Baylor Evans Zoda Aff Wake Round1

7/24/2019 Baylor Evans Zoda Aff Wake Round1

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We resume our genealogy in the seventeenth century at thetime of sovereigntys morph from the power to put to death, tothe power to expose life whereby life becomes conditioned bydefense of the sovereign Foucault explains that the Wests

transformation of mechanisms of power generates forces andorders them under a system of hierarchization.iThis symbolicordering of death evolved to sanitize regimes of dying. ohreh!ayatrizi explains this ordering as a construction of not deathsentences but "life sentences# which normalize death thoushalt not die violently, thou shalt not die prematurely, thoushalt not $ill thyself, thou shalt die an orderly death. The%gure posited oppositionally to ordered death &' suicide, whichescapes the condition of death on the defense of the sovereignand therefore must be eradicated by the state. This ordering

of society around the value of life emerged in the mid(seventeenth century as a moral community posited aroundnormalized %gures of life and death, allowing for thedevelopment of a )uridicomedical culture that preserves lifeabove all else.iiThe medicalization of death is rooted in theconcept of normality which lends itself to disciplinarytechni*ues of biopower, creating a medical gaze through whichsuicide is rendered dangerous +nne yan explainsAnne Ryan, School of Psychology at Massey University, New Zealand, TheProblem with eath! Towards a "enealogy of #$thanasia,% Manawat$octoral Research Sym&osi$m, '()) S*#

+avi '((-. arg$es that the modem concept of euthanasia can be traced bac$to the movement of death and dying from the domain of religion tothat of medicine and law/ The meaning of the word 0e$thanasia1 itself has changed radically overthe last two h$ndred years/ The term comes from a "ree2 root meaning 0well3dying1 and im&lies a 0good death1 or0easy death4/ 5n this original sense, the 6hristian world viewed e$thanasia as a death blessed by "od/ The deathbedat this stage was very m$ch a &$blic event and the &rovince of religion, with behavio$r s$rro$nding it governed by

a boo2 of r$les 2nown as ars moriendi or 0the art of dying4/ 7owever, during the nineteenthcentury the physician began to usurp the role of the minister asdying became a medical event. The physician was now charged withhelping the patient achieve this easy deathwhile not hastening it/ Th$s, by themiddle of the nineteenth cent$ry the meaning of e$thanasia re8ected the assistance of the &hysician in &roviding a

&ainless death/ This medicalisation of death on the other hand was somewhat &roblematic beca$se the &hysicianco$ld not c$re dying &atients! therefore, the o&tion of hastening death by, medical e$thanasia emerged as a

&ossible sol$tion to the &roblem of dying% +avi, '((-, &/ 9./ The subse*uent attempts tolegalise medical euthanasia had the e-ect of ta$ing death and dyinginto the realm of law and public policy/ The ca$ses of death have also changed,&artic$larly over the last cent$ry, with deaths from infectio$s disease giving way to death from more chronic

degenerative conditions s$ch as cancer and heart disease/ Th$s, the experience of death anddying has been transformed over time by signi%cant advances inmedical technologies from a short(term event to one that usually


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involves a prolonged time of slow decline.Alongside this has been the movementaway from dying in the home s$rro$nded by friends and family to dying in a hos&ital or other medical setting being

tended to by health &rofessionals +yons : 6hamberlain, '((9. &t is important at this point to

emphasize the profound e-ect of medicalisation on society. /ealth

and medicine are integral to the concept of 0normality that is an

essential component of the disciplinary techni*ues of bio(power

that see$s to regulate and transform human life. The medical 0gazeencom&asses all as&ects of o$r lives, constantly monitoring and regulating ourbodies in order to achieve social control of the population.At no other&oint in o$r e;istence is this medical regime as strict as ./ ?o$ca$lt arg$ed that medicine had formed a $ni@$e relationshi& aro$nd death and the modems$bect/ 7owever, in contrast to the changed relationshi& between &ower and death that accom&anied the shift

from sovereign &ower to bio3&ower, the normalizing role of medicine re*uired adi-erent reorientation in its relationship to death. 1evelopments inWestern medicine at the turn of the 23th century lead to a changeof focus from the promotion of life through the cure of disease to

concerns regarding the pathology of death. New light was shed on death by e;amining the anatomyof the cor&se in order to determine the nat$re of disease and illness/ Therefore rather than o$r common &erce&tionthat medicine1s sole &reocc$&ation is with the maintenance of life, it can in fact be characteriBed as having a&ositive relationshi& with death Tierney, '((9./

&t is at this point that communities use the %gure of vitality tode%ne themselves in opposition to what is "threatening# to lifepreservation the allowance of bodies to be inscribed withmeasurable attributes enables violence through bodily coding,particularly against bodies deemed "impaired# or "abnormal#.4atasha 'altes explainsNatasha, C$eens University, 0Abnormal1 Dodies on the Dorders of 5ncl$sion! Dio&olitics and the Parado; of isabilityS$rveillance/% Surveillance & Society'()E S*#

