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8/4/2019 Clandestine HUMINT http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/clandestine-humint 1/25 Clandestine HUMINT From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigationsearch This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please improve this article if you can. (March 2009) This article is a subset article under Human Intelligence. For a complete hierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy. Concepts here also are intimately associated with counterintelligence. This article deals with the what of clandestine HUMINT, and is a prerequisite for the how in the Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques article. Clandestine HUMINT (  HUMan INTelligence) includes a wide range of espionage sources. This includes the classic spy (called, by professionals, asset or agent ) who collects intelligence, but also couriers and other personnel, who handle their secure communications . Other support personnel include access agents who may arrange the contact between the potential spy, and the case officer who recruits them. In some cases, the recruiter and the continuing supervision of the agent may be different people. Large espionage networks may be composed of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. Espionage networks are usually organized on a cell system, where each clandestine operator knows the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer, and an emergency method, not necessarily a person, to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people in other cells. Espionage involves a human being obtaining (i.e., using human intelligence (HUMINT ) methods) information that is considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information. Espionage is inherently clandestine, and the legitimate holder of the information may change plans or take other countermeasures once it is known that the information is in unauthorized hands. See the articles such Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques and Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting for discussions of the "tradecraft" used to collect this information. HUMINT is in a constant battle with counterintelligence , and the relationship can  become very blurry, as one side tries to "turn" agents of the other into reporting to the other side. Recruiters can run false flag operations, where a citizen of country A believes they are providing intelligence to country B, when they are actually providing it to country C. Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored, or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people to whom he was selling information.

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Clandestine HUMINT

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search 

This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards.Please improve this article if you can. (March 2009)

This article is a subset article under  Human Intelligence. For a complete

hierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy.Concepts here also are intimately associated with counterintelligence. This

article deals with the what of clandestine HUMINT, and is a prerequisite for the

how in the Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques article.

Clandestine HUMINT ( HUMan INTelligence) includes a wide range of espionage sources. This includes the classic spy (called, by professionals, asset or agent ) whocollects intelligence, but also couriers and other personnel, who handle their secure

communications. Other support personnel include access agents who may arrange thecontact between the potential spy, and the case officer who recruits them. In some cases,the recruiter and the continuing supervision of the agent may be different people. Largeespionage networks may be composed of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, andsupervisors. Espionage networks are usually organized on a cell system, where eachclandestine operator knows the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer,and an emergency method, not necessarily a person, to contact higher levels if the caseofficer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people in other cells.

Espionage involves a human being obtaining (i.e., using human intelligence (HUMINT)methods) information that is considered secret or confidential without the permission of 

the holder of the information. Espionage is inherently clandestine, and the legitimateholder of the information may change plans or take other countermeasures once it isknown that the information is in unauthorized hands. See the articles such ClandestineHUMINT operational techniques and Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting for discussions of the "tradecraft" used to collect this information.

HUMINT is in a constant battle with counterintelligence, and the relationship can become very blurry, as one side tries to "turn" agents of the other into reporting to theother side. Recruiters can run false flag operations, where a citizen of country A believesthey are providing intelligence to country B, when they are actually providing it tocountry C.

Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involvesaccessing the place where the desired information is stored, or accessing the people whoknow the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There areexceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of RobertHanssen in never meeting the people to whom he was selling information.

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This article does not cover military units that penetrate deep between enemy lines, butgenerally in uniform, to conduct special reconnaissance. Such military units can be on the border of the line, in international law, which defines them as spies, if they conductinformation in civilian clothes. In some circumstances, the uniformed personnel may actin support to the actual agents, providing communications, transportation, financial, and

other support. Yet another discipline is covert operations, where personnel, uniformed or not, may conduct raids, sabotage, assassinations, propaganda (i.e., psychologicaloperations), etc

Contents

[hide]

• 1 Legal aspects• 2 Major HUMINT organizations• 3 Penetrations of foreign targets by people loyal to their own country

o 3.1 Clandestine Reportingo 3.2 Dangled Mole

• 4 Human sources who changed allegianceo 4.1 Recruitment through Moneyo 4.2 Recruitment through Ideologyo 4.3 Recruitment through Compromiseo 4.4 Recruitment through Ego

• 5 Recruit Typeso 5.1 Mole

5.1.1 Defector  5.1.2 Defector in place 5.1.3 False Flag Penetrator 

o 5.2 Double Agent 5.2.1 Basic Double agent 5.2.2 Redoubled Agent 5.2.3 False flag double agent 5.2.4 Active provocateur  5.2.5 Passive provocateur  5.2.6 Fake double agent 5.2.7 Unwitting double agent

o 5.3 Multiply Turned Agent 5.3.1 Triple agent 5.3.2 Quadruple agent

• 6 Support Serviceso 6.1 Courierso 6.2 Safehouses and Other Meeting Placeso 6.3 Finance

6.3.1 Formal Value Transfer Systems 6.3.2 Money Laundering and subverting formal value transfer 

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systems 6.3.3 Informal value transfer systems

• 7 References

• 8 External links

[edit] Legal aspects

 Black's Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: "...gathering, transmitting, or losing...information related to the national defense."

In the UK, "Under the 1911 Act, a person commits the offence of 'spying' if he, for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State;

(a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited place,

(b) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might beor is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or (c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other personany secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to bedirectly or indirectly useful to an enemy. [Note: "an enemy" apparently means a potential enemy, so could theoretically include all foreign governments]"The offence of spying covers all such acts committed by any person within Her Majesty's dominions, and such acts committed elsewhere by British Officers or subjects. It is not necessary for the person concerned to have been warned beforehand that they were subject to the Official Secrets Act. The 1920 Act

creates further offences of doing any "act preparatory" to spying, or of soliciting,inciting, seeking to persuade, or aiding and abetting any other person to commitspying.[1]

The US defines espionage towards itself as "The act of obtaining, delivering,transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with anintent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the UnitedStates or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Espionage is a violation of 18 UnitedStates Code 792-798 and Article 106, Uniform Code of Military Justice [2]."

