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PC Landing Corp 319 Diablo Road, Suite 213, Danville CA 94526 USA Tel: +1 415 200 0300 Fax: +1 415 402 0772 August 1, 2012 Via Electronic Filing, FERC Online Mr. Vince Yearick Division of Hydropower Licensing Office of Energy Projects Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 888 First Street, NE Washington, D.C. 20426 Re: Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project, FERC Project No. 12690Ͳ005 Dear Mr. Yearick: Thank you for your interest in and attention to PC Landing Corp.s submissions in the Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project referenced above. We write to provide responses to your request for additional information dated July 16, 2012 in advance of the August 6, 2012 meeting on the issues we have raised. Attached hereto are detailed responses to your questions on the areas of inquiry directed to PC Landing Corp. In addition, to assist in the technical evaluation of these issues, we are including supporting and supplemental information from subject matter experts working with PC Landing Corp. This supplemental material also clarifies various matters raised by the applicant, Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, in its June 22, 2012 responses to our Protest, and addresses a number of issues raised in your request to the District for additional information, dated July 16, 2016. Thank you again for your attention to our concerns. We look forward to discussing these issues further at the August 6 meeting. Very truly yours, /s/ Kurt Johnson Kurt Johnson Chief Financial Officer Attachments

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PC Landing Corp 319 Diablo Road, Suite 213, Danville CA 94526 USA

Tel: +1 415 200 0300 Fax: +1 415 402 0772

August 1, 2012

Via Electronic Filing, FERC Online

Mr. Vince YearickDivision of Hydropower LicensingOffice of Energy ProjectsFederal Energy Regulatory Commission888 First Street, NEWashington, D.C. 20426

Re: Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project, FERC Project No. 12690 005

Dear Mr. Yearick:

Thank you for your interest in and attention to PC Landing Corp.�’s submissions in theAdmiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project referenced above. We write to provide responses to yourrequest for additional information dated July 16, 2012 in advance of the August 6, 2012 meetingon the issues we have raised.

Attached hereto are detailed responses to your questions on the areas of inquirydirected to PC Landing Corp. In addition, to assist in the technical evaluation of these issues, weare including supporting and supplemental information from subject matter experts workingwith PC Landing Corp. This supplemental material also clarifies various matters raised by theapplicant, Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, in its June 22, 2012 responses to ourProtest, and addresses a number of issues raised in your request to the District for additionalinformation, dated July 16, 2016.

Thank you again for your attention to our concerns. We look forward to discussingthese issues further at the August 6 meeting.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Kurt Johnson

Kurt JohnsonChief Financial Officer

Attachments

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington

)))))

Project No. 12690-005

PC LANDING CORP. RESPONSE TO

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUEST FOR AUGUST 6, 2012 MEETING Craig S. Trueblood Ash S. Miller Kari Vander Stoep K&L Gates LLP 925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104-1158 Phone: (206) 623-7580 Fax: (206) 623-7022 Email: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Martin L. Stern William M. Keyser K&L Gates LLP 1601 K Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20006 Phone: (202) 778-9000 Fax: (202) 778-9100 Email: [email protected] [email protected]

Attorneys for PC Landing Corp.

Dated: August 1, 2012

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i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. RESPONSE TO FERC INFORMATION REQUEST ....................................................... 2

A. Determination of the Appropriate Separation Distance Under ICPC Recommendations....................................................................................................2

1. ICPC 13 As Applied Here Counsels Separation of 750-1000 Meters .........3

2. ICPC 2, Relating to Parallel Cables in Deep Water, With Minimal Vessel Traffic Is Not Applicable to the Project ...........................................6

3. The ROV Repair Operation Proposed by the PUD is Not Feasible in Admiralty Inlet, and Does Not Support Limiting Separation To Twice the Water Depth. ..........................................................................................7

B. PC-1 Physical Characteristics ................................................................................12

C. Increased Separation is Required Because Subsurface Conditions at the Proposed Site are Currently Unknown, and May Cause Significant Risk to PC-1 .......................................................................................................................12

D. Increased Separation is Required Due to the Complications and Difficulties of Operations in an Extreme Marine Environment................................................16

E. Increased Separation is Required Because Damage to PC-1 Would Substantially Interfere with Communications on PC-1 .........................................25

F. To Allow for Increased Separation, Feasible Alternatives Exist, and Should be Explored ............................................................................................................27

III. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 30

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Appendices Appendix A Statement of Thomas F. Brenneman Appendix B Alcatel-Lucent Submarine Networks Letter dated July 16, 2012 Appendix C Evidence of Admiralty Inlet Marine Conditions and Adverse and

Unanticipated Impacts On Project Marine Operations As Reported In Contractor Pre-Installation Study Reports

Appendix D Gordon Fader, P. Geo., Atlantic Marine Geological Consulting Ltd.,

Supplement to Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project Siting Assessment and Observations from OpenHydro Bay of Fundy TISEC Deployment

Appendix E Report of Capt. Richard P. Fiske, USN (Ret.) Appendix F Complaint and Consent Judgment, GCI v. US, 2:10-cv-00856-RAJ (W.D.

Wash.) Appendix G Statement of Kurt E. Johnson Appendix H Ship Accidents Sever Data Cables Off East Africa, Wall Street Journal

Online (February 28, 2012) Appendix I Ship's anchor accidentally slices internet cable cutting off access in six

African countries, Mail Online (Mar. 1, 2012) Appendix J AECOM, Supplement to Assessment of Tidal Energy Sites Near

Admiralty Head

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington

)))))

Project No. 12690-005

PC LANDING CORP. RESPONSE TO

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUEST FOR AUGUST 6, 2012 MEETING I. INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 2012, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the

“Commission”) requested that PC Landing Corp. (“PCLC”) provide certain additional

information in connection with PCLC’s Motion to Intervene and Protest, dated May 23, 2012

(the “Intervention and Protest”) with respect to the proposal by Public Utility District No. 1 of

Snohomish County, Washington (the “PUD”) to site two hydrokinetic turbines in Admiralty Inlet

(the “Project”), approximately 100 and 150 meters, respectively from the north segment of

PCLC’s trans-Pacific fiber optic submarine telecommunications cable, PC-1. This Response

provides PCLC’s reply to the inquiries in FERC’s request to PCLC. In addition, in order to help

clarify technical issues raised by the proposed separation distance of the turbines from PC-1

North, we also provide certain supplemental information relevant to the appropriate separation

distance between PC-1 and the Project, as well as addressing a number of issues raised in the

Commission’s request to the PUD for additional information, dated July 16, 2012. Finally,

PCLC clarifies certain misstatements and mischaracterizations made in the PUD Response, dated

June 22, 2012, relevant to the questions posed by the Commission.1 PCLC hopes that the factual

1 See Response of Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, To Recommendations, Terms and Conditions, Protest, and Comments (June 22, 2012) at 24 (“PUD Response”). This filing is intended to respond to the Commission’s additional information request. However, to the extent the

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material and analysis in this Response will aid the Commission in its evaluation of PCLC’s

concerns prior to the August 6, 2012, technical meeting.

II. RESPONSE TO FERC INFORMATION REQUEST

A. Determination of the Appropriate Separation Distance Under ICPC Recommendations

FERC’s July 16, 2012 request to PCLC (“FERC Request to PCLC”) seeks additional

information from PCLC with respect to how PCLC calculated its proposed separation distance

pursuant to International Cable Protection Committee (“ICPC”) Recommendation Number 13

(“ICPC 13”), and why it is appropriate to have more than a 120 meter separation distance

pursuant to the PUD’s interpretation of ICPC Recommendation Number 2 (“ICPC 2”):

P.C. Landing states that based on International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) recommendations, a separation of 750 to 1,000 meters between the turbine and PC-1 is needed. However, it is unclear how the estimated separation distance was calculated. … In response to the FCC’s and P.C. Landing’s comments, the District states that ICPC Recommendation 13 is not applicable because the recommendations were developed in the context of wind energy projects where the maneuverability of repair ships could be compromised by pilings supporting the wind turbines and the whirling blades. The District asserts that the submerged tidal turbines pose zero risk to the cable ship which can freely navigate over it. The District adds that ICPC Recommendation 2 is more applicable and that with modern navigational equipment and repair practices, a separation of twice the water depth (about 58 meters) is sufficient to allow for a safe repair. The District also provides evidence of alternative methods of repair that would allow the project and PC-1 to coexist. Please explain why a separation of more than 120 meters, given the current water depth, would be necessary.

Commission considers aspects of this filing to be beyond the questions raised in the request, PCLC requests that the Commission accept this filing as responding to the PUD Response. The Commission has granted leave to respond to answers in accordance with Rule 213 when the response submitted provides additional information that will aid the Commission in issuing a reasoned decision. This response is limited to correcting and clarifying misstatements and mischaracterizations and does not reargue issues already raised by the PCLC in its Intervention and Protest. In prior proceedings, the Commission has permitted otherwise impermissible answers that help ensure a complete and accurate record or aid in the Commission’s decision-making process. See, e.g., Duke Energy Oakland, LLC, 102 FERC ¶ 61,093, at P 10 (2003) (finding good cause to accept an otherwise impermissible answer because the answer assisted the Commission in understanding and resolving the issues involved in the proceeding); Carolina Power & Light Co., et al., 97 FERC ¶ 61,048, at p. 61,278 (2001) (finding good cause to waive Rule 213 when the pleading helped to ensure a complete and accurate record).

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Each question is addressed in turn below.

1. ICPC 13 As Applied Here Counsels Separation of 750-1000 Meters

ICPC 13 provides useful and applicable insight into the question posed here of the

adequate separation distance between the Project and PC-1, an active submarine

telecommunications cable. In order to clarify the application of ICPC recommendations, PCLC

submits herewith a statement from Thomas F. Brenneman, an independent consultant with over

30 years of experience in offshore construction representing owners, purchasers, and the U.S.

government in numerous subsea projects, with particular expertise involving fiber optic

submarine cables, power cables, pipelines and wind farms.2

As Mr. Brenneman explains, ICPC 13 is the most appropriate guideline that currently

exists to determine the appropriate distance between the Project and PC-1. Despite being written

for wind farm projects, ICPC 13 is in fact quite nuanced, and breaks down its recommendation

separation distance into several components, one of which is a 500-meter safety zone.3 This

500-meter figure is intended to prevent above-water collisions between wind turbines and ships.

This is the only aspect of ICPC 13 that is operationally specific to the fact that the wind turbines

protrude above water—the remainder of the recommendation is therefore entirely relevant.

Accordingly, notwithstanding the PUD’s and its consultant’s assertions,4 PCLC in fact omitted

2 Statement of Thomas F. Brenneman (July 12, 20120) (“Brenneman Statement”), attached hereto as Appendix A. Mr. Brenneman has extensive experience onboard vessels overseeing cable lay and repair projects, post-lay burial, pre-lay and burial assessment surveys, cable landing inspections, cable repairs, dredging and ROV operations. 3 The PUD claims that “ICPC has never recommended a 500 meter safety zone.” PUD Response at 24. This statement is apparently incorrect—ICPC Recommendation No. 13 expressly recommends a “500m safety zone” around wind turbines. ICPC Recommendation No. 13, PCLC Intervention and Protest, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, at 6. That being said, as noted here and despite the PUD’s and its expert’s assertions to the contrary, PCLC does not propose that a 500 meter safety zone be imposed around the tidal turbines. 4 PUD Response, Attachment B, Statement of Keith Ford-Ramsden, at 5 (“Ford-Ramsden Statement”).

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this 500-meter safety zone from its application of ICPC 13 set forth in the Intervention and

Protest.

As described by Mr. Brenneman:

The 500 meter safety zone in the [ICPC] recommendation [No. 13] is not relevant to the separation between PC-1 and the turbines. But in referring to ICPC No. 13 as the best guidance for appropriate separation with the turbines, PCLC explicitly did not use the 500 meter safety zone for wind turbines in Recommendation No. 13 (If it had used the 500 meter safety zone, the recommended separation would have been closer to 1200 meters).5

The remaining separation distances set forth in ICPC 13 are appropriate and applicable to

subsurface turbines. As Mr. Brenneman explains:

Other aspects of ICPC No. 13 are, however, completely relevant, including allowance for run on (200m), grappling rig (300m at 60 meter water depth), and ship length (here, approximately 140m for ASN or TE SubCom vessels which would likely be doing the work under a teaming agreement with ASN).6

Thus, ICPC 13 counsels a separation distance of approximately 640 meters as calculated

by Mr. Brenneman.7 This number does not provide any “safety zone” around the turbine, but

Mr. Brenneman notes that some safety zone would nonetheless be appropriate given that ropes,

umbilicals, or other items that may trail a vessel have the potential to catch on the turbines or the

associated transmission cables:

An additional issue is that while vessel draft is not an issue given water depth and the height of the turbines, cable vessels have ropes, umbilicals, etc. that trail behind the vessel, which could easily snag the turbines or the transmission cables, requiring the need for separation to allow for safe operation.8

In addition, as Mr. Brenneman notes, in the event the repair to PC-1 were necessitated by a

vessel anchor snagging the PC-1 cable, it would not be uncommon for the vessel to drag the

5 Brenneman Statement at ¶ 16. 6 Id. at ¶ 17. 7 Id. at ¶ 15. 8 Id. at ¶ 17.

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snagged cable, in this case bringing the cable potentially even closer to the turbines, counseling

an additional cushion to account for that possibility over and above the 640 meters calculated

above.9 Taking into account this need for a “minimal” safety zone less than the 500 meters for a

wind farm, PCLC in its Intervention and Protest therefore requested a 750-1000 meter separation

distance between PC-1 and the proposed Project turbines.10

Thus, PCLC has put forth an appropriately tailored version of ICPC 13. PCLC notes that

the PUD argues ICPC 13 should be disregarded altogether because wind turbines protrude above

the water. PCLC has already taken that difference into account in its application of ICPC 13.

Due to the nuance built into ICPC 13, it is appropriate to consider this recommendation when

assessing a subsurface hydrokinetic turbine, but consideration must also be given to underwater

operations, grapnel rigs, run on, and ship length.

PCLC also notes that one component of the ICPC 13 is the length of the ship itself

servicing the cable. Here, such a ship will be 140 meters long. It is particularly notable that the

PUD would separate the Project from PC-1 by less than the length of the ship required to service

the cable. Thus, in order to repair or maintain PC-1, a 140 meter vessel would likely be

positioned directly over turbines located 100 – 150 meters from the cable for an extended period

9 Id. at ¶ 17 (“[H]here, the damage to the cable requiring the repair could be caused by a vessel dragging an anchor, which could drag the cable even closer to the turbine unit.”). PCLC’s marine contractor, Alcatel-Lucent Submarine Networks (“ASN”), likewise notes this concern in its supplemental letter to PCLC addressing the expected repair operation and cost in the event of a cable break near the proposed turbine locations. See Letter from ASN to PCLC at 3 (July 16, 2012), Appendix B, hereto (“ASN Supplement”):

[W]e note that when a cable is snagged, before it breaks, it is not uncommon for it to be dragged hundreds of meters along the seabed. Here, given the already minimal separation between PC-1 N and the turbines, there is a real possibility that in the event of a snag, the cable could be dragged even closer to the turbine if not over it. However, with adequate separation, the risk of this possibility would be greatly reduced.

10 Intervention and Protest, Appendix A, at 11, ¶ 3.

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of time during the cable repair operation, raising direct safety issues for both the cable lay vessel

as well as for the turbines given the potential for cable repair equipment to snag the turbines.

2. ICPC 2, Relating to Parallel Cables in Deep Water, With Minimal Vessel Traffic Is Not Applicable to the Project

FERC requests that PCLC explain why a separation distance of more than 120 meters is

necessary. This request would appear to be in part due to the PUD’s claimed reliance on ICPC 2,

in asserting that a separation distance of only twice the water depth is appropriate, and

suggesting that ICPC 2 “recommends separations in the range of twice the water depth or 100

metres to allow for a safe repair distance.”11 Recognizing that here twice water depth would be

approximately 120 meters FERC has asked PCLC “why a separation of more than 120 meters,

given the current water depth, would be necessary”12 in light of the water depth here of

approximately 60 meters.

A separation distance of more than 120 meters is required for many reasons, as set forth

throughout this Response and PCLC’s previous Intervention and Protest.13 Looking solely at

ICPC 2, however, it is clear that ICPC 2 does not take into account the factual scenario of this

Project involving a proposed subsea structure in relatively shallow waters.

ICPC 2 is intended to address situations of parallel cables in deeper water. Here, there

has been no showing that the Project involves a parallel cable situation in the first instance. The

PUD makes no assertion in its response that parallel cables would exist here after Project

construction.14 In addition, ICPC 2 is more generally focused on the siting of cables in much

11 See Ford-Ramsden Statement at 6. 12 FERC Request to PCLC at 2. Of course, the PUD’s proposed separation distance of 104 meters does not even meet a separation of two times water depth, which as FERC notes is 120 meters. 13 See infra Sec. II.C-F (explaining why increased separation distance is necessary here). 14 PUD Response, Statement of Keith Ford-Ramsden at 6, ¶ f; PUD Response at 26.

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deeper water, specifically makes reference to separation distances of 9 kilometers and 6

kilometers based on water depth as examples—orders of magnitude different from the current

situation. As summarized by Mr. Brenneman:

I also disagree with Mr. Ford-Ramsden’s suggestion that ICPC No. 2 would be the most appropriate recommendation to apply to the situation here and particularly its recommendation as to “Cable Parallels.” As the name implies, that recommendation involves separation between parallel cables particularly in deep water (as opposed to shallow water here), and is not relevant to separation between a cable and a structure such as a turbine because the installation and repair operations to a turbine use different operational procedures. … But again, as indicated by the 9 km and 6 km references, this recommendation was written for deeper water.15

For these reasons, and the additional reasons provided below and throughout PCLC’s

Protest materials, a separation distance of much more than 120 meters is necessary and

appropriate. As described above, PCLC believes a separation of 750-1000 meters is appropriate.

3. The ROV Repair Operation Proposed by the PUD is Not Feasible in Admiralty Inlet, and Does Not Support Limiting Separation To Twice the Water Depth.

The PUD urges that a remotely operated underwater vehicle, or ROV, can be used for

any repairs to PC-1 adjacent to the turbines, which it believes would obviate the need for a

reasonable separation between the cable and the turbines. The PUD argues that an ROV can

operate in closer quarters than a grapnel operation that ASN believes would be required for a

repair adjacent to the turbines.16 However, the use of an ROV to complete a cable repair

15 Brenneman Statement at ¶ 18. PCLC notes that the PUD has mischaracterized ICPC 2 as recommending a separation of twice the water depth, in any event. In fact ICPC 2 states that separation should be three times water depth, and only upon consultation and express agreement of the parties involved is two times depth considered. Id. See also ICPC Recommendation No. 2 at 11-12. (“Where cables parallel one another, the distance between them shall be maintained at 3 times depth of water where possible or 9 km, whichever is the lesser. However, with the use of modern navigational equipment and lay/repair practices, these distances could be reduced to 2 times depth of water and 6 km spacing, whichever is the lesser, after consultation and agreement by all affected parties.”)(emphasis added). 16 Ford-Ramsden Statement at 8-9. Intervention and Protest, Appendix B (ASN Initial Letter) at 2.

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operation in Admiralty Inlet is simply not feasible, as demonstrated by the reports of the PUD’s

contractors and their failed pre-installation ROV operations in Admiralty Inlet.

Admiralty Inlet is a particularly turbulent area with extremely strong currents—the same

reason it is targeted for tidal power development also makes marine operations there particularly

challenging. This is due to the unique geographic characteristics of the inlet:

Though only 6 kilometers (3.7 mi) wide at the narrowest point (between the Point Wilson and Admiralty Head lighthouses), it is through this passage that nearly all the seawater flows into and from Puget Sound during daily tidal variations. Tidal currents can reach six knots in the area northeast of Point Wilson.17

As both ASN and Mr. Brenneman explain in detail, an ROV operation to complete a

cable repair in Admiralty Inlet is simply not feasible. According to ASN, there are “a number of

concerns regarding this alternative repair procedure given the presence of strong currents in

Admiralty Inlet. Even if an ROV could be used for a limited aspect of the operation, in our

opinion, a grapnel operation would still be required for this operation.”18 As ASN explains:

ROVs for this type of activity are fairly large vehicles (see Exhibit 4 to Mr. Ford-Ramsden’s statement which shows a picture of an ASN ROV) and are extremely hard to hold to position in strong currents. Essentially, in strong currents, the current pushes the ROV, with the operator struggling to hold it in place. In our experience, in currents over 2 knots, which is typical of Admiralty Inlet, the kind of ROVs that are used on cable repair vessels would struggle to maintain position in this type of bottom operation.19

A further issue is visibility:

ROVs use cameras for the operator to see the work area, as well as mechanical arms to cut and grip. However, to cut and grip the cable using an ROV the operator needs to be able to see it. However, in strong currents visibility is limited, further limiting the use of an ROV for repair of a cable fault in an area such as Admiralty Inlet. In addition, where cable is buried, as is the case in

17 Brenneman Statement at 2. 18 ASN Supplement at 1. 19 Id. at 2. See also Brenneman at 4-5. (“[T]he work location here is in a very confined area, with very high currents (NOAA predictions for the area of > 4 knots), and high vessel traffic. Due to the high currents, this area is not favorable for an ROV repair as described by Mr. Ford-Ramsden.”)

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shallow water such as in Admiralty Inlet, the inability for the operator to see the cable would further complicate its use in recovery operations.20 These concerns are not merely hypothetical. In fact, ROV repairs were recently

unsuccessful in an attempt to repair another cable that traverses Admiralty Inlet—the Alaska

United Fiber Optic System (“AUFS”) owned by GCI. An attempt to repair AUFS in 2009 via

ROV failed, due to extreme currents, and a grapnel had to be used to complete the procedure.21

Mr. Brenneman explains this operation in more detail:

ROV operations can be particular[ly] challenging in strong currents, such as Admiralty Inlet. For example, during repair operations of Alaska United Fiber Optic Cable System (“AUFS”), which parallels PC-1, the Tyco Cable Ship, CS Global Sentinel, attempted to utilize an ROV for the repair of AUFS-E and had only partial success. Operation of the ROV in the current was done with great toil, and conditions were at some points beyond the vehicle’s capabilities. It could only operate in a very limited window at slack water. In this very limited window, the ROV was successful in cutting the cable, eliminating the cutting grapnel drag, but due to the current it was not used for the holding/recovery drag. Grapnel drags where used to recover the cable.22

That the PUD and their consultant would suggest that an ROV operation in Admiralty

Inlet could replace a grapneling operation and obviates the need for greater separation is rather

surprising given the experience of the PUD’s own contractors in their attempts to use ROVs to

conduct pre-installation surveys in the vicinity of the proposed turbine locations, as reflected in a

series of pre-installation study reports collected in Appendix L to the Application. The

contractors’ pre-installation reports, relevant excerpts of which are included in Appendix “C”

hereto, candidly document the extreme, unrelenting tidal conditions in Admiralty Inlet and their

20 ASN Supplement at 2. 21 Use of grapnels, and associated “run on” are the factual reasoning underlying the separation distances recommended in ICPC 13, discussed in detail above. 22 Brenneman Statement at 2.

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adverse, and unanticipated impacts on marine operations generally, and ROV operations, in

particular.

For example, the PUD’s contractors prepared preliminary and final reports on seafloor

substrate and benthic habitat characterization based on ROV surveys conducted in August 2010

and September 2011.23 These substantially similar reports on the ROV operations reported

significant issues with the overall marine operations (discussed in more detail in Section II.D,

below), and, in particular, with the ROV surveys. As the Final ROV Survey Report noted,

“[t]his is a site of high tidal water exchanges and almost continuous strong currents, an ideal site

for tidal energy conversion but a hindrance to seafloor examination.”24 Recognizing the

difficulty that the currents presented to ROV operations, the ROV surveys were undertaken at

two separate times, the first in mid-August 2010 and the second in late September 2010, in order

to take advantage of tidal conditions “with the least amount of exchange and velocity.”25

However, the initial ROV survey in August was a complete failure due to tidal conditions and

the inability of the support vessel to hold position.26 In the September survey, the contractors

attempted to perform the surveys during slack currents, but still experienced significant issues

with the ROV operations:

The investigation area, the tidal turbine site, is by necessity a highly dynamic and energetic environment subjected to strong tidal flows. Even though timing of the ROV surveys was selected to occur when tidal flow was comparatively low, the water mass at the site was always restless and very seldom was true slack

23 See Application, Appendix L-8, Seafloor Substrate and Benthic Habitat Characterization of the SnoPUD Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project Turbine Site Through ROV Video Observations – A Preliminary Report (“Preliminary ROV Survey Report”); Appendix L-10, Habitat Characterization of the SnoPUD Turbine Site – Admiralty Head, Washington State – Final Report, June 1, 2011 (“Final ROV Survey Report”). 24 Final ROV Survey Report at 1. 25 Preliminary ROV Survey Report at 1. 26 See Id. at 2-3.

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experienced. Quite the contrary, strong currents often over a knot in speed were encountered and affected the smooth, trouble-free operation of the ROV. … Much time was spent untangling the tether when wrapped around boulders. Although moderate to large size boulders were rare they did occur in sufficient numbers to tangle the tether. … Visibility varied throughout the survey and the presence of marine snow often prevented good observation of the seafloor from much more than a meter above the bottom.27

Thus, as reflected in the expert opinions of Mr. Brenneman and ASN, and reinforced by

the experience of the PUD’s own contractors, ROV operations are simply not a reliable option

for effectuating repairs to PC-1 in Admiralty Inlet in the event of damage to the cable. At most,

ROVs could be used during slack currents for only one aspect of the repair operation, which

would still entail significant waiting time and delay, but still, grapneling operations that require

increased separation from the turbines would be required for the balance of a repair operation.28

Moreover, as reflected in the reports of the PUD’s own contractors, “the water mass at the site

was always restless and very seldom was true slack experienced. Quite the contrary, strong

currents often over a knot in speed were encountered and affected the smooth, trouble-free

operation of the ROV.”29 Under these circumstances, the use of an ROV operation is not

feasible, and does not support limiting separation to two times water depth.

27 See Preliminary ROV Survey Report at 5; Final ROV Survey Report at 5 (emphasis added). See also Preliminary ROV Survey Report at 2; Final ROV Survey Report at 2 (caption to a graphic included in both reports showing the ROV in Admiralty Inlet advised the reader to “Note strong current even though this operation is occurring at slack tide.”). 28 See, e.g., ASN Supplement at 2 (were an ROV to be used, the repair operation would need to wait for a slack tide, typically a wait time of 5 or 6 hours, and then could only proceed during the slack tide, maybe a two hour window, which adds cost and delay; even if the extent conditions were suitable (i.e., in slack tide) and the cable was on the surface, the ROV could be used, at most, for a cutting operation, but then grapnels would be used to clamp and recover the cable). 29 Preliminary ROV Survey Report at 5; Final ROV Survey Report at 5.

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B. PC-1 Physical Characteristics

FERC’s Request to PCLC also asks: (1) is PC-1 buried near the proposed turbines, and if

so, at what depth; and (2) what is the size of the cable and is it shielded in any fashion near the

project site?

PCLC believes, based on the best information available to it, that PC-1 is buried in the

vicinity of the proposed turbines. While precise data is not available for this particular location,

PCLC believes that the depth of burial in this area likely ranges between 0.5 and 1 meter.

PC-1 in the vicinity of the turbines is 31.3 millimeters in total diameter, and is single-

armored, meaning the cable contains a layer of wires that are 4.57 millimeters in diameter,

wrapped in an outermost layer of tar-soaked nylon yarn.

C. Increased Separation is Required Because Subsurface Conditions at the Proposed Site are Currently Unknown, and May Cause Significant Risk to PC-1

Increased separation between the Project and PC-1 is required for the additional reason

that the PUD simply does not know what underlies the seabed where it proposed to site its 386-

ton turbines. This issue was raised by PCLC in its Intervention and Protest, and has been almost

entirely ignored by the PUD.30 This issue is critical because if, as the PUD believes, the seabed

is underlain by soft material this would likely result in the turbines settling unevenly on the sea

bottom, causing the need for additional turbine maintenance and repair. In addition, exposure of

underlying soft sediments to currents can cause significant scouring hundreds of meters away,

cross current.

These issues are clarified and described in detail in the supplemental report attached

hereto by Gordon Fader, of Atlantic Marine Geological Consulting, who was an expert geologist

30 PCLC Intervention and Protest at 27, and material cited there; PUD Response at 29, Attachment A, at 2.

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for the Fundy Ocean Research Centre for Energy (“FORCE”) in Nova Scotia, Canada in

connection with the test of OpenHydro and other tidal instream energy conversion (“TISEC”)

technologies in the Bay of Fundy, and compared geologic characteristics from the Bay of Fundy

site to the Project site here.31

As described by Mr. Fader, the PUD does not know the geologic physical characteristics

of the proposed site:

The various studies that have been conducted to evaluate the seabed and subsurface geology give the impression that the foundation is well-known. The evidence presented in the geophysical reports in the Application, however, demonstrate that actual foundation conditions are not known as no samples have been collected and analyzed. . . . Descriptors such as “likely,” “suspected,” “extrapolated,” “estimated,” “interpreted,” “suggested,” and “unknown” are terms used throughout SnoPUD’s supporting documents to describe the state of knowledge about the seabed and immediate subsurface at the sites where the turbines are planned to be placed. This is not a quantitative understanding of the conditions on which the gravity structures will be placed, only a qualitative estimate at best.32

The PUD’s own materials admit, candidly, that this information is unknown:

In addition, SnoPUD’s survey contractor reports its failure, despite multiple attempts, to grab sediment samples due to rocky bottom type and intense current activity, and consequently as a result of this and other limitations, “we do not and cannot have a complete understanding of the subsurface conditions underlying the site.”33

Marine operations expert, Capt. Richard P. Fiske, USN (ret.), who PCLC retained to

assist in assessing the risks to its cable, put it this way, citing to and quoting from various PUD

pre-installation reports:

[C]urrent and visibility conditions made visual characterization of the bottom difficult. . . . [A]fter several failures the seabed sampling was unsuccessful and

31 Supplement to Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project Siting Assessment and Observations from OpenHydro Bay of Fundy TISEC Deployment, attached hereto as Appendix D (“Fader Supplement”). 32 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 33 Id.

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ultimately abandoned despite multiple attempts at multiple locations near the proposed turbine sites due to “intense current activity.” “The sub-bottom profile data showed little or no subsea penetration.” Further, Fugro states in its Executive Summary: “The thickness of the glacial deposits is unknown as no geotechnical explorations have been performed and the gravel, cobbles, and boulders on the seafloor precluded a sub-seafloor penetration and seismic imaging.” There are no indications that samples have been taken to characterize the bottom and its substrate. Yet, the District asserts that it “performed bathymetric, geophysical, and geological hazard site surveys.” While the surveys may have been performed, their contributions to understanding site geology appear to be limited.34

The implications of this data gap are quite significant. While questions surround the

PUD’s inferences about the underlying conditions at the proposed location, there is evidence of a

relatively thin rocky layer underneath the turbines, which overlies softer sediment material. Mr.

Fader concludes that if this is correct, two things are likely to occur: differential settlement of

the turbines into the softer materials below, and substantial scouring of sediments. Both of these

events will adversely impact PC-1 and require increased separation between the Project and PC-

1.

