CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS

I. BASIC CONCEPTS

Procedural Law v. Substantive Law

Bustos v Lucero, October 20, 1948

G.R. No. L-2068

TUASON, J.:

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERIA, J., dissenting:

I am sorry to dissent from the decision.

The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted.

It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.

In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of said section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question was not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions on preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said:

It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft, except the part referring to preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or officer conducting the preliminary investigation.

But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass upon it.

Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The constitution added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails.

This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the Constitution.

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void.

The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again in the presence of the defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it.

Petition is therefore granted.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:

In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted, and applied in a way that will not contravene the constitutional provision guaranteeing to all accused the right "to meet the witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17], Article III.)

Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of fundamental right to her the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and to cross-examine them.

Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently depicted in the decision, and the constitutional guarantee protects defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being finally convicted and punished, but also from the physical, mental and moral sufferings that may unjustly be visited upon him in any one of the stages of the criminal process instituted against him. He must be afforded the opportunities to have the charges against him quashed, not only at the final hearing, but also at the preliminary investigation, if by confronting the witnesses for the prosecution he can convince the court that the charges are groundless. There is no justice in compelling him to undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his favor. Otherwise, the preliminary investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that should not have a place within the framework of dignified and solemn judicial proceedings.

On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be granted and so we vote.

Petition dismissed.

R E S O L U T I O N

March 8, 1949

TUASON, J.:

This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration.

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose the constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject.

It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 1 infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.

We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence which is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) the entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.

In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court said:

Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is not well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut. vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570.

Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived.

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.

The motion is denied.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

FERIA, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

The motion for reconsideration must be granted.

According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in a preliminary investigation granted by law or provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as amended, in force prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court, is not a substantive right but a mere matter of procedure, and therefore this Court can suppress it in section 11, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court, for the following reasons:

First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . . "The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court." And therefore "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole Code of evidence embodied in these rules."

Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition."

Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree" . . . It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. . . . "This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage."

Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from procedure, for the distinction is not always well understood. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights as opposed to objective or procedural law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights. What constitutes practice and procedure in the law is the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, "that which regulates the formal steps in an action or judicial proceedings; the course of procedure in courts; the form, manner and order in which proceedings have been, and are accustomed to be had; the form, manner and order of carrying on and conducting suits or prosecutions in the courts through their various sages according to the principles of law and the rules laid down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc. Law and Procedure, p. 1153; id., 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary; Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the Constitution or in any branch of the law, civil, criminal, administrative or procedural law. In our old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there are provisions which create, define and regulate substantive rights, and many of those provisions such as those relating to guardianship, adoption, evidence and many others are incorporated in the Rules of Court for the sake of convenience and not because this Court is empowered to promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of Criminal Procedure General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the right to commence a criminal action or file a complaint against the offender and to intervene in the criminal prosecution against him, and grants the defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in the City of Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary investigation including his rights during said investigation, and the rights at the trial, which are now reproduced or incorporated in Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules of Court, except the rights now in question. And all these, and others not necessary for us to mention, are obviously substantive rights.

(1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial is not correct. Undoubtedly the majority means to say procedural, in line with the conclusion in the resolution, because remedial law is one thing, and procedural law is another. Obviously they are different branches of the law. "Remedial statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an injury as distinguished from a penal statute. A statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong where he had none or a different one before. . . . Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the common law, as arise either from the general imperfections of all human law, from change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determination of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever." (Black's Law Dictionary, third edition, pp. 1525, 1526.)

It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore is also procedural." In the first place, the provisions of said section to the effect that "the defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to the court has the right to be informed of the complaint or information filed against him, and also to be informed of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and may be allowed to testify and present witnesses or evidence for him if he so desires," are not rules of evidence; and in the second place, it is evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all, are substantive laws that define, create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing out of reasoning, experience and common sense of lawyers and courts." (State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true that weighing of evidence and the rules of practice with respect thereto form part of the law of procedure, but the classification of proofs is sometime determined by the substantive law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 Phil., 170, 176.) How can the law on judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris tantum presumption, hearsay and best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, interpretation of documents, competency of a person to testify as a witness be considered procedural?

Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently wrong, not only for the reason just stated, but because our contention that the defendant can not be deprived of his right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary investigation under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear down said section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so construed as to be valid and effective, that is, that if the defendant asks the court to recall the witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in his presence, and to allow the former to cross-examine the latter, the court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under obligation to grant the request. But if the defendant does not so ask the court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witness against him.

(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that the preliminary investigation as provided for in the General Orders, No. 58, as amended, is not an essential part of due process of law, because "due process of law" is not iron clad in its meaning; its does not necessarily mean a particular procedure. Due process of law simply requires a procedure that fully protects the life, liberty and property. For that reason the investigation to be made by the City Fiscal of the City of Manila under Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the Administrative Code, before filing an information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due process of law constitutional requirement (U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is also true that we have already and correctly held that: "The law having explicitly recognized and established that no person charged with the commission of a crime shall be deprived of his liberty or subjected to trial without prior preliminary investigation (provided for in General orders, No. 58, as amended) that shall show that there are reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, there can be no doubt that the accused who is deprived of his liberty, tried and sentenced without the proper preliminary investigation having been made in his regard, is convicted without the process of law," (United States vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564).

The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, quoted in the resolution, has no application to the present case, for the question involved therein was the power of Congress to alter the rules of evidence and procedure without violating the constitutional precept that prohibits the passing of ex post facto law, while the question herein involved is the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure, which diminish the substantive right of a defendant, expressly prohibited by the same provision of the Constitution that confers upon this Court the power to promulgate said rules.

(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact definition;" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question of degree," (Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because, as we have already said in refuting the majority's first reason, remedy and procedure are two completely different things.

As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from procedural law and practice. But even assuming arguendo that it is difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond which the power of the court over procedure can not pass without touching upon the substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do in that case would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure which many increase, diminish or modify substantive right in order to avoid violating the constitutional prohibition above referred to. Because as this Supreme Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in any manner.

Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and cross-examine the witness against him in a preliminary investigation would affect the accused not in a limited and unsubstantial but in a harsh and arbitrary manner. The testimony of a witness given in the absence of the defendant and without an opportunity on the part of the latter to cross-examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be admitted against the defendant in a preliminary investigation that is granted to the latter as a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused who is innocent and should not be arrested, or if arrested should be released immediately a short time after his arrest after the preliminary investigation, would have to be held for trial and wait for a considerable period of time until the case is tried and acquitted after trial by the Courts of First Instance in provinces on account of the admission of such evidence in the preliminary investigation, evidence not admissible at the trial.

Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the necessary proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or modified in accordance with my dissenting opinion.

PERFECTO, J.:

We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion for reconsideration should be granted.

Retroactive Application of Procedural Law: Fresh-Period Rule; Neypes Doctrine

Rodriguez v. People, October 24, 2012

G.R. No. 192799

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner assails the March 2, 2010 Decision1rll and June 29, 2010 Resolution2rll of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108789, which affirmed the April 14, 2009 Order3rll of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24 in Manila, denying due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal in Criminal Case No. 02-206499.

The RTC convicted petitioner for Unfair Competition penalized under Sections 155, 168, 160 in relation to Sec. 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, and sentenced him to serve imprisonment of two (2) years, to pay a fine of PhP 50, 000 and actual damages of PhP 75,000.

The pertinent factual antecedents are undisputed.

After promulgation of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 02-206499 convicting him for unfair competition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal. Fourteen (14) days after receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal.4rll Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Before the RTC, the CA and now here, petitioner was unwavering in his assertion of the applicability of the "fresh period rule" as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

The rationale of the "fresh period rule"

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Neypes elucidates that the "fresh period rule" applies to appeals under Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTC) and Rule 41 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA or this Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to this Court).7rll A scrutiny of the said rules, however, reveals that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes need NOT apply to Rules 42, 43 and 45 as there is no interruption in the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. It is explicit in Rules 42, 43 and 45 that the appellant or petitioner is accorded a fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision, award, judgment, final order or resolution or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed.