Fngoing debates about the relationship betweenbodies biological life. andthe state &olitics. have 5prompted scholars to revisit Foucaultswritings andlect$res on biopolitics/ Among the com&etingGartic$lations, +aBBarato &rovides a $sef$l conte;t$aliBation ofthe &arameters of bio&olitics noting that it can be 0$nderstood as a government3&o&$lation3&olitical economyrelationshi& HthatI refers to a dynamic Gof forces that establishes a new relationshi& between ontology and &olitics1'(('! )('./ Scholars who Ghave e;amined ?o$ca$lt1s lect$res have traced bio&olitical themes in his genealogy ofrace S$ GRasm$ssen '()). showing how otherness emerges as a res$lt of the constr$ction of inferior races ?assin

G'(()./ A &arallel can be drawn between the otherness of racialiBation and the 0abnormality of

impairment Gin that both are the conse*uences of a biopolitical regime

underpinned by normalization / GA common theme that weaves thro$gh diverging views of

bio&olitics is an em&hasis on the dyadic Grelationshi& between life and &olitics/


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conce&tion of bio&ower and Gbio&olitics in the conte;t of the 0normaliBing society1/ 5n his lect$res at the 6ollge de

?rance in )=>-3)=>9, ?o$ca$lt '((Eb. disting$ishes between these two Gconce&ts noting that biopower isa disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body 5while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at thepopulation/ ?o$ca$lt claries that while 5both are 0technologies of the body'((Eb! 'L=., the traectory of &ower diOers for each/ !iopower is 5exercised through$nowledge and power structures embedded within institutionalarrangements that 50discipline and condition the individualizedbody through processes of surveillance and training while 5biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological andpolitical problem and operates through 5administrative andstrategic arrangements of the state thro$gh 0forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall Gmeas$res1 and intervenes in 0the birth rate, the mortality rate, variousbiological disabilities , and the 5e-ects of the environment1 '((Eb! 'L-3

'L9./ GAccording to ?o$ca$lt '((Eb., the conce&t that $nder&ins bio&ower and bio&olitics is 0the norm1 '-E./ &t

Gis the application of the norm to the body and population that

establishes the 0normalizing society '((Eb! G'-E./ Foucault de%nes the

normalizing society as 0a society in which the norm of disciplinesHbio&owerI Gand the norm of regulationHbio&oliticsI intersect1 '((Eb! '-E./ &t is asociety in which power 5dominates the 0organic and the biologicalthrough control over the life of both the body and the 5population?o$ca$lt '((Eb! '-E./ ?o$ca$lt '((Ea. s$ggests that the 0norm1 is a &olitical conce&t wherein G&rocesses of

&ower emerge and are legitimiBed/ 7e claims that the underlying principles of thenorm are 5that of 0*uali%cation and correction'((Ea! -(./ Mader observes that&rocesses of 0@$alication and Gcorrection1 are contingent on comparing and measuring

bodies against 0*uanti%able *ualities '((>! 9./ G 6nly when bodies are

inscribed with measurable attributes can they be 0controlled andmanaged '((>! 9./ Altho$gh ?o$ca$lt recogniBes the re&ressive o$tcomes of &olitical &ower e;ercisedthro$gh &rocesses Gof normaliBation, he is averse to conce&t$aliBing &olitical &ower in strictly re&ressive terms ands$ggests Gthat re&ression is a 0secondary eOect1 '((Ea! -'. and that the f$nction of &ower that emerges in Gaccordance with the norm is not to 0e;cl$de and reect1, b$t is 0a &ositive techni@$e of intervention and Gtransformation, to a sort of normative &roect1 '((Ea! -(./ ?o$ca$lt1s association of the normative &roect Gwith&ositive intervention might seem c$rio$s given the $nderlying themes of &ower and its relation to Gsocial controlthat $nderlie m$ch of his wor2/ Qet, he contends that disci&lines of normaliBation that Gemerged in the eighteenthcent$ry &rod$ced a &rod$ctive form of &ower aimed toward 0transformation and Ginnovation1 '((Ea! -'./

The result of this normalizing power of the communityconstructs an ongoing situation of state(commissionedgenocide where entire populations can be exterminated in the

name of necessity and vitality Foucault explainsMichel ?o$ca$lt, 7istory of Se;$ality An introd$ction, && )E93>, Robert 7$rley Translation

