Assessing a Nuclear North Korea

Assessing a Nuclear North Korea

Theresa Lou

GOVT 451

Professor Karber

December 7, 2012

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Introduction

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has

been the center of many foreign policy debates. The regime’s nuclear weapons

program has long been a threat to regional stability and international security.

After the death of Kim Jong-‐il, North Korean society is further shrouded in

mystery as the world wonders which direction the young leader, Kim Jong-‐un,

will take North Korea. Tensions have escalated when the DPRK claimed to have

“missiles that can reach the American mainland,”1 early October 2012. Though

Mr. Kim has demonstrated his intentions of a new leadership style2, the world

has no reason to believe that the security threat North Korea poses will subside

any time soon.

This paper therefore aims to analyze how various levels of DPRK

nuclear capabilities might affect international relations in northeast Asia. After

first reconstructing the history of North Korea’s nuclear program and analyzing

the current U.S. extended deterrence strategy in the region, this paper will

answer the following questions. What are some of the real world nuclear effects

of an attack of the different magnitudes described? What are the political effects

of the attacks? Is there the possibility of preemption, inception, or mitigation?

What are some scenarios in which such capabilities could become a useful

coercive mechanism? Finally, given these premises, what are some political

consequences of North Korea acquiring such nuclear capabilities? To conclude,

this paper assesses the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy and how Washington

could proceed in the three different scenarios provided.

1 Choe Sang-‐Hun, “North Korea Says Its Missiles Can Reach U.S. Mainland,” New York Times, (9 October 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/world/asia/north-‐korea-‐says-‐its-‐missiles-‐can-‐reach-‐us-‐mainland.html> [accessed 4 November 2012]. 2 Kim Jong-‐Un has allowed more women to dress in Western clothing and also publically admitted to failure when the rocket launch in April 2012 went awry. Both actions greatly deviate from traditional North Korean leadership. “Kim Jong-‐un,” New York Times, (15 October, 2012), <http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/k/kim_jongun/index.html> [accessed 4 November 2012].

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History: North Korea’s Nuclear Program

North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in

1974 and proceeded to ratify the nuclear non-‐proliferation treaty (NPT) in 1985.

After becoming an NPT signatory, however, the DPRK refused to sign the IAEA

full-‐scope safeguards agreement required under the provisions of the NPT.3

Tensions eased temporarily as the two Koreas signed the Joint Declaration on

the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992 and as the DPRK agreed to

IAEA inspections. Relations between Pyongyang and the IAEA quickly soured,

however, as inspectors became suspicious of the discrepancies in the amount of

plutonium North Koreans may have extracted.4

In a defiant move against international pressures to allow IAEA

inspectors in North Korea in 1993, Pyongyang threatened to withdraw from the

NPT. On May 29 and 30, 1993, North Korea fired the Rodong-‐1 (or No Dong-‐1), a

single-‐stage, medium-‐range ballistic missile (MRBM), into the Sea of Japan.

Though the DPRK suspended its withdrawal after bilateral negotiations with the

United Stats, IAEA inspections did not restart; then IAEA director Hans Blix

announced that there was no longer any “meaningful assurance” that North

Korea was using its nuclear material for solely peaceful purposes as it claimed.5

Blix’s statement pressured the Clinton administration to either reach a

diplomatic consensus with Pyongyang or proceed with economic sanctions,

which ultimately resulted in the signing of the Agreed Framework6 in 1994. The

Agreement stated that North Korea would freeze and eventually dismantle its

nuclear weapons program in exchange for help building two light-‐water reactors

3 William E. Berry, Jr., “The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: A Comparison of the Negotiating Strategies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations,” in Perspectives on U.S. Policy Towards North Korea: Stalemate or Checkmate?, edited by Sharon Richardson, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 1-‐22. 4 Ibid., pp. 3. 5 David E. Sanger, “U.N. Agency Finds No Assurance on North Korean Atomic Program,” New York Times, (3 December 1993), <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/world/un-‐agency-‐finds-‐no-‐assurance-‐on-‐north-‐korean-‐atomic-‐program.html>, [accessed 5 November 2012]. 6 “Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” International Atomic Energy Agency, (2 November 1994), <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf>, [accessed 5 November 2012].

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and normalized economic and diplomatic relations. The ambiguous language

and controversial nature of the document, however, led to serious problems in

implementation as became evident when the DPRK fired the Taepodong-‐1, a

three-‐stage intermediate-‐range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan in 1998,

suggesting that North Korea had significantly increased the range of its missiles.7

Tensions escalated when Pyongyang formally withdrew from the NPT in

2003. Series of Six-‐Party talks yielded little result, and the North conducted two

rounds of missiles tests in July of 2006. The DPRK fired at least seven separate

missiles over the Sea of Japan including two new Taepodong-‐2 missiles designed

for long range but exploded 42 seconds after it was launched. The North claimed

to have conducted a nuclear test in October later that same year. Despite

Pyongyang’s claims that the blast had an explosive force of around four kilotons,

most estimate the explosive force to have been less than one kiloton.

