British Airways (BA): Economic Issues英航案：经济学问题China Antimonopoly forum, Shanghai, 9 November, 2012 中国反垄断论坛 .上海 . 2012.11.9

Derek Ridyard, Partner, RBB Economics LLP, London

derek.ridyard@rbbecon.com

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The BA case: form v effects-based approaches英航案：形式分析和效果分析

Form (or rules) based approach

形式（法律）分析Effects (economic) approach 效果（经济）分析

Does BA account for >40% of the airline

ticketing business of UK travel agents?

BA在英国旅行公司出售飞机票市场上的份额超过 40%了吗？

Does BA face effective rivalry/competition

from other airlines, both in and outside UK?

BA面临着英国境内外航空公司的有效竞争吗？

Have BA travel agent rebates succeeded

in defending BA share above what it

would otherwise have been? BA的折扣制度是否让它竞争中过的了非常规的成功？

Have BA rebates foreclosed effective rivalry

from other airlines within and outside the UK?

BA折扣行为是否排除了来自英国境内外航空公司的有效竞争？

Do BA rebates result in price differences

that cannot be explained by cost

differences – i.e. price discrimination? BA

的折扣是否不能通过成本差异进行解释，也即是否是歧视？

Is the differentiation in BA ticket prices

caused by the rebates explicable in terms of

legitimate commercial objectives by BA?

折扣所造成的机票价格的差异背后是否存在合法的商业目的？

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The importance of a clear theory of harm竞争损害理论的重要性

Competition law intervention can change the way a market works, and fundamentally affect economic incentives 竞争法的干预可以改变市场运作方式，并且能根本性影响经济动机。

Bork’s “Antitrust paradox” – competition laws assume that competitive markets provide efficient outcomes, but then use government intervention to adjust those outcomes, and penalise winners 博克的“反垄断悖论”—竞争法假设竞争性市场提供了有效率的产出，但是又通过政府干预调整这些产出并惩罚获胜者。

Complainants have clear incentives to use competition laws to protect them from competition – can’t assume their interests align with those of consumers 原告们有着明确的动机：用竞争法使他们在竞争中得到保护—但是不能假设他们的利益和消费者利益具有直接的联系。

Of course, valid competition law interventions do exist, but they need to be clearly based on – and justified by – a valid theory of competitive harm 当然，有效的竞争法干预的确存在，但是它需要清晰地建立在正当的竞争性损害理论之上并为之调整。

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Roll-back rebates – foreclosure theory of harm反向折扣——排挤损害竞争

The BA case concerned the incentives BA paid to UK travel agents when selling airline tickets 英航案关注的是英航在销售机票时给旅行公司付费的动机

BA was by far the largest UK airline, and so it was the most important airline customer for travel agent - about 40% of the agent’s air tickets were BA 英航是英国最大的航空公司，因此也是旅游公司最重要的航空客户，他们大约 40%的航空机票来自英航。

BA had incentive deals to encourage the agent to choose BA over rival airlines, e.g. 英航从销售额度上鼓励旅行公司选择自己的机票而不是他人的机票，例如

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Roll-back rebates – foreclosure theory of harm反向折扣——排挤损害竞争– 10% base rate travel agent commission on BA sales 给旅游公司英航销售额 10%的折扣

– But 11% on all tickets if the travel agent sold more than (say) 1000 BA tickets 如果旅游公司销售 BA公司机票超过 1000张，则返还全部票款的 11%

– Key feature is that higher commission rate applied across all tickets sold, so potentially powerful incentives for agent to favour BA 关键在于更高的退款率适用于全部机票，因此促使旅游公司更乐意选择英航。

BA scheme thus amounted to a kind of “roll-back” rebate scheme 英航策略就此相当于一种“反向”折扣

Concern was that the incentives to sell more BA tickets would prevent rival airlines – including Virgin – from gaining sales, thus strengthening BA’s UK market leadership 关注点在于估计销售更多英航的机票阻碍其他航空公司的机票销售，并因此增强英航的领先地位。

