burhanettin tatar-heidegger

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ONDOKUZ MAYIS NiVERSiTESi

iLAHiYAT fAIL

lESi

lll -

DERGISI

SAYI 1

.

Samsun - 88


2/10

INilllKIZ

MAYIS

ONiVEIIiTEii

iLAHiYAT f l iLIEli

I E I ~ i l i

S a y

:

10

Samsun 1998

..

Sahibi

ilahiyat Fakltesi

A d n a :

Prof Dr Hseyin PEKER

Mesul Mdr

Y a y n K o m i s y o n u A d n a

Prof Dr. Mustafa Zeki T E R Z

Y a z i l r i Mdr

Yrd Do Dr Yavuz NAL

Dizgi veMizanpaj

A r

Gr

Vejdi

B L G N

B a s k

Ondokuz

M a y s

niversitesi M a t b a a s

Dergide a y n l a n a n y a z l a r n

bilim ve dil

ynnden

s o r u m l u l u u

y a z a r i a r n a aittir


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l l

DEGGfii S

NOIIO.N Of

Ril i

N NI TIME

Ir.

lurhanoUih

I B H I U *

TURK Z T

Heidegger bilginin nesnesi ile

u y u m a s ' e k l i n d e t a n m l a n a n

geleneksel hakikat

k a v r a m n

bu t a n m n a r k a p l a n n d a bulunan varsa-

y m Z a r a geri gtrr. Herhangi bir hakikat

i d d i a s n d a

ortaya

k a n

e y ,

temelde, nesnenin tezahr o l d u u iin, hakikat tezahr ( i f a ) olarak

a n l a l m a l d r .

Tezahr

( i f a )

ncelikli olarak nesnelerin tezahr

( i f a )

nn a r k a p l a n olarak d n y a n n tezahrne i a r e t eder.

Heidegger

e

gre, yeni bir nesnenin k e f e d i l m e s i tmyle gizli olan bir

nesnenin

k e f e d i l m e s i e k l i n d e

g e r e k l e e m e z ;

fakat hareket

o k t a s n

d

g r n t e b e n z e e n bir tezahrden a l r . Bu demektir ki, nesneler

,

belli

bir tarzda zaten

k e f e d i l m i

ve

a y n

zamanda rtk bir

d u r u m d a d r / a r .

Onlar rtk bir durumda

o l d u k l a r

iin,

i f a y

da bir

e y i

ama ola-

rak hakikat daima nesnelerin kendilerinden elde edilmelidir. Buna gre,

Dasein ( O r a d a - v a r l k l hem hakikat ( i f a ) iinde hem de h a k i k a t - d

(yani henz kendisini i f a e t m e m i v a r l k ) nda bulunur.

Bununla birlikte, i f a yolu ancak u n l a r n [hakikat ve hakikat-

d ]

a r a s n

a y r t e t t i i

zaman

b a a r / r

d e d i i

zaman, Heidegger neyi

kastetmektedir? Bizler hakikat ve h a k i k a t - d

m a y r t e t t i i m i z

zaman

i f a

n a s l

g e r e k l e t i r e b i l i r i z ? Bu i d d i a y ileri srerken, Heidegger

hakikat ve h a k i k a t - d ' n kendisiyle a y r t e t t i i m i z ve bylece i } a ger-

e k l e t i r d i i m i z

bir (hakikat) n k a v r a m n a sahip o l d u u m u z u kabul

e t m i

olmuyor mu?

a y e t

durum

bu

ise, her yeni

i f a

(ama) kendisini

O.M.. l i i h i y a t Fakltesi.

Heidegger Dnya

k a v r a m

ile zellikle

v a r l n

tarihsel tezahrleri Zerinde olu-

a n

b e e r i

tecrbeler yani kltr

n y a s m

k a s t e t n e k t e d i r .

2

Dasein k a v r a m y l a Heidegger

i n s a n n

Dnya da kendine zg

v a r o l u t a r z n a

i a r e t eder. Buna gre i n s a n n v a r l (Dasein) Dnya dan ve Dnya da i n s a n n

v a r l n d a n : b a m s z

olarak

k a v r a n a n a z . H e n l e n t i k

daire

( h e r n e n e u t i c

circle)

metaforoyla

i a r e t

edileri bu k a r l k l b a m l l k

v a r l n t e z a l r n n

ve insan

k a v r a y n n

t a r i h s e l l i i n i gsterir.