The pivotal question is whether the "fresh period rule" is applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122 which pertinently

Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run. (Emphasis supplied.)

While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases, the issue was squarely addressed in Yu v. Tatad,9rll which expanded the scope of the doctrine in Neypes to criminal cases in appeals of conviction under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the Court held in

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

x x x x

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal casea situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced.

We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in lawQuod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege. Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.

It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.

Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil casesunder the spirit and rationale in Neypesgreater leeway in filing an appeal through the "fresh period rule," with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases which involve the accuseds "sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

Consequently, in light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner seasonably filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2009, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from January 19, 2009, the date of receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April 14, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 24 in Manila and the assailed March 2, 2010 Decision and June 29, 2010 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 108789 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Notice of Appeal of petitioner Rolex Rodriguez y Olayres dated January 29, 2009 is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Let the case records be elevated by the RTC to the CA for the review of petitioners appeal with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders v. Bayang, April 20, 2015

G.R. No. 194702

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 23, 2010 decision1 and the December 2, 2010 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332. The CA affirmed the resolutions dated November 17, 2006 and July 26, 2007 of the Office of President in O.P. Case No. 06-D-160, which dismissed the appeal of petitioners San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. (SLR Builders) and Oscar Violago for having been filed out of time.

Facts

On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as Violago Builders, Inc), as seller, and respondent Ma. Cristina F. Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.

Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR Builders the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot's certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago (petitioners) before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

In a decision3 dated February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in Cristina's favor, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Ordering the respondents (referring to the petitioners) to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in the name of the complainant (referring to the respondent) and deliver the title thereof free from all liens and encumbrances;

In the alternative, in case of legal and physical impossibility of the respondents to perform the aforementioned acts in the preceding paragraph, respondent San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Incorporated is hereby ordered to reimburse to the complainant the amount of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS & 16/100 (P324,865.16) with legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum to be computed from the filing of the complaint on November 04, 2002 until fully paid; and

Ordering respondent San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Incorporated to pay the following sums:

FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages;

FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as exemplary damages;

FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees;

An administrative fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) payable to this Office fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this decision, for violation of Section 18 in relation to Section 38 of PD 957.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board dismissed5 and denied,6 respectively, the petitioners' appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President (OP), which was docketed as O.P. Case No. 06-D-160.

In a resolution7 dated November 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the petitioners' appeal for having been filed out of time. The OP's resolution stated:

A review of the records shows that the HLURB Decision affirming the Arbiter's decision was received by the respondents/appellants (referring to the petitioners) on July 27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal, respondents-appellants opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration on August 10, 2005. Their filing of the said motion interrupted the period of appeal by that time, however, fourteen (14) days had already elapsed.

On April 17, 2006, respondents-appellants received the Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Following the above rules, respondents-appellants have only one (1) day left, or until April 18, 2006, within which to file their notice of appeal to this Office. Unfortunately, they were able to do so only on April 27, 2006, or nine (9) days late8 (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in the case of Domingo Neypes, et at. v. Court of Appeals, et al.9 should be applied to their case.

The OP, in a resolution10 dated July 26, 2007, denied the petitioners' motion with finality, stating that the "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals, such as in petitioners' case. The petitioners then appealed to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In its assailed decision, the CA denied the petitioners' petition for review. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration; hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

Issue: Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.

Our Ruling

We DENY the petition. It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.

In Panolino v. Tajala,11 the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the "fresh period rule" applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the "fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

x x x x

As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987:

Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently reads:

Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office of the President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the present case, we find that the CA correctly affirmed the OP in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for having been filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision dated July 23, 2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.

SO ORDERED.

