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Authors: E. Gyimah-Boadi, Kojo P. Asante, Victor Brobbey, George Ofosu

Institution: Ghana Center for Democratic Development

Address: 95 Nortei Ababio Loop, North Airport Residential AreaAccra, Ghana

E-mail: gyimah@cddghana.org, kasante@cddghana.org,vbrobbey@cddghana.org, george@cddghana.org

Telephone: T: +233-302-776142, F: +233-302-763028/9

Achieving successful governance in Africa: the case ofGhanas Commission on Human Rights and Administrative

Justice

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AbstractSince its creation in 1992, the Ghana Commission on Human Rights and Administrative

Justice (CHRAJ) has emerged as a highly respected and effective institution, with a reputation for

strong commitment to its various roles, and a willingness to challenge the power of government

when necessary. It is also unusual amongst Human Rights Commissions in that it has taken its

work to the grass roots, dealing with complaints and offering a dispute mediation service at the

local level through its network of District offices throughout the country. These disputes aresettled using an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) approach which is very popular and

appeals to local understandings of justice and fairness.

Using survey data, ethnographic observation, and in-depth focus group discussions with

senior and mid-level staff at CHRAJ, we argue that explanations for the success of the CHRAJ

can be found in its hybrid character; it combines the positive elements from its position as a

national, state-funded, constitutionally protected body with a strong organisational culture and

an ability to work informally and responsively with local cultures. Thus, as a national institution

it benefits from an organisational structure and management which sustains the professionalism

and commitment of its staff. This commitment is itself a product of both the professional training

and the strongly held values of most of its staff, which have produced a powerful organisational

culture in which honesty, public service and promotion of human rights are values which are

constantly reinforced from the top down through all levels. Its leadership also managed to use itsconstitutional position to maintain its autonomy from political interference right from the outset.

These aspects of its character as a national formal organisation have been successfully

combined with the informality of its local level dispute mediations, which offer free and impartial

settlement of a wide range of issues, particularly those relating to the position of women and

children. The ADR approach of its officers, strictly sustained through good training, focuses on

compromise settlements and attempts to base itself on what the parties themselves consider to be

fair whilst maintaining the values of human rights principles. But in situations where there is

conflict between universal and legal principles on the one hand, with local cultures or religious

beliefs on the other, officers attempt to negotiate in a sensitive manner.

Thus the organisation manages to combine the formal and the informal in a mutually supportive

way in contrast to many other African governance institutions.

Synopsis

Ghanas Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), has grown

into one of the better performing national human rights institutions in Africa. CHRAJ has

however been plagued, from its inception, by deep problems of poor institutional design. Its

three-part mandate (ombudsman, human rights body and anti-corruption agency) coupled with

chronic under-funding from Ghanas government has rendered the institution overstretched and,

as a result, some of the functions of CHRAJ have received less-than-adequate attention. The

Commission is also relatively weak because the legal status of its findings and resolutions are

unclear.

This paper is part of a research stream on public service delivery in Ghana. It draws on

research findings from the local justice delivery stream of the African Power, Politics, and

Policy (APPP) program to highlight the extraordinary success of CHRAJs mediation program. It

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also offers some suggestions for reforming CHRAJ in order to ensure that it becomes a more

effective pro-poor human rights institution. The conclusions reached include the following: (a)

the tripartite mandate of CHRAJ should be decoupled and pruned, i.e. the commission should

focus on delivering those services for which it is best equipped. (b) The CHRAJ mediation

process should also be strengthened to ensure that it delivers more of its pro-poor services. And

finally, (c) The decisions and findings of the CHRAJ mediation process should have the force of

law. The present situation where CHRAJ findings/resolutions have undetermined legal standing is

confusing and must be remedied to boost the legitimacy of the CHRAJ mediation process.

Human Rights in Ghana

The story of human rights protection in Ghana has mirrored much of the countrys

checkered political history. At the time of independence in 1957, Ghana inherited a Westminster-

style parliamentary democracy that emphasized limited government and the rule of law. The

independence constitution was also imbued with elaborate guarantees of individual liberties. This

period of constitutionalism was however short-lived. By 1960, Kwame Nkrumah and the

Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) scrapped the independence constitution and replaced it with

one that significantly expanded the powers of the executive branch. The Preventive Detention Act

of 1958 also gave Nkrumah unbridled powers to harass and imprison his political opponents on

the slightest provocation.1 Ghana ultimately became a one-party state with Nkrumah effectively

serving as President for Life in 1964.