[edit] Major HUMINT organizationsSee List of intelligence agencies for a more complete list

Country Espionage organization

 Australia Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

 Brazil Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN)

 China Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China or 

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(Simplified Chinese:国家安全部; Pinyin: Guojia Anquan Bu, or Guoanbu)

 CubaIntelligence Directorate, formerly Dirección General deInteligencia (DGI)

 Korea,

Democratic People'sRepublic of 

Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau

 FranceDirection générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE) or Directorate-General for External Security

 India Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

 IsraelMossad (HaMossad leModi'in uleTafkidim Meyuhadim (Hebrew: ) or Institute for Intelligence andהמוסד למודיעין ולתפקידים מיוחדיםSpecial Operations )

 Germany Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) or Federal Intelligence Service

 Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

 Korea, Republicof   National Intelligence Service (South Korea)

 RussiaForeign Intelligence Service (Russian: Служба ВнешнейРазведки (or SVR)

 South Africa South African Secret Service (SASS)

 United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), commonly known as MI6

 United States National Clandestine Service (NCS), part of the CentralIntelligence Agency

Espionage is usually part of an institutional effort (i.e., governmental or corporateespionage), and the term is most readily associated with state spying on potential or 

actual enemies, primarily for  military purposes, but this has been extended to spyinginvolving corporations, known specifically as industrial espionage. Many nations routinely spy on both their enemies and allies, although they maintain a policy of notmaking comment on this. In addition to utilizing agencies within a government many alsoemploy private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCGInternational Risk  and others.

[edit] Penetrations of foreign targets by people loyal to

their own country

 Not all clandestine human sources change their loyalties to the country to which theywere born, or owed their first allegiance. In this section we are talking of the classical andactually rare "spy", who really is a loyal citizen of country A but obtains informationfrom country B, either through informal means (e.g., fake news reporting) or actuallygoing to work for country B.

A special case is of the Country B loyalist who controls agents or provides other supporting or managerial functions against Country A.

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[edit] Clandestine Reporting

Richard Sorge was a Soviet citizen (i.e., country A), who posed as a German (country C) journalist in Tokyo, to report on Japan (country B) back to the Soviet Union. Sorge waseventually caught and executed by the Japanese, who generally honored his bravery.

Especially in wartime, while a country may need to execute an agent, they sometimesrespect them.

It is a truism that a live captured spy has more potential value than a dead one, since alive one can still be interrogated, or perhaps turned into a double agent. There have beencases where countries have announced the execution of people who are actually alive.

[edit] Dangled Mole

Dangled moles start out being loyal to one country B, but go to work for another serviceA, reporting back to their original service. Such operations can become "infinities of 

mirrors"[3]

as the mole may be detected and the service by which they are employed triesto double them, which may or may not work.

One of the best-known, and apparently most successful, was the early Soviet recruitmentof Kim Philby (i.e., service B), who was then dangled to the British Secret IntelligenceService (i.e., service A), for whom Philby went to work and rose to high rank. Philby isdiscussed further below.

As far as is known from public sources, the only mole, already loyal to a foreign service,who went to work for the CIA (i.e., in the service A role) was Karl Koecher , who actuallywas loyal to the Czechoslovakian intelligence service (service B1), while Czechoslovakia

was a Soviet (i.e., service B) satellite state. Koecher became a CIA translator and a goodsource of information to the Czechs and Soviets. While, as far as is known in publicsources, still loyal to his original agency, Koecher was ordered to report to Moscow byOleg Kalugin, longtime legal resident of the USSR in the US. Kalugin accused Koecher of being a US double agent. Koecher retired from the CIA and went to work in academia, but was subsequently reactivated by the KGB and went to work, part-time, for the CIA.During this period, he was discovered by the FBI, who attempted to double him againstthe KGB, but the FBI considered him unreliable and eventually arrested him. The arrestwas legally tainted, and Koecher was eventually exchanged for Soviet prisoners, bothsides apparently not wanting the affair to be in a public court.

The US used Katrina Leung as a dangled mole to the PRC, although the true loyalty of Leung, who came to the US on a Taiwanese passport, is not known with certainty. Shemay have had a long-term allegiance to the PRC, been loyal to the US and then beenturned by the PRC, or primarily been loyal to herself.

[edit] Human sources who changed allegiance

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With the exception of penetration moles, other human sources start out as highly trusted by their services. What causes an individual to betray service A, typically his country of  birth? The most common shorthand for changing allegiance is MICE, an acronym for:

• Money: Low salary? Greedy? Needs money for family crisis? In

debt?• Ideology: Hates his system, admires ours?• Compromise (or coercion): Vulnerable to blackmail? Emotionalrelationship with an access agent?• Ego (or excitement): Lonely? Looking for a friend? Passed over for a promotion? Not appreciated by peers and superiors? Seeking praiseand recognition? Adventurous? Looking for personal challenge? Wants to be James Bond? Egomaniac? Wants to prove he can get away with it?

Sometimes more than one factor applies, as with Robert Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence agent who was a "write-in" to the KGB. While he received large

amounts of money, he apparently felt unappreciated in his own service and spying on itsatisfied his ego.

Psychological factors can apply to people changing allegiance for reasons other thancoercion or ideology. To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of theIntelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up withcharacteristics of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage.

It "examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionagesubjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better 

understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others whileconducting espionage [4].

How an espionage subject sees himself (at the time of espionage)

Attitude Manifestations

His basic belief structure

Special, even unique.

Deserving.

His situation is not satisfactory.

 No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).

Only doing what others frequently do.

 Not a bad person.

His performance in his government job (if presently employed) isseparate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount his

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contribution in the workplace.

Security procedures do not (really) apply to him.

Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for him, unlessthey connect with something with which he can personally identify.

He feels isolatedfrom theconsequences of hisactions:

He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continuallynarrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. The processthat evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially"Okay" to initiate the crime.

He sees espionage as a "Victimless" crime.

Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it.These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.

He finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards (he is able tosolve that problem). He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do(the information would really be better protected). This "Ease of accomplishment" further reinforces his resolve.

Attempts to copewith espionageactivity

He is anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact (somealso feel thrill and excitement).

After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues (even

flourishes).

In the course of long term activity subjects may reconsider their involvement. -- Some consider breaking their role to become anoperative for the government. This occurs when access to classifiedinformation is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves,or both.

-- Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they nolonger want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides. They arereluctant to continue. They may even break contact.

-- Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have done.Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing, they'renegotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.

According to a press report about Project Slammer and Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly basic function is observing one's own personnel for behavior 

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that either suggests that they could be targets for foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted. News reports indicate that in hindsight, red flags were flying but notnoticed. [5] In several major penetrations of US services, such as Aldrich Ames, theWalker ring or Robert Hanssen, the individual showed patterns of spending inconsistentwith their salary. Some people with changed spending may have a perfectly good reason,

such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not beignored.

By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meetings of theSecurity Policy Advisory Board[6]. While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in themid-nineties, there are research data used throughout the security community. Theyemphasize the "essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage.Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as therole of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trendtoward economic espionage."

According to a 2008 Defense Department study, financial incentives and externalcoercion have played diminishing roles in motivating Americans to spy against theUnited States, but divided loyalties are increasingly evident in recent espionage cases.The study said, “Two thirds of American spies since 1990 have volunteered. Since 1990,spying has not paid well: 80% of spies received no payment for espionage, and since2000 it appears no one was paid. ... Offenders since 1990 are more likely to benaturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties, and thereforethey are more likely to be motivated to spy from divided loyalties.” Despite this trend, thereport says that the majority (65%) of American spies are still native born. [7][8]

[edit] Recruitment through Money

Ames seems to have been motivated primarily by money.

[edit] Recruitment through Ideology

Among the most important moles, a senior officer already in place when he startedreporting, for ideological reasons, to service B (actually two B's, SIS and CIA), was Col.Oleg Penkovsky [9]

[edit] Recruitment through Compromise

Recruitment can be done through personal relationships, from casual sex and blackmail to friendship or romance

[edit] Recruitment through Ego

Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach based on ego. William Kampiles,a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations

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manual on the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite. To an interviewer, Kampiles suggestedthat if someone had noted his "problem" -- constant conflicts with supervisors and co-workers—and brought in outside counseling, he might not have stolen the KH-11manual.[5]

[edit] Recruit Types

[edit] Mole

Other than the dangled moles described above, moles start out as loyal to their owncountry A. They may or may not be a trained intelligence officer.

 Note that some intelligence professionals reserve the term mole to refer to enemy personnel that personally know important things about enemy intelligence operations,technology, or military plans. A person such as a clerk or courier (e.g., Jack Dunlap, who photograpeds many documents but was not really in a position to explore enemy

thinking), is more generically an asset. To be clear, all moles are assets, but not all assetsare moles.

Another special case is a "deep cover" or "sleeper" mole, who may enter a service, possibly at a young age, but definitely not reporting or doing anything that would attractsuspicion, until reaching a senior position. Kim Philby is an example of an agent activelyrecruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service while he was already committed toCommunism. Philby, at first, concentrated on doing a good job for the British, so hecould rise in trust and authority [10]. Philby was motivated by ideology before he joinedSIS.

[edit] Defector

An individual may want to leave their service at once, perhaps from high-level disgust, or low-level risk of having been discovered in financial irregularities and is just ahead of arrest. Even so, the defector certainly brings knowledge with him, and may be able to bring documents or other materials of value.

Starts in ALeaves and goes to B

Philip Agee is an example of a US CIA officer who came to the belief that he was

working on behalf of an ideology he had come to hate. Eventually, he resigned, andclandestinely went to Cuba, telling their intelligence service everything he knew, with thestated goal [11] of damaging the CIA. Agee claims the CIA was satisfied with his work anddid not want him to leave, although the author, John Barrow, claims that he was close to being discharged for improper personal conduct [12].

Soviet, and now Russian, doctrine has some interesting insights that might well be usefulto the West. For example, rather than use the term "defector", which has a negative

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connotation, they use The Russian word is dobrozhelatel , "well-wisher," as used herevirtually the equivalent of our "walk-in." This term has a positive connotation, and mayreflect how the service views such people, as described by Ivan Serov, [13], former chief of GRU (Soviet military intelligence)

While the term "well-wisher" may be positive, in Serov's view, he does not assume awell-wisher has value to offer. Pointing out the majority actually turn out to be offeringmaterial of no significant value, the first task is to determine if they are randomsympathizers who fail to understand the subject they propose to discuss, or are active provocations being run by foreign counterintelligence.

Provocateurs obtain some value if they can simply identify the intelligence officers in anembassy, so the initial interviews are, unless there is a strong reason to the contrary,conducted by low-level staff. Serov points out that even if some walk-ins have nomaterial of value, "Some are ideologically close to us and genuinely and unselfishlyanxious to help us; some are in sympathy with the Soviet Union but want at the same

time to supplement their income; and some, though not in accord with our ideas andviews, are still ready to collaborate honestly with us for financial reasons." A genuinesympathizer without useful material still may become useful as an access agent, courier,or support agent.

Other walk-ins simply are trying to get money, either for nonsense information or for realinformation with which they have been entrusted. Physical walk-ins are not the only kindof volunteer "well-wisher," who may communicate through the mail, by telephone, or direct contact. If, for example, contact is made with someone who really is an intelligenceofficer, there is immediate reason to believe the person does have intelligence contacts—  but further investigation is necessary to see if they are real or if they are   provocateurs

from counterintelligence. A provocateur can be from the local agency, or even from athird country false-flag provocation.

"Persons wanting to make money usually produce a large quantity of documents and talk much and willingly about themselves, trying to make a favorable impression.Extortioners and blackmailers usually act impudent, making their offer in the form of anultimatum and even resorting to open threats."