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hakikat

n k a v r a m n d a n

a y r a n

bir

z e l l i e

sahip olmuyor mu? Bu a

l m a m z d a u n u

iddia

e d e c e i z :

Ama y da

i f a

olarak hakikat

v a r l k

l a r

(nesneleri) kendi oriJinallikleri

ve

tarihsellikleri iinde ortaya

karmak o l d u u iin

i f a

olarak her hakikat tezahr eden nesnenin orifi

n a l l i i a ; n d a n kendisine zg nitidik/ere sahiptir.

H a k i k a t n

z d m a n s a l l (temporality)

a y n

zamanda bilgimizin

z a m a n s a l l n . o r t a y q .

koyar. A k a s n-kavram yeni hakikate

a r a c l k

edemez,

zi ra

yeni hakikat n-hakikatz s n r n gstermek suretiyle olum

suz/ar. Bylece

s n r l / k ,

janilik (finiteness) sadece bizim tarihsel ujku

muzun

s n r l

o l u u n d a n

d e i l , a y n

zamanda hakikat

n k a v r a m m z n

s n r _ l a r n

gsteren yeni hakikatin

o r i j i n a l l i i n d e n .

k a y n a k l a n r . Her

ne

kadar paradoxal grnse de, bu gerek yzndendir ki, hakikat kendi

zeminini kuran bir hareket olarak ortaya

k a r .

Bununla birlikte, eski

hakikat (hakikat

n - k a v r a m )

ile yeni hakikat a r a s n d a k i b o l u k y da

sreksizlik problemi hala

o r t a d a d r .

Heidegger de hakikat

n k a v r a m

ile yeni hakikat

a r a s n . d a

da

hili bir gerilim

v a r d r

Ne var

ki,

Hegel in

K a n t n

numen ve fenomen

a y r r n m a g e t i r d i i t t i r a z

kullanacak olursak,

s n r n f a r k n d a

olmak

zaten bu

s n r n

tesine gitmektir. Bu demektir ki, her yeni

f a

(hakikat)

eski

i f a

(hakikat) ' n s n r n gsterir ve bizim bu

s n r n

tesine gitmemi

zi ve kendisini

t a n m a m z a

imkan verir. Bu nedenle, Heidegger

e

gre

hakikat, Gadamer

in

diliyle, nesneninbizzat kendisini g s t e m e s i d i r ..

H e i d e g g e : .

leads the traditional canception of truth as the

agreement

of

knowledge with its object back to its unthought

p r e s i p p o s i t i o n s . Since what is demonstrated in the assertian is solely

the Being-uncovered of the entity itself, truth mu st be understood in

t e r n s

of

disclosedness. Disclosedness refers primarily to the world's

disciosedness as the ground of the uncoveredness of entities. According to

. Heidegger, the discovering of anything new is never done on the basis of

having something completely hidderi, but takes its departure rather from

uncoveredness in the mode of e m b l a n c e . ' , This is t say that entities have, in

a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are

sti1l

disgt l ised Since

they are disguised, truth as uncoveredness must always be captured from

entities. Therefore, Dasein is both in the truth and in untruth.

3

Otto Pggeler,

Martin Heidegger :S Path of Thinking,

trans. p. agurshakand S

Barher (NJ: Humanities Press International, Ine., I 987),

p

7

4

M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward J,{obinson

(New York: H a p e r and Row, 1962), p 265

298


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However; what does Heidegger mean when

he

asserts that the

way

o

uncovering

is

achieved

only n

distinguishing between these [truth

and untruth] ?

5

How can

we

achieve discovering by distinguishing truth

from untruth? n this argurnent does not Heidegger accept that we have a

fore-conception

o

truth by which we distinguish between truth and

untruth, and thus.achieve discovering? And i this

is

the.case, does not new

uncoveredness have a feature by which it differs from the f o r e ~ o n e p t i o n

.

o

truth? This paper will argue that s nce truth as uncoveredness is to

discover entities in

t h ~ i r

originality (and historicity), every truth . as

uncoveredness has al

so

a speciflc feature in terms

o

the originality

o

he

entities uncovered.

nHeidegger's hermeneutics, 'fore-conception' oftruth refers both

to the fact that uncoveredness

o

beings

is groun:ded

in the 'world' s

disclosedness' and to the basic characteristic

o

Dasein as 'uncovering.'

Precisely because

o

this fact, as Versenyi puts it, . in Heidegger's

philosophy man and world can never be separated or even discussed in

separation.

6

Accordingly, since Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, it

is

always already dwelling with s

ome

.

be

ing, that is the uncoveredness

o

such. beings

is

equiprimordial with the being

o

Dasein. and its

disclosedness.