Concept of Liberal Construction of the Rules

Cabrera v. Ng, March 12, 2014

G.R. No. 201601

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated October 21, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated March 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03392. The CA denied the petition for certiorari filed by Marylou Cabrera (petitioner), which assailed the Order4 dated December 19, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No. MAN-4773.

The Facts: On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the petitioner and her husband Marionilo Cabrera (spouses Cabrera), alleging that the latter issued to him the following: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0244694 dated June 30, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-One Thousand Pesos (P31,000.00); (2) Metrobank Check No. 0244674 dated August 9, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-Eight Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos and Seventy-Six Centavos (P38,074.76); and (3) Metrobank Check No. 0244745 dated August 15, 2005 for Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). That when presented for payment, the said checks were all dishonored as the accounts from which they had been drawn were already closed.

The spouses Cabrera admitted that they issued Metrobank Check No. 0244694 and Metrobank Check No. 0244674 to the respondent and that the same were dishonored when presented for payment. However, they claimed that they paid the respondent the amount represented by the said checks through the latters son Richard Ng. Further, they deny having issued Metrobank Check No. 0244745 to the respondent, alleging that the said check was forcibly taken from them by Richard Ng.

On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 which ordered the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent the following: (1) Two Million Five Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos (P2,569,074.00) plus legal interest from inception of the obligation until fully paid; (2) moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (3) attorneys fees of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and (4) litigation expenses in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

On August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera received a copy of the RTC Decision dated August 7, 2007. On August 14, 2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration,6 which they set for hearing on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the respondent thru registered mail; it was actually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007.

The said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said court had just assumed office. On August 28, 2007, the RTC issued a notice,7 which set the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on September 25, 2007.

On September 20, 2007, the respondent filed an opposition8 to the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The respondent alleged that the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper since it violated the three-day notice requirement. The respondent pointed out that the spouses Cabrera sent to him a copy of their motion for reconsideration, which was set for hearing on August 17, 2007, via registered mail on August 14, 2007; that he actually received a copy thereof only on August 21, 2007 four days after the scheduled hearing thereon.

It appears that the scheduled hearing of the spouses Cabreras motion for reconsideration on September 25, 2007 did not push through. Consequently, on September 26, 2007, the RTC issued another notice,9 which set the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on October 26, 2007.

On October 26, 2007, the RTC issued an Order,10 which directed the parties to file their additional pleadings, after which the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera would be deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order11 which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The RTC pointed out that the spouses Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that every motion required to be heard should be served by the movant in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing. Thus:

After a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, the court opines that the motion was filed beyond the reglementary three (3)[-]day period.

As the records bear out, the instant motion was mailed to the plaintiffs counsel on August 14[, 2007] and was set for hearing on August 17, 2007. However, the copy of said motion had reached plaintiffs side and a copy of which was received by plaintiffs counsel only on August 17, 2007[,] four (4) days late after it was supposed to be heard. Hence, a clear blatant violations [sic] of the rule on notice and hearing.12

The RTC further opined that a motion, which fails to comply with the three-day notice requirement is a mere scrap of paper; it is not entitled to judicial cognizance and would not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleadings. Accordingly, the RTC held, its Decision dated August 7, 2007 had already become final for failure of the spouses Cabrera to comply with the three-day notice requirement.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari13 with the CA, alleging that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration. The petitioner pointed out that the RTC did not actually conduct a hearing on her motion for reconsideration on August 17, 2007;that her motion for reconsideration was actually heard on October 26, 2007, after the respondent had already filed his opposition thereto. Thus, the petitioner claimed, the issue of her failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement had already been rendered moot. In any case, the petitioner asserted, the RTC should have resolved her motion for reconsideration on its merits rather than simply denying it on mere technicality.

On October 21, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, denied the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA opined that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera since it merely applied the three-day notice requirement under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Thus:

It appears that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing on 17 August 2007. A copy thereof was mailed to private respondent on 14 August 2007, and private respondent actually received his copy only on 21 August 2007 or four (4) days after the set date of hearing; and thus, depriving him of the opportunity to oppose the motion. Respondent court, therefore, correctly held that such motion violated the three (3)-day notice rule; the essence of due process. Respondent court had applied said rule to the given situation, and of no doubt, mere adherence to the rules cannot be considered grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court. x x x.15 (Citation omitted)

The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated October 21, 2009 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution16 dated March 26, 2012.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue: The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis ours)

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.17 "The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein."