The period of authoritarian single-party rule under Kwame Nkrumah ended with a joint

military and police coup dtat in February 1966. The coup however failed to restore either long-

term stability or democratic rule. The country subsequently went through decades of alternations

of power between progressively worse forms of military rule and equally inept and illiberal

civilian governments. However, even in the most enlightened and progressive periods of civilian

rule, there were several incidents that showed a lack of internalization of human rights norms.

The Busia government of 1969-1971 operated under the very liberal democratic Westminster type

constitution, and tolerated persistent and sometimes scathing public criticism from its political

opponents. But the human rights record of the Busia government was severely dented by the

crude enforcement of the Aliens Compliance Order in 1969 which rendered thousands of

undocumented non-Ghanaian West Africans and other long-term foreign residents of Ghana

stateless and forced the Nigerians among them to return to their home country then afflicted by a

1The Preventive Detention Actprovided for detention without trial for up to five years (later extended to 10 years).

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brutal civil war and the intensification of restrictions on Nkrumah-CPP politicians. Even the

government of Hilla Limann (1979-1981), which was largely benign, tolerated the activities of

so-called vigilantes attempting to enforce price controls.

The PNDC era (1982-1992) was unquestionably the most repressive period in Ghanas

post-independence history. This regime introduced and for the next 11 years presided over the so-

called popular revolution and a culture of silence featuring kangaroo trials, cruel and unusual

forms of punishment (such as making convicted and suspected offenders carry human excreta,

stripping citizens of their citizenship and banishing them from Ghana). Courts routinely imposed

penalties far in excess of the crime committed, subjecting suspects to torture and other forms of

trial by ordeal, confiscating private assets without assigning a cause, and of course, imprisoning

without detention, with detention orders sometimes backdated. Amnesty International reports

that over 300 people were allegedly killed extra-judicially or proclaimed missing during the

tenure of the PNDC.

There is at least anecdotal evidence suggesting the existence of pro-government death

squad operations, suspected to be responsible for the kidnap and murder of three senior judges

and a retired army officer in 1983 as well as other gruesome murders in the period. Summary

execution of military personnel and civilians suspected of coup plotting and other political

offences became relatively commonplace, with at least one instance in which the head of state

extracted a confession from a person condemned to die by a tribunal and tied to the stakes for

execution by firing squad.

The Rawlings-PNDC regime was also characterised by the arbitrary exercise of state

power (with the head of state frequently revoking/annulling the rulings of public tribunals and

courts unilaterally; routinely dismissing/interdicting/suspending public officers; introducing and

applying nebulous crime categories such as acts with intention to sabotage the economy); verbal

lynchings of perceived opponents of the regime in the state media. It also featured highly

ubiquitous security personnel (Civil Defence Organization/Peoples Militia, Committees for the

Defence of the Revolution, Commandos) and a proliferating array of extra-legal adjudicating

bodies (some of which were operated by outlaw military and police personnel (such as ex-warrant

officer Nkwantabisa, Salifu Amankwaa, and ex-police officer Jack Bebli) functioning as

musclemen and enforcers at large and running their own jails. The PNDC government also

imposed strict censorship over the media and severely curtailed associational freedoms. The order

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proscribing the Mormon Church, the Jehovahs Witnesses and two local charismatic Christian

sects as well as the attempt to impose strict official regulations on religious organizations through

a decree in the late 1980s highlighted official attacks on religious freedom even at the onset of the

post-cold war global and African political liberalization.

The end of the cold war and the emergence of an international consensus on democracy

and human rights, however, forced the hands of many of Africas strongmen, including Ghanas

Jerry Rawlings, to open up their regimes. The transitional constitutions, many being adaptations

of Western liberal constitutions, created space for the institutionalization of human rights

protection. The adoption of the African Charter on People and Human Rights in 1986 and the

Paris Principles in 1993 also provided strong moral support and institutional guidelines for the

creation of human rights bodies. It is in this context that Ghanas CHRAJ was formed in 1993.