Differential settlement will result in more vessel trips to the turbines, increasing risks to

PC-1 with unknown, and currently unplanned, marine operations:

[S]ettlement of the device will likely occur and it may be uneven or differential, resulting in tilting of the entire gravity structure and attached turbine. This may occur during deployment. It may also occur later during operation as turbine vibrational forces are transmitted to the feet from tidal action, resulting in bearing capacity failure. This lack of understanding of the sub gravel properties of the sediments on which the device will rest will likely necessitate repeated visits and repositioning of the devices on the seabed, require premature intervention for removal or other means of leveling through unknown and untested marine operations in an intense marine environment. This additional maintenance will

34 See Report of Capt. Richard P. Fiske, USN (ret.), Appendix E, hereto, at 6-7 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (“Fiske Report”). Capt. Fiske has 47 years experience in marine operations, including ship operations, ship repair, diving and salvage, deep ocean search and recovery operations, casualty analysis, and research and development. See id., Attachment 1.

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result in increased intervention and vessel traffic much greater than is described in the application and supporting documents over the 5-year pilot licensing period.35

Scouring of soft sediments can also pose a threat to PC-1. Mr. Fader has observed scours

at the Bay of Fundy, which propagate thousands of meters, and hundreds of meters cross current.

The potential adverse impacts on PC-1 are twofold. First, scouring could directly expose PC-1

in an area that is likely to see significant vessel traffic, and second, it would exacerbate the

differential settlement of the turbines.

It is common in strong current regions for the seabed to be covered with thin protective lag gravel surfaces over soft sediments, but once broken through, major erosion often ensues, and through local scour and slumping processes, the seabed can be eroded into deep troughs resulting in removal of sediments that are over 100 meters in thickness. These scoured depressions also grow normal to the current directions and propagate for large distances down current and across current. SnoPUD’s report suggests that if scoured trenches formed around the turbines they would not propagate across current. In the Bay of Fundy, Canada, where tidal power test sites have been selected, similar scours from large currents and seabed obstacles such as large boulders have propagated thousands of meters downstream and hundreds of meters across currents.36

In Mr. Fader’s initial report filed with PCLC’s Intervention and Protest, Mr. Fader noted

in connection with the Bay of Fundy project that when eventually deployed, OpenHydro moved

the location of the turbine from its original location on a gravel lag surface overlying unknown

materials, likely soft sediments similar to the PUD’s proposed site here, and instead placed the

device on the nearby volcanic platform of exposed basalt rather than the substrate of bedrock

ridges and gravel with boulders.37 As Mr. Fader observes in his Supplement, the move gave the

OpenHydro device “the most stable seabed possible as a foundation” and:

35 Fader Supplement at 3. 36 Id. at 3-4. 37 Report of Atlantic Marine Geological Consulting Ltd., Appendix C to PCLC Intervention and Protest, at 5-6.

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suggests a concern by the project sponsor regarding substrate suitability but a report on the lessons learned from the Bay of Fundy experience, including the site relocation, has never been made available publicly. Nonetheless, it appears that OpenHydro still proposes to locate the device for the project here in a thin gravel bottom setting overlying soft unsampled materials, similar to the conditions which they moved away from in the Bay of Fundy.38

The PUD, however, did not address this change in location at the Bay of Fundy in its response,

or potential concerns with the suitability of the substrate, which would be particularly relevant to

consideration of the present location and risks to PC-1. In light of these data gaps and the

concomitant risks to PC-1, increased separation distance from the turbines is the only available

and appropriate mechanism to avoid or mitigate the threat to PC-1.

D. Increased Separation is Required Due to the Complications and Difficulties of Operations in an Extreme Marine Environment

As noted above in the context of the PUD’s efforts to conduct pre-installation surveys at

the turbine locations, Admiralty Inlet is a particularly turbulent area with extremely strong

currents. Thus, the same reason it is targeted for tidal power development also makes marine

operations there particularly challenging. As Capt. Fiske explains:

The proposed turbine location is environmentally challenging. The Project’s own site surveys report the difficulty in working in the currents at the survey sites. While strong currents are appropriate for generating electricity, the attendant difficulties and hazards for marine operations mandate increased caution.39 According to the PUD’s Application, these pre-installation survey reports “augmented

the already extensive collection of data available for the Admiralty Inlet region to support a

thorough and complete environmental analysis for the Project.”40 However, what these pre-

installation reports actually document are (1) the extreme tidal conditions in Admiralty Inlet and

their adverse and unanticipated impacts on marine operations at the proposed Project locations; 38 Fader Supplement at 4. 39 See Fiske Report at 1. 40 Application, Executive Summary at 4.

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(2) the inexperience of the PUD and its contractors in adequately preparing for and addressing

these conditions in the context of particular marine operations; and (3) a failure to appreciate and

plan for risk in the context of marine operations, particularly through a series of survey

operations around the cable that have already served to hazard PC-1 North. All of these

complications and difficulties further demonstrate why increased separation is required to ensure

the protection of PC-1 from harm by the Project.

First, as noted above, as part of a bathymetric and geophysical survey to understand the

sea bottom that will underlie the turbines, the PUD’s contractor attempted to obtain seabed

samples using a device known as Van Veen Grab Sampler. However, according to the survey

report submitted with the application, the seabed sampling survey was unsuccessful and

ultimately abandoned despite multiple attempts at multiple locations near the proposed turbine

sites due to “intense current activity” and rocky bottom type.41 The Survey Report at Table 2-1,

reflects that although four sample locations were planned near the turbine locations, “no

recovery” was made at three of the locations after multiple attempts, and that, as a result, the

fourth site was abandoned.42 Clearly, the PUD and its contractors believed that sediment

samples were important to a full understanding of the sea bottom underlying the turbines. The

failure to obtain these samples as discussed above and in Mr. Fader’s Supplement reflects a

significant data gap in the PUD’s understanding of the sea bottom. It also reflects a lack of

experience with marine operations, including the inability to accurately plan and consider

unanticipated contingencies necessary to the successful completion of a critical marine operation.

41 Application, Appendix L-3, Bathymetric and Geophysical Survey Site Characterization Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project at 2-6. 42 A relevant excerpt from the survey report is included in Appendix C, hereto.

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Second, as discussed above, the PUD’s contractors attempted to conduct ROV survey

operations in the proposed locations of the turbines to understand the seafloor substrate and

benthic habitat. As noted, due to the marine environment, the contractors faced significant issues

with those ROV operations. At the same time, the Application and the installation methodology

concept shows an ROV monitoring the cable installation, as well as periodic post-installation

ROV monitoring. Despite known issues with ROV operations in Admiralty Inlet, the PUD

indicates in its Application materials that it will use ROVs to monitor installation of the turbines

as well in connection with post-installation surveys without caveat or explanation (and staunchly

advocates their use for PC-1 repairs). This discrepancy creates a significant credibility gap in the

Application.43

Third, and more significantly, from a risk standpoint vi-à-vis PC-1, vessels engaged in

these activities used anchors to maintain position and in fact had anchor-related issues at the

Project location. As reflected in the ROV survey report, during the initial ROV attempt in

August 2010, “[u]nfortunately the support vessel Prudhoe Bay was too small for the tidal

conditions and the anchors too light to keep the vessel in position . . . .”44 This implies an

anchored vessel in the vicinity of PC-1 that could not keep its position, i.e., the anchor was being

dragged along the sea bottom creating a potential cable snag scenario. The second ROV attempt

was conducted in late September and involved repeated anchoring in the vicinity of PC-1 North

over a four-day period, involving “a large barge” supporting the ROV “that was properly

anchored.”45 The survey report reflects that at various points during the four-day period, that the

43 See Fiske Report at 9-10. (“Given the visibility and handling problems experienced by District contractors when conducting simple visual bottom surveys, noted above, the assertion that ROVs will be used to monitor the cable during and post-installation is not understood.”). 44 ROV Summary Preliminary Report, at 2. 45 Id.

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barge was “repositioned” implying repeated anchoring in the vicinity of PC-1 North. As noted

by Capt. Fiske, the barge was anchored using a “four-point anchoring system” and “one of the

barge anchors dragged to the surface in its flukes a small boulder and cobble from the turbine

site.”46

According to Capt. Fiske, this indicates that, in fact, “Hazarding of PC-1 North has

already occurred”:

Perhaps most alarming is that the District has already hazarded PC-1 North by the anchoring of contractor vessels in close proximity to the cable while performing surveys. . . I find no indication that the District or its contractors had any appreciation of the presence of an active international communications cable in the immediate vicinity of its work zone (despite the presence of PC-1 North on navigational charts and in a recorded aquatic lands easement), or that the District or its contractors notified PCLC that these surveys were being conducted in the vicinity of PC-1 North and that anchoring was undertaken in the vicinity of PC-1 North as a deliberate part of the survey process.47 Unfortunately, this also is emblematic of the PUD’s attitude towards risk to PC-1: quite

simply, its actions belie its words. On one hand, the District asserts, “[c]onsideration for the

avoidance of risk to PC-1 North has been a fundamental design premise for the planning [sic].”48

On the other hand, the District’s Assessment of Potential Puget Sound Marine Safety Risk

Resulting from Installation of the Admiralty Inlet Tidal Energy Project49 and its Project

Safeguard Plans50 make no mention of PCLC, PC-1 North, any risk that the Project presents to

submarine cables or any practices with respect to the cable, including, the PUD’s “no-anchoring”

and other assurances contained in the Marine Operations Report submitted with its response. As

46 Fiske Report at 8, citing Application, Appendix L-8, Figure 2 and Figure 23 (emphasis added). 47 Id. at 7. 48 Response, Attachment 1, Marine Operations Installation Considerations Relating to Telecommunications Cable PC-1 at 1 (“Marine Operations Report”). 49 Application, Appendix L, Pre-Installation Study Reports, L-13. 50 Id., Appendix E.

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Capt. Fiske observes, to reconcile these statements “is a challenge and demonstrates a weakness

in the Project’s approach to risk.”51

Of note, the District’s risk analysis, “while superficially thorough in process”52 appears to

focus on interactions between the turbines and vessel traffic, while completely ignoring potential

impacts on PC-1, from such activities as vessel anchoring, that as noted, already hazarded the

cable:

There are broader risk issues that have yet to be addressed by the District. They include the risk posed by OpenHydro’s lack of experience and unexplained problems with previous installations, hazarding of PC-1 North –without notice – by the District’s contractors while conducting surveys, incomplete bottom information, and incomplete launch and recovery information and casualty plans, at a distance of 100m from PC-1 North, all of which cumulatively contribute to the risk of severing PC-1 North.53

While the PUD’s Response argues that Project installation cannot pose a risk to PC-1

because “installation, operation, maintenance, and removal of the turbines will not involve

anchors,”54 this statement does not hold up under scrutiny. Capt. Fiske points out that the PUD,

despite assurances to the contrary, actually does plan to use anchors as part of the Project, as

follows:

However, and despite its assurances, the District elsewhere indicates that it does expect to anchor, using vessel anchors, in the vicinity of PC-1 North while performing work on the Project turbines. This is not only contemplated, but planned. In its Response to the PCLC Protest the District asserts, “If the District observes derelict fishing gear snagged on the Project works, the District will remove the gear as soon as possible. Successful removal of deep-water fishing gear using ROVs has been demonstrated in Puget Sound (NRC 2008)…. The gear removal deployment will generally involve vessel anchoring, ROV anchoring,…”

51 Fiske Report at 12. 52 Id. 53 Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 54 Id. at 4.

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(emphasis added). This clearly obviates assurances that there will be no anchoring on behalf of the District for work on the Project.55

The PUD is simply not in a position to guarantee that no anchors will be utilized, and

cannot credibly state that no anchors will ever be used at any stage of the Project. This claim is

further belied by the PUD’s own Navigation Safety Plan, which expressly contemplates use of

anchors in contingencies:

…if the vessel is adrift and no assistance is immediately available, the vessel master may make both anchors ready for letting go and prepare to anchor at closest anchorage or moor at nearest harbor of safe refuge upon direction of the Captain of the Port.56

As Capt. Fiske observes in response to the PUD’s assurance that it will not use anchors:

To look at risk is as simple as recognizing that the master of an installation tug, having experienced a casualty and been cut loose from the Project may, despite plans and District commitments to the contrary, feel it necessary to drop an anchor to slow or stop himself from being driven by the current and into danger, whether or not he is near a submarine cable. This is the reality of life on the water, despite assertions that “no anchors will be used.57

A 2009 anchor snag incident in Admiralty Inlet involving a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, is

instructive. The Polar Sea, a Coast Guard vessel based in Seattle, dropped an anchor in

Admiralty Inlet after an incident with a small passenger launch, dragged the anchor across the

sea bottom, and snagged a segment of the Alaska United Fiber System submarine cable

(“AUSF”), causing a cable fault. The owner of AUSF, General Communications, Inc., filed a

55 Fiske Report at 4 (citation omitted, emphasis added). 56 PUD FERC Application, Vol. II, Appendix E, at 9 (emphasis added). Precisely how a vessel that is “adrift” without power and without “assistance” could navigate to any anchorage or mooring location other than its current location is not explained. In essence, this language must be given a practical interpretation: when it has to, the vessel will simply drop an anchor where it is currently situated. This is precisely the type of event which could result in anchor incursion to PC-1. 57 Fiske Report at 11.

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complaint in U.S. District Court against the United States claiming $1.5 million in damages, and

a consent judgment was entered against the United States for $805,320.58

The PUD further claims that there will be “no ‘maintenance’” of the turbines insofar as

all maintenance “will occur onshore after removal of the turbine and its gravity base.”59 What

exactly the PUD intends by this statement is unclear, but if the turbines have to be removed from

the seafloor to conduct maintenance, such a removal operation will only compound the potential

for interference with PC-1. To be clear, turbine “repair” and/or “maintenance” activities are

referred to numerous times throughout the most recent PUD report on the topic, as well as in the

PUD’s Response.60 Moreover, as noted, the need for maintenance and more frequent vessel

58 See Consent Judgment, General Communications, Inc. v. United States, Case No. C10-856 RAJ (W.D. Wash., May 20, 2011). The Complaint (“GCI Complaint”) and Consent Judgment are attached as Appendix F. AUSF is a fiber optic submarine cable that connects points in Alaska with points in Washington State. According to the GCI complaint, the Polar Sea, a vessel designed to perform science, icebreaking, and all Coast Guard missions, after dropping anchor in Admiralty Inlet, snagged a segment of AUSF, causing a cable fault. The Polar Sea was conducting a small boat launch for passenger embarkation from Port Townsend, and the crew of the Polar Sea was unable to release the rigging attached to the launch vessel, causing it to swamp and capsize. Shortly after the launch capsized, the Polar Sea let go of its anchor, west of an area in Admiralty Inlet where several submarine cables are located, including segments of AUSF and PC-1. The Polar Sea, with the permission of the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Center, was permitted to drag anchor through the cable area, and snagged a segment of the AUSF cable. After the Polar Sea attempted to break away from the cable, the combination of the vessel propulsion and the ebb tide, stressed the cable, damaging its fibers.

The cable repair operation took 10 days, 18 hours, and 45 minutes. GCI claimed damages in the amount of $1.5 million. As noted, a consent judgment was ultimately entered ordering the United States to pay $805,320. 59 PUD Response at 4-5. 60 See, e.g., PUD Response, Attachment A, Marine Operations Installation Considerations Relating to Proximity to Telecommunications Cable PC-1, at 1, 6 (June 20, 2012) (referring to “potential impacts of installation, operation, and maintenance of the Admiralty Inlet Project turbines,” “the installation, operation, and maintenance of the Admiralty Inlet Project in its current proposed location presents no material risk to the PC-1,” and “installation and maintenance activities do not require nor permit the use of anchors,” “[f]ailure modes and effects analysis has been performed on the installation and maintenance activities”); PUD Response at 4 (referring to “The Installation and Maintenance of the Project” and “the installation, operation, maintenance, and removal of the turbines” and “all maintenance of the turbines”) and 6 (referring to the “processes used to install, repair, and remove the Project”. (All emphases supplied.)

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traffic will likely be exacerbated by potential settling or uneven placement of the turbines due to

unknown characteristics of the substrate. The Commission must fully understand precisely what

the PUD intends in this regard, because the prospect of multiple installation and removal

operations of the turbines for onshore maintenance would further increase the risks to PC-1.

Finally, the proposed use of tugs as a backup to maintain the lay barge during turbine

installation does not alleviate these concerns. According to Mr. Brenneman, in his experience,

“in an area of strong currents, even the use of backup tugs has risks.”61 For example, Mr.

Brenneman relates that during the lay of the fiber-optic cable “Maya,” the same procedure as the

PUD proposes here was used off the coast of Florida while working in the Gulf Stream.

However, one of the 2 tugboats lost power during lay operations and the lay vessel ended

running over 1000 meters offline with the cable.62 Capt. Fiske similarly notes the complexities –

and the dangers – inherent in the backup proposal that the PUD’s contractors lay out here:

The District plans to use a standby tug in the event that one of the three planned tugs becomes inoperative. As noted throughout the documentation, the installation location is subject to strong currents. To disengage a disabled tug, move it clear of the barge (or in the case of the trailing barge in the OpenHydro Deployment Concept keep the disabled tug from being driven by the current into the tug/barge assembly), transfer wires or rig new wires to the standby tug, and the standby tug to take a strain, all while current are driving the entire flotilla, tethered to the bottom by power cables or by turbine lift wires, timely and without need to repeat steps, presents a not-insignificant challenge. To accomplish this while avoiding being carried by currents a short 104m to the West, where lies PC-1 North, seems to be overly optimistic. The District has not provided sufficient operational detail to demonstrate that such a contingency could be managed without adverse incident. Loss of control of the flotilla in such a scenario while the turbines are suspended (mid-installation) in the water column, or near the seabed, would pose substantial risks to PC-1 North.63

61 Brenneman Statement at 2. 62 Id. 63 Fiske Report at 5 (emphasis added).

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Overall, as Mr. Brenneman observes, most installations he has participated in “are

carefully planned, with professional mariners and advanced marine technologies. Still,

unanticipated events frequently occur, resulting in injury and significant damage to infrastructure

and property.”64 Despite the most careful planning, the very definition of an unforeseen event is

that it was not anticipated. Here, even use of anchors is actually anticipated in certain known

circumstances. These risks are only heightened in an extreme current environment such as

Admiralty Inlet, hence the need for a greater separation to minimize the risks of interference

between the turbines and cable. Plainly, the Project as currently proposed creates a substantial

conflict with PC-1’s preexisting use, and the extreme currents and environment, combined with

the close proximity as proposed to PC-1, render this a sensitive area to locate the Project, which

would create substantial adverse impacts on PC-1:65

The planned Project location, in close proximity to PC-1 North, is a sensitive location from an operational perspective due to the presence of the cable. In maritime operations, 100 meters is very close proximity. To install a large, heavy experimental project in close proximity to PC-1 North is to invite problems needlessly.66 As Capt. Fiske concludes, in offshore operations the easiest problems to solve are those

that are avoided altogether through careful planning—here, through greater separation:

64 Id. 65 PUD in its Response cites Verdant Power, LLC, 138 FERC ¶ 62,049 at P 3 (2012) in arguing that the Commission there “suggested that the ‘sensitive’ location prohibition [in the Commission’s white paper on Licensing Hydrokinetic Pilot Projects] refers to environmentally sensitive areas, not areas with potential user conflicts.” PUD Response at 13. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Verdant Power did not hold that user conflicts cannot render an area sensitive – it merely made passing reference to “environmentally sensitive” areas. The question of user conflicts was not contested or addressed in the decision. Second, “environmentally sensitive” areas can include areas of user conflict, because the preexisting uses constitute a part of the built human environment, consistent with the expansive definition of “environment” under the National Environmental Policy Act. 40 CFR § 1508.14 (“Human environment shall be interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment.”). See also PCLC Intervention and Protest, IV.A. 66 Fiske Report at 2.

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Marine operations are dynamic and cannot, as in terrestrial operations, simply be stopped until a problem is resolved. This planning is best done by persons experienced in marine operations. Even with the best planning, unanticipated situations arise and the best way to deal with both anticipated and unanticipated problems offshore is to use the planning process to minimize risk. The values in planning maritime operations are foresight, simplicity and common sense. The easiest problems to solve are those that are avoided.67

E. Increased Separation is Required Because Damage to PC-1 Would

Substantially Interfere with Communications on PC-1

The PUD, through Mr. Ford-Ramsden, asserts that a break in PC-1 would not interfere

with data traffic over the cables, adversely impact customers, or result in significant costs or lost

revenue, because, among other things, the traffic could be rerouted over other segments of the

cable’s ring system. This characterization is incorrect. The consequences to PC-1 would be

severe and thus increased separation is necessary to ensure that such damage does not occur.

As explained by PCLC in the statement of its Chief Financial Officer Kurt Johnson

attached herewith,68 the network of which PC-1 is a part has at any given time a fixed and

limited capacity to transmit data, known as a system’s “lit capacity.” As a result, only a limited

amount of data can be rerouted in the event of a break in the cable. A small portion of PCLC’s

customers take advantage of this capability and, for a premium charge, purchase the protection to

have their data rerouted—but the balance of its customer traffic cannot typically be rerouted:

[I]n the event of a fault on an unprotected PC-1 North circuit, PC-1 is not contractually required to reroute the interrupted circuit on other PC-1 segments, but more importantly would not physically have the ability to do so. Simply put, PC-1 only has the capability to manually reroute capacity from PC-1 North to adjacent segments to the extent there is available lit capacity on those segments. Given the cost and time to light additional capacity, excess lit capacity is typically (and currently) very limited.69

67 Id. at 1. 68 Statement of Kurt Johnson Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1, dated July 31, 2012, attached hereto as Appendix G. 69 Id. at ¶ 11.

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In fact, contrary to its (erroneous) extrapolation from press clippings, the cable fault on

two segments of PC-1 resulting from the Japan Tohoku earthquake caused significant disruption

to PCLC’s data traffic:

In fact, all customers on PC-1 North and West suffered service interruptions from the Tohoku earthquake on March 11, 2011. Some customers were not restored until May 26, 2011 and most customers were without service for four to seventy-six days while they were manually restored.70 PCLC’s ability to manually restore this traffic was the result of a completely fortuitous

event:

This manual restoration was possible because coincidentally, Pacific Crossing had just completed a system upgrade adding additional lit capacity of 170 gigabits per second of transpacific capacity on PC-1 South (Shima, Japan to Grover Beach, California) only days before the earthquake and therefore had this additional lit capacity, that had not yet been sold to customers, available for restoration. This is highly unusual and, in this case, completely fortuitous.71

As recent headlines demonstrate, severing an international submarine cable is a major,

adverse event with significant consequences.72 As Capt. Fiske notes, this case is all about risk,

and here the risk to PC-1 can and should be addressed in the planning stage:

Unless they are urgent in nature, most marine operations are carefully planned and deliberately executed. Alternatives are investigated with the goal of simplifying the operation, minimizing risk, and developing as completely as possible a list of possible failures and problems and other variables, such as the

70 Id. at ¶ 13. 71 Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. 72 See Ship Accidents Sever Data Cables Off East Africa, Wall Street Journal Online (February 28, 2012)(“Undersea data cables linking East Africa to the Middle East and Europe were severed in two separate shipping accidents this month, causing telecommunications outages in at least nine countries and affecting millions of Internet and phone users, telecom executives and government officials said.”); Ship’s anchor accidentally slices internet cable cutting off access in six African countries, Mail Online (Mar. 1, 2012), attached as Appendices H and I, respectively. As noted above, to resolve the alleged negligent snag of the Washington-Alaska AUSF resulting in a fault in one of its segments, a consent judgment was entered against the United States in the amount of approximately $802,000. This is a far cry from the non-event posited by Mr. Ford-Ramsden, suggesting incremental repair costs in the $10,000 to $20,000 range.

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operational environment, that might arise and plans to deal with those problems and failures and variables. … Some risks are necessary and some risks are elective. An elective risk need not be taken and can often be reduced through planning, organization and design. To take an elective risk without justification is to invite problems.73

The cost of repairs to the cable in event of a break would be substantial, also contrary to

the PUD’s assertions. Mr. Ford-Ramsden opines on an incremental cost estimate—ignoring that

if the PUD’s Project caused a fault, the PUD would bear responsibility for the entire cost of

repairs, not just an incremental analysis.74 Further, ASN has reviewed his cost estimate and

determined that it “significantly underestimates” the actual costs of repairs and does not account

for “significant unknowns” which would increase costs further, and cannot be readily

quantified.75 A detailed statement underlying this conclusion is included in Appendix B.

In short, a break or disruption in cable operations would result in an immediate disruption

of PC-1’s role in worldwide telecommunications, and cause substantial expense and

complication for repairs. The PUD's apparently casual attitude toward these risks is inexplicable

and unsupported, and is further support for increased separation between PC-1 North and the

turbines.

F. To Allow for Increased Separation, Feasible Alternatives Exist, and Should be Explored

Greater separation between PC-1 and the turbines should be explored because the

available data indicate that tidal forces are likely sufficient to sustain the Project in other

locations. The PUD in its Response takes issue with the technical aspects of the AECOM tidal

73 Fiske Report at 1, 11. 74 Id. at 10. 75 Altcatel-Lucent Supplement at 2-3.

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model submitted by PCLC, however, nowhere does the PUD deny that other sites lack sufficient

tidal energy for a successful pilot Project with further separation.

To the contrary, the modeling results now produced by the PUD confirm that other sites

can work—AECOM has reviewed and analyzed the PUD’s latest submittal, and concludes based

on the PUD’s data and modeling output:

There are now three modeling exercises – one conducted by AECOM and two by SnoPUD, that show multiple locations to the west of PC-1 may produce acceptable power potential compared to the proposed locations 100 and 150 meters east of PC-1. In addition, these sites appear to be consistent with SnoPUD’s other siting criteria such that a detailed analysis is warranted. We also agree with Dr. Polagye that the appropriate siting methodology is modeling to measurement. We conclude that, based on the results of both AECOM’s simplified and SnoPUD’s sophisticated modeling exercises, at this point it would be appropriate to conduct stationary ADCP measurements at multiple alternative locations west of the PC-1 cable where the models have indicated potential alternative sites.76

Significantly, as noted by AECOM, the PUD’s Dr. Polagye, in his critique of the

AECOM model can only say that results from the new PUD model (Thyng 2012) “indicate no

regions of higher power density to the west of the PC-1 cable.”77 Areas to the west of PC-1 are

not dismissed as having insufficient power potential under the sophisticated modeling (Thyng,

2012), or being significantly below the power potential at the proposed turbine location.78

Thus, the PUD’s modeling exercises, while perhaps more sophisticated, expensive and

time-consuming than AECOM’s modeling exercise, confirm AECOM’s fundamental conclusion

here: other sites at greater distance from PC-1 are feasible and should be explored further in

order to avoid or mitigate adverse impacts on PC-1.79 The Commission now has the benefit of

76 Supplemental Report of AECOM at 2, Appendix J hereto. 77 Id. at 3 (citing Polagye Supplemental Report at 5, PUD Response, Attachment D.) 78 Id. 79 In addition, as reflected in the Polagye Supplemental Report, sites father away from PC-1 North to the west of the current proposed location also meet the PUD’s other siting criteria.

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more than one model which support PCLC’s request for a detailed analysis of reasonable

alternative sites. A full and proper analysis of alternatives should follow.80

80 PCLC expressly preserves its arguments with respect to environmental review under the applicable state and federal statutes, as set forth in full in its Intervention and Protest.

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III. CONCLUSION

PCLC remains hopeful that productive dialogue will occur on August 6 with the PUD

and FERC staff, and PCLC welcomes a reasonable and open discussion to resolve the issues

through a detailed analysis of reasonable alternative Project locations. PCLC appreciates that the

Commission has scheduled the upcoming technical meeting, and hopes it will further such a

dialogue.

Respectfully submitted,

Martin L. Stern William M. Keyser K&L Gates LLP 1601 K Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20006 Phone: (202) 778-900 Fax: (202) 778-9100 Email: [email protected] [email protected]

[email protected] By /s/ Martin L. Stern Attorneys for PC Landing Corp.

Dated: August 1, 2012

Craig S. Trueblood Ash S. Miller Kari Vander Stoep K & L Gates LLP 925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104 Phone: (206) 623-7580 Fax: (206) 623-7022 Email: [email protected] [email protected]

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Appendix A

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STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. BRENNEMAN

Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1

Project No. 12690-005 1. My name is Thomas F. Brenneman. I am a United States citizen and live at 3523 Canterbury Road, Trent Woods, North Carolina. 2. I have been asked by PC Landing Corp. (“PCLC”) to provide this statement as an expert in the field of submarine cable installation, maintenance and repair in connection with the application of Snohomish County PUD No. 1 (“SnoPUD”) to license a pilot tidal energy project in Admiralty Inlet (the “Project”) and the written statement of Keith Ford-Ramsden filed by SnoPUD with its Response, dated June 22, 2012, to, inter alia, PC Landing Corp.’s protest to the Project, filed May 23, 2012. 3. Specifically, I have been asked to address certain issues relative to the proposed location of the Project turbines – one approximately 100 m and the other approximately 150 m from the northern segment of the Pacific Crossing submarine cable system, PC-1, based on my experience in the industry.

Experience and Qualifications 4. I am an independent consultant with over 30 years’ experience in the offshore construction industry, with particular expertise involving fiber optic submarine cables, power cables, pipelines, and windfarms. I have served as the representative for owners, purchasers, and the U.S. government in connection with numerous subsea projects, including projects involving cable lay operations, post-lay burial, pre-lay and burial assessment surveys, cable landing inspections, cable repairs, dredging and ROV operations. I have also served as the Project Surveyor on wind farm and power cable projects. 5. In my capacity as a party representative, it is my responsibility to oversee the day-to-day operations onboard the vessel, liaison between the owners and the sub-contractor(s), insure a safe working environment is maintained, report discrepancies in operations with the owners, and provide guidance to the sub-contractor(s) as required using my knowledge and experience. As lead surveyor, my role is to maintain the highest caliber of survey data capable, direct the survey crew on a day to day basis, resolve problems onboard if and when they occur, and to liaison with the client representative. A representative list of my clients is provided in the attachment. 6. I am very familiar with PC-1 and have worked as the owner representative for the former parent of PCLC in connection with several projects involving PC-1, including involving PC-1 North and East off the waters of Washington State and an environmental survey off of California State.

