Boeing 737 NG ENGINEERING CONTINUATION …cbt.altitudeglobal.aero/Files/Boeing 737 NG Q3 Q4 2017 R3.pdf · The Boeing Company Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model

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Boeing 737 NG ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q3 & Q4 2017

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Contents:

Introduction

Welcome to a new module for the forthcoming introduction of the Boeing 737NG to the Altitude Global Part 145 capability. Included are MOR & AD’s for the period June 2017-January 2018.

This addition also includes a top ten of maintenance errors from previous and current experience. If you’d like to comment or add to this list please contact me at [email protected] and we’d be happy to add your chart toppers!

1 737 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

2 737 UK MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR

3 SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETINS

4 TONYS TOP 10 GOTCHAS !

mailto:[email protected]

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1 B737 NG Airworthiness Directives The following pages lists the Boeing 737 NG AD’s issued from June 2017 to January 2018. If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website (http://ad.easa.europa.eu) or you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there is no material change.

US AD No.: 2017-10-22 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 53 Fuselage - Aft Pressure Bulkhead Web Lap Splices - Inspection

Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1353, dated July 21, 2016

Reason: This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the web lap splices in the aft pressure bulkhead are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the web lap splices in the aft pressure bulkhead for cracking of the fastener holes, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.


ATA 21 Air Conditioning - Temperature Control Valve / Control Cabin Trim Air Modulating Valve - Replacement


Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-21A1203, dated June 8, 2016.

Reason: This AD was prompted by reports of in-flight failure of the left temperature control valve and control cabin trim air modulating valve. This AD requires replacing the left temperature control valve and control cabin trim air modulating valve. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

http://ad.easa.europa.eu/



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ATA 25 Equipment / Furnishings - Rudder Pedal Heel Rest Cover Assembly Screws - Torque Check


Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737- 25A1732, Revision 2, dated April 13, 2017.

Reason: This AD was prompted by a report of an aborted takeoff because the rudder pedals were not operating correctly. Investigation revealed a protruding screw in the rudder pedal heel rest adjacent to the pedals. This AD requires a torque check of the screws in the cover assembly of the heel rest for both the Captain and the First Officer's rudder pedals, and corrective action if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.


ATA 57 Wings - Krueger Flap Bullnose Attachment Hardware - Inspection


Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and - 900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-57A1327, Revision 1, dated September 28, 2016.

Reason: This AD was prompted by a report of a Krueger flap bullnose departing an airplane during taxi, which caused damage to the wing structure and thrust reverser. This AD requires a one-time detailed visual inspection for discrepancies in the Krueger flap bullnose attachment hardware, and related investigative and corrective actions, if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.



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ATA 53 Fuselage - Skin Chem-milled Steps - Inspection / Repair


Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1232, Revision 3, dated July 27, 2015.

Reason: AD 2008-12-04 required various repetitive inspections to detect cracks along the chem-milled steps of the fuselage skin, and to detect missing or loose fasteners in the area of a certain preventive modification or repairs; replacement of the time-limited repair with a permanent repair, if applicable; and applicable corrective actions which would end certain repetitive inspections. This AD reduces the post-modification inspection compliance times, limits installation of the preventive modification to airplanes with fewer than 30,000 total flight cycles, and adds repetitive inspections for modified airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) that indicated that the upper skin panel at the chem-milled step above the lap joint is subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD) if the modification was installed after 30,000 total flight cycles. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.


ATA 34 Navigation - Nose-Up Pitch Trim Limit and Associated Warning - Replacement / Relocation


Applicability

This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-700 and -700C series airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this AD, certificated in any category, except for airplanes on which winglets are installed as specified in Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00830SE, Amendment dated on or after April 21, 2015. (1) Airplanes having STC ST00830SE installed (Aviation Partners Boeing blended winglets), as identified in Aviation Partners Boeing Service Bulletin AP737-27-002, Revision 4, dated April 24, 2017. (2) Airplanes identified in Boeing Alert



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Cont’d Service Bulletin 737-27A1306, dated September 10, 2015, as revised by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1306, Revision 1, dated December 14, 2016. (3) Airplanes identified in Aviation Partners Boeing Service Bulletin AP737-34-005, dated July 17, 2015.

Reason: This AD was prompted by a report that, for certain airplanes, the nose-up pitch trim limit and associated warning will allow the horizontal stabilizer position to be set outside acceptable limits for a mis-trimmed takeoff condition. This AD requires, depending on airplane configuration, replacing certain pitch trim light plates, relocating certain position warning horn switches, revising certain software, removing a certain placard, and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

2. 737 NG UK Maintenance Related MOR’s

The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the

information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated.