The UNSC adopted multiple resolutions8 condemning the DPRK’s actions

and calling for it to return to Six-‐Party talks, which resumed on October 31,

2006. Despite a tentative agreement to provide North Korea with roughly $400

million in fuel oil and aid9 in 2007, Pyongyang defied the international

community yet again and conducted both nuclear and missiles tests in 2009.

Most recently, the compromise between the United States and the DPRK struck

in February—whereby North Korea agreed in principle to give up nuclear and

long-‐range missile tests in exchange for food aid—fell apart as the North

launched a probably long-‐range rocket test on April 13, 2012.10

Though this abridged version of the history of North Korea’s nuclear

program only highlights the major events that occurred throughout the years, it

7 Sheryl WyDunn, “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory,” New York Times, (1 September 1998), <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/01/world/north-‐korea-‐fires-‐missile-‐over-‐japanese-‐territory.html>, [accessed 5 November 2012]. 8 UNSCR 1695 and 1718. 9 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, “In Shift, Accord on North Korea Seems to Be Set,” New York Times, (13 February 2007), <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/world/asia/13korea.html?_r=0>, [accessed 5 November]. 10 “U.S.-‐North Korea compromise ends with failed missile test,” Council on Foreign Relations Global Governance Monitor, <http://www.cfr.org/global-‐governance/global-‐governance-‐monitor/p18985?breadcrumb=%2FthinKtank%2Fiigg%2Fpublications#/Nuclear%20Proliferation/Timeline/>, [accessed 5 November 2012].

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hopefully provides the reader with the understanding that the issue at hand is a

complicated one. The “two steps forward, three steps back” nature of the

situation has frustrated scholars and politicians alike, and there is no simple

solution to the problem.

U.S. Extended Deterrence Analysis

One only has to look at the Cuban Missile Crisis to understand the

dilemma of extended deterrence. John Kennedy struggled with balancing the

security of U.S. homeland and the preservation of international peace, but Nikita

Khrushchev was faced with an even greater dilemma. Once Fidel Castro

concluded that an U.S. invasion was just on the horizon, Castro demanded that

Khrushchev consider launching a preemptive strike against the United States.11

“Khrushchev no doubt asked himself, ‘Why Should I use nuclear weapons to

defend my ally when it will likely bring an all-‐out nuclear attack on my

country?’”12 Deterrence is based on persuading an adversary that the risks and

costs of his actions are greater than the potential rewards. When a state

threatens to retaliate an adversary’s attack with nuclear weapons, the credibility

of the threat is high. However, it is much more difficult to persuade an adversary

and the defended ally that a state is willing to risk its own security for the sake of

the third party. Furthermore, it is also challenging to persuade the domestic

population that extending the nuclear umbrella to allies is vital to national

interests.

U.S. extended deterrence nonetheless has been at the heart of many U.S.

foreign policy goals. Washington’s nuclear deterrent protected NATO during the

Cold War and has played a particularly significant role in U.S. policies in the East

Asia region. To recap, U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War

served three functions in the NATO context. Firstly, it relayed to adversaries that

11 Richard C. Bush, “The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views, and Implications,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/arms%20control%20bush/02_arms_control_bush>, [accessed 27 November 2012]. 12 Ibid., 2.

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“an Alliance deterrent has been constituted, with multiple Allies involved in

consulting on policy, maintaining the posture, and preparing for possible

operations.”13 Secondly, the weapons provided credibility for U.S. commitments

to responding in the event of a crisis. Last but not least, the arrangement divided

the responsibility of financial costs and political risks amongst the Allies instead

of Washington bearing the burden alone.

Turning then to the current deterrence strategy in East Asia, it aims to

protect and reassure regional allies, provide regional security management, and

limit the chances of an arms race. However, there are two key differences

between the security environments in Europe and East Asia that may make U.S.

allies in East Asia question the U.S. security umbrella. Firstly, the U.S. nuclear

deterrent in Europe is “embedded in the American commitment to the NATO

alliance,”14 whereas no parallel multilateral alliance structure exists in Asia.

Secondly, the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe is “underpinned in part by the

presence of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of NATO allies,”15 a

relationship Washington has never had with its Asian allies. “The United States

also withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and removed

nuclear weapons from its submarines and surface ships during the George H. W.