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The Need for Adequate Separation Unanticipated Events Occur in Difficult Marine Environments 7. Most installations I have participated in are carefully planned, with professional mariners and advanced marine technologies. Still, unanticipated events frequently occur, resulting in injury and significant damage to infrastructure and property. 8. For example, while working on the “Walney II” wind farm in the Irish Sea, a vessel lost dynamic positioning control (which is a technology for vessels to maintain position without anchoring), and the ROV it was operating was dragged into the platform, taking over 72 hours to recover and repair. 9. The PUD’s experts have indicated that installation of the Project turbines will be supported by the use of tugboats as a backup to maintain the lay barge during turbine installation. Yet in my experience, in an area of strong currents, even the use of backup tugs has risks. For example, during the lay of the fiber-optic cable "Maya", the same procedure was used off the coast of Florida while working in the Gulf Stream. One of the 2 tugboats lost power during lay operations and the lay vessel ended running over 1000 meters offline with the cable. 10. And as I discuss in more detail below, ROV operations can be particular challenging in strong currents, such as Admiralty Inlet. For example, during repair operations of Alaska United Fiber Optic Cable System (“AUFS”), which parallels PC-1, the Tyco Cable Ship, CS Global Sentinel, attempted to utilize an ROV for the repair of AUFS-E and had only partial success. Operation of the ROV in the current was done with great toil, and conditions were at some points beyond the vehicle’s capabilities. It could only operate in a very limited window at slack water. In this very limited window, the ROV was successful in cutting the cable, eliminating the cutting grapnel drag, but due to the current it was not used for the holding/recovery drag. Grapnel drags where used to recover the cable. Thanks to pinpoint accuracy by the CS Global Sentinel, this was a success, but involved significant risk due to the proximate distance of the PC-1 cable to the AUFS cable, which was greater than the 100m being proposed for one of the Project turbines. 11. These type of risks are particularly heightened given the nature of currents, marine traffic, and weather in Admiralty Inlet. Though only 6 kilometers (3.7 mi) wide at the narrowest point (between the Point Wilson and Admiralty Head lighthouses), it is through this passage that nearly all the seawater flows into and from Puget Sound during daily tidal variations. Tidal currents can reach six knots in the area northeast of Point Wilson. All sea vessels must pass through Admiralty Inlet to enter or leave Puget Sound, except those small enough to use Deception Pass. Today a great deal of maritime freight traffic passes through Admiralty Inlet to the major shipping ports at Seattle and Tacoma, as well as significant United States Navy traffic to the Naval facilities in Puget Sound. The Keystone-Port Townsend run of the Washington State Ferries crosses the inlet and serves as a link for State Route 20. Any work in this area is potentially unpredictable and dangerous to personnel, equipment, and vessels due to tidal conditions, rapidly changing currents, ship traffic, and variable weather conditions.

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The Need to Separate Infrastructure Involving Significant Vessel Activity From Submarine Cables In Difficult Marine Environments 12. Submarine cables, by their very nature, are susceptible to damage and breaks as a result of outside aggression, particularly from vessel anchoring, dredging works, subsea obstacles and debris, as well as other cables in the same vicinity. (During the installation of West Africa Connect, off the coast of Gabon, the cable vessel’s plow cut two power cables belonging to Total Oil, resulting in over 10 million GBP loss). A typical submarine cable is comprised of a variable number of fiber pairs, surrounded by shielding and protection, i.e., single or double armor. My understanding is that the PC-1 cables used in Admiralty Inlet are single armored and buried. Still even armored cable can be snapped or damaged as a result of a snag, and, as noted, I am aware of this occurring even in connection with well-planned and established installations. Because the cable is of the armored type in this area it would likely be dragged far off position before breaking because of the added strength of the cable that the armor provides. 13. For these reasons, in planning an infrastructure that involves significant vessel activity, I believe it is important to allow an adequate separation distance in the planning stage between the planned infrastructure and an existing undersea cable. This is particularly critical here, in a marine environment characterized by extreme weather, currents and turbulence, such as Admiralty Inlet, where marine operations will by necessity include a higher degree of risk and uncertainty. Consequently, adequate precautions should be taken at the onset, where possible, through physical separation of infrastructure, to avoid unanticipated conflicts that can occur even in the most carefully planned installations. The ICPC Recommendations 14. This is the wisdom behind the ICPC recommendations – allowing for adequate separation at the planning stage between new infrastructure and existing submarine cables, both to avoid injury to the cable infrastructure and to allow for ease of repair. 15. While I agree with Mr. Ford-Ramsden that the ICPC recommendations are just that -- recommendations and not mandates, I also believe that they provide the best guidance available as to safe distances between cables and other infrastructure for planning purposes. Here, Mr. Ford-Ramsden dismisses reference to ICPC No. 13 (which was developed for wind farms) and suggests that if an ICPC recommendation is to be used, he would use Recommendation No. 2, which addresses coordination between cable systems, including recommended distances between cables that are parallel to each other. I do not believe that is appropriate in this circumstance. 16. As to ICPC No. 13, I agree with Mr. Ford-Ramsden that the 500 meter safety zone in the recommendation is not relevant to the separation between PC-1 and the turbines. But in referring to ICPC No. 13 as the best guidance for appropriate separation with the turbines, PCLC explicitly did not use the 500 meter safety zone for wind turbines in Recommendation No. 13 (If it had used the 500 meter safety zone, the recommended separation would have been closer to 1200 meters).

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17. Other aspects of ICPC No. 13 are, however, completely relevant, including allowance for run on (200m), grappling rig (300m at 60 meter water depth), and ship length (here, approximately 140m for ASN or TE SubCom vessels which would likely be doing the work under a teaming agreement with ASN). Thus, without any safety zone around the turbines at all, the recommended separation distance would still be 640 m. The run on is defined as the distance needed between the cable and the start of the grapnel touchdown on the ocean floor to begin recovery. The recommended scope of rope equals 5 times the water depth. An additional issue is that while vessel draft is not an issue given water depth and the height of the turbines, cable vessels have ropes, umbilicals, etc. that trail behind the vessel, which could easily snag the turbines or the transmission cables, requiring the need for separation to allow for safe operation. Moreover here, the damage to the cable requiring the repair could be caused by a vessel dragging an anchor, which could drag the cable even closer to the turbine unit. 18. I also disagree with Mr. Ford-Ramsden’s suggestion that ICPC No. 2 would be the most appropriate recommendation to apply to the situation here and particularly its recommendation as to “Cable Parallels.” As the name implies, that recommendation involves separation between parallel cables particularly in deep water (as opposed to shallow water here), and is not relevant to separation between a cable and a structure such as a turbine because the installation and repair operations to a turbine use different operational procedures. In addition, Mr. Ford-Ramsden inaccurately quotes ICPC No. 2 in any event for the proposition that the recommended separation would be 100 meters. That recommendation provides for separation of the lesser of 3 times the water depth or 9 km, but could be reduced to the lesser of 2 times the water depth or 6 km, but only “after consultation and agreement by all affected parties.” But again, as indicated by the 9 km and 6 km references, this recommendation was written for deeper water. 19. Based on ICPC recommendations and my experience with the installation of telecommunications and energy infrastructure, the potential for external aggression and the need for safe operating distances to make repairs, ideally I recommend a separation here of 1000 meters between PC-1 north and the project turbines. In my opinion, separations of 100 and 150 meters between the turbines and PC-1 north present an unmanageable risk that would be tempting fate. If a separation of 1000 meters cannot be achieved, under no circumstances should a separation of less than 500 meters be authorized.

ROV Repair 20. Mr. Ford-Ramsden also recommends the use of an ROV for the cable recovery and repair operation, which, in his view, would eliminate the need for greater than 100 meter separation since ROVs can work in confined spaces. As noted, the work location here is in a very confined area, with very high currents (NOAA predictions for the area of > 4 knots), and high vessel traffic. Due to the high currents, this area is not favorable for an ROV repair as described by Mr. Ford-Ramsden. 21. I described above the issue with an ROV operation in Admiralty Inlet involving the AUSF. As a further example, while working on the Walney II wind farm, a 600hp ROV was limited to 3 to 4 hours of working time per day in 3 knot currents. This same situation occurred on the "Eirgrid" power cable lay last year in the Irish Sea. Operation of the ROVs in the current

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was done with great difficulty, and as in the AUSF situation, sea conditions were, at times, beyond the capabilities of the ROV. My understanding is that the ROVs on the ASN and TE SubCom vessels are of lower power. 22. The point is that ROVs cannot work in fast currents, and the only way they can be used is to wait for slack currents, use them in a brief window of several hours, and then wait for the next slack current. This is obviously an unacceptable approach from a time standpoint, where waiting time could add multiple days to such an operation, as well as from a cost standpoint, since cable owners are charged days rates for the repair, as well as will incur additional costs associated with cable down time.

Thomas F. Brenneman Dated: July 12, 2012

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THOMAS F. BRENNEMAN REPRESENTATIVE CLIENTS

Telecommunications Sector

Cable Owners: TATA Unity Cable Tyco Melita Cable Verizon Global Crossing Limited Pacific Crossing Ltd. (former parent of PCLC)

Contractors:

Global Marine Fugro Alcatel Submarine Networks

Energy Sector

Trans Bay Cable TranElec Eirgrid Tran Ocean National Petroleum Construction Company, UAE (NPCC)

Government

US Government [Agency classified]

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Appendix B

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Centre de Vitlarceaux Route de Villejust 91620 Nozay France

Alcatel ·Lucent @

PC Landing Corp. 319 Diablo Road, Suite 213

Danville, CA 94525 USA

Attn: Mr. Kurt Johnson, (FO

16 July 2012

Re: Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project - FERC No.12690

Dear Mr. Johnson.

We are writing in reference to the application of Snohomish County PUO No.1 ("SnoPUD") to License a pilot tidal energy project in Admiralty Inlet (the "Project") and the written statement of Keith Ford-Ramsden filed by SnoPUD with its Response, dated June 22, 2012, to, inter alia, PC landing Corp. 's protest to the Project, filed May 23, 2012.

As we explained in our letter to you dated May 10, 2012, as the maintenance contractor for the Pacific Crossing cable system (PC-1), we have a number of concerns with the proposed location of the Project turbines - one approximately 100 m and the other approximately 150 m from PC-1 N, the northern segment of PC-1.

In our letter, we contrasted a typical cable fault repair operation with the type of repair operation that would be required in the event of a cable fault adjacent to the turbines, See Exhibit 1 to our 10 May 2012 letter, and also concluded that the proposed proximity of the turbines to PC-1 N would increase the cost, complexity, and timing of such a repair.

In the SnoPUO Response, Mr. Ford-Ramsden states that rather than the typical grapnel operation that ASN recommends (which would require, among other things, two cable cuts each at a distance away from the fault to allow for safe operations), a potential alternative repair method, sometimes used when working near other seabed infrastructure, could be considered. This alternative would require the use of an ROV for the repair operation, which would allow the cable to be accessed directly at the fault location adjacent to the turbine. The import of the SnoPUD Response appears to be that to the extent an ROV can be used for the repair in place of grapnels, the proposed proximity of the turbines woutd have no impact on normal repair activities in the case of a fault adjacent to the turbines.

ASN can envisage a number of concerns regarding this alternative repair procedure given the presence of strong currents in Admiralty Inlet. Even if an ROV could be used for a limited aspect of the operation, in our opinion, a grapnel operation would still be required for this operation.

ALCATEl·lUCENT SUBMARINE NETWORKS 5AS au capilal de EUR 112 013 478 . social; 3, avenue Octave Greard, 75007 Paris - 389 534 256 R.C.S. Paris

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Basically, ROVs for this type of activity are fairly large vehicles (see Exhibit 4 to Mr. Ford-Ramsden's statement which shows a picture of an ASN ROV) and are extremely hard to hold to position in strong currents. Essentially, in strong currents, the current pushes the ROV, with the operator struggling to hold it in place. In our experience, in currents over 2 knots, which is typical of Admiralty Inlet, the kind of ROVs that are used on cable repair vessels would struggle to maintain position in this type of bottom operation. In this context it is essential to note that there is no guarantee that an ASN repair vessel, equipped with the more powerful ASN ROV, would be used. It is quite possible that an alternative vessel could be used, which would be equipped with a different kind of ROV which, although meeting the industry standard, is lower powered when compared with the ASN ROV and thus even less able to cope with the strong currents experienced in the Inlet.

Thus here, were an ROV to be used, the repair operation would need to wait for a slack (or slow) tide, to proceed with the operation - typicaUy a wait time of 5 or 6 hours. Even then, the operation could only proceed during the period of the slack tide, maybe a two hour window in which to work, followed by additional waiting time, which adds cost and delay to the operation.

A further issue is visibility. ROVs use cameras for the operator to see the work area, as well as mechanical arms to cut and grip. However, to cut and grip the cable using an ROV the operator needs to be able to see it. However, in strong currents visibility is timited, further limiting the use of an ROV for repair of a cable fault in an area such as Admiralty Inlet. In addition, where cable is buried, as is the case in shallow water such as in Admiralty Inlet, the inability for the operator to see the cable would further complicate its use in recovery operations. With buried cable, the operator will not be able to get a hold of or cut the cable wi th an ROV. Should the cable be exposed and visible due to, for example an anchor drag, it is possible that the distance to the turbines would be reduced by the external aggression event, further reducing any safety margins for the repair operation.

Depending on conditions, an ROV could be deployed at the start of the operation but whether and how it would be used, depends on the specific conditions. To the extent that the conditions are suitable (i.e., in slack tide) and the cable was on the surface, the ROV could be used to for a cutting operation, but then grapnels would be used to clamp and recover the cable, requiring the grapnel operation that we explained in our May 10 letter.

Basically. utilizing ROV cameras and mechanical arms to clamp the cable and then recover it is a slow operation compared to a grapneling run. Thus, even if an ROV could be used for the cutting operation, the ROV would not be used to clamp and recover the cable in any event. In addition, even using an ROV to cut the cable presumes suitable tides and that the cable was unburied in the work area.

In short, an ROV would have at most a limited role in a repair operation in Admiralty Inlet, and even if it could be used to cut the cable, given the current in the area it would still be likely to be less time consuming to use a grapnel to recover the cable, requiring the more complex and costly operation described in our May 10 letter.

In terms of cost, Mr. Ford-Ramsden takes exception to our characterization of the cost and complexity of a repair operation using cutting and holding drives with grapnels as described in our May 10 letter. Basically, the SnoPUD Response estimates the incremental vessel time and spare cable cost at $11 ,100 to $21 ,840. In our view, this significantly

2

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underestimates the likely incremental cost of such an operation, particularly since it fails to account for the additional cost of relaying the cable further to the west of the existing route, to allow for additional separation from the turbines. In particular, even under a best case scenario, the incremental work would take at least an extra day for the recovery, repair and burial operation alone without accounting for the cable reroute, adding approximately $25,000 per day for fuel, lube, and the vessel day rate, plus the incremental cable cost. This does not take into account potential additional time for the complexity of the operation, allowances for complications, or waiting time for currents. Thus, for planning purposes, we would expect this to be a multiple day operation, and think that Mr. Ramsden's estimate of an additional 4 to 8 hours to complete this repair is overly optimistic.

In addition, the SnoPUD Response does not account for relaying the cable to the west of the current location. ! For example, if the cable were moved approximately 400 m to the west of its current location to allow for 500 m in separation to the turbine location, this would require not only additional cable, but we would be particularly concerned with the permitting costs and issues associated with changing the current alignment of the cable, which, in our view, could be significant. These are significant unknowns that cannot be immediately quantified.

Finally, as an additional point supporting an increased separation between PC-1 N and the turbines than is currently planned, we note that when a cable is snagged, before it breaks, it is not uncommon for it to be dragged hundreds of meters along the seabed. Here, given the already minimal separation between PC-1 N and the turbines, there is a real possibility that in the event of a snag, the cable could be dragged even closer to the turbine if not over it. However, with adequate separation, the risk of this possibility would be greatly reduced.

Yours Sincerely,

Claire Boggis Alcatel-Lucent Submarine Networks Vice President Marine

Attachment

1 SnoPUD states in its Environmental Report (at 102) that "The project wilt constrain Pacific Crossing to re-Lay the repair section to the west of the existing cabLe route_ They will want to re-Lay as paralleL to the existing cabLe as possible to minimize cross current forces on the able as much as possible."

3

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Appendix

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Appendix C

EVIDENCE OF ADMIRALTY INLET MARINE CONDITIONS AND ADVERSE AND UNANTICIPATED IMPACTS ON PROJECT MARINE OPERATIONS AS

REPORTED IN CONTRACTOR PRE-INSTALLATION STUDY REPORTS As reflected in its Application, the PUD, through outside contractors, conducted a suite of pre-installation studies, that according to the PUD “augmented the already extensive collection of data available for the Admiralty Inlet region to support a thorough and complete environmental analysis for the Project.” PUD Application, Executive Summary at 4. These are collected in Appendix L to the Application. In fact, the reports of the PUD’s own contractors at the turbine sites candidly document the extreme, unrelenting tidal conditions in Admiralty Inlet and their adverse, and unanticipated impacts on marine operations at the proposed project locations. Significantly, vessels used in these activities used anchors to maintain position and in fact had anchor-related issues. Relevant excerpts from the actual reports are included below. Appendix L-3: Bathymetric and Geophysical Survey Site Characterization Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project (Fugro Seafloor Surveys, Inc., June 25-30, 2009) Purpose: Perform bathymetric and geophysical site surveys for the project to determine seafloor characteristics, including through seabed sampling with a Van Veen grab sample. The seabed sampling, however, was unsuccessful and ultimately abandoned despite multiple attempts at multiple locations near the proposed turbine sites due to “intense current activity” (see Appendix L-3 at 2-6):

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2

Appendix L-8: Seafloor Substrate and Benthic Habitat Characterization of the SnoPUD Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project Turbine Site Through ROV Video Observations – A Preliminary Report Appendix L-10 Habitat Characterization of the SnoPUD Turbine Site – Admiralty Head, Washington State – Final Report, June 1, 2011 (CapRock Geology) These reports were prepared and based on two ROV video surveys undertaken to characterize the benthic substrate and habitats of the project site. The ROV surveys were undertaken at two separate times, one in mid-August 2010 and the second in late September 2010, in order to take advantage of tidal conditions “with the least amount of exchange and velocity.” Preliminary Report at 1. Reflecting on the surveys, the final report noted that “This is a site of high tidal water exchanges and almost continuous strong currents, an ideal site for tidal energy conversion but a hindrance to seafloor examination.” Final Report at 1 (Emphasis added.) The Reports contain substantially identical discussions of survey method and difficulties encountered. See Preliminary Report at 2-3, 5; Final Report at 2-3, 5. (referenced figures omitted in excerpt below). Note specifically issues with ROV use and operation, and observation that “very seldom was true slack experienced. Quite the contrary, strong currents often over a knot in speed were encountered and affected the smooth, trouble-free operation of the ROV.” The reports comment extensively on need for and difficulty with anchoring. This demonstrates issues with marine operations in Admiralty Inlet currents, and difficulties with use of an ROV even for simple video operations. However, of particular concern, it also indicates significant vessel operations and anchoring in the vicinity of PC-1 N without notification to or coordination with PCLC. Fortunately, there were no external aggressions during these operations. Method

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Appendix D

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1

Supplement t) Admiralty Inlet Pil)t Tidal Pr)ject Siting Assessment and Observati)ns fr)m OpenHydr) Bay )f Fundy TISEC Depl)yment

FERC Pr)ject P-12690

Submitted By:

Atlantic Marine Ge)l)gical C)nsulting Ltd.

G)rd)n Fader, P. Ge).

2901 Parkdale Ave.Halifax, NSCanadaB3L3Z2

July 2012

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2

This rep*rt supplements my May 2012 Admiralty Inlet Pil.t Tidal Pr.ject Siting Assessment and Observati.ns fr.m OpenHydr. Bay .f Fundy TISEC Depl.yment (“Fader Rep*rt”). On June 22, 2012, the Public Utility District N*. 1 *f Sn*h*mish C*unty (“Sn*PUD”) filed with FERC a set *f resp*nses t* many *f my c*mments in a d*cument entitled “Marine Operati.ns Installati.n C.nsiderati.ns Relating t. Pr.ximity t. Telec.mmunicati.ns Cable PC-1(June 20, 2012) (“Sn*PUD Marine Operati*ns Rep*rt”) *n the installati*n and maintenance *f the OpenHydr* device in Admiralty Inlet that suggests that the device p*ses n* risk t* the adjacent PC-1 submarine cable. Many *f the c*mments in my May 2012 Assessment were n*t addressed by Sn*PUD in its resp*nse and I reiterate th*se here al*ng with further clarificati*n and emphasis. In additi*n, *n July 16, 2012, FERC issued a Request f.r Additi.nal Inf.rmati.n t* PC Landing C*rp. and this supplement als* addresses, in part, FERC’s requests.

It has been stated that the OpenHydr* system will be placed *n the seabed with a “planned maintenance schedule f*r rem*ving the turbines five years after depl*yment” (Draft Bi.l.gical Assessment, Sn*PUD, Applicati*n F*r A New Pil*t Pr*ject License, Admiralty Inlet Pil*t Tidal Pr*ject (the “Applicati*n”), Appendix (“App.”) G, at 31) s*, acc*rding t* Sn*PUD, peri*dic maintenance is anticipated t* be minimal. The vari*us studies that have been c*nducted t* evaluate the seabed and subsurface ge*l*gy give the impressi*n that the f*undati*n is well-kn*wn. The evidence presented in the ge*physical rep*rts in the Applicati*n, h*wever, dem*nstrate that actual f*undati*n c*nditi*ns are n*t kn*wn as n* samples have been c*llected and analyzed. It is appreciated that sampling the seabed and immediate subsurface in str*ng current regi*ns where the seabed is b*ulder-c*vered is a very difficult undertaking, but it is n*netheless essential that samples be c*llected and their ge*technical pr*perties be well-underst**d f*r pr*per system design. Descript*rs such as “likely,” “suspected,” “extrap*lated,” “estimated,” “interpreted,” “suggested,” and “unkn*wn” are terms used thr*ugh*ut Sn*PUD’s supp*rting d*cuments t* describe the state *f kn*wledge ab*ut the seabed and immediate subsurface at the sites where the turbines are planned t* be placed. This is n*t a quantitative understanding *f the c*nditi*ns *n which the gravity structures will be placed, *nly a qualitative estimate at best.

The immediate seabed (*r “pavement” as it is referred t* in the Sn*PUD Marine Operati*ns Rep*rt) is suggested t* be 0.5 t* 1m thick, c*nsisting *f gravel with c*bbles and very r*unded b*ulders. The rep*rts states that the r*unded b*ulders *n the seabed can and d* m*ve ab*ut in the str*ng currents *f Admiralty Inlet. It is described as being in a “l**se and unc*ns*lidated” c*nditi*n. Seafl..r Substrate and Benthic Habitat Characterizati.n .f the Sn.PUD Admiralty Inlet Pil.t Tidal Pr.ject Turbine Site Thr.ugh ROV Vide. Observati.ns – A Preliminary Rep.rt, Applicati*n, Appendix L-8, at 25. This gravel lag is “suspected t* *verlie a glacial clay layer,” which is a relatively s*ft material. Habitat Characterizati.n .f the Sn.PUD Turbine Site – Admiralty Head, Washingt.n State – Final Rep.rt, June 1, 2011 (CapR*ck Ge*l*gy), Applicati*n, Appendix L-10 at 28. In additi*n, Sn*PUD’s survey c*ntract*r rep*rts its failure, despite multiple attempts, t* grab sediment samples due t* r*cky b*tt*m type and intense current activity, and c*nsequently as a result *f this and *ther limitati*ns, “we d* n*t and cann*t have a c*mplete understanding *f the subsurface c*nditi*ns underlying the site.” Bathymetric and Ge.physical Survey Site Characterizati.n Admiralty Inlet Pil.t Tidal Pr.ject(Fugr* Seafl**r Surveys, Inc., June 25-30, 2009), Applicati*n, Appendix L-3 at 2-6, 6-1.

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The design *f the feet f*r the gravity structures is pr*p*sed t* be tapered steel p*ints (Applicati*n, Exhibit F, Sheet 3, Gravity Base and Turbine Assembly) *ver 1 meter in length, which w*uld penetrate the thin l**se gravels and rest up*n the sub gravel sediments. Other secti*ns *f the rep*rts state that the base f**t print will distribute the l*ad s* that the s*il shear strength will n*t be exceeded – “the subsea base f**t print will be c*nservatively designed t* distribute the l*ad s* that the s*il shear strength is n*t exceeded.” Sn.PUD Marine Operati.ns Rep.rt, at 2. These tw* f**ting descripti*ns c*ntradict *ne an*ther. M*st imp*rtantly, this c*nclusi*n simply cann*t be supp*rted with*ut actual measurements *f the shear strength *f the sea b*tt*m and immediate subsurface material and certainly n*t with tapered and p*inted feet that rest up*n s*ft s*ils. This is a critical sh*rtc*ming in the siting *f the devices.

Given what is kn*wn, tw* events will likely *ccur. One is that the full weight *f the gravity structure will n*t be *n the gravel lag, as the tapered steel p*ints will penetrate the thin l**se gravel lag, and will lie *n the unkn*wn sub b*tt*m sediments underlying the gravel lag. Depending *n the pr*perties *f these sediments, and their distributi*n, settlement *f the device will likely *ccur and it may be uneven *r differential, resulting in tilting *f the entire gravity structure and attached turbine. This may *ccur during depl*yment. It may als* *ccur later during *perati*n as turbine vibrati*nal f*rces are transmitted t* the feet fr*m tidal acti*n, resulting in bearing capacity failure. This lack *f understanding *f the sub gravel pr*perties *f the sediments *n which the device will rest will likely necessitate repeated visits and rep*siti*ning *f the devices *n the seabed, require premature interventi*n f*r rem*val *r *ther means *f leveling thr*ugh unkn*wn and untested marine *perati*ns in an intense marine envir*nment. This additi*nal maintenance will result in increased interventi*n and vessel traffic much greater than is described in the applicati*n and supp*rting d*cuments *ver the 5-year pil*t licensing peri*d.

Given the pr*ximity t* PC-1, it is essential t* *btain samples *f the material directly beneath the gravel lag at the actual site where the turbines are ultimately placed, in *rder t* assess the ge*technical pr*perties *f the sediments and their behavi*r under l*ading. Extrap*lati*n fr*m nearby land *r anecd*tal evidence fr*m the dragging *f seabed anch*rs in the vicinity is simply n*t sufficient f*r predicting the nature and pr*perties *f the sediment *n which the devices will be f*unded. The c*llecti*n and ge*technical assessment *f seabed and sub b*tt*m samples is standard *ffsh*re energy industry practice f*r determining the l*cati*n *f large *ffsh*re structures that are b*tt*m f*unded, and the lack *f such inf*rmati*n is a significant and surprising *missi*n at this site.

The presence *f s*ft clay materials interpreted by Sn*PUD’s c*ntract*rs t* exist beneath the gravel lags will als* likely result in sc*ur ar*und the feet *f the gravity base. Sc*ur will result fr*m the thinness and m*bility *f the gravel lag, the presence *f s*ft materials beneath the gravel lag, and increased fl*w ar*und the tubular legs and feet. This c*uld als* enhance differential settlement *f the feet *f the gravity base structure and induce an unstable p*siti*n f*r the entire device. It is c*mm*n in str*ng current regi*ns f*r the seabed t* be c*vered with thin pr*tective lag gravel surfaces *ver s*ft sediments, but *nce br*ken thr*ugh, maj*r er*si*n *ften ensues, and thr*ugh l*cal sc*ur and slumping pr*cesses, the seabed can be er*ded int* deep tr*ughs resulting in rem*val *f sediments that are *ver 100 meters in thickness. These sc*ured depressi*ns als* gr*w n*rmal t* the current directi*ns and pr*pagate f*r large distances d*wn current and acr*ss current. Sn*PUD’s rep*rt suggests that if sc*ured trenches f*rmed ar*und the turbines they w*uld

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n*t pr*pagate acr*ss current. In the Bay *f Fundy, Canada, where tidal p*wer test sites have been selected, similar sc*urs fr*m large currents and seabed *bstacles such as large b*ulders have pr*pagated th*usands *f meters d*wnstream and hundreds *f meters acr*ss currents (AECOM Canada Ltd., 2009, V*lume 2, Fundy Tidal Energy Dem*nstrati*n Facility, Appendix 3, Ge*l*gy, Bathymetry, Ice and Seismic C*nditi*ns, AMGC) (Exhibit A heret*). Such cr*ss-current er*si*n is enhanced by l*cal slumping and turbulence and is c*mm*n. Evidence already exists f*r such a pr*cess presently underway t* the n*rtheast *f the pr*p*sed turbine l*cati*ns in a large sc*ured tr*ugh interpreted t* *ccur in Admiralty Inlet. Fader Rep*rt, Fig. 3.

As I n*ted in my initial rep*rt (Fader Rep*rt at 5-6), at the Bay *f Fundy test site, OpenHydr* initially ch*se t* place the turbine *n a similar gravel lag surface *verlying unkn*wn materials (likely s*ft sediments) as is the case with Sn*PUD’s pr*p*sed site here. Late in the pr*ject depl*yment pr*cess, OpenHydr* m*ved t* a nearby site *f exp*sed basalt bedr*ck giving their device the m*st stable seabed p*ssible as a f*undati*n. The m*ve suggests a c*ncern by the pr*ject sp*ns*r regarding substrate suitability but a rep*rt *n the less*ns learned fr*m the Bay *f Fundy experience, including the site rel*cati*n, has never been made available publicly. N*netheless, it appears that OpenHydr* still pr*p*ses t* l*cate the device f*r the pr*ject here in a thin gravel b*tt*m setting *verlying s*ft unsampled materials, similar t* the c*nditi*ns which they m*ved away fr*m in the Bay *f Fundy.

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EaHIBIT A

AECOM Canada Ltd., 2009, V*lume 2, Fundy Tidal Energy Dem*nstrati*n Facility, Appendix 3, Ge*l*gy, Bathymetry, Ice and Seismic C*nditi*ns, AMGC

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Minas Basin Pulp and Power

Volume II: Appendices Fundy Tidal Energy Demonstration Facility

draft for discussion

Prepared by:

AECOM Canada Ltd. 1701 Hollis Street, SH400 (PO Box 576 CRO), Halifax, NS, Canada B3J 3M8 T 902.428.2021 F 902.428.2031 www.aecom.com Project Number:

107405 Date:

April 21, 2009

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Minas Basin Pulp and Power

Vo l . I I Ap pe nd ices Fund y Tida l Ene r g y De monst ra t ion Fac i l i t y

List of Appendices Appendix 1: Joint Federal/Provincial Harmonization Agreement (Pending) Appendix 2: Device Plans and Scaled Drawings Appendix 3: Geology, Bathymetry, Ice and Seismic Conditions (Fader 2009) Final Report Pending Appendix 4: Benthic Communities (Envirosphere 2009a) Final Report Pending Appendix 5: Currents in Minas Basin (Oceans Ltd. 2009) Final Report Pending Appendix 6: Physical Oceanography (Envirosphere 2009b) Final Report Pending Appendix 7: Marine Seabirds and Marine Mammals (Envirosphere 2009c) Final Report Pending Appendix 8: Terrestrial and Intertidal Environments (Envirosphere 2009d) Appendix 9 Commercial Fisheries Studies-Phase I and Phase II (CEF Consultants Ltd., 2008, 2009) Appendix 10: Archaeological Assessment (Davis Archaeological Consultants Ltd., 2008) Appendix 11: Invitations to Public Participation Appendix 12: Marine Transportation Study (Gartner Lee Ltd. 2008)

draft for discussion

(vol_ii_appendix_final_draft_ea_minas_2009apr21-1)

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Minas Basin Pulp and Power

Vo l . I I Ap pe nd ices Fund y Tida l Ene r g y De monst ra t ion Fac i l i t y

Appendix 3:

Geology, Bathymetry, Ice and Seismic Conditions

(Fader 2009) Final Report

draft for discussion

(vol_ii_appendix_final_draft_ea_minas_2009apr21)

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Geological Report for the Proposed In Stream Tidal Power Demonstration Project in Minas Passage, Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia Prepared By:

Atlantic Marine Geological Consulting Ltd. 2901 Parkdale Ave. Halifax, Nova Scotia B3L 3Z2 For:

Minas Basin Pulp and Power Co. Ltd. 53 Prince St., P.O. Box 401, Hantsport, N.S. B0P 1P0 April 27, 2009

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Contents:

Chapters 1) Regional Physiography, Geography and Bathymetry of Minas

Passage, Inner Bay of Fundy 2) Bedrock and Surficial Geology of Minas Passage 3) Sediment Transport and Suspended Sediments

4) Glacial, Post Glacial, Present and Projected Sea Levels: Bay of

Fundy

5) Seismic Hazard, Faults and Earthquakes: Inner Bay of Fundy

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Regional Physiography, Geography and Bathymetry of Minas Passage, Inner Bay of Fundy Physiography

The location of the proposed tidal power demonstration facility falls within one major physiographic province of eastern Canada known as the Appalachian Region (Figure 1). Within the Appalachian Region there are two divisions: the Atlantic Uplands and the Carboniferous-Triassic Lowlands. The proposed tidal power demonstration site (Minas Passage) falls within the Carboniferous- Triassic Lowlands that is named because it is underlain largely by rocks of Carboniferous and Triassic age. A further subdivision of the Carboniferous – Triassic Lowlands is known as the Fundian Lowlands (Williams et al., 1972).