'ince the classical age the West has undergone a very profoundtransformation of these mechanisms of power . "1eduction# hastended to be no longer the ma)or form of power but merely oneelement among others, wor$ing to incite, reinforce, control,

monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it7 a power bent


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on generating forces, ma$ing them grow, and ordering them , rather than

one dedicated to im&eding them, ma2ing them s$bmit, or destroying them/ There has been aparallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself withthee;igencies of a life(administering power andto de%ne itself accordingly.This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now

manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to

ensure, maintain, or develop its life .Qet wars were never as bloody as they have beensince the nineteenth cent$ry, and all things being e@$al, never before did regimes visit s$ch holoca$sts on their

own &o&$lations/ D$t this formidable power of death and this is &erha&s what acco$nts for&art of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly e;&anded its limits now presents itselfas the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive in8uence on life,that endeavors to administer, o&timiBe, and m$lti&ly it, s$becting it to &recise controls and com&rehensive

reg$lations/ Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign whomust be defended9 they are waged on behalf of the existence of

everyone9 entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of

wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity7 massacres havebecome vital / 5t is as managers of life and s$rvival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes havebeen able to wage so many wars, ca$sing so many men to be 2illed/ And thro$gh a t$rn that closes the circle, asthe technology of wars has ca$sed them to tend increasingly toward all3o$t destr$ction, the decision that initiates

them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the na2ed @$estion of s$rvival/ The

atomic situation is now at the end point of this process7 the power

to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the

power to guarantee an individuals continued existence / The &rinci&le$nderlying the tactics of battle that one has to be ca&able of 2illing in order to go on living3has become the &rinci&le

that denes the strategy of states/ D$t the existence in *uestion is no longer the)uridical existence of sovereignty9 at sta$e is the biological

existence of a population. &f genocide is indeed the dream ofmodern powers, this is not beca$se of a recent ret$rn of the ancient right to 2ill it is becausepower is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, therace, and the large(scale phenomena of population.


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The power structures of normality are not a relic of theseventeenth century, theyre a continuous and systemicconstruction of symbolic ordering around death whichmanifests itself in modern :+' discourses primarily concernedwith resolving the unruly nature of death ohreh !ayatrizi

explains that the anxiety around "undigni%ed death# has ledto increasing medicalization, legality, and *uanti%cation ofassisted suicide.iiiThis discursive regime of ordering reinforcesitself through the legal system7 the 3(; decisions inWashington v. uill asserted a"legitimate state interest# in preserving lifeivthat )udged anyproposed "right to die# unconstitutional, the +ssisted 'uicideFunding estriction +ct further demonstrated the statespower to regulate death, normalizing the superiority of life andthe states claim over it. Todd ?c1orman explains

Todd ?/ Mcorman, Associate Professor in the Rhetoric e&artment at = VD

4ormalizing the 'tate@s &nterest in Aife7 The oot of 1omination As?o$ca$lt &revio$sly noted, the willf$l death Ff the citiBen thro$gh Ws$icideW has been a controversial iss$e

thro$gho$t history/ The response of the state to e-orts to choose death hasbeen to develop means of supervision and discipline that create a

sort of public $nowledge that normalizes the superiority of life and

in particular the state@s claim over it. That is, through legal

instrumentsXstatutes and selected Bourt decisionsthe importance

of preserving the life 6f the body became public $nowledge/ The selectedfragments demonstrate the traectory Ff the iss$e, high3 lighting both the state4s &ersistence in reg$lating ors$&ervising death and the changing nat$re Ff the arg$ment as the general prohibition against

suicide became a more particularized concern with assisted death.As a critical rhetoric, this section traces the roots Ff domination in e;&osing what has become the $nderlying

&rinci&le for other eOorts that disco$rage or &rohibit the RT/ The laws and court casesdisc$ssedrepresent examples of authoritative discourses that normalize thestate@s interest in life and re8ect the expansion of bio(power intothe T1. At least since St/ A$g$stine4s condemnation Ff s$icide, there has been a &res$m&tion against themoral and legal legitimacy Ff ending one4s ife/'L The thread connecting euthanasia,morality, and the states prohibition of suicide is codi%ed in William!lac$stones legal commentaries. Forming the basis of C' commonlaw, these commentaries established a presumption against suicideand, later, against assisted suicideor mercy 2illing and euthanasia/'- The&rosec$tion of early instances of e$thanasia or mercy 2illing as homicide demonstrated the state1s o&&osition to the

&ractice, thro$gh a form of disci&line, while signaling state a&&ro&riation of, or control over, the body/'9 !y

treating the issue as a de%nitional *uestion mercy vers$s m$rder.,

prosecution maintained focus on classi%cation, initially de8ecting*uestions of rights and autonomy, and established a legal norm that


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willfully ending ones life was not allowed. 'uch focus allowed thestate to overloo$ mitigating circumstances, the su-ering of theindividual, and the lac$ of value life had for the person in *uestion.Dy changing their strategy from attem&ting to disting$ish 00mercy 2illing11 from 00m$rder11 to see2ing legal&ermission for the act, RT advocates so$ght to oOer resistance, thereby challenging the dominant disco$rse/ S$ch

resistance demonstrates ?o$ca$lt1s claim that power is relational , that it exists in

relation to the absence or suppression of resistance and it dependsupon that resistance in maintaining its power networ$.'> uinlan)=>9. was an early and clearindication of the states anti(euthanasia stance/ es&ite the $nanimo$s o&inion ofmedical e;&erts that Varen Ann C$inlan had no ho&e of recovery, her father1s re@$est for relief was o&&osed by