Ghana had returned to constitutional rule in the previous year. By the year 2000, twenty four (24)

African countries had legal or constitutional provisions for the establishment of national human

rights bodies.2

Notwithstanding the fact that Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings and most of his

officials (including the PNDC era security chief and minister for justice and attorney general)

remained in power after the first democratic elections in 1992 elections, the human rights

situation in Ghana under the Rawlings-National Democratic Congress (NDC) civilian

administration saw dramatic improvements. Media censorship continued to be relaxed, private

newspapers began to flourish again, and the right to hold public meetings without an official

permit was explicitly restored by a Supreme Court ruling in July 1993. Importantly, human rights

activists and others who visited the headquarters of Ghanas dreaded internal security agency

the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) reported that its main detention camp was virtually

empty.

Throughout the 1990s, Ghanas human rights situation continued to improve, though

human rights abuses largely transformed into formats more acceptable in a democracy such as

the use of the courts to harass journalists began to subside. There were however credible reports

of the continued use of Castle (the seat of government) and other places as extra-legal

detention camps where suspects were subjected to abuses (including the deployment of crude

2Modelling Success Phase II: Governance and Institution Building in African Human Rights Commissions in Benin, Ghana and

Nigeria, CDD-Ghana, 2010.

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instruments to give identification haircuts). The reported chase and overturning of a taxicab by

President Rawlings and his security guards in Accra and the razing down of a newly-completed

three-star privately-owned Accra hotel by the security agencies and municipal authorities (with

Rawlings reportedly hovering over the action in a military helicopter) in the late 1990s

highlighted the continued display of impunity by top officials of that regime. And, as usual, petty

abuse by the police and other local level state officials continued.

However, given the extremely repressive nature of the Ghanaian state in the 1990s, the

progress Ghana has made in the enforcement of human rights has been remarkable. Undoubtedly,

one of the factors that was instrumental in bringing about this change has been the work of

CHRAJ.

The Functions of CHRAJ

The Constitution of Ghana outlines the functions of CHRAJ in Articles 218 and 219. The

Commission has a three-pronged mandate: the promotion of human rights, administrative justice

and anti-corruption. This combination of mandates (Ombudsman, anti-corruption agency, and

human rights agency) is quite unusual for a national human rights institution. CHRAJ has powers

to investigate complaints of violations of human rights and freedoms, abuse of power and probe

alleged corruption cases. It however cannot initiate investigations without having first received a

complaint.

Beyond investigations into alleged abuses, CHRAJ is also charged with the responsibility

to seek remedies for rights violations or halt and reverse violations where possible. Appropriate

remedial actions include mediation and preferring legal charges against alleged rights violators.

In order to fulfil this mandate, article 219 of the Constitution grants CHRAJ the power to issue

subpoenas for persons to appear before its committees or provide relevant documents. The

Commission also has powers to file contempt proceedings against persons refusing to honour its

subpoenas and can swear witnesses to oath. The constitution however places a curious limitation

on the remedial powers of CHRAJ: the Commission has no powers to directly enforce its

decisions. Instead, the Commission must go through the Attorney-General (AG) in order to

prosecute offenders or enforce its decisions. This arrangement presents a serious risk of conflict

of interests when CHRAJ looks into abuses linked to the executive branch, because the AG is part

of the government and typically a leading member of the ruling party.

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Finally, CHRAJ has the mandate to educate the public on human rights and freedoms

through regular publications, symposia, and other means of information dissemination available

to the Commission.

Institutional Checks and Balances

The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners of CHRAJ are appointed by the

President, in consultation with the Council of State. The Commissioner must be someone who is

qualified for appointment as a Justice of the Court of Appeal, while the Deputy Commissioners

must be qualified for appointment as a justice of the High Court. The commissioner and deputy

commissioners may only serve until they reach the ages of seventy and sixty-five respectively.

They have security of tenure and may only be removed in the same manner as a Judge of the

Court of Appeal and the High Court respectively i.e. they shall only be removed for gross

misconduct, incompetence, or infirmity of body and mind.3

All administrative expenses of the Commission, including salaries, allowances and

pensions are drawn from the Consolidated Fund. This however requires CHRAJ to obtain its

funds from the Minister of Finance, which can potentially compromise the independence of the

Commission. The perennial problem of government under-funding has also meant that CHRAJ

increasingly relies on the procurement of external funding from institutions like the Danish

International Development Agency (DANIDA). This is a double-edged sword; it can free

CHRAJs financial dependence on the government but then again external NGO money is not

guaranteed.

