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Transmission Genetics of Isozyme Loci in Raphanus sativus (Brassicaceae): Stress-DependentNon-Mendelian SegregationAuthor(s): N. Ellstrand and B. DevlinReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Botany, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 40-46Published by: Botanical Society of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2444771 .

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THE BI-LA KAYFADOCTRINE AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

BY

BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

s is well known, the anthropomorphic expressions in the

Qur'an and the Sunna were generally treated by Muslim

scholars in three different ways. Some scholars adopted the literal

meanings of these expressions saying, e.g., that God has hands,

face, legs and that He sits on His Throne and descends every night

to the lowest heaven, and that He is angry or is happy'. On the

basis of Qur'an verses that God is unlike anything2, some others,

mainly rationalist thinkers, interpreted these anthropomorphisms

in a figurative way. Thus, God's hand stands for His power and

His sitting on the Throne means His rule over the world3. A third

group embraced a middle way according to which one has to acceptthe sacred text as it is without trying to interpret its modality

(kayfiyya), This last attitude toward anthropomorphism (tasbhh)

occurs in Islamic theological works through the formula bi-ld kayfa,

i.e., without asking how, or without comment4. An important con-

tribution to the understanding of bi-Id kayfa was made by R.M.

Frank (<<Elements)>, p. 155-160) who proved that in Arabic the

question koyfaapplies to corporeal features, therefore any reference

to anthropomorphic expression with the addition of the denial of

I See e.g., Qur'an 38.75, 28.88, 20.5, 4.93. The Sunna literature is replete withanthropomorphic traditions. For example: <<Godcreated Adam in His image>,<(The Almighty put His leg in the Fire,>, )(The believer's heart is between two ofGod's fingers,>. Al-Bagdadi, Usuil, p. 74f. Al-Sahrastani, Nihayat, p. 103f. Id., K.al-milal, p. 77, 11.15-18. Al-Razi, Asa-sal-taqdis, passim. W.M. Watt, <<Created n

His Image,), pp. 38-49. For extensive collections of such traditions see al-Lalaka'i,Sarh, III, pp. 412-430. Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wUl, pp. 204-224, 270-276. IbnUuzayma, K. al-tawhzd, pp. 6-230.

2 See e.g., Qur'an 42.11, 112.4.3 Abrahamov, al-Qdsim, p. 27. Id., Anthropomorphism,ntroduction.4 (Affirmation de l'existence des attributs en refusant de s'interroger sur leur

mode (kayf)>>,L. Gardet and M.M. Anawati, Introductiona la TheiologieMusulmane,Paris 1948, p. 66, n. 5.

? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1995 Arab9ca, tome XLII



366 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

kayfa means to accept this expression as it is without attributing cor-

poreal qualities to God.

In Laoust's view the bi-ldkayfadoctrine is traced back to the Han-balites. The Hanbalite scholar al-Barbahari (d. 941) defines exactly

the Hanbalite approach saying that God should be described as He

describes Himself and as the Prophet describes Him, without com-

ment on ((how>)and ((why>).According to al-Barbahar1, the origin

of this doctrine is the teaching of Malik ibn Anas (d. 795) and other

fuqahd5. Malik is reported to have made the following statement,

which, according to some sources, is a tradition going back toMuhammad or to one of the sahdba. (<God's sitting on the Throne

(istiwdl)6 is known (ma'luim), but its modality is unknown (al-kayf

maghul). The belief in the istiwa' is obligatory (al-fmdn bihi wdgib),

and the inquiry about it is an innovation?>(al-suIdlCanhu id'a)7. The

idea of the affirmation of anthropomorphisms without commenting

on them appears in a creed ('aqfda) ascribed to Ibn Hanbal. The

term bi-ld kayfa, however, does not appear in it. Ibn Hanbal deals

with God's face which appears in some Qur'anic verses8. (<God,

may He be extolled and exalted, has a face unlike shapes which are

formed (suwar musawwara)and substances which are limited (a ydnmuhattata), but a face which He has described in His verse:

'Everything will perish except His face' (Qur'an 28.88). Whoever

changes the meaning of the verse, deviates from it (alhada 'anhu).

It is a face in reality (haqfqa)and not in a figurative way (magaz).

God's face is eternal and will not disappear, it is His attribute (sifa)which will not perish. Whoever claims that His face means His

essence (nafsuhu)is a heretic and whoever changes its meaning is an

unbeliever. Face in the Qur'an is not interpreted to mean a body,

or a shape or a limit. Whoever says so is an innovator9.?)The consti-

H. Laoust, La Professionde Foi D'Ibn Batta, Damascus 1958, p. 102, n. 3, p.

87, n. 1. By fuqahd' al-Barbahari seems to refer to the imams of the jurisprudent

schools, namely, Ibn Hanbal, al-Safi'i and Abu- Hanifa.6 This statement refers to Qur5dn 20.5: <(The All-compassionate sate Himself

upon the Throne,, (tr. Arberry).

Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 132f. Malik's statement has several versions. See e.g.,

al-Bada-di, Usul, p. 113 in which God's sitting is intelligible (al-istiwa' maCquil).

8 See e.g. Qur5an 2.115: ?To God belong the East and the West; whithersoever

you turn, there is the Face of God,, (tr. Arberry). For a discussion of this issue in

a work of a Zaydite imam prone to Mu'tazilism see my Anthropomorphism,ntro-

(luction.Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 'Aqida (according to the version of Abu Bakr al-Hallal),

ed. 'Abd al-'Azlz Izz al-Din al-Sirawdn, Damascus 1988, p. 103.



BI-LA KA YFA 367

tuents of the bi-ld kayfadoctrine can be derived from this passage.

First, it is the denial of tasbah,both in its <<crude))orm, i.e., God

is not a body, and in its <(soft))orm, God has not a shape of a body.Second, the word ((face))represents a reality and therefore it should

not be interpreted in a figurative way (ta wi7) or changed in any

other way. Thirdly, the word ((face)) s an attribute, which means

that it is equal to other attributes of God like (<Godis hearing)>or

(<God is Omniscient>>. And fourthly, the change of the meaning of

a Qur'anic expression amounts to unbelief. To sum up, on the one

hand, this method manifests God's incorporeality (against tasbah)and the authority of the Qur'an (against ta'wal which, according to

the adherents of this theory means also ta'tal-i.e., divesting God of

His attributes), and on the other, it attests to man's inability to

know God's essence'0.

The proponents of the bi-ldkayfadoctrine had to defend it against

both the musabbihun nd the mu'awwilun. Whereas they used a stock

argument against anthropomorphism, already developed by the

Mu'tazilites, to the effect that if God were like the created beings

He would also be regarded as created and hence could not be eter-

nal and God1", they had to set forth arguments to show why the

Qur'an and the Sunna must not be interpreted figuratively in order

to eschew tasbah.

An examination of the works of several Muslim scholars, begin-

ning with Ibn Qutayba (d. 889) and ending with Ibn Taymiyya (d.

1328), reveals a variety of arguments in favour of bi-lIdkayfa. Thesearguments, which are based on scriptural as well as linguistic,

rational and philosophical considerations, are proof beyond doubt

of the efforts made by Muslim scholars to render this doctrine

sound and hence acceptable. The seeds of the justification of bi-ld

kayfa were sown in the ninth century, and the <<tree>>as grown

'0 Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism,ntroduction."1 This argument can be formulated in another way: Since any body is com-

posed of parts, whereas God is one, and since any body is produced in time,whereas God is eternal, it is inconceivable to liken God to a body. Al-Baqillani,K. al-tamhid, pp. 191-193. Al-As"ari, K. al-lumacf l-radd caldahl al-zayg wal-bidac,ed. and tr. R.J. McCarthy, in the Theologyof al-Asjcarl,Beirut 1953, p. 8, 1. 1, p.9, 1. 18-p.10, 1. 8, p. 17, 1. 14. Al-Sahrastani, Nihayat, p. 105, 11. 8-10. Al-Maturidi, K. al-tawhfd, p. 38, 11. 3-7. Al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (?), K. al-cadl wal-tawhJd wa-nafy al-gabr wal-tasbih, in Rasa-il al-cadl wal-tawhzid, ed. Muhammad

clmara, Cairo 1971, I, p. 103.




during the ages. In the following an attempt will be made to bring

forth and analyze these arguments.

First we shall see how the Qur'an and the Sunna and their inter-pretations serve the proponents of bi-ld kayfa. Qur'an 21.23 is set

forth to show that one should not engage himself in asking ques-

tions about God, because ((He is not to be questioned about His

acts, whereas people are questioned (about their acts)>>12.Another

justification of bi-ld kayfa is based on Qur'an 14.27 which reads:

<<God does what He wills>). Abui Bakr Ahmad ibn-Husayn al-

Bayhaqi (d. 1066) cites this verse as a corroboration for the thesis

of the impossibility of knowing God's modality. (<Goddoes what He

wills)> means, e.g., that He descends to the earth as He wills, and

the conclusion implied is that His will cannot be known by man.

According to al-Bayhaql, one should know the literal meaning

(zadhir) f the anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur)an, but one

cannot reveal their inner meaning (batin). These expressions are the

ambiguous (mutasdbih)part of the Qur'an as against the self evident

part (muhkam)of it which one can know its real meaning'3. Like-wise, al-Guwayni uses the same verse to show that in the Qurdan

there are secrets which people cannot know. These secrets have no

connection to the carrying out of the religious precepts'4.