“No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of the organisation without the express permission in writing of the Civil Aviation Authority Safety Data Office.”

ATA 27 Control restriction in roll.

On final approach after taking out the autopilot, a restriction in roll was felt when trying to apply more than about 6 units of left aileron. It was possible to "push through" the restriction but it remained present throughout the approach and landing until taxi speed when it cleared. Tech log entry made and engineer called. CAA Closure: Investigation Findings and Root Cause: All function tests performed during troubleshooting did not identify any faults within the system. Due to the intermittent nature of the defect, the Feel Centring Unit was inspected and found with slight wear and lower spring loose. Both springs replaced and tested. Remedial Action(s) Taken: Reliability have rolled out a replacement programme of the aileron feel and centring unit cam follower bearings and is being tracked within AMOS.

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ATA 27 T/E Electrical Motor Failure.

During Operation Test of T/E Alternate Flap Drive Electrical Motor Per AMM 27-51-00-720-803 the Electrical Motor failed to operate. Suspected Electrical Motor Clutch Failure. Flap Bypass Valve checked OK as Per AMM 27-51-02-720-801.T/E Alternate Flap Drive Electrical Motor replaced and tested Satisfactory. Supplementary 30/06/17: Inconclusive, alternate flap system tested satisfactory 3 months prior to the failure. Its considered that the long term storage of the aircraft and infrequent use of the alternate flap system may have been contributing factors to the failure of the electrical drive motor. Long Term Storage Effects on Electric Motors: When stored for long a period before start up, electric motors are exposed to external influences, such as temperature variations, humidity, aggressive agents, etc. As a result of long term storage, the insulation resistance of the winding may decrease, bearings and machine parts may rust and properties of any lubricant may change. All these factors increase the risk of damage or failure on start up.

ATA 32 Foreign Object Debris located inside the OLEO of a RH MLG Assembly.

In early 2017 this 737 NG Ship Set undercarriage assembly (NLG x 1 & MLG x 2) was repaired by ****The original **** customer was *****. The undercarriage set was sent onto Fokker in Holland and fitted to an aircraft for one flight (cycle) to allow the aircraft to be flown to its own maintenance base. ****** eventually leased the gears onto *****. In March 2017 ***** contacted ******** to advise them that the MLG s were leaking during static test. ******* Informed ***** and ******** that the temporary owner of the landing gear would arrange for *** to send engineers to replace the seals. An email from ******* to *******, ******** and **** suggested that the seals did not require changing at that time, but to check 7 days later. After this, at some point it was decided that the seals did in fact need to be replaced, and *** were asked to supply 2 off Carrier s PT/No ****** along with a set of seals to ****** so that they could carry out the replacement of the carriers and seals. On return of the gears to **** this June, ****** original decision was to overhaul as they had a buyer for the set. This deal fell through and the decision was taken to test & inspect ONLY. The test was carried out IAW the Component Maintenance Manual, and passed without any issues. Shortly after the test, ***** found another buyer and a new PO was sent through for overhaul. It was during the stripping of the RH Main Outer Cylinder from the Inner Cylinder that the evidence of foreign debris was discovered. We ascertain that the foreign debris was pushed up into the Support Tube to prevent any potential FOD from entering the Outer Cylinder during the Carrier & seal change. Once the Carrier and seals were changed then the Outer Cylinder would be lowered back on to the Inner Cylinder. After further investigation, it was confirmed that the carrier shown in the photos is in fact one of the two (Serial Numbers ********) sent to ***** to allow them to carry out the Carrier and seal change themselves. The LH MLG has also been stripped with NO FOD found. ***** and ****** to be informed. Conclusions If the foreign debris had not been discovered, this potentially could have caused the landing gear to fail (hard landing). Corrective actions Strip the MLG totally and carry out a full clean & inspection procedure.

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ATA 57 During walk round inspection it was noted that a cover plate was missing from L/H O/B main flap at O/B aft flap O/B program track.

During walk round inspection it was noted that a cover plate was missing from L/H O/B main flap at O/B aft flap O/B program track. For details see CMM ref 57-53-07, IPL fig 1, item 316. The missing part is partially obscured by a blade seal fitted to the O/B edge of the O/B aft flap, and it is not immediately obvious that the part is missing, due to the attachment holes being fully obscured by the aforementioned seal. A comparison check with the opposite side was necessary to confirm that the cover plate was, in fact, missing. There is no evidence to suggest that a cover plate has ever been installed at this location, i.e. no witness marks, paint discolouration or fretting associated with a loose component. On fitment of a replacement part, rundown torque on both anchor nuts was found to be satisfactory. It is suspected that the part has been missing since delivery of the aircraft, having flown only 418 cycles at time of discovery. This submitted report has been risk assessed with a severity of N/A. Due to being related to 0 other events, has a frequency of 0.0 (N/A) and an overall ERC risk score of 0. As this is a Green risk it can be logged for statistics.