Organizational and Technical Capacity of CHRAJ

The CHRAJ headquarters is in Accra, and there are four internal departments, each

headed by a director. The departments are Finance and Administration, Legal and Investigations,

Public Education, and Anti-Corruption. There is a regional office in each of Ghanas ten regional

capitals, and a district office in some, but not all, of the district capitals. The positions of

Commissioner and Regional Director are designed to be held by lawyers. However, there are

some vacancies at the regional offices because CHRAJ finds it difficult to attract and retain legal

officers in those places. This is partly because the salaries paid by CHRAJ are not competitive.

Salaries of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, for example, are pegged with those

of a Court of Appeals Judge and High Court Judge respectively. Commensurate positions with

3These provisions are found in Articles 228 and 146 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana

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the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the Attorney-Generals department pay better.4 CHRAJs

legal department faces the worst attrition rates: when the Commission began in 1993 it employed

over 80 lawyers but by 2005, despite considerable expansion in the Commissions operations, the

number of lawyers at CHRAJ had dropped to 20.5

The statistics are no better today.

Beyond low salaries, CHRAJ finds it difficult to attract top mid-level talent because of

limited opportunities for career progression. This is because the top jobs at CHRAJ,

Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners, are political appointments. In order to resolve this

issue, the commission would have to do one of two things: significantly increase the salaries of its

legal staff or relax the requirement that lawyers fill a lot of the mid-tier positions.

In spite of these limitations, CHRAJ has expanded its reach within the districts and public

patronage of its services is high. The Commission receives about 13,000 complaints each year. In

2007, CHRAJ settled 51.4% of all complaints through its Alternative Dispute Resolution

mechanisms, including mediation and reconciliation. Another 27% of cases were resolved

through formal investigation and only 4.6% of cases were referred to other fora like the Attorney-

Generals department.6

In the next section, we attempt to explain the reasons behind the high

popularity of the CHRAJ dispute resolution process and also offer some suggestions on how to

reform the institution so that it delivers more of those services that directly benefit the poor.

The CHRAJ Mediation Service

CHRAJ is unusual, compared to other national human rights commissions, in that it has a

network of District Offices in around 110 of Ghanas 170 Districts. These District Offices offer

free mediation or Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) service to complainants. The district

level CHRAJ mediations deal primarily with disputes between private individuals and the

resolution process takes place in a relaxed and informal atmosphere by an impartial mediator. The

service is popular with individuals seeking resolution of disputes ranging from family

disagreements (custody of children, maintenance of spouses etc) to inheritance, land and property

cases, landlord-tenant relations, and employer-employee cases. General satisfaction with

CHRAJs ADR is high. This conclusion is supported by findings from a recent study under the

local justice delivery stream of the African Power, Politics, and Policy Program (APPP).7

4Emile Short.Operations and Challenges of CHRAJ. Publication from the review workshop on the CHRAJ, July 19-21, 2002, p. 4.

5CHRAJ Report 2005, p.7.

6CHRAJ Report 2007, p 50.

7Crook et al. (2011) Popular Concepts of Justice and Hybrid Judicial Institutions in Ghana, IDS Bulletin Volume 42 Number 2

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The APPP program aims to develop analytical and policy tools for generating policies

that might work better for development and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. APPP

research and analysis is also expected to deepen our understanding of what works and what

doesnt in terms of effective governance and the supply of public goods. The APPP program is

grounded in the proposition that public institutions are more likely to succeed if they are

embedded in the predominant mores and expectations of the societies that they serve.

As part of a research stream on public service delivery in Ghana, the APPP conducted an

empirical study to assess and explain the extent to which local dispute settlement institutions

(DSIs), including CHRAJs ADR, were providing public dispute settlement which can be

considered to be legitimate, accessible and effective. The study operationalized its three metrics

of measurement as follows:

Legitimacy: the extent to which the codes of justice, principles, procedures and remedies

offered by the DSIs were congruent with the beliefs, expectations and demands of both

the general public and of litigants who used them.

Accessibility: the extent to which ordinary citizens, and particularly the poorer and more

vulnerable, were able to access and use their services, and not disproportionately

excluded or disadvantaged by their procedures.

Effectiveness: the efficiency of their services in terms of speed of settlement,

affordability, and enforcement of settlements.

a. Research Methodology

The APP data was collected using a mixture of methods: two case-studies were

conducted, one in the outskirts of Accra and the other a rural district of the Brong Ahafo region.

A representative sample of popular opinion was also collected over a five-month period using

structured questionnaire, and finally an anthropological observation of the CHRAJ dispute

resolution process.

