The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 26 | Number 3 | Jun 28 2010

1

Can Japanese Agriculture Overcome Dependence and Decline　日本の農業は依存と衰退を克服できるか

Yukie YOSHIKAWA

Can Japanese Agriculture OvercomeDependence and Decline

Yukie Yoshikawa

Agriculture in Japan suffers from a wide rangeof problems including a low food self-sufficiency rate of only 411 and an inflexiblefarmland market Rather than seriouslytackling these problems the Japanesegovernment has chosen to compensate farmersthrough import restrictions subsidies and pricesupports 2 These measures aimed ataddressing the widening urban-rural incomegap and assuring the Liberal DemocraticPartyrsquos rural base raised Japanese rice pricesto among the highest in the world and furtherreduced food self-sufficiency Japanrsquos farmsupport initiatives began in the 1960s and werepromoted by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei asldquoNihon Rettō Kaizō Ronrdquo (Remodeling theJapanese Archipelago) The large infrastructureprojects launched under this program providedpublic works jobs in rural and urban areas thatboosted incomes of rural communities but didlittle to stay the decline of agriculture

Moreover international pressure to openJapanrsquos agricultural markets increased moststrikingly during the Uruguay RoundAgreement in 1994 Japanese policies ofprotecting farmers through maintaining highmarket prices and high tariffs were targetedand Japan was forced to accept food imports atthe level imposed by the World TradeOrganization (WTO) in return for keeping hightariffs on rice and other products This has nothelped Japanrsquos agriculture however becausethe government simply chose to delay the

drastic changes necessary to enhance thecompetitiveness of Japanese farmersMeanwhile international demands for freetrade continued to increase

A chance for a drastic shift in Japanrsquosagricultural policy came in 2009 when theDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ousted thelong-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)from power The DPJ has proposed a newagricultural policy that would facilitate openingof Japanrsquos agricultural market whilecompensating farmers with direct subsidiesBut will the DPJrsquos policy work and how wellwill it serve Japanese agriculture This articlecompares LDP and DPJ policies and assessesthe future prospects for agriculture

I Problems of Japanese Agriculture

As Figure 1 shows Japan has the lowest rate offood self-sufficiency of developed countries

Figure 1 Food Self-Sufficiency RateComparisons

Source Japanese Ministry of Agriculture

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

2

Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) website(httpwwwmaffgojpjzyukyuzikyu_ritu013

html)

Note Food self-sufficiency rate = domesticfood production (including for export)

domestic food consumption

Japanrsquos low rate of food self-sufficiency isprincipally due to the fact that farm size is sosmall that it is almost impossible to make aliving by farming The result has been a declinein the number of farmers the aging of theagricultural population and a drop in theamount of land under cultivation Thepopulation of those who primarily engage infarming sharply declined from 118 million in1960 to only 19 million in 2009 with 61being 65 years of age or older Revenue fromfarming amounted to only a quarter of farmersrsquototal revenue in 2007 Agriculture accountedfor just 08 of GDP in 2007 And totalfarmland shrunk by nearly a quarter from 609hectares (ha) in 1961 at its height to 463 ha in20083

As shown in Figure 2 Japanese agriculturesuffers from an inflexible farmland marketrice-oriented government policies and the part-time farming cycle We examine each of theseproblems below

Figure 2 Root Causes of Japanrsquos Low FoodSelf-Sufficiency Rate

Inflexible Farmland Market

There are four main factors behind the low self-sufficiency rate high production costs lowrevenue (ie sales) government policyfailures and the combination of high marketprice for rice with high entry barriers The highproduction costs are in part a product ofinefficiencies associated with small-scalefarming Indeed in 2009 the average farmlandper farmer was only 141 ha except inHokkaidō4 (where it was 205 ha)5 While todayin Japan 10 ha or more is said to be the optimalfarmland size for full-time agriculture6 only07 of Japanese farmers have land this sizeThe vast majoritymdash92mdashhave 3 ha orless7 this has not changed much since the 1947Land Reform which created a structure inwhich 99 of Japanese farmers owned land ofthis size one considered optimal for farmers atthat time Due to technological improvementsleading to rising cost in agricultural tools andmachines more revenue or land is required tocover costs But while the minimum size offarmland to make living has increased by morethan 300 in 60 years the farmland per farmhousehold has not expanded

Why are Japanese farmers having a hard timeexpanding their farmlands The two majorreasons are the inflexible farmland market andthe government policy of reducing the amountof land cultivated as rice paddies (gentan) In

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

2

Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) website(httpwwwmaffgojpjzyukyuzikyu_ritu013

html)

Note Food self-sufficiency rate = domesticfood production (including for export)

domestic food consumption

Japanrsquos low rate of food self-sufficiency isprincipally due to the fact that farm size is sosmall that it is almost impossible to make aliving by farming The result has been a declinein the number of farmers the aging of theagricultural population and a drop in theamount of land under cultivation Thepopulation of those who primarily engage infarming sharply declined from 118 million in1960 to only 19 million in 2009 with 61being 65 years of age or older Revenue fromfarming amounted to only a quarter of farmersrsquototal revenue in 2007 Agriculture accountedfor just 08 of GDP in 2007 And totalfarmland shrunk by nearly a quarter from 609hectares (ha) in 1961 at its height to 463 ha in20083

As shown in Figure 2 Japanese agriculturesuffers from an inflexible farmland marketrice-oriented government policies and the part-time farming cycle We examine each of theseproblems below

Figure 2 Root Causes of Japanrsquos Low FoodSelf-Sufficiency Rate

Inflexible Farmland Market

There are four main factors behind the low self-sufficiency rate high production costs lowrevenue (ie sales) government policyfailures and the combination of high marketprice for rice with high entry barriers The highproduction costs are in part a product ofinefficiencies associated with small-scalefarming Indeed in 2009 the average farmlandper farmer was only 141 ha except inHokkaidō4 (where it was 205 ha)5 While todayin Japan 10 ha or more is said to be the optimalfarmland size for full-time agriculture6 only07 of Japanese farmers have land this sizeThe vast majoritymdash92mdashhave 3 ha orless7 this has not changed much since the 1947Land Reform which created a structure inwhich 99 of Japanese farmers owned land ofthis size one considered optimal for farmers atthat time Due to technological improvementsleading to rising cost in agricultural tools andmachines more revenue or land is required tocover costs But while the minimum size offarmland to make living has increased by morethan 300 in 60 years the farmland per farmhousehold has not expanded

