CM XLVIII 29 200713 Altaf Hussain Para

8/12/2019 CM XLVIII 29 200713 Altaf Hussain Para

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COMMENTARY

Economic & PoliticalWeekly EPW july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29 23

Overall, it seems unrealistic to believe

that net capital inflows on the needed

scale would materialise: the result could

well be that the rupee would remain

under downward pressure even in the

absence of outflows of portfolio capital.

One should not rule out a balance-of-

payments crisis. To avoid/overcome itwhat would be needed is to depreciate

the rupee to somewhere in the Rs 70+

level and adopt extremely tight, defla-

tionary monetary and fiscal policies to

get out of the cycle of high inflation,

which would need a fall in the nominal

exchange rate, in turn, leading to fur-

ther inflation. The medicine would be

bitter and it is most unlikely that a gov-

ernment facing elections in less than a

year would be able to administer it.

Growth and the Exchange Rate

There is no evidence that floating exchange

rates help growth. On the contrary, in

the modern era (last 70 years), every fast

growing economy from Germany and

Japan in the Bretton Woods era, to China

for the last 30 years have used fixed/

managed exchange rates supporting

export-led manufacturing growth. If man-

aging the domestic value of a currency is

legitimate and important, surely manag-

ing the external value is no less crucial?Remember, negative net exports corre-

spondingly reduce output, growth and

jobs, and their unchecked continuation

is a potential threat to financial stability.

Demystifying Sheikh Abdullah

Altaf Hussain Para

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah has

been the most dominating

political figure of modern Jammu

and Kashmir who played a

significant role in shaping its

post-1947 politics. Frequently

mentioned in various works, both

scholarly and journalistic, his roleis often viewed in black and white

terms. This article attempts to

place his political work in the

contexts of its times and find clues

to the regions present

predicaments from a study of

Kashmirs modern history.

An eminent scholar and journalist,

M J Akbar, rightly regards Sheikh

Mohammed Abdullah as the archi-

tect of modern Kashmir saying: The

modern history of Kashmir begins with

the greatest Kashmiri of modern times,

Sheikh Abdullah (Akbar 1991: xii). Sheikh

Abdullah was, without question, the

dominant figure in Kashmir from 1930s

until his death in 1982.1He was the mostenigmatic and complex political leader

of Kashmir. He had a meteoric rise to the

top slot of Kashmir politics and continued

to dominate the political scene for more

than 50 years with enduring impact.

However, notwithstanding his abiding

contribution, perhaps no other person

has become as controversial as Sheikh

Abdullah did. In this article, I intend to

revisit his role with a view to understand

the politics of modern Kashmir.

Sheikh Abdullah was the harbinger

of national consciousness2 and instru-

mental to introduce political modernisa-

tion in the state of Jammu and Kashmir

(J&K). Those who met Sheikh Abdullah

during his political heyday attest to

his enormous charm, considerable pres-

ence, and unquestioned charisma and

authority though his political wisdom

was always not so evident.By establish-

ing the Muslim Conference, Sheikh Ab-

dullah not only started political life inthe state, but also his organisation be-

came an important pressure group over

the feudal establishment which com-

pelled the state to introduce different

socio-economic and administrative re-

forms. The organisation, with Sheikh

its moving sprit, championed civil liber-

ties, freedom of the press, spread of

modern education and economic eman-

cipation of the downtrodden sections of

the society.3

Undeterred by the state-sponsored

communalism and non-Muslim sub-

jects (barring exceptions) reactionary

role,4it was through Sheikh Abdullahs

persistent efforts that the slogans like

Hindu-Muslim-Sikh Ithad, Zindabad

Zindabad became the rallying slogansthroughout the struggle for freedom.