The development of the Appalachian Region began during the late Jurrassic to

early Cretaceous time with the modification of the landscape by fluvial drainage systems and today is considered a mature surface. The Fundian Lowlands cover most of the Bay of Fundy continuing into the deeper parts of the Gulf of Maine. They extend inland in Nova Scotia to include the Annapolis and Minas Lowlands. Both the uplands and lowlands of the Appalachian Region are thought to have developed together in response to a long and continuous cycle of erosion. Subsequent glacial erosion of these surfaces has been minor in nature. It only altered local regions of the former landscape previously developed by subaerial erosion.

Geography Minas Passage occurs in the inner part of the Bay of Fundy connecting Minas Channel with Minas Basin, (Figure 2). Minas Channel connects with the inner Bay of Fundy to the west. The Bay of Fundy is part of a much larger regional marine system that includes the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank and is referred to as the FMG for research purposes. The Bay of the Fundy is a linear embayment, 155 km in length that tapers to 48 km wide at its northeastern end where it bifurcates into Chignecto Bay and Minas Channel. The Bay also shallows in a northwest direction from 233 m water depth in Grand Manan Basin at the entrance, to 45 m at the bifurcation. The Bay of Fundy connects to the northeastern corner of the Gulf of Maine between the islands of Grand Manan, New Brunswick; and Brier Island, Nova Scotia. Divisions of the Bay of Fundy The Bay of Fundy has been divided into a variety of geographic regions for research and fisheries purposes. One system divides the Bay into what is referred to as the “Upper Bay” and the “Lower Bay” with the dividing line running from Cape Spencer east of Saint John, NB, to Parkers Cove northeast of Digby, NS. A further subdivision is sometimes used to divide the Bay into four quadrants separating the north and south

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portions. Other divisional systems define the boundary between the inner and outer Bay of Fundy as a line that runs in a more southerly direction from Cape Spencer in NB to the Digby Gut area (Figure 3). Dadswell et al, (1984), in a review of fisheries in the Bay of Fundy, divided it into three geographic regions: lower, mid and upper. Fisheries divisions of the Bay of Fundy term the Inner Bay as area 55 and the Outer Bay as area 54. The dividing line in this case is between Digby and Musquash Head in NB, slightly to the west of the other divisions. The Minas Passage project area occurs within the inner or upper Bay of Fundy.

Minas Passage

Minas Passage is a rectangular – shaped body of water that connects Minas Channel to Minas Basin (Figure 2). Minas Channel is the area of the inner Bay of Fundy east of a line that extends from Cape Chignecto in the north, to Harbourville in the south. The entrance to Minas Channel lies east of Ile Haute, a prominent Island of the inner Bay of Fundy.

Minas Passage is approximately 14 km long. At its narrowest constriction, it is 5 km wide between Cape Sharp and the southern shore of North Mountain and is 10 km wide at its widest point between Parrsboro and Cape Blomidon. The Passage is oriented northwest – southeast. The four corner points and boundary lines of Minas Passage are Ramshead Point west of the mouth of the Diligent River in the northwest, south to the western tip of Cape Split, southeast to Cape Blomidon and northeast across the passage to Second Beach, at the eastern headland of the entrance to Parrsboro Harbour. Black Rock is a small basalt island that lies in the northern part of Minas Channel to the east of Cape Sharp, located approximately 0.5 km offshore. Some maps present Minas Passage as a minor geographic component of Minas Channel that occurs to the west.

Coastline of Minas Passage

The southern shoreline of Minas Passage is a straight coastline with steep basalt

cliffs of North Mountain basalt extending from Cape Split to Blomidon, where the coastline turns to the south as part of the western shoreline of Minas Basin. There are few bays, indentations and headlands along the southern shore of Minas Passage and this is the result of the bedrock geology of this coastal segment that consists of uniform North Mountain basalt.

In contrast, the coastline of the northern part of Minas Channel is much different, largely the result of varying bedrock lithologies at or near the shoreline. Partridge Island and Cape Sharp are prominent steep sided, high-relief basalt promontories that resisted erosion in comparison to the adjacent siltstone and shale softer rocks of the Carboniferous Parrsboro Formation and the Triassic to Jurassic Blomidon Formation that have been more heavily eroded. Additionally, the overlying glacial and post glacial sediments of the region were formed in a complex environment resulting from caving ice fronts and raised sea levels that have produced terraced regions of glacial outwash, gravel barriers, till cliffs and bedrock exposed coastal segments. These processes and materials have resulted in a coastline that is highly irregular with some straight coastal segments

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and a large embayment called West Bay controlled by the resistant headlands of Cape Sharp and Partridge Island.

Welsted, 1974 undertook a study of the shorelines of the Bay of Fundy to produce a series of maps showing a coastal classification based on the interpretation of air photos. Shaw et al., 1998 undertook a regional sensitivity study of the coastlines of Atlantic Canada to rising sea levels (Figure 4). The shoreline region of Minas Passage is classified as moderate in this assessment.

Bathymetry The Canadian Hydrographic Chart for Minas Passage is Chart # 4010 (Figure 2). The sparse bathymetry presented on this chart is in fathoms and it depicts Minas Passage as a narrow body of water constricted to the north of Cape Split as defined by the 20 fathom contour that broadens toward the east to the north of Cape Blomidon. The deepest depths in the Passage are 61 fathoms in the central area to the south of Cape Sharp.

Chart #4010 also shows a number of current velocity vectors with the highest values of 7 - 8 knots off Cape Split and Cape Sharp (Figure 2). A current velocity of 5 – 6 knots is plotted on the north side off Ram Head. Minas Passage is the region of highest currents in the Bay of Fundy.

Minas Passage had previously been studied as part of early tidal power proposals in the 1960s and 70s and geological/geophysical surveys were conducted to investigate seafloor conditions and sediment distributions. Two tidal barrages were proposed for construction in the passage at both ends termed the B4 and B5 crossings.

Multibeam Bathymetry

Modern bathymetric mapping technologies have significantly evolved over the past several decades and present methods utilize multibeam sonar systems that provide for 100% seabed coverage, precise measurements of depth and location, and an ability to present the information in a variety of interpretation friendly images and fly-throughs. At the start of this project, multibeam bathymetry had just been collected from the Minas Channel and Minas Passage region of the Bay of Fundy by the Geological Survey of Canada and the Canadian Hydrographic Service. That information was obtained at the start of this project and subsequent multibeam surveys were conducted in the region of Minas Passage by the proponents to obtain very high-resolution information for project needs and infrastructure micro-siting. Multibeam bathymetry not only provides water depth information, but through processing of the data, images of backscatter (proxy for seabed hardness) and seabed slope can be generated.

The bathymetric imagery can be presented as shaded-relief maps that depict the seabed as a digital terrain model with an artificial sun shining across the imagery to enhance relief. They are similar to aerial photographs of land surfaces. The data can also be displayed using conventional, but very precise bathymetric contours. These maps and images can be interpreted in conjunction with seabed samples and photographs, and seismic reflection and sidescan sonar data to understand seabed materials and processes

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active on the seabed. The following is a description of the regional bathymetry of Minas Passage based on multibeam bathymetry.

Minas Passage The regional multibeam bathymetric shaded relief image in Figure 5 shows the

water depths of Minas Passage in a colour depth-coded presentation. The image extends from the western tip of Cape Split in the south to Black Rock in the northeast – key geographic components of the Minas Passage area. The bathymetry was collected by the Geological Survey of Canada and provided to the project. A major feature of Minas Passage is a deep narrow linear depression that runs throughout Minas Passage oriented parallel to the southern shoreline of North Mountain and has been termed the “Minas Scour Trench” by researchers during the first round of tidal power development. This deep channel begins in an area to the north west of Cape Split where it is oriented southwest and turns to the south east to the north of Cape Split. Here the Channel is 0.6 km wide. The channel broadens to 1.5 km wide toward the east and largely occurs in the southern part of Minas Passage. As the channel approaches Minas Basin, it shallows, bifurcates into three deep regions, and gradually merges with the seabed. The north and south flanks of this channel are steep and bedrock controlled. The southern area of Minas Passage near North Mountain consists of a narrow platform that continues to the southern shoreline.

To the north of the deep channel lies a broad bedrock controlled platform 3 km

wide with a very rough surface of exposed bedrock ridges and some fields of ripples in gravel. A prominent series of three, 30 – 40 m shallow flat topped platforms extend to the west from Black Rock and collectively form a ridge that is over 4 km in length. These represent areas of volcanic outcrop of North Mountain Basalt on the seabed confirmed by magnetic maps of the region and bottom photographs. Directly to the south of the volcanic platform is a prominent linear fault that runs east-west parallel to the trend of the platform extending from the southern area of Cape Sharp to the west. The region to the north of the volcanic ridge consists of rough morphology similar to the area to the south of the platform and is a region of outcropping bedrock. The seabed shallows abruptly toward the north shore of Minas Passage with a shore platform at about 10 m water depth that is approximately 0.5 km wide from the low water shoreline. Sand and gravel bedforms occur on this surface. In the north west region of Minas Passage the seabed is smoother (Figure 5) in comparison to the rough bedrock ridged region in the central part. This suggests a cover of surficial sediments overlying the bedrock as the Passage gradually shallows to the northwest. To the east of Cape Sharp, a similar shallow region extends further offshore and its edge presents a steep slope to the deep channel. Minas Channel Bathymetry Minas Passage connects to Minas Channel in the west and the bathymetry of this region is more complex (Figure 6). To the northwest of Cape Split lie a series of shallow offset faulted volcanic ridges that are likely a seaward continuation of North Mountain basalt projecting from Cape Split across the adjacent seabed. This series of shallow

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platforms that together make up a northwest trending ridge, are similar in shape, composition and morphology to the volcanic platforms that lie to the west of Black Rock in Minas Passage. Minas Channel consists of both broad flat shallow regions mainly in the southeast and deeper scoured depressions in the central region with a high degree of roughness. The bottom of the broad scoured regions display only a few small areas of exposed bedrock directly to the south of the volcanic ridge suggesting that the remaining scoured areas are cut into glaciomarine sediments and till. The scouring process has not been as severe as that in Minas Passage where vast regions of exposed bedrock have been exhumed.

Two prominent linear northeast trending ridges cut across the seabed of the northern area of Minas Channel and may represent boulder covered moraines that were originally deposited by receding glaciers and have survived the subsequent scouring process. Other isolated scour depressions occur in Minas Channel and contain large symmetrically-shaped sandy bedforms or dunes. A very large deposit of sand, termed a banner bank, lies to the southwest off Cape Split and is referred to as the Cape Split Dunefield (Miller and Fader, 1990). It has been studied in considerable detail and contains large sand waves or dunes on its surface that shift orientation, shape and height with every tidal cycle, all while maintaining the general location of the dune field.

Most Recent Multibeam

An interpretation of the Minas Channel and Minas Passage region was first

undertaken utilizing previous published material and reconnaissance seismic reflection, sidescan sonar and sample data collected by the Geological Survey of Canada. This analysis determined that the most appropriate location for a demonstration tidal power project was located in Minas Passage and that such a location occurred to the west of Black Rock in the northern area of Minas Passage. The siting analysis was based on criteria such as avoidance of seabed hazards, preference for hard and stable seabed, water depth limits for devices, length reductions for marine cables, avoidance of shipping lanes and fishing zones, proximity to the electrical grid and distance from adjacent parkland. Once the area was selected, it was necessary to conduct very high-resolution seabed surveys in order to characterize the seabed in considerable detail and to determine appropriate sites for device micro-siting.

The prime system utilized for survey was a Reson multibeam bathymetric sonar

system that had an ability to represent the morphologic information at approximately 0.5 m resolution, considerably higher than the previous multibeam data collected by the Geological Survey of Canada that was girded at 2 m. The multibeam information from the high resolution survey was collected over a smaller region that contained potential candidate sites to characterize details of seabed relief and to provide detailed contoured imagery of bottom topography and seabed slope information. The following is a general description of the bathymetry based on the detailed multibeam information (Figure 7).

The high resolution multibeam bathymetric survey was conducted in an area in

and around Black Rock extending to the west across the volcanic platform and to the

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north to an area south of Ram Head (Figure 7). It also continued to the low water shoreline to the north of Black Rock and was conducted at high water to provide near shore coverage. The survey covers a region of approximately 4 km by 1.6 km.

The high resolution multibeam bathymetric shaded-relief map, Figure 7 shows the

east west trending volcanic ridge as the dominant morphologic feature of the southern part of this study region. Water depths across the ridge show that it is defined by the 30 m contour in the eastern portion near Black Rock, and increases in depth to 35 m at the western tip of the feature. It is a broad flat platform with very minor relief of a few m across its surface and is 500 m wide at its widest location tapering to a triangular-shaped western end. Several broad deep channels occur across the surface of the platform near the western part of the feature and reach over 50 m water depth. A few localized linear depressions occur along the northern flank of the volcanic ridge and appear as erosional moats. The volcanic ridge protrudes above the surrounding areas by as much as 15 m but averages 5 m in height and has very steep slopes. The slopes are steeper and higher in the western portion of the platform area. Some local scouring appears to occur around the volcanic ridge flank in the west.

A broad region of northwest trending bedrock ridges lies to the north, south and

west of the volcanic platform in deeper water. The ridged region to the north has water depths that range between 35 and 40 m in the east and is slightly deeper in the west, ranging between 40 and 45 m. A few intervening deeper regions between ridges approach 50 m water depth. The ridges are rough and undulating with flat regions occurring between ridges.

In the northern region of the study area at approximately 45 m water depth, the

seabed becomes smoother and the bedrock ridges appear to be buried beneath sediments as the region approaches the shoreline. Continuing to the north and northeast, the seabed presents a gradual shallowing slope with increasing steepness, and at 10 m water depth a scarp occurs where the seabed flattens to the north. This flat region is a broad platform that continues to the shoreline across the intertidal zone. The edge of the scarp is convoluted in places and only a few areas are straight and well-defined. These regions of convoluted scarp are interpreted to represent possible slump scars.

To the northwest and south east of Black Rock are a series of prominent ridges on

the seabed that are interpreted as gravel bedforms. On the nearshore platform in water depths around 5 m are a variety of sand and gravel bedforms as defined by crests and troughs that are oriented normal to the adjacent shoreline.

A detailed interpretation and discussion of the bathymetry and how it relates to

the bedrock and surfical geology and seabed processes will be presented in other sections of this report.

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Figures

Figure 1. Major Physiographic divisions of Atlantic Canada from Williams et al., (1972).

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Figure 2. A section of Canadian Hydrographic Chart 4010 that shows the relationship of Minas Passage to Minas Channel in the west and Minas Basin in the east. See text for detailed description.

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Figure 3. Divisions of the Bay of Fundy into inner and outer, and other geographic regions of the inner Bay.

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Figure 4. Sensitivity index for coasts of Atlantic Canada vulnerable to the effects of global sea level rise, from Shaw et al., 1998. The shorelines of Minas Channel, Passage and Basin are shown in yellow indicating moderate sensitivity.

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Figure 5. Multibeam bathymetric shaded-relief image of Minas Passage from data collected by the Geological Survey of Canada and the Canadian Hydrographic Service.

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Figure 6. Multibeam bathymetric shaded-relief image of Minas Channel from data collected by the Geological Survey of Canada and the Canadian Hydrographic Service.

Figure 7. High resolution multibeam bathymetric map of the area to the west of Black Rock produced by Seaforth Engineering where the in-stream tidal power demonstration test sites are proposed to be located.

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References Dadswell, M. J., Bradford, R., Leim, A. H. and Scarratt, D. J., 1984. A review of the research on fishes and fisheries in the Bay of Fundy between 1976 and 1983 with particular reference to its upper reaches. In, Update on the marine environmental consequences of tidal power development in the upper reaches of the Bay of Fundy by Gordon, D. C. and Dadswell, M. J., Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences No. 1256, Fisheries and Oceans Canada. King, L. H., and MacLean, B., 1976. Geology of the Scotian Shelf, Geological Survey of Canada, Paper 74-31, 31 p. Miller, R. O. and Fader, G.B. J., 1990. Cruise Report C.S.S. Navicula 89-009, Phase C, The sand wave field-Scots Bay, Geological Survey of Canada Open File Report #2298, 28 p. Shaw, J; Taylor, R B; Forbes, D L; Ruz, M H; Solomon, 1998. Sensitivity of the coasts of Canada to sea-level rise. Geological Survey of Canada, Bulletin 505, 1998; 79 pages (1 sheet) Welsted, J. W., 1974. Morphological Maps of the Fundy Coast, Maritime Sediments, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.46-51. Williams, H., Kennedy, M. J. and Neale, E. R.W., 1972, The Appalachian Stuctural Province, p. 181-261. In R. A. Price and R. J. W. Douglas (ed.). Variations in Tectonic Styles in Canada. Geol. Assoc. Can. Spec. Pap. 11: 181-261.

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Bedrock and Surficial Geology of Minas Passage Bedrock Geology

Prior to studies associated with this tidal power demonstration project, a limited

amount of research had been conducted in the Minas Passage region of the Bay of Fundy. Most was undertaken to evaluate environmental and engineering aspects of the previous round of tidal power development in the 1980s that envisioned the construction of tidal power barrages or dams across regions of the inner Bay of Fundy. Surveys were conducted using low-resolution acoustic systems and details of the seabed morphology, bedrock, sediments, seabed features and bathymetry were lacking.

The most recent study (2008) for this project has had the advantage of the

development and application of many new and improved seabed mapping systems and technologies over the past two decades. These included high-resolution seismic reflection systems, sidescan sonars, multibeam bathymetric sonars, cameras, and navigation systems. As part of the proposed tidal power demonstration project, surveys have been conducted in Minas Passage using these systems and the data has provided a characterization of the seabed with resolutions of decameters.

The following is a description of the bedrock geology and surficial sediments of

Minas Passage as well as the proposed sites for tidal power device and associated cable placement. The present study has been integrated with results of previous research.

Data Base

Seismic reflection surveys have previously been undertaken in Minas Passage to support bedrock mapping by the Geological Survey of Canada and by the Atlantic Development Board for the 1980s tidal power assessment (Huntec Ltd., 1966). The marine bedrock geology of the region has been mapped by King and MacLean, (1976) and in a subsequent digital revised map released by King and Webb (in press) (Figure 8). The geology was interpreted on the basis of structural and stratigraphic relationships and acoustical reflectivity from a grid of high-resolution seismic reflection profiles collected in the 1960s and 70s. Bedrock information from adjacent land areas, well data, dredged samples, and gravity and magnetic and seismic refraction data were also used. The bedrock geology of the adjacent land in Nova Scotia has been studied by the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources over many years and the land geology assessment in this report was extracted from map ME 2000-1 (Keppie, 2000) and map 82-7 by Donohoe and Wallace, 1982.

The most recent geophysical survey in the Bay of Fundy was conducted by Fader, 1998, from the CCGS Hudson that collected sidescan, airgun and Huntec high-resolution

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seismic reflection data from a survey that extended from Minas Basin through Minas Passage and Minas Channel.

Previous Research

Earliest research on the bedrock of the Bay of Fundy and adjacent Gulf of Maine suggested that the Bay was a graben (Upham, 1894 and Johnson, 1925). Koons (1941, 1942), proposed that the Bay formed by fluvial erosion followed by submergence and that glacial erosion played a minor role. Shepard (1930, 1931) interpreted that the deep basins in the Bay were glaciated and that glaciation was responsible for its overall shape. Swift and Lyall (1968) investigated Triassic sediments in the Bay of Fundy using sparker seismic reflection techniques and defined a broad open syncline as well as the Fundian Fault along the northern flank of the Bay. The sparker seismic reflection profiles from that survey have been published and preserved in Geological Survey of Canada Open File Report #898 (Fader, 1983) and were assessed for this study.

Based on a study of industry wells and seismic reflection profiles, Wade et al., 1996 assessed the subsurface geology of the Fundy Basin and determined that the Basin has been influenced by major pre-existing transverse faults. Deep penetrating seismic reflection profiles were interpreted and show that it is a half-graben that lies south of the Cobequid-Chedabucto Fault System (Glooscap Fault, King and MacLean, 1976) in Nova Scotia, at the boundary between the major Avalon and Meguma lithotectonic zones of the northern Appalachians. The Basin formed at the eastern margin of North America during the Triassic/Jurassic rifting of Pangaea. Continental derived red clastic rocks and Triassic and Early Jurassic basalt flows crop out along the Bay of Fundy and Minas Basin coast of Nova Scotia and are comprised of four formations: Wolfville, Blomidon, North Mountain Basalt and Scots Bay.

The most recent geological map of Nova Scotia, Map ME 2000-1 (Keppie, 2000) describes the North Mountain Basalt that borders the southern part of the Bay of Fundy as tholeiitic plateau basalt. Based on a U-Pb concordant zircon age of 202+- 1 Ma, the basalt is considered to be Jurassic in age. This therefore controls the age of the overlying Scots Bay Formation as Jurassic as well. The entire suite of sedimentary rocks extending from North Mountain across the Bay of Fundy is now accepted to be Jurassic in age in contrast to the earlier Triassic assumption (King and MacLean, 1976) and others. The recent geological map of Nova Scotia (Keppie, 2000) indicates they the rocks of the Scots Bay Formation are lacustrine limestone, siltstone, chart, fluvial sandstone and contained vertebrate fossils. The dominant structure of the Acadian Basin is a syncline defined by the hook of Cape Split to the northeast that plunges to the southwest along the entire Bay. The thickness of the Triassic sediments are up to 900 m as measured from seismic reflection profiles and regionally there may be as much as 2000 m of section present.

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Minas Passage The bedrock geology of most of the floor of Minas Passage is mapped as Triassic/Jurassic sedimentary bedrock (King and Webb, in press), (Figure 8). This compilation is regional in nature and presents the geology at a scale of 1:1,000,000 and does not show details at any given location. The passage is depicted as being underlain mostly by Triassic sedimentary rocks but a long linear volcanic deposit occurs parallel to the passage just south of the north shore and is mapped as the Triassic McKay Head Basalt. Along the northern coast the bedrock is complex and consists of the McCoy Brook Formation of fluvial, deltaic, lacustrine, playa and aeolian clastic rocks. Lacustrine limestone and basalt agglomerate are common.

1980 Surveys

As part of the studies for the first round of tidal power development in the Bay of Fundy, Huntec Ltd. prepared a report in 1966 on the marine geology and geophysics of Minas Channel, Minas Passage and Minas Basin for the Atlantic Development Board. It was intended as an overview engineering evaluation of Minas Passage. The systematic grid survey resulted in bathymetric, sediment, and bedrock maps that were prepared to assess the feasibility of constructing a dam across Minas Passage as it was considered the most probable location for a tidal dam. Bedrock structural and stratigraphic assessments were undertaken as part of this study and although of low resolution, some of this information provides a regional framework in which to place the present study and is summarized here.

The bedrock surface was found to be highly irregular and rough and interpreted to occur at the seabed in places and to have been modified by glacial erosion. Much of Minas Channel was found to have been swept clean of sediments attributed to strong tidal currents. Sediments up to 330 feet in thickness, however, occur in adjacent Minas Basin outside of the scoured region. A map of the distribution of bedrock was prepared for the Minas Passage region (Huntec Ltd., 1966) (Figure 9). This showed that three different bedrock types occurred: Carboniferous and Triassic sedimentary rocks as well as Triassic basalt. Carboniferous rocks were interpreted to occupy the northern two thirds of Minas Passage and Triassic rocks occur in the southern third. Volcanic ridges extended to the west from both Cape Sharp and Cape Split. They interpreted that Minas Passage is part of the north limb of the Fundy Syncline with the centre of the syncline occurring in the curving ridge of North Mountain south of Cape Split.

The contact between the Triassic Blomidon Formation in the south and Carboniferous rocks in the north was interpreted to partially coincide with a regional fault in the deepest part of Minas Passage and was thought to be responsible for the origin of the deep channel. The contact was suggested to contain fractured and crushed rock that was prone to severe differential erosion by fluvial and glacial processes.

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The sedimentary rocks were found to consist of gently to steeply dipping sandstones and shales that are weathered on the seabed exhibiting highly variable properties. They are described as being well–compacted and sound. The southern Blomidon formation was found to have better engineering properties for the foundation of a tidal barrage in the offshore then on adjacent land. Based on the Huntec 1966 studies, bedrock mapping on the adjacent land, and the new results obtained on bedrock by the 2008 round of surveys, it appears that the stratified bedrock at the seabed of the proposed facility represents the Parrsboro Formation (Mossman and Grantham, 2000). It consists of a lower red facies and a thicker coarser overlying grey facies (Belt, 1962, 1965). The upper part is a predominantly lacustrine unit composed of grey and red mudrock, dark coloured shale, with intervals of red and grey sandstone. Vertebrate tracks have been found in the upper section along with rooted horizons, raindrop impressions, dessication cracks and dewatering structures. Tree stems and roots are common in some sections.

Faults

The Huntec Ltd. 1966 report identified several faults in Minas Passage that trend east–west. The North Mountain Basalt to the west of Black Rock is portrayed as being in fault contact with the surrounding Carboniferous rocks. A number of smaller northeast trending shear faults also occur in this area.

The main fault zone within the inner Bay of Fundy is part of a major system that occurs along the north flank of the Bay and connects with the Chedabucto-Cobequid system in Nova Scotia. These faults are all part of the Glooscap Fault System (King and MacLean, 1976) that continues further to the west in the Bay of Fundy and east across the Scotian Shelf. Within Minas Passage a large fault is clearly seen on the multibeam bathymetry (Figures 5,10). It occurs to the south of the volcanic ridge that projects to the west from Black Rock and extends from an area off Cape Sharp in the east, to an area to the northwest of Cape Split, for a distance of over 13 km. It is manifest on the multibeam bathymetry (Figure 5) as a linear depression that varies in width up to 50 m. Along some parts of the fault, both northern and southern flanks consist of prominent ridges. The depression associated with the fault is interpreted to arise from preferential erosion of weaker and fractured rocks. It is difficult to determine the horizontal offset along this fault as the strike of the exposed bedrock on both sides is the same. Wade et al., (1996) have mapped a prominent fault on land to the east that may be the same one as identified from the multibeam bathymetry. It is the Portapique Fault that begins in the west near Cape D’Or and extends to the east past Truro, sub parallel to the Cobequid Fault further to the north. The Portapique Fault on land sets the Carboniferous rocks against the Triassic deposits which surround Cobequid Bay. In the offshore the strata exposed on both sides of the fault have the same strike so it is difficult to determine the amount of strike slip offset. The character of the bedrock exposure on either side of the fault is quite similar suggesting that the rocks may be of the same age. This is in agreement with the bedrock geology interpretation from the 1966 Huntec Ltd. survey but not in agreement with the interpretation by King and MacLean, 1976 that suggested that all the rocks in

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Minas Passage are Triassic (Jurassic).The Huntec Ltd. 1966 survey suggests that the contact between the Carboniferous rocks and Triassic rocks is interpreted to be further to the south in the deepest part of Minas Passage in what has been termed the “Minas Passage Scour Trench”. Therefore the age of the bedrock in the central and southern area of Minas Passage is not yet resolved.

Several sets of prominent joints occur within the exposed bedrock that trend almost north-south and southwest – northeast. These features occur as linear deeper regions and may represent suitable locations for routing of project cables as protection in regions of lower hydrodynamic conditions, low relief and flat gravel surfaces.

Surficial Sediments With the exception of the nearshore regions of Minas Passage, much of the seabed consists of exposed bedrock. In the northwest region thick surficial sediments overlie the bedrock and have large linear furrows, ridges and isolated scour depressions on their surface (Figure 5). An area of bedforms in gravel termed gravel waves occurs in the deepest part of Minas Passage. Other areas of gravel waves occur in the eastern part of Minas Channel and to the northwest and southeast of Black Rock (Figure 10). These gravel waves overlie a thicker deposit of surficial sediments that are thought to represent coarse deposits in the lee of the island associated with strong currents. They may also represent a remnant of a deposit of till or glaciomarine sediment that once covered much of the seabed of Minas Passage but has survived erosion in this area. On the north side of Minas Passage is a narrow flat shelf that extends from the shoreline dipping gently seaward to a depth of approximately 10 m. Gravels and sands occur on this shelf and are formed into a variety of bedforms with an orientation normal to the shoreline. The shelf dips steeply from its seaward edge to 40 m water depth where bedrock begins to crop out on the seabed and continues to the south. This slope is covered in gravel consisting of granules, pebbles, cobbles and boulders. Samples are difficult to collect across this surface because of a dominance of large boulders at the seabed. Seismic reflection profiles across this area (Figure 11) show that the thickest material below the slope is largely stratified glaciomarine sediment and till is thin or absent. Overlying the glaciomarine sediment is a more recent deposit of sand and gravel that continues to the shoreline. The western part of the inner shelf and adjacent slope as well as the region to the north of Black Rock has features interpreted as bedforms and slumped sediments. Circular depressions are common and suggest current scouring. The inner shelf outer edge appears to be incised with circular features that are the headwall scarps of slumped sediments. Cable routes from the offshore devices have been chosen to avoid these features. The volcanic flat ridge that extends to the west from Black Rock is mostly exposed bedrock but pebbles, cobbles and boulders are common. No fine-grained clays, silts and sands appear to be present. In the region of exposed bedrock sedimentary ridges to the north and south of the volcanic platform, sediments occur in the flat areas between the exposed ridges. They have a gravel cover of granules, pebbles, cobbles and boulders.

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Several seismic reflection systems were used to determine the nature and thickness of the surficial sediments between the exposed bedrock ridges. Little acoustic penetration was achieved and side echoes were common acoustic artifacts on the profiles that result from the hardness and steepness of the nearby bedrock ridges. A covering of boulders also scattered the acoustic energy from the systems degrading penetration and resolution of subsurface events. Regional interpretations of the seismic reflection data from the Minas Channel region and indeed the inner Bay of Fundy show that glaciomarine stratified sediments are widespread and very thick, in contrast to thin or absent glacial till. This suggests that Minas Passage once contained thick glaciomarine sediments in early post glacial time and today it is a large scoured depression formed by beach erosion during times of lowered sea level and strong currents. The surficial material that occurs between the bedrock ridges and underlies the gravel is more likely to represent glaciomarine muddy sediments than till. Wider areas of seabed between bedrock ridges would be expected to contain thicker glaciomarine sediments.