Why are Japanese farmers having a hard timeexpanding their farmlands The two majorreasons are the inflexible farmland market andthe government policy of reducing the amountof land cultivated as rice paddies (gentan) In

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

3

addition the majority of farmers are already atthe retirement age of 65 or older with fewsuccessors8 According to governmentstatistics 390000 ha of farmland wasabandoned (not farmed but still owned byan(ex-)farmer household) in 20059 though theactual number is probably higher as farmersoften deny abandoning land in order to receivevarious incentives and to avoid higher landtaxes as the real estate tax law favorsfarmland Yet few younger Japanese farmerscan buy the abandoned land

Why It is because of the irony that ldquofarmlanditself not crops is the most profitable output inJapanese agriculturerdquo10 Farmers can expecttheir land to be sold at extraordinarily highprices when the government builds roadsairports and other public facilities or whendiscount stores and other companies buy theirland Good farmland is flat sunny and squarewith good access to roads and water Thesealso happen to be good conditions for bigshopping centers and factories11

Thus it makes sense for farmers especiallythose with good farmland to wait for suchoffers rather than to sell their land to fellowfarmers who cannot pay as much as shown inFigure 3 Landowners are even reluctant tolease land to other farmers for fear that therenters could demand a portion of the profit ifthe land is sold And farmers know the best wayto foster windfall offers pressure localpoliticians Indeed the best scenario forJapanese farmers is first keep the farmlandwhether they are actually farming or not inorder to receive various agricultural subsidiesand enjoy a low tax rate second pressure localpoliticians to start public works projects or topromote shopping centers so that they can selltheir farmland at premium prices third whenthe projects are approved remove their landrsquosstatus as farmland to facilitate its sale12 andfourth sell it

Figure 3 Wide Price Gaps in Land Sales by

Purpose National Average

(Unit 1000 yen per 10 a)

Source Zenkoku Nōgyō Kaigisho (NationalChamber of Agriculture) Denpata Baibai

Kakaku tō ni Kansuru Chōsa [Survey on theSales Prices of Farmland etc] FY 2007 edition(Tokyo National Chamber of Agriculture Fall

2008)

For this strategy to work farmers need weaklyenforced zoning regulations As noted byYamashita Kazuhito an ex-MAFF officialalthough Japan has two related laws designedto prevent the reduction of farmland they havenot functioned effectively1 3 The LocalAgricultural Committee (LAC) which is electedby farmers and represents the voice of localfarmers investigates and gives opinions onwhether a tract of farmland should be re-designated to allow its use for other purposesThe local officials listen to the Committee andthen make the final decisions14 Consideringthat local farmers elect these officials it is hardto ignore their opinions and collusion prevailsbetween the Committee and potential sellers offarmland who typically are both longstandingmembers of the same community15

Indeed in 2006 13413 ha of farmland was re-designated of which 559 became roadsrailways public facilities (including hospitalsand industrial commercial use) and servicefacilities As much as 49ndash55 of the re-designated farmland has undergone such re-designation yearly since 198616 when land

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

4

prices especially in cities and neighboringareas skyrocketed along with the bubbleeconomy While the MAFF statistics show thatthe amount of farmland re-designated for otherpurposes in 2006 was half of the amount at thepeak in 199117 Prof Gōdō Yoshihisa warns thatthe statistics do not include illegal re-designation and re-designation afterabandonment He estimates that this re-designation increased 15 times from1994ndash2003 and 14 times from 1995ndash2000 Thisimplies that the total shifting area of re-designated land has actually increased notdeclined18

The MAFF has been trying to tackle theinflexible farmland market by promotingleasing The revision of the Agricultural LandAct in 1970 and the projects to promoteeffective usage of farmland in 1975 badefarewell to the owner-farmer principle of landreform and allowed leasing if supported by theLAC19 Despite similar efforts made since thenthe rented land area grew only to 448481 ha in200520 slightly more than the 390000 ha offarmland abandoned in the same year and lessthan the amount of abandoned farmland during2007ndash200921 Despite revision of laws to favorlandowners renters can still refuse to leaveunless given money as compensation Thusfarmers with good land are reluctant to leasetheir lands22

Rice-Oriented Policies

The second main reason why full-time farmersare having trouble expanding their farmland isthe governmentrsquos gentan policy of reducing theamount of land cultivated as rice paddies Todate the gentan policy has reduced ricepaddies by 11 million ha Introduced in 1969the policy is intended to keep the price of ricehigh by reducing the rice supply All farmerswith the exceptions of those in the few regionsthat did not accept the gentan policy23 arerequired to shift part of their rice paddies toother crops according to the size of the rice

paddy (the larger the paddy the moreproduction has to be shifted) The MAFFspends 200 billion yen annually to compensate2 million farm households But this policy doesnot make sense because it encourages farmerswith smaller tracts of farmland to hold ontotheir land thus preventing consolidation offarmland into more economically viable farmsFor the LDP asking small farmers to abandontheir farmland was tantamount to politicalsuicide as these farmers constituted its loyalpower-base in rural regions that have beendisproportionately represented in theDiet24 Gentan which was primarily a politicalprogram aimed at shor ing up a localconstituency has prevented rationalization ofland use and kept farms inefficient

In the late 1950s due to the growing incomegap between urban laborers and rural farmersthe government took control of rice productionand distribution buying all rice crops at a highprice and selling them at a cheaper price Thispolicy obviously resulted in losses for thegovernment while providing incentive forfarmers to harvest as much rice as possibleFinally in 1969 the LDP gave up this costlypolicy By then the revenue gap between cityand rural dwellers had significantly declined25

The gentan policy also allowed interim dealersto trade rice freely bypassing the Food AgencyThis too benefited rice farmers because thefarmersrsquo association Japan Agriculture (JA)could sell rice more freely The governmentcontrol system however could not catch upwith changing consumer demand and anincreasing amount of illegally traded rice (yamigome or rice sold by anyone includingindividual farmers who bypassed JA) came tothe market Finally in 1995 the LDPabandoned the rice control system completelyallowing anyone to sell rice (legalizing yamigome) and to import rice under the UruguayRound Agreement In 2003 the governmentlimited its purchases of rice to reservepurposes26 Of course such purchases are still a

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

5

form of intervention to absorb the oversupplyof rice in the consumer market But the impactis much smaller than during the days of fullgovernmental control Today the gentan policybesides high tariffs is the primary meansgovernment uses to maintain high rice prices27

