CAIRO iwillfurnishthewar

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I Will Furnish the Wainfographics in times of coni

Article by Alberto C

Edited by Eileen Mign

On the night o February 15, 1898, the Ameribattleship Maine sank ater an explosion in the bayHavana, Cuba, killing more than 250 people. Te ship been sent weeks beore to watch or US interests inarea, which was suering rom riots or and againstSpanish colonial authorities. Te cause o the explos

was not clear, and it remains unsolved to this day.But there were people who thought the cause q

clear.

A Furnished WArWilliam Randolph Hearst, the amous media mo

was convinced that the tragedy o the Maine wasresult o a conspiracy by Spanish soldiers (1). He also engaged in a erce ght with his main compet

Joseph Pulitzer, or audience dominance. Te inograp(FIG1) he published in the ront page o its agshipNew York Journal on February 17, is crystal clear: picture shows with great detail the mine oating runder the ships belly. It caption reads: Te Spaniait is believed, arranged to have the Maine anchored

one o the Harbor mines. Wires connected the mine wa powder magazine and it is thought the explosion caused by sending an electric current through the wir

Te headline was unequivocal: Destruction owar ship Maine was the work o an enemy. Tere somebody to blame, and measures had to be taken. Hehad been an advocate or a conict with Spain, andhad no regrets in publishing rumors and lies, sometiin the shape o extremely biased stories, sometimeillustrations, to make his case.

Te word inographics didnt exist at that although maps and simple diagrams, such as the FIG 1: New York Journal - February 17, 1898.


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discussed here, were regularly published. Te hostilities between the US andSpain eventually broke out. Tey lasted or 100 days.

Hearst is amous or a cable interchange with the illustrator FrederickRemington. Remington, who was covering the Cuba revolution or Hearst,telegrammed him to say that the situation in the island was unexpectedlyquiet, and that he didnt think that a major conict was about to be unleashed.According to a well-known legend, Hearst responded: Please remain. Youurnish the pictures. Ill urnish the war (2).

And a war was urnished, indeed.

A Misguided WArOn the morning o February 5, 2003, US Secretary o State Colin Powell

addressed the United Nations Security Council on the US case against Iraq.He talked about the evidences the US secret services had gathered on therebuilding o Iraqs stocks o weapons o mass destruction. He suggested linksbetween Saddam Husseins regime and Islamic terrorism. He asserted that theIraqi dictator was seeking a nuclear weapon. Powells speech was the climax oa well-orchestrated war drumming campaign that had began months beore.

While he was making his case, a screen projected PowerPoint slides. Manyo them contained graphs and maps, including 3D cutaways o the mobile

production acilities used (by Iraq) to make biological agents (FIG2). Tesereconstructions were astonishingly detailed. Tey included call-outs thatidentied parts o the vehicles, such as the ermentation and the activematerials tanks. How could anyone doubt that Powells inormation wasaccurate, i he was able to show such beautiul diagrams? Visualevidence, onemight think has to be preceded byactualevidence.

My colleagues, every statement I make here today is backed up withsources, solid sources Powell told the Security Council. Not so much. Later,it turned out that the sources were not solid at all. Most assertions regardingthe WMD and Husseins ties to Al Qaeda were plainly alse (3). But theymade their way to the media and to the public.

And a war was urnished, again.

A WArFor JournAlisMTe impact o Powells speech on public opinion was notable. It helpedsweep the public mind towards a more avorable view o the invasion. Moreimportantly, it was uncritically echoed by the media. Many newspaperspublished one or more o the slides without questioning their accuracy, notonly in the US, but worldwide.

In other cases, the inormation Powell provided was used to create in-house inographics, such as the one in FIG 3, Iraqs ballistic missiles,published by El Mundo a ew days ater the speech. As you can see, in the lastscene I programmed an interactive map that allowed the reader to move Iraqslaunching vehicles to the our corners o the country to see how ar Saddamsballistic missiles could reach. We could call this interactive evidence.