"A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon."19 "Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency."

Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with. Thus, in Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation,21 the Court ruled that:

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:

This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007.

Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his position. Thus, the R TC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration based merely on their failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2009 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03392, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera on the merits within five (5) days from the finality of this Decision. SO ORDERED.

Negros Slashers, Inc., v. Alvarez, et al., February 22, 2012

G.R. NO. 187122

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1][1] dated September 17, 2008 and Resolution[2][2] dated February 11 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00817. The appellate court had reversed and set aside the September 10, 2004 Decision[3][3] and March 21, 2005 Resolution[4][4] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated with modification the Decision[5][5] of the Labor Arbiter finding respondent to have been illegally dismissed.

The facts are undisputed.

Respondent Alvin Teng is a professional basketball player who started his career as such in the Philippine Basketball Association and then later on played in the Metropolitan Basketball Association (MBA).

On February 4, 1999, Teng signed a 3-year contract[6][6] (which included a side contract and agreement for additional benefits and bonuses) with the Laguna Lakers. Before the expiration of his contract with the Laguna Lakers on December 31, 2001, the Lakers traded and/or transferred Teng to petitioner Negros Slashers, with the latter assuming the obligations of Laguna Lakers under Tengs unexpired contract, including the monthly salary of P250,000, P50,000 of which remained to be the obligation of the Laguna Lakers. On March 28, 2000, the management of the Laguna Lakers formally informed Teng of his transfer to the Negros Slashers.[7][7] Teng executed with the Negros Slashers the Players Contract of Employment.[8][8]

On Game Number 4 of the MBA Championship Round for the year 2000 season, Teng had a below-par playing performance. Because of this, the coaching staff decided to pull him out of the game. Teng then sat on the bench, untied his shoelaces and donned his practice jersey. On the following game, Game Number 5 of the Championship Round, Teng called-in sick and did not play.

On November 21, 2000, Vicente Tan, Finance Head of Negros Slashers, wrote[9][9] Teng requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his precipitated absence during the crucial Game 5 of the National Championship Round. He was further informed that a formal investigation would be conducted on November 28, 2000. The hearing, however, did not push through because Teng was absent on the said scheduled investigation. Hearing was rescheduled for December 11, 2000. On said date, the investigation proceeded, attended by Tengs representatives, Atty. Arsenio Yulo and Atty. Jose Aspiras.[10][10] A subsequent meeting was also conducted attended by the management, coaching staff and players of the Negros Slashers team, wherein the team members and coaching staff unanimously expressed their sentiments against Teng and their opposition against the possibility of Teng joining back the team.[11][11]

On March 16, 2001, the management of Negros Slashers came up with a decision, and through its General Manager, petitioner Rodolfo Alvarez, wrote[12][12] Teng informing him of his termination from the team.

On July 28, 2001, Teng filed a complaint before the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA pursuant to the provision of the Uniform Players Contract which the parties had executed. Subsequently, on November 6, 2001, Teng also filed an illegal dismissal case with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC.[13][13]

On July 16, 2002, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision finding Tengs dismissal illegal and ordering petitioner Negros Slashers, Inc. to pay Teng P2,530,000 representing his unpaid salaries, separation pay and attorneys fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the penalty of dismissal was not justified since the grounds relied upon by petitioners did not constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience or insubordination that would call for the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant illegal and respondents Negros Slashers, Inc. are hereby ordered to PAY complainant the total sum of TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P2,530,000.00) PESOS representing complainants unpaid salaries, separation pay and attorneys fee, the award to be deposited with this Office within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

All other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[14][14]

The case was then appealed to the NLRC. On September 10, 2004, the NLRC issued a Decision setting aside the July 16, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter and entering a new one dismissing the complaint for being premature since the arbitration proceedings before the Commissioner of the MBA were still pending when Teng filed his complaint for illegal dismissal. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter a quo is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is entered, dismissing the instant case for being premature.