While rice farming has long enjoyed significantLDP support other products including wheatbeans and cereals for cattle feed are virtuallyignored and most of these products areimported Despite the consistent increase in theconsumption of bread and the decline in theconsumption of rice (this ldquoWesternizationrdquo ofthe Japanese diet is the MAFFrsquos official excusefor Japanrsquos low food self-sufficiency rate) noserious discussion was undertaken in the MAFFon increasing wheat production The result wasthat the price of rice remained high while theconsumer wheat price (the sale price of thegovernment to the milling companies) was keptlow as shown in Figure 428 Not surprisinglyJapanrsquos high priced rice surplus grew while thenation grew ever more dependent on theimport of wheat and other grains

Figure 4 High Rice Price Low Wheat Price

(Unit yen 60Kg)

Note The prices refer to the sales prices of thegovernment to private distributors

Source MAFF Shokuryō Tōkei Nenpō [FoodStatistical Yearbook] 2005 edition

(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu1TokID=I017ampTokKbn=BampNen=2005ampHNen=H

17) International Rice Research Institutewebsite

(httpbetairriorgindexphpOnline-Queryhtml) World Bank World Development Indicators

Online (httpdatabankworldbankorg)

Partly as a result of price disparities riceconsumption continued to decrease from 134million tons at its peak in 1963 to 87 milliontons in 2008 while wheat consumption grewfrom 6 million tons in 1960 to 85 million tonsin 200829 as shown in Figure 530

Figure 5 Comparison of Rice and WheatProduction and Consumption

(Unit 1000t)

Source MAFF website(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu2TokID=H001ampTokKbn=CampTokID1=H001C-014ampTokKbnName=92B78AFA97DD9

4N939D8CvTOP)

The LDP stubbornly protected rice from foreigncompetition in return for surrendering mostother items At the Uruguay Round Agreementin 1995 the Japanese government acceptedimporting from 4 (1995) to 8 (2000) ofdomestic rice for consumption according to theminimum access requirement in return for notopening the rice market (no private entity was

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

4

prices especially in cities and neighboringareas skyrocketed along with the bubbleeconomy While the MAFF statistics show thatthe amount of farmland re-designated for otherpurposes in 2006 was half of the amount at thepeak in 199117 Prof Gōdō Yoshihisa warns thatthe statistics do not include illegal re-designation and re-designation afterabandonment He estimates that this re-designation increased 15 times from1994ndash2003 and 14 times from 1995ndash2000 Thisimplies that the total shifting area of re-designated land has actually increased notdeclined18

The MAFF has been trying to tackle theinflexible farmland market by promotingleasing The revision of the Agricultural LandAct in 1970 and the projects to promoteeffective usage of farmland in 1975 badefarewell to the owner-farmer principle of landreform and allowed leasing if supported by theLAC19 Despite similar efforts made since thenthe rented land area grew only to 448481 ha in200520 slightly more than the 390000 ha offarmland abandoned in the same year and lessthan the amount of abandoned farmland during2007ndash200921 Despite revision of laws to favorlandowners renters can still refuse to leaveunless given money as compensation Thusfarmers with good land are reluctant to leasetheir lands22

Rice-Oriented Policies

The second main reason why full-time farmersare having trouble expanding their farmland isthe governmentrsquos gentan policy of reducing theamount of land cultivated as rice paddies Todate the gentan policy has reduced ricepaddies by 11 million ha Introduced in 1969the policy is intended to keep the price of ricehigh by reducing the rice supply All farmerswith the exceptions of those in the few regionsthat did not accept the gentan policy23 arerequired to shift part of their rice paddies toother crops according to the size of the rice

paddy (the larger the paddy the moreproduction has to be shifted) The MAFFspends 200 billion yen annually to compensate2 million farm households But this policy doesnot make sense because it encourages farmerswith smaller tracts of farmland to hold ontotheir land thus preventing consolidation offarmland into more economically viable farmsFor the LDP asking small farmers to abandontheir farmland was tantamount to politicalsuicide as these farmers constituted its loyalpower-base in rural regions that have beendisproportionately represented in theDiet24 Gentan which was primarily a politicalprogram aimed at shor ing up a localconstituency has prevented rationalization ofland use and kept farms inefficient

In the late 1950s due to the growing incomegap between urban laborers and rural farmersthe government took control of rice productionand distribution buying all rice crops at a highprice and selling them at a cheaper price Thispolicy obviously resulted in losses for thegovernment while providing incentive forfarmers to harvest as much rice as possibleFinally in 1969 the LDP gave up this costlypolicy By then the revenue gap between cityand rural dwellers had significantly declined25

The gentan policy also allowed interim dealersto trade rice freely bypassing the Food AgencyThis too benefited rice farmers because thefarmersrsquo association Japan Agriculture (JA)could sell rice more freely The governmentcontrol system however could not catch upwith changing consumer demand and anincreasing amount of illegally traded rice (yamigome or rice sold by anyone includingindividual farmers who bypassed JA) came tothe market Finally in 1995 the LDPabandoned the rice control system completelyallowing anyone to sell rice (legalizing yamigome) and to import rice under the UruguayRound Agreement In 2003 the governmentlimited its purchases of rice to reservepurposes26 Of course such purchases are still a

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

5

form of intervention to absorb the oversupplyof rice in the consumer market But the impactis much smaller than during the days of fullgovernmental control Today the gentan policybesides high tariffs is the primary meansgovernment uses to maintain high rice prices27

While rice farming has long enjoyed significantLDP support other products including wheatbeans and cereals for cattle feed are virtuallyignored and most of these products areimported Despite the consistent increase in theconsumption of bread and the decline in theconsumption of rice (this ldquoWesternizationrdquo ofthe Japanese diet is the MAFFrsquos official excusefor Japanrsquos low food self-sufficiency rate) noserious discussion was undertaken in the MAFFon increasing wheat production The result wasthat the price of rice remained high while theconsumer wheat price (the sale price of thegovernment to the milling companies) was keptlow as shown in Figure 428 Not surprisinglyJapanrsquos high priced rice surplus grew while thenation grew ever more dependent on theimport of wheat and other grains

Figure 4 High Rice Price Low Wheat Price

(Unit yen 60Kg)

Note The prices refer to the sales prices of thegovernment to private distributors

