8/16/2019 BATASAN 5
1/3
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE(and related cases of the Batasan 5)
June 1, !!"#R$ 1"5!1%& 1"!"!'"& 1"!"'"
CARPIO, J.
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is
Void.
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been
lawfullyarrested without warrant. Section 5, Rule ! of the Re"ised
Rules of#ri$inal Procedure pro"ides the instances when such
warrantless arrest $aybe e%ected.
The &oint a'da"it of Beltran(s arresting o'cers states
that the o'cersarrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to
Sedition, and not forRebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could
only ha"e conducted ) as he did
conduct ) an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
#onsequently,when another group of prosecutors sub&ected
Beltran to a second inquestproceeding for Rebellion, they
o"erstepped their authority rendering thesecond inquest "oid. *one
of Beltran(s arresting o'cers saw Beltran co$$it,in their presence,
the cri$e of Rebellion. *or did they ha"e personal+nowledge of
facts and circu$stances that Beltran had &ust
co$$ittedRebellion, su'cient to for$ probable cause to belie"e that
he had co$$ittedRebellion. hat these arresting o'cers alleged in
their a'da"it is that theysaw and heard Beltran $a+e an allegedly
seditious speech on - /ebruary-001.
Indeed, under 234 #ircular *o. 1, dated - Septe$ber !, the
initial dutyof the inquest o'cer is to deter$ine if the arrest of
the detained person was$ade 6in accordance with the pro"isions of
paragraphs 7a8 and 7b8 of Section5, Rule !.6 If the arrest was not
properly e%ected, the inquest o'cershould proceed under Section of
#ircular *o. 1.
There is *o Probable #ause to Indict Beltran for
Rebellion.
Probable cause is the 6e9istence of such facts and circu$stances
as woulde9cite the belief in a reasonable $ind, acting on the facts
within the+nowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the cri$e
for which he was prosecuted.6 To accord respect to the
discretion granted tothe prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this #ourt, as a rule, does notinterfere with the
prosecutor(s deter$ination of probable cause forotherwise, courts
would be swa$ped with petitions to re"iew theprosecutor(s :ndings
in such in"estigations. ;owe"er, in the few e9ceptionalcases where
the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clearinsu'ciency
of e"idence to support a :nding of probable cause, thus denyingthe
accused his right to substanti"e and procedural due process, we
ha"e