[edit] Defector in place

Another method is to directly recruit an intelligence officer (or terrorist member) from

within the ranks of the adversary service (terrorist group) and having that officer (terrorist) maintain their normal duties while spying on their parent service(organization); this is also referred to as recruiting an “agent” or defector in place.[14]

Starts in AStays working in A but reporting to B

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As mentioned, Oleg Penkovsky was a key US-British agent, apparently detected throughSoviet counterintelligence work. Adolf Tolkachev, and electronic engineer working onSoviet radar, was another defector in place for the US, who was exposed by the CIAdefector, Edward Lee Howard, who fled to the KGB before being arrested. Penkovskyand Tolkachev, both motivated by ideology were executed by the Soviets.

To give a sense of the "infinity of mirrors" involved in agent work, Howard was exposed by an apparent Soviet walk-in defector, Vitaly Yurchenko walked into the US Embassyin Rome and defected to the United States. While Yurchenko also identified RonaldPelton as a Soviet defector-in-place working in the  NSA Yurchenko himself re-defected back to the USSR within a few months. It is possible that Yurchenko was acting as adouble agent, sent by the Soviets to sacrifice less important Soviet assets in order to protect the more important CIA defectors in place, Aldrich Ames.

[edit] False Flag Penetrator

A special case of a mole is a false flag recruitment of a penetrator:

Starts in CBelieves being recruited by AActually is recruited by B and sends false information to C

False flag recruitments, admittedly for covert action rather than pure HUMINT, werereported [15] as a technique used by Edwin P. Wilson, who left CIA in 1971, and thenwent to work for a Navy HUMINT unit, Task Force 157 until 1976, when he went private.[16] During his time working for CIA, he was both officially and unofficiallyinvolved in arms sales. "His assignments sometimes required him to establish and use

“front” companies to gain access to information and to support CIA operations here andabroad commercially."[16] Three men, found dead under mysterious circumstances, had believed they had been recruited by Wilson, "under the pretense that he was still a CIAexecutive." According to Epstein, "Wilson maintained a close association with two of theagency's top executives-Thomas G. Clines, the director of training for the clandestineservices, and Theodore G. Shackley, who held the No. 2 position in the espionage branch.Both of these men sat in on meetings that Wilson held with his operatives and weaponsuppliers and, by doing so, helped further the illusion that his activities had the sanctionof the CIA— an illusion crucial to keeping his false flag attractive."[15] Wilson wasinvolved in then-banned arms sales to Libya, and it is unclear who actually sponsoredthese sales.

He was in Libya in 1982, but came to the Dominican Republic in 1982, where he wasarrested for illegal arms sales, and sentenced, in 1984, to 52 years in prison. He was 55years old at the time.

Continuing Freedom of Information Act and other research by his attorney caused afederal judge to throw out the conviction [16], on the basis that prosecutors "deliberately

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deceived the court", in the words of the judge, "America will not defeat Libyan terrorism by double-crossing a part-time, informal government agent."

[edit] Double Agent

The first thing to consider about a double agent is that he is, at least minimally, a trainedintelligence asset. He may not be a full case officer of the other side, but he may, at least,have been an agent of theirs. They had some reason to trust him. Like all other intelligence operations, double agent cases are run to protect and enhance the nationalsecurity. They serve this purpose principally by providing current counterintelligenceabout hostile intelligence and security services and about clandestine subversiveactivities. The service and officer considering a double agent possibility must weigh netnational advantage thoughtfully, never forgetting that a double agent is, in effect, acondoned channel of communication with the enemy [17].

Before even considering double agent operations, a service has to consider its own

resources. Managing that agent will take skill and sophistication, both at the local/caseofficer and central levels. Complexity goes up astronomically when the service cannot put physical controls on its doubles, as did the Double Cross System in WWII. In theDouble Cross System, the double agents were motivated by coercion: they knew theywould be executed if they did not cooperate. Few of them were highly trainedintelligence officers, but opportunists to start.

For predictive purposes the most important clue imbedded in the origins of an operationis the agent's original or primary affiliation, whether it was formed voluntarily or not, thelength of its duration, and its intensity. The effects of years of clandestine associationwith the adversary are deep and subtle; the Service B case officer working with a double

agent of service A is characterized by an ethnicity or religion may find those bonds rundeep, even if the agent hates the government of A. The service B officer may care deeplyfor the double.

Another result of lengthy prior clandestine service is that the agent may be hard to controlin most operations the case officer's superior training and experience give him so decidedan edge over the agent that recognition of this superiority makes the agent more tractable.But add to the fact that the experienced double agent may have been in the businesslonger than his U.S. control his further advantage in having gained a first-handcomparative knowledge of the workings of at least two disparate services, and it isobvious that the case officer's margin of superiority diminishes, vanishes, or even is

reversed.

One facet of the efforts to control a double agent operation is to ensure that the doubleagent is protected from discovery by the parent intelligence service; this is especially truein circumstances where the double agent is a defector-in-place.

Double agent operations must be carefully planned, executed, and above all, reported. One of the problems with double agent operations in the US, run by the FBI, is that the

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FBI culture has been very decentralized to the field office level. This is, perhaps, anoverreaction to the extremely centralized culture under J. Edgar Hoover. Prior to 9/11,information in one field office, which might reveal problems in a HUMINT operation, isnot necessarily shared with other offices. FBI Director Robert Mueller cited the changessince 9/11: "We then centralized coordination of our counterterrorism program. Unlike

 before, when investigations were managed primarily by individual field offices, theCounterterrorism Division at Headquarters now has the authority and the responsibility todirect and coordinate counterterrorism investigations throughout the country. Thisfundamental change has improved our ability to coordinate our operations here andabroad, and it has clearly established accountability at Headquarters for the developmentand success of our Counterterrorism Program." [18]

"The amount of detail and administrative backstopping seems unbearable at times in suchmatters. But since penetrations are always in short supply, and defectors can tell less andless of what we need to know as time goes on, because of their cut-off dates, doubleagents will continue to be part of the scene [19]."