Source MAFF Shokuryō Tōkei Nenpō [FoodStatistical Yearbook] 2005 edition

(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu1TokID=I017ampTokKbn=BampNen=2005ampHNen=H

17) International Rice Research Institutewebsite

(httpbetairriorgindexphpOnline-Queryhtml) World Bank World Development Indicators

Online (httpdatabankworldbankorg)

Partly as a result of price disparities riceconsumption continued to decrease from 134million tons at its peak in 1963 to 87 milliontons in 2008 while wheat consumption grewfrom 6 million tons in 1960 to 85 million tonsin 200829 as shown in Figure 530

Figure 5 Comparison of Rice and WheatProduction and Consumption

(Unit 1000t)

Source MAFF website(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu2TokID=H001ampTokKbn=CampTokID1=H001C-014ampTokKbnName=92B78AFA97DD9

4N939D8CvTOP)

The LDP stubbornly protected rice from foreigncompetition in return for surrendering mostother items At the Uruguay Round Agreementin 1995 the Japanese government acceptedimporting from 4 (1995) to 8 (2000) ofdomestic rice for consumption according to theminimum access requirement in return for notopening the rice market (no private entity was

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

5

form of intervention to absorb the oversupplyof rice in the consumer market But the impactis much smaller than during the days of fullgovernmental control Today the gentan policybesides high tariffs is the primary meansgovernment uses to maintain high rice prices27

While rice farming has long enjoyed significantLDP support other products including wheatbeans and cereals for cattle feed are virtuallyignored and most of these products areimported Despite the consistent increase in theconsumption of bread and the decline in theconsumption of rice (this ldquoWesternizationrdquo ofthe Japanese diet is the MAFFrsquos official excusefor Japanrsquos low food self-sufficiency rate) noserious discussion was undertaken in the MAFFon increasing wheat production The result wasthat the price of rice remained high while theconsumer wheat price (the sale price of thegovernment to the milling companies) was keptlow as shown in Figure 428 Not surprisinglyJapanrsquos high priced rice surplus grew while thenation grew ever more dependent on theimport of wheat and other grains

Figure 4 High Rice Price Low Wheat Price

(Unit yen 60Kg)

Note The prices refer to the sales prices of thegovernment to private distributors

Source MAFF Shokuryō Tōkei Nenpō [FoodStatistical Yearbook] 2005 edition

(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu1TokID=I017ampTokKbn=BampNen=2005ampHNen=H

17) International Rice Research Institutewebsite

(httpbetairriorgindexphpOnline-Queryhtml) World Bank World Development Indicators

Online (httpdatabankworldbankorg)

Partly as a result of price disparities riceconsumption continued to decrease from 134million tons at its peak in 1963 to 87 milliontons in 2008 while wheat consumption grewfrom 6 million tons in 1960 to 85 million tonsin 200829 as shown in Figure 530

Figure 5 Comparison of Rice and WheatProduction and Consumption

(Unit 1000t)

Source MAFF website(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu2TokID=H001ampTokKbn=CampTokID1=H001C-014ampTokKbnName=92B78AFA97DD9

4N939D8CvTOP)

The LDP stubbornly protected rice from foreigncompetition in return for surrendering mostother items At the Uruguay Round Agreementin 1995 the Japanese government acceptedimporting from 4 (1995) to 8 (2000) ofdomestic rice for consumption according to theminimum access requirement in return for notopening the rice market (no private entity was

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

6

allowed to import foreign rice) In contrast allother products whose trade the governmenthad full control over (no private entity wasallowed to import them) were allowed on theopen market In 1999 Japan agreed to open therice market in exchange for reducing theimport quota to 7231 Yet the rice tariff(778) is extremely high By comparison theaverage tariff of agricultural products is1232 Some crops with low self-sufficiencyrates also have high tariffs including wheat(252) barley (256) and red beans(403) 3 3 Yet rice enjoys more robustprotection

As a result of these rice-oriented policiesJapanrsquos food self-sufficiency rate today is 100for rice 14 for wheat 26 for cereals forfeed and 9 for beans34

Iron Triangle of LDP-MAFF-JA

Then why does the LDP go to all this trouble tofocus on rice We can find the answer in thestructural collusion among the LDP MAFF andJA as shown in Figure II-6

Figure 6 Iron Triangle of Collusion ofLDP-MAFF-JA

Note 1 This figure is based on YamashitaKazuhito ldquoMinshutō no Manifesuto no Mondai[Problems of the DPJ Manifesto]rdquo August 20

2009 Tokyo Foundation website(httpwwwtkfdorjpresearchsub1phpid=2

47)

Note 2 The lighter lines of Full-Time Farmerswith JA show weaker link than those of Part-

Time Farmers

For most farmers lacking economies of scalefarming is not sufficient to make a livingforcing 80 of farmers to work part-time35 Thisdiscourages younger generations to succeed asfarmers and invest their time to becomesuccessful farmers including analyzing themarket producing value-added productspromoting their products and expanding theirsales networks Instead they look to the JAwhich advises them about how much to plantwater and fertilize sellsrents them all kinds ofagricultural equipment sells them fertilizerand seeds and buys agricultural products fromthem For JA the commission it gets from salesof these products and crops is significant ThusJA has a strong incentive to keep the rice pricehigh so that their sales commissions also willbe high36

In order to maximize its profit JA approacheslocal politicians namely the LDP Diet memberswho have close connections with the MAFFalso known as Nōrin-zoku asking them topressure the MAFF to keep the rice price highThe LDP Nōrin-zoku happily do so in return forthe farmersrsquo votes The MAFF in returnreceives larger budgets37

II LDP Agricultural Policies

What has MAFF done so far to tackle theseproblems Below we will discuss the three mostimportant issues farmland reform rice-oriented policies and the LDP-MAFF-JA IronTriangle

Farmland Reform

As we have seen the root problem of Japanrsquosagriculture lies in the inflexible farmland

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

7

market which forces most farmers to be part-timers who end up supporting the JA and theLDP who in return enforce policies to keep theprice of rice high Full-time farmers must beable to obtain or rent more farmland in order tohave enough land to make economic sensemeaning that a majority of current part-timefarmers need to be encouraged to sell orleasetheir lands Farmers can only achieveeconomies of scale and increase productivitythrough consolidation of landholdings at leastto the extent thatthey can make a living byfarming