Supplementary 17/07/17:

From a review of the photographs taken during the aircraft delivery inspection, it would appear that the subject panel is installed during production. Therefore, it cannot be confirmed at which point in time the panel was lost from the aircraft structure, and also the cause of the loss.

ATA 27 Rudder restriction felt with far right rudder. Lower fwd screw on pedal shroud found incorrectly installed.

A/C on arrival back into LBA. With captains rudder pedals adjusted fully Fwd, rudder restriction felt with far right rudder. No restriction when adjusted slightly aft. Lower fwd screw on pedal shroud found incorrectly installed. Screw replaced and refitted in correct orientation. During invest, F/O's rudder pedal top cover found incorrectly assembled, subsequently reassembled IAW AMM. With Captains rudder pedals adjusted the fully Fwd position, the Capt. right rudder pedals were found to be making contact with the panel during full and free checks. On investigation it was found that clip nuts had been used instead of loose nuts, causing the panel to stand slightly proud. The clip nuts have been removed and the correct nuts have now been fitted. This defect is only apparent with the pedals in the most Fwd position, if the pedals are wound slightly back they do not catch during the full range of movement.

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ATA 32 Mechanical Failure of No3 Main Wheel.

On arrival to stand we were greeted by the dispatcher who informed us that one of our wheels was a funny shape. We carried out on inspection to find that the No3 main wheel had completely deflated, operations were informed and the line maintenance provider was called The maintenance engineer arrived after a short time and confirmed that they did not stock this type of wheel and he would-be surprised if any other maintenance provider in FCO would stock this type of wheel due to it being of an uncommon size. Six of the wheel assembly bolts had completely sheared off. I then decided to inform ATC of the possibility of the presence of the sheared bolts on the active runway and I advised a runway and taxiway inspection.

CAA Closure:

Investigation Findings: Six of the wheel assembly bolts had completely sheared off. It could not be categorically determined what torque settings had been used in the construction of the wheel. It could not be determined what tooling had been used or calibration status at the time of fitting. It is possible that torque settings were incorrect and caused the wheel to split, resulting in a tyre deflation. Root Cause: The Type Certificate Holder advised some possible causes: • FATIGUE INITIATING FROM CORROSION PITS: Many bolts we examine have fatigue fractures that are found to have initiated from corrosion pits. Typically, these bolts are found to have visible corrosion pits in many locations on the bolt shank and threads. • PURE FATIGUE: Some of the broken bolts Boeing has examined have fractured as a result of pure fatigue. This is a more difficult problem to resolve since the bolts would likely have passed NDT checks at the previous installation. WHEEL MATING FACE FLATNESS: There is mounting evidence that the flatness and condition of the mating surfaces of the wheel halves highly influences tie bolt life. One theory is that the mating faces on the wheel halves wear in such a way that the faces become uneven or tapered. This puts the bolt in a bending mode when tightened, thereby dramatically reducing bolt fatigue life. • POOR MAINTENANCE TECHNIQUES: Poor maintenance techniques such as incorrect torqueing procedure, incorrect washer orientation, inadequate lubrication, inadequate component inspection, etc. have led to bolt fractures. • BOLT MANUFACTURING DEFECTS: In a few cases, it has been found that a batch of bolts or nuts had a manufacturing problem that led to fractures. However, this appears to be very rare since metallurgical analysis of damaged bolts rarely finds problems with material or heat treat. Remedial Action(s) Taken: RH main gear inbd and outbd main wheels replaced IAW AMM 32-45-11. The aircraft was returned to service following a visual inspection of the condition of tie bolts during the routine daily inspection on both sets of main wheels. All were found to be intact. The wheel assembly overhaul supplier was changed with immediate effect. In future all bolts (both old and new) will have Mag particle NDT carried out on them, prior to installation. Engineers advise ongoing monitoring during operation has begun with immediate effect. Contracted CAMO added a requirement to the aircraft Daily Check Form in the Exterior section, Item 3 (Check main and Nose Landing gear tyres and wheels), to: “Visually inspect (as far as possible and with hub caps in situ) wheel tie bolts for security and condition” Daily Inspection Form in use now annotated with the above statement and distributed to all relevant parties.