SO ORDERED.[15][15]

Teng filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for being filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period provided for in Section 15,[16][16] Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

Aggrieved, Teng filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the NLRC Decision datedSeptember 10, 2004and the Resolution datedMarch 21, 2005denying his motion for reconsideration.

OnSeptember 17, 2008the CA rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the September 10, 2004 Decision and March 21, 2005 Resolution of the NLRC and reinstating with modification the Labor Arbiters Decision.

The CA reinstated the findings of the Labor Arbiter that Teng was illegally dismissed because the grounds relied upon by petitioners were not enough to merit the supreme penalty of dismissal. The CA held that there was no serious misconduct or willful disobedience or insubordination on Tengs part. On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA ruled that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the pendency of arbitration proceedings in the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but their motion was denied by the CA in a Resolution[17][17] datedFebruary 11, 2009.

Petitioners now come to this Court assailing the Decision datedSeptember 17, 2008and Resolution datedFebruary 11, 2009of the CA.

Firstly, petitioners argue that respondent Teng and his counsel committed a blatant violation of the rule against forum shopping. Petitioners aver that onJuly 28, 2001, Teng filed a complaint before the MBA pursuant to the voluntary arbitration provision of the Uniform Players Contract he executed with Negros Slashers, Inc. During the pendency of said complaint, Teng filed another complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. It is petitioners position that Teng lied by certifying under oath that there is no similar case pending between him and Negros Slashers, Inc., when in fact, months before he had filed a complaint with the MBA alleging the same factual antecedents and raising the same issues.

Secondly, petitioners argue that the CA erred in ruling that Tengs offenses were just minor lapses and irresponsible action not warranting the harsh penalty of dismissal. Petitioners allege that the CA paid scant attention to two very important pieces of evidence which would clearly show the gravity and seriousness of the offenses committed by Teng. Petitioners claim that these two documents, i.e., the minutes of the meeting[18][18] of players, management, and coordinating staff, and a petition[19][19] by the players to the management not to allow Teng to come back to the team, would show that Teng should not have been treated as an ordinary working man who merely absented himself by feigning sickness when called upon to work. Petitioners argue that the nature of the work and team atmosphere should have been considered and given credence. By neglecting these two documents, the CA failed to appreciate the gravity of the misconduct committed by Teng and the effects it had on the basketball organization.

Petitioners also argue that respondents petition for certiorari with the CA should have been dismissed outright because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners point out that Teng received the NLRC Decision on October 15, 2004and therefore had ten days[20][20] or until October 25, 2004 within which to file a motion for reconsideration. But he filed his motion for reconsideration only on October 26, 2004 and said motion was denied[21][21] on March 21, 2005 for being filed late. Thereafter he filed his petition for certiorari[22][22] with the CA on June 20, 2005. Petitioners contend that the petition for certiorari was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court because the 60-day period to file the petition for certiorari should have started to run from the receipt of the NLRC decision onOctober 15, 2004. And it should have expired onDecember 14, 2004 because it was as if no motion for reconsideration was filed in the NLRC. Further, petitioners argue that the CA could not take cognizance of the case because it is a settled rule that certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the NLRC to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. In this case, since the motion for reconsideration was filed late, it should have been treated as if no motion for reconsideration was filed.

Teng, on the other hand, maintains that there is no violation of the rule against forum shopping. He submits that he indeed filed his complaint before the MBA as early asJuly 28, 2001. Unfortunately, for more than three months, the supposed voluntary arbitration failed to yield any result until the MBA itself was dissolved. It was only on November 2001, after exhausting the arbitration process, did he file his complaint before the Labor Arbiter. In other words, it was only after the MBA failed to come up with a resolution on the matter did he opt to seek legal redress elsewhere.