Bush administration. Since then, the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for the

region has therefore been provided by U.S. strategic nuclear forces.”16

Despite these key differences, the Cold War experience provides valuable

lessons for ways to think about the extended deterrence strategy in East Asia.

“America’s fundamental problem in confronting the Soviet Union was that

13 David S. Yost, “U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO and North-‐East Asia,” Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique, (March 2010), pp. 16. 14 Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-‐Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nuclear_deterrence>, [accessed 6 November 2012]. 15 Ibid., pp. 29. 16 Ibid., pp. 30.

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Washington could deter only certain behavior.”17 Figure 118 provides a chart

indicating that despite the success of U.S. nuclear deterrence during the Cold

War, the Soviet Union nonetheless “retained considerable scope for destabilizing

and even threatening conduct.”19 Washington could only credibly threaten

nuclear war in circumstances when its vital interests, such as the survival of U.S.

allies, were at stake. Such was the case during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when

Israel’s existence was threatened.

Figure 1

South Korea

South Korea doubts whether it can “absolutely trust the United States to

supplement, where necessary, its own efforts to ensure security.”20 This fear of

17 Paul J. Saunders, “Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia: A U.S.-‐Japan-‐South Korea Dialogue,” Center for the National Interest, <http://www.cftni.org/2012-‐Extended-‐Deterence-‐In-‐East-‐Asia.pdf>, [accessed 28 November 2012]. 18 Ibid., pp. 3. 19 Ibid., pp. 3. 20 Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-‐Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nuclear_deterrence>, [accessed 6 November 2012].

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abandonment and its perceived relative weakness to its larger neighboring

countries has resulted in a strong need for American reassurance. Seoul’s’ fears

of being marginalized by bilateral discussions between Pyongyang and

Washington were ameliorated by the Obama administration’s responses to

DPRK provocations, but it nonetheless worries about U.S. commitment to a

denuclearizing the North. It worries that Washington may “be willing to tolerate

[North Korea’s] retention of nuclear weapons and try to ‘manage’ the

proliferation problem.”21 Thus, what Seoul seeks is for the United States to

unequivocally state that it will not accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons

capability.

Japan

Though Tokyo has at multiple points considered beginning its own

nuclear program, it never took action, as did some of its other neighbors. Japan

has a substantial amount of plutonium, but it is unlikely to build a nuclear

weapon. The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki left much of the

Japanese population opposed to nuclearization. Though the mainstream view

“has been continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent as an indispensable

component of Japanese defense policy,”22 Tokyo nonetheless “supplements with

dependence on the U.S. deterrent”23 through multiple strategies: increased

cooperation with Washington to reduce incentives for ignoring Japan’s interests;

periodically suggest it might consider the nuclear option to solicit U.S.

reaffirmation of its commitment; and build up its own land and sea based missile

defenses.24

21 Ibid., pp. 32. 22 James L. Schoff, “Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-‐Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence,” Project Report by: the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, (March 2009), <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>, [accessed 6 November 2012]. 23 Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-‐Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nuclear_deterrence>, [accessed 6 November 2012]. 24 Ibid., pp. 35.

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North Korean Nuclear Capabilities

North Korea has produced enough fissile material for approximately six

to ten nuclear weapons.25 This section of the paper will focus on how would the

following DPRK nuclear capabilities affect international relations in East Asia:

1. 10 Rodong-‐1 MRBMs with a 10 kiloton (Kt) warhead

2. 10 Taepodong-‐1 IRBMs with a 20 Kt warhead

3. 10 Taepodong-‐2 ICBMs with a 40Kt warhead

Figure 2

Figure 226 provides a reference for the range of these missiles. As was laid out in

the introduction, each scenario would include an analysis of the political

consequences of North Korea acquiring each of the mentioned nuclear

capabilities. Some of the questions this paper will ask include:

1. What are some of the real world nuclear effects of an attack of the

different magnitudes described?

2. What are the political effects of the attacks?

25 Bruce W. Bennett, “Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2010). 26 “MRBMs and IRBMs,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/part04.htm>, [accessed 6 November 2012].

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3. Is there the possibility of preemption, inception, or mitigation?

4. What are some scenarios in which such capabilities could become a

useful coercive mechanism?

Before analyzing the implications of a North Korea with the

aforementioned capabilities, it is necessary for the author to recognize that the

scenarios are not entirely realistic. Firstly, the yield for North Korea’s nuclear

tests in 2006 and 2009 are both disputed, as the DPRK government never

announced the exact yield. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization

Preparatory Commission assessed that the 2009 nuclear test yield was only

slightly larger than the 2006 test, which was less than one kiloton. The scenarios

provided in this paper where North Korea possess a nuclear weapon with a 10 Kt

yield, therefore, is an intended exaggeration, as is true regarding the range of

Taepodong-‐2. The Federation of American Scientists does not believe North

Korea currently possesses a functional version of a Taepodong-‐2 ICBM.27 For the

sake of argument and to make analysis interesting, however, this paper will

proceed to analyze the implications of a nuclear North Korea under these

doomsday scenarios.