Since Sheikh Abdullahs secular politi-

cal discourse was in accordance with

Kashmiri mass psyche, which believes

in religious syncretism, he was well-re-

ceived by common Kashmiris. It is no

wonder then that during 1947, when the

whole subcontinent was burning in the

communal fire, Gandhiji saw a ray of hope

in Kashmir where the Muslim majority

protected the life and property of the

non-Muslim minority.5

No Ideology

Although, Sheikh Abdullah was deeply

religious and staunchly secular, his

politics, however,was never truly rooted

in ideology, rather he used ideologies

to raise his own stakes. Although the

National Conference was founded on lofty

ideals, after he abandoned the platform

of the Muslim Conference, in reality,

however, the new creed was preachedby him to free himself from the domina-

tion of Punjabi Muslim influence.6In the

Altaf Hussain Para ([email protected])is with the Government Amar Singh College,

Srinagar.


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COMMENTARY

july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29 EPW Economic & PoliticalWeekly24

same way, Sheikh Abdullahs closeness

with the Indian National Congress (INC),

particularly to its brand ambassador,

Jawaharlal Nehru, was not motivated by

any ideological uniformity but rather by

mutual interests. It is not an unknown

fact that from 1940s INCbecame the big-

gest source of funding to the NationalConference.7By affiliating himself with

Nehru, it was not only that Sheikh

Abdullahs popularity received an enor-

mous boost at the national level, but it

also helped mitigate the intensity of

propaganda made against him by Kashmiri

pandits. In return, the Congress needed

Sheikh Abdullah as a counter-argument

to Jinnahs two-nation theory.8

Sheikh Abdullah was unfortunately a

poor judge of crucial situations. The Indian

Partition of 1947 and the Bangladesh

Crisis of 1971 are only a few cases in

reference. He disastrously failed to antici-

pate the partition as late as in 1946. In

May that year when the prospects of

Pakistan were as bright as daylight, he

considered it as a hypothetical question.9

It was this misjudgment and blind eye to

the events of such importance which

caught him unprepared in 1947. In the

same way, he took the short-term conse-

quences of 1971 crisis as a final verdict ofhistory and reached a hasty accord with

Indira Gandhi.

Instrument of Accession

Abdullah was essentially a Kashmiri

patriot, inspired by socialist rather than

communal aspiration, who would have

preferred independence for his state had

it been possible or, failing it, to retain it

as a semi-independent entity under the

protection of Nehrus India.10In Jinnahs

Pakistan, there was no possibility of

enjoying special positions and powers.11

However, with the Poonch revolt12shaking

the basis of Dogra Raj in August-Septem-

ber 1947, and the tribals thundering to-

wards Srinagar shouting slogans against

the National Conference and creating pan-

ic in its rank and file, it became a case of

India or death for Sheikh Abdullah.13His

hasty slogan freedom before accession

was rendered irrelevant due to the force

of circumstances. It was against thisbackdrop that Sheikh Abdullah provided

his fullest support (Poplai 1959: 75) to

the accession offer made by the defeated

Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, to the

Indian dominion. Nehru was fully aware

that Sheikh Abdullah had waded through

blood to shake hands with India. Thus, in

the Instrument of Accession which was

subsequently signed, Sheikh Abdullah

remained Nehrus prime concern.By lending his crucial support to the

accession, Sheikh Abdullah got three

things in return: (a) control over the

state administration; (b) a provisional

accession; and (c) its limited character.

The reference in Hari Singhs letter to

his desire to call upon Sheikh Abdullah

to form an interim government and the

governor general expressing satisfaction

at this gives a clear impression about the

conditions attached to the accession. By

the Instrument of Accession, Hari Singh

accepted only three subjects foreign

affairs, defence and communications as

ones which the dominion legislature may

make laws from the state. It is quite

probable that a prior understanding was

made between Nehru and Sheikh Abdul-

lah to grant the state autonomy in its in-

ternal matters.14While accepting the ac-

cession it was made clear from the outset

that its finality was strictly conditional on

a reference to the people of the state.Nehru declared on 2 November 1947 his

governments pledge to hold a referen-

dum under international auspices such

as the United Nations (UN)to determine

whether the people wished to join India

or Pakistan.15For Sheikh Abdullah this

provision was significant in two ways.

First, he used it as an argument that

people, not Hari Singh, had the right to

confirm the accession. Second, through

this provision there was an escape route

if at any point the Indian state failed to

fulfil its commitments.