Unfortunately LDP administrations neveraddressed this issue Given that part-timefarmers who want to sell their land at highprices for non-farm uses represent a keyconstituency for the LDP the party balked atreforms aimed at consolidating farm holdingsIn addition the JA facilitates such profitablenon-farm use land transactions because thecash from the sales are deposited in JA bankaccounts In this context it has been difficultfor the MAFF to strictly enforce zoning lawsthat would curtail the lucrative practice of re-designating farmland for non-farm use Themost the ministry can do is facilitate landleasing especially of abandoned land andencourage cultivating twice a year andharvesting different crops from the samefarmland The New Agriculture Policy 2008mentioned that the ministry would eradicateabandoned land by 201138

Changing Tactics of Rice-Oriented PoliciesIntroducing Direct Subsidy

The government has mostly ignored the cost ofits rice-oriented policies instead of endingthese policies including gentan whichencouraged farmers to produce more rice thanJapan could consume it desperately sought toexpand domestic consumption of rice Forexample it shot TV commercials encouragingpeople to eat rice for breakfast (mezamashigohan campaign) encouraged local

consumption of local products (chisan chishō)urged using rice powder (komeko) in bread andpasta and producing rice for feeding cattle andpromoted exports of Japanese agriculturalproducts In order to reduce production costsit also supported eco-feeding (feeding cattleleftover food) and using rice straw for fuel39

The only significant exception is the policychange that came with the internationalpressure o f the WTOrsquos Doha Roundnegotiations to comply with authorized policiesto support farmers (sticking with unauthorizedpolicies brought penalties including a highmandatory ratio of minimum access imports)In 2007 the MAFF started a new direct subsidysystem (Hinmoku Ōdanteki Keiei Antei Seisaku)that would comply with the WTO This systemprovides two kinds of subsidies One is aimedat compensating for the gap in production costscompared with those of the primary source ofJapanrsquos imports the United States for fourproducts wheat soybeans sugar beets andpotato to produce starch The other providesrevenue for farmers producing rice wheatsoybeans sugar beets and potato to producestarch in case of poor harvests due to badweather or price plunges Further only farmersand farming organizations with 4 ha or more(10 ha or more in Hokkaidō) were entitled tothe subsidies40 in order to encourage theconcentration of farmland among large-scalefarmers

However this LDP policy proved to beunpopular The DPJ victory in the Upper Houseelection in 2007 was partly due to its proposalfor another direct subsidy system (KobetsuShotoku Hoshō Seido) This one targeted morefarmers (there were no conditions on farmlandsize) with a generous budget of 1 trillion yencompared with 142 billion yen budget41 for theMAFFrsquos new direct subsidy system in200742 Soon the LDP loosened the strictcondition on farm size for eligibility toparticipate in the Hinmoku Ōdanteki KeieiAntei Seisaku system so that smaller-sized

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

8

farmers could benefit if authorized by localgovernment43 and the budget was increased to224 billion yen in 200844 But this new policywas doomed with the LDPrsquos loss in the 2009Lower House election which also had moresignificant consequences as we discuss below

III DPJ Agricultural Policies

A Fatal Blow to the LDP-MAFF-JA IronTriangle The DPJrsquos New Agricultural Policy

The iron triangle of the LDP MAFF and JAseemed to be robust enough to last foreverHowever one element the LDP crumbled withits great loss in the general election of August2009 The new DPJ administration succeeded indefeating the LDP in rural areas which hadbeen its traditional power base partly byproposing Kobetsu Shotoku Hoshō Seido[System to Compensate Farming Households]

Kobetsu Shotoku Hoshō Seido is intended toencourage Japanese farmers to cultivateagricultural products whose production costsare higher than their prices including rice andwheat and to invest more in agriculture inorder to improve quality and aid other businessefforts By guaranteeing to pay the differencebetween the cost of production and marketprices the system encourages farmers to plantcrops other than rice Furthermore byproviding incentives for farmers to produceaccording to the governmentrsquos production planthe policy could contribute to a higher foodself-sufficiency rate45 Farmers can even selltheir products at prices that can compete withtheir foreign counterparts (This is why the DPJinitially proposed to sign a long-debated FreeTrade Agreement (FTA) with the United StatesSubsequently it backed away from this boldproposal instead merely proposing that Japanldquoexpedite FTA negotiationsrdquo fearing a voterbacklash in the August 2009 election) The shiftfrom price support to direct subsidy isacceptable to farmers who do not care whethertheir revenue comes from a high price of rice

or from a direct subsidy as long as theirincome is assured It is only the JA that wantsto keep the price of rice high46

Of course there was an underlying factor inthe crumbling of the triangle JA has beenlosing power Gōmon posits the followingreasons 1) declining profit in its financialsector which has been its major revenuesource 2) the electoral reform of 1994 whichnarrowed the electoral district voting disparitybetween city dwellers and rural people 3)liberalization of the agricultural productsdistribution system (legalizing yami gome)where JA played a dominant role 4) anincrease in criticism of public works in ruralareas making it difficult for JA to bring in suchprojects and 5) the shrinking farmingpopulation undermined its political power47

Further farmers are not always happy with JAand its inefficient practices They are frustratedabout its fertilizers and other agriculturalmaterials that are more expensive than those ingarden stores partly because JA has to providesuch merchandise in remote regions at thesame price as more central areas and thesecosts had to be shared among all farmersFarmers also complain about JArsquos lowpurchasing prices for their crops which do notallow them to make a living by farming aloneThus in 1992 when the farmers association(nōkyō) renamed itself JA a satire was heardldquoJA sayonarardquo (ldquojardquo can mean ldquogood byerdquo inJapanese)48 Thus if there was an attractivealternative to JA many farmers would welcomeit

Therefore the DPJ appealed directly to thefarmers while damaging JA which it saw asjust a power broker for the LDP The subsidieswould bypass JA and provide direct governmentto support to farmers

Prospects for DPJ Agricultural Policy

It is too early to evaluate the DPJrsquos proposedpolicyLittle is really known about it other than

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

9

what is in MAFFrsquos FY2010 budget which theHatoyama cabinet approved on Christmas Dayof 2009 But the budget suggests that thelargest change will be in the rice-orientedpolicies namely the DPJrsquos direct subsidysystem There will be a transitional budget (562billion yen) before full introduction of KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido in 2011