Services functioning abroad-and particularly those operating in areas where the police powers are in neutral or hostile hands—need professional subtlety as well. The agenthandlers must have full knowledge of [the agent's] past (and especially of any prior intelligence associations), a solid grasp of his behavior pattern (both as an individual andas a member of a national grouping), and rapport in the relationship with him.[17] Caseofficers must know the agent's area and have a nuanced understanding of his language;this is an extremely unwise situation for using interpreters, since the case officer needs tosense the emotional content of the agent's communication and match it with the details of the information flowing in both directions. Depending on whether the operation is beingrun in one's own country, an allied country, or hostile territory, the case officer needs to

know the relevant laws. Even in friendly territory, the case officer needs both liaisonwith, and knowledge of, the routine law enforcement and security units in the area, so theoperation is not blown because an ordinary policeman gets suspicious and brings theagent in for questioning.

If at all possible, the service running the double agent have complete control of communications, which, in practice, need to be by electronic means or dead drop.Meetings between the double and his Service A handler are extremely risky. Even textcommunication can have patterns of grammar or word choice, known to the agent and hisoriginal service, that can hide a warning of capture, by the use of a seemingly ordinaryword. Some controlling services may paraphrase the double's text to hide such warnings, but run into the possibility of being detected by sophisticated analysis of the double'snormal choice of words.

[edit] Basic Double agent

Starts in ARecruited by BDefects and tells B all he knows (defector)

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operates in place (Agent doubled in place) and continues to tell B about A

[edit] Redoubled Agent

A service discovering an adversary agent, who entered one's own service either as a

 penetrator or an asset in place may offer him employment as a double. His agreement,obtained under open or implied duress, is unlikely, however, to be accompanied by agenuine switch of loyalties. The so-called redoubled agent whose duplicity in doublingfor another service has been detected by his original sponsor and who has been persuadedto reverse his affections again -also belongs to this dubious class. Many detected anddoubled agents degenerate into what are sometimes called "piston agents" or "mailmen,"who change their attitudes with their visas as they shunt from side to side .[17]

Operations based on them are little more than unauthorized liaison with the enemy, andusually time-wasting exercises in futility. A notable exception is the detected andunwillingly doubled agent who is relieved to be found out in his enforced service to the

adversary.

[17]

[edit] False flag double agent

Starts in AAssigned to CB creates a situation where agent believes he is talking to C, when actuallyreceiving B disinformation

[edit] Active provocateur

There can be active and passive provocation agents. A double agent may serve as ameans through which a provocation can be mounted against a person, an organization, anintelligence or security service, or any affiliated group to induce action to its owndisadvantage. The provocation might be aimed at identifying members of the other service, at diverting it to less important objectives, at tying up or wasting its assets andfacilities, at sowing dissension within its ranks, at inserting false data into its files tomislead it, at building up in it a tainted file for a specific purpose, at forcing it to surfacean activity it wanted to keep hidden, or at bringing public discredit on it, making it look like an organization of idiots. The Soviets and some of the Satellite services, the Poles in particular, are extremely adept in the art of conspiratorial provocation. All kinds of mechanisms have been used to mount provocation operations; the double agent is only

one of them

[17]

.

An active provocateur is sent by Service A to Service B to tell B that he works' for A butwants to switch sides. Or he may be a talk-in rather than a walk-in. In any event, thesignificant information that he is withholding, in compliance with A's orders, is the factthat his offer is being made at A's instigation. He is also very likely to conceal onechannel of communication with A-for example, a second secret writing system. Such"side-commo" enables A to keep in full touch while sending through the divulged

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communications channel only messages meant for adversary eyes. The provocateur mayalso conceal his true sponsor, claiming for example (and truthfully) to represent an A1service (allied with A) whereas his actual control is the A-a fact which the Sovietsconceal from the Satellite as carefully as from us [17].

Starts in A and is actually loyal to AGoes to B, says he works for A, but wants to switch sides. Gives B access to hiscommunications channel with A (channel Y)Keeps second communications channel, X with A, about which B knows nothingReports operational techniques of B to A via XProvides disinformation from A, via X, which he disseminates to B (A may alsosend disinformation directly through Y, since B should assume A doesn't knowline of communication Y is compromised)

[edit] Passive provocateur

Passive provocations are variants involving false-flag recruiting.

In Country C, Service A surveys the intelligence terrain through the eyes of Service B (aspecies of mirror-reading) and selects those citizens whose access to sources and other qualifications make them most attractive to B. Service A officers, posing as service Bofficers, recruit the citizens of country C. At some point, service A then exposes theseindividuals, and complains to country C that country B is subverting its citizens.

The stake-out has a far better chance of success in areas like Africa, where intelligenceexploitation of local resources is far less intensive, than in Europe, where persons withvaluable access are likely to have been approached repeatedly by recruiting services

during the postwar years.

[17]

A does an analysis of C and determines what targets would be attractive to BA then recruits citizens of C, which A believes will be more loyal to BThe A recruit, a citizen of C, volunteers to BA can then expose B's penetration of C, hurting B-C relations.

This may be extremely difficult to accomplish, and even if accomplished the realdifficulty is maintaining control of this “turned asset”. Controlling an enemy agent whohas been turned is a many-faceted and complex exercise that essentially boils down tomaking certain that the agent’s new-found loyalty remains consistent, which means

determining whether the “doubled” agent’s turning is genuine or false. However, this process can be quite convoluted and fraught with uncertainty and suspicion.[14]

Where it concerns terrorist groups, a terrorist who betrays his organization can be thoughtof and run as a double-agent against the terrorist’s “parent” organization in much thesame fashion as an intelligence officer from a foreign intelligence service. Therefore, for sake of ease, wherever double-agents are discussed the methodologies generally apply toactivities conducted against terrorist groups as well.[14]

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[edit] Fake double agent

Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are notdouble agents because they are not agents. Almost certainly motivated by money, it isunlikely they can maintain the deception for very long.

They may be uncovered by a headquarters check, as they may well have tried the samegame elsewhere.