On the merits, Teng relies on the reasoning of the Labor Arbiter in finding that his alleged lapses and misconduct were too minor to justify the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. In large part, he quotes the Labor Arbiters decision, and emphasizes the Labor Arbiters statements that (1) loosening of the shoe laces and the donning of the practice jersey are not indicative of serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from employment; (2) it cannot be concluded that he merely feigned sickness when he informed the Coach of his inability to play during Game No. 5; and (3) there is no showing of any bad faith or ill motive on his part that would qualify his actions as serious, severe and grave as to warrant termination from service.

Teng also argues that the CA aptly clarified and explained the legal reason why the petition for certiorari was given due course despite some procedural lapses regarding the motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. Teng stresses that jurisprudence allows the relaxation of procedural rules even of the most mandatory character in the interest of substantial justice. In this particular case, justice and equity calls for the relaxation of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration as well as the rule prohibiting the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration.

Simply put, the basic issues for our resolution are as follows: (1) whether the CA erred in giving due course to respondent Tengs petition for certiorari despite its late filing; (2) whether Teng violated the rule on forum shopping when he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC while a similar complaint was pending in the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA; and (3) whether the CA erred in ruling that Tengs dismissal from the Negros Slashers Team was unjustified and too harsh considering his misconduct.

The petition is bereft of merit.

On the first issue raised by petitioners, we rule that the CA did not commit a reversible error in giving due course to Tengs petition for certiorari although said petition was filed late. Ordinarily, rules of procedure are strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system. However, in not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[23][23] In Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation,[24][24] we ruled:

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. x x x

Indeed the prevailing trend is to accord party litigants the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes, free from the constraints of needless technicalities.

Here, besides the fact that a denial of the recourse to the CA would serve more to perpetuate an injustice and violation of Tengs rights under our labor laws, we find that as correctly held by the CA, no intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to Teng. The CA therefore did not commit reversible error in excusing Tengs one-day delay in filing his motion for reconsideration and in giving due course to his petition for certiorari.

As regards the second issue, we likewise find no merit in petitioners claim that respondents act of filing a complaint with the Labor Arbiter while the same case was pending with the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA constituted forum shopping.

For forum shopping to exist, it is necessary that (a) there be identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) there be identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in one action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other action.[25][25]

Petitioners are correct as to the first two requisites of forum shopping. First, there is identity of parties involved: Negros Slashers Inc. and respondent Teng. Second, there is identity of rights asserted i.e., the right of management to terminate employment and the right of an employee against illegal termination. However, the third requisite of forum shopping is missing in this case. Any judgment or ruling of the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA will not amount to res judicata. As defined in Agustin v. Delos Santos.

Res Judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. To state simply, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. (Emphasis supplied.)

To clarify, res judicata is defined in jurisprudence as to have four basic elements: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.[27][27]

Here, although contractually authorized to settle disputes, the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA is not a court of competent jurisdiction as contemplated by law with respect to the application of the doctrine of res judicata. At best, the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA is a private mediator or go-between as agreed upon by team management and a player in the MBA Players Contract of Employment.[28][28] Any judgment that the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA may render will not result in a bar for seeking redress in other legal venues. Hence, respondents action of filing the same complaint in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC does not constitute forum shopping.

On the third issue, we find that the penalty of dismissal handed out against Teng was indeed too harsh.

We understand petitioners in asserting that a basketball organization is a team-based enterprise and that a harmonious working relationship among team players is essential to the success of the organization. We also take into account the petition of the other team members voicing out their desire to continue with the team without Teng. We note likewise the sentiments of the players and coaching staff during the meeting ofFebruary 4, 2001stating how they felt when Teng abandoned them during a crucial Game Number5 inthe MBA championship round.