7

Out

o

this inseparability between man and world, it

follows that entities can never be true in themselves; what makes them r u e

is

the fact that they enter into a relationship with Dasein

in

terms.ofBeing

discovering and

B e i n g ~ d i s c o v e r e d

From t l s perspective, Heidegger's

cntention that ' :asein is in the truth' states equiprimordially iliat

'Dasein

is

in untruth' can be taken to mean that Dasein is always aware

o

he boundary where truth differs from untruth. f his

is

the case,

we

can

argue that just as

we

know that

we

are

in

truth since

we

have a fore

conception

o

truth, so we know that we are in untruth since we have a

fore-conception

o

untruth.

However, this

does

not mean certainly that the fore-conception

o

truth is discrete from that

o

untruth. But. rather this distinction reflects

only the inner tension between 'disclosedness' and 'closedness' in the

concept

o

truth itself.

8

For that reason, there

is no

total concealment and

total revealment bt as Pggeler argues, truth

is

a co-presence

o

5

lbid.

6

Lazslo Versenyi, Heidegger Be ng and Truth (New Haven: YaleUniversity

Press: 1966), p. 14.

7

Heidegger, e ng and Time p. 264.

8

In this context, Heidegger argues that to be closed off and covered up belongs to

Dasein's facticity. lbid. p. 265.

299


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.unconcealment and concealment, a process

of

instituting and :withholding

of ground.

9

Since truth. enters always into. a 'limited opening,' to bring

something into the light

is

to cast anaspect

f i t i ; t o

shadow.

1

.

At this point to maintain both that 'trutli is co-presence of

u i c o n c e a J m e i t and concealment' and that 'untruth is coveredness'seems

to be u z z l i n g ~ How can we explain that 'untruth' is both 'closedness' and

'present' at one and the same time? If untrutp as coveredness is the

absence of truth as uncoveredness; how can absence be deseribed as

present?

It

seems that the

a r g t m e n t

fOr- the co-presence of tnith and

~ t r u t h

cannot be restricted only to temporal co-existence, since it

presupposes that the presence

of

truth is not at the same Ievel

a8

that of

untruth. If this is the case, the co-presence of truth and untruth must be

both temporal and spatial

c o p r e s e n c ~ .

In our view, this spatio-temporal

'co-presence' of truth and. untruth. cannot be un derstood i we do not look

at

it as manifesting the internal continuity between them.

From this perspective, we can argue that Dasein can uncover

entities only by following this inner continuity which takes its departure

from the limited

d i s c l o s e d e s s

of

entities. Accordingly,

tb

follow the

n i e r

continuity is to suppose that untruth is also truth to be uncovered.

To

put

it another way, to beaware ofuntruth is to propose a future (or possible)

truth. If, as Tugendhat remarks, disclosure is to be understood as an

occurrence that is actively related to its opposite closedness or

concealment

11

th.ere

: s t be a circular relation between truth and u i t r u t h .

Since we take our departure .. from uncoveredness we r e ~ i l i z e that

entities ... are disgised, but insofar as we are aware of : n t r u t h we can

snatch entities out

oftheir

hiddenness.

12

Since we have a fore-conception

o

ruth we approach entities

in

their hiddenness, and insofar as we

approach suchentities in theirliiddenness we can release their truth, i.e.,

uncover them.

However, if, since we have a fore-conception.of truth, we snatch

entities in their hiddenness, how do we reaiize the difference between

the

fore-conception

oftruth

and new discoveredness?_In other words, ifDasein

B e i n g - i n c o v e r i n g , i.e., discovering

is

a process, how does Dasein

9

Pggeler, Metaphysics and Topology

of

Being in Heidegger, trans. P. Amad,

Man and World

8, no.

I

975),

p.

lO.

10

Robert J. Dostal, 'The Experience

of

Truth

for

Gadamer and Heidegger: Taking

Time and Sudden Lightening, in Henneneutics and Truth edit. B.

Wachterhauser (Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1994), pp. 49-50.

.EmsTugendhat, Heidegger's Idea f T r u t h , ~

inHenneneutics and Truth;

p 88.

12

Heidegger, Being and Time p. 265.

300


7/10

appreciate the new occurrence

of

truth? The significance

of

this question

shows itself

if

w e look

at

it from the po nt

of

view

of

the internal tension or

circular relation between truth and untruth. Accordingly, is the new

occurrence oftruth only a different aspect

of

a vicious circle or, reversely,

is it a new manifestation which occurs

ina

circular process?

At this level we can say that if the act

of

uncovering is a process,

then the uncoveredness of anything new should introduce itself as a

manifestation

of

this process.