By the above-cited provisions of the

Instrument of Accession, Sheikh Abdullah

became a true successor of Hari Singh

with unbridled powers, backed by dem-

ocratic India, to deal with those who do

not subscribe to his views on accession.

In the pursuit of establishing a regi-

mented state, scores of intellectuals and

leaders were banished and imprisoned

for showing disagreement with theviews of Sheikh Abdullah.16He became

the champion advocate of Kashmirs

accession with India both within the

state and at international fora. He would

project accession as the ultimate goal

and logical culmination of Kashmirs

freedom struggle.

Against Plebiscite and Pakistan

Being a mass leader, Sheikh Abdullahwas, however, aware about two harsh

realities: (a) that his stand about acces-

sion was unpopular, and (b) that there

was a strong pro-Pakistan constituency

in his state. It is not surprising then that

he started advocating against both the

plebiscite and Pakistan.

Many may be surprised to note that

the first open opposition against the

plebiscite was not made by the Indian

Right, but it came from Sheikh Abdullah

only nine days after Nehru made his

pledge. Making the destruction caused

by the tribal invasion an excuse, Sheikh

Abdullah declared: there may not be a

referendum at all after this disaster at

Baramulla, Uri,PattanandMuzzaffara-

bad and other places.17 His lieutenant

and the iron man of the National Con-

ference, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad,

confirmed his leaders views a few days

later when he commented that the peo-

ple of Kashmir are more likely to beasked to ratify the provisional decision

to accede to India at the general elections

than to vote in a referendum to decide

the future of the state....18

In the same manner Sheikh Abdullah

became the worst critic of Pakistan and

strongly refused to accept it as a party to

the Kashmir issue. A few lines from his

famous speech at the UNin February 1948

will suffice to substantiate this. Speaking

both against the plebiscite and Pakistan

in the same breath he declared:

I had thought all along that the world had got

rid of Hitlers...but from what is happening in

my poor country, I am convinced they have

transmigrated their souls into Pakistan...

The (plebiscite) offer (was) made by the

prime minister of India when, I think, he had

not the slightest need for making it, for

Kashmir was in distress...I refuse to accept

Pakistan as a party in the affairs of Jammu

and Kashmir; I refuse this point blank...We

have seen enough of Pakistan.19

That was Sheikh Abdullah at theprime of his power. Outside power he

would speak a different tune.


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Economic & PoliticalWeekly EPW july 20, 2013 vol xlviii no 29 25

With the plebiscite and Pakistan syn-

drome refusing to die, particularly after

the UN resolutions,20 Sheikh Abdullah

launched a massive project to win over

the people for an anticipated referen-

dum. On the one hand, he introduced

sweeping land reform,21 perhaps un-

known to any non-communist state, andon the other, he systematically used his

regimented state apparatus to eliminate

all the opposing views. But things re-

mained as they were. Sentiments die

hard. The observations made in this re-

gard by Indira Gandhi22 from Srinagar

and Sardar Patel in their letters to Nehru

on 14 May 1948 and 3 July 1950 respec-

tively, were as much relevant then as

they are now. Patel informed Nehru:

it appears that both the National Conferenceand Sheikh Sahib are losing their hold on

the people of the valley and are becoming

somewhat unpopular...In such circumstanc-

es...plebiscite is unreal.23

The memories of communal passions

roused by Partition politics, the Jammu

massacre24 and the treatment to the

National Conference workers on the

first appearance of the Indian army in

the state25 were still fresh in the

popular psyche.

New Avatar

Seeing the growing anti-India sentiment

and the prospects of winning plebiscite

becoming dark, Nehru got apprehensive

of Sheikh Abdullah and in frustration

pressurised him to ratify the accession on

the floor of the constituent assembly.26It

was unacceptable to Sheikh Abdullah in

view of his popular alienation and isola-

tion. To regain his influence he came out

in a new avatar. He started voicing his

reservations on accession and started

again dreaming of an independent

Kashmir.27 In an emotional speech at

Hazratbal on 25 April 1952 he said: it

would be better to die than to submit to

the taunt that India was our bread giv-

er.28With Sheikh Abdullah becoming a

liability to India, he was unceremoni-

ously sacked at the direct orders of his

best friend, Nehru.29It set an unhealthy

precedent which has honestly been fol-

lowed by the Indian state since then.Once out of power, Sheikh Abdullah

started preaching the gospel of Kashmiris

right to self-determination for more than

two decades by patronising the plebiscite

front.30He also acknowledged Pakistan

as an unavoidable fact of the Kashmir

issue31using symbols like Pakistani salt

and the green handkerchief (Koul 1993)