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K R

IDY

AR

D

Illustrative roll-back rebate scheme 反向折扣的说明

100

Cu

sto

mer

’s

Exp

end

itu

re

Domco variable Cost

Purchases100

Cu

sto

mer

’s

Exp

end

itu

re客

户的

支出

Domco’s Cost (€0.50 per unit)Domco 的成本

（每单位€ 0.50 ）

Purchases购货

Price €1 per unit for first 99 units 前99单位每单位€ 1

Then €0.90 per unit if sales之后如果继续销售每单位€0.90

Customer gains cash rebate of €9 with 100th unit 每销售 100个客户获得 9英镑

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DE

RE

K R

IDY

AR

D Analysing incentive effects 激励措施的效果分析C

ust

om

er’s

Exp

end

itu

re客

户客

户支

出

APurchases购货

100

X

Y

C

B

DomcoCost

Domco 的成本

€9 rebate

€9 折扣

From point X, additional units cost customer nothing 从 X开始，额外销售不增加客户的成本

At point Y, marginal price is negative在 Y点，边际价格是负的

90

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The competitor’s perspective 竞争者的观点

Total Sales

Price (€)

价格

0.90

Competitor Sales

竞争对手的销售额

Domco Sales

Domco 的销售额

0.50 Cost

成本

Total sales

销售总额

1000

C

B

A

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The Court’s criticism of BA conduct 法院对 BA行为的评判

BA incentives were not cost justified BA的动机不具备成本合理性

BA scheme meant that BA enjoyed higher market share than it would otherwise have achieved 英航折扣制度意味着英航能够获得正常不能得到的市场份额

BA scheme was designed to achieve customer loyalty 英航折扣旨在赢得客户的忠诚

But none of these distinguishes competitive from anti-competitive conduct 但是所有这些并没有将促进竞争的行为与限制竞争行为区别开来

And none provides useful compliance guidance for other dominant firms 也没有给其他具有支配地位的公司提供有用的合规性指导。

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Problems with the BA case (and others) 英航案件（以及其他案件）的问题

Could rebate schemes of the kind operated by BA foreclose rivals? Clearly YES 英航的“折扣”策略能排除竞争对手吗？很明显能够。

But given the actual operation of schemes and market context, DID BA UK travel agent incentives foreclose competitors?但是考虑到计划的实际操作和市场环境，英航的英国旅游公司会不会被鼓励去排除竞争对手 ?– BA continued to face competition from international rivals (Air France,

United Airlines, Lufthansa, etc) 英航继续面对来自国际对手的竞争（法国航空公司、美国航空公司、德国汉莎航空公司等等）

– Many of these airlines enjoyed similar position to BA in domestic markets许多航空公司在国内市场享有和英航类似的地位

– All were able to operate their own incentive schemes to travel agents both in the UK and elsewhere在英国和其他地方，它们都能够对旅行社实施自己的激励政策 ,

– Even amongst UK-based carriers, Virgin Atlantic steadily gained share throughout period at BA’s expense 甚至在英国的航空公司中，维珍大西洋航空公司正在稳步的抢夺英航的市场份额。

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Problems with the BA case (and others) 英航案件（以及其他案件）的问题

Effects-based approach requires simple test:效果分析方法只要需要进行很简单的测试 :– Theory of harm is foreclosure of competing airlines 对竞争的损害是对排除竞争的航空公司

– BA plainly did not foreclose rivals 英航显然并没有排除竞争对手

– So the theory of harm against BA’s travel agent rebates should be rejected. 因此不应该认为英航行为对旅行公司进行折扣的行为具有损害竞争的效果

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The case for effects-based enforcement 案件的执行效果

Effects-based enforcement driven by clear theory of harm效果分析方法是要认定明确的损害竞争的效果Is capable of identifying abuses and dealing with them 也能够认定滥用并对之进行处理 Reduces scope for false convictions – hence interventions that

protect competitors without making markets more competitive 减少错误判断，因此减少那些只保护竞争者却不能是市场竞争更为激烈的措施

Avoids clear anomalies of rule-based enforcement 避免明显的形式分析所产生的错误

Ensures competition law interventions – in this case constraints on firms competing on price – are limited to instances where clear market failure exists 确保竞争法只干预（限制经营者进行价格竞争）市场明显失灵的情形

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