Furthermore, it is difficult to predict the damages of a North Korean

nuclear attack. Factors that might affect the damage include: “the height above

ground at which [the weapon] is detonated, the atmospheric conditions, the

terrain, buildings, and other shielding near the explosion, the physical

characteristics of the people, and the medical care and other emergency

response available.”28 The following sections therefore aim to provide

approximate information on the consequences of a nuclear attack with existing

research.

27 “Missiles,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/index.html>, [7 November 2012]. 28 Bruce W. Bennett, “Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2010).

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The Facts: Overall Effects of a 10Kt Nuclear Warhead Detonation

Nuclear explosions have both immediate and delayed effects. Immediate

effects, such as blast, thermal radiation (heat), and nuclear radiation cause

significant damage and destruction within minutes or even seconds of a nuclear

attack.29 Some of the delayed effects include mostly radioactive fallout and

possible environmental effects. Most of the destruction caused by nuclear

attacks is due to blast effects, which is 40 to 60-‐percent of the total energy

released in the explosion.30 In the Hiroshima attack, “blast and burn injuries

were found in 60 to 70-‐percent of all survivors.”31 Nuclear weapons also

produce high quantities of thermal radiation as visible light known as “flash.”

Thermal radiation can cause eye injuries as well as start fires in regions near the

detonation. Depending on the yield of the weapon, thermal radiation accounts

for 35 to 45-‐percent of the energy released in the explosion.32 Approximately 5-‐

percent33 of the total energy released in a nuclear explosion comes from nuclear

radiation. Its effects decrease with distance from the point of burst, thus

“dangerous radiation levels only exist so close to the explosion that surviving the

blast is impossible.”34 As a general rule for estimating the casualties for these

three effects of a nuclear attack, everyone inside the 5-‐psi blast overpressure

contour around the hypocenter [can be considered] as a fatality.35 Long-‐term

radioactive fallout is dispersed downwind with the fireball and debris cloud,

contaminating large areas of soil, food, and water supply.36

29 “Section 5.0 Effects of Nuclear Explosions,” Nuclear Weapons Archive, (15 May 1997), <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html#nfaq5.1>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 30 “Nuclear Bombs,” Solcom House, (2011), <http://www.solcomhouse.com/nuclearholocaust.htm>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 31 “Section 5.0 Effects of Nuclear Explosions,” Nuclear Weapons Archive, (15 May 1997), <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html#nfaq5.1>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 “Nuclear Detonation: Weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices,” Radiation Emergency Medical Management, (28 December 2011), <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm#size>, [accessed 19 November 2012].

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The Facts: U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) develops, tests, and fields an

integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS) by working closely with the

U.S. Combatant Commanders.37 Some of the elements of the current U.S. BMDS

include the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, the Ground-‐based Midcourse Defense,

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the PATRIOT Advanced

Capability-‐3 (PAC-‐3).

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The Aegis BMD is a sea-‐based component of the BMDS and is part of the

missile defense system protecting Europe. It “defeats short-‐ to intermediate-‐

range, unitary and separating, midcourse-‐phase, ballistic missile threats with the

Standard Missile-‐3 (SM-‐3), as well as short-‐range ballistic missiles in the

terminal phase with SM-‐2.”38 The SM-‐3 is designed to intercept a ballistic missile

in its midcourse phase. It is equipped with a “hit-‐to-‐kill” warhead, which aims

destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead through collision. The SM-‐2 is designed to

intercept a ballistic missile in its terminal phase and is equipped with a blast

fragmentation warhead.39

Since the first intercept test conducted in January 2002, the Aegis BMD

has successfully intercepted 23 out of 29 at sea events, “including intercepts of

two targets by two interceptors during a single test.”40 Its capabilities in

intercepting ICBMs, however, are still in question. There are 26 Aegis BMD

combatants as of November 2012—1641 are assigned to the Pacific Fleet, 10 to

37 “About Us,” Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/about/about.html>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 38 “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 39 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, (19 April 2011). 40 “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” Missile Defense Agency, <http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_tests.pdf>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 41 5 at Yokosuka, Japan, 6 at Pearl Harbor, HI, and five at San Diego, CA. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, (19 April 2011).