I remember that at the end we decided not to include the Al Abbas missile

(whose range was even bigger), present in Mr. Powells slides, because ourmost cautious reporters pointed out that it was not clear the missile had everbeen operational. Nonetheless the message was evident: according to ourgraphic, both Israel and Riyadh, capital o Saudi Arabia, were within rangeo Saddams WMD. Other newspapers didnt restrain themselves whatsoever.Ater all, this inormation was based on solid sources -wasnt it?

Hearsts and Powells inographics are hardly stand-alone examples o themisuse o inormation graphics in times o war, either with the purpose opushing agendas, or guided by intentions. Tey are not important or thatreason. Tey are relevant because they made their way to the media, andthe evidence they showed, alse as it was, tainted the publics mind and wasrepeated uncritically everywhere.

FIG 2: Slides rom Mr. Powells presentation

FIG 3: elmundo.es - http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/gracos/eb/s3/scud.html


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What we do as visual communicators has an impact on our audienDoes this sound like a no-brainer? It does, indeed! But, i so, why dokeep making the same mistakes over and over? Why do we keep gloriy

war using ashy illustrations on our daily maps? Why are we more worabout showing how the state-o-the-art engines o destruction work, inso explaining what their eects on the population are?

Part o the problem is what I call the original sin o inographics in npublications. Since newspapers started using visual explanations, and in so a handul o exceptions, they were not conceived o as tools or enhanthe understanding o inormation. Rather, they were thought o as a derivao illustrations, designed and executed by illustrators, not by reporters wart skills. In many cases, their goal was not to inorm, but to entertain, shoand awe.

Te way war inormation graphics are produced in many newspapers tooriginated during World War II (FIG 4). It developed ully with the coveo the Falklands war, in 1982 (FIG 5), and then, was perected duringrst Gul War o 1991.

In the 1991 war, the popularization o user-riendly computer sotwpackages, and the desire to compete with the V, (particularly with emergent 24-hours news networks, such as CNN), encouraged grap

styles loaded with huge 3D arrows, gratuitous special eects, and colomaps oten partially hidden behind ultra-detailed renderings o bombersghters. Te lack o good photographs rom the rontline in a time whenprevalence o images was considered key to the competition or a dwingreadership strengthened this approach to inormation graphics.

oday, there are signs that the tide is changing, but were still too ar rwhere we should be.

A WArFor responsibilityLet me be honest about my reasons or this article: Ive made ton

mistakes with inographics when covering conicts, and I want to about them candidly. My own peccadilloes have led me to think that thesomething deeply wrong with the way many news publications deal with

War graphics today are more technically elaborate and sophisticated thanones during the 1991 Gul War and, o course, during the conict at Falklands but, journalistically, they are exactly the same. Teir main goal doseem to be to be useul, but to have an impact(FIG 6 and FIG 7).

FIG 5: Te Sunday London imes, 1982

FIG 4: Te work o Robert M. Chapin Jr., Chie Cartographer at ime magazine in the 1940s

and the 1950s was visually striking, but journalistically (and cartographically, or that matter!)

dubious


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As the stories o Hearst and Powell prove, we, as journalists, have a proound eect on how thepublic perceives and thinks about war. I we show war as a clean, precise, collateral-damage-onlyevent, itll have consequences on public opinion. 67% o Fox News regular viewers believed thatSaddam was involved in 9/11 two years and one month ater the attacks took place (5). Needless tosay, i we present war as something un or exciting, its even worse.

So what can we do when acing a topic as difcult and ethically challenging as this? Ive learnedthe hard way. Here are some recommendations, based on my own experience... and oenses:

1. Stick to the actsTis should be obvious. Or maybe not. Its all about the story, right? But to publish a good story

rst o all you have to know the acts. Remember the old inographics motto: i you dont knowhow it happened, dont draw it (6).

On March 23, 2003, private Jessica Lynch was captured by Iraqi orces in an ambush duringthe battle or Nasiriyah, and later rescued by American troops. Te story, as delivered by the USArmy, was one o heroic resistance by a young, brave soldier, who kept ghting her enemies untilshe could not do anything but surrender.