Crown Lease Area and Device Site Bedrock and Surficial Geology

The proposed Crown Lease Area and three device sites occur to the west of Black Rock and south east of Ram Head, Minas Passage. They all occur in the northern part of Minas Passage. Device areas B and C occur over stratified outcropping bedrock and site A lies over North Mountain basalt. The new survey information on the nature of the bedrock geology comes from a study and interpretation of multibeam bathymetry, sidescan sonograms and mosaics, a few samples, and bottom photography and video. Samples of the bedrock are difficult to collect as the bedrock is very hard and covered with boulders in many places. The following is a more detailed description of the bedrock and overlying surficial sediments at each of the proposed device locations each of which covers an area defined by a 200 m diameter circle (Figure 12). Site A Site A occurs over a volcanic shallow flat ridge that extends to the west from the Black Rock region. It is located approximately 1400 m from the centre of Black Rock on the northern part of the volcanic ridge. The northern part of A also covers the northern flank of the volcanic platform and extends to water depths of 45 m over a steep bedrock surface. The water depths at site A average 30 m and the surface is largely exposed bedrock with gravel (boulders, cobbles and a few pebbles). Many boulders larger than 1 m in diameter can be seen on the high resolution multibeam bathymetric imagery. The bedrock surface is rounded and hummocky with a roughness of less than 1 m and differs from sites B and C that display sharp eroded edges of upturned bedrock strata. The multibeam bathymetry and the sidescan sonograms show a slight linearity to the surface that may represent variations in the volcanic flows, glacial erosional grooves, or patterns of subaerial erosion that were developed when the area was exposed at lower sea levels in post glacial time. The slope map of site A shows that it is a very flat surface and the backscatter imagery indicates that it is an area of very uniform high reflectance – hard.

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Bottom photographs from nearby area A on the volcanic platform show that the bedrock surface is gently rounded and hummocky much like exposures of North Mountain Basalt in the shoreface of the region. Crevasses are filled with pebbles, cobbles and some granules and biogenic growth is quite extensive. Site B Site B occurs 2 km to the west of Black Rock north of the volcanic ridge over a region of largely exposed sedimentary bedrock as the furthermost offshore test site. Water depths over this region are the deepest of the three device locations and average 45 m. This area has a slightly greater exposure of bedrock than site C. Nearby bottom photographs show the bedrock to consist of Carboniferous Parrsboro Formation grey and red beds. The bedrock beds are upturned strata with a rough and undulating surface and the strike of the beds is northwest, close to the direction of the prevailing current. This is considered to be coincident rather than controlled. The beds appear to dip to the northeast based on the geometry of exposed bedrock ridges on the seabed. This is contrary to the dip of the beds presented in the early Huntec Ltd. 1966 study. The relief on the bedrock surface is less than in other areas of the region and was one of the criteria for site selection. Both the northern and southern regions of area B have zones of flat seabed. These regions are gravel covered with boulders. The flatness arises from the presence of surficial sediments that fill the deeper regions between bedrock ridges. The composition of the material underlying the gravel is not well known because of sampling problems associated with bouldery seabeds and a lack of penetration and resolution of the high-resolution seismic reflection systems. Based on a regional distribution of sediments throughout Minas Passage interpreted from seismic reflection profiles and a few samples collected by bottom dredge, it appears that the subsurface sediments are either till or glaciomarine muds. The regional relative distribution of till and glaciomarine sediment indicates that glaciomarine sediment is more prevalent. Although in both cases the surface of these materials is heavily armoured with gravel including boulders. Dredge samples collected in the region penetrated the gravel lag in a few places and sampled stiff, dry, and red muddy sediment that is similar to glaciomarine sediments cored in the inner Bay of Fundy.

Site C

Site C lies 1 km to the west of Black Rock just north of the volcanic ridge with the southern boundary of the area encroaching on the northern flank of the volcanic ridge. Average depths across this area are 40 m and it consists of exposed bedrock ridges and several flatter regions of gravel with boulders and is similar to site B. The northern part of the area has the largest region of flat seabed. Bottom photographs from Area C show both exposed bedrock at the seabed as well as gravel regions with granules, pebbles, cobbles and boulders. Broken shell debris occurs in some areas. The bedrock is similar to that of Site B and the overlying surficial sediments that lie beneath the flat areas of seabed are interpreted as erosional remnants of both till and glaciomarine sediment. Gravel occurs over the flat regions of the seabed and boulders are common within the gravel and on the bedrock.

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Cable Corridor Geology

The selection of the cable corridor is largely controlled by seabed characteristics and engineering design criteria. One of the criteria for route selection requires that the cable must be able to be removed if required. This results in a route that avoids regions of moving seabed gravel bedforms that could bury it and make recovery difficult. It is important to lay the cable on seabeds that would not abrade the cable and as a result, the crossing of exposed bedrock ridges is not a preferred route. The chosen cable route also takes advantage of bedrock structure to minimize hazards. A main route through the sedimentary bedrock region has been chosen in a wide gravel covered flat region of seabed that represents an eroded joint in the bedrock. The individual cables to each of the devices have been chosen to run parallel to bedrock strike in the slightly deeper and protected depressions between bedrock ridges that are flat and gravel covered. Steep slopes were avoided and routes were chosen to traverse the terrain with the lowest slopes to place the cable on the seabed and avoid suspensions.

At the northern end of the sedimentary bedrock region, the cable route crosses the slope and adjacent inner shelf edge in a region with no bedforms, slumps or headwall scarps and crosses the shelf edge at right angles. The cable route then turns to run southeast on the shallow inner shelf approximately parallel to the shoreline. Areas of bedforms, and rock outcrop are avoided along this part of the route and the cable route takes a final turn to the shoreline in an area north of Black Rock.

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Figures

Figure 8. A map of the inner Bay of Fundy portion of a new digital bedrock compilation by King and Webb, (in press). Minas Passage is mapped as being underlain by Triassic to Jurassic sedimentary bedrock. Some areas of volcanic Jurassic North Mountain basalt have been mapped in this regional compilation. 8B is the index for the bedrock of this region.

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Figure 9. Huntec Ltd., (1966) interpreted bedrock map of the Minas Passage region. The site of the tidal power test project overlies Carboniferous sediments and the contact between the Triassic Blomidon Formation and the Carboniferous sedimentary bedrock is presented as occurring in the southern part of Minas Passage in the area of the “Minas Scour Trench”. Contours are drawn on the bedrock surface as interpreted from seismic reflection data.

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Figure 10. An interpretation of multibeam bathymetry for the Minas Passage region showing both bedrock and surfical geological characteristics. The major regional fault, likely the Portapique Fault, lies just to the south of the volcanic platform that extends to the west from Black Rock. The fault runs east – west.

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Figure 11. A Seistec Line in Cone seismic reflection profile from the inner shelf of the north shore of Minas Passage extending down the slope to the deeper water in the south. The stratified material beneath the seabed is interpreted as glaciomarine sediment deposited at the time of glacier recession from the region. It has been eroded during times of lower sea level and marine transgression as the sea level rose. Strong currents also played a major role in removing the glaciomarine sediments from Minas Passage. Much of the Passage was likely filled with these sediments at the end of the last glaciation, the Wisconsinan.

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Figure 12. A multibeam bathymetric map of the northern part of Minas Passage showing the Crown Lease area as a rectangle and the proposed device sites as circles. The dashed line represents a potential cable corridor to shore.

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References

Donohoe, H. V. and Wallace, P. I., 1982. Geological Map of the Cobequid Highlands, Colchester, Cumberland and Pictou Counties, Nova Scotia, Map 82-7.

Fader, G. B. J. 1983, Sparker seismic reflection profiles; Bay of Fundy, from Grand Manan island to Chignecto Bay, Geological Survey of Canada, Open File Report #898. Fader, G.B. J. 1998, Cruise Report CCGS Hudson, Bay of Fundy when Huntec Ltd, 1966. Report of geological-geophysical study Minas Basin, Bat of Fundy, Nova Scotia for Atlantic Development Board.

Johnson, D. W., 1925. The New England – Acadian shoreline. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

New York, NY, 608 p.

Keppie, J. D., 2000. Geological map of the Province of Nova Scotia, Map No. ME 2000 -

1.

King, E.L. and Webb, K. J., In press. Geology of the Scotian Shelf and adjacent areas offshore Nova Scotia; 2nd edition of the 1976 map by King and MacLean; Geological Survey of Canada A-Series, scale 1: 100 000. King, L. H. and MacLean, B., 1976. Geology of the Scotian Shelf, Geological Survey of Canada paper 74-31. 31 p., enclosure Map 812H. Klein, G. deV., 1962. Triassic sedimentation, Maritime Provinces, Canada. Geological Society of America Bulletin 73, pp. 1127 – 1146. Koons, E. D., 1941. The origin of the Bay of Fundy and associated submarine scarps. Journal of Geomorphology, 4. pp. 135 – 149. Koons, E. D., 1942. The origin of the Bay of Fundy: a discussion. Journal of Geomorphology, 5. pp. 143 – 150. Mossman, D. J. and Grantham, R.G., 2000. Vertebrate trackways in the Parrsboro Formation at Rams Head, Cumberland County, Nova Scotia. Atlantic Geology. Shepard, F. P., 1930. Fundian faults or Fundian glaciers. Geological Society of America Bulletin 41, pp. 659 – 674. Shepard, F. P. 1931. Glacial troughs of the continental shelves. Journal of Geology, 39, pp. 345 – 360. Shepard, F. P., 1942. Origin of the Bay of Fundy: a reply. Journal of Geomorphology, 5. pp. 137 – 142.

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Swift, D. J. P. and Lyall, A. K., 1968. Reconnaissance of bedrock geology by sub-bottom profiler, Bay of Fundy, Geological Society of America Bulletin 79, pp. 639 – 646.

Upham, W. 1894. The fishing banks between Cape Cod and Newfoundland. American

Journal of Science, 3rd. series, 16: p. 123 – 129.

Wade, J.A., Brown, D.E., Traverse, A. and Fensome, R. A., 1996. The Triassic-Jurassic

Fundy Basin, eastern Canada: regional setting, stratigraphy and hydrocarbon potential.

Atlantic Geology, pg. 189-231.

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Sediment Transport and Suspended Sediments

Introduction

Sediments in Minas Passage can be transported in the water column as suspended sediments; ice rafted at the sea surface and released through melting to the water column and seabed, and transported directly on the seabed as bedload. Sediment transport, seabed stability, sediment deposition and erosion, and suspended sediments are considered important components of the in-stream tidal power demonstration project that must be understood in order to determine the effects of the infrastructure on the environment and the effects of the environment on the infrastructure. Sources of fine-grained material (silt and clay) are provided to the Bay of Fundy from both natural and anthropogenic sources that include ocean dumping activities, rivers, seabed bottom fishing activities, natural erosion of the seabed, shorelines, the adjacent land, and by ice rafting. In order to understand issues associated with sediment transport in Minas Passage, particularly at the site of the proposed in stream tidal power demonstration project, an understanding of the seabed, its characteristics and the processes that are active there are essential components.

Previous Research Within the Bay of Fundy most of the research on seabed sediments, sediment transport and suspended sediment has been confined to the inner Bay with a historical emphasis on Minas Basin and Chignecto Bay. An early phase of the research was largely controlled by a need to understand the potential effects of erosion, sedimentation and suspended sediments associated with the construction of tidal barrages for proposed tidal power generation (Gordon and Dadswell, 1984; Amos, 1984)). Increased sedimentation seaward of the Windsor Causeway, near the gypsum dock in Hantsport, and associated with the Petitcodiac River has further focused research on sediments in the inner Bay of Fundy.

In the outer Bay, a large project has been underway for over many years to investigate the fate of sandy and muddy dredge spoils disposed to the seabed off Black Point derived from dredging activity in Saint John Harbour (Parrott et al., 2006). This study used a modern multibeam bathymetric and modeling approach to the assessment of sediment transport associated with large scale dredge disposal and its effects on seabed habitat and in particular the lobster fishery. It also provided detailed information on the seabed and natural processes of the region.

Multibeam bathymetric systems are a new tool for seabed understanding that provides considerable insight into seabed processes of erosion, deposition and sediment transport (Courtney and Fader, 1994). Multibeam data were collected during three phases of the early study in the Bay of Fundy during the 1990s. The first collected information off Margaretsville, in Minas Channel, and in Scots Bay of the inner Bay of Fundy by the University of New Brunswick and the Canadian Hydrographic Service and these studies were intended to characterize dynamic bedforms that were discovered through earlier

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mapping of the surficial sediments (Fader et al., 1977) and to test and calibrate multibeam mapping systems. A second phase by the Geological Survey of Canada collected multibeam bathymetry in Chignecto Bay in 1998 and was undertaken to investigate reported changes to sediment distributions and over-deepening of the seabed reported by the fishing community. A large scoured region off Cape Enrage is similar morphologically to Minas Passage. A third phase conducted multibeam mapping over a number of issue related seabed features and processes in the outer Bay of Fundy: horse mussel bioherms, iceberg furrowed terrain, for sea level studies, archaeological discoveries and glacial ice dynamics. From all of these surveys, new insights have been gained into present conditions of erosion, sediment transport and deposition at the seabed and complex relationships associated with large sand waves that were not previously known. The Petitcodiac River, New Brunswick, is the largest river discharging into the upper Bay of Fundy. The hydrological and geological characteristics of the river have been altered dramatically by the construction of a causeway between the City of Moncton and the Town of Riverview in 1968. This has changed the hydrodynamics and accelerated the deposition of fine-grained sediment in the upper reaches of the estuary. In 2002 and 2003, the Science Branch of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Maritimes Region, conducted field surveys on the Petitcodiac River Estuary (Curran et al., 2004). Preliminary analysis indicates extremely high suspended sediment concentrations including the presence of fluid mud on the seabed and sediment deposition near the causeway that extends 34 km out into the Bay of Fundy (Chignecto Bay). As part of a project to determine underwater marine park boundaries, an ADCP (acoustic doppler current profiler) study was conducted in 2001 by the Ocean Mapping Group of the University of New Brunswick. They studied the M2 tidal circulation patterns at the mouth of the Musquash Estuary where it exchanges water, nutrients and sediments with the open Bay of Fundy (Byrne et al., 2002). The experiment was designed to better define the seaward boundary of the proposed Musquash Marine Protected Area (MPA). Observations from this study show a large quantity of suspended sediment transferred from the estuary into the Bay of Fundy.

Recent observations of environmental characteristics of the Bay of Fundy indicate significant modern change (Daborn and Dadswell, 1988). These include changing sediment grain size distributions on the mudflats, anecdotal observations from the fishing community of increasing water depths in some areas, and changing benthic communities. These concerns have led to a need to better understand the dynamics of the Bay of Fundy and a more detailed knowledge of seabed, sediment, suspended sediment, oceanographic and biological conditions.

An important sediment transport study using a 2-dimensional tidally-forced model was undertaken by Greenberg and Amos, 1983, for Minas Passage and Minas Basin that combined a numerical model and a sediment budget analysis. It involved an assessment of the tides and currents, suspended sediments, bottom sediments, sediment sources and the postglacial evolution of the system. The study was mainly concerned with cohesive

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clay and silt sized sediments and was intended to assess sedimentation associated with the construction of a tidal barrage in inner Minas Basin. They suggest that the only significant source of suspended sediment was from the open boundary to Minas Basin (through Minas Channel and Minas Passage). This study was undertaken before the development of multibeam sonars that can provide digital terrain models of seabed relief and can be assessed for an understanding of processes of erosion and deposition. From the study of the multibeam bathymetry it is clear that fine-grained sub-surface sediments are eroding from the seabed of the inner Bay of Fundy, from Minas Channel and the entrance to Minas Basin. Minas Passage is not a major contributor of fine-grained sediment as it has largely been removed from this mature scoured region. It is merely a conduit for the transfer of suspended sediment.

Sediment Transport Minas Channel and Minas Passage

From a morphological perspective, most of the area of the Bay of Fundy is a gently sloping surface from west to east with several anomalous deep scoured regions. The largest of these occurs between Grand Manan Island and southwestern Nova Scotia at the entrance to the Bay of Fundy where it is narrow and restricted. Such deep depressions are attributed to fluvial followed by glacial erosional processes of over deepening. For the inner Bay of Fundy, deep regions occur in central Chignecto Bay, two off Cape D’Or in Minas Channel and in Minas Passage. These deep regions are characterized by rough topography, linearity, occurrence in narrow restricted bodies of water or near projecting headlands and strong currents. They possess many other morphological hallmarks of current scoured depressions. Some depressions are scoured completely through sediments to bedrock while others contain sediments and are only partially eroded. The common characteristic of these deep depressions is that they lie in narrow passages with strong currents. Adjacent regions at broad ends of these depressions are usually flat areas of thick sediments suggesting that material has been eroded from the deep scoured regions and transported and deposited in adjacent regions with lower velocity currents.

The scoured regions of the inner Bay of Fundy represent anomalous areas and cover only a small proportion of the seabed. The in-stream tidal power demonstration project is proposed to be located in Minas Passage which is one of these scoured depressions. The history of development of the scoured regions indicates that they have been initially formed by glacial erosion with subsequent sediment deposition. Fluctuating sea levels and modern high current processes have continued to scour the sediments. The following is a description of Minas Passage and the proposed development area that includes the geological history, materials at the seabed, and observations on sediment deposition and transport based on modern marine surveys.

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Seabed of Minas Passage

The surficial sediments at the seabed of the Crown Lease area are all gravel – that is granules, pebbles, cobbles and boulders. This is interpreted from the MB backscatter that indicates no mud or sand at the seabed. The sidescan sonograms also show high reflectivity indicating that the seabed is very hard – gravel. The high-resolution multibeam bathymetry shows large boulders on the gravel and exposed bedrock surfaces. Boulder measurements indicate that some are up to 5 m in diameter and they often appear in clusters. Indeed, conditions that occur at the demonstration site are similar to those of much of Minas Passage.

Questions have been posed about the stability and nature of the device sites and the potential for local scour and effects on sediment transport and regional morphology associated with device installations. Sediment samples are a very important component of sediment modeling but they are very difficult to collect in Minas Passage. Subsurface sampling is even more difficult because of the widespread occurrence of protective lag gravel with rounded boulders. Large areas of the seabed of the demonstration site are exposed bedrock in the form of upturned jagged ridges or flat volcanic areas. Attempts were made at sampling the gravels and were only partially successful returning a few gravel clasts in most cases. For an understanding of sediment transport, sediment deposition and erosion, bottom photographs and video of the seabed provide critical evidence. Bottom photographs have been collected regionally in the area and over 600 have been analyzed for particle size, shape, sorting, distribution, stability and biological growth. This information has been integrated with the results from the interpretation of the sidescan sonograms and high resolution multibeam bathymetry.

No sand sized sediments or silts and clays were observed on the seabed of the

Crown Lease area. Most of the photographs were taken during times of slack water or close to it, and sand sized material that may have been in suspension as well as silts, clays and organic matter would be expected to settle temporarily on the seabed. This was not observed on the photographic data suggesting that in the study area little sand is in suspension and that silt and clay are either in low concentration in the water column or don’t settle to the seabed. Greenberg and Amos (1983) measured and modeled suspended sediments in the inner Bay of Fundy and showed that suspended sediments in Minas Passage were less than 5 mg/l and stable at 2 mg/l throughout the Bay of Fundy to the west. Additionally, pebbles, cobbles and small boulders have no attached biological growth (Figure 13). Larger boulders and adjacent bedrock have broad coverings of low growth that appears to start at about 20 cm above the seabed (Figure 14). This suggests that the smaller gravel sizes that have clean surfaces may be moving and rolling around as bedload and preventing growth in the zone immediate to the seabed. The movement is likely local and confined by the bedrock ridges and large boulders of the region. No boulders on the photographic imagery showed tilted sediment lines that would indicate recent movement and repositioning. The seabed therefore, appears as a mature hard scoured bottom of bedrock and gravel.

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Most of the gravel clasts in the study area are round to subround in shape. A few clasts are angular and may have been transported by ice. A simple interpretation is that the rounding is due to present day active movement. However the larger rounded boulders that occur in the same area do not move. The rounding is interpreted to have occurred during times of lowered sea levels. Relative sea level in the region could have fallen as low as 40 m in early post glacial time as the land quickly rebounded from the removal of nearby glaciers. At times of lowered sea levels, large regions would have been above or near sea level and beach processes of high energy during regressions and transgressions would have produced the roundness of the boulders. Additionally the lowered sea level would have resulted in erosion of both tills and glaciomarine fine grained sediments that were previously deposited over bedrock. Thus the present seabed is largely a relict bottom with modern elements of granule, pebble and cobble bedload movement as well as sediment deposition by ice rafting. The lag gravel surfaces are termed “relict”, that is, they reflect deposition and formation under differing conditions (very high energy) in the past and have maintained these characteristics for thousands of years to the present. They are not in dynamic equilibrium with present energy conditions. For these reasons, samples of the gravel cannot be used in transport models that consider that the entire seabed is in equilibrium with present conditions and responding to those energy conditions.

Sediment Bedforms

Within Minas Passage there are five areas of bedforms in sand and gravel. On the

shallow nearshore shelf west of Cape Sharp and on the shelf off North Mountain there are a series of small amplitude sand and mixed gravel bedforms oriented normal to the shoreline. To the northwest and southeast of Black rock are areas of gravel waves (Figure 15). Bottom photographs show that these sediments are mostly pebble to cobble in size and repetitive multibeam mapping shows that they alter their orientation and wavelength but remain in the same area. Another large area of gravel bedforms occurs in the deep Minas scoured trench close to the southern shore off Cape Split. This area of bedforms may be part of a pair located to the west and east of the projection of Cape Split into the Bay. These paired bedform features are termed banner banks, although in this case the one in the Minas scour trench is gravel while the one to the west of Cape Split is composed of coarse sand and fine gravel. The final area of gravel ripples occurs to the south and southwest of Black Rock in deep water overlying bedrock ridges. Repetitive multibeam bathymetric surveys over ten years show that these bedforms have slightly changed their distribution and orientation with time. There are a few bedforms in gravel within the Crown Lease proposed area in the northeast corner but none within the actual device site proposed locations. Thus an interpretation of the sediment bedload transport potential of the proposed area is that the seabed is very stable. Granules, pebbles and cobbles may move locally but are not thick and abundant enough to form bedforms or the flow conditions are not strong enough. The gravel is confined between bedrock ridges and amongst large boulders that are widespread. None of the boulders show evidence for movement or reorientation.

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Sub Surface Sediments What lies beneath the gravel and how thick the gravel and the underlying sediments are, remains an issue that is not clearly understood. Two of the best high-resolution seismic reflection systems available were used to penetrate the gravel layer and resolve the layering and structure to bedrock. This was only successful in a few areas and is the result of acoustic scattering from the presence of the hard rounded gravel clasts. The seismic data from adjacent areas, as well as from the slope area to the north clearly shows that stratified sediments interpreted as glaciomarine muds are the dominant glacial sediment of the region and not till (Figure 11). Till normally contains over 50% gravel and in strong currents is only slightly eroded and armoured by the cover of gravel, and further erosion is suppressed. The fact that Minas Passage is a large deep scoured depression means that till was not the dominant material that originally filled this depression as it is not easily eroded in strong currents. Also the fact that the gravel is relatively thin suggests that it was not derived from till where gravel makes up to 50 % of that material. Glaciomarine sediments are thick regionally and this suggests that beneath the gravel lag with boulders, remnants of the glaciomarine sediment could occur that were once much more extensive. The thickness of the material over bedrock could be greater closer to shore than further offshore. The wider the flat area between exposed bedrock ridges, the greater likelihood that the surficial material is of greater thickness. Some of the material beneath the gravel to the west was sampled with a robust dredge and the material consisted of a very stiff red marine sediment, likely glaciomarine mud (Figure 16). Typically this sediment consists of silt, clay, sand and a few gravel clasts. It was deposited as the glaciers receded from the region through transport by water of sub ice and englacial debris. Some of the gravel in Minas Passage could also have been transported to the area by recent ice rafting.

Suspended Sediment The first comprehensive Bay of Fundy wide assessment of suspended sediment was conducted by Miller in 1966. Water samples were collected during both mid-flood and mid-ebb from 43 stations at the bottom, 1 metre from the bottom, 10 metres from the bottom and at the surface. Concentrations varied from 0.2 to 30.4 mg/l with an average value of 6.6 mg/l for the 263 samples collected in the study. Sediment concentrations for the entire water column throughout the tidal cycle greater than 8 mg/l occurred on the northeast side of the Bay near the New Brunswick coast. Concentrations of less than 4 mg/l were found on the south side of the Bay particularly near the entrance.

Miller also examined the suspended sediment and found sand, silt, clay, plankton and other organic debris. Silt and organic debris were the major components. Organic carbon was determined to comprise 0.3 to 2.65 % by weight of the suspended load. From X-ray diffraction analysis, illite, halloysite, kaolinite, quartz, feldspar and calcite were the constituents in decreasing abundance.

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Miller characterized the suspended sediment system in the Bay of Fundy as an open system. He interpreted 4 components of the system: 1) an oscillating body of turbid water, 2) a seabed that exchanges sediment with the overlying water, 3) minor fresh turbid water input and, 4) minor turbid water release to the Gulf of Maine. The northwest nearshore zone was described as a mud facies in a state of short-term equilibrium with the overlying water. Seabed sampling at slack water revealed thin layers of fluid mud that appeared to have settled out on the seabed. As the tide begins to flow it is mobilized. The south side of Fundy is interpreted to be a winnowed Quaternary bottom of coarse sediment with a long term transfer of fine-grained material in the suspended load. He interpreted that this component eventually aggrades to the mud facies of the northwest side. Minas Basin Suspended sediment was measured in Minas Basin by Pelletier and McMullen (1972) from 60 water samples. Concentrations of particulates varied from 72 to 2680 grams per cubic m. All but three samples had in excess of 90 grams per cubic m and more than half were between 100 and 200. The higher values came from samples collected at low tide near the sediment-water interface and the highest ones were collected after the tide had turned and was flooding across the exposed sediment surface. Most of the sediment was reported to consist of silt and clay sized particles but some consisted of fine and medium-grained sand. Surface water at high tide contained 125 gm per cubic metre of sediment in suspension. This is a considerable amount of material as compared to the open ocean which contains on average 2 grams per cubic meter. Pelletier and McMullen (1972) interpreted that material brought into Minas Basin from the Bay of Fundy proper is the least important component of the sediment in the Minas Basin system. The major contributor is the Avon, Salmon and Shubebacadie and other smaller rivers that dump into Minas Basin. They considered Minas Basin as almost a closed system which is filling up with fine-grained sediment. Greenberg and Amos, 1983, studied the size, shape and composition of suspended particulate matter in Minas Basin through analysis of 48 samples. The majority of the material consisted of composite sedimentary particles. The modal diameter of the particles was 30 um. The length of time the critical sheer stress is less than the value for deposition in Minas Basin is approximately 1 h at high and low water slack periods. This suggests that suspended particles that move through Minas Passage should fall to the seabed for this period of time. In contrast to the study of Pelletier and McMullen (1972), they suggested that the rivers in Minas Basin were not the main source for suspended sediments and that the sediments came from the open ocean (the Bay of Fundy proper to the west).

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Inner Bay of Fundy Geological History and Suspended Sediments

In the inner Bay of Fundy, sediments, morphology, features and seabed processes are much different than in the outer area. In the 1977 study of Fader et al., the inner seabed was mapped as sand and gravel (Sambro Sand) with fields of large sand bedforms. This sedimentary unit was considered to have formed both as a result of proximity to the low sea level stand but also from modern strong currents generated by the high tides of the Bay.

Unusual large areas of sub-sand mud were detected on the seismic profiles which

in places cropped out at the seabed. These subsurface deposits were mapped on Map 4011G and considered to be Holocene muds deposited on the underlying till when the Bay of Fundy was much larger, deeper, and at a time of minimal dynamics. These muds were later buried by two processes: proximity to the later low sea level stand which produced transgressions and regressions and the much later increased dynamics of the system from the development of the high tides. An extensive high-resolution seismic reflection and sidescan sonar survey conducted in 1998 provided insight into these interpretations and required a reinterpretation of the buried mud first considered to be the Holocene LaHave Clay.

The new information clearly shows that the buried mud is glaciomarine Emerald

Silt (Figure 17). This sedimentary formation is coarser than the Holocene clay and consists of silt, clay, sand and some gravel and was deposited by floating glaciers and glacial plumes from sub ice water but not directly by ice contact with the seabed as is till. Cores of these stratified sediments have been examined and consist of brick red thick clayey silt. They are ice recessional deposits and are widespread over the inner Bay of Fundy buried beneath sand and thin gravel lags including in Minas Channel. The Emerald silt is also interbedded with the till in the form of features termed till tongues and these represent former grounded ice positions.

Through either a low sea level stand associated marine transgression, or the onset

of tidal dynamics, the inner Bay of Fundy seabed has been greatly modified and reflects more the dynamics of present conditions in contrast to the iceberg scoured relict tills in the outer Bay which have remained unchanged. Multibeam Bathymetry was collected off Margaretsville Nova Scotia in the inner Bay of Fundy west of Minas Channel over a field of large sandy bedforms. An interpretation of these bedforms and associated erosional moats has provided new insights into modern processes which are thought to contribute large amounts of glacial age mud to the water column (Fader, 1996). This represents a new understanding of the sediment budget in the Bay of Fundy and has defined a previously unknown source of fine-grained sediment. It has implications to sediment transport, changes observed in the fishery, changes observed in the nature of the mud flats and their relationship to the semi-palmated sandpiper, and observations on seabed over deepening.

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Based on interpretation of the new multibeam bathymetry (2006 – 2008) collected by the Canadian Hydrographic Service and the Geological Survey of Canada (Atlantic), fine-grained sediment in suspension in Minas Passage is interpreted to be sourced from the inner part of the Bay of Fundy, from adjacent Minas Channel in the west, from the entrance to Minas Basin in the east and from near shore slope areas of the northern part of Minas Channel where slumped deposits occur. The multibeam bathymetry from Minas Channel and the entrance to Minas Passage shows that scouring of the seabed in glaciomarine sediments is a continuing process over very large areas and that the seabed has not been scoured down to the bedrock as has Minas Passage. Some sediment may also be eroded from the northwestern area of Minas Passage where thick sediments cover the bedrock surface and show evidence of elliptically-shaped scour features with internal bedforms. This suggests a selective erosion of silt and clay and the formation of bedforms in residual sand and gravel. Similar scoured depressions and large sand bedforms occur in Minas Channel to the west (Figure 18).

Sediment traps were placed on the ADCP systems to sample and determine the nature of sediments in suspension in Minas Passage. Samples from these traps contained fine-grained muds, minor sand and granules and a few pebbles. It is not clear if the material in the traps was collected by settling during slack water or inadvertently during difficult recovery efforts through system dragging. The dominance of marine growth on bedrock and boulders above a 20 cm exclusion zone suggests that the bedload zone is confined to the immediate seabed so that granules, pebbles and cobbles would not likely be transported above that level. Repetitive multibeam bathymetric comparisons show that the water depths have not changed over a two year interval except in small areas in a moat region along the north flank of the volcanic platform where granules exist. Such a lack of erosional and depositional change is also evidence for a stable seabed. Current measurements at the seabed have a maximum velocity of 5 knots that is not enough to transport boulders.