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the Atlantic Fleet.42 The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces has two classes

of Aegis configured destroyers and the South Korean government has plans to

build Aegis-‐equipped ships.43

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

The GMD is the United States system for engaging and destroying limited

intermediate-‐ and long-‐range ballistic missile threats in space. It is composed of

Ground-‐Based Interceptors and Ground Systems components. A total of 31 GBI

silos have been deployed to Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base

(VAFB), California as of 2010. VAFB has 5 launch facilities, 3 of which are

dedicated for operational use, 1 intended for either test for operations, and the

last 1 dedicated for testing. All 26 silos at Fort Greely are designated for

operational use.44

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

“The THAAD element provides the BMDS with a globally transportable,

rapidly deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or

outside the atmosphere during their terminal phase of flight.”45 It carries no

warhead and instead relies on kinetic energy of the impact to destroy incoming

ballistic missiles. The THAAD program has completed 11 successful tests,

including 9 intercepts and three operationally-‐realistic tests since 200946, but a

THAAD Battery nonetheless has a limited capability against ICBMs.

42 “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 43 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, (19 April 2011). <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33745_20110419.pdf>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 44 “Report to Congress on Assessment of the Ground-‐based Midcourse Defense Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System,” Department of Defense, (May 2010), <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/missile_defense_agency/10_F_1399Report_toCongress_onAssessment_of_the_GBMD_Element_of_the_BMDS.pdf>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 45 “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),” Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/thaad.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 46 Ibid.

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PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)

The PAC-‐3 is a surface-‐to-‐air missile that is operational and fielded by the

U.S. Army. It provides simultaneous air and missile defense capabilities and

works with THAAD to provide an integrated, overlapping defense against missile

threats in the terminal phase of flight.47 Since 1981, Patriot systems have been

sold to various nations including Taiwan and Japan. After North Korea test-‐

launched ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan in 2006 and proceeded with

under ground nuclear testing, South Korea also purchased second-‐hand PAC-‐2

missiles from Germany.48

Scenario Analyses

Given the general effects of a nuclear explosion as well as the most

prominent types of anti-‐ballistic missile systems currently deployed, this paper

will now focus on the three various forms of North Korean nuclear capability and

assess the implications.

10 Rodong-1 MRBMs with a 10 Kt warhead

According to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, North Korea

possesses fewer than fifty Rodong-‐1 MRBMs. With a range of approximately 800

miles,49 the Rodong-‐1 can hit almost any part of South Korea with near certainty

and potentially threaten parts of Japan. According to RAND, “a 10 Kt nuclear

weapon could have a ‘lethal radius’ of about 1,100 meters and a ‘seriously

casualty radius’ of almost 1,500 meters if ground burst.”50 Figure 351 illustrates

47 “PATRIOT Advanced Capability-‐3 (PAC-‐3),” Military Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/pac_3.html>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 48 Lee Tae-‐hoon, “PAC-‐2 missiles to go for upgrade,” The Korea Times, (28 October 2012), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/10/281_123339.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 49 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center, (March 2006), <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NASIC2006.pdf>, [accessed 7 November 2012]. 50 Bruce W. Bennett, “Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2010). 51 Courtesy of “NUKEMAP” by Alex Wellerstein. NUKEMAP is a new tool that lets anyone experiment with the effects of some of history’s famous nuclear explosions on cities around the world. <http://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, [accessed 7 November 2012].

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the qualitative effects of a 10Kt nuclear bomb on Seoul, and Figure 4 is a color

legend indicating the effects radii of the blast of said bomb.

Figure 3

Figure 4

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If a 10 Kt nuclear weapon be reliably delivered and ground burst in Seoul,

there could be “125,000 to more than 200,000 fatalities and 290,000 to more

than 400,000 fatalities and casualties combined.”52 Casualties would increase in

the direction that the winds would blow the fallout.53 If targeted at ground

forces, a nuclear weapon with such a yield could case 19-‐percent casualties to a

ground force division, which is not significant given that South Korea would have

thirty ground forces prepared to advance into the DPRK. Should these nuclear

weapons be launched at airfields, however, they would cause about 70-‐percent

casualties to a single airfield.54 Given that South Korea is the third largest

economy in Asia and the 13th in the world,55 a nuclear weapon exploding in Seoul

would also have serious consequences for the world economy. RAND predicts

that a 10 Kt nuclear attack on Seoul would be at least $1.5 trillion.