[edit] Unwitting double agent

"Witting" is a term of intelligence art that indicates that one is not only aware of a fact or  piece of information, but also aware of its connection to intelligence activities. Anunwitting double agent thinks that he is still working for his own Service A, but ServiceB has somehow managed what, in communications security, is called a man-in-the-middle attack. Service A believes it is in contact with its own agent, and the agent

 believes he is communicating with his true control. This is extremely difficult to continuefor more than a very brief period of time.

Creating an unwitting double agent is extremely rare. The manipulative skill required todeceive an agent into thinking that he is serving his team when in fact he is damaging itsinterests is plainly of the highest order.

[edit] Multiply Turned Agent

A triple agent can be a double agent that decides his true loyalty is to his original service,or could always have been loyal to his service but is part of an active provocation of your 

service. If managing a double agent is hard, agents that turned again (i.e., tripled) or another time after that are far more difficult, but in some rare cases, worthwhile.

Any service B controlling, or believing it controls, a double agent, must constantlyevaluate the information that agent is providing on service A. While service A may have been willing to sacrifice meaningful information, or even other human assets, to help anintended penetration agent establish his bona fides, at some point, service A may start providing useless or misleading information as part of the goal of service A. In the WWIIDouble Cross System [20], another way the British controllers (i.e., service B in thisexample) kept the Nazis believing in their agent, was that the British let true informationflow, but too late for the Germans to act on it. The double agent might send information

indicating that a lucrative target was in range of a German submarine, but, by the time theinformation reaches the Germans, they confirm the report was true because the ship isnow docked in a safe port that would have been a logical destination on the coursereported by the agent [21]. While the Double Cross System actively handled the doubleagent, the information sent to the Germans was part of the overall Operation Bodyguard deception program of the London Controlling Section. Bodyguard was meant to convincethe Germans that the Allies planned their main invasion at one of several places, none of which were Normandy. As long as the Germans found those deceptions credible, which

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they did, they reinforced the other locations. Even when the large landings came at Normandy, deception operations continued, convincing the Germans that Operation Neptune at Normandy was a feint, so that they held back their strategic reserves. By thetime it became apparent that Normandy was indeed the main invasions, the strategicreserves had been under heavy air attack, and the lodgment was sufficiently strong that

the reduced reserves could not push it back.

There are other benefits to analyzing the exchange of information between the doubleagent and his original service, such as learning the priorities of service A through theinformation requests they are sending to an individual they believe is working for them.If the requests all turn out to be for information that service A could not use against B,and this becomes a pattern, service A may have realized their agent has been turned.

Since maintaining control over double agents is tricky at best, it is not hard to see how problematic this methodology can become. The potential for multiple turnings of agentsand perhaps worse, the turning of one’s own intelligence officers (especially those

working within counterintelligence itself), poses a serious risk to any intelligence servicewishing to employ these techniques. This may be the reason that triple-agent operationsappear not to have been undertaken by U.S. counterintelligence in some espionage casesthat have come to light in recent years, particularly among those involving high-level penetrations. Although the arrest and prosecution of  Aldrich Ames of the CIA and RobertHanssen of the FBI, both of whom were senior counterintelligence officers in their respective agencies who volunteered to spy for the Russians, hardly qualifies asconclusive evidence that triple-agent operations were not attempted throughout thecommunity writ large, these two cases suggest that neutralization operations may be the preferred method of handling adversary double agent operations vice the more aggressiveexploitation of these potential triple-agent sources.[14]

[edit] Triple agent

Starts out working for BVolunteers to be a defector-in-place for ADiscovered by BOffers his communications with A to B, so B may gain operational data about Aand send disinformation to A

A concern with triple agents, of course, is if they have changed loyalties twice, why not athird or even more times? Consider a variant where the agent remains fundamentallyloyal to B:

[edit] Quadruple agent

Starts out working for BVolunteers to be a defector-in-place for A. Works out a signal by which he caninform A that B has discovered and is controlling himDiscovered by B

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Offers his communications with A to B.B actually gets disinformation about A's operational techniquesA learns what B wants to know, such as potential vulnerabilities of A, which Awill then correct

Successes such as the British Double Cross System or the German Operation North Pole show that these types of operations are indeed feasible. Therefore, despite the obviouslyvery risky and extremely complex nature of double agent operations, the potentially quitelucrative intelligence windfall – the disruption or deception of an adversary service – makes them an inseparable component of exploitation operations [14].

If a double agent wants to come home to Service A, how can he offer a better way toredeem himself than recruiting the Service B case officer that was running his doubleagent case, essentially redoubling the direction of the operation? If the case officer refuses, that is apt to be the end of the operation. If the attempt fails, of course, the wholeoperation has to be terminated. A creative agent can tell his case office, even if he had not

 been tripled, that he had been loyal all along, and the case officer would, at best, berevealed as a fool.

"Occasionally a service runs a double agent whom it knows to be under the control of theother service and therefore has little ability to manipulate or even one who it knows has been successfully redoubled. The question why a service sometimes does this is a validone. One reason for us is humanitarian: when the other service has gained physicalcontrol of the agent by apprehending him in a denied area, we often continue theoperation even though we know that he has been doubled back because we want to keephim alive if we can.

"Another reason might be a desire to determine how the other service conducts its doubleagent operations or what it uses for operational build-up or deception material and fromwhat level it is disseminated. There might be other advantages, such as deceiving theopposition as to the service's own capabilities, skills, intentions, etc. Perhaps the servicemight want to continue running the known redoubled agent in order to conceal other operations. It might want to tie up the facilities of the opposition. It might use theredoubled agent as an adjunct in a provocation being run against the oppositionelsewhere. Running a known redoubled agent is like playing poker against a professionalwho has marked the cards but who presumably is unaware that you can read the backs aswell as he can.[17]

[edit] Support Services

[edit] Couriers

A courier has no responsibilities other than clandestine communications. Anyinvolvement of the courier in activities that may draw attention from counterintelligenceis unwise. For example, if there is a political party, friendship society, or other 

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organization that would be considered favorable to Service B, couriers, under nocircumstances, should be identified with them.