Orthodox Muslim scholars also deny interpretations of

anthropomorphic expressions in order to draw the conclusion that

interpretation cannot be applied to these expressions and that they

should remain as they are. Using the Kalam device of division

12 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 194.13 Al-Bayhaqi, al-Asma' wal-sitdt, Ddr Ihya' al-Turdt al-Arab1, Beirut n.d., pp.

453-457. Id., al-I'tiqdd wal-hiddya ild sabfl al-rasad ald ma4dhabl-salaf wa-ashdb al-

hadft, ed. al-Sayyid al-6umayli, Beirut 1988, p. 94. Qur'dn 3.7 is the basis of the

distinction between self-evident verses and ambiguous ones. It reads as follows:

,,It is He who brought down the Book; in it there are self-evident verses (muhkamdt)that are the basis of the Book (umm al-kitdb) and others that are ambiguous

(mutasabihdt).Those who deviate from the right way follow the ambiguous verses

for the purpose of [bringing about] dissension and of interpreting them (the

ambiguous ones). Only God knows the interpretation of these verses (wa-md

yaclamu ta wliahu illd allah). And the most erudite persons (al-rasihu-nfil-cilm)say we

believe in them (the ambiguous verses), each one (every ambiguous or self-evident

verse) is from God, and only the clever people pay attention to [it]>. For further

details concerning this verse, see Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, h. 2.1 Al-Guwayni, al-Sdmilfzusiil al-din, ed. cAll Sami al-Nassar, Alexandria 1969,

p. 550f.



BI-LA KAYFA 369

(qisma)'5, al-A'sarli denies the possibility of interpreting God's

hands (Qur'an 38.75, 51,47) either as His organs, or His favours

or His ability, and hence affirms God's hand without interpretingits meaning'6. To this he adds a hermeneutic rule directed toward

the proponents of the figurative interpretation (magazand elsewhere

ta)wd): the literal meaning of a verse should not be replaced by a

figurative meaning unless there is a proof which necessitates such

a change'7. It is to be noted that those who adhere to the bi-Ia kayfa

doctrine have as their principal opponents the adherents of the figu-

rative interpretation and not the anthropomorphists, who were a

minority among Muslim scholars. A hermeneutic rule against

magaz, is, then, a rule in favour of bi-ld kayfa.

A similar procedure is taken by al-Maturid1. All the possible

interpretations of anthropomorphisms are cancelled on account of

Qur'an 42.11, for if God is unlike anything, no attribute of this

world can apply to Him. Moreover, in the case of many interpreta-

tions, no one can state definitely which is the true one'8. This point

was further elaborated by Ibn Taymiyya. The proponents of ta)wil,

says Ibn Taymiyya, base their use of ta'wil on the argument that

reason cannot accept such notions as the people's seeing of God inthe world to come, the uncreatedness of the Qur'an, the Resurrec-

tion and God's sitting on the Throne. However, reason is not a

consistent device for solving such problems. This is proved through

their using of reason; some of them claim that reason makes a cer-

tain notion possible or necessary, whereas others, concerning thesame notion, say that reason makes it absurd19.

Let us now show how Ibn Taymiyya interprets Qur'an verses ina rational manner to deny the figurative interpretation. The

reference is to al-Gazali's interpretation of God's sitting on the

Throne. According to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Gazall is one of those who

deny God's raising Himself above the Throne. Al-Gazall states thatthis raising should be interpreted to mean God's ability over and

15 For this term, see J. van Ess, ,The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology>,in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum, Wiesbaden 1970,pp. 40-42.

16 Al-As"arl, al-Ibana, p. 37.17 Ibid., p. 39.18 Al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhfd, pp. 67-85. Cf. Ibn al-Gawzl, Naqd al-Cilmwal-

ulama-'aw talbzs iblWs, darat al-Tib5ca al-Muniriyya, Cairo n.d., p. 85.19 Ibn Taymiyya, cAqjdahamawiyya,p. 440. Cf. Abrahamov, <Jbn Taymiyya on

the Agreement of Reason with Tradition,,, MW, 82,3-4 (1992), p. 259f.




overwhelming the Throne or God's being better than the Throne.

Notwithstanding God's being above everything in the meaning of

rule and power, He is near every existent, and He is nearer to manthan the jugular vein20. God's nearness to man is understood by al-

Gazdll as His knowledge of him. Ibn TIaymiyya does not agree with

al-Gazdli for several reasons: a. Nearness is not expressed in the

language only through knowledge or ability; b. It is well known

through Qur'an verses (67.13-14, 20.7, 9.78, 43.80, 58.7) that God

knows the overt and the hidden things, so that there is no reason

to particularize the jugular vein in order to prove God's knowledge

of man; c. The structure of the verse (see note 20) proves that God

first affirms knowledge, and then nearness. Thus, nearness should

not be interpreted as knowledge; d. The following two verses

(50.17-18) which read: <<When the two angels (al-mutalaqqiydni)

meet together, sitting one on the right, and one on the left, not a

word he utters, but by him is an observer ready)>prove that those

who are near to man are the angels, who write man's deeds every

day, and not God's essence21. Consequently, the interpretation ofGod's nearness to man as God's knowledge of him is out of place

here22.