A North Korean nuclear attack on any part of South Korea would receive

global condemnation and invite U.S. retaliation, as is laid out in Washington’s

existing security umbrella. Not only would this be consistent with U.S. nuclear

deterrence policy since the days of the Cold War, U.S. military action against

Pyongyang post-‐nuclear attack would also be necessary to ensure that U.S.

security guarantees to its allies are perceived as credible. If Washington did not

uphold its end of the bargain, U.S. allies around the world would likely ignore

America’s security umbrella and start developing individual nuclear programs to

protect themselves. In a South Korean poll conducted shortly after the North

Korean nuclear test in 2006, 65-‐percent of the people wanted their country to

52 Bruce W. Bennett, “Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2010). The RAND report cited provides a detailed analysis of the approximate counts of casualties and potential numbers of those who could seek medical attention for apparent serious injuries, lesser injuries, and those who would be afraid that they had been injured without actually having been physically injured. 53 The RAND report also analyzes the various effects of a nuclear attack given factors such as height of detonation, fallout patterns…etc. The information provided in the report is extremely technical and is outside of the scope of this particular paper, but it is nonetheless very interesting. <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2010/RAND_DB589.pdf> 54 Ibid., ix. 55 “South Korea profile,” BBC News Asia-‐Pacific, (10 October 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-‐asia-‐pacific-‐15289563>, [accessed 11 November 2012].

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have a nuclear weapon.56 East Asia could spiral into a regional arms race if U.S.

allies perceived that America’s nuclear deterrence could no longer be trusted.

Given these improved nuclear technologies in the DPRK, China would become an

even more important actor. The People’s Republic has traditionally been

Pyongyang’s supportive ally, but its leverage over North Korea seems to have

slowly waned. A North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea, therefore, would

be a complete slap in the face for Beijing, who has long advocated for diplomatic

resolutions to the North Korean problem.

Chances for South Korea to intercept a North Korean MRBM are, as of

now, uncertain. Though Seoul possesses PAC-‐2 missiles, they “have been

evaluated as unable to counter North Korean missile threats.”57 Its interception

rate is currently below 40-‐percent, well below the 70-‐percent interception rate

the South Korean military desires. To accomplish that, Seoul must upgrade to

the PAC-‐3 system. “Military officials forecast that the PAC-‐3 system or an

upgraded version of the PAC-‐2 will be introduced as early as in 2014.”58 In the

mean time, Washington and Seoul reached an agreement in October of 2012 that

allows South Korea more flexibility with its ballistic missiles. Under the revised

agreements, South Korea can increase the payload and range of South Korean

ballistic missiles as well as “develop and deploy more powerful drones that carry

more reconnaissance equipment and weapons.”59 Seoul’s ballistic missile range

has now increased from 300 km to 800 km, and it can now load warheads

weighing up to two tons on missile with shorter ranges as opposed to the

previous limit of 500 kilograms regardless of range.60 Given this agreement, it is

56 Shin Chang-‐un, “In poll, 78% say engagement policy should change,” Korea JoongAng Daily, (11 October 2006), <http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2825906>, [accessed 13 November 2012]. 57 Lee Tae-‐hoon, “PAC-‐2 missiles to go for upgrade,” The Korea Times, (28 October 2012), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/10/281_123339.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 58 Ibid. 59 Choe Sang-‐Hun, “U.S. Agrees to Let South Korea Extend Range of Ballistic Missiles,” The New York Times, (7 October 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/us-‐agrees-‐to-‐let-‐south-‐korea-‐extend-‐missile-‐range.html?_r=0>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 60 Ibid.

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likely that North Korea would be deterred from any excessively provocative acts,

such as a nuclear attack, against South Korea.

Pyongyang has historically used its nuclear weapons for deterrence and

coercion in peacetime. The DPRK’s immediate neighbors—South Korea, Japan,

China, and even Russia—are all very cautious about using military force against

North Korea for fear of the ramifications escalations could cause. One can

realistically envision a nuclear North Korea that attempts to threaten South

Korea into inaction or even submission. Whether these scare tactics would yield

much success, however, is a different question.

The political consequences of North Korea acquiring the nuclear

capabilities outlined in this section are not too detrimental. Pyongyang has

already demonstrated that it possesses MRBMs with the range indicated. Its

regional neighbors would be not be pleased if the DPRK acquires a nuclear

warhead with a 10Kt yield. South Korea would most likely still rely on

Washington’s security umbrella instead of attempting to proliferate, but it may

still be concerned with the ramifications of a North Korean nuclear attack. For

the South Korean government, a nuclear weapon launched at any of its territory

would be unacceptable, regardless of whether the United States would retaliate.

Nonetheless, chances of North Korea being reckless enough to nuke Seoul for any

reason with this level of nuclear technology are slim.