to influence the simple minds of common

Kashmiris. His consistent advocacy for22 years created a deep-rooted mass

psyche and memory which he himself

failed to eradicate when he abandoned

the platform of plebiscite in return to the

state chief ministership. He added insult

to injury by disowning the Kashmiris

longest political struggle for the right to

self-determination by calling it Siyasi

Aawaragardi (political waywardness).

When the Congress dislodged him

again in 1977, he also tried to interpret

the Accord of 1975 in his own typical

way. He said, since the Congress Party

has withdrawn its support, the accord

that had been concluded between him

and Indira Gandhi should be deemed to

have ended.32

Thus, Sheikh Abdullah was not only

the architect of accession, but also its

demolisher. He used accession as a

bargaining ploy to secure for himself

the kingdom of Dogra and in the course

created a disputed identity of the masseshe claimed to represent. True to his split

personality, he made frequent U-turns

and somersaults and left his people

where they find themselves now. The

need of the hour is to revisit the role

of Sheikh Abdullah in the light of

present political scenario of J&Kso that

many complexities related to it are

better understood.

Notes

1 For detailed information about SheikhAbdullahs early life and times see his ownautobiography,Aatash-i-Chinar, Srinagar, 2006.See also Bazaz (1954); Saraf (1977); and Taseer(1968). A few political biographies which give usdifferent perspectives on Sheikh Abdullahspolitical life include, Puri (1983); Koul (1985)and Bhattacharjea 2008.

2 On the emergence of national consciousness,see Zutshi 1986; Bazaz, op cit; Khan 1980 and

Yasin and Rafiqi, 1980.

3 For demands of Sheikh Abdullahs politicalorganisation see two historical documents, viz,

National Demandsigned by the leaders of theNational Conference on 29 August 1938 and

Naya Kashmir Manifestopassed in 1944 annualsession of the organisation.

4 On this issue recently two authoritativeworks have been published. See, Rai 2004 andZutshi 2003.

5 Mahatma Gandhi used the accession of Kashmirto Indian Union as an argument to douseHindu communal reactions to Partition. At aprayer meeting on 29 December 1947, Gandhisaid: My sole hope and Prayer is that Kashmir

will become a beacon of light in this benightedsubcontinent, Tendulkar (1958), p 222.

6 After first meeting with Nehru in North-WestFrontier Province (NWFP) in 1936, Sheikh

Abdullah was so impressed that he declared in

a press conference at Amritsar: Communaltension in Kashmir is the result of propagandaby the communal leaders of Punjab. We wantpeople of Punjab not to interfere in our internalaffairs. Our next programme will be to followthe principles of the Congress Party and afterreturning to Kashmir, I will strive to set up anorganisation which supports national ideology,

Aatish-i-Chinar, op cit, pp 209-11.

7 See for example, the confident ial report toM A Jinnah, 20 August 1943, Indian OfficeRecords, R/1/1/3913.

8 Nehru who was aware about the potential signi-ficance of Sheikh Abdullah, wrote to KrishnaKriplani on 6 March 1940 that Sheikh Abdullah

was definitely a man who counts and will countand paid first of the three goodwill visits to Kash-

mir to woe the National Conference leadership.He was followed in succeeding years by a chainof Congress leaders.Nehru Papers, Teen Murti,New Delhi, 41/2601.

9 Khidmat, Srinagar, 6 May 1946.

10 See my unpublished PhD theses entitledEmergence of Modern Kashmir: A Study ofSheikh Mohammad Abdullahs Role, KashmirUniversity, 2008. See particularly chapter on

Accession.