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ATA 79 Rubber seals on the chip detector were damaged.

During turnaround I performed the walk round with no defects found. Approx 50 minutes later, just after all doors were closed, the dispatcher contacted us via interphone to inform us that liquid was now dripping from the #2 engine. I inspected the engine and found what appeared to be engine oil dripping from the chip detector access panel. OCC/Maintrol were contacted and arranged for engineers to attend. They found that the two rubber seals on the chip detector were damaged. One was cut through and the other was partly shaved. It was noted in the Tech log that a chip detector inspection had been performed the previous night in GLA. Pax were kept informed and after approx 1:30 when it was clear that spares were not available in FAO the pax were returned to the terminal to await a replacement aircraft.

Supplementary 17/08/2017 :

Analysis / follow up: On 02 August 2017, the following report was raised with the title - ""Air Safety Report - reported by Flight Crew member"" related to registration ****. This occurred in Faro Airport(FAO). During turnaround I performed the walk round with no defects found. Approx 50 minutes later, Just after all doors were closed, the dispatcher contacted us via interphone to inform us that liquid was now dripping from the #2 engine. I inspected the engine and found what appeared to be engine oil dripping from the chip detector access panel. OCC/Maintrol were contacted and arranged for LSI engineers to attend. They found that the two rubber seals on the chip detector were damaged. One was cut through and the other was partly shaved. It was noted in the tech log that a chip detector inspection had been performed the previous night in GLA. Pax were kept informed and after approx 1:30 when it was clear that spares were not available in FAO the pax were returned to the terminal to await a replacement aircraft. Root Cause: Reviewing the maintenance history of the #2 engine on *****(ESN *****), it is apparent that the Magnetic Chip Detectors (MCDs) were inspected in the early hours of the 2nd August, the leak was then detected later that same day. As the engine was not reported to be leaking oil prior to the MCD inspection, this would suggest an issue was introduced during re-installation of the MCDs. It is impossible to determine conclusively, but it is possible to damage the O Rings (seals) during installation, if the MCD is not properly aligned, and this is considered the most likely cause. Preventative Controls: There are 2 seals installed on the MCD, one 'D-Shaped' seal and one 'Packing' seal. In this instance both were found damaged. The AMM task for the MCD re-installation allows re-installation of the original 'D-Shaped' seal provided it is inspected for tears, cuts, or other damage prior to installation. If any damage is found then a new seal must be installed. As there was no mention of an oil leak prior to the MCD inspection and a new 'Packing' seal should have been installed, it is a fair assumption that the seals were in a good condition prior to re-installation of the MCD. Whilst the AMM doesn't specifically mention it, it is company policy to perform an independent inspection following installation of the MCD to ensure it has been performed correctly. Looking at the work card, this second inspection was signed for on this occasion. Note it would not be possible to see if the seals were damaged during this independent inspection. Importantly, neither the AMM task or the associated Boeing Task Card instruct that an engine ground run is performed to check for leaks post installation. It is likely that the oil leak would have been evident during an engine run, even at idle power. In conclusion, Power plant’s recommendation to reduce the likelihood of a similar situation happening again, is to ensure

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an idle leak check ground run is performed per AMM Task 71-00-00-700-801-F00 after all MCD installations. If this recommendation is considered acceptable, Power plant will investigate adding this requirement to the AMM/Boeing Task card."

ATA 28 Fuel venting over right wing.

During normal refuelling from third party fuel supplier, A/c began leaking fuel from the RH wing at the tank access panel inboard of the surge tank NACA vent. Fuelling was stopped and 600Kg of fuel was transferred from the right wing into the centre tank, until the leak stopped. The panel was removed and its seal was found in a badly damaged condition, with clear fold lines and screw hole damage consistent with incorrect fitment. The seal was replaced and the panel refitted correctly, fuel was then pumped back from the centre tank to fill the RH main tank with no further leaks apparent.

ATA 27 FOD found on runway from aircraft maintenance.

During a routine runway inspection at approximately 09:00 UTC, the rangers came across an item laying on the runway in Block 9 (near LR RET ) The item was retrieved & having spoken to a based airline engineering company was identified by its part number. Part No. **** is noted to be a Position Assy & is part of the *** Rigging Equipment used to rig the ground spoiler interlock system without jacking. The engineering company subsequently contacted airfield ops & advised that the piece had been in use on one of their aircraft over night. The aircraft in question had departed from Stansted at 07:05 UTC that morning (approximately 2 hours prior to the inspection.) The previous FOD / bird inspection had been undertaken by Ranger 1 entering the runway at 05:59 & completed at 06:36 UTC. The full inspection also undertaken by Ranger 1 had commenced at 08:16 & completed at 09:10 UTC.