Ten, it was the story o a woman violently interrogated by her captors, and later rescued ina lie-or-death mission by special orces, who had to conront strong resistance by Iraqi soldiers.Te graphics that many newspapers published to cover the Lynch event suggested that there hadbeen heavy ghting during the rescue, which was not the case. Additionally, the entire ofcialnarrative was later disputed by critics and by Lynch hersel (7).

oday, three and a hal years later, I still wonder how is it possible to witness the totallymade up reconstructions I saw ater the rescue (Te New York Posts andEl Mundos, see FIG 8,were particularly hilarious). I guess too many news organizations spend more time trying to nd

FIG 6: Globo (Brazil) FIG 7: San Jose Mercury News


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striking stories, and delivering them using sophisticated sotware, rather tmaking sure they get the storyright.

Its true that in these kind o situations it is hard to nd non-biased souto double-check the acts, but still. I hear reporters all the time doubthe reliability o inormation provided by the military so, why dont wesomething? o get started: instead o designing a bombastically illustradiagram, use a locator map, as sophisticated and detailed as you wish, buta map.

2. Keep reminding yoursel that war is not a gameWar is not a movie, either. Inographics should not dramatizereality,

representit. Its not our goal to strengthen the tragic nature o the story, becawar is tragic by itsel. When presenting war stories, tone the style down, dover-illustrate. Avoid 3D arrows and orced perspectives. A simple, plamap is always better than an isometric rendering o the battle scene, wlittle cartoony explosions and Apache helicopters gunning people down. Wgraphics should be approached the same way as reconstructions o terroattacks, accidents, and natural catastrophes: in an aseptic manner, with a drespect or the victims and the soldiers involved.

Dont let weaponry ascinate you. Weapons are sexy, shiny (at least in

promotional videos o the companies that produce them), and, moreothey look very cool when done in 3D, and explained in video-game-animations.

Weapons have always appealed to inographics artists or these reasAter all, many o us have a solid background as video-game, comic-boand action-movie consumers. When I was the online graphics director aMundo we produced nearly60 animated diagrams on the war in Iraq betwFebruary and April 2003 (plus innumerable static maps and charts). O th7 where about the eld operations and 35 about weapons; 3 dealt witheconomic consequences o the war. Only1 was about reugees and civil(8). You get the picture. Did we have the right priorities? I I had to cover

war in Iraq today, I assure you, I would have done it very dierently.Am I saying that we should give up making graphics on war technolo

O course not. But we must be honest about what the relevant inormatis, and what the reader cares about. Who wants to know how a Supercohelicopter works, anyway (FIG 8)? What percentage o your readers wond that inormation relevant? Some o them would surely stop and takquick look at the gorgeous 3D model, and then ip the page to read the nheadline, unless the explanation o the helicopter is somehow justied byimportant news story. I thats not the case, you had better spend your timesomething worthwhile. Tis leads me to my next suggestion.

3. Tink about the diferent angles war can be approachedWar is much more than military operations, battles and city raids. W

about shattered amilies, destroyed communities, reugee camps, suering

grie. And, sometimes, its also about hope. We should ocus more on all thelements and less on the troop movements. Tink about the big picture.Keep in mind what Te New York imes did ater the invasion o I

or during the recent conict in Lebanon. In both cases, the paper sentinormation graphics reporter, Archie se, to look or stories that cobe told using graphics. O course, not every newspaper can aord to graphics person to a dangerous area, but there are lessons to be learned those experiences.

See just one o the graphics that se produced or the war in Lebacoverage: Riding in a Convoy to Southern Lebanon (FIG 9). Te presentais a neat combination o cartography and multimedia elements: short vidillustrate each step o the trip rom Beirut to Merj Uyun. A second

FIG 8: El Mundo

FIG 8: El Mundo - http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/gracos/abr/s2/supercobra.html


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navigation gives access to each one o those videos and to a simple vectordiagram on the composition o the convoy.