Varen1s doctors, the hos&ital, the co$nty &rosec$tor, and the State of New *ersey/'K 4ew Derseys+ttorney


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e$thanasia in the death of Thomas Qo$2, broadcast on 9( Min$tes in November )==K, nally res$lted in his

conviction after a trial that feat$red Vevor2ian re&resenting himself in co$rt/ &n 23 3, thegovernment reasserted its opposition tothe RT and assisted suicidethro$gh two se&arate co$rses of action/ ?irst, the Blinton administration )oined theDustice 1epartment in %ling two amicus curiae, or friend3of3the3co$rt, briefs inWashington v. uill.es&ite ac2nowledging the signicantinterest of the individ$al in avoiding the &rotracted s$Oering, &ain, and mental ang$ish that often accom&any

terminal illness, one of the briefs asserts that 00overriding state interests)ustify the states decision to ban physicians from prescribing lethalmedication.The state has an interest of the highest order inprohibiting its physicians from assisting in the purposeful ta$ing ofanother persons life.E' Altho$gh the #conomist calls the ling s$r&rising considering the 6lintonadministration1s stress on individ$al a$tonomy, this analysis demonstrates that it would have beensurprising only if the administrationremoved itself from the controversy orsupported an individuals interest in ma$ing end(of(life decisions/EESecond, in the s&ring of )==>, the /ouse of epresentatives and the 'enatepassed a highly symbolic :+' bill/ 5nitially inacc$rately re&orted by some as a 00ban11 onassisted s$icide, the bill prevents the use of federal funds in paying forprocedures connected to suicide assistance/ The bill has no eOect on &atient

care b$t served perceptually to reinforce the states claim over life. Passed in the 7o$se by a vote of E=K)9 and in the Senate by a vote of ==(, the bill was signed into law by

President 6linton/EL 'ince the passage of the 6regon 1eath with 1ignity +ct,

the most s$ccessf$l eOort at resistance, there have been multiple attempts at the

federal level to thwart the decision of 6regon residents. These

e-orts initially consisted of two failed congressional attempts topass theironically titled :ain elief :romotion +ct, which ostensibly wo$ld have wor2ed torelieve &atient &ain by a de facto over3r$ling of the Fregon law/E- S$bse@$ently, the9 November G;;2

00+shcroft 1irective attempted to achieve the same result throughnon(legislative means.A reversal of the &olicy anno$nced by former Attorney "eneral *anet Reno,this proclamation authorized federal agents to ta$e action againstphysicians who prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patientsYactionsthat are legal $nder the Fregon stat$te/E9 ?o$r Fregon residents in vario$s stages of terminal illness immediatelychallenged Ashcroft1s directive and, after an initial '((' district co$rt decision in favor of Fregon and the legitimacyof its death with dignity law, the government a&&ealed to the United States 6o$rt of A&&eals for the Ninth 6irc$it/E>Fn '9 May '((L, a year after hearing the a&&eal, that co$rt fo$nd the Ashcroft directive an $nlawf$l eOort to sti8e00democratic debate abo$t &hysician3assisted s$icide/11 Undeterred, the federal government made an additionaleOort to revalidate its &ower of s$&ervision by &ers$ading the S$&reme 6o$rt to hear "onBaleB v/ Fregon/ EK Themost s&ectac$lar controversy to ill$strate the &ersistence of the state in $sing legal instr$ments to control the bodyis the Terri Schiavo Saga/ This $n$s$ally com case, even by RT standards, &itted family members against oneanother in debating &ro&er treatment and garnered a level of media scr$tiny li2ely $n&aralleled in the alreadyvisible controversy/ The 6ase &rod$ced novel eOorts to &reserve the life Ff the body in o&&osition to 6o$rt decisions

and reb$2ed a&&eals, all in favor of Ms/ Schiavo4s h$sband and g$ardian, Michael Schiavo/ ?lorida4s "overnor *ebD$sh iss$ed an Fctober '((E e;ec$tive Frder, $nder the cover Ff a s&ecial ?lorida ho$se bill, that &rohibited thewithholding of n$trition and hydration from Schiavo/ The meas$re was tem&orarily eOective in &reserving Schiavobefore being reected as $nconstit$3 tional, which &rod$ced yet f$rther legal wrangling between the &arties anddrew State and national instit$tions dee&er into the s$&ervision of Ms/ Schiavo4s treatment/ 5n what was another

