there is no cause other than whatever initiates the development from potentiality to actuality. And such things as have no matter are all, without qualification, essential unities.

[1075β] [1] ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς: τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα （συνάγει γάρ） καὶ ὡς ὕλη: µόριον γὰρ τοῦ µίγµατος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συµβέβηκεν [5] καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ. ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡµεῖς λέγοµεν: [10] ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστί πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον µὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν µὴ ῥυθµίσῃ τις. καὶ διὰ τί τὰ µὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ [15] µὲν ἐκ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα: οἱ δ᾽ ἵνα µὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἓν πάντα ποιοῦσιν.

ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει. καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα: διὰ τί γὰρ µετέσχεν ἢ [20] µετέχει; καὶ τοῖς µὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιµιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήµῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡµῖν δ᾽ οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάµει ταῦτα ἔστιν: ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν. εἴ τε µὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ [25] αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν. εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται τὰ εἴδη: ἢ <οἱ> ἀριθµοί, οὐδενὸς αἴτια: εἰ δὲ µή, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε. ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀµεγεθῶν µέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθµὸς οὐ ποιήσει [30] συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος. ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδέν γ᾽ ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν µὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ µὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάµεως. οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν: ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται πῶς. ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθµοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ [35] ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶµα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγµα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς: οὐδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν µὴ ὡς ἡµεῖς εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθµὸν πρῶτον τὸν µαθηµατικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχοµένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας,

[1075b] [1] whether as an end or as a moving cause or as form.

Empedocles theory is also absurd, for he identifies the Good with Love.1 This is a principle both as causing motion (since it combines) and as matter (since it is part of the mixture).2 Now even if it so happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as causing motion, still the essence of the two principles is not the same. In which respect, then, is Love a principle? And it is also absurd that Strife should be imperishable; strife is the very essence of evil.3

Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing motion; for Mind moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be some other Good4—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health.5 It is absurd also not to provide a contrary for the Good, i.e. for Mind.6 But all those who recognize the contraries fail to make use of the contraries, unless we systematize their theories.And none of them explains why some things are perishable and others imperishable; for they make all existing things come from the same first principles.7 Again, some8 make existing things come from not-being, while others,9 to avoid this necessity, make all things one. Again, no one explains why there must always be generation, and what the cause of generation is.

Moreover, those who posit two principles must admit another superior principle,10 and so must the exponents of the Forms; for what made or makes particulars participate in the Forms? [20] And on all other views it follows necessarily that there must be something which is contrary to Wisdom or supreme knowledge, but on ours it does not. For there is no contrary to that which is primary,since all contraries involve matter, and that which has matter exists potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to Wisdom would tend towards the contrary of the object of Wisdom; but that which is primary has no contrary.

Further, if there is to be nothing else besides sensible things, there will be no first principle, no order, no generation, and no celestial motions, but every principle will be based upon another,11 as in the accounts of all the cosmologists and physicists.And if the Forms or numbers are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not of nothing, at least not of motion.

Further, how can extension, i.e. a continuum, be produced from that which is unextended? Number cannot, either as a moving or as a formal cause, produce a continuum. Moreover, no contrary can be essentially productive and kinetic, for then it would be possible for it not to exist;and further, the act of production would in any case be posterior to the potentiality. Therefore the world of reality is not eternal. But there are real objects which are eternal. Therefore one of these premisses must be rejected. We have described how this may be done.12

Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or soul and body, or in general the form and the object, are one, no one attempts to explain; nor is it possible to do so except on our theory, that it is the moving cause that makes them one.13 As for those14 who maintain that mathematical number is the primary reality,