11 Ibid.

12 Between August and October, 1947, a majorlocal revolt against the Maharajas oppressiverule developed among the Muslim populationof north-western Poonch area of Jammu. Fordetails see, Birdwood 1956, pp 50-51.

13 It is interest ing to note here that the slogan of

the raiders was reported to be: Down with theNational Conference and Sheikh Abdullah.See Secret Eighth Meeting of the DefenseCommittee Held at 11 am on Saturday, the25 October 1947.

14 See the text of the letters exchanged betweenthe Maharaja and Lords Mountbatten and theInstrument of Accession as set out in theGovern-ment of Indias White Paper on Jammu and

Kashmir 1948,pp47-48.

15 Nehrus broadcast from New Delhi on 2 Novem-ber, ibid, pp 52-54.

16 The National Conference regime ironically,suppresses all the opposition against its viewsin the state, no healthy opposition was allowedto grow. The state government promulgated anOrdinance entitled the Enemy Agents Ordi-

nance allocating for the arrest and summarytrials of those suspected of pro-Pakistan lean-ings Bazaz 1965, p 12. For more detail s, see Butt1981, pp 46-47.

17 Hindustan Times, 12 November 1947.

18 Times of India, 17 November 1947.

19 Varshney cited in Raju and Thomas, pp 194-95.

20 Full text of UN resolutions is given in Korbel1966.

21 On land reforms see, Thorner 1956, p 50,See also Ladjensky 1977, pp 179-80.

22 On 14 May 1948, Indira Gandhi wrote to herfather from Srinagar: they say that only SheikhSaheb is confident of winning the plebiscite,Gandhi 2004, pp 512-18.

23 Patel to Nehru, 3 July 1950, Das, p 317. Compare

also ex defence minister Krishna Menons answerto a journalist who enquired, in 1956, why Indiahad never held the promised plebiscite: because

we would lose it. Quoted in Sayeed 1967, p 266.


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24 On this little known and still controversialepisode, see my thesis, op cit, pp 133-35.

25 About seven National Conference workers werekilled during the night of 5 November 1947 near

Rambaghby Indian army. SeeWhitehead 2007:p 184.

26 See Nehrus confidential Note for SheikhAbdullah , dated 25 August 1952.

27 GM Sadiqs letter to Sheikh Abdullah on 11 Sep-tember 1956.

28 As cited by Noorani 2006.29 For detailed description, see my disser tation,

op cit, Chapter IX.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Mir Qasim,Dastan-I-Hyat,(Urdu), p 385.

References

Akbar, M J (1991): Kashmir: Behind the Vale(NewDelhi: Roli Books).

Bazaz, P N (1965): The Shape of Things in Kashmir(Delhi: Pamposh Publications).

Bazaz, Prem Nath (1954): The History of the Strug-gle for the Freedom, Cultural , and Political:

From the Earlier Times to the Present Day (NewDelhi: Kashmir Publishing Company).

Bhattacharjea, Ajit (2008): Sheikh Mohammad

Abdullah: Tragic Hero of Ka shmir (New Delhi:Roli Books).

Birdwood, Lord (1956): Two Nations and Kashmir(London: Robert Hall).

Butt, Sunaulla (1981): Kashmir in Flames (Srina-gar: Ali Mohammad & Sons).

Das, Durga (1971): ed. Sardar Patels Correspond-ence, Vol I, Ahmadabad.

Gandhi, Sonia (2004): ed. Two Alone, Two Togeth-er: Letters Between Indira Gandhi & Jawaharlal

Nehru 1940-64(New Delhi: Trafalgar SquarePublishing).

Khan, Hassan (1980): Freedom Movement in Kash-mir 1931-40(Delhi: Light and Life Publishers).

Korbel, Josef (1966): Danger in Kashmir (Prince-ton: Princiton University Press).

Koul, R N (1985): Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: APolitical Phoenix (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers).

Koul, Shyam (1993): Kashmir: Some Realities,Kashmir Times, 6 June.

Ladjensky, Wolf (1977): Land Reforms: Observa-tions in Kashmir in L J Walinsky (ed.), Agrari-an Reforms as Unfinished Business (New Delhi:Oxford University Press).