$n&recedented act, the C' Bongress hastily passed the HBompromise !ill,Hsigned into law byPresident !ushon ') March '((-, less than forty(eight hoursafter it was introduced by lawma$ers. The bill was directed s&ecically at Schiavo for the&$r&ose of granting $risdiction to a US district co$rt to hear s$its bro$ght forth by Schiavo4s &arents in their eOorts

to maintain treatment/ The intent of the act to normalize the state@s control


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over life is plainly expressed in section two of the bill whereby legalproceedings are )usti%ed against any Hperson who was a party to'tate court proceedings relating to the withholding or withdrawal of

food, 8uids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life.H The

brazen act , ironically cham&ioned by states3rights Re&$blicans, signals a federal interest

to regulate life and death that threatens to im&ede the a$thority of $dicial decisions and $&setthe chec2s and balances Ff the constit$tional system/ The district co$rt $ltimately validated the &revio$s co$rtr$lings and, after m$lti&le a&&eals for hearing were reected by the US S$&reme 6o$rt, Terri Schaivo was &ermittedto die/4 The &osition of the state in each of these instances demonstrates a strong desire to control end3of3lifedecisions and disci&line those who wo$ld attem&t to evade s$&ervision/ The history of the RT demonstrates thatthe state has attem&ted to normaliBe its 00interest11 in the body by $sing a variety of technical, legal disco$rses tocreate &$blic 2nowledge of the abnormality of willf$lly see2ing death/ 5n withholding, restricting, and o&&osing the

RT, the state is at once demonstrating its dominance and e;erting agency3limiting control/ Bonsistentwith the articulation of bio(power, the 00power play at wor$ here is

not threatening to end life, but threatening to preserve and

monitor it through regulatory means. Advocate eOorts to establish a 00right11 to die mightbest be $nderstood as an attem&t to ad$st the &ower 8ow between the state and the s$bect, in the &rocess

e;&anding individ$al agency/ ?aced with challenges from RT advocates, the state has res&onded by a&&ro&riatingthe hos&ital and creating the &owerless vegetative s$bect, as the ne;t section e;&lores/

The "mental competency standard# employed under currentmodels of :+' reify ableist biases by basing access to death onsub)ective determinations about "mental imparment,#solidifying the medical complexs )urisdiction on the terrain ofdeath 'ara >ualls and Dulia Easl((./ + 0competent person $nows that society considers the need5forassistance in activities of daily living to be degrading andundigni%ed,#Gwrites 6oleman '((', &/ ''L./ 5n other words, when as2ed to describeGthe 0indignities1that assisted s$icide wo$ld hel& &eo&le avoid, &ro&onentsGdescribe disability% 6oleman, '((' &/ ''(./ 5f

&rofessionals thin2 that ofGco$rse the disabled &erson wo$ld want to die% beca$se of the indignitiesGof disability,might not these e;&ectations &lay a disheartening role in some Gone1s decision to see2 &hysician3assisted

s$icide% as2s Fl2in '((-, &/ >(./ 5n concl$sion, capacity assessment may be "theTro)an horse# of assisted(5suicide policiesMartyn : Do$rg$ignon, '(((, &/ EKK./ +i2ethe TroanGhorse, it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. &tschief danger is that it is sub)ective/ As advocates of assisted s$icide recogniBe" clinicians5are left to decide on their own Iwhat to use andJ howstrict a standard to use #G


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can deliver/ They sho$ld he ed$cated and ed$cate others abo$t theGlimits of scientic 2nowledge on ca&abilityassessment/ They sho$ld also beGaware abo$t the danger, in the absence of scientically rob$st standards, thatG

ableist biases in8uence evaluations of the rationality of physician(

assistedGsuicide re*uests .5The patient must be determined not to

su-er from a mental condition impairing5)udgment/ 5f either &hysician believesthe &atient4s $dgment is im&aired by a G&sychiatric or &sychological disorder, the &atient m$st be referred for a

&sychologicalGeval$ation/ 4o medication to end a patients life in a humaneand digni%ed manner5shall be prescribed until the personperforming the counseling determines that the5patient is norsu-ering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression5causing impaired )udgment. This clause, li2e the one abo$t ca&acity, is meant5to provide safeguardsagainst the in8$ence of &sychological disorders onG$dgment, but it isso vague and wea$ to be practically meaningless .?irst Gof all, it is ane;ceedingly minimalist% cla$se D$rt, '(((/ &/ EKE. beca$seGit r$les o$t only mental conditions that im&air

$dgment/ 5n other words,Gthe clause allows for petitioners to have mentaldisorders as long as these5disorders do not impair )udgmentKanoxymoron based on current C.'. mental evaluation standardsD$rt,'((( N/ "/ 7amilton : 7amilton, '((-GS$llivan et al/, )==K./ +nother paradox in the mentaldisorder clause is5that within current standards, suicidal ideation isa symptom par excellence5of impaired )udgment and mentaldisorder/ 5n fact, suicidal ideation is one of5the few legal )usti%cationsfor involuntary psychological treatmentS$llivanGet al/, )==K./ Dased on c$rrent clinicalstandards, the &resence of s$icidalGintention calls for an a$tomatic nding of incom&etence and obligates theG

clinician to s$icide &revention, incl$ding removal of lethal means/ Dy contrast, within the physicianassisted(suicide competence model, providing the5lethal means isthe main decision to ma$e in response to suicidal intentionGN/ "/

