CLU & Monroy

7/27/2019 CLU & Monroy

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as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by therespondents provides:

Sec. 7. . . . . .Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, noappointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled corporations or theirsubsidiaries.

Issue/s:1.)Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinetmembers, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made forappointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

2.)Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?

3.)Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from theoffices they have held pursuant to EO 284?

Held:1.) No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on thePresident and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in thegovernment or elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding ofmultiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive publicofficials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, theirdeputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unlessotherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil serviceare allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when suchis allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, theirdeputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. Inother words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective

and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be theexception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, theirdeputies and assistants.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretationto refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-Presidentbeing appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting asPresident in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, theSecretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8(1), Article VIII.

2.) The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by

the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex- officio capacityas provided by law and as requiredby the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason isthat these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutionalprohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Theterm ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done inan official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment orauthority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely relatedto, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to beperformed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien


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to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purviewof "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

3.) During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de factoofficers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "incases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possessionof the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to theemoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and othercompensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received bythe respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may thereforebe retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department tohold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13,Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided inthe 1987 Constitution itself.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions areGRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set

aside.


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Effects of acts of de facto officers:

G.R. No. L-23258 July 1, 1967

ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondent.

Doctrine: the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salaryreceived by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into theoffice in good faith and under color of title

Facts: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when onSeptember 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal inthe forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on

September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. TheCommission on Elections, per resolution,

approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961,

respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office asmunicipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of thecertificate of candidacy in question.

The petitioner brought an action claiming that he is still the incumbent mayor of Navotas. CFIdeclared that Petitioner was deemed resigned upon filing his COC and ordered to reimbursesalaries received infavor of Del Rosario. The Court of appeals affirmed the CFIs decision.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the lower courtjudgment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages thesalaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of petitioner's

vacation of his office as mayor.

Issues: Is the petitioner, as a de facto officer entitled to the salaries he was allegedly entitled toreceive?

Held: No and it is the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a specific lawful office mayrecover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongfultenure thoughhe entered into the office with goodfaith and under color of title, which applies tothis case. A de factoofficer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at risk and must account tothe de jure officer forwhatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongfulretention of the public office

Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is, asit is hereby, affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

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CLU & Monroy