ATA 35 Passenger oxygen drop solenoid body was loose with screws missing.

During replacement of PSU PCB on PSU 19 abc (work order *****) it was found that the passenger oxygen drop solenoid body was not screwed down or secured, screws missing. A defect was raised and screws ordered to install and secure solenoid. An inspection on all other PSUs was carried out, we did not find any other PSUs with this issue.

ATA 80 Engine start valve issues on nr 2 engine..

On pushback at LGW when trying to start No2 engine, there was no engine shaft rotation observed after moving Start Selector to GRD. Start selector moved back to GRD as there was no applicable NNC for this event and the ground crew were retained. We checked all Before Start Procedure and Engine Start Procedure selections and all appeared normal. We made second attempt but again no rotation so Start Selector returned to GRD. We contacted MAINTROL by phone and were informed that this had happened on the previous rotation but on the third attempt the engine had started. We made a third attempt and after 1m30s

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engine shaft rotation then began followed by a normal engine start. MAINTROL advised us that after this had happened on the previous rotation the plan had been to replace the Engine Start Valve prior to dispatch from LGW; which had clearly not happened. There were no ATL entries to advise of this situation so it could not have been anticipated. After successful engine Start, we agreed with MAINTROL to fly to SKG on the proviso that Engineering assistance would be available for manual engine Start Valve operation in case of recurrence. Very busy turnaround in SKG liaising with engineers and ground crew to arrange manual Start Valve operation in case of recurrence. Engineers then had issues engaging the crank tool into the manual valve operation socket. MAINTROL advised that the cowling would likely then have to be opened to align valve socket. It was also not obvious where the procedure for manual valve operation could be found but ultimately it was found in the DDG MEL 09.80.03. There were also problems in getting Flight Interphone to work reliably for communication during manual valve operation necessitating agreeing hand signals instead. In the end the engine started on first attempt and no manual valve operation was required. This report is submitted to highlight: With no ATL entry being made by either previous flight crew or engineering this whole situation could not have been anticipated by oncoming flight crew. It may be that without an ATL entry it was possibly missed that the valve replacement work was required. It is not obvious where to find the procedure for manual Start valve operation.

ATA 32 Incorrect maintenance action.

During my walk around I discovered that there was no airflow from the Equipment Cooling Automatic Flow Control Valve which is situated underneath the forward fuselage just aft of the nose gear. I contacted Maintrol to discuss the problem and they agreed to send an engineer to stand. An engineer arrived and the defect was pointed out to him, by this time we had already consulted the MEL, this was handed to the engineer who agreed that this was the issue (MEL 21-40). The engineer requested that I ask Maintrol to send him (AMM 21-00-00/901) and (AMM 32-09-00) so that he may carry out his maintenance procedure, I asked him whether he wanted to take the MEL to which he refused. Whilst this was being undertaken by the engineer, both the first officer and I were discussing the aforementioned procedure detailed in the MEL. It seemed to us that we would be flying the aircraft back with a different configuration on the pressurisation panel (see MEL 21-40) one pack switch to high & right Re-circ fan off. Once the engineer had completed the maintenance procedure I questioned whether returning the pack to normal and the re-circ fan to auto was the correct configuration for the return flight. His response was absolute in that we were to fly the aircraft back in a standard configuration. He stated that the positioning of the switches in the maintenance procedure were in order for him to position the overboard exhaust valve into the smoke position only. Notwithstanding the fact that the maintenance procedure does not detail this, I took the engineer at his word. The operational procedure in the MEL does not make reference to operating with the non-standard configuration. During the flight back to the UK we had an issue with setting an acceptable temperature both in the cabin and the flight deck. This resulted in an unusually low setting of the temperature selectors on the overhead panel. Our thoughts on this were that there was most likely blocked temp sensors in the cabin, something which we both had experienced before. It was noted on the outbound sector that the temperature selectors were having to be set cooler to maintain temperature although not to the extent during the return leg. Whilst conducting a VNAV