10 Taepodong-1 IRBMs with a 20 Kt warhead

Taepodong-‐1 IRBMs are liquid-‐fueled missiles intended to deliver a 1,000

to 1,5000 kg warhead to a range of approximately 1,500 to 2,500 km.61 They are

expensive for an impoverished country such as the DPRK and are unlikely to be

produced in large quantities. Thus, the Taepodong-‐1 only makes strategic sense

if targeted at limited numbers of high leverage targets.62 Nonetheless, the IRBM

61 Steven A. Hildreth, “North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” (24 February 2009), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21473.pdf>, [accessed 12 November 2012]. 62 “North Korea’s Taepodong and Unha Missiles,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/Taepodong.html>, [accessed 12 November 2012].

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in question could put Japan and Okinawa into range. Figure 5 and 663 provide

illustrations for the qualitative effects of a 10Kt nuclear bomb on Tokyo and

Okinawa, respectively. The legend is provided with Figure 7. A 20 Kt nuclear

weapon launched at Tokyo or another major city would result in high casualties.

The numbers would vary depending on the time when North Korea chose to

attack—casualty numbers would be higher during the night than during daytime.

Figure 5

A nuclear attack on U.S. airbases in Okinawa, however, poses a different

set of threats and damages. As mentioned previously, a nuclear attack could

cause approximately 70-‐percent casualties to a single airfield.64 The model

bomb in Figure 6 is detonated over the Kadena Air Base, the largest U.S. Air

Force base in the Pacific. It is the home to the 18th Wing, the 5th Air Force’s

largest combat wing, and a variety of associate units. With up to 4,000 Japanese

workers, the United States Air Force estimates that Kadena contributes $700

63 Courtesy of “NUKEMAP” by Alex Wellerstein. <http://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, [accessed 7 November 2012]. 64 Ibid., ix.

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million to Okinawa’s economy each year.65 A nuclear attack on Kadena, for

example, would not only cause severe damage not only to U.S./Japanese

infrastructure and personnel, but would also hinder U.S. ability to efficiently

respond to regional provocations with its aerial force.

Figure 6

The political ramifications of a nuclear attack on Japan, especially on

Okinawa, would be significant. The United States could perceive this as an attack

on U.S. facilities and personnel and retaliate with full force. Given the relatively

robust BMDS the United States has in the region, however, interception does not

seem to be a problem. Both the current Aegis BMD, of which 5 are deployed to

65 “Map: US Military Bases in Okinawa,” The International institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.iiss.org/whats-‐new/iiss-‐voices/map-‐us-‐military-‐bases-‐in-‐okinawa/>, [accessed 13 November 2012].

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Figure 7

Japan in addition to those employed by the Japanese Royal Navy, as well as the

PAC-‐3 have had relatively high successful interception rates against MRBMs and

IRBMs. Furthermore, Japan could “theoretically acquire and deploy elements of

at least four general types of BMD systems,”66 including lower-‐tier systems,

upper-‐tier systems, boot-‐phase intercept, and national missile defense. Given

such defense mechanisms, North Korean IRBMs are unlikely to penetrate and

cause severe damage to Japan.

There are nonetheless two possible results from the DPRK acquiring such

nuclear capabilities. Firstly, the United States may diplomatically engage

Pyongyang more actively in attempts to disarm it through economic incentives

and normalized relationships. It would have to involve other regional actors,

such as China and South Korea, to coax North Korea to the negotiation table. Or,

Washington may consider a North Korea with missiles with the range and

accuracy to hit U.S. airbases to be a red line that must not be crossed. If this is

the case, Washington could respond much more militaristically. It may flex its

muscle to threaten the DPRK, indicating that a nuclear North Korea will not be

66 Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swagner, Takashi Kawakami, “Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001).

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tolerated. It may attempt to impose harsher sanction the DPRK in the UN

Security Council.

For Japan and South Korea, however, the fear would be a scenario where

the United States focuses on containing, even appeasing, a nuclear North Korea

instead of actively attempting to disarm it. Given that DPRK missiles can hit

American targets, Tokyo and Seoul may get the impression that the United States

now has considerable stake in the matter and would not want to risk American

facilities or personnel by agitating Pyongyang. If U.S. allies get this perception,

chances of a regional arms race may increase. The instant either Japan or South

Korea feels insecure about Washington’s nuclear deterrence strategy, one may

choose to proliferate and ultimately destabilize the East Asia region. The

likelihood of this occurring, however, is nonetheless limited. Washington

understands the importance of upholding its security agreements to its allies. It

has demonstrated much political will in the past, especially during the Cold War

against a much stronger adversary. Neither Japan nor South Korea, therefore,

would have much reason to doubt the U.S. security umbrella even if North

Korean IRBMs can hit U.S. airbases.