Courier work is among those things that consist of hours of boredom punctuated withmoments of sheer terror. Keeping a courier, who is not a member of your service and/or 

has diplomatic cover, is challenging.

Occasionally, it may be practical to transfer a courier to other, more challenging duties.Once that transfer is made, however, the individual should never be reassigned to courier duty, as the probability of that person having become known to counterintelligence ismuch higher.

There may be occasions where diplomats, or even members of diplomats' families whohave diplomatic immunity, may serve as couriers. Their value in the diplomatic servicemust be weighed against the near certainty that if discovered, they will be expelled as persona non grata.

Drivers, especially those trained to receive car tosses, are a variant of couriers, and towhich the same constraints apply. Using persons with diplomatic immunity may beslightly more sensible in the case of drivers, since their cars are usually immune tosearch. On the other hand, a diplomatic car will have distinctive license plates and may be under surveillance whenever it leaves diplomatic premises. Counterintelligenceservices may take the risk, given the potential reward, of putting electronic trackingdevices on diplomatic vehicles.

[edit] Safehouses and Other Meeting Places

Safehouses may not be literal stand-alone houses. Indeed, in an urban area, the anonymityof an apartment house or office building may give greater security.

In more rural areas, houses may indeed be needed. This is especially the case if thecountry team needs storage of bulky supplies (e.g., weapons, sabotage materials, propaganda), printing presses, etc.

In general, communications, as well as equipment clearly associated with clandestineoperations should be portable and not fixed in a safehouse used for meetings. If this isdone, there is a chance that a counterintelligence search of the premises might not turn upanything incriminating. The safehouse should have emergency communications so that it

can be reached to call off a meeting or to warn of surveillance or an impending raid, preferably with a wrong-number dialogue or other deniable communications method.

It is a difficult call as to whether a safehouse should have destruction facilities. Modernforensic laboratories can reconstruct papers that are merely burned, although shreddersare no longer exotic items, especially if there is a mundane office function in thesafehouse. More definitive destruction capabilities will confirm the clandestine use of the

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 premises, but may be a reasonable protection if the safehouse is being overrun andcritical communications or other security material is in jeopardy.

[edit] Finance

Industrialized nations, with complex financial systems, have a variety of reportingsystems about money transfer, from which counterintelligence potentially can derive patterns of operations and warnings of operations in progress. Money laundering refers tomethods for getting cash in and out of the financial system without it being noticed byfinancial counterintelligence.

The need for money, and challenge of concealing its transfer, will vary with the purposeof the clandestine system. If it is operated by a case officer under diplomatic cover, andthe money is for small payments to agent(s), the embassy can easily get cash, and theamounts paid may not draw suspicion. If, however, there will be large payments to anagent, getting the money still is not a problem for the embassy, but there starts to be a

concern that the agent may draw attention to himself by extensive spending.

US security systems, about which the most public information is known, usually includea credit check as part of a security clearance, and excessive debt is a matter of concern. Itmay be the case that refusing to clear people with known financial problems has stoppeda potential penetration, but, in reality, the problem may well be at the other side. AldrichAmes, Robert Hanssen, and John Walker all spent more money than could be explained by their salaries, but their conspicuous spending did not draw attention; they weredetected because variously through investigations of leaks that threw suspicion on their access to information. Suspicion did fall on Jack Dunlap, who had his security clearancerevoked and committed suicide. Perhaps Dunlap was more obvious as a low-level courier 

and driver than the others, while the others were officers in more responsible positions.

The question remains if sudden wealth is likely to be detected. More extensive bank reporting, partially as a result of the US PATRIOT Act and other reporting requirementsof the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the latter established before9/11, may make receiving payments easier to catch.

Additional requirements for bank reporting were in the PATRIOT act, and intended tohelp catch terrorists preparing for operations. It is not clear, however, if terroristoperations will involve highly visible cash transactions. The 9/11 operations cells werereported to have required somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 in operating funds,

and there were indeed wire transfers in the $100,000 range. Still, the question remains if arelatively small expenditure, compared with the enormous amounts in the illegal drugtrade, will draw counterintelligence/counterterrorist attention.

Wire transfers and bank deposits go through formal value transfer systems where there isreporting to government. Especially terrorist groups, however, have access to informalvalue transfer systems (IVTS), where there is no reporting, although FinCEN has beensuggesting indirect means of detecting the operation of IVTS.[22]

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For clandestine networks where the case officers are under non-official cover , handlinglarge sums of cash is more difficult and may justify resorting to IVTS. When the cover isunder an aviation proprietary[disambiguation needed ], it can be relatively simple to hide large bundles of cash, and make direct payments.

[edit] Formal Value Transfer Systems

In the US, financial transactions begin with mutual identification between the customer and the financial institution. Although there are many Internet frauds involving fakefinancial institutions or criminals masquerading as a financial institution (i.e., phishing),the more difficult requirement is for the prospective customer to show acceptableidentification to the bank. For basic relationships, a government-issued identificationdocument, such as a passport or driver's license, usually suffices. For foreign nationals,their country's equivalent may be accepted, although it may be harder to verify.

Going beyond the basics becomes much more difficult. Were the relationship one that

involved classified information, there would be an extensive personal historyquestionnaire, fingerprint check, name search with law enforcement and intelligence, and,depending on the clearance level, additional investigations.

Credit bureaus and other financial information services may be helpful, although theaccuracy of some of these is questionable. There are Federal requirements to check names against lists of possible terrorists, financial criminals and money launderers, etc. Inmany respects, we have a problem where financial institution employees, without lawenforcement training, are being asked to be detectives. There is a conflict of interest andlack of law enforcement training when bank employees are asked to monitor the legalityof their customers' acts. Stay aware of the status of court tests of legislation and

regulation in this area, as well as new legislation. While it is possible to teach manyinvestigative skills, every experienced and successful investigator speaks of instinct,which takes years to develop.