The potential for seabed scour associated with gravity platforms depends on the design that includes the area and shape of the platform feet and whether they are located on bedrock or gravelly seabeds. The thickness of the gravel at the seabed and the presence if any of subsurface till or glaciomarine muddy sediments is an important component of such an assessment. Based on the regional distribution of sediments above bedrock and between bedrock ridges it is interpreted that the subsurface material would be patchy in distribution and have a variable thickness.

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Figures

Figure 13. A bottom photograph of the seabed in Minas Passage showing a typical bottom of gravel – granules, pebbles and cobbles. The clasts consist of a variety of lithologies ranging from metasedimentary to igneous rocks. Note a lack of growth on the clasts and an absence of a thin cover of sand or mud despite being collected at slack water.

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Figure 14. A bottom photograph from Minas Passage showing a gravel seabed consisting of granules, pebbles, cobbles and boulders. The larger clasts are small boulders and have a sponge growth cover above a clean zone that is interpreted as the bedload transport zone approximately 20 cm in height. This suggests that the granules, pebbles and cobbles may move in response to currents.

Figure 15. A multibeam bathymetric image of the seabed to the northwest of Black Rock, Minas Passage showing a zone of gravel ripples. Repetitive multibeam mapping across these features shows that they have altered their pattern of distribution but that the field has not changed location. Bottom photographs from this area show the clasts in the bedforms are pebbles and cobbles.

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Figure 16. Photograph of a sample of stiff red mud collected by a rock dredge that penetrated the gravel lag surface in the northern area of Minas Passage. The material is similar to cored glaciomarine sediments in other areas of the inner Bay of Fundy that were deposited approximately 13 000 years ago during the retreat of the glaciers from the region. This material may underlie other areas of flat gravel lag in Minas Passage.

Figure 17. A seismic reflection profile from Minas Channel that shows thick glaciomarine sediments beneath gravel lag surfaces and sand bedforms. Thin till overlies the bedrock surface and the glaciomarine sediments are very thick and widespread in this area of the inner Bay of Fundy.

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Figure 18. A multibeam bathymetric image of the seabed of Minas Channel. The region is flat gravel covered glaciomarine sediment. A large scoured region of seabed is shown that contains many singular symmetric sand waves within the depression. This is an area of active erosion but the currents are likely not strong enough to transport the sand sized material out of the depression. Large quantities of silt and clay are eroded from this feature and are likely transported as suspended sediments.

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References Amos, C.L., 1984. An overview of sedimentological research in the Bay of Fundy, in: Gordon, D. C. and Dadswell, M. J., eds. Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences No. 1256, Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Byrne, T., Hughes Clarke, J.E., Nichols, S. and M-I, Buzeta, 2002, The delineation of the seaward limits of a Marine Protected Area using non-terrestrial (submarine) boundaries – The Musquash MPA : Canadian Hydrographic Conference Proceedings. Courtney, R. C. and Fader, G.B.J., 1994. A new understanding of the ocean floor through multibeam mapping: Science Review 1992 and 1993 of the Bedford Institute of Oceanography. Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans, p. 9-14. Curran, K.J., T.G. Milligan, G. Bugden, B. Law, and M. Scotney. 2004. Suspended Sediment, Water Quality, and Hydrodynamics of the Petitcodiac River Estuary, New Brunswick (2002–2003). Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 2516: xi, 88 p. Fader, G.B., King, L.H. and MacLean, B, 1977. Surficial Geology of the Eastern Gulf of Maine and Bay of Fundy; Marine Sciences Paper 19, 23 p. (Geological Survey of Canada Paper 76-17). Fader, G.B.J., 1996. Marine aggregate assessment and sediment transport. In workshop Proceedings, Bay of Fundy Issues: a scientific overview, Wolfville, NS, Jan 29 to February 1, 1996, Edited by J.A. Percy, P.G. Wells and A.J. Evans, Environment Canada Report No. 8, Pg. 30 – 33. Gordon, D. C. and Dadswell, M. J., 1984. Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences No. 1256, Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Parrott, R; Parsons, M; Li, M; Kostylev, V; Hughes Clarke, J; Tay, K -L; Multidisciplinary approach to assess sediment transport and environmental impacts at an offshore disposal site near Saint John, NB. in, The Atlantic Geoscience Society/La Société Géoscientifique de l'Atlantique - 32nd Colloquium and Annual Meeting, program with abstracts; 2006; pages 57-58 (ESS Cont.# 2005624) G.R. Daborn and M.J. Dadswell, 1988, Pages 547-560. Natural and anthropogenic changes in the Bay of Fundy - Gulf of Maine - Georges Bank System. In Natural and Man-Made Hazards, edited by M.I. El-Sabh and T.S. Murty. D. Reidel Publishing Co. (1988). Pelletier, B. R. and McMullen, R. M. 1972, Sedimentation patterns in the Bay of Fundy and Minas Basin, in, Tidal Power, eds. T. J. Gray and O. K. Gashus, Plenum Publishing Corporation, New York, N. Y. p. 153 - 187.

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Shaw, J., Parrott, D. R., Parsons, M. B., Taylor, R. B. and Patton, E., 2003. Assessing marine environmental quality in coastal waters of eastern Canada: Effects of offshore disposal of dredged materials, Geological Survey of Canada, Geoscience for Ocean Management (GOM) web site.

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Seismic Hazard, Faults and Earthquakes: Inner Bay of Fundy

Introduction

This report provides an assessment of the seismic hazard for the area of the proposed tidal power demonstration project in Minas Passage, Bay of Fundy, as well as the regional and local distribution of faults and earthquakes. Within Canada, the Bay of Fundy area occurs within the Northern Appalachian Seismic Zone (NAN). Figure 19 shows the historical seismicity in eastern Canada and Figure 20 is a more detailed map of the location of seismicity in NAN during varying time periods.

The Geological Survey of Canada (NRCan) has produced a new seismic hazard model (GSC Open File #5813, 2008) and a suite of new seismic hazard maps for Canada and this report draws on the excellent information provided by the GSC that is available on their web site.

http://earthquakescanada.nrcan.gc.ca/hazard/index_e.php GSC Open File # 4459 presents the development and rationale for the model, the

detailed model itself, and results for selected cities and areas of Canada. Open file #5813 makes available seismic hazard values for a grid of more than 200,000 points over Canada and surrounding areas. They were computed using the final methods and model used for the 2005 National Building Code of Canada. These values represent median ground motion on firm soils for a probability of exceedance of 2% in 50 years for the five ground motion parameters (5% damped spectral acceleration of 0.2, 0.5, 1 and 2 second periods plus peak ground acceleration.

The Northern Appalachians Seismic Zone (NAN) includes most of New Brunswick, western Nova Scotia and extends into New England. No earthquakes are shown to occur in the Minas Channel, Minas Passage and Minas Basin region of Nova Scotia on this compilation.

Background on earthquakes in eastern Canada

The continual movement of large segments of the earth's tectonic plates is the cause of more than 97% of the world's earthquakes. Eastern Canada is located in a stable continental region within the North American Plate and has a relatively low rate of earthquake activity. Nevertheless, large and damaging earthquakes have occurred there in the past and may occur in the future.

Rate of Activity

Approximately 450 earthquakes occur in eastern Canada each year. Of this number, perhaps four will exceed magnitude 4, thirty will exceed magnitude 3, and about

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twenty-five events will be reported just as felt. On average, a decade will include three events greater than magnitude 5. A magnitude 3 event is sufficiently strong to be felt in the immediate area, and a magnitude 5 is generally the threshold of damage. The seismograph network in Canada can detect all events exceeding magnitude 3 in eastern Canada and all events magnitude 2.5 or greater in densely populated areas.

Causes

The causes of earthquakes in eastern Canada are not well-understood. Unlike plate boundary regions where the rate and size of seismic activity is directly correlated with plate interaction, eastern Canada is part of the stable interior of the North American Plate. Seismic activity in areas like these tends to be related to the regional stress fields, with the earthquakes concentrated in regions of crustal weakness. Although earthquakes can and do occur throughout most of eastern Canada, years of instrumental recordings have identified certain clusters of earthquake activity. In these clusters, earthquakes occur at depths varying from surface to 30 km deep.

Seismic Hazard in Canada

Although earthquakes occur in all regions of Canada, certain areas have a higher probability of experiencing damaging ground motions. This probability is used in the National Building Code to help design and construct buildings that are as earthquake proof as possible. Figure 21 provides an idea of the likelihood of experiencing strong earthquake shaking at various locations. This map shows the relative seismic hazard across Canada for single family dwellings (1-2 story structures). The map indicates that the site of the proposed tidal power demonstration project in Minas Passage occurs in an area where the relative hazard is considered to be low.

The damage potential of an earthquake is determined by how the ground moves and how the buildings within the affected region are constructed. Expected ground motion can be calculated on the basis of probability, and the expected ground motions are referred to as seismic hazard.

The evaluation of regional seismic hazard for the purposes of the National Building Code of Canada (NBC) is the responsibility of the Geological Survey of Canada. The seismic hazard maps prepared by the Geological Survey are derived from statistical analysis of past earthquakes and from advancing knowledge of Canada's tectonic and geological structure. On the maps, seismic hazard is expressed as the most powerful ground motion that is expected to occur in an area for a given probability level. Contours delineate regions likely to experience similarly strong of ground motions. The simplified seismic hazard map (Figure 21) indicates the relative hazard across Canada. The seismic hazard maps and earthquake load guidelines included in the National Building Code are used to design and construct buildings to be as earthquake proof as possible. The provisions of the building code are intended as a minimum standard. They are meant to prevent structural collapse during major earthquakes and thereby to protect

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human life. The provisions may not, however, prevent serious damage to individual structures.

Seismic Hazard Information in the National Building Code (NBC) Building design for various earthquake loads is addressed in sections 4.1.8, 9.20.1.2, 9.23.10.2, 9.31.6.2, and 6.2.1.3 of the 2005 NBC. In addition, a table in Appendix C starting on page C-11 of Division B, volume 2 of the Code provides ground motion design values for many of the larger communities across Canada. While the National Building Code is chiefly intended for new buildings (Article 1.1.1.1 of Division A), appendix A (appendix note A-1.1.1.1) outlines the principles by which the code should also be applied to the use and modification of existing buildings.

The seismic hazard is described by spectral-acceleration values at periods of 0.2, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 seconds (Figures 22 -25). Spectral acceleration is a measure of ground motion that takes into account the sustained shaking energy at a particular period. It is a better measure of potential damage than the peak measures used by the previous 1995 code, and thus will improve earthquake-resistant design. Peak Ground Acceleration is still used for foundation design. All parameters are expressed as a fraction of gravity. The four spectral parameters allow the construction of uniform hazard spectra (UHS) for every place in Canada.

Ground motion probability values are given in terms of probable exceedence, that is the likelihood of a given horizontal acceleration or velocity being exceeded during a particular period. The probability used in the 2005 NBC is 0.000404 per annum, equivalent to a 2-per-cent probability of exceedence over 50 years. This means that over a 50-year period there is a 2-per-cent chance of an earthquake causing ground motion greater than the given expected value.

Calculation of Seismic Hazard

The seismic hazard at a given site is determined from numerous factors. Canada has been divided into earthquake source regions based on past earthquake activity and tectonic structure. The relation between earthquake magnitude and the average rate of occurrence for each region is weighed, along with variations in the attenuation of ground motion with distance. In calculating seismic hazard, scientists consider all earthquake source regions within a relevant distance of the proposed site. The four spectral acceleration seismic hazard maps show levels of ground shaking at periods of 0.2, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 seconds (equivalent to frequencies of 5, 2, 1, and 0.5 Hertz). This is important because different buildings are susceptible to different frequencies of earth motion, and damage is frequently associated with a resonance between earthquake ground motion and the building's own natural frequency. A high-rise of ten stories or more may sway with a natural period of 1 or 2 seconds, whereas in response to the same earthquake a brick bungalow across the street may vibrate at nearly 10 Hertz. The UHS is a description of the seismic hazard at a site in terms of building height.

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In building construction and design, not only the size of a probable earthquake should be considered, but also the nature of the ground motion most likely to occur at the site. Seismic hazard calculations provide part of this information. As our understanding of earthquakes and of their effects on engineered structures continues to develop, the seismic provisions of the National Building Code are revised to enhance public safety and minimize earthquake losses.

Earthquakes in New Brunswick

A summary of the historical earthquake activity in the province of New Brunswick is contained in a report by Burke, (2005). Most of New Brunswick lies within the Northern Appalachian Zone (NAN), as shown on the map of earthquakes in Eastern Canada and has experienced several earthquakes in the magnitude 5 to 6 range. The exception is the northwestern part of the province with a few smaller magnitude earthquakes, which lies within the Eastern Background Zone. New Brunswick has also felt the effects of larger events from the Charlevoix-Kamouraska Zone, Lower St. Lawrence Zone and the Laurentian Slope Zone.

In New Brunswick, epicentres cluster in three regions (Burke, 1984); Passamaquoddy Bay region, Central Highlands (Miramichi) region, and the Moncton region. Earthquakes have been more frequent in these regions and sometimes of a size to be potentially damaging (larger than magnitude 5). Figure 29 shows the distribution of earthquakes from 2004 to the present and two small ones are located to the west and east of the proposed tidal power demonstration area.

Faulting in the Bay of Fundy Region

The most widespread and significant fault or fault zone in the Bay of Fundy region is the Chedabucto-Cobequid fault system. It is part of a much larger transform fault system that extends from the Grand Manan area of the outer Bay of Fundy, north of Minas Basin, across Nova Scotia, through Chedabucto Bay to the Laurentian Channel. The name “Glooscap Fault System” has been proposed for this system that also includes the marine sector (King and MacLean, 1976). They further proposed that it might join with the Newfoundland fracture zone in deep water to the east and involve oceanic crust. The fault system is essentially Triassic/Jurassic and earlier in age but there is evidence for additional faulting in Cretaceous time and perhaps recent activity on the eastern Scotian Shelf and in the adjacent Laurentian Channel.

Map 812H (King and Maclean, 1976) shows the distribution of faults of the Glooscap Fault System in the Bay of Fundy. It consists of a linear continuous – discontinuous fault that extends from Ile Haut in the east, westerly to a few kilometers off the south coast of New Brunswick at Cape Spencer where it changes direction and continues southwesterly to Grand Manan Island in the outer Bay of Fundy. There it joins a series of other faults bordering pre-Pennsylvanian acoustic basement. North of this western area of the fault, the Triassic sediments are structurally disturbed in a broad zone that continues to the Passamaquoddy Bay region in the north.

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As reported in King and MacLean 1976, in the disturbed zone the aeromagnetic data shows considerable variation in contrast to the typically smooth signature of the Triassic/Jurassic rocks through the remainder of the basin. Fader (1989) conducted a high-resolution seismic reflection survey over the northern part of the disturbed zone to determine if any of the faults had affected the Quaternary overlying sediments in order to assess recent activity. The faulted Triassic/Jurassic sediment is overlain by thick glaciomarine stratified sediments that would record any activity on the faults below. The survey showed that the overlying sediments were not disturbed in any way indicating no activity of the faults over the past 15 – 18 000 years. This is contrast to the eastern Scotian Shelf were north of Banquereau, both glaciomarine Emerald Silt and LaHave Clay Holocene sediments are faulted and contorted along the offshore extension of the Glooscap Fault System.

Seismic activity along the Chedabucto-Cobequid fault near the proposed development site consists of two small earthquakes epicentres. One occurred off Cape Chignecto in the Bay of Fundy near the entrance to Chignecto Bay and the other occurred 17 km south east of Springhill. Appendix 1 shows a map of the earthquakes in the region over the past five years as well as a listing of the dates, times, locations, depths, magnitudes and regions from the GSC earthquake data base.

Portapique Fault

Within Minas Passage the most evident fault is the Portapique Fault. It lies to the south of the volcanic platform that projects to the west from Black Rock and extends from an area off Cape Sharp in the east, to an area to the northwest of Cape Split for a distance of over 13 km (Figures 5,10). It is manifest on the multibeam bathymetry as a linear depression that varies in width up to 50 m. Along some parts of the fault, both northern and southern flanks consist of prominent ridges. The depression associated with the fault is interpreted to arise from preferential erosion of weaker and fractured rocks. It is difficult to determine the horizontal offset along this fault as the strike of the exposed bedrock on both sides is the same. Wade et al., (1996) have mapped a prominent fault on land to the east that may be the same as the one identified from the multibeam bathymetry. It is the Portapique Fault that begins in the west near Cape D’Or and extends to the east past Truro, sub parallel to the Cobequid Fault but further to the north. The Portapique Fault on land sets the Carboniferous rocks against the Triassic deposits which surround Cobequid Bay. In the offshore the strata exposed on both sides of the fault on the multibeam bathymetry have the same strike so it is difficult to determine the amount of strike slip offset. The character of the bedrock exposure on either side of the fault is quite similar suggesting that the rocks may be of the same age. This is in agreement with the bedrock geology interpretation from the 1966 Huntec Ltd. survey but not in agreement with the interpretation by King and MacLean, 1976 that suggested that most of the rocks in Minas Passage are Triassic (Jurassic).The Huntec Ltd. 1966 survey suggested that the contact between the Carboniferous rocks and Triassic rocks is interpreted to be further to the south in the deepest part of Minas Passage in what has been termed the “Minas Passage Scour Trench”. Although the Portapique Fault is a prominent fault on the multibeam bathymetry, there is no evidence for seismic activity on this fault.

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Deformed proglacial deltaic sediments have been found at Economy Point –

Lower Five Islands, Nova Scotia (Broster and MacDougall, 1996). Fluid escape structures were attributed to the expulsion of groundwater during post glacial seismic shaking of saturated sediments. Dating of charcoal associated with the fluid escape structures suggests significant seismic shaking around 1870+- 70 years. The deformation may have resulted from the 1855 M5+ earthquake that occurred in New Brunswick, 100 km to the northwest near Moncton.

Minas Passage Proposed Tidal Power Site Assessment

An assessment of the proposed tidal power demonstration site has been evaluated against the 2005 National Building Code of Canada. Appendix 1 below shows the spectral and peak hazard values for firm ground. The values have been interpolated from a 10 km spaced grid of points. More than 95% of the interpolated values are within 2% of the calculated values.

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Appendix 2

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Summary and Conclusions

Seismic zoning maps for Canada are derived from the analysis of past earthquakes and advancing knowledge of Canada's tectonic and geological structure. Canada is divided into earthquake source regions based on past earthquake activity and tectonic structure. The relation between earthquake magnitude and the average rate of occurrence for each region is considered, along with variations in the attenuation of ground motion with distance. In calculating seismic hazard, scientists consider all earthquake source regions within a relevant distance of the proposed site. On the maps, seismic hazard is expressed as the maximum ground motion that is expected to occur in an area with a given probability. Contours delineate zones likely to experience similar intensities of shaking.

Minas Passage is located within the Northern Appalachian Seismic Zone (NAN). Maps of seismic risk in the 2005 code show the area occurs within Zone 1 and is considered to have a low earthquake risk. In fact, Canada to the east of the Cordillera, extending north from the United States border to the Arctic Ocean, comprises about two-thirds of the stable craton of the North American plate. Much of this large area appears to be substantially aseismic, although it contains several zones of significant seismicity and a few other regions of lower-level seismicity. Historically, earthquakes in the Minas Passage region have been infrequent and of small magnitude. The nearest zone of earthquake activity is likely associated with the Chedabucto-Cobequid Fault System and consists of two small earthquakes to the west and east. These did not occur within the proposed tidal power demonstration area.

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Figures

Figure 19. A map of the historical seismicity in eastern Canada.

Figure 20. A more detailed map of the location of seismicity in the NAN area of eastern Canada.

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Figure 21. A simplified seismic hazard map of Canada.

Figure 22. Spectral acceleration for a period of 0.2 seconds in southeastern Canada at a probability of 2%/50 years for firm ground conditions (NBCC soil class C).

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Figure 23. Spectral acceleration for a period of 0.5 seconds in southeastern Canada at a probability of 2%/50 years for firm ground conditions (NBCC soil class C).

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Figure 24. Spectral acceleration for a period of 1.0 seconds in southeastern Canada at a probability of 2%/50 years for firm ground conditions (NBCC soil class C).

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Figure 25. Spectral acceleration for a period of 2.0 seconds in southeastern Canada at a probability of 2%/50 years for firm ground conditions (NBCC soil class C).

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Figure 26. Distribution of earthquakes from 2004 to 2009 in the Bay of Fundy region.

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References

Adams, J; Halchuk, S., 2003. Fourth generation seismic hazard maps of Canada: values for over 650 Canadian localities intended for the 2005 National Building Code of Canada; Geological Survey of Canada, Open File 4459; 155 pages.

Burke, K.B.S. 1984: Earthquake activity in the Maritime Provinces, Geoscience Canada, v. 11, p. 16-22.

Burke, K. S. 2005, A summary of the historical earthquake activity in the province of New Brunswick. University of New Brunswick Web Site. Fader, G. B. J., 1989, Cruise Report 88-018, Phase 4 and 88-018, Phase 5, M.V. Navicula - Passamaquoddy Bay and Bay of Fundy, 22 p. Halchuk, S; Adams, J., 2008. Fourth generation seismic hazard maps of Canada: Maps and grid values to be used with the 2005 National Building Code of Canada; Geological Survey of Canada, Open File 5813; 32 pages. King, L. H. and MacLean, B., 1976. Geology of the Scotian Shelf, Geological Survey of Canada paper 74-31. 31 p., enclosure Map 812H. National Building Code of Canada, 1995. NRCC no. 38726; section 4.1.9.1 sentence 5 and Appendix C: Climatic Information for Building Design in Canada Richter, C. 1958. Elementary seismology. W.H. Freeman and Co., New York.

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Glacial, Post Glacial, Present and Projected Sea Levels: Bay of Fundy

Relative Sea level Change - the Bay of Fundy Region Former Quaternary shorelines have been identified at elevations as high as 75 m

above present sea level and over 100 m below in Atlantic Canada. In contrast to the glacial and early post glacial history of sea level change, sea level appears to be rising in Maritime Canada today at a rate of between 20 and 30 cm/100 years. This has been attributed to long term climate change and crustal subsidence (Scott et al., 1995). A summary of the glacial history of the region over the past 100 ka provides an understanding of the relative sea level change and a perspective on future potential change.

The sea level history of the region also controls to a large degree the

characteristics of materials deposited in association with both high and low sea level stands and the intervening areas that have been transgressed and regressed. Within recent years, an understanding of sea level change associated with global warming has added an additional amount of potential sea level rise to that predicted from crustal movements alone. For the proposed tidal power demonstration project in Minas Passage, former sea level positions have controlled to a large degree the characteristics of the materials on the seabed and on the adjacent land. An understanding of the future projected change in sea level that includes effects of global warming is important for the design of project infrastructure.

Quaternary glaciers played a major role in sea level change and for Atlantic

Canada two opposing glacial models termed maximum and minimum models were put forth. The maximum model suggests that ice extended across the entire region to the continental slope from a Laurentide ice centre in Quebec, (Goldthwait, 1924, Denton and Hughes, 1981, Shaw et al., 2002). The minimum model suggests the presence of only local thin glaciers during the late Wisconsinan (Grant, 1977; Dyke and Prest, 1987). Through mapping of the glacial landforms and materials both on land and in the offshore, a more complex model of Wisconsinan glaciation (the last major ice advance in Atlantic Canada) has been developed and it appears to be closer to the maximum model.

The following discussion is a summary of findings in Stea et al., 1998; Shaw et

al., 2002 and the results of mapping of sediments in the Bay (Fader et al., 1977, Fader, 1989) and adjacent coastal areas with an emphasis on the Bay of Fundy region. Recently collected seismic reflection data and multibeam bathymetry in Minas Passage have provided high resolution information for an understanding of the relative sea level low stand at the proposed tidal power demonstration site.

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Sea Levels during the Previous Interglacial A regional former sea level position prior to the Wisconsinan glaciation has been

mapped and interpreted as an abrasion surface 4 – 6 m above present sea level in parts of Nova Scotia. It is overlain in places by peat and wood beyond the range of radiocarbon dating (Grant 1980). This rock platform has been interpreted as an erosional surface formed during the last interglacial period (marine isotope stage 5e) approximately 120 000 ybp. Grant interpreted that it represents an important former equilibrium position of sea level due to glacier melting and crustal subsidence after the previous major glacial episode. Marine sands have been found in both northern and southern Nova Scotia at elevations of 25 m and provide further evidence for higher sea levels.

The amount of relative sea level rise during the last interglacial may be an

important indicator of present and future sea level rise in Maritime Canada. Based on the present rate of sea level rise, and not considering effects of global warming on sea level rise, it would take approximately 2 ka to raise sea levels by 6 m (the height of the old abrasion platform). Such estimates represent a minimum as the rate of subsidence is expected to decrease exponentially (Pirazzoli, 1996).

Late Wisconsinan Sea Levels 20 – 10 KA During the earliest Wisconsinan phase of ice flow, ice extended across the region

to the continental slope where it was grounded in over 300 m of water depth and perhaps as much as 800 m. Deglaciation began earliest in the southwest (outer Gulf of Maine) as early as 21 ka and progressed across the continental shelf in a time transgressive manner with the last ice remaining on the eastern Scotian Shelf. Ice retreated rapidly out of the Gulf of Maine and up the Bay of Fundy because of their great depths and linear morphological connection to the ice centres. This removal isolated an ice mass on Nova Scotia (Scotian Ice Divide) that later became an active ice centre. The isolated ice cap was drawn into the deeper Bay of Fundy where it formed streamlined deposits of till on the seabed.

In the Bay of Fundy there is an anomalous northeast trend to lower marine limits

from over 40 m at the mouth to 0 near the Bay head (Figure 27). The shorelines are tilted toward a local late ice centre, the source of the ice flow out of the Bay of Fundy. Stea (1982) suggested that shorelines around the Bay of Fundy are diachronous and the marine limit may not be a function of ice thickness but of protracted ice retreat to local ice centres. This may have prevented the formation of beaches in some areas. Widely varying ages on raised marine deposits from both sides of the Bay support this idea.

Relative Sea Level History of the Bay of Fundy

The relative sea level history in the Bay of Fundy is very complex with the lowstand shoreline shallowing from southwest to northeast (Fader, 1989, Fader et al., 1977, Shaw et al., 2002). The following is a discussion of the high and low stand history

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of sea levels and new ideas resulting from the collection and interpretation of multibeam bathymetry in the Bay. Former high sea level stands are relatively easy to locate, interpret and map. Most are associated with rock platforms, beach sediments of well-sorted sand and rounded gravel, terraces and sometimes deltaic sediment deposits where rivers and streams entered the former sea. Lidar imagery and aerial photographs also show vegetation changes possibly related to textural properties of the sediments that affect water content and the presence of subtle terrace and beach morphological features. They are difficult to interpret from on-land field investigations alone.

Determining the position of former lower sea level stands that are presently submerged is a much more difficult problem. Seabed features indicative of low sea level stands and subsequent transgressions include: terraces, erosional surfaces and unconformities, sediment textural characteristics of winnowing, absence of fine-grained sediment, erosion of glacial till and glaciomarine sediment, muted topography and relative greater exposures of bedrock. Dating these low sea level stands is also very difficult as material suitable for dating, such as marine shells, must be confirmed to have formed in situ in low stand deposits. With the advent of multibeam bathymetric mapping, subtle morphologic characteristics of low sea level stands are becoming easier to recognize and interpret. However, in areas of high energy, such as the Bay of Fundy, overprinting by modern sediment transport processes has resulted in the burial of low stand features or their removal, making recognition more difficult. The following is a summary of the low stand sea level evidence from the Bay of Fundy (Fader et al., 1977) and a discussion and interpretation of recent multibeam bathymetry.

The lowest position of sea level in post glacial time prior to the Holocene marine transgression is critical to the distribution of sediments, their stratigraphic relationships, sediment texture and seabed features such as exposed bedrock, former channels, etc. For the Scotian Shelf and outer Gulf of Maine, this position has been interpreted to occur at a depth of approximately 115 – 120 m in the offshore and 65 -70 m in the near shore.

Within the Bay of Fundy, the low sea level stand has been interpreted to occur at a depth of between 40 to 60 m gradually decreasing in depth from 110 m near German Bank, Gulf of Maine to the southwest of Yarmouth. In the Fader et al. (1977) study, glacial till and glaciomarine sediments were found in the Bay of Fundy well above the depth of occurrence of the low stand on the adjacent Scotian Shelf. At the entrance to the Bay of Fundy a noted increase in the silt and clay component from sediment samples supports a decrease in the former sea level position. The grain shape of the gravels in the outer Bay of Fundy also supports this model. Transgressed gravel surfaces consist of well-rounded to rounded clasts and the gravels in the Bay below are angular to subangular in shape.

Along the south-western and south-eastern coasts of Nova Scotia there is no evidence for a postglacial marine limit higher than the present shoreline. Studies by Goldthwait (1924), Hickox (1962), Bloom (1963), Swift and Borns (1967), Grant (1971) and others have found widespread raised marine strandlines and marine deposits in the area to the north of Yarmouth and along the south and north coasts of the Bay of Fundy

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and the Gulf of Maine. These features attest to late and post glacial significant rebound. In Nova Scotia the marine limit increases in elevation from a hinge line slightly north of Yarmouth and trends generally northeastward on land parallel to the geographic axis of the Bay of Fundy. Along the Nova Scotian side of the Bay, the highest marine limit is 45 m at Digby Gut (Grant 1971 and Stea et al., 1998). In contrast, the height of the marine limit in New Brunswick is 73 m above present sea level (Gadd, 1973). A minimum age for this limit is 13 325 ybp. In central Maine the height of the marine limit is even higher at 135 m (Stuvier and Borns, 1975) and is dated at 13 000 ybp. This shows that a tilt existed across the Bay of Fundy due to greater depression of the crust in New Brunswick and Maine as a result of closer approximation to the Laurentide ice centre. Although formed at the same time, there is approximately a 30 m difference in the present elevation of the marine limit in a line of section across the Bay of Fundy from Digby to Saint John.