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descent through FL300 the auto throttle increased thrust to maintain speed, we felt a pressure bump in our ears and noticed a rate of descent momentarily up 3000fpm followed quickly by a climb to 500fpm on the cabin climb indicator. There was no unusual duct pressure indication. Parameters returned to normal very quickly however a smaller pressure bump was felt shortly afterward so I requested the first officer descend in LVL CHG. From then on cabin pressure remained as normal, VNAV was again selected with thrust increase and ROD was stable at 500fpm for the remainder of the cabins descent. After landing I contacted Maintrol to discuss the issues. Initially it was agreed that the pressure bumps we felt were most likely due to the flow control valve being locked open. As a consequence of this phone call both Maintrol and I agreed that a tech log entry was not required. During the phone call I brought up the fact that I had to question the engineer about the return configuration of the pressurisation panel and subsequently asked Maintrol on their thoughts. They were of the opinion that the maintenance procedure did not detail the switching back to a standard configuration. This suggested that the aircraft had returned with the pressurisation panel set in the wrong configuration for dispatch. With hindsight I should have contacted Maintrol before our departure regarding the correct configuration for the pressurisation panel, I trusted the station engineer’s judgement regarding his interpretation of the maintenance procedure and the AMM. As a result of this the aircraft dispatched with an incorrect configuration.

ATA 32 Brake unit broken up and unable to remove from wheel assy.

The #2 main wheel tyre assy was worn to limits and needed to be replaced. The U/S wheel could not be removed from the brake unit. On further inspection the second rotor assy of the brake unit had broken up and was causing the problem. The brake unit had to be removed still attached to the wheel assy. New wheel and brake unit assys fitted.

ATA29 Fluid leak from Nr1 Engine.

Before push back a fluid leak was noticed by the ground crew coming from nr1 Eng. The leak was traced to the no1 Eng EDP case drain filter bowl. Specifically the seal backup ring was deformed preventing the correct sealing of the bowl to body. Seal, backup rings and filter were replaced. EGR was carried out with no further leaks. This resulted in an aircraft AOG situation with over a 2hr delay to the route.

Supplementary 12/10/17:

Hyd leak coming from EDP case drain filter. Case drain filter bowl back up ring found deformed. Filter, backup rings and seal replaced IAW AMM.

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ATA27 Malfunction of emergency/backup flight control system.

During scheduled Flight Data recorder test and download, AMM test 27-51-00-860-802 carried out. Alternate Trailing edge flaps failed to operate with associated tripped circuit breaker P6-2 D13. Troubleshooting iaw FIM 21-51 task 837 identified failure of Flap electric motor M339. Flap Electric motor replaced and tested on w/o.

ATA32 No.1 Main wheel tie bolt missing with corresponding damage to LH wing, inboard aft flap and no.1 brake unit.

On arrival to BHX, a/c was found to have tie bolt missing from no.1 main wheel. Further investigation found that the tie bolt had punctured the left-hand wing, inboard aft flap and damaged the no.1 brake unit. This caused the aircraft to become AOG.

Supplementary 09/11/2017 :

Assessment c/o - puncture Dia of 0.62"", dent 1.69"" x 1.49"" w/ depth 0.06"" ref SRM 57-53-01-1a-2 out of limits. Knsi rad granted. 277-rad-001-0.r. Speed tape applied and d&b item 8 entered as per WO *****. No.1 main wheel replaced IAW AMM 32-45-11 rev 64. Brake unit Insp c/o IAW AMM 32-41-41-700-803. Brake unit cx required See next entry. Brake unit: Ref w/o ***** #1 brake unit to be replaced due damage from tie bolt shearing. No.1 brake unit replaced IAW AMM 32-41-41/401 rev 64 satis."

ATA29 Incorrect hydraulic oil filter installed.

During **** 6 YR Heavy Check in Hangar 61, it has been reported that 4 x Hydraulic Oil Filters were in a poor state. The removed Hydraulic Oil Filters were worn and the seals had expanded significantly. Upon review, it would appear that the incorrect filter kit may have been installed back in 2015. Ref Task Card ***** has been recorded as being used. This part number is not recognised in the 737NG IPC and it is believed that this is a 737 classic component. It is worth noting that there are currently QTY: x5 of P/N ***** in stock.

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3. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins

Information Bulletins can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

EASA SIB NM-17-17 Boeing 737, 757 and 767 Aeroplanes - B/E Aerospace Chemical Oxygen Generators

Introduction This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises registered owners and operators of The Boeing Company Model 737, 757, and 767 airplanes equipped with certain chemical oxygen generators manufactured by B/E Aerospace, Inc., of an airworthiness concern regarding potential failure of the oxygen system during an emergency situation. At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

FAA UPN2017-20170125002 & UPN2016-20160316004 Boeing Aeroplanes - Bushings manufactured by ESNA Aerospace (Fitz Manufacturing Ind.) sold by Wesco Aircraft

Introduction Boeing bushings, part numbers BACB28AK04-042, BACB28AK04-329, BACB28AK05-021, BACB28AK04-075, BACB28AT14B060C, BACB28T10B049C 9 used on Boeing models 727, 737, 747, 757, 767, 777, 787 sold by Wesco Aircraft that were manufactured by ESNA Aerospace.

