ARSENIO VERGARAVALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180

November 23, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on himPetitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and the search.Held:The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit:(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted.The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.Issues:(1) Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally.(2) Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally.Held:a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as afruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

Soliven vs Judge Makasiar

Facts: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed acomplaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file acomplaintaffidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE:Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran,a personother than the president.

HELD:The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure theexerciseofPresidentialduties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the ChiefExecutiveof theGovernmentis a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in acriminal casein which the President is complainant cannot raise thepresidentialprivilege as adefenseto prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed theprotectionafforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether toexercisethe privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.Soliven vs Judge makasairFacts:In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process wheninformationsfor libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still underreviewby the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for hisarrestwithout personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrativeremediesavailable under the law has lost factual support.

Issues:(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process wheninformationsfor libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still underreviewby the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for hisarrestwithout personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held:With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in acriminal caseactually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants ofarrest. The pertinent provision reads:Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonablesearchesandseizuresof whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant orwarrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexaminationnder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsibleofficersas may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants ofarrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of awarrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supportingdocumentssubmitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue awarrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminaryexaminationand investigation of criminalcomplaintsinstead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants ofarrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.Nolasco, et al vs. Pao

G.R. No. L-69803October 8, 1985

Facts:The present case was subject for resolution.Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision of respondent Judge Pao, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the respondents claim that the search was incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.Issue: Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.Held: The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It was held that the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]).All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary ruletotallyandunqualifiedlyand cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case ofGalman vs. Pamaran(G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrestThe Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

Cynthia P. Nolasco vs Hon. Ernani Cruz PanoFACTS:Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno; applied for search warrant from the respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, after a month of round the clock surveillance of the premises as a suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA, particularly connected to MV Karagatan / Pena Andrea cases. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. The City Fiscal information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive DocumentsPetitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularly the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness.ISSUE:Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal?

HELD:The search warrant is of General, thus, it was hereby annulled by set aside.RATIONALE:The Search Warrant does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what are the manuals not otherwise available to the public certain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter.

Mere generalization will not suffice and odes not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

Seizure of goods concealed to avoidduties/taxes Papa vs.MagoFacts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upona reliable information received on November 3,1966 to theeffect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedlymisdeclared and undervalued, would be released thefollowing day from the customs zone of the port of Manilaand loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitionerRicardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputizedagent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance atgate No.1of the customs zone.When the trucks left gate No.1 at about 4:30 in theafternoon of November 4,1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them atthe Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks,consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, wereseized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Uponinvestigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods andshowed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts ofDuties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501

", issued bythe Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain BienvenidoNaguit.The respondent Mago, filed a petition for mandamusand certiorari before the CFI Manila contending that thesearch and seizure is illegal for lack of a valid warrant.Moreover, she also contends that such articles sought fromher is not included by the law for prohibited importation andthat it no longer under the control of the Tariff and Customscode for it (articles) were already sold to the petitioner.She also contends that the search seizureconducted by the respondents are illegally being madeoutside the jurisdiction of the BOC and that the subsequentsearch warrant issued by the collector of customs is not validbeing not issued by a judge.The respondent Mago filed an ex-parte motion torelease the confiscated articles upon her posting a bond.This motion was then granted by the respondent JudgeJarencio.issue: Was the seizure of the goods unlawful? And that theBOC has no jurisdiction over the articles sought?Held: No. it is a valid seizure.The Chief of the Manila Police Department, RicardoG. Papa, having been deputized in writing by theCommissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of theenforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches,seizures, and arrests,and it washis duty tomake seizure,among others, of any cargo, articles or other movableproperty when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liablefor any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He couldlawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or othercontainer wherever found when he had reasonable cause tosuspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introducedinto the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop,search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonablysuspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G.Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect thesearch and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff andCustoms Code authorizes him to demand assistance of anypolice officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latterhas the legal duty to render said assistance. This was whathappened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, withhis unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucksloaded with the nine bales of goods in question at theAgrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Policeto make the interception of the cargo.Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companionpolicemen had authority to effect the seizure without anysearch warrant issued by a competent court.The Tariff and Customs Code does not require saidwarrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes personshaving police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff andCustoms Code to enter, pass through or search any land,inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwellinghouse; and also to inspect, search and examine any vesselor aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or anyperson on board, or stop and search and examine anyvehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveyingany dutiable or prohibited article introduced into thePhilippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of asearch warrant in said cases.It is our considered view, therefore, that except inthe case of the search of a dwelling house, personsexercising police authority under the customs law may effectsearch and seizure without a search warrant in theenforcement of customs laws.Note:The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers andjurisdiction, among others,(1)to assess and collect all lawfulrevenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees,charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff andcustoms laws;(2)to prevent and suppress smuggling andother frauds upon the customs; and(3)to enforce tariff andcustoms laws.The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, asshown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected onInformal Entry."Aslongastheimportation hasnotbeenterminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdictionof the Bureau of Customs.Importation is deemed terminated only upon thepayment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon thearticles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and thelegal permit for withdrawal shall have been grantedThe payment of the duties, taxes, fees and othercharges must be in full.People vs Malmstedt

Facts: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.Issue: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.Ruling: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport.A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The People of the Philippines vs Mikael Malmstedt The Swedish National with Hashish CaseFacts:MikaelMalmstedt,aSwedishnational,wasfound,viaaroutineNARCOMinspectionatKilometer14,Acop,TublayMountainProvince,carryingHashish,aderivativeofMarijuana.RTCLaTrinidadfoundhimguiltyforviolationoftheDangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the reversalof the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there wasno search warrant.Issue:Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or affirmed)because the accused argues that the search and arrest was made without a warrant

Held:The RTC decision is affirmed.