In

other words, even

i

uncoveredness

is

the

truth itself, every new uncovering should transcend or widen the horizon

of

the truth which has occurred before.

If

this is the case; the internal tension

and the continuity (circular relation) between truth and untruth should not

be a vicious circle. This

is e d u s e

we have a fore-conception

of

truth that

we are faced with untruth and every new uncoveredness becomes a fore

conception for further uncovering.

When Heidegger remarks that, through uncovering, entities

becme

accessible in themselves

to

Dasein,

3

he

refers

to

the fact that truth is

g n s p i n g

the originality of anything behind the semblance or cover.

In

this

context, he also argues that Dasein should defend it [that which

has

already

been uncovered]

against

semblance.

4

By this he means

that

Dasein should

preserve the originality ofuncovering in discourse and language.

From this perspective,

it

can be argued that

if

every truth

is

finite,

i.e., limited, and uncovering is a process, then originality of'uncoveredness

refers

to

nothing else than the distinctive aspect and uniqueness.

of

a being

unco:vered. This is to say that since no discovering can be reduced to

another discovering and replaced

by

another truth, so every truth as

discoveredness has its own feature, scope and limit.

5

Heidegger's

argument that disclosedness is essentially.factical calls our attention also

to the limit and uniqueness

of

every occurrence

of

truth. Precisely because

of

this fact, we refer to the original feature

of

disclosedness by means

of

different words. For instance, when we associate the name 'Newton' with

the laws we not only mention that 'Newton first discovered them,' but

also, and m9re importantly, refer to the fact that the truth

ofthese

laws has

3

lbid. 269.

14

Jbid.

265.

5

As can be seen, by 'irreducibility of original discoveredness'

we

mean both that

discoveredness cannot be reduced to another discoveredness behind it (for

instance, since a syroptom considered as discoveredness can be reduced to another

discoveredness e l i n d it, it is not original discoveredness) and that

it

cannot be

reduced to another discoveredness before it, i.e., t is not a repetition of what is

already known.

301


8/10

been preserved.

or

handed down

to

us) in the originality

of

.i

s

discoveredness. For that reason, through language entities become

accessible in their originality to Dasein.

However, the originality here should not be con:fused with the

originating moment of uncovering or with the way the author understood

what he uncovered. The 'originality' refers to the fact that the identity of

the entity uncovered cannot be based on something. el s nce the

distinctive aspects and features .of the. unc.overedness cannot be r e d u c e j to

anything else.

6

Since e v e r y u n c o v ~ r e d n e s s is f i n i ~ ~ and thus a p h e in the

endless process

of

uncovering, discontinuity or difference is. intrinsic to the

identity itself. To

put

it another way,

i d e ~ t i t y

is not something to which

different aspects .can be reduced and thus with respect to which difference

between the aspects disappears. Rather since the continuity ofuncovering

is grasped in terms

of

the occurrence of the discontinuities, identity and

difference reflects the internal conflict between force and resistance withln

the entity itself. While the intrinsic force is the basis of the revealment of

an entity, the intrinsic resistance to this force is the basis

of

the

limited

revealmenf As indicated above, we refer to this conflict wheri we argile

that

revealment

is

the revealment

of

the

irreducible

unique nature

of

each

aspect of the entity. From this perspective, since there isa counterbalance

between intriosic force and.intrinsic resistance

within

the uncovered entity

we perceive a unity (or identity) as the continuity between its distinctive

aspects or features.

n

other words, identity reveals itself in the opposite but

complementary functions of the aspects of the entity. By opposite but

complementary functions, we refer to the fact that though every aspect

(uncoveredness) has its own distinctive i d irreducible nature, it becomes

a step upon which further uncoveredness can be based. Heidegger refers to

this function by 'fore-conception.' From this perspective,

the

o J j r e s e i c e

of coveredness and uncciveredness does not mean that what is k i r i w n

previously becomes unknown when an entity reveals its new aspect.

Rather, it means that since every uncoveredness is original and irreducible

to another uncoveredness, it cannot be s u b s u n e d under one general

concept which reflects the timeless identity of the entity.