Noorani, A G (2006): Kashmir: Blunder of thePast,Frontline, 29 December.

Poplai, S L (1959): Selected Document on Asian Af-fairs: India 1947-50, Volume I (Bombay: OxfordUniversity Press).

Puri, Balraj (1983): Abdullahs Era (Srinagar:Kashmir University).

Rai, Miridu (2004): Hindu Rulers, Muslim Sub-jects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir(New Delhi: Permanent Black).

Saraf, Mohammad Yusuf (1977): Kashmiri s Fightfor Freedom, 2 Volumes (Lahore: Ferozsons).

Sayeed, Khalid (1967): The Political System of Paki-stan(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company).

Taseer, Abdul Rasheed (1968): Tarikh-i-Hurriyat-i-

Kashmir(Srinagar: Mahafiz).Tendulkar, D G (1958):Mahatma, Volume 8, (New

Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India).

Thorner, Daniel (1956):The Agrarian Prospect inIndia (Delhi: University Press).

Varshney, Ashutosh (1992): Three CompromisedNationalisms, in Raju J, C Thomas (ed.) Per-spectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict inSouth Asia: (Boulder: West View).

Whitehead, Andrew (2007): A Mission in Kashmir(New Delhi: Penguin).

Yasin, Mohammad and Qaiyaum Rafiqi (1980):History of the Freedom Struggle in Jammu andKashmir(New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers).

Zutshi, Chitralekha (2003): Languages of Belong-ing: Islam, Religion, Identity, and the Making of

Kashmir(New Delhi: Permanent Black).Zutshi, UK (1986): Emergence of Political Awaken-ing in Kashmir (Delhi: Manohar).

Is There a Need for ChinaStudies in India?

Tansen Sen

We need to understand China in a

more complex, globalised, and

intrinsically connected world, not

only because of security concerns,

but also due to issues such as the

economy, the environment, and

the scarcity of resources. Against

the backdrop of the recent policy

document entitled Nonalignment

2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy

for India in the Twenty First

Century, this article argues that

there is little interest within the

Indian government, the leading

think tanks, or the private sector

in developing China studies in

India at present.

A recent policy document entitled

Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign

and Strategic Policy for India in

the Twenty First Century released by

the Delhi-based think tank Centre for

Policy Research remarked that,

China will, for the foreseeable future, re-

main a significant foreign policy and securi-

ty challenge for India. It is the one major

power, which impinges directly on Indiasgeopolitical space. As its economic and mili-

tary capabilities expand, its power differen-

tial with India is likely to widen.

The document goes on to recommend

various ways in which India should re-

spond to possible territorial and eco-

nomic conflicts with China.

Leaving aside the soundness of the

predictions and the policy recommenda-

tions on dealing with China outlined in

the document, I was confounded by two

issues when reading it. First, I did not

see names of any China scholars from

India involved in drafting the report.This could either mean that there are no

competent China scholars in India to

contribute to the report, or that the

drafters of the report thought that they

possessed enough expertise on China

and India-China relations to make the

necessary policy recommendations.

The second issue that perplexed me

was the fact that given the importance

of (and the perceived threat from) China,as repeatedly underscored in the docu-

ment, the drafters of the report did not

find it necessary to recommend the de-

velopment of research infrastructure in

India on China and Chinese affairs. This

could also mean one of two things. Either

the drafters are satisfied with the current

state of China studies in India, or that they

believe that there is no need for a cohort

of China academics, beyond the diplo-

matic corps, journalists, op-ed writers,

etc, to play a role in the deliberations of

Indias China policy. For them, scholars

of China in India seem to be irrelevant to

any kind of policy-related discourse. The

document clearly indicates that there is

no need for China studies in India.

Lack of Interest

I have wondered the same things about

the Indian governments interest (or lack

thereof) in consulting China scholars and

investing in the field of China studies inIndia. This is in stark contrast to the

Title VI programme (sometimes also

Tansen Sen ([email protected])

is with the Department of History, Baruch

College, City University of New York.

Documents

CM XLVIII 29 200713 Altaf Hussain Para