In line with the hypotheses that public institutions are more likely to be effective at

providing public goods when they are anchored in locally established understandings and ways of

doing things (i.e. local culture), the APPP study first sought to construct a picture of local beliefs

and expectations regarding dispute settlement and justice before analyzing how the workings of

CHRAJ correspond to these popular expectations. The study was guided by the following

questions:

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I. What do users of the CHRAJ DSI and the local communities actually seek from the

dispute resolution process? What theories do they hold about justice or what do they

consider to be fair?

II. How do these local understandings correspond to the way in which the CHRAJ DSI

functioned?

b. Results of Study

Popular Concepts of Justice

The survey interviewed 800 respondents selected randomly from the two case-study districts,

using a multi-stage, stratified area sample with random selection of households and random

selection of individuals within households. The respondents were divided into three subsets:

I. Subset 1: those who have actually experienced a case (20.1 percent);

II. Subset 2: those who had witnessed a dispute settlement in their community (38.4

percent);

III. Subset 3: those who said they had neither been involved in nor witnessed a dispute

settlement in their community (41.4 percent)

The respondents in subsets 1 and 2 were asked to explain why they thought a case they

either witnessed or been a party to had been handled fairly or unfairly. Those in subset 3 were

asked a more general question: If you ever got involved in a case, what are the most important

things about a dispute settlement institution which will make you trust them to give a fair

settlement of your case? The answers were post-coded for the principal meaning of the answer

given. The results are as follows:

Table 1 Popular understandings of justice, by type of respondent (%)

Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3 All

Establishing truth through due process 44.7 31.6 33.5 36.1

Impartial/honest judge or arbitrator 15.5 12.7 15.4 14.8

Subtotal 1 + 2 60.2 44.3 48.9 50.9

Other qualities of judge (competent, firm, God-

fearing)5.6 1.3 35.3 16.8

Chief, elders involved, community expectationsrespected 0.0 13.4 9.4 9.3

Mutual acceptance of verdict, reconciliation 14.9 28.0 0.0 14.2

Fault identified, law enforced 5.6 10.1 0.0 5.2

Efficiency issues (delay, cost, etc.) 3.7 0.7 0.0 1.0

Dont know 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.7

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Overall, the largest single response group (36.1 percent), across all subsets, emphasized

the importance of uncovering the truth through a balanced process i.e. the parties being allowed

to speak freely and make their case to the judge. The respondents also thought that an impartial

judge/arbiter was very important. Crook et al (2010) therefore concluded that the notion that

justice requires a balanced process for establishing the true facts was very widespread in the

general population of the Districts surveyed, regardless of the peoples personal experiences

although it was clearly much more important to those who had actually been party to a case.8

The legitimacy of the CHRAJ mediation service

The researchers interviewed 48 people who were party to a case at CHRAJ. The sample

included an equal number of men and women even though the case statistics show that the

majority of complainants happen to be women. Overall, 71 percent of the litigants felt that

CHRAJ was the best way of settling disputes.9 And of those whose case had been settled, 61%

felt that it had been fair and they were satisfied with the result. A small majority however remain

dissatisfied even though they acknowledge the process has been fair. The data reveal further that

defendants tend to be more satisfied with CHRAJ verdicts than complainants. Crook et al (2010)

conclude that this imbalance is the result of CHRAJs emphasis on compromise which can

sometimes make weaker parties, especially women litigants, accept settlements that may not

necessarily be in their best interest.

Figure 1.0: Litigants survey: Overall satisfaction with decision, plaintiffs and defendants

8Crook et al. (2011) Popular Concepts of Justice and Hybrid Judicial Institutions in Ghana, IDS Bulletin Volume 42 Number 2

9Ibid

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CHRAJ settlements are generally respected and the institution has facilitated payments of

compensations through their offices. But the Commission cannot enforce the agreements of these

mediations and there is confusion regarding whether they are to be automatically upheld by the

courts it is yet to be tested.

Reconsidering CHRAJs Tripartite Mandate

Having a three-part mandate coupled with insufficient finances necessarily creates a

situation where not all the mandates get equal attention and as such the administrative justice

mandate, for example, has been historically neglected.10 During interviews with mid-level

CHRAJ officials, many expressed the need for some functions of the Commission to be pruned,

specifically the anti-corruption and administrative justice mandates.11

This suggestion is

supported by the types of cases that come before CHRAJ: the anti-corruption and administrative

justice functions of CHRAJ account for a relatively small number of cases each year.