7amilton : 7amilton, '((-./ Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or

suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status,

which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for

ableist ideologies 6oleman, '(('./

The drive for life preservation allows for exclusion of womenfrom the sphere of death, either under the determination ofsupposed "irrationality# or to prevent them from denying theircapacity to reproduce. 1iane aymond explainsiane, &rofessor of "ender St$dies at Simmons 6ollege, Ph/ in &hiloso&hy from NQU, 1?atal &ractices1! A feministanalysis of &hysician3assisted s$icide and #$thanasia% HypatiaS&ring )===/ ol/ )L!' S*#

5n the section W"ender in 6ases, 5mages, and Practices,W Wolf extends her argument

against :+' by grounding the examples )ust discussed in agendered context wherefemale self3sacrice andpassivity have been thenormative ideal.That insight leads her to e;&lore the historical and c$lt$ral bac2gro$nd of s$icide andits ideology, s$ggestively $sing "ree2 tragedy, the nineteenth3cent$ry c$lt of Tr$e


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Stoic, for e;am&le33e*uated suicide with courage and thereby framed thepractice as male .The "ree2 tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than beta2en as slaves, the *a&anese rit$al of hara32iri, the e;am&les of 7emingway, Vohlberg, and n$mero$s others33theseeasily recoverable cases s$ggest that s$icide can be seen as &art of a masc$linist ideology or at least not$n&roblematically feminine/ )(


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medical directives33formal and informal33as well as to gendered distinctions on @$ality3of3life iss$es/ Those$nfamiliar with the ravages of &ersistent vegetative state PS. may &ict$re the comatose or PS &atient as acomfortable Wslee&ing bea$tyW waiting for her mirac$lo$s awa2ening s$ch gendered imagery may hel& to acco$ntfor the resistance to withdrawal of life s$&&ort in the classic C$inlan and 6r$Ban cases, and the willingness of the"eorgia S$&reme 6o$rt to grant the &hysicians of +arry McAfee, a 63' @$adri&legic a non3terminal condition.,&ermission to &rovide him with the dr$gs necessary for him to be free of &ain when his res&irator was disconnected/


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not simple an additional ideological edifice thatappears at a given moment in a sort of grand antirevolutionary protect.%t themoment when the discourse of race struggle was being transformed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionarythought. %lthough they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary pro(ect and revolutionary propheticismnowbegan to take a very different direction. *acism is, +uite literally,revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. %lternatively, we

couldput it this way' "hereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, wasa weapon to be used against the historico#politicaldiscourse of $omansovereignty, the discourse of racein the singularwas a way of turning that weapon

against those who had forged it ,of using it to preserve the sovereignty of

the 'tate , a sovereignty whoseluster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by

magico#%uridical rituals,but by medico(normalizing techni*ues .#hanks to theshift from lawto norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from theemancipatorv protect to a concern with purity,

sovereignty was ableto invest or take over the discourse of race struggle andreutilize itfor its own strategy. !tate sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to

protect the race. &t becomes both an alternative to and a way of

bloc$ing the call for revolution that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations,demands, and promises.

&t is through the framing of these continually morphing powerstructures that our genealogy must recognize a right to die.Briticism of the regimes surrounding physician assisted suicidethrough countermemory combined with aOrmation of the"right to die# ruptures the discourse of medicalization andsubverts biopolitical control over death. !en


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to die Lread alongside his wider criti*ue of biopolitics actually

entail a 0fundamental challenge to the )uridico(medical complex of

modernity Tierney, '((9! 9E). by 0raisHingI $nsettling @$estions abo$t the very nat$re of modern

s$bects1 Tierney, '((9! 9(-./ The deployment of rights is intended to re8ect

bac$, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucaults assertionof a 0right to die is thus intended to problematize the sub)ective

pre(suppositions of medicalized bio(politics Lobedience to

discourses of death(deferral and medical self(management by

opening up a di-erent perspective upon death in life that is, the

preparation of ones own death as an aesthetic pro)ectcf/ ?o$ca$lt, )=KE!'E>./ 05t is @$ite inconceivable that we not be given the chance1, ?o$ca$lt writes elsewhere, 0to &re&are o$rselveswith all the &assion, intensity and detail that we wish, incl$ding the little e;tras that we have been dreaming abo$tfor s$ch a long time1 ?o$ca$lt, )==9! '=9'=>., that is to ma2e of s$icide 0a fathomless &leas$re whose &atient and