Tis is a story that was not ound anywhere else, at least in this orm, asa well built multimedia package. Its original, its engaging and its relevantbecause it talks about the human side o the conict, its impact on civilians.Its true that Te New York imes publishes too many o your average wargraphics (FIG 10), but in most cases they are restrained and ocused (9).

Moreover, this kind o story makes a diference. Making a dierence intodays increasingly competitive newspaper market can keep your readerpaying or your content. Anybody can publish wire news based on dubiousinormation by ofcial sources, but only a handul o publishers still thinkthat producing original stories is the best strategy. I agree with the latter. Asproessor Philip Meyer (10) joked once, i you have a restaurant in crisis, youdont start oering a menu olesserquality. Its bizarre that this is requentlythe approach o news organizations, whose only strategy to keep readers seemsto be to worsen the product by laying o many o their best proessionals.

Jokes aside, the reasons why we should think more about how we producegraphics on war is not economics, but ethics and proessionalism. Ater all,the bottom line o this article is quite simple: the war or good inographics is,

rst o all, a war or good journalism.

NOES

(1) Some inquiries conducted years ater the sinking concluded thatthe explosion was caused by an internal re that aected the powder in theship. Others said that the explosion was the result o hitting a oating mine.Regardless, what it is not known to this day is i, as Hearst assumed, the minehad been set up by Spanish agents.

(2) According to Nasaw (2001), it is not clear that Hearst was talkingabout a conict between the US and Spain or about the hostilities between

the Spanish occupying orces and the Cuban rebels. Te telegrams thatHearst and Remington interchanged were never ound. Nasaw says that theclaim that Heart s actions were the main cause o the war is an overstatement.In his opinion, the war was inevitable, whether with or without Hearst noisyinterventions.

(3) Most inormation about the mobile WMD acilities was provided byjust one source, codenamed Curveball, held by German intelligence. Tereliability o Curveball had been questioned numerous times beore Powellsspeech. See Isiko and Corn (2006, p.182-190), Ricks (2006, p. 90-92), andRich (2006, p. 68-70). Te other major source was a National IntelligenceEstimate (NIE) rom 2002. Te Bush administrations pre-war accusationsagainst Iraq were analyzed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in

a review released in July, 2004. It concluded: Most o the major key judgmentsin the Intelligence Communitys October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate(NIE), Iraqs Continuing Programs or Weapons o Mass Destruction, eitheroverstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.

(5) Report by Te Program on International Policy, at the University oMaryland, October 2003, page 13

http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pd/oct03/IraqMedia_Oct03_rpt.pd

(6) See my article What Should You Show in a Graphic? in the Summer2006 issue oDesign magazine. It can be downloaded rom my website:

http://www.albertocairo.com/imagenes/articlesndsummer.pd

FIG 9 - Te New York imes

FIG 10 - Te New York imes


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(7) http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,956255,00.html

(8) http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/gracos/eb/s4/indexiindex.html

(9) An exception has to be made: the many meaningless piecesweaponry and aircrat during the war in Iraq.

(10) Meyer is the author o the hugely relevant Te Vanishing Newsp(2006), University o Missouri Press. Meyer is a proessor at the Schoo

Journalism - University o North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I didnt takequote rom the book.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Holmes, Nigel (1991) Pictorial maps . Watson-Guptill Publications.

Isiko, Michael and Corn, David (2006) Hubris: the Inside Story of SpScandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War. Tree Rivers Press.

Kull, Steven et. al. (2003) Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War.Program on International Policy, University o Maryland

Nasaw, David (2001) Te Chief: the life of William Randolph Hearst. FMariner Books.

Rich, Frank (2006) Te greatest story ever sold: the decline and fall of trfrom 9/11 to Katrina. Penguin Books.

Ricks, Tomas E. (2006) Fiasco: the American military adventure in IPenguin Books.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2004) Report on the Uintelligence communitys prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. htt

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5403731/


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