Boeing bushings, part number BACB28AK07-465, sold by Wesco Aircraft and Fitz Aerospace

This notification advises all aircraft owners, operators, manufacturers, maintenance organizations, parts suppliers, and distributors of Boeing bushings manufactured by ESNA Aerospace and sold by Wesco Aircraft without Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) production approval.

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FAA NM17-10 Boeing 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777 Aeroplanes - Maintenance Practices

Introduction We have received numerous reports of corrosion damage to the aft fuselage structure in the area of the vacuum waste tanks on Model 777 airplanes. This corrosion has been attributed to insufficient clean up and neutralization of leakage and spillage from the vacuum waste system. These reports document that an initial finding of corrosion damage is often followed within the year by corrosion found in close proximity. The waste material from a vacuum waste system spill or leak is acidic and corrosive to the airplane structure, such as skin, stringers, and frames. The waste material erodes the corrosion inhibiting compound and the protective finishes, which causes areas of bare structure that are more susceptible to corrosion.

While the reports of corrosion have been limited to Model 777 airplanes, Boeing believes the Model 737, 747, 757, and 767 airplanes are subject to the same issue. To minimize and address this corrosion, Boeing is revising the related aircraft maintenance manuals (AMMs) and structural repair manuals (SRMs), as listed in Table 1 of this SAIB. The revisions include adding procedures for

neutralizing vacuum waste; defining the correct procedures for containing, cleaning, and neutralizing vacuum waste; and adding procedures for the inspection for and removal of corrosion, and re-application of protective coatings.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

4. Tony’s Top Ten Boeing 737-6/7/8/900 Gotcha’s !

No10. Make sure you use the 737-600/-700/-800/-900 Steering Lockout Pin.

Use Pin, A09003-1, or -2, because its diameter is larger than the lockout pin used on other 737 models. If another 737-model lockout pin is used, the pin will fit loosely and not lockout the steering bypass function, thus, it will be operational which can cause injuries to persons and damage equipment Please Refer AMM 09-11-00 ONLY USE THE CORRECT PIN FOR THE AIRPLANE MODEL. IF YOU USE AN INCORRECT PIN, THE HYDRAULIC STEERING CAN OPERATE. THIS CAN CAUSE INJURIES TO PERSONNEL AND DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

No9. Borescope plugs fitted in the incorrect ports causing engine damage

Please Refer AMM 72-00-00 -200-805 & AMM 72-00-00-200-811

MAKE SURE THAT THE BORESCOPE PLUGS ARE INSTALLED IN THE CORRECT PORT LOCATIONS. ENGINE DAMAGE CAN OCCUR IF A BORESCOPE PLUG IS NOT INSTALLED IN THE CORRECT LOCATION.

(1) Do these steps to install the borescope plugs:

NOTE: The borescope plugs of the LPT stage one and combustor case have the same thread

size. The stem of the borescope plug to the LPT stage one nozzle will burn away if you

install it in the borescope port of the combustion chamber.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

No8. Incorrect DEU part number fitted causing inflight display discrepancies

Please Refer AMM 31-62-21

NOTE: Different part numbers for DEU-1 and DEU-2 may require different software part numbers. See the notes for the applicable DEU part number(s) in the Illustrated Parts Catalogue (IPC).

Software for the Display Electronic Unit is usually pre-loaded by the OEM. There needs to be

verification that the software is configured correctly.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

No7. Use of CBs to deactivate pressurisation controllers after an 'autofail'

Please Refer AMM Part 1 21-30-00

There are two digital cabin pressure controllers (CPCs). Each CPC has its own systems interface and valve motor system. This gives the automatic mode of control a dual redundant architecture. Only one CPC controls the outflow valve at any time. The other CPC is a backup. The active controller changes for every flight or when the CPC in control has an autofail event.

The CPCs are a part of a dual redundant system. They are active when the system operates in the automatic mode. Only one CPC operates the outflow valve at a time. The other CPC is the standby.

Single Auto Fail

The system automatically changes the pressurization control to the non-active controller if the active

controller fails. The indication for an auto fail condition of the non-active controller is the same.

If the system is in the automatic mode when an auto fail condition occurs, these lights come on:

- Amber AUTO FAIL light

- MASTER CAUTION and AIR COND annunciator lights

- Green ALTN light.

The ALTN light shows that one automatic system is active. The AUTO FAIL light goes off when you move the selector to the ALTN position.