The method Ibn Taymiyya adopts is very interesting, for he

proves here and in the following pages23 that some scholars have

recourse to figurative interpretation without justification, since this

interpretation is wrong from either the rational or linguistic point

of view. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya denies the using of ta)wil. This denialproves the necessity of understanding the Qur'an verses according

to their context, which, in other words, means to describe God as

he describes Himself. It seems that the polemics of Ibn Taymiyya

against ta)wil aims at paving the way for the bi-ld kayfa system.

The rational use of a tradition in order to interpret another tradi-

tion also serves as a device for abrogating ta)wfl. Concerning God's

attributes, says Ibn Qutayba, we reach the point which God's

messenger reached. This means that one should not say about

God's attributes more than what the Prophet said24. The reason

20 Qur'an 50.16: ,We indeed created man; and We know what his soul

whispers within him, and We are nearer to him than the jugular vein>>, (tr.

Arberry)21 Cf. al-Tabarl, XI, 26, p. 100.22 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 368-371.23 Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., pp. 372-397.

24 Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wil, p. 208.



BI-LA KAYFA 371

implicit in this assertion is the notion that the sacred texts are per-

fect and hence supply the believer with what he should know, and

any addition to them is superfluous and leads to absurdities. IbnQutayba refers to a tradition which states that the believer's heart

is between two of God's fingers. On the basis of God's otherness,

he rejects the anthropomorphic perception of this tradition. But he

also does not accept its figurative interpretation which regards

God's finger as His favour. His repudiation of this interpretation

is based on another tradition which speaks of the Prophet's prayer.

The Prophet said: (<OHe who turns about men's hearts (muqallib

al-qulzib)25, asten (labbit) my heart to Your religion > Then one of

his wives said: <(Doyou fear for yourself?>>Muhammad answered:

<The believer's heart is between two of God's fingers)). Now, says

Ibn Qutayba, if, according to their view, the heart is between two

of God's favours, and Muhammad is guarded by these two favours,why did he pray to God to fasten his heart to the religion, and why

did he argue against his wife by quoting a tradition which affirms

her question? If his heart had been protected by two of God'sfavours, he should not have feared. Therefore God's finger is not

His favour26. After rejecting both the literal and the figurative

interpretation of the text, there is nothing left but to accept it as it

is.

This kind of argument appears in Ibn Huzayma (d. 925). He

rejects the interpretation of God's hands in the Qur'dnic phrase

((God's hands are outspread> as God's favours, because such aninterpretation would mean that God has only two favours, which

is absurd27. Both the preceding and the present examples have as

their point of departure the adherence to the text, which if it is

abandoned, will bring about irrational conclusions.

For the purpose of defending the bi-ld kayfadoctrine, the Safi'ite

scholar al-Ldlakad: (d. 1027) quotes a tradition on the authority of

'Umar ibn al-Hattab. It reads: <(Think n (tafakkard)God's creation

and do not think on God >>28This prohibition to deal with God's

25 This phrase seems to be derived from Qur'dn 6.110: .We shall turn abouttheir hearts (wa-nuqallibuaf'idatahum)and their eyes, even as they believed not init the first time; and We shall leave them in their insolence wandering blindly> (tr.Arberry).

26 Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wdl, pp. 208-210.27 Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawhfd, p. 85.28 Al-Lalakadi, Sarh, III, p. 524. Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi, ItbJt sifat al-uluww,

ed. Ahmad ibn CAtiyya ibn 'All al-Gamidi, al-Madina 1407 H., p. 155.




essence is further elaborated by another Safi'ite scholar Abiu al-

Qasim al-Taymi (d. 1140) who quotes Ibn Mandah (d. 1004) as

saying the following: ((God's messenger ordered not to deal withand discuss God through rational arguments and to avoid what

would bring about doubts)>29. According to Abiu al-Qasim al-

Taymi, discussing God's names and attributes and not keeping

silent about what the Prophet's Companions (sahdba) and their

followers (tdbi'uin)kept silent amounts to an innovation (bid'a)30.

The end of this statement alludes to the principle of igma' (general

consensus), which is one of the bases of Islamic jurisprudence. Hereit is the consensus of the first two generations of Muslim scholars.

The Ascarite theologian al-Guwayni (d. 1085) plainly states that the

Prophet's Companions and their followers neither interpreted

anthropomorphic expressions nor did they deal with figurative

interpretation. One has to follow the igma' of those scholars31.

After presenting arguments based on the Qur'an, the Sunna and

the igma'c,we shall now turn to the linguistic or logical argument.

The essential part of this argument is the use of the term <<common

name)). A common name is a name which applies to some objects.