Ratio:The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a personwithout a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The offense was recognizedwith the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) thereceiptofinformationbyNARCOMthataCaucasiancomingfromSagadahadprohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately presenthis passport.

Harris v. United StatesFacts.Petitioner Harris sold narcotics out of his pawnshop, while wearing an unconcealed firearm. Under 18 U.S.C. Section: 924 (c)(1)(A), he was sentenced to seven years for brandishing his firearm. Petitioner argued that this was a statutory offence separate from the crime on which he had been convicted, and had to be proved under Apprendi.Issue.Whether [the] McMillan [case, which sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crimeBrief Fact Summary.Gun and narcotics dealer was given a higher sentence for brandishing a gun.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.McMillan is limit[ed] . . . to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jurys verdict.Facts of the CaseWilliam Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.

Question

Is McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, valid after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466?

Argument

Decision:5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) againstLegal provision:18 U.S.C. 924

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense, in which brandishing a firearm is a sentencing factor to be found by the judge, not an offense element to be found by the jury. Reaffirming McMillan, the Court also concluded that section 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional because basing a 2-year increase in the defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of brandishing does not evade the requirements of neither the Fifth and Sixth Amendments nor Apprendi. "Apprendi's conclusions do not undermine McMillan's. There was no comparable historical practice of submitting facts increasing the mandatory minimum to the jury, so the Apprendi rule did not extend to those facts," wrote Justice Kennedy.Statement of the case: The D contended that the weapon seized from his person and introduced into evidence was obtained through an illegal search, under the Fourth Amendment, and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress.

Procedure below: Petitioner sought review of a judgment from the Supreme Court of Ohio that affirmed petitioners lower court conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.

Statement of the facts: An officer observed two men standing on a street corner. One would walk up to a store window, look inside, and return to confer with his companion. This process was repeated about a dozen times. The suspects talked with a third man, then followed him up the street. Thinking the suspects were casing the store, the officer confronted the three men and asked their names. The men mumbled a response, at which time the officer spun one of the men, Terry (D), around and patted his breast. He found and removed a pistol. D was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. D moved to suppress this weapon from evidence. The trial judge denied his motion. The Ohio court of appeals affirmed, and the state supreme court dismissed Ds appeal.

Legal issue: Is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons when there is no probable cause for arrest?

Holding: An officer is justified in conducting a carefully limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be dangerous in order to discover any weapons which might be used to assault him or other nearby, even in the absence of probable cause for arrest and any weapons seized may be introduced in evidence.

Reasoning: (Warren, C.J.) No. An officer is justified in conducting a carefully limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be dangerous in order to discover any weapons which might be used to assault him or other nearby, even in the absence of probable cause for arrest. The exclusionary rule has limitations as a tool of judicial control. In some contexts, the rule will not be effective as a deterrent, and will potentially exact a high toll in human injury. The governments interest in preventing harm must be balanced against the invasion into a persons privacy. The policeman should use an objective test, and be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably justify the intrusion. Standard would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search Warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally protected rights! . The Court went on to say that, effective crime prevention and detection is a governmental interest in appropriate circumstances for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. It would be unreasonable to require that the policeman take unnecessary risks. He has a need to protect himself and others in situations where he lacks probable cause for arrest. In this case, nothing in the conduct of D and his friends dispelled the officers reasonable fear that they were armed. Affirmed, for P.

Concurrence: (Harlan, J.) An officer must have constitutional grounds on which to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. The right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.

Concurrence: (White, J.) A policeman can address questions to anyone on the streets, but citizens are not obliged to answer, and answers may not be compelled. A refusal to answer is no basis for an arrest, but it may be a basis for continued observation.

Dissent: (Douglas, J.) Infringement of ones personal liberty is only reasonable if probable cause is present. The majority gives a policeman more authority to make a seizure and conduct a search than a judge has.

Critical summary: This case represents a delineation between a reasonable belief and a reasonable suspicion. Probable cause= reasonable belief. Stop and Frisk = reasonable suspicion backed by articulable facts.

Facts.The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue.Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Constitution)?

Brief Fact Summary.The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the Petitioner), was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.Posadas vs CAFacts:Members of the IntegratedNationalPolice (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with theIntelligenceTask Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal MemorialCollegesthey spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)caliber.38 Smith & WessonrevolverwithSerialNo. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38calibergun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22calibergun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue:Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held:In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that underSection12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of acommissionof an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the policeofficersto inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the policeofficersto search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such anexercisemay prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Clearly,the searchin the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches andseizureshas not been violated.Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur

Facts:

One Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities at the Davao del Sur Constabulary HQ.

He testified that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him as member of NPA. Burgos threatened him with the use of a firearm. Masamlok attended the seminar where Burgos spoke about his membership with the NPA and the organizations desire to overthrow the government.

Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to house of accused. Accused was plowing the field when they arrived.

Pat. Bioco called accused and asked him about the firearm. Accused denied possession of said firearm but later, his wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.

After