Sea Level History Post Marine Limit Formation

The marine limit (highest level of marine water on land) formed some time after the ice retreated or is coequivalent with the timing of ice retreat. In some areas ice cover may have prevented the formation of raised marine features, hence, they are discontinuous. The early post glacial body of water that existed in the area of the Bay of Fundy has been termed the “DeGeer Sea” and was considerably larger than the present Bay extending up the Annapolis Valley and the St. John River Valley flooding large areas of present land. After 13 500 ybp, isostatic rebound exceeded the rate of eustatic sea level rise resulting in a marine regression across the former sea bed (elevations presently to a maximum of 45 m) with a resulting emergence of the land. Through this process of rapid isostatic rebound, the relative sea level in the Bay of Fundy fell during the time period of 13 000 to approximately 9 500 ybp. Grant (1971) studied aggraded material in intertidal estuaries and estimated that sea level fell to a position 20 - 30 m below the present level. Recent studies in coastal and nearshore Maine by Belknap et al. (1989) show the presence of a widespread unconformity at a present water depth centered around 60 m. Studies of the surficial geology of Passamaquoddy Bay using seismic reflection profiles by Pecore and Fader (1991), also recognized a regional unconformity at a depth of 60 below Holocene pockmarked muds that was developed on glaciomarine sediments. Recently collected multibeam bathymetry from several areas of the Bay of Fundy shows a variety of previously unrecognized seabed features such as iceberg furrows, fluted till and sub parallel transverse moraines in water depths greater than 60 m that are likely too delicate to have survived a marine transgression intact and support the interpretation of a higher low sea level position. Deltaic deposits have also been found in similar depths with high-resolution seismic reflection profiles. After formation of the low sea level stand at approximately 9 500 ybp, relative sea level began to rise and transgressed areas above 60 m water depth continuing to the present shoreline. Transgressions can be very effective erosional mechanisms compared to regressions where sediments tend to be armoured and not undercut and are thus preserved. In the Bay of Fundy, tills and previously deposited glaciomarine sediments

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were eroded, armoured with lag gravels and the topography was smoothed and muted in this transgressed zone of between 60 m water depth and the present shoreline. Subsequent strong currents resulting from the development of high tides in the Bay of Fundy further armoured this surface and continue to do so at present. Amos and Zaitlin (1985) studied the sea level history for the inner Bay of Fundy in Chignecto Bay. They suggested a relative sea level fall from a high of 48 m at about 13,500 ybp to a low of 25 m at 7000 ybp. Additionally, Amos et al., (1991) suggested that there were actually two times of macrotidal conditions in Fundy: the first as the relative sea level fell from the high stand across the present position, and another as the sea level returned to its former preglacial position sometime after 6000 ybp. Shaw et al., 2002 combined isobase maps with a digital terrain model of Atlantic Canada to map coastlines from 13 000 ybp to the present. Their map of the Bay of Fundy inner region for 9000 ybp (Figure 28) shows that much of Minas Basin was subaerially exposed.

Short Term Relative Sea Level Trends in the Bay of Fundy

Tide gauge data from Atlantic Canada extends back almost 100 years and contains a strong signal of rising sea level (Shaw and Forbes, 1990) (Figure 29). Grant (1970, 1975) cited rates of 46, 41 and 26 cm/century for St. John, N.B. Carrera and Vanieck gave rates of 31.4 cm/century for the time period 1966 – 1985 for Yarmouth, south of the entrance to the Bay of Fundy.

The sources for compiling tide gauge trends discussed in Shaw and Forbes, 1990, are Tidal Publication No. 30 published in 1951 by the Canadian Hydrographic service. They also used data obtained from Marine Environmental Data Services (MEDS), a branch of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Yarmouth data set from MEDS sources includes some isolated values for 1900 and 1956 with the continuous set beginning in 1967. The rate for the period 1900 -1988 is 26.3 cm/century. Excluding the 1906 value, the rate is 26.8. For St. John, N.B. and the rate includes 24 values predating 1929, the first year of MEDS recordings. The record gives a rate of 21.2 cm/century. A regression using only data from 1929 onwards provides a rate of 28.4 cm/century.

From the above values it is clear that along with many other areas in Atlantic

Canada, the Bay of Fundy is experiencing a rise in relative sea level. The calculated rise does depend on the length of the record. The two most important causes of sea level rise are crustal subsidence and eustatic sea level rise. The fact that rates change regionally suggests regional variations in the crustal component. Grant (1975) also reached this conclusion. Global climatic warming may play an even larger role in sea level rise than amounts associated with responses to glacial offloading and crustal movements. This is discussed in the following section.

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Global Warming Associated Sea Level Rise

The most recent research on sea level change was presented at the International Scientific Congress on Climate Change in Copenhagen in March 2009. It showed that the upper range of sea level rise by 2100 could be in the range of about one meter, or possibly more. In the lower end of the spectrum it appears increasingly unlikely that sea level rise will be much less than 50 cm by 2100. The following is a summary of the Copenhagen meeting.

Dr. John Church of the Centre for Australian Weather and Climate Research, Australia and the lead speaker in the sea level session, told the conference, "The most recent satellite and ground based observations show that sea-level rise is continuing to rise at 3 mm/yr or more since 1993, a rate well above the 20th century average. The oceans are continuing to warm and expand, the melting of mountain glaciers has increased, and the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica are also contributing to sea level rise."

New insights reported at the meeting include the loss of ice from the Antarctic and Greenland Ice Sheets. "The ice loss in Greenland has accelerated over the last decade. The upper range of sea level rise by 2100 might be above 1m or more on a global average, with large regional differences depending where the source of ice loss occurs", says Konrad Steffen, Director of the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES) at the University of Colorado, Boulder and co-chair of the congress session on sea level rise.

The last assessment report from the IPCC from 2007 projected a sea level rise of 18 - 59 cm. However the report also clearly stated that not all factors contributing to sea level rise could be calculated at that time. The uncertainty was centered on the ice sheets, how they react to the effects of a warmer climate, and how they interact with the oceans, explains Eric Rignot, Professor of Earth System Science at the University of California Irvine and Senior Research Scientist at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

"The numbers from the last IPCC are a lower bound because it was recognized at the time that there was a lot of uncertainty about ice sheets. The numerical models used at the time did not have a complete representation of outlet glaciers and their interactions with the ocean. The results gathered in the last 2-3 years show that these are fundamental aspects that cannot be overlooked. As a result of the acceleration of outlet glaciers over large regions, the ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica are already contributing more and faster to sea level rise than anticipated. If this trend continues, we are likely to witness sea level rise one meter or more by year 2100".

"Measurements around the world show that sea level has risen almost 20 cm since 1880," explained Professor Stefan Rahmstorf of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, who gave the plenary speech on sea level rise at the 2009 congress. These data also reveal that the rate of sea level rise is closely linked to temperature: sea level rises faster the warmer it gets. "If sea level keeps rising at a constant pace, we will end up in

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the middle of that 18-59 cm IPCC range by 2100," says Rahmstorf. "But based on past experience I expect that sea level rise will accelerate as the planet gets hotter."

The results of the 2009 International Scientific Congress on Climate Change in Copenhagen demonstrate that a clear assessment of the amount of sea level rise due to global climate warming does not exist and a range of values of between 18 and 100 cm by 2100 have been proposed. The infrastructure for the tidal power demonstration project in Minas Passage that includes buildings, cables, gravity based structures and perhaps water surface piercing structures will use the most up to date information on sea level rise as a component of the design criteria.

Tidal Variations

Sea surface elevation records taken at Saint John, New Brunswick were analyzed by Godin (1992) who noted that the amplitude of the M2 tide was increasing at a rate of 10 -15 cm/century. He interpreted this to be the result of changes in resonance resulting from sea level rise or sediment redistribution at the head of the Bay. Scott and Greenberg (1983) estimated a 1.5% increase in tidal amplitude for each 1 m rise in sea level. This would only translate into a 1-2 cm/century increase based on the present knowledge of sea level rise. Greenberg (1979) suggested that such high increases in tidal amplitude as suggested by Godin could only occur with major tidal power installations and not changing sedimentation patterns. Greenberg and Petrie suggested that more study was required to sort out magnitudes and causes of changing amplitude of the M2 tide. The tidal range expansion was interpreted as most rapid after 7000 ybp and that it had decreased by 4000 ybp (Scott and Greenberg, 1987). John Shaw (personal communication, 2008, in prep.) has proposed a novel idea suggesting that tidal expansion was delayed in Minas Basin by the existence of a barrier at the junction between Minas Passage and Minas Basin. This barrier was destroyed perhaps by a large storm in one event and may represent the legend recorded in the First Nations accounts of the great flood in the stories of Gloosecap.

Summary of Sea Level History and Implications for the proposed development of Tidal Power in Minas Passage

The glacial, post glacial and historical sea level knowledge has implications for

the construction of offshore infrastructure as well as on land components. Of utmost importance to the design of structures that may pierce the sea surface is consideration of the continued projected rise in sea level. Based on the knowledge of sea level change over the past 50 years, the facilities will be designed and constructed to anticipate a sea level rise of 30 cm/century for natural crustal changes combined with a further 18 to 100 cm associated with global climate change. Such a design will also take into consideration potential change in tidal heights and storm waves associated with higher sea levels.

With regard to the design and construction of the land based facilities, knowledge

that former sea levels were as high as 26 m near Cape Sharp will also be considered in

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the design and construction. These former and higher sea levels have controlled the characteristics of glacial outwash and other materials in the near shore zone.

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Figures

Figure 27. Lines of equal emergence (isopleths) of elevations of the marine limit in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The marine limits are represented by wave-cut terraces, beaches and deltas. Former interglacial shorelines occur around Cape Breton Island and north of Yarmouth. In contrast, the low stand shoreline offshore east Nova Scotia at 65 m is shown. From Stea et al., 2001.

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Figure 28. A map of the distribution of Atlantic Canada at approximately 9000 ybp showing the paleogeography of the region. Areas in green represent offshore regions of subaerial exposure resulting from the position of relative sea level at this time. Note that most of Minas Basin was land at this time. From Shaw et al., in press (2005).

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Figure 29. Tidal records and rates of change for a) Charlottetown, P. E. I., b) Yarmouth, N. S., c) Saint John, N.B., and d) St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. From Shaw and Forbes, 1990.

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References

Amos, C. L. and Zaitlin, B. A. 1985. The effect of changes in tidal range on a sublittoral macrotidal sequence, Bay of Fundy, Canada. Geomarine Letters 4, p. 161 – 169. Amos, C.L., Tee, K. T. and Zaitlin, B. A., 1991. The post glacial evolution of Chignecto Bay, Bay of Fundy, and its modern environment of deposition. In Classic Tidal Deposits, Canadian Soc. Of Petroleum Geologists Memoir16, p. 59 – 90.

Belknap, D. F., Shipp, R. C., Stuckenrath, R., Borns, H.W. and Kelly, J. T., 1989. Holocene sea level change in Maine. In W. A. Anderson and H. W. Borns eds., neotectonics of Maine. Maine geological Survey, Augusta, pp. 85 – 105. Bloom, A. L., 1963. Late Pleistocene fluctuations of sea level and postglacial crustal rebound in coastal Maine. American Journal of Science 261, p. 862 – 869. Curray, J. R., 1960. Sediments and history of Holocene transgression, continental shelf, northwest Gulf of Mexico. P. 221 – 226. In F. P. Shepard, F. B. Phleger, and Tj. H. vanAndel, eds., Recent sediments, northwest Gulf of Mexico, American Association of Petroleum Geology. Denton, G.H. and Hughes, T.J., 1981. The last great ice sheets: Toronto, John Wiley and Sons. 484 p. Dyke, A. S. and Prest, V.K., 1987, Late Wisconsinan and Holocene history of the Laurentide ice sheet, in Fulton, R.J. and Andrews, J. T., eds., The Laurentide ice Sheet: Geographie Physique et Quaternaire, v. 41, p. 237 – 264. Fader, G. B. J., King, L. H. and MacLean, B., 1977 Surficial geology of the eastern Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy. Geological Survey of Canada paper 76-17, 23 p. Fader, G. B. J., 1989, A late Pleistocene low sea level stand of the southeast Canadian offshore, in Scott, D.B., et al., eds., Late Quaternary sea level correlations and applications: Dordrecht, Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 71 – 103. Fairbanks, R. G., 1989. A 17000-year glacio-eustatic sea level record: Influence of glacial melting rates on the Younger Dryas event and deep ocean circulation: Nature, v.342, p. 637 – 642. Gadd, N. R., 1973. Quaternary geology of southwest New Brunswick with particular reference to the Fredericton area. Geological Survey of Canada Paper 71 – 34: 31p. Godin, G., 1992. Possibility of rapid changes in the tide of the Bay of Fundy, based on a scrutiny of the records from St. John. Continental Shelf Research, v.12(2/3) p. 327 – 338.

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Goldthwait, J. W., 1924. Physiography of Nova Scotia: Geological Survey of Canada Memoir 140, p. 60 – 103. Grant, D. R., 1970. Recent coastal submergence of the Maritime Provinces; Canadian Journal of Earth Sciences, v. 7, p. 676 -689. Grant, D. R. 1971. Glacial deposits, sea level changes and pre-Wisconsinan deposits in southwest Nova Scotia. Geological Survey of Canada paper 71-B: p. 110 – 113. Grant, D. R. 1975. Recent coastal submergence of the Maritime Provinces. Proceedings of the Nova Scotia Institute of Science, 27supplement 3: p. 83 – 102. Grant, D. R., 1977. Glacial style and ice limits, the Quaternary stratigraphic record and changes of land and ocean level in the Atlantic Provinces, Canada; Geographie Physique et Quaternaire, v. 31, p. 247 – 260. Grant, D. R., 1980. Quaternary sea level change in Atlantic Canada as an indication of crustal delevelling, in Morner, N. A., ed., Earth rheology, isostasy and eustasy; London, John Wiley and Sons, p. 201 – 214. Greenberg, D. A., 1979. A numerical model investigation of tidal phenomena in the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of Maine. Marine Geodesy 2. p. 161 – 187. Greenberg, D. A. and Petrie, B. D. 1996. Physical oceanographic processes, the physical environment of the Bay of Fundy, in proceedings of the Fundy Marine Ecosystem Science Project Workshop, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, January 29 – February 1. Eds. J. A. Percy, P. G. Wells and A. Evans, p. 13 – 30. Hickox, C. F. Jr. 1962. Pleistocene geology of the central Annapolis valley. N. S. Department of Mines Memoir 5, 36 p. Milliman, J. D. and Emery, K. O., 1968. Sea levels during the past 35000 years. Science 162. p. 1121 – 1123. Pecore, S. S and Fader, G. B. J., 1991. Surficial geology, pockmarks and associated neotectonic features of Passamaquoddy Bay, New Brunswick, Canada. Geological Survey of Canada Open File report. Pirazzoli, P. A., 1996. Sea level changes: The last 20000years: New York, John Wiley and Sons, 207 p. Scott, D. B. and Greenberg, D. A., 1983. Relative sea level rise and tidal development in the Fundy tidal system. Canadian Journal of Earth Sciences, 20. p. 1554 -1564.

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Scott, D. B., Brown, K., Collins, E. S., and Medioli, F. S., 1995. A new sea level curve from Nova Scotia, evidence for a rapid acceleration of sea level rise in the late- mid Holocene: Canadian Journal of Earth Sciences, v. 32, p. 2071 – 2080. Shaw, J., and Forbes, D.L., 1990. Shore and long term relative sea level trends in Atlantic Canada: Proceedings, Canadian Coastal Conference 1990, Kingston, Ontario: Ottawa, National research Council of Canada, p. 291 – 305. Shaw, J., Gareau, P. and Courtney, R.C., 2002. Paleogeography of Atlantic Canada, Quaternary Science Reviews, 21, p. 1861 – 1878. Stea, R. R., 1982. The properties, correlation and interpretation of Pleistocene sediments in central Nova Scotia, M. S. Thesis: Halifax, Nova Scotia, Dalhousie University, 215 p. Stea, R. R., Piper, D. J. W., Fader, G. B. J. and Boyd, R., 1998, Wisconsinan glacial and sea level history of Maritime Canada and the adjacent continental shelf: A correlation of land and sea events. GSA Bulletin, July 1998; v. 110, No 7, p. 821 – 845. Stuvier, M., and Borns, H. W. 1975. Late Quaternary marine invasion in Maine: its chronology and associated crustal movement. Geological Society of America Bulletin 86, p. 99 – 104. Swift, D. J. P. and Borns, H. W. 1967. A raised fluvial marine outwash terrace, north shore of the Minas Basin, N. S., Journal of geology 75, p. 693 – 710.

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Appendix E

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I. Introduction

Report of Capt. Richard P. Fiske, USN (ret.) 27 July 2012

A. I am Captain Richard P. Fiske, USN (ret). I was retained by PC Landing Corp. ("PCLC") to review and analyze from a marine operations perspective documentation associated with the application ("Application") of Public Utility District No.1 of Snohomish County, Washington ("District") for a license to install two underwater tidal energy turbines and associated cables and infrastructure as the Admiralty Inlet Pilot Project ("Project"). This documentation includes the Application, the intervention and protest submitted by PCLC to the Application ("Protest") based on concerns for the safety of its Pacific Crossing transpacific fiber optic cable system ("PC-1 "), specifically for the north segment of the cable ("PC-1 North"), the District's subsequent response ("Response") to the Protest dated June 22, 2012, and, the documentation accompanying each submittal. I also reviewed FERC's Requests for Additional Information, dated July 16, 2012.

B. As reflected in the Application and the Response, the primary purpose of the Project is to conduct research and gather data. 1

C. My experience and qualifications are included as Attachment 1. Based on my background, training, and experience with vessel operations and marine proj ects and on my review of the materials I have been provided, I have concerns with the proposed location of the Project turbines relative to PC-1 North.

II. Summary

A. Unless they are urgent in nature, most marine operations are carefully planned and deliberately executed. Alternatives are investigated with the goal of simplifying the operation, minimizing risk, and developing as completely as possible a list of possible failures and problems and other variables, such as the operational environment, that might arise and plans to deal with those problems and failures and variables. Marine operations are dynamic and cannot, as in terrestrial operations, simply be stopped until a problem is resolved. This planning is best done by persons experienced in marine operations. Even with the best planning, unanticipated situations arise and the best way to deal with both anticipated and unanticipated problems offshore is to use the planning process to minin1ize risk. The values in planning maritime operations are foresight, simplicity and common sense. The easiest problems to solve are those that are avoided.

B. The proposed turbine location is environmentally challenging. The Project's own site surveys report the difficulty in working in the currents at the survey sites. While strong currents are appropriate for generating electricity, the attendant difficulties and hazards for marine operations mandate increased caution.

I Application, Exhibit E Environmental Report at xvii.

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C. The Project is an experimental program using a system with a very limited track record. As discussed below, two previous installations using the OpenHydro technology proposed by the District have had documented issues demonstrating the need for caution and risk reduction measures in planning the Project.

D. The planned Project location, in close proximity to PC-I North, is a sensitive location from a maritime operational perspective due to the presence of the cable. In maritime operations, 100 meters is very close proximity. To install a large, heavy experimental project in close proximity to PC-I North when there are reasonable alternative locations is to invite problems needlessly.

E. Having reviewed the District documentation, given the close proposed proximity to PC-l North, I have concerns about technical aspects of the installation, the completeness of the information provided to FERC, and internal inconsistencies in the information provided. In addition I have concerns about the arguments provided regarding U.S. legislation and international treaties with which I am familiar.

F. I note from the materials I reviewed that there appear to be alternate installation locations with sufficient current flow to accomplish the goals of the project while minimizing risk to PC-l North.

O. There appears to be some urgency on the part of the District to having FERC approve the Project as proposed and without further analysis. While developing renewable sources of electricity is a laudable goal, this is an experin1ental project done electively. It is a desirable and an appropriate project, but there is no urgency here sufficient to obviate the need to undertake a complete planning process that minimizes risk to existing infrastructure.

H. I understand that PCLC has asked that the turbine locations be moved 750 meters or more from the PC-l North cable. Moving the turbine locations significantly away from PC-l North makes sense.

I. While I am not predicting a specific problem or that OpenHydro will be unable to install the turbines safely, I have concerns based on 1) the energetic environmental conditions, 2) the proximity of the proposed Project turbine locations and the existing PC-l North cable segment, and 3) technical and credibility issues with the District's proposal as submitted. I am concerned that the proposed turbine locations create needless and avoidable risk (even if small) which would have significant consequences and which can be readily reduced or avoided.

J. Based on the above I recommend that Project approval be withheld until PCLC and the District can agree on a location that minimizes risk to PC-I North while accomplishing the District's Project goals.

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III. Technical Issues

A. Environmental Conditions as Documented by District Surveys. As indicated in various pre-installation study reports submitted by the District in Appendix L to its Application, environmental conditions in the proposed Project locations are challenging, with high currents,2 low visibility3 and small operational windows between tides.4 Even during "slack" water current is present. Project surveys submitted by the District repeatedly note problems with conducting site surveys due to conditions of high current, including wrapping of ROV umbilicals around rocks on the bottom.5 Low visibility precluded detailed visual inspection of the bottom, and "intense current activity" resulted in abandonment of a planned sediment sampling program, after multiple unsuccessful attempts by the District's contractor to recover bottom samples using a grab sampler.6

The documented issue of Project survey boats dragging anchors in the vicinity of PC-1 North due to strong currents 7 is in itself exemplary and alarming for multiple reasons, and will be discussed later in this report.

B. Lack of specificity. Broad, general bland statements in the Application and its supporting documentation do not provide sufficient detail for FERC to gain a full understanding of the technical challenges of the project and the extent to which those challenges are understood and have been addressed, given the close proximity to PC-1 North. While some areas of the Application provide massive detail, especially in addressing marine biological issues, technical aspects of the project need amplification and clarification.

1. Use of anchors. Project documentation asserts in various places that anchors will not be used, e.g. "No anchor placements, pilings, or surface-piercing structures would be involved with the turbine installations or cable.,,8 And again, in its Response the District asserts, "The installation and maintenance activities do not require or permit the use of anchors.,,9 However, later in the Application: "A two anchor mooring system is planned to be installed for installation and operations support. The anchors are installed to the east of the turbine locations so that they are positioned far away from the existing PC-1 North telecommunications cable."IO (emphasis added). And, "The use of a two anchor mooring is to provide safety against any emergency situation during installation and inspection to avoid vessels needing to drop anchors in a power loss or equipment failure

2 Application, Appendix L Pre-Installation Study Reports, L-8 Seafloor Substrate and Benthic Habitat Characterization of the SnoPUD Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project Turbine Site Through ROV Video Observations, para. 2.2 Difficulties Encountered at 5. 3 Application, Appendix L-8 para. 2.2 Difficulties Encountered at 5. 4 Application, Appendix L-8 para. 2.2 Difficulties Encountered at 5. 5 Application, Appendix L-8 para. 2.2 Difficulties Encountered at 5. 6 Application, Appendix L-3 Bathymetric and Geophysical Survey Site Characterization Admiralty Inlet Pilot Tidal Project, para. 2.10 at 2.6. "However, after multiple unsuccessful attempts at three of the sites, the fourth site was abandoned." 7 Application, Appendix L-8 at 2 et. seq. 8 Application at 4. 9 Response, Attachment A, Marine Operations Installation Considerations Relating to Telecommunications Cable PC-l at 1. 10 Application, Exhibit A Project Description at A-5.

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scenario.,,1! It is not clear whether and how and for what anchors are to be used, when and how wires from anchors to vessels (during turbine placing operations, during emergencies?) and where they are to be placed relative to PC-l North. Further, if the anchors are to be placed to the East of the Project they would be of minimal use in plumbing the project anyway, as the energetic tidal currents run on a Northwest! Southeast axis.

However, and despite its assurances, the District elsewhere indicates that it does expect to anchor, using vessel anchors, in the vicinity of PC-l North while performing work on the Project turbines. This is not only contemplated, but planned. In its Response to the PCLC Protest the District asserts, "If the District observes derelict fishing gear snagged on the Project works, the District will remove the gear as soon as possible. Successful removal of deep-water fishing gear using ROVs has been demonstrated in Puget Sound (NRC 2008) .... The removal deployment will generally involve vessel anchoring, ROV anchoring, ... ,,} (emphasis added). This clearly obviates assurances that there will be no anchoring on behalf of the District for work on the Project. Further, the fact that ROV operations have been demonstrated elsewhere "in Puget Sound," absent a description of the currents in which this demonstration was made, is meaningless as to the effectiveness of ROV s in the vigorous currents in the vicinity of the Project in Admiralty Inlet.

2. Navigation. The District plans to use a Wide Area Differential Global Position System ("W ADGPS") for navigation'3 rather than vessels equipped with Dynamic Positioning (DP) systems. A W ADGPS system provides information to operators about the location of the WADGPS antenna (with manual vessel control by the operator and the operator applying direction and distance offsets from the W ADGPS antenna to the planned location of the Project). Dynamic Positioning systems, which are commonly used in the off shore energy industry, on the other hand, are capable of using GPS along with heading and environment reference systems to control vessel maneuvering directly. Positions and tracks can be planned and programmed ahead of time, antenna/project offsets can be programmed in, lag time is minimized and, once properly programmed, operator error is reduced. In addition, DP systems may have one or more levels of redundancy built into the system (referred to generally as "DP Class"), that, depending on the DP Class, are designed to prevent a loss of station keeping ability in the event of one or more control system failures. The District has not provided information as to where the W ADGPS antenna is to be located in relation to the center of the turbine platform, how any offset is to be applied, how the information is to be provided to the tug Masters, and how the command and control structure is arranged to maneuver each of the tugs and control the turbine placement system.

3. Detailed Installation Plan. In its Response the District provides two slides comprising Appendix A to Marine Operations Installation Considerations Relating to

11 Application, Exhibit A Project Description at A-5. Application, Exhibit E Environmental Report at 142.

13 Response, Attachment A at 3.

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Telecommunications Cable PC-1 (Installation Considerations).l4 Although asserted to show the installation methodology "step by step"l5 each of the two slides simply shows the "concept"l6 for two aspects of the operation. There is much about the installation process that is missing.

4. Tugs and Barge. The District plans to use a standby tug l7 in the event that one of the three planned tugs becomes inoperative. As noted throughout the documentation, the installation location is subject to strong currents. To disengage a disabled tug, move it clear of the barge (or in the case of the trailing barge in the OpenHydro Deployment Concept l8 keep the disabled tug from being driven by the current into the tug/barge assembly), transfer wires or rig new wires to the standby tug, and the standby tug to take a strain, all while currents are driving the entire flotilla, tethered to the bottom by power cables or by turbine lift wires, timely and without need to repeat steps, presents a not-insignificant challenge. To accomplish this while avoiding being carried by currents a short 104m to the West, where lies PC-1 North, seems to be overly optimistic. The District has not provided sufficient operational detail to demonstrate that such a contingency could be managed without adverse incident. Loss of control of the flotilla in such a scenario while the turbines are suspended (mid-installation) in the water column, or near the seabed, would pose substantial risks to PC-1 North.

5. Launch/Recovery Process and Systems. The Application and Response do not supply sufficient information to allow FERC to adequately evaluate the turbine launch and recovery process. There appear to be three winches on the installation barge, two of which are labeled in Figure 2-13 of the Environmental Report. l9 If this assumption is correct, then how are the winches controlled and coordinated? If one assumes that the controls are in the control cabin several questions then pertain, and are relevant to the potential failure modes and their resolutions.

A drawing of the turbine installation on the bottom20 shows a turbine mounted on its base. In its Response the District mentions a "deployment/recovery frame.,,2l,22 Figure 2-13 shows portions of this base but no deployment/recovery platform. Is it intended that there be a winch dedicated and a wire linked to each of the three vertices of the gravity base or to a separate deployment/recovery platform? How is a deployment/recovery frame incorporated? It is not clear, but the issue is relevant to clarity and completeness of

14 Response, Attachment A at 10, Appendix A Cable Installation Methodology Turbine Installation Methodology. 15 Response, Attachment A at 3. 16 Response, Attachment A at 5, Table 1 Safeguards for Potential Failure Modes. 17 Response, Attachment A at 5, Table 1. 18Response, Attachment A, Appendix A. 19 Application, Exhibit E Environmental Report at 36, Figure 2-13, Turbine Installation Barge Carrying a 6-Meter Open Hydro Turbine. 20 Application, Exhibit E at 119, Figure 3-25, Dimensions of Turbines in Relation to Depth at Deployment Site. 21 Response, Attachment A at 3. 22 Response, Attachment A at 5.

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what the District has proposed and how it plans to deal with installation problems presented in the District's Response.

Of more interest, however, are failure modes and recovery. The District asserts in Table 1 that should the release mechanism fail to release, the turbine would be recovered and the installation aborted.23 Assuming a launch/recovery frame, is there a single latch to release all three vertices of the turbine base? Given the apparent system configuration this is most unlikely. What, then, is the safeguard to PC-I North if one or two of these latches releases, leaving a single wire attached, to a launch barge live boating without using a DP system. Similarly, what if a single winch fails at exactly the wrong time in the launch sequence? Winches typically operate using pressurized hydraulic fluid and if the problem is more than simple hose replacement (e.g. stripped hose threads in a winch block, electrical control failure, etc.) it is not hard to envision one or two vertices of the turbine on the bottom, the remaining vertex still attached to its lift wire as the currents rise with PC-l North 104m away. Again, this is not a static, terrestrial environment where one can simply stop the process until repairs are made.

6. Geological Information. The District " ... conducted extensive investigation of the site prior to site selection.,,24 And further, "The District carried out a bathymetric and geophysical survey of the proposed deployment zone ... Side scan sonar and multi-beam bathymetry were used to identify potential deployment sites within the zone. In addition, a sub-bottom profiler and drop camera were used to identify the seafloor and subsurface conditions.,,25 Based on these surveys the District asserts that the materials at the site of the proposed installation are "likely in a medium dense to dense condition. ,,26 The District's conclusion is that "The seafloor is competent to handle the loading of the subsea base and turbine.,,27

However, current and visibility conditions made visual characterization of the botton1 difficult. 28 As noted above, after several failures the seabed sampling was unsuccessful and ultimately abandoned despite multiple attempts at multiple locations near the proposed turbine sites due to "intense current activity.,,29 "The sub-bottom profile data showed little or no subsea penetration.,,3o Further, Fugro states in its Executive Summary: "The thickness of the glacial deposits is unknown as no geotechnical explorations have been performed and the gravel, cobbles, and boulders on the seafloor precluded a sub-seafloor penetration and seismic imaging.,,31 There are no indications

23 Response, Attachment 1 at 5, Table 1. 24 Response, Attachment A at 2. 25 Application, Exhibit E at 47. 26 Response Attachment A at 2. 27 Response Attachment A at 2. 28 Application, Appendix L-l 0 Habitat Characterization of the SnoPUD Turbine Site Admiralty Head, Washington State, para 2.2. "Even though timing of the ROY surveys was selected to occur when tidal flow was comparatively low, the water mass at the site was always restless and very seldom was true slack experienced. Quite the contrary, strong currents often over a knot in speed were encountered and affected the smooth, trouble-free operation of the ROY." 29 Application, Appendix L-3 at 2-6. 30 Application, Exhibit E at 57. 31 Application, Appendix L-3 at ES-I.

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that samples have been taken to characterize the bottom and its substrate. Yet, the District asserts that it "performed bathymetric, geophysical, and geological hazard site surveys.,,32 While the surveys may have been performed, their contributions to understanding site geology appear to be limited.

7. Site Selection. It is not adequately explained, other than a table of simple current flow rates of selected sites, why the particular proposed turbine locations were chosen. Survey data in the District's Response suggest that alternate sites have power densities approaching those of the selected sites.33 New analysis does not address alternative locations in sufficient detail to enable FERC to follow the reasoning as to why particular sites were selected.

8. No Experience. The District acknowledges that OpenHydro has no experience installing tidal energy projects in the vicinity of submarine cables,34 no experience with installations adjacent to submarine cables and no information regarding submarine cable/tidal energy installations.35 Given the lack of this particular kind of relevant experience, increased caution and efforts to minimize risk are appropriate.