It can be either a name of different objects which have no common

traits, or which partake of one or more attributes32. A common

name may have a different meaning in each object to which it

applies. Ibn Huzayma brings examples from the Qur'an to

illustrate this phenomenon. The word ((mighty>>'azaz) applies in

the Qur'an both to God and to men; the master of Yuisuf in Egyptas well as Yiusuf himself are named mighty33. Likewise other words

(e.g., powerful- cazim,gabbdr, knowing-'al/m) which apply to God

apply also to men and to created entities. The same rule should be

followed when dealing with words such as face and hand which

apply to God. Just as ((mighty>? pply both to God and to men but

29 Al-Taymi, al-Huga, vol. I, p. 98.30 Ibid., p. 104.31 Al-Guwayni, al- Aqfdaal-niza-miyya, d. Muhammad Zahid al-Kawtari, Cairo

1948, p. 23f. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, CAqfda amawiyya, p. 464.32 For the various kinds of common name, see Maimonides, Introductiono Logic

in theHebrew Versionof Moses ibn Tibbon, (Milot Ha-higayon), ed. L. Roth, Jerusalem

1965, ch. 13. On one kind of common name, an amphibolous name, see H.A.

Wolfson, <(The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and

Maimonides>>, Studies in the History of Philosophyand Religion, 1, Cambridge Mass.

1979, pp. 455-477.

33 Qur'an 12.30, 78.



BI-LA KA YFA 373

in different meanings, so <face>>nd ((hand))apply both to God and

to men in different meanings. One does not know the real meaning

of mighty when applying to God, and therefore one cannot knowthe real meaning of face when applying to God. It follows that there

is no ground for the thesis of the interpretation of the anthropomor-

phic expressions in a figurative way, for if each word in the Qur'an

which has double application (both to God and to created things)

brings about tasbfh, then whoever believes in the Qur'an is a likener

(musabbih), which is absurd34. Ibn Huzayma's implied conclusion

that without common names one can know nothing about God, and

hence the use of common names is a necessity, is stated plainly by

al-Maturidi (d. 944).

According to al-Maturidl, abstaining from using common names

leads to divesting God of His attributes (ta'tfl), which means

ignorance of God, whereas affirming the literal meaning of a word

applying to God means taibih. Therefore it is necessary to employ

a middle way; to adhere to the common name while denying the

application of the usual meaning to God. Thus, God is a knowerunlike other knowers. In like manner, both the reward and the

punishment of the world to come are perceived by the people

through the Qur'an's speaking of the pleasures and injuries of this

world35.

The notion that using common names does not necessitate liken-

ing God to created entities is further developed by Ibn Taymiyya.

He says that if God were like man because both God and man are

designated as being knowing, living and compassionate, then every

existent would be like every other existent, because all existents

share the attribute of existence. Thus, that a thing takes part in one

attribute with another thing does not entail total likeness of the two

things. If this statement is right with regard to two created things,

34 Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawh'd, pp. 24-36, 84-85.35 Al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, p. 42, 11. 14-22. Cf. al-Gazall, al-Maqsad al-asna-

fisarh asma' alldh al-husna, ed. Muhammad Mustafa Abiu al-'Ala, Cairo n.d., p.41. It is worth noting that with regard to the notion that the Scripture does notset forth the real meaning of the world to come al-Maturidi's stand resembles thephilosopher's. Cf. R. Walzer, Al-Fdrdbi on the Perfect State: AbuiNasr al-FdrdbUsMabddi'Ara'Ahl al-Madina al-Fddila, a rev. text with intr., trans., and commen-tary, Oxford 1985, pp. 474-480. But whereas the philosopher thinks that thedescriptions of the world to come are no more than symbols of the truth, the

theologican does not know what are the meanings of these descriptions.




the more so with regard to God in relation to the created entities36.

The knowledge of the hidden things, says Ibn Taymiyya, is

attained through the existent things. One cannot know what ispower, knowledge or speech of another unless one knows these

things through his own experience. If this process did not take

place, there would be no possibility of learning, and a man would

know only the objects of his senses. Like al-Maturdfi, he brings the

example of the world to come which is described in the Scripture

in terms known to every man in order to make people understand

God'spromise.

In someaspects

there isagreement

andsimilaritybetween the existents of this world and the existents in the world

to come. However, the difference between these two kinds of

existents, which are created, is known only to God.