relentless &re&aration will enlighten all of yo$r life1 )==9! '=9./ The crux of the di-erencebetween the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the 0right to

die thus resides in lifes preparation for death and, through thislate modern melete thanatou, the conse*uent 0enlightenment inlife read, for ?o$ca$lt! the disr$&tion of bio3&oliticiBed s$bectivity./ 5n contrast, 0by focussing oncontrolling ones death ItheJ liberal perspective does not fostercritical re8ection upon those convictions by which one lives oneslife, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority inshaping those convictions1 Tierney, '((9! 9E'./ ?or all its insistence $&on the manner of deathneeding to re8ect a$tonomo$s decisions concerning the val$e of life itself which wo$ld seemingly im&ort some

critical &ers&ective $&on that life., orthodox liberal articulations of the 0right todie1, li2e that of the 0ream Team1, wor$ to reinforce a bio(political medicalapparatus . The liberal narrative reinscribes the death3 bo$nd s$bect of bio3&olitics in a milie$ of s$Oeringsee the &athos3laden concl$sion to wor2in et al/, )==>. from which medicine cannot save her and it th$s calls$&on lawGand the state to balance the interests of the individ$al1s dignity against the state1sGbio3&olitical. interest

in &reserving life/ 'uch an approach leaves un*uestioned Lindeed,G

performatively reinforces the respective roles of law, state and

medicine, whereasGFoucaults aesthetic, de(medicalized, anti(

statist discourse see$s to subvert or avoidGthese relations.

This aOrmation of a right to die is a non(teleological strategicreversibility against dominant nodes of sovereignty whichenables continual contestation. ights seized in this manner

are political tools which construct and reconstruct historicalartifacts. !en


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rights that 8ow from or are com&atible with the above g$re of the non3necessary, $ngro$nded gro$nd of rights/

That is, if the content of a right cannot straightforwardly be derivedfrom a necessary %gure of the human and if that human is rather, as?o$ca$lt consistently holds, a contested and volatile construction, then rightsemerge as historical and political artefacts which re8ect thecontours of 0the human as sPhe is variously constructed in discourseand regimes of power. ights hence appear from this perspective asthoroughly political creations, dependent upon thepoliticalPdiscursivePstrategic viability of rights claimsand their conse@$entobservance and enforcement/)> Rights can be made and $nmade Patton, '((-! '>''>E. and, cr$cially, theterms of their unPma$ing betray particular exclusions, erasures anddisavowals which themselves re8ect particular political aims ,pro)ects and alliances. ?o$ca$lt1s wider &hiloso&hical and &olitical &ractice is of co$rse animated byand attentive to s$ch concerns/ ?rom his early archaeology of >./ Rather,

rights in this sense are political tools used in the service of

constructing and reconstructing di-erent social and political

visions , tools which compete on the same terrain in agonistic combatSimons, )==-. with other rights and indeed with other &olitical idioms and visions/)= 5f from some orthodo;&ers&ectives this deval$es rights, from the &ers&ective elaborated here it o&ens $& both a &olitically richer and a

more self3re8e;ive less disingen$o$s, less moralistic. rights disco$rse/'( Th$s, from Foucaultsperspective the removal of ontological certainty for rights claimsactually excavates a hidden margin of 0freedom indeed, the critical force ofgenealogy is directed at e;&osing false necessities and demonstrating that 0&eo&le /// are m$ch freer than they feel1

?o$ca$lt, @$oted in Martin, )=KK! )(./ ights must be claimed, must be seized and

in this political seizure can be expanded and inhabited indeed even

against their 0terms1, as a strategic reversibility or as a counter(investment

?o$ca$lt, )=>=! )(()(' NietBsche, )==K, 55, [)'! -(-'./ This political description of rightsth$s designates both an ungrounded and a non(teleological

conception , a necessarily open(ended, never(ending, process of

contestation , a 0&ermanent &rovocation1 ?o$ca$lt, '(((i! EL'. which, as ?o$ca$lt memorably &$ts it

in a slightly diOerent conte;t, will, separate out, from the contingency that hasmade us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thin2ingwhat we are, do, or thin2 /// Hthat is,I to give new im&et$s, as far and wide as &ossible, to the $ndenedwor2 of freedom/


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:olitical sub)ects under the state are ahistorical fabrications ofbeing our praxis of counter(memory exposes the illusion ofsub)ectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up spacefor radical becoming. ?ichael Bli-ord explainsMichael, Associate Professor of Philoso&hy with the 5nstit$te for the