Petitioners rely heavily on the alleged effects of Tengs actions on the rest of the team. However, such reaction from team members is expected after losing a game, especially a championship game. It is also not unlikely that the team members looked for someone to blame after they lost the championship games and that Teng happened to be the closest target of the teams frustration and disappointment. But all these sentiments and emotions from Negros Slashers players and staff must not blur the eyes of the Court from objectively assessing Tengs infraction in order to determine whether the same constitutes just ground for dismissal. The incident in question should be clear: Teng had a below-par performance during Game Number 4 for which he was pulled out from the game, and then he untied his shoelaces and donned his practice jersey. In Game Number 5, he did not play.

As an employee of the Negros Slashers, Teng was expected to report for work regularly. Missing a team game is indeed a punishable offense. Untying of shoelaces when the game is not yet finished is also irresponsible and unprofessional. However, we agree with the Labor Arbiter that such isolated foolishness of an employee does not justify the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioners could have opted to impose a fine or suspension on Teng for his unacceptable conduct. Other forms of disciplinary action could also have been taken after the incident to impart on the team that such misconduct will not be tolerated.

In Sagales v. Rustans Commercial Corporation,[29][29] this Court ruled:

Truly, while the employer has the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees, this prerogative is subject to the regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.

In this regard, it is a hornbook doctrine that infractions committed by an employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed in connection with the disciplinary authority of the employer. (Emphasis in the original.)

In the case at bar, the penalty handed out by the petitioners was the ultimate penalty of dismissal. There was no warning or admonition for respondents violation of team rules, only outright termination of his services for an act which could have been punished appropriately with a severe reprimand or suspension.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 and Resolution dated February 11, 2009, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00817 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu Bionic Builders Supply v. DBP, November 17, 2010

G.R. No. 154366

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Resolution[2] dated February 5, 2002 and the Amended Decision[3] dated July 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57216. In the Resolution dated February 5, 2002, the Court of Appeals admitted the Motion for Reconsideration[4] of herein respondents Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Jose To Chip, Patricio Yap and Roger Balila, notwithstanding the fact that the same was filed more than six months beyond the reglementary period. Said motion prayed for the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision[5] dated February 14, 2001, which affirmed the Decision[6] dated April 25, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. CEB-10104 that ruled in favor of petitioners. In the Amended Decision of July 5, 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed its previous Decision dated February 14, 2001 and dismissed the petitioners complaint for lack of merit.

The facts leading to the instant petition are as follows:

On June 2, 1981, the spouses Rudy R. Robles, Jr. and Elizabeth R. Robles entered into a mortgage contract[7] with DBP in order to secure a loan from the said bank in the amount of P500,000.00. The properties mortgaged were a parcel of land situated in Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu, which was then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 47783 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu, together with all the existing improvements, and the commercial building to be constructed thereon[8] (subject properties). Upon completion, the commercial building was named the State Theatre Building.

On October 28, 1981, Rudy Robles executed a contract of lease in favor of petitioner Cebu Bionic Builders Supply, Inc. (Cebu Bionic), a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business, as well as the sale of hardware materials. The contract pertinently provides:

CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Lease Contract made and entered into, by and between:

RUDY ROBLES, JR., Filipino, of legal age, married and resident of 173 Maria Cristina Ext., Cebu City, hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,

- and -

CEBU BIONIC BUILDER SUPPLY, represented by LYDIA SIA, Filipino, of legal age, married and with address at 240 Magallanes St., Cebu City hereinafter known as the LESSEE;

WITNESSETH:

The LESSOR is the owner of a commercial building along Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu, known as the State Theatre Building.

The LESSOR agrees to lease unto the LESSEE and the LESSEE accepts the lease from the LESSOR, a portion of the ground floor thereof, consisting of one (1) unit/store space under the following terms and conditions:

1. The LESSEE shall pay a monthly rental of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The rental is payable in advance within the first five (5) days of the month, without need of demand;

2. That the term of this agreement shall start on November 1, 1981 and shall terminate on the last day of every month thereafter; provided however that this contract shall be automatically renewed on a month to month basis if no notice, in writing, is sent to the other party to terminate this agreement after fifteen (15) days from receipt of said notice;

x x x x

9. Should the LESSOR decide to sell the pr