[edit] Money Laundering and subverting formal value transfer systems

Money laundering is more associated with domestic crime than with clandestineoperations, and is less likely to be involved in clandestine operations. Nevertheless, a brief mention of its potential benefits are in order. The basic principle of moneylaundering is that someone is in a business that has large cash income, such as drug salesor gambling. The receiving organization needs to find a way that these get into usable

 bank accounts, so they can be accessed for large purchases.

The most common way to do money laundering is to find a legal business that naturallyreceives much of its income in cash. These could include hair and beauty shops, smallgroceries, and, ironically, laundries and dry cleaners. The legal business, or more likelymultiple businesses, receive the illegal cash as well as normal receipts, and draw amountsthat do not attract suspicion. Periodically, the launderer may have the cash-receiving firm buy something for him, or, less commonly, to write a large check that goes into his legal

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account. Care is taken that the amounts in the legal accounts do not hit the limits thatcause automatic reporting.

[edit] Informal value transfer systems

Informal value transfer systems (IVTS)[22]

, however, exist in a number of cultures, and bypass regular financial channels and their monitoring systems (see financialintelligence). These are known by regional and cultural names including:

• hawala (Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan)• hundi (India)

While details differ by culture and specific participants, the systems work in acomparable manner. To transfer value, party 1 gives money (or other valuta) to IVTSagent 1-A. This agent calls, faxes, or otherwise communicates the amount and recipientof the funds to be transferred, to IVTS agent 2-A, who will deliver the funds to party 2.

All the systems work because they are valuable to the culture, and failure to carry out theagreement can invite savage retribution.

Reconciliation can work in a number of ways. There can be physical transfer of cash or valuables. There can be wire transfers in third and fourth countries, countries withoutstrong reporting requirements, which the IVTS agents can verify.

Another means of transferring assets is through commercial shipment of conventionalgoods, but with an artificially low invoice price, so the receiver can sell them and recover disbursed funds through profit on sales.

[edit] References

1. ^ UK Security Service (MI5). "Espionage and the Law" ([dead link ] –  Scholar search).http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page570.html

2. ^ US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). "Joint Publication 1-02 Departmentof Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" (PDF).http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf . Retrieved 2007-10-01.

3. ^ Condon, Richard (1964). An infinity of mirrors. Random House.4. ^ Intelligence Community Staff (1990-04-12). "Project Slammer Interim Progress

Report". http://antipolygraph.org/documents/slammer-12-04-1990.shtml .Retrieved 2007-11-04.

5. ^ a b Stein, Jeff (1994-07-05). "The Mole's Manual". New York Times.http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9503E5D91E3CF936A35754C0A962958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=pr int. Retrieved 2007-11-04.

6. ^ Security Policy Advisory Board (1997-12-12). "Security Policy Advisory BoardMeeting Minutes". http://www.fas.org/sgp/spb/spab1297.html . Retrieved 2007-11-04.

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7. ^ Herbig, Katherine L. (2008-03-01). "Changes in Espionage by Americans:1947-2007" (PDF). Defense Personnel Security Research Center, withCounterintelligence Field Activity. http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/changes.pdf .Retrieved 2008-04-07.

8. ^ Shane, Scott (2008-04-20). "A Spy’s Motivation: For Love of Another 

Country". The New York Times.http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/weekinreview/20shane.html? pagewanted=print. Retrieved 2008-04-20.

9. ^ Schecter, Jerrold L.; Deriabin, Peter S. (1992). The Spy Who Saved the World:

 How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War . Scribner. Schecter 1992.

10. ^ Philby, Kim (1968). My Silent War . Macgibbon & Kee Ltd.11. ^ Agee, Philip (1975). Inside the Company. Penguin Books. Agee 1975. ISBN 0-

14-004007-2.12. ^ Barron, John (1983). KGB Today: The Hidden Hand . Readers Digest Assn..

ISBN 0-88349-164-8.

13. ^ Serov, Ivan A.. "Work with Walk-Ins" (

[dead link ]

–  

Scholar search

). Studies in Intelligence. CIA-Serov. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v08i1a02p_0002.htm

14. ^ a b c d  e Gleghorn, Todd E. (September 2003) (PDF). Exposing the Seams: the

 Impetus for Reforming US Counterintelligence.  Naval Postgraduate School.http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/gleghorn03.pdf . Retrieved 2007-11-02

15. ^ a b "Edwin Wilson: The CIA's Great Gatsby". Parade. September 18, 1993.http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/edwin_print.htm . Retrieved 2007-11-10

16. ^ a b c Hughes, Lynn N. (October 27, 2003). "Opinion on Conviction [US DistrictCourt, Southern District of Texas"] (PDF).http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/wilson102703.pdf . Retrieved 2007-11-10

17. ^ a b c d  e  f    g  h Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995). "Observations on the DoubleAgent" ([dead link ] –  Scholar search). Studies in Intelligence.https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v06i1a05p_0002.htm. Retrieved 2007-11-03

18. ^ Mueller, Robert (2004-04-14). "Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director,FBI Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the UnitedStates". http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/mueller041404.htm . Retrieved2007-11-10.

19. ^ Matschulat, Austin B. (2 July 1996). "Coordination and Cooperation inCounerintelligence" ([dead link ] –  Scholar search). Studies in Intelligence.https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v13i2a05p_0001.htm. Retrieved 2007-11-03

20. ^ Masterman, J. C. (1982). The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945.Ballantine, 1982. ISBN 0-345-29743-1.

21. ^ Brown, Anthony Cave (1975). Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary TrueStory Behind D-Day. HarperCollins. ISBN 0060105518.

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22. ^ a b United States Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (March 2003). "Informal Value Transfer Systems, FinCEN AdvisoryIssue 33" (PDF). http://www.fincen.gov/advis33.pdf 

[edit] External links

• Why the West can't infiltrate al-Qaida by Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post March 20, 2008

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Words of Estimative Probability · Analysis of CompetingHypotheses · Intelligence cycle (target-centric approach)

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