7$manities and the e&artment of Philoso&hy and Religion at Mississi&&iState University, '((), Political "enealogy After ?o$ca$lt%/ Ro$tledge,+ondon, "reat Dritain/ &&/ )EL3>.?o$ca$lt1s counter(memory is very close to the 4ietzschean idea of"active forgetfulness#a2tive ergesslich2eit./') Bounter(memory consists ofessentially forgetting who we are . &t is a forgetfulness of essence, ofnecessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us toan identity .There is freedom in forgetf$lness/ Bounter(memory holds us at aremove, a distance, from ourselves 9 not in the traditional sense ofself re8ection, but of wrenching the self Kthis identityKapart,through an incision, a cutting that ma$es the self stand na$ed and

strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap ofdi-erence.6o$nter3memory dislodges the &ro&riety of o$r3selves/ The self , as a coherentidentity, becomes foreign through counter(memory. We cannotremember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a givenway. Bounter(memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination,this sub)ection . The power of identity is suspended through aforgetfulness of its necessity Ka freedom is opened within the spaceof a di-erence that no identity can constrain.This diOerence always &lays o$tsidethe limits, o$tside any delimitation of being/ 6o$nter3memory thr$sts $s into this $ncharted world, where a memoryma2es no sense, where &lay is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid,

the identical/ Bounter(memory bears directly on processes of

sub)ectivation, on the techni@$es of the self thro$gh which we constit$te for o$rselves an identity/

"Bounter(discourses# anticipate a sub)ectival freedom of openpossibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truththrough which we recognize ourselves as sub)ects.'' These counter(discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensomeobligations imposed on us by such a recognition .As a forgetf$lness of theseobligations, counter(memory always ta$es the form of a transgression .5tinvites condemnation even as it ref$ses to be held acco$ntable/Net there is freedom in thisrefusal,in this transgressionXfor those who have the stomach for it/'E There is always an essential ris2involved in ref$sing, in forgetting, one1s identity/'L 6o$nter3memory is not a form of conscio$sness/ 5t is nothing,really, e;ce&t the eOect of a certain 2ind of descri&tion of o$rselves, a descri&tion of the historical ontology ofo$rselves as s$bects/ This descri&tion has been closed oO and denied by &ower2nowledge relations, e;cl$ded andmade &eri&heral by certain dominant disco$rses and entrenched scientic3&hiloso&hical enter&rises that bind $s to

a conce&tion of what we are in tr$th/ Bounter(memory counters, or suspends , thepower of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution .


16/18

has the e-ect of disposing sub)ectival constraints by exposing thecontingency of their imposition/ "enealogy t$rns the rm &ost$re of the self3identical s$bectinto the mere &osing of a &retentio$s dis&lay/ "enealogy &roceeds thro$gh dissension% and dis&arity/%

Wherever "the self fabricates a coherent identity,# genealogy putsinto play a subversive counter(analysis that "permits thedissociation of the self, its recognition and dis&lacement as an em&ty synthesis/%'9


17/18

Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform o$rselves, to be other than the identity dictated for $s by some e;traneo$s

rationality, we have no freedom/ Qven the most violent forms of resistanceagainst sub)ection accomplish nothing if they do not gain thisfreedom, do not open a space of possible transformation Kwhichmeans nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of beingotherwise/ Something very li2e this &oint is made by ennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of)=9= and the militant "ay +iberation ?ront that emerged from them in the early )=>(s/ 5n one of the seminal te;tsof what wo$ld later become 2nown as C$eer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a &olitical movementthat so$ght for gay and lesbian &eo&le little more than an e;&ansion of rights and the liberal tolerance% of thehomo&hile comm$nity! 7omose;$als can win acce&tance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation ofsociety, one that is based on a 0new h$man1 who is able to acce&t the m$ltifaceted and varied nat$re of his or herse;$al identity/ That s$ch a society can be fo$nded is the gamble $&on which gay and women1s liberation arebased li2e all radical movements they hold to an o&timistic view of h$man nat$re, above all to its m$tability/%E'

This re@$irement that we are only gen$inely free if we able to transform o$rselves is recalcitrant/EE 5t is cr$cial to

$nderstand, however, that what is being re*uired here is not a freedom totransform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleologicalmodel of a more "genuine# form of sub)ectivity.This freedom does not consist asit does in Fn +iberty. in re&lacing one form of s$bectivity for another that is s$&&osedly tr$er% or more f$llling toh$man nat$re/ Not only is this ill$sory and $nobtainable, it wo$ld also amo$nt to a cancellation of freedom, a

reim&osition of s$bectival limitations and e;&ectations/ ather, the freedom opened bycounter(memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, ofalways being able to become other than what we are .


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iMichel ?o$ca$lt, )=K>, 7istory of Se;$ality! An introd$ction,% && )E93>,% Robert 7$rley Translation

iiZohreh DayatriBi, '((K, +ife Sentences! The Modern Frdering of Mortality,% && K3)'

iii#$id/

iv*ohn Parry, '((-, 0Society M$st be HReg$latedI1! Dio&olitics and the 6ommerce 6la$se in "onBales v/ Raich,% +ewis :6lar2 +aw Review o$me = 5ss$e L

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