From this perspective, coveredness or hiding itself does not

16

Thus since, in the originality ofdiscoveredness, w hat is c q m ~ s into the

T h ~ r e

(Da), Newton's laws, for instance, cannot be reduced to anything else. Here

Newton's laws do not stand as secondary representation ofy.-hat' 'is:

~ t h ~ r

through it reality comes

to

its own

truth. '

302


9/10

necessarily mean that when one aspect

of

the entity comes to the fore its

other aspect is obscured. But

it

refers primarily to the fact that the identity

of

the entity reveals itself always

iria

finite, limited way Therefore,

just

as

f o r e ~ c o n c e p t i o n

p v ~ s the

way

for f i r t h e r (new) uncoverings,

so

the new

rmcovering makes us anticipate future uncoverings. Thus 'hiding' isnt a

total darkness behirid the light(revealedness)

but

reflects the irifinite

possibilities or the depth

of

the future which irivites Dasein to itself. .

For

that reason, the temporality (finitude)

oftruth

as uncoveredness refers also

to the temporality (historicity) ofidentity. n this sense, the identity carries

with

itself

the determinacy of the present (the said) and the

i n d e t e r r i i n c y

of

the future

{the

unsaid).

n

other words, the identity

of

text

cannot

be

realized without anticipating the future.

If out

analysis of Heidegger's concept of truth and identity is

correct, we can also say that the metaphor

of

sudden lightening which

Heidegger

e r i p l o y s

n order to characterize the unexpected, s u p r i s i n g

nature

of

truth must refer not only to the temporality (the suddenness

of

the moment)

of

truth but also t the original and distinctive features

of

uncciveredness itself. This is so because, if the every occurrence

of

truth as

an intetplay

of

the way in which Being sends

itselfandits

withdrawal were

not the occurrence

of

the new uncoveredness

in

its originality

(irreducibility) and thus in its s u p r i s e character, it would be only a mere

repetition

of

what occurred before. n this case, since we would have been

already in the same light, i.e., familiar with it, we could not even

recognizethe o urren e

of

the truth and the argument for sudden

lightening wotild

be

an empty one.

17

However, how can one solve the puzzle of the relation between fore

conception and the s u p r i s e character oftruth? Since we have fote-conceptions,

we can anticipate or project

into

the future and thus unoover entities. However,

on the other

hand we

argue

that

every truth

is

distinctive and thus

s u p r i s e s

us.

18

n this case, we lccept that

t r u t l

does not occur exactly

in

the way we

anticipated.

t is

beyond our control and always ttanscends our expectations. It

reveals itself as the negation of

our previous conceptions

in

the

sense

that it

always reflects the narrowness

of i r

fore-conceptions.

17

Dostal understands by Heidegger's metaphor of sudden lightening only the

temporality (the suddenness of the moment) of truth. See, Dosta , "The Experience

ofTruth," pp 47-58.

18

The relation between the fore-conception and the occurrence of the new truth is

called 'hermeneutic circle.' When Heidegger talks about the productive nature of

the hermeneutic circle he seems

to

refer to this dialectic between fore-conception

and new truth. Hence he convinces us that it is not a vicious circle as noted above.

303


10/10

'

In

conclusion, the

temporalityof

~ t h

is

alsothe

r e c o g l l t i o n

of

the tem,poralityof

our

k n o w l e d g ~ , Obviously this is .to say

that

a fore

conception cannot mediate. the new .truth since the new t r . t h negates 1;he

mediation p: o r ~ - c o n c e p t i o n by reflectwg its. limit. Thus finiteness comes

not only f r o n ~ t h e limit of our.

bistorical

horizon

but

also out of the

originality of the ;new

t u t h

.which limits

our

fore:-eonception

of t n t l

Howeyer paradoxical it may seem, it. is precisely because

of

this fact that

truth occurs also

as

a self-grounding movement. Nevertheless,

the

pro)Jlem

of the

gap

(the disc()ntinuity) between the old

t u t h .

(the f o r e - c o n c ~ p t i o n )

andthe

new truth remains open.

As we noteel above that there is an internal tension between the

fore-conc:eption .and the new truth. What .was indicated .there is the fact

that, to use Hegel' s objection to the Kantian distinction betWeen noumenon

and phenomenon, to recognize the

l.imit

is a l e a d y

to.

have gone beyond it

This is

to

say

that

every new uncoveredness reflects the limit of the

old

unoveredness (fore-conception) and

us

makes it possible for us to go

beyond this limit and to recognize itself. Therefore, Heideggerian truth, to

use

G a d a n e r s l a g u a g e

is the self-presentation

of

the thing itself..

B B U G ~ . A P H Y .

DOSTAL, Robert

J.

The Experience

of T r u t l

for Gadamer. and

Heidegger: Taking Time and Sudden Lightening.

Hermeneutics

and

Truth. Edited by

B

Wachterhauser. Evanston: Northwestem

University Press, 1994.

HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Translated

by

John Macquarrie and

Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

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