In this context, Ibn Taymiyya uses the verse quoted above

(Qur'an 3.7. n. 13 above); <only God knows its interpretation)>(wa-

mdyaClamu a'wUlahuladallih). The verse continues as follows: wal-

rasiLhuinil-'ilmyaquluna dmanndbihi. The last sentence can be inter-

preted to mean either that those who are well rooted in knowledgeknow its interpretation (the wa being a conjunctive particle waw

al-'atJ), or that those who are well rooted in knowledge say: ((We

have believed in it)>(in its interpretation), which means that they

do not know its interpretation. Now, according to Ibn Taymiyya,

these two interpretations are right, although at first sight they seem

contradictory, but refer to two different aspects; the first interpreta-

tion refers to the meaning of the words, which is known to thosescholars, whereas the second refers to the modality (kayfiyya) of

these words which only God knows (In this case the wa of wal-

rasihun is waw al-ibtidd' in the meaning of (<whereas>)).Conse-

quently, the forefathers (al-salaf), like Malik ibn Anas, explains Ibn

Taymiyya, said: God's sitting upon the Throne is known, but its

modality is unknown. According to him, the forefathers combined

these two interpretations to create this famous formula37. Another

tradition is set forth to corroborate the bi-ld kayfadoctrine. Accord-

ing to this tradition the Qur'an interpretation is divided into four

aspects: a. interpretation which is known through the language,

i.e., the knowledge of the literal meaning of the words; b. inter-

pretation which no one can excuse because of his ignorance, i.e.,

36 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 75-77, 84f.

37 Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., pp. 104-108.



BI-LA KAYFA 375

the knowledge of precepts; c. interpretation which is known to the

scholars; d. interpretation which is known only to God38.

As we have seen, the use of the common names is importantregarding the people's knowledge of the world. But more important

is the knowledge gained through the common names concerning

God. The outcome of this knowledge is belief in God and the desire

to worship Him (Sarh, p. 111). Thus, common names have an

important function from the religious point of view.

In his al-Nuagafr baydnal-mahaga wa-sarh Caqfdathl al-sunna, the

Saficite scholarAbui al-Qasim al-Taym1 reasons the use of the mid-dle way (the bi-ldkayfa)through understanding the relation between

God's essence and attributes. He states that the discussion of God's

attributes (sifat) branches off the discussion of His essence (ddt).

Now, the affirmation of God's essence is only an affirmation of

existence and not of modality, hence the affirmation of God's

attributes is also only an affirmation of existence39. Abiu al-Qasim

al-Taymi does not explain why the discussion of God's attributes

branches off the discussion of His essence. This was done later onby Ibn Taymiyya.

According to Ibn Taymiyya, in reality there is no essence which

is free from its attributes40. An essence which is free from its

attributes exists only in one's intellect. No one can affirm the

existence of a man without qualifying him through life, power,

moving, speaking, etc. Therefore, the forefathers called the deniers

of God's attributes (nufdtal-sifdt) the abrogators (mu'atilla), becausethey abrogated God's essence, even if they did not know that their

notion of abrogating God's attributes entailed the abrogation of

God's essence. The connection between God's essence and His

attributes demonstrates the idea that the attributes cannot be inter-

preted and hence known, that is, for if God's essence is unknown

according to reason and the Qur'an (42.11: <<There s no one like

38 Ibid., p. 109. Cf. al-Tabari, I, 1, p. 26. Y. Goldfeld, <<TheDevelopment ofTheory of Qur'anic Exegesis in Islamic Scholarship,,, Studia Islamica 67 (1988), p.18f. It is not our concern to discuss the four aspects in this tradition, but attentionshould be paid to the overlapping of them.

39 Al-Taymi, al-Hugga, I, p. 175.40 Ibn Taymiyya, Dar' tacdrudal-caql wal-naql, ed. Muhammad Rasad Salim,

Riyad 1979, III, p. 20. Cf. H. Laoust, Essai sur les doctrinessociales et politiques de

Takf-D-Din Ahmad B. Taimjya, Cairo 1939, p. 160.




Him)>and 112.4: ((No one is equal to Him))), His attributes should

also remain unknown41.

In al-Lalakal the impossibility of knowing God is derived fromthe impossibility of knowing the world. If we cannot know the

created beings, all the more so we cannot know the Creator42. This

argument is formulated in a slightly different manner in Ibn

Taymiyya: ((The proof of the intellect's inability to know the true

meaning of God's attribute (tahqzq yfatihi) s its inability to know the

attribute of the smallest of God's created beings>43. On the other

hand, the understandingof processes which take place in created

beings helps man to understand the impossibility of knowing God's

attributes. Ibn Taymiyya regards motion as a genus which has four

species. These are: a. motion concerning modality (harakaffl-kayf).

It means the change of an attribute in a thing: a thing which is red

turns to be black. In like manner, one's knowledge after one's

ignorance is deemed a motion; b. motion concerning quantity

(haraka f 1-kam),e.g., a body which is small becomes big; c. motion

concerning state (harakafifl-wad'), e.g., the rotation of a thing in one

place. The millstone rotates in one place, but its state changes every

moment; d. motion concerning place (4arakajfI-'ayn), e.g., the pass-

ing from one place to another44. The three last kinds refer to bodily

features, whereas the first one can apply to changes in one's soul.