Administrative justice cases account for around 10% of cases each year while corruption cases

are far fewer, having never represented more than 2% of the total number of cases, and in 2007

accounting for just 0.8% of the total.12

There is also the challenge of conflicting mandates between the Serious Fraud Office

(SFO) and CHRAJ: the constitution charges the SFO to investigate situations where there is a

financial loss to the state while it gives CHRAJ a seemingly broader mandate to investigate all

instances of alleged or suspected corruption.13

Limiting CHRAJs mandate to human rights

protections could ensure that the institutions resources are not spread out too thinly. The

Commission would also be able to focus on delivering more of the services for which it has

become popular i.e. alternative dispute resolution.

Fixing the legal quandary surrounding CHRAJ decisions

Presently CHRAJ decisions have no firm legal bite and they can only be enforced

through court proceedings initiated by the Attorney-Generals office. Judges at the law courts are

also unsure of the legal status of CHRAJ decisions: they are unsure about whether courts only

have powers of review over CHRAJ decisions or whether they must conduct fresh trials of cases

previously examined at CHRAJ. This confusion has left CHRAJ-decided cases in legal limbo.

10Modelling Success Phase II: Governance and Institution Building in African Human Rights Commissions in Benin, Ghana and

Nigeria, CDD-Ghana, 2010.11

Ibid12

Ibid13

See Article 218(e) of the Constitution of Ghana for the anti-corruption mandate of CHRAJ

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The popular appeal of CHRAJs ADR system will be greatly enhanced if their findings and

decisions have some force of law.

Indeed, the survey suggests that one of the weaknesses of CHRAJ ADR is the uncertainty

surrounding the legal status of decisions of CHRAJ. The APPP survey shows clearly the

importance litigants attach to obtaining an effective and enforceable remedy. The popularity of

magistrate courts is a function of the fact that they provide just such a remedy. Magistrate courts

are seen as being able to provide the formality and gravitas of a state backed court procedure in a

relatively informal and user-friendly environment. Most importantly, they provide an efficient

enforcement mechanism. Indeed, a significant majority of respondents cited the enforcement

capability of the Magistrates Courts as one of its major attractions.

The uncertainty and general ineffectiveness of CHRAJ ADR settlements is an obvious

weakness of the CHRAJ ADR process. One possible solution for this is to significantly

streamline the process of enforcing the decisions of CHRAJ by the Magistrate Courts. Currently,

where one of the parties to a CHRAJ mediation fails to abide by the settlement, the only remedy

available to the non-defaulting party is to re-initiate the dispute resolution process in a magistrate

or circuit court. It is suggested that strong consideration be given to the possibility of judgments

by CHRAJ being treated in a similar manner as decisions that are reached through court attached

ADR, i.e. they should be treated as consent judgments. This will cloak them with the more formal

status of a court judgments, and makes available civil law judgment enforcement mechanisms to

the parties.

However, a move to grant legal force to CHRAJ rulings must be very carefully thought

through. It will require legislative reform, which would undoubtedly be complicated by the turf

war that exists between CHRAJ and the Judiciary. It would compel CHRAJ to restrict their ADR

settlements to human rights issues. There will be cost implications, which may result in CHRAJ

becoming a less attractive dispute resolution tribunal. It would undoubtedly be accompanied by a

review of the CHRAJ ADR process to ensure that the Commissions staff apply legal principles

rather than relying on common sense or religious/cultural mores for their decisions. 14 But

though the CHRAJ mediators rarely apply strict legal principles in decision-making, an

observation of court attached ADR suggests that the strict legal principles are also only rarely

applied by court attached ADR mediators. Indeed, an observation of the court attached ADR

14Crook et at. (2011)

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process suggests that regarding the basic principles used in the arrival of decisions as well as the

training and orientation of the personnel that serve as mediators, there are more similarities than

differences between court attached ADR and CHRAJ ADR.

Conclusion:

CHRAJ is one of the better performing constitutional bodies in Ghana. It has also gained

tremendous public legitimacy and support for its alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The

poor, mostly women, are also the major clients of this service. This paper argued that the

functions of CHRAJ be pruned so that it can better deliver on these dispute resolution functions.

The high degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance of the CHRAJ mediation service means

that the institution has greater prospects of delivering more pro-poor public goods by capitalizing

on its strengths.