In FY2010 the government will introduceKobetsu Shotoku HoshōSeido for rice as amodel case and another direct subsidy systemto farmers who cultivate crops with low self-sufficiency rates including wheat (SuidenRikatsuyō Jikyūritsu Kōjō Jigyō) KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido for rice would provide adirect subsidy of 15000 yen per 10 ares(a)49 (the average gap between the rice priceand the production cost) as well as for the gapbetween the actual price and average price asshown in Figure 7 The subsidy would go to ricefarmers who consent to produce according tothe production plan agreed upon with thegovernment In return the gentan policy wasquietly removed from MAFFrsquos budgetdocument for FY 201050 This farewell to thegentan policy seems to be a big step forward inrectifying the distorted demand-supplyrelat ionship and undermining the JAstranglehold on the farming sector

Figure 7 DPJrsquos Direct Subsidy System onRice

Note Drafted by Yukie Yoshikawa based onMAFF Heisei 22 Nendo Nōrin Suisan Kankei

Yosan no Shuyō Jikō [Major Points in theFY2010 Budget on Agriculture Forestry and

Fishery] MAFF website(httpwwwmaffgojpjbudget2010pdf4-000

pdf)

Suiden Rikatsuyō Jikyūritsu Kōjō Jigyō wouldprovide direct subsidies to farmers whocultivate wheat barley soybean feed cereals(35000 yen10 a) or rice for energy or feed(80000 yen10 a) or who cultivate buckwheator rapeseed (20000 yen10 a)51 The DPJexpects that by subsidizing these cropsfarmers can earn as much as rice farmers whileboosting food self-sufficiency

At least theoretically these policies appearpromising as 1) they would encourage ricefarmers to have larger fields and improveproductivity 2) without the gentan policywhich limited production of rice the rice pricewould decline and 3) encouragement toproduce crops other than rice would enhancethe national food self-sufficiency rate Farmerscould profit more by lowering actual costsbelow the average cost that the KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido policy assumes and theeasiest way to do so would likely be throughachieving economies of scale namely procuringmore farmland Although the fixed amount ofthe subsidies does not seem likely to raiseproductivity if a farmer sells surplus ricebeyond the amount initially planned as rice forcattle-feeding heshe can increase profit byreceiving subsidies from both Kobetsu ShotokuHoshōSeido and Suiden Rikatsuyō JikyūritsuKōjō Jigyō

Yamashita Kazuhito however questions thesemerits He argues that the DPJ plan is notintended to increase productivity Rather likethe gentan policy he argues that it is intendedto decrease rice production as the DPJ plans togive subsidies for ldquoreducing production to 6tons of rice for farmers who can produce 10

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

8

farmers could benefit if authorized by localgovernment43 and the budget was increased to224 billion yen in 200844 But this new policywas doomed with the LDPrsquos loss in the 2009Lower House election which also had moresignificant consequences as we discuss below

III DPJ Agricultural Policies

A Fatal Blow to the LDP-MAFF-JA IronTriangle The DPJrsquos New Agricultural Policy

The iron triangle of the LDP MAFF and JAseemed to be robust enough to last foreverHowever one element the LDP crumbled withits great loss in the general election of August2009 The new DPJ administration succeeded indefeating the LDP in rural areas which hadbeen its traditional power base partly byproposing Kobetsu Shotoku Hoshō Seido[System to Compensate Farming Households]

Kobetsu Shotoku Hoshō Seido is intended toencourage Japanese farmers to cultivateagricultural products whose production costsare higher than their prices including rice andwheat and to invest more in agriculture inorder to improve quality and aid other businessefforts By guaranteeing to pay the differencebetween the cost of production and marketprices the system encourages farmers to plantcrops other than rice Furthermore byproviding incentives for farmers to produceaccording to the governmentrsquos production planthe policy could contribute to a higher foodself-sufficiency rate45 Farmers can even selltheir products at prices that can compete withtheir foreign counterparts (This is why the DPJinitially proposed to sign a long-debated FreeTrade Agreement (FTA) with the United StatesSubsequently it backed away from this boldproposal instead merely proposing that Japanldquoexpedite FTA negotiationsrdquo fearing a voterbacklash in the August 2009 election) The shiftfrom price support to direct subsidy isacceptable to farmers who do not care whethertheir revenue comes from a high price of rice

or from a direct subsidy as long as theirincome is assured It is only the JA that wantsto keep the price of rice high46

Of course there was an underlying factor inthe crumbling of the triangle JA has beenlosing power Gōmon posits the followingreasons 1) declining profit in its financialsector which has been its major revenuesource 2) the electoral reform of 1994 whichnarrowed the electoral district voting disparitybetween city dwellers and rural people 3)liberalization of the agricultural productsdistribution system (legalizing yami gome)where JA played a dominant role 4) anincrease in criticism of public works in ruralareas making it difficult for JA to bring in suchprojects and 5) the shrinking farmingpopulation undermined its political power47

Further farmers are not always happy with JAand its inefficient practices They are frustratedabout its fertilizers and other agriculturalmaterials that are more expensive than those ingarden stores partly because JA has to providesuch merchandise in remote regions at thesame price as more central areas and thesecosts had to be shared among all farmersFarmers also complain about JArsquos lowpurchasing prices for their crops which do notallow them to make a living by farming aloneThus in 1992 when the farmers association(nōkyō) renamed itself JA a satire was heardldquoJA sayonarardquo (ldquojardquo can mean ldquogood byerdquo inJapanese)48 Thus if there was an attractivealternative to JA many farmers would welcomeit

Therefore the DPJ appealed directly to thefarmers while damaging JA which it saw asjust a power broker for the LDP The subsidieswould bypass JA and provide direct governmentto support to farmers

Prospects for DPJ Agricultural Policy

It is too early to evaluate the DPJrsquos proposedpolicyLittle is really known about it other than

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

9

what is in MAFFrsquos FY2010 budget which theHatoyama cabinet approved on Christmas Dayof 2009 But the budget suggests that thelargest change will be in the rice-orientedpolicies namely the DPJrsquos direct subsidysystem There will be a transitional budget (562billion yen) before full introduction of KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido in 2011

In FY2010 the government will introduceKobetsu Shotoku HoshōSeido for rice as amodel case and another direct subsidy systemto farmers who cultivate crops with low self-sufficiency rates including wheat (SuidenRikatsuyō Jikyūritsu Kōjō Jigyō) KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido for rice would provide adirect subsidy of 15000 yen per 10 ares(a)49 (the average gap between the rice priceand the production cost) as well as for the gapbetween the actual price and average price asshown in Figure 7 The subsidy would go to ricefarmers who consent to produce according tothe production plan agreed upon with thegovernment In return the gentan policy wasquietly removed from MAFFrsquos budgetdocument for FY 201050 This farewell to thegentan policy seems to be a big step forward inrectifying the distorted demand-supplyrelat ionship and undermining the JAstranglehold on the farming sector