9. Hazarding of PC-l North Has Already Occurred. Perhaps most alarming is that the District has already hazarded PC-l North by the anchoring of contractor vessels in close proximity to the cable while performing surveys. "The first attempt to collect ROV video at the SnoPUD tidal energy site was undertaken .... Unfortunately the support vessel. .. was too small for the tidal conditions and the anchors too light to keep the vessel in position.,,36 (emphasis added). And further, "The second attempt to obtain video images of the seafloor within the SnoPUD tidal energy site was undertaken from aboard a large barge ... after the barge supporting the ROV was properly anchored.,,37 added). The barge was anchored using a " ... four-point anchoring system.,,3 Finally, one of the barge anchors dragged to the surface in its flukes a small boulder and cobble "at the turbine site. ,,39 (emphasis added). I find no indication that the District or its contractors had any appreciation of the presence of an active international communications cable in the immediate vicinity of its work zone (despite the presence of PC-l North on navigational charts and in a recorded aquatic lands easement), or that the District or its contractors notified PCLC that these surveys were being conducted in the vicinity of PC-l North and that anchoring was undertaken in the vicinity of PC-l North as a deliberate part of the survey process.

10. Lack of Specificity. The lack of specificity of the Application and its subsequent submissions demonstrates the District's insufficient appreciation of the technically varied

32 Application, Exhibit E Environmental Report at 56. 33 Response, Attachment 0 Northwest National Marine Renewable Energy Center. 34 Application Vol. III, Appendix N Stakeholder Consultation, Attachment 1 at 10, Response VII.7. 35 Protest at 3. 36 Application, Appendix L-8 at 2. 37 Application, Appendix L-8 at 3. 38 Application, Appendix L-8 Figure 2 at 4. 39 Application, Appendix L-8 Figure 23 at 26.

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problems that inevitably arise when working offshore and is insufficient to allow FERC to make an informed decision that would allow the Project to proceed.

IV. Credibility; Issues Not Well Thought Out or Incorrect

The District provides broad, general assertions that frequently are found to be critically flawed when examined. It provides hyper-analysis in some areas and glosses over others. Rigorous analysis in one area does not imply the same rigor in all areas.

A. Use of Anchors (or not). The District asserts, frequently, that no anchors will be used in the installation, maintenance, and removal of the turbines. Yet the District provides for two large anchors and sophisticated acoustic release systems for the mooring wires. As described above, the locations for the anchors and wires running to vessels have not been adequately specified, and the use of these anchors is anticipated for some operations.

B. Installation Order (Turbines vs. Power Cable or Vice Versa). The District asserts that "The cables are installed prior to the installation of the turbines. They are installed from the turbine location to the shore.,,4o However, elsewhere the installation order is reversed: "The trunk cables are installed from the turbines to the HDD exit point immediately following the turbine installation.,,41 What is the installation order of the two major components of the Project? Something so fundamental to the Project as the installation order is confused.

C. Standby Tug. The District asserts that a stand-by tug will be used.42 The "Detailed Installation Methodology" shows three tugs involved in the installation43 and the Environmental Report Proposed Actions and Alternatives indicates that the vessels required to install the turbine and subsea cables to include "Three tugS.,,44 No stand-by tug is shown or mentioned.

D. Bottom Surveys. As noted above, the District asserts that bottom surveys were conducted, which may be true ("Conducted ROV video investigations to characterize the Project area seafloor ... ,,45), but as noted above survey documentation shows the generally unhelpful and incomplete results of these surveys. Further, PCLC expert Mr. Gordon Fader notes that no samples were taken that confirm the geology of the bottom.46 The District is postulating the composition of the bottom rather than citing to hard data.

E. Site Selection. It appears that alternate sites and their characteristics, evident in detailed survey information, were not identified in more summary documents. Nor was the reasoning for selecting the chosen locations and rejecting alternatives. A more

40 Response Attachment A at 1. 41 Application, Exhibit E, Proposed Actions and Alternatives at 24. 42 Response Attachment A at 3. 43 Response Attachment A, Appendix A. 44 Application, Exhibit E, Proposed Actions and Alternatives, at 34. 45 Application, Exhibit E at xix. 46 Protest, Appendix C Fader Report at 2.

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complete picture of the tidal energy available by location is provided in an attachment to the District Response, where there appear to be a number of alternate areas with current energy similar to that of the selected sites.47 To reject a site that reduces risk to PC-1 North because that site might produce slightly less electrical power, particularly given that power production is not the primary purpose of this experimental project, fails to maintain the larger perspective of the Project and the environment in which this experiment is to be conducted.

Detailed Installation Plan. In its Response the District asserts in Attachment A that it has provided in its Appendix A, a "step by step" installation methodology.48 Each of the two slides in the Appendix is labeled as a concept. This step by step plan as provided has but two steps, both of which are concepts. It will be a challenge for FERC to fully understand the installation, and its risks, based on this Appendix.

G. ROY Monitoring. The installation methodology/concept shows an ROY monitoring the cable installation, as well as periodic post-installation ROY monitoring. Given the visibility and handling problems experienced by District contractors when conducting simple visual bottom surveys, noted above, the assertion that ROY s will be used to monitor the cable during and post-installation is not understood.

H. Problems with Earlier Installations. In its Protest PCLC quotes Mr. Fader, who addresses concerns with previous OpenHydro installations in the Bay of Fundy (location change without explanation and disintegration of the turbine blading due to underestimating the current flow), and the Orkney Islands (barged-based construction method for driving piles hindered by presence of large boulders at the seabed).49 What is of interest here is that those substantive issues were not addressed by the District in its response to the PCLC Protest.

1. Treaty and Legislative Issues. Many traditions, dating back to the earliest days of maritime trade, have become codified over the years in treaty and in law. The District denigrates the federal Submarine Cable Act of 1888 (47 U.S.C. § 21, et seq.) and its assignment of liability for breaking or injuring a cable whether willfully or through "culpable negligence," as an "historical relic having virtually no practical utility."sO However, until replaced or repealed the 1888 Cable Act remains the applicable federal statute governing vessel operations around and hazards to submarine cables in U.S. waters. It is surprising that FERC, a federal agency, is being asked by the District to ignore applicable federal law.

Further, and of interest, after dismissing the 1888 Cable Act, the District bases its subsequent arguments on the applicability of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other more recent conventions than the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables (1884) that the 1888 Submarine

47 Response, Attachment D Figure 1. 48 Response, Attachment A, Appendix A at 10. 49 Protest, Appendix C at 6. 50 Protest at 14 citing Douglas R. Burnett, "Cable Vision," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 66, 68 (2011).

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Cable Act was based on. The District points out that" ... these modern treaties address both submarine cables and energy systems generated from tidal currents and their relationships in the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"),,.51 What the District fails to note, however is that the location of the Project is not in the EEZ. The Territorial Sea of the United States extends out from the coastline for three miles, and to as far as 12 miles depending on particular issues or locations. As UNCLOS notes, "The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea ... ,,52 All surveyed Project locations are clearly within even the most limited application of the Territorial Sea. To assert arguments based on a treaty that is effective in the EEZ misleads FERC.

J. Assertions of Inclusion versus Actions. The District asserts that stakeholders were involved early and frequently. Yet, as discussed above, the District conducted surveys over and around PC-1 North, including hazarding the cable with anchors, well before PCLC was made aware of the Project in May, 2011.53 PCLC notes in its Protest that the District has failed to comply with notification requirements in FERC regulations. 54 Further, the District's contact list for emergencies includes various agencies but does not include PCLC. 55 In addition, there was no mention of PC-1 North in the Project Safeguard Plan as submitted with the Application in February, 2012. 56

K. Ford-Ramsden Financial Analysis (Incremental Cost vs. Absolute Cost). Mr. Ford-Ramsden did not address the increased likelihood of cable intrusion based on presence of the Project. If the Project causes the intrusion, it should be subject to a full absolute costs analysis, not the incremental analysis undertaken by Mr. Ford-Ramsden. Therefore, it is reasonable to look at absolute costs, since the actions of the District, in conducting the Project as proposed, increases hazard to PC-l North and the increased likelihood, which would be minimal otherwise, of a cable repair being required. Alcatel Lucent ("ASN") has corrected Mr. Ford-Ramsden's estimate of incremental time and cost57 in its recent letter. However, it would be helpful for FERC to consider the absolute cost of a cable repair necessitated by Project operations and the hazard to the Project, pointed out by ASN,58 in its proposed location engendered by a cable repair.

L. Simultaneous Operations. In the event that simultaneous operations are required, i.e. installation or service or removal of the Proj ect and repair to PC-l North, which entity and operation has priority? Should this not be understood and based in an agreement between the parties established prior to beginning Project installation? The District has not addressed these questions, or the increased risks posed by simultaneous operations situations.

5' Protest at 15. 52 UNCLOS Part V Exclusive Economic Zone, Article 55. 53 Protest at 20. 54 Protest at 20. 55 Application, Appendix E, Project Safeguard Plan at 4. 56 Application, Appendix E, Project Safeguard Plan. 57 ASN Letter of 16 July 12. 58 ASN Letter of 16 July 12.

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M. Public Safety. The District asserts that" ... the Project does not present a risk to PC-1.,,59 However, PCLC in its various submissions has demonstrated that PC-l North is at risk. As noted here, the information provided to FERC by the District and on which it is to rely for its decision indicates otherwise. However, if there is a risk to PC-l North then there is a risk to public safety and FERC license criteria60 regarding public safety are not met.

v. Risk

A. Risk Assessment Process. Some risks are necessary and some risks are elective. An elective risk need not be taken and can often be reduced through planning, organization and design. To take an elective risk without justification is to invite problems. This is motherhood, but it is true, particularly offshore. To look at risk is as simple as recognizing that the master of an installation tug, having experienced a casualty and been cut loose from the Project may, despite plans and District commitments to the contrary, feel it necessary to drop an anchor to slow or stop himself from being driven by the current and into danger, whether or not he is near a submarine cable. This is the reality of life on the water, despite assertions that "no anchors will be used."

B. District Approach to Risk. One statement and one omission appear to sum up the District's approach to risk. On one hand, the District asserts, "Consideration for the avoidance of risk to PC-l North has been a fundamental design premise for the planning.,,61 On the other hand, the District's Assessment of Potential Puget Sound Marine Safety Risk Resultingfrom Installation of the Admiralty Inlet Tidal Energy Project, 62 makes no mention of PCLC, PC-I North or any risk that the Project presents to submarine cables. To reconcile these two statements is a challenge and demonstrates a weakness in the Project's approach to risk.

C. Who or What is at Risk? It is of interest to note that the District's risk analysis, while superficially thorough in process, appears to focus on interactions between the turbines and vessel traffic. There are broader risk issues that have yet to be addressed by the District. They include the risk posed by OpenHydro' s lack of experience and unexplained problems with previous installations, hazarding of PC-l North -without notice - by the District's contractors while conducting surveys, incomplete bottom information, and incomplete launch and recovery information and casualty plans, at a distance of 100m from PC-l North, all of which cumulatively contribute to the risk of severing PC-I North.

D. Is There No Risk? Perhaps the District in fact believes that there is no risk to PC-l North. The Project's Response asserts this expressly, "Because the Project does not present a risk to PC-l North, it does not present a risk to public safety, as PCLC claims.

59 Response at 12. 60 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Licensing Hydrokinetic Pilot Projects at 13. 61 Response, Attachment A at 1. 62 Application, Appendix L-13 Assessment of Potential Puget Sound Marine Safety Risk Resulting from Installation of the Admiralty Inlet Tidal Energy Project.

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In any event, the District's safeguard plans detail the specific measures the District will undertake to safeguard the public and environmental resources in its construction, operation, and maintenance of the Project.,,63 This wording is curious since the safeguard plan is silent as to PCLC, PC-I North or even submarine cables.64 Since the District is hazarding, and indeed has already hazarded, PC-l North while believing that it is and has not, it is important that FERC protect this aspect of public safety.

E. There is No Imperative. There is no imperative to take the risk to install the Project turbines in the particular location chosen by the District.

F. To Reduce Risk. The simplest way to reduce risk to PC-1 North, aside from that to which it has already been exposed by the anchors of District survey vessels, is to locate the Project turbines farther from PC-1 North. This mayor may not result in a reduction in power generated, but as the District notes, "The primary purpose of the Project is to conduct research and gather data, with energy production playing a secondary role.,,65 Let this be so.

VI. Conclusions

This paper has looked at the issue of Project turbine location relative to the submarine cable PC-1 North and the risk that the Project poses to the cable. It has reviewed technical concerns with the Project plan as presented by the District, and with credibility concerns having to do with assertions that are overly broad, unsupported, misleading or incorrect. The technical and credibility concerns all come down to risk, and the increased risk that a particular approach or plan (or lack thereof) poses (or has already posed) to the PC-l North cable from a marine operations standpoint.

In summary, it is not clear how an inexperienced organization conducting an experimental project at less than recommended separation from a vulnerable but important trans-pacific cable, having already hazarded that cable by dragging anchors in high currents in the vicinity of the PC-1 North cable can assert that its Project does not present a risk to that cable. The District asserts that to gather data is primary, and to generate power is secondary. Reasonable alternate locations appear to exist that are sufficiently separated from PC-1 North would avoid or and reduce risk and meet the Project's stated goals.

There is no reason or urgency to take the elective risk posed by the planned turbine location. It would be appropriate for FERC to withhold approval until the District and PCLC can analyze and establish a mutually agreeable locations for the Project that meets the District's needs while allying PCLC concerns.

RiCl1afClP:FiSk "2 7 July 2012

63 Response at 12. 64 Application, Appendix E, Project Safeguard Plans. 65 Application, Executive Summary at xvii.

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Attachment I - Experience and Qualifications of Capt. Richard P. Fiske, USN (ret.)

1. I am a retired Captain of the United States Navy, now an independent consultant, with over 47 years experience in marine operations, including ship operations, ship repair, diving and salvage, deep ocean search and recovery operations, casualty analysis, and research and development. Significant positions include U.S. Navy Director of Ocean Engineering I Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, and Director of Marine Operations for Oceaneering Technology, Inc. (OTECH). I received graduate engineering degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (M.A.) and an Engineers degree in Ocean Engineering (0. Eng.). I am a qualified Navy air and mixed-gas diver and Salvage Operations Officer. I have a Juris Doctor degree from George Mason University School of Law and am admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth of Virginia. I am the author of the Ship Salvage entry in the current McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology and co-author of two legal treatises, The International Law of the Shipmaster (Informa, 2009) and Defending Against Pirates: The International Law of Small Arms, Armed Guards and Privateers (Intershipmaster, 2011). I am a member of the American Society of Naval Engineers, the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, and the Maritime Law Association. I serve on the Legal Committee of the American Salvage Association.

2. My earliest offshore work was for the Marine Physical Laboratory of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography working on communications and power systems for the Navy Man-In-The-Sea Program's SEALAB II, an experimental submerged habitat project off the coast of San Diego. As a Navy officer I routinely was involved in both ship operations and technology development, serving aboard 5 vessels during my Navy career, including qualifying as an Officer of the Deck, Fleet Steaming and as Pilot I Executive Officer I Instrumentation Officer of the large experimental hydrofoil Plainview. I worked in ship repair and offshore with ROV's in marine salvage operations, culminating in the penultimate Navy assignment noted above. As Supervisor of Salvage I was responsible to the Navy for United States salvage capability (Title 10, U.S. Code). I led development and establishment of ship and aircraft salvage procedures and diving procedures used by the U.S. Navy. After retirement I was Director of Marine Operations for OTECH before becoming an independent consultant. In both the SUPSALV (and earlier Navy assignments) and OTECH positions I led developn1ent of equipments and systems for use offshore and execution of complex marine operations including location and recovery of a Navy helicopter in depth of 17,000+ feet, recovery of the Confederate Submarine CSS Hunley, and recovery of debris from the crash of EgyptAir flight 990 in the sea off Rhode Island. As a consultant I developed terrorist scenarios for the National Academies of Science that could close two major Gulf Coast ports using the same number of terrorists as executed the 911 attacks. I have spoken on CNN and CNN World as a salvage expert, including review of the recovery plan for the Russian submarine KURSK. One consulting project required casualty analysis of an incident where-in the anchor of a ship performing operations in proximity to an inter-island power cable likely caused the cable to part at some distance from the anchor snag itself.

3. I am familiar with the issues regarding PC-1 North and the proposed turbine installation.

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Appendix F

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      111      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      222      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      333      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      444      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      555      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      666      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      777      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      888      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      999      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      111000      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      111111      ooofff      111222

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!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222111///111000                  PPPaaagggeee      111222      ooofff      111222

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U.S. Department of JusticeTorts Branch, Civil Division

450 Golden Gate Avenue, P.O. Box 36028 San Francisco, CA 94102, (415) 436-6647

CONSENT JUDGMENTCase No. C10-856 RAJ 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTWESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant._____________________________________

))))))))))))

Case No. C10-856 RAJ

IN ADMIRALTY

CONSENT JUDGMENT

TONY WESTAssistant Attorney GeneralJOHN MCKAY, United States AttorneyBRIAN KIPNIS, Chief, Civil DivisionU.S. Attorney’s Office 1201 Pacific Avenue, Ste. 400Tacoma, Washington 98402R. MICHAEL UNDERHILLAttorney in Charge, West Coast OfficeTorts Branch, Civil DivisionERIC KAUFMAN-COHENTrial AttorneyU.S. Department of JusticeBox 36028, 450 Golden Gate AvenueSan Francisco, California 94102-3463Telephone: (415) 436-6648Facsimile: (415) 436-6632E-mail: [email protected]

Attorneys for DefendantUNITED STATES OF AMERICA

!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111888                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222444///111111                  PPPaaagggeee      111      ooofff      333

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U.S. Department of JusticeTorts Branch, Civil Division

450 Golden Gate Avenue, P.O. Box 36028 San Francisco, CA 94102, (415) 436-6647

CONSENT JUDGMENTCase No. C10-856 RAJ 2

The above captioned action having been compromised, it is, upon the subjoined

consents of counsel;

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant, United States of America, shall pay

to General Communications, Inc., the sum of Eight Hundred and Five Thousand, Three

Hundred and Twenty Dollars and No Cents ($805,320.00), plus post-judgment interest only

pursuant to the Public Vessel's Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31107, and without costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/23/11

AThe Honorable Richard A. JonesUnited States District Judge

We hereby consent to the entry of the foregoing Consent Judgment:

Dated: May 20, 2011 TONY WESTAssistant Attorney GeneralJOHN MCKAY, United States AttorneyBRIAN KIPNIS, Chief, Civil DivisionU.S. Attorney’s Office R. MICHAEL UNDERHILLAttorney in Charge, West Coast OfficeTorts Branch, Civil Division

/s/ Eric Kaufman-Cohen ERIC KAUFMAN-COHENTrial AttorneyU. S. Dept. of Justice

Attorneys for DefendantUNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dated: May 20, 2011 GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

/s/ Martin Weinstein

!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111888                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222444///111111                  PPPaaagggeee      222      ooofff      333

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U.S. Department of JusticeTorts Branch, Civil Division

450 Golden Gate Avenue, P.O. Box 36028 San Francisco, CA 94102, (415) 436-6647

CONSENT JUDGMENTCase No. C10-856 RAJ 3

MARTIN WEINSTEIN

Attorney for Plaintiff GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

!aaassseee      222:::111000-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000000888555666-­-­-RRRAAAJJJ                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      111888                  FFFiiillleeeddd      000555///222444///111111                  PPPaaagggeee      333      ooofff      333

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Appendix G

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Japan

PC-1 WestAjigaura, JapanT5 Shima, Japan

U.S.

PC-1 EastHarb5ur P5inte, WAT5 Gr5ver Beach, CA

PC-1 S5uthGr5ver Beach, CAT5 Shima Japan

PC-1 N5rthHarb5ur P5inte, WAT5 Ajigaura, Japan

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Appendix H

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Appendix I

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Ship's anchor accidentally slices internet cable cutting off access in six African countries

Claims the cables may have been sliced on purpose

By Rob Cooper UPDATED: 16:03 EST, 1 March 2012

A ship's anchor accidentally sliced an underwater internet cable, cutting off access to six African countries.

The incident happened as the vessel stopped in the wrong area as it waited to enter a port in Mombasa, Kenya.

The ship was dragging its anchor when it broke the 3,000 mile long fibre-optic cable on Saturday. It will take engineers three weeks to repair.

Internet cut: Workers haul part of the fibre optic cable to shore as it is laid in Mombasa in 2009

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However, teams have already managed to restore 10 per cent of the cable's function so services are back up and running at slow speeds, the Wall Street Journal reported.

There are claims that the cable was intentionally sliced as three other cables were also cut in the Red Sea off the coast of Djibouti just days beforehand.

The broadband line severed last weekend goes from Mombasa to the United Arab Emirates and was laid in 2009.

The cable - which cost £83million - was half-funded by the Kenyan government and half by the private sector.

As well as supplying Kenya, the cable provides internet access to Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Juba, which is the capital of South Sudan.

Chris Wood, chief executive of the West Indian Ocean Cable company, told the Wall Street Journal: 'It's a very unusual situation. I believe these were accidental incidents, although more will be known when we bring the cables up from the sea bed.'

Since the cable was laid three years ago the number of internet users in Nairobi has soared from 1.8million to 3.1million - and it has helped drive growth in the area.

Google, Microsoft and Samsung have all opened offices in the area in recent years.

The broadband outage is expected to cost the Kenyan economy in the region of £300million and has led to calls for more internet cables to be laid.

Joel Tanui, manager of The East African Marine Systems company (Teams) who are responsible for the cable, told the Guardian: 'We wish to notify all our stakeholders of ongoing emergency repair works and apologise unreservedly for any inconvenience this may cause.

'The cable should be fully operational within the next three weeks.'

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Appendix J

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AECOM 206.624.9349 tel

710 Sec4nd Ave., Ste. 1000 206.623.3793 fax

Seattle, WA 98104

Admiralty Inlet Pil.t Pr.ject

Federal Energy Regulat.ry C.mmissi.n Pr.ject N.. 12690Supplement t. Assessment .f Tidal Energy Sites Near Admiralty Head

Jena F. Gilman, P.E.

William J. Gerken, P.E.Peter Grant, P.E.

July 2012

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AECOM 2

This rep4rt supplements 4ur May 2012 Assessment 'f Tidal Energy Sites Near Admiralty Head (May

2012 Assessment), prepared at the request 4f PC Landing C4rp. (PCLC), and filed with PCLC’s

interventi4n and pr4test (“Pr4test”) t4 the final license applicati4n f4r the Admiralty Inlet Pil4t Tidal Pr4ject

(Pr4ject) 4f the Sn4h4mish C4unty Public Utility District N4. 1 (Sn4PUD). On June 22, 2012, Sn4PUD

filed Resp4nses t4 all c4mments, including the Pr4test and 4ur May 2012 Assessment. In additi4n, 4n

July 16, 2012, FERC issued Requests f'r Additi'nal Inf'rmati'n t4 PCLC, as well as t4 Sn4PUD, and t4

the Federal C4mmunicati4ns C4mmissi4n which als4 filed c4mments with FERC 4n the Pr4ject’s likely

impacts 4n the PC-1 submarine cable. This Supplement t4 4ur May 2012 Assessment pr4vides s4me 4f

the additi4nal inf4rmati4n requested by FERC and addresses certain 4ther matters relevant t4 FERC’s

inf4rmati4n request t4 Sn4PUD. This Supplement als4 addresses p4rti4ns 4f Sn4PUD’s Resp4nse

regarding 4ur May 2012 Assessment, including a paper entitled Rati'nale f'r Admiralty Inlet Tidal energy Dem'nstrati'n Pr'ject Siting (P4lagye, June 2012). Sn'PUD Resp'nse, Attachment D.

In 4ur May 2012 Assessment, we used a tw4-dimensi4nal, depth averaged finite element numerical

m4del t4 identify multiple p4tentially viable and feasible alternative l4cati4ns f4r the Pr4ject within

Admiralty Inlet that pr4vide a greater separati4n distance fr4m PC-1 and c4ncluded that alternate

l4cati4ns sh4uld be further analyzed in detail by Sn4PUD in 4rder t4 av4id, minimize and mitigate adverse

impacts t4 PC-1. P4lagye (June 2012) pr4vided a detailed critique 4f the m4del we used and presents

the results 4f a new high-res4luti4n c4mputer m4del devel4ped by 4ne 4f Dr. P4lagye’s graduate

students, Miss Kristen Thyng (Thyng, 2012). As n4ted bel4w in m4re detail, all m4dels have limitati4ns,

including the m4del we used and the m4dels used by Sn4PUD. We n4te, h4wever, that Thyng’s new

high-res4luti4n m4del appears t4 c4nfirm 4ur c4nclusi4ns as it als4 indicates that sites t4 the west 4f the

PC-1 cable are p4tentially feasible fr4m a res4urce intensity and p4tential energy generati4n perspective.

There are n4w three m4deling exercises – 4ne c4nducted by AECOM and tw4 by Sn4PUD, that sh4w

multiple l4cati4ns t4 the west 4f PC-1 may pr4duce acceptable p4wer p4tential c4mpared t4 the pr4p4sed

l4cati4ns 100 and 150 meters east 4f PC-1. In additi4n, these sites appear t4 be c4nsistent with

Sn4PUD’s 4ther siting criteria such that a detailed analysis is warranted. We als4 agree with Dr. P4lagye

that the appr4priate siting meth4d4l4gy is m4deling t4 measurement. We c4nclude that, based 4n the

results 4f b4th AECOM’s simplified and Sn4PUD’s s4phisticated m4deling exercises, at this p4int it w4uld

be appr4priate t4 c4nduct stati4nary ADCP measurements at multiple alternative l4cati4ns west 4f the

PC-1 cable where the m4dels have indicated p4tential alternative sites.

In April and May 2012, AECOM undert44k a numerical c4mputer m4deling eff4rt t4 estimate p4wer pr4ducti4n. At the time AECOM devel4ped its m4del, Sn4PUD had n4t indicated 4r pr4vided a m4del 4f Admiralty Inlet, while 4ne such m4del had previ4usly been c4mpleted (Thyng, 2010), and a sec4nd m4del (Thyng, 2012) was under devel4pment and c4mpleted by the time Sn4PUD filed its Resp4nse t4 c4mments. AECOM’s m4deling eff4rt was c4nducted under time and res4urces c4nstraints that were clearly stated in 4ur May 2012 Assessment. Specifically, the AECOM m4del 4ver-predicted p4wer pr4ducti4n generally by up t4 10%, but 4nly up t4 5% at the pr4p4sed turbine l4cati4ns.

1Alternative site

l4cati4ns identified in 4ur May 2012 Assessment were pr4vided within 20% 4f the p4wer p4tential 4f Sn4PUD’s pr4p4sed turbine l4cati4ns. These l4cati4ns sh4uld all be c4nsidered as c4mparable alternatives.

AECOM m4deling results suggest the feasibility 4f alternative sites such as AECOM’s m4del stati4n ID numbers 1360 and 1412 which are l4cated appr4ximately 500-600 meters fr4m PC-1 and exhibit

1M4ti4n t4 intervene and pr4test 4f PC Landing C4rp., May 23, 2012, Appendix D, Table 1.

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AECOM 3

c4mparable kinetic energy density.2

The AECOM m4deling results identify alternative l4cati4ns that appear t4 be viable and feasible f4r c4mmercial-scale pr4ject applicati4n based 4n predicted p4wer 4utput. Based 4n these results, AECOM c4ncluded that further detailed investigati4n by Sn4PUD is warranted t4 address the c4ncerns 4f PCLC.

N4thing in the P4lagye rep4rt changes these c4nclusi4ns. The Thyng (2010) M4SSea m4del, like AECOM’s m4del, indicates that sites t4 the west 4f the PC-1 cable are feasible in terms 4f p4tential p4wer generati4n – see page 5, Figure 3 4f Dr. P4lagye’s resp4nse (P4lagye, June 2012). In additi4n, the M4SSea m4del was later used by Sn4PUD this year t4 nest a higher res4luti4n m4del 4f Admiralty Inlet (Thyng, 2012) f4r further refinement and accuracy 4f the estimated site c4nditi4ns. The M4SSea m4del is cited t4 achieve p4wer estimates within 5%.

3

The AECOM m4del and the s4phisticated M4del 4f the Salish Sea (M4SSea) devel4ped by Thyng and rep4rted in 2012 thr4ugh her graduate w4rk, generally pr4vided similar m4del results, as is indicated by a c4mparis4n 4f the AECOM and M4SSea results at the ADCP l4cati4ns utilized in the Pr4ject’s FERC applicati4n. Indeed, in rep4rting 4n the Thyng 2012 results, P4lagye can 4nly say that results fr4m the Thyng m4del “indicate n4 regi4ns 4f higher p4wer density t4 the west 4f the PC-1 cable.” – see page 5 4f Dr. P4lagye’s resp4nse (P4lagye, June 2012). Areas t4 the west 4f PC-1 are n4t dismissed as having insufficient p4wer p4tential under the s4phisticated m4deling (Thyng, 2012), 4r being significantly bel4w the p4wer p4tential at the pr4p4sed turbine l4cati4n. Figure 4 4n page 6 4f Dr. P4lagye’s resp4nse d4es n4t include inf4rmati4n necessary t4 assess the results 4f the s4phisticated m4deling in the alternative areas available west 4f the cable. This inf4rmati4n w4uld be helpful t4 understand the results 4f the m4deling w4rk perf4rmed.

Figure 3 in P4lagye pr4vides a n4rmalized kinetic p4wer density during an ebbing tide f4r Admiralty Inlet.

While the c4l4rati4n 4f the pl4t d4es n4t all4w a refined understanding 4f the deviati4n in kinetic p4wer

between the pr4p4sed turbine sites and the alternative sites, the limited inf4rmati4n pr4vided by the

District suggests s4me 4f the alternative sites are within +/- 20% 4f the pr4p4sed turbine site’s kinetic

p4wer density, warranting further evaluati4n with the m4del and subsequent field investigati4n using

stati4nary ADCPs.

M4re4ver, 4utput 4f an4ther m4del cited appr4vingly by P4lagye (Eppler, et al. 2010), appear t4 sh4w

current amplitude 4f appr4ximately 80% t4 perhaps as high as 97% as c4mpared t4 the turbine l4cati4ns

in areas t4 the west 4f PC-1- see page 7 Figure 6 4f Dr. P4lagye’s resp4nse (P4lagye, June 2012).

In its siting criteria, Sn4PUD indicates that the pr4p4sed turbine sites sh4uld have “High res4urce intensity t4 be representative 4f c4nditi4ns that w4uld be enc4untered by a c4mmercial-scale pr4ject.”

4In

4ur 4pini4n, the alternative sites, whether under the AECOM m4del 4r under Thyng (2010) 4r Thyng (2012) are all estimated t4 be representative 4f c4nditi4ns that w4uld be enc4untered by a c4mmercial-scale pr4ject.

2M4ti4n t4 Intervene and Pr4test 4f PC Landing C4rp., May 23, 2012, Appendix D, Table 2.

3Resp4nse 4f Public Utility District N4. 1 4f Sn4h4mish, C4unty, Washingt4n, t4 rec4mmendati4ns, terms

and c4nditi4ns, pr4test, and c4mments, Appendix D, page 3, paragraph 1.

4M4ti4n t4 Intervene and Pr4test 4f PC Landing C4rp., May 23, 2012, Appendix D, Page 1, first bullet.

Page 180: Concerns About Tidal

DC-9639933 v1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding.

Dated Washington, D.C. this 1st day of August 2012.

/s/ William M. Keyser William M. Keyser