Dual Auto Fail

These are the indications when the two automatic systems fail:

- The AUTO FAIL and MASTER CAUTION lights come on

- The FLT ALT and LAND ALT displays show five dashes (-----).

If the two CPCs fail, the ALTN light does not come on. This shows that the system cannot move the pressurization control to an operative automatic controller.

Prior to using CB’s to deactivate CPC’s without consultation of the FIM to establish the faulty CPC has resulted in inflight and down route failures.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

No6.Engine C (Thrust Reverser) duct collapsed on engineer working on engine core.

Please Refer AMM 78-31-00-000-802

WARNING

DO NOT OPEN THE THRUST REVERSER IN HIGH WINDS, IN SUDDEN WIND CONDITIONS, OR IF THE WIND VELOCITY IS MORE THAN 40 KNOTS.IF YOU DO NOT OBEY THESE INSTRUCTIONS, INJURY TO PERSONS ANDDAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR.

WARNING

DO NOT GO OR PUT A PART OF YOUR BODY BETWEEN THE ENGINE AND THE THRUST REVERSER UNLESS THE OPENING ACTUATOR SAFETY LOCK IS INSTALLED. IF THE THRUST REVERSER SUDDENLY CLOSES, INJURY TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR.

WARNING

DO NOT BE OR PUT A PART OF YOUR BODY IN THE PATH OF THE THRUST REVERSER WHILE YOU OPEN THE THRUST REVERSER. INJURY TO PERSONS OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT CAN OCCUR IF THE THRUSTREVERSER SUDDENLY CLOSE

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

No5.Ailerons incorrectly rigged following routine cable tension check/adjustment.

Please refer to AMM 27-11-00/501

Before you do cable adjustment, permit a minimum of one hour at a constant ambient temperature of ±5°F (±2.8°C) for the airframe temperature to become stable. The cable tension values will not be correct when there are temperature differences along the cable run.

For the new aileron wing control cables, reinspection/readjustment of the new cables' tension must be done within 7-9 days. Further inspection/adjustment should be accomplished within 6 to 9 months of the last cable tension inspection.

Note: The split scimitar winglet (SSW) configuration changes some of the aileron rigging characteristics and instructions. Refer to the 737-700 AMM supplement for airplanes operating in an SSW configuration. Refer to the 737-800 AMM supplements for additional aileron maintenance requirements for airplanes operating in an SSW configuration.

No4. E+E rack connectors (Raychem) damaged during wiring checks causing numerous intermittent inflight system failures.

Please Refer AMM 20-10-07-400-801

DO NOT TOUCH THE E/E BOX BEFORE YOU DO THE PROCEDURE FOR DEVICES THAT ARE SENSITIVE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE. ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE E/E BOX.

CAUTION

MAKE SURE THE ELECTRICAL PINS AND CONTACTS ON THE E/E BOX CONNECTOR AND TRAY CONNECTOR ARE NOT BENT OR DAMAGED. INSTALLATION OF THE E/E BOX WITH DAMAGED

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

PINS OR CONTACTS CANCAUSE DAMAGE TO THE E/E BOX, THE TRAY ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR, OR THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS.

During troubleshooting, the use of breakout wires with incorrect pins/sockets in Raychem connectors has resulted in permanent damage to the installed connector pin/socket, resulting in loose/poor connection to the LRU

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

No3. Interchangeability of crew O2 cylinder - change of Weight & Balance required.

Please Refer AMM 12-15-21

If there was a replacement between a steel and composite oxygen cylinder-there is a weight difference of approximately 15 pounds between a steel and composite oxygen cylinder.

A weight and balance change needs to be recorded for the aircraft.

No2. Standby pump CBs left tripped - hidden in P92


Power Distribution Panel (PDP) Number 2, P92

NOTE: The Standby Hydraulic Pump circuit breaker is located behind the P92 front panel

chrisi

Callout

CB in P92

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

No1. Manual Landing gear extension, door microswitch damaged during cleaning – Landing Gear fails to retract after take-off!


There is an access door to the manual extension control mechanism handles. The access door has a position switch on it. When the door is open, the switch closes.

This sends a signal to the alternate extend solenoid valve in the landing gear selector valve. This moves the bypass valve in the landing gear selector valve. It connects all the hydraulic components in the landing gear extension and retraction system to the hydraulic system return.

- END -

Documents

Boeing 737 NG ENGINEERING CONTINUATION …cbt.altitudeglobal.aero/Files/Boeing 737 NG Q3 Q4 2017 R3.pdf · The Boeing Company Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model