Figure 7 DPJrsquos Direct Subsidy System onRice

Note Drafted by Yukie Yoshikawa based onMAFF Heisei 22 Nendo Nōrin Suisan Kankei

Yosan no Shuyō Jikō [Major Points in theFY2010 Budget on Agriculture Forestry and

Fishery] MAFF website(httpwwwmaffgojpjbudget2010pdf4-000

pdf)

Suiden Rikatsuyō Jikyūritsu Kōjō Jigyō wouldprovide direct subsidies to farmers whocultivate wheat barley soybean feed cereals(35000 yen10 a) or rice for energy or feed(80000 yen10 a) or who cultivate buckwheator rapeseed (20000 yen10 a)51 The DPJexpects that by subsidizing these cropsfarmers can earn as much as rice farmers whileboosting food self-sufficiency

At least theoretically these policies appearpromising as 1) they would encourage ricefarmers to have larger fields and improveproductivity 2) without the gentan policywhich limited production of rice the rice pricewould decline and 3) encouragement toproduce crops other than rice would enhancethe national food self-sufficiency rate Farmerscould profit more by lowering actual costsbelow the average cost that the KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido policy assumes and theeasiest way to do so would likely be throughachieving economies of scale namely procuringmore farmland Although the fixed amount ofthe subsidies does not seem likely to raiseproductivity if a farmer sells surplus ricebeyond the amount initially planned as rice forcattle-feeding heshe can increase profit byreceiving subsidies from both Kobetsu ShotokuHoshōSeido and Suiden Rikatsuyō JikyūritsuKōjō Jigyō

Yamashita Kazuhito however questions thesemerits He argues that the DPJ plan is notintended to increase productivity Rather likethe gentan policy he argues that it is intendedto decrease rice production as the DPJ plans togive subsidies for ldquoreducing production to 6tons of rice for farmers who can produce 10

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

9

what is in MAFFrsquos FY2010 budget which theHatoyama cabinet approved on Christmas Dayof 2009 But the budget suggests that thelargest change will be in the rice-orientedpolicies namely the DPJrsquos direct subsidysystem There will be a transitional budget (562billion yen) before full introduction of KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido in 2011

In FY2010 the government will introduceKobetsu Shotoku HoshōSeido for rice as amodel case and another direct subsidy systemto farmers who cultivate crops with low self-sufficiency rates including wheat (SuidenRikatsuyō Jikyūritsu Kōjō Jigyō) KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido for rice would provide adirect subsidy of 15000 yen per 10 ares(a)49 (the average gap between the rice priceand the production cost) as well as for the gapbetween the actual price and average price asshown in Figure 7 The subsidy would go to ricefarmers who consent to produce according tothe production plan agreed upon with thegovernment In return the gentan policy wasquietly removed from MAFFrsquos budgetdocument for FY 201050 This farewell to thegentan policy seems to be a big step forward inrectifying the distorted demand-supplyrelat ionship and undermining the JAstranglehold on the farming sector

Figure 7 DPJrsquos Direct Subsidy System onRice

Note Drafted by Yukie Yoshikawa based onMAFF Heisei 22 Nendo Nōrin Suisan Kankei

Yosan no Shuyō Jikō [Major Points in theFY2010 Budget on Agriculture Forestry and

Fishery] MAFF website(httpwwwmaffgojpjbudget2010pdf4-000

pdf)

Suiden Rikatsuyō Jikyūritsu Kōjō Jigyō wouldprovide direct subsidies to farmers whocultivate wheat barley soybean feed cereals(35000 yen10 a) or rice for energy or feed(80000 yen10 a) or who cultivate buckwheator rapeseed (20000 yen10 a)51 The DPJexpects that by subsidizing these cropsfarmers can earn as much as rice farmers whileboosting food self-sufficiency

At least theoretically these policies appearpromising as 1) they would encourage ricefarmers to have larger fields and improveproductivity 2) without the gentan policywhich limited production of rice the rice pricewould decline and 3) encouragement toproduce crops other than rice would enhancethe national food self-sufficiency rate Farmerscould profit more by lowering actual costsbelow the average cost that the KobetsuShotoku HoshōSeido policy assumes and theeasiest way to do so would likely be throughachieving economies of scale namely procuringmore farmland Although the fixed amount ofthe subsidies does not seem likely to raiseproductivity if a farmer sells surplus ricebeyond the amount initially planned as rice forcattle-feeding heshe can increase profit byreceiving subsidies from both Kobetsu ShotokuHoshōSeido and Suiden Rikatsuyō JikyūritsuKōjō Jigyō

Yamashita Kazuhito however questions thesemerits He argues that the DPJ plan is notintended to increase productivity Rather likethe gentan policy he argues that it is intendedto decrease rice production as the DPJ plans togive subsidies for ldquoreducing production to 6tons of rice for farmers who can produce 10

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

10

tonsrdquo52

Moreover the DPJ policies do not addresseffectively the need to expand the amount offarmland under cultivation do not promoteconsolidation of landholdings and do nottighten enforcement of zoning restrictionsRather part-time farmers would be assured ofreceiving the same revenue from the directsubsidy as before and thus small-scale farmerswill choose to continue farming rather than selltheir farmland Nor do the new policies helpfull-time farmers acquire more farmland53 Thispolicy may help the DPJ woo small-scalefarmers away from the LDP but it will notpromote significant agricultural reform Otherthan the changes mentioned above the DPJproposal does not represent much improvementon LDP policies although it does subsidize thecost of reviving abandoned land into productivefarmland54

Thus DPJ policy may lead to somewhat lowerrice prices while lowering rice productionthrough its new direct subsidy system andfacilitating the opening of Japanrsquos agriculturemarket so that Japan can promote FTAs withthe US and other countries which Japanesebusiness circles eagerly promote Thisrepresents a wasted opportunity to initiatemore sweeping and urgently needed farmlandreforms

Yukie Yoshikawa is a Senior Research Fellow atthe Edwin O Reischauer Center for East AsianStudies School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS) The Johns Hopkins UniversityShe wrote this article for The Asia-PacificJournal