There is a difference between the motion of the body and the

motion of the soul. The soul is qualified by attributes which cannot

qualify the body. The same rule applies to the angels, whoseattributes and motions are different from those of the soul. Now,

the possibility that God, the most perfect of all beings, has

attributes which are different from the attributes of the created

beings, is more likely than the possibility of the difference of

attributes among the created beings themselves. The body's des-

cent is different from the spirit's descent, and God's descent is more

sublime than the descent of the former. Therefore, it is not impos-

sible that God descends from the Throne while the Throne is not

empty of Him45. Faithful to the bi-ld kayfamethod, Ibn Taymiyya

4' Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 72-74.42 Al-Lalakd'i, Sarh usud, p. 530.43 'Aqjda hamawzjyya,p. 443.44 Cf. Ibn Sind, K. al-Nagdt, ed. Magid Fahri, Beirut 1985, p. 143.

45 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 301-304, 400, 445-455.



BI-LA KA YFA 377

does not trv to explain how God descends, but only to demonstrate

that it is possibly different from the descent of other entities.

Another attitude toward bi-ld kayfa is advanced by al-Gazdll (d.1 1 11). Adhering to his way of differentiating between the common

people (al-Cawamm)and the elite (al-hawdSS)46 al-Gazali states that

al-cawamm cannot understand figurative interpretation, hence the

bi-ld kayfa system is dedicated to them. However, the learned ones

are able to use the figurative interpretation47. Al-Gazall, thus, does

not explain the bi-ldkayfadoctrine but applies it to a kind of people.

In doing this, he differs from the As'arite tradition in which bi-Ia

kayfa and tawUl occur without such a differentiation48.

46 H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in al-Ghazzdll, Jerusalem 1975, pp. 353-355.47 Al-Gazdli, al-Iqtisddfl-iCtiqdd, Cairo 1971, p. 26f.48 On the differences between al-Gazali's teachings and the A'sarites) see K.

Nakamura, <Was Ghazali an AshCarite?,,, Memoirs of the ResearchDepartmentof theToyo Bunko, Tokyo 51 (1993), pp. 1-24.

A different reference to the common people in connection with the issue of

God's corporeality is made by Ibn Rusd (d. 1198). In his Mandhigal-adillafr Caqdaidal-milla, Ibn Rusd states that one should follow the religious way (minhag'al-sar')in dealing with anthropomorphic expressions. According to this way, and contraryto the bi-ld kayfadoctrine, it is forbidden either to deny or to affirm these expres-sions, and whoever of the common people asks about them will be answeredthrough Qur'an 42.11, and will be prohibited from asking. Ibn Rusd, Mandhig,p. 172. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 258. Three reasons are brought forward infavour of this approach: a. The Mutakallimzin'sproof that God is not a body is notdemonstrative (burha-nzyya). bn Rusd, ibid., pp. 138-145. (According to theMutakallimu-n ach body is generated, since it is composed of atoms (gawdhir) and

accidents (aCrd . Accidents are generated, therefore bodies, which are not free ofaccidents, must also be generated. Cf. H.A. Davidson, Proofs or Eternity, Creationand the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New York andOxford 1987, pp. 134-146.) If it were demonstrative, most of the common peoplecould not attain it. Furthermore, the Mutakallimun hold that God is an essence towhich attributes are added (sifa-t zadida 'ald al-dc-t). (Ibn Rusd refers to sifdtma nawjyya. Cf. al-Guwayni, K. al-Irsdd ild qawatic al-adilla ft usil al-iCtiqdd,ed.Ascad Tamim, Beirut 1985, pp. 51f., 77ff.) This notion entails God's corporealitymore than the denial of it. That is, since there is an attribute and a substancequalified by this attribute, and this is the state of a body. Ibn Rusd, Mandhig, p.

166f. As a result, the Scripture does not state plainly that God is not a body; b.The common people consider the existent as that which is perceived by the sensesand imagination, and that which is not perceived by them is nonexistent. Thus,if they are told that there is an existent which is not a body, they will not be ableto perceive this existent through imagination, and hence they will consider it asnonexistent. The more so, if they are told that this existent is neither outside theworld nor inside it, neither above the world nor below it; c. The denial of God'scorporeality brings about doubts as to some religious issues, e.g., the Resurrectionand the people's seeing of God in the hereafter. Whoever denies God's cor-poreality denies His movement, which means that God will not come to judge the

people contrary to Qur'an verses (e.g., 89.22). Likewise, in stating that God is not



378 BiNYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

In this article we have seen how bi-ld kayfa has developed from a

mere formula in the Hadit literature into a doctrine based on vari-

ous kinds of arguments, some of which seem to be very convincing.As we have seen, these arguments had a dual function; on the one

hand, they served as a weapon against anthropomorphism and

against figurative interpretation, and on the other, they aimed at

strengthening the thesis of the unknowability of God's essence and

attributes. Al-Gazall is an exception, for he considered the bi-ld

kayfa doctrine as a good device only for a certain type of people.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism= B. Abrahamov, Anthropomorphismnd Interpreta-

tion of the Qur'anin the Theologyof al-Qdsim ibn Ibrihim, K. al-Mustarshid, Leiden

(forthcoming).