10 Taepodong-2 ICBMs with a 40 Kt warhead

As the successor to the Taeopodong-‐1, Taepodong-‐2 has potentially the

longest range in the North Korean missile arsenal, but most estimates of its

performance are speculative. Some scientists have calculated that the

Taepodong-‐2 could “deliver a one ton payload to a range of 6,000 km…and, with

a 500 kg payload, would have a range of 9,000 km.”67 Though the accuracy and

range of the missile with a 40Kt warhead is still questionable, this paper assumes

that the DPRK has acquired the nuclear capability to detonate a nuclear weapon

in a major U.S. city, such as Los Angeles. This assumption is held in place to

analyze the effects such nuclear capabilities may have on the East Asian region as

67 “North Korea’s Taepodong and Unha Missiles,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/Taepodong.html>, [accessed 12 November 2012].

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well as on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Figure 868 provides a visual aid to understand

the scope a nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach.69 The legend is provided in

Figure 9.

Figure 8

A nuclear attack on the Port of Long beach would destroy the

infrastructure and ships in the port, as well as those situated in the adjoining

Port of Los Angeles. More than sixty thousand people will die due to either

direct blast effects or radiation poisoning. The radioactive fallout of water and

sediment from the port would expose over 150,000 people to hazardous

radiation levels, and six million people will try to evacuate the city to avoid

68 Courtesy of “NUKEMAP” by Alex Wellerstein. <http://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, [accessed 7 November 2012]. 69 This paper chose to analyze the affects of a nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach for a few reasons. Firstly, the destruction of such a major port would have catastrophic consequences for the U.S. economy. Secondly, given that there are over 20,000 shipping containers each day from ports all over the world that are unloaded in the United States, it is difficult to implement comprehensive in-‐port security programs for all 361 seaports. Lastly, the RAND Corporation had previously researched the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach, meaning that this paper could provide tangible analysis with real world facts.

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Figure 9

further risks of contamination. Given that Long Beach refines approximately a

third of gasoline west of the Rockies and there is no pipeline infrastructure to

import supplies to the region, gasoline would be in critically short supply.70

The chances of interception in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack

exist. There are only two systems currently that can intercept ICBMs, one of

which is the GMD system deployed in Fort Greely, Alaska. It provides Combatant

Commanders with continues, operational capability to protect U.S. homeland

against limited IRBMs and ICBMs. Nonetheless, there are skeptics who are

concerned with the systems’ abilities to intercept incoming ICBMs and have

cautioned Washington to maintain a robust anti-‐ballistic missile capability.

North Korea could attempt to coerce the United States by threatening to

attack its regional allies, air bases, and U.S. homeland, yet it is difficult to see such

threats yielding fruitful results. Not only would an attack on U.S. home soil

would almost inevitably result in a full scale U.S. military response, but also such

provocation might prompt Washington to take unilateral action to ensure that

70 Charles Meade, Roger C. Molander, “Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2006).

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North Korea never acquires such nuclear capabilities. There are several possible

calculations. South Korea and Japan may be concerned that the United States

would be more willing to concede and focus on containing North Korea as

opposed to actively disarming Pyongyang given its ICBM technology. If not

properly managed, this perception could easily result in a regional arms race.

Thus, Washington may find it more beneficial to take active measures, whether

diplomatically or militarily, to ensure that the DPRK does not acquire nuclear

capabilities that could threaten U.S. homeland.

Regardless of whether Washington preemptively or preventively strikes

North Korea to deny it the stated nuclear capabilities, the United States has a

vested interest in assuring its regional allies. During the Cold War, the United

States demonstrated its resolve to protect its European allies even if it meant

being on the receiving end of a nuclear attack. Given such a track record, neither

Japan nor South Korea has much reason to doubt that Washington would not

uphold its end of the bargain. The United States should nonetheless clearly

communicate with its allies and other regional actors, such as China and Russia,

to ensure there are no misunderstandings that could lead to an arms race.

Conclusion

The East Asian region has been plagued by the North Korean problem for decades, and chances of it resolving in the immediate future are slim to none.

This paper therefore has analyzed the real life and political consequences of

various North Korean nuclear capabilities. Despite the certain unrealistic

aspects of the scenarios, it is nonetheless important to recognize that, if left

unaddressed, the North Korean nuclear problem would only escalate. The

delicate balance between diplomacy and U.S. military action (or inaction) would

have a grave impact on its regional allies and their responses to the problem.

Given that Japan and South Korea could decide to proliferate if the North Korean

threat grows severe, it is in the United States’ best interest to assure its allies

through diplomatic engagements and to maintain credible nuclear deterrence.

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After all, the only thing worse than a nuclear North Korea would be to have to

manage a nuclear Japan and South Korea as well.

Lou 26

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