Recommended citation Yukie Yoshikawa CanJapanese Agriculture Overcome Dependenceand Decline The Asia-Pacific Journal 26-3-10June 28 2010

Notes

1 2008 figure Ministry of Agriculture Forestryand F ishery Japan (MAFF) webs i te(httpwwwmaffgojpjzyukyuzikyu_ritupdfsankou4pdf)

2 The Republic of Korea (ROK) followed Japanaround the late 1980s For example in Japanthe percentage of the national budget devotedto agriculture doubled agriculturersquos portion ofthe GDP for the first time in the late 1960swhile in the ROK that happened in the 2000sIn China in the mid-1970s Deng Xiaopingannounced that China was entering the firststage of modernization under the slogan of theFour Modernizations claiming that those whocould get rich quickly (including in the coastalregion such as Shenzhen) should indeed getrich Signs of the transition to the second stagein China are starting to show today See HaraTakeshi and Waseda Daigaku Taiwan Kenkyūjoed Gurōbarizēshon-ka no Higashi Ajia noNōgyō to Nōson Nichi Chū Kan Tai noHikaku [East Asian Agriculture and RuralVillages under Globalization Comparison ofJapan China Korea and Taiwan] (TokyoFujiwara Shoten 2008) 167 Chen ZhonghuanCrisis of Chinese Agriculture and the Meaningof its Transition into Protection Policy (TokyoHihyōsha 2008) 3

3 M A F F w e b s i t e(httpwwwmaffgojpjtokeisihyoindexhtml)

4 The Japanese archipelagos except Hokkaidōare mountainous or hilly (73 of the total areahas these features) and have few plainsHokkaidō is regarded as exceptional Thus thefigures used in this article exclude Hokkaidōunless otherwise indicated

5 T h e 2 0 0 9 f i g u r e M A F F w e b s i t e(httpwwwmaffgojpjtokeisihyoindexhtml)

6 Gōdō Yoshihisa Nihon no Shoku to Nō Kikino Honshitsu [Food and Agriculture in JapanCore of Crisis] (Tokyo NTT Shuppan 2006)

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

11

134

7 M A F F F a r m l a n d C e n s u s(httpwwwmaffgojpjtokeicensusafc2010report05_archiveshtml) 2005

8 T h e 2 0 0 9 f i g u r e M A F F w e b s i t e(httpwwwmaffgojpjtokeisihyoindexhtml)

9 M A F F w e b s i t e(httpwwwmaffgojpjtokeisihyoindexhtml)

10 Gōdō Yoshihisa Nihon no Shoku to Nō Kikino Honshitsu [Food and Agriculture in JapanCore of Crisis] (Tokyo NTT Shuppan 2006)146

11 Ibid 131-4

12 Ibid

13 Yamashita Kazuhito ldquoLet Corporations Play aRole in Reviving Japanese AgriculturerdquoDecember 2 2008 Tokyo Foundation website(httpwwwtkfdorjpresearchsub1phpid=210)

1 4 M A F F w e b s i t e(httpwwwmaffgojpwwwcounsilcounsil_contkeieinogyoiinkai1siryou21pdf)

15 Gōdō Yoshihisa Nihon no Shoku to Nō Kikino Honshitsu [Food and Agriculture in JapanCore of Crisis] (Tokyo NTT Shuppan 2006)138-9

1 6 M in i s t r y o f I n te rna l A f f a i r s andCommunications Statistics Bureau websiteL i n k s 1(httpwwwstatgojpdatanihonzuhyoun07009 0 0 x l s ) 2(httpwwwstatgojpdatachoukizuhyou07-12xls)

17 Ibid

18 Gōdō Yoshihisa Nihon no Shoku to Nō Kikino Honshitsu [Food and Agriculture in Japan

Core of Crisis] (Tokyo NTT Shuppan 2006)147-8

19 Ibid 156-9

2 0 M A F F F a r m l a n d C e n s u s(httpwwwmaffgojpjtokeicensusafc2010report05_archiveshtml) 2005

21 MAFF ldquoKōchi Menseki [Farmland Areas]v a r i o u s y e a r s M A F F w e b s i t e(httpwwwmaffgojpwwwinfobunruibun01html)

22 Gōdō Yoshihisa Nihon no Shoku to Nō Kikino Honshitsu [Food and Agriculture in JapanCore of Crisis] (Tokyo NTT Shuppan 2006)157-8

23 Includes well-known expensive rice brandfarmers in Uonuma city Niigata

24 Yamashita Kazuhito ldquoThe Pros and Cons ofJapans Rice Acreage-Reduction PolicyrdquoOctober 07 2008 Tokyo Foundation website(httpwwwtokyofoundationorgenarticles2008the-pros-and-cons-of-japans-rice-acreage-reduction-policy)

25 Gōdō Yoshihisa Nihon no Shoku to Nō Kikino Honshitsu [Food and Agriculture in JapanCore of Crisis] (Tokyo NTT Shuppan 2006)100-4

26 Ibid

27 Yamashita Kazuhito ldquoThe Pros and Cons ofJapans Rice Acreage-Reduction PolicyrdquoOctober 07 2008 Tokyo Foundation website(httpwwwtokyofoundationorgenarticles2008the-pros-and-cons-of-japans-rice-acreage-reduction-policy)

28 Yamashita Kazuhito ldquoNihon no ShokuryōJikyūritsu ha Naze Teika shitanoka [Why didJapanrsquos Food Self-Sufficiency Rate is so low]rdquoAugust 27 2008 Tokyo Foundation website(httpwwwtkfdorjpresearchsub1phpid=1

APJ | JF 8 | 26 | 3

12

74)

2 9 T o k y o F o u n d a t i o n w e b s i t e(httpwwwtdbmaffgojptoukeia02smenu2TokID=H001ampTokKbn=CampTokID1=H001C-014ampTokKbnName=92B78AFA97DD94N939D8CvTOPgt MAFF website

30 With the deepening habit of including breadin the Japanese dietary rice price elasticityrose from ndash018 during 1970-81 to 011 during

1981-2001 while that of wheat declined from004 to ndash023 See Food and resourceeconomics laboratory University of Tokyow e b s i t e httpfrececau-tokyoacjpgyoujifood3pdf

31 Yamashita Kazuhito ldquoNihon no WTO Kōshōha Kokueki ni Sotteirunoka [Does the JapanrsquosStance on the WTO Negotiations Meet theNational Interests]rdquo July 24 2008