Abrahamov, al-Qdsim = B. Abrahamov, Al-IKdsimB. Ibrdhfmon the Proof of God's

Existence, Kitab al-Dalt al-KabTr,Leiden 1990.

Arberry = A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted,Oxford 1983.

al-As"arl, al-Ibana = al-AsCari, al-Ibdna can usul al-dajyana,Idarat al-Tibd'a al-Muniriyya, Cairo n.d.

al-Bagdadi, Usiil = al-Bagdddi, K. Usuilal-dan, Istanbul 1928.

al-Baqillani, K. al-Tamhfd = al-Baqillhni, K. al- Tamhfd, ed. R.J. McCarthy,

Beirut 1957.

Frank, <Elements>> = R. M. Frank, <,Elements in the Development of the

Teaching of al-Ash'arl,, Le Muse'on104 (1991), pp. 141-190.

Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawhfd = Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn Huzayma, K. al-

Tawhid wa-itbdt sifdt al-rabb, ed. Muhammad Halil Harks, Beirut and Cairo

1988.

Ibn Kutayba, Ta'wil = Ibn Kutayba, Tawfl muhtalif al-hadat, ed. MuhammadZuhri al-Naggr, Cairo 1966.

Ibn Rusd, ManJhig = Ibn Rusd, Mandhig al-adilla ft caqdaidal-milla, ed. Mahmuid

Qasim, Cairo 1969.

a body, it is impossible to interpret the tradition concerning God's descent to the

earth (hadit al-nuzfJ). To sum up, according to Ibn Rusd, from a religious point

of view, it is better not to cancel plainly the literal meanings of the Book, for they

are more persuasive, and hence more believable, than the non-demonstrativeviews of the adherents of the figurative interpretation. Ibid., pp. 171-174. Thus,

Ibn Rusd justifies his stand on the grounds of its being a pedagogical device which

aims at benefiting most of the people. The figurative interpretation is rejected

because it cannot serve the common people.

A similar stand was adopted by Ihwdn al-Safa' who permitted the common

people (considered by them as the unlearned) to use anthropomorphic expressions

in order to make them believe in God's existence and hence carry out his precepts.

Rasa-il ihwdn al-safid, Beirut 1957 (rep. of Hayr al-Din al-Zirikli's edition, Cairo

1928, III, p. 515. I.R. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists,An Introduction o the Thought

of the Brethrenof Purity (Ikhwdn al-SafJ'), London 1982, p. 40.



BI-LA KAYFA 379

Ibn Taymiyya, CAqfdaamawzyya= Ibn Taymiyya, al-CAqfda l-hamawiyyaal-kubra,

in Magmu`at al-rasd'il al-kubra-,Beirut 1972, I, pp. 425-478.Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh = Ibn Taymiyya, Su'dlfh kadit al-nuziil wa-gawdbuhuaw sarh

hadit al-nuziil, ed. Muhammad ibn CAbd al-Rahman al-Hamis, Riyad 1993.al-Lalakd'i, Sarh = Abfi al-Qasim Hibat Allah ibn al-Hasan ibn Mansuir al-

Tabari al-Ldlakd'l, Sarh usuil ctiqddahl al-sunna wal-g'amaca,ed. Ahmad SaCd

Hamdan, Makka 1402 H.

al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid = al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, ed. Fathalla Kholeif,

Beirut 1970.

al-Razli, Asa-sal-taqdis = Fahr al-Din al-Razi, Asas al-taqdfsfi cilm al-kaldm, Cairo

1935.

al-Sahrastani, K. al-Milal = al-Sahrastani, K. al-Milal wal-nihal, ed. W. Cureton,

Leipzig 1923 (rep. of London 1846).

al-Sahrastani, Nihdyat = al-Sahrastani, Niha-yat al-aqddmft cilm al-kaldm, ed. A.Guillaume, Oxford 1931.

al-Tabarl = al-Tabari, Gdmical-bayan ttafszr al-Qurdn, Beirut 1986 (rep. of Bulaq1323 H.).

al-Taymi, al-Huga = Abu al-Qasim Ismacil ibn Muhammad ibn al-Fadl al-

Taymi al-Isbahani, al-N.ugaafitbayanal-mahaggawa-s`ar4caqidatahl al-sunna, ed.

Muhammad ibn Rabic al-Madhall, Riyad. 1990.Watt, <Created in His Image,, = W.M. Watt, <Created in His Image,,, The Tran-

sactions of the Glasgow UniversityOriental Society 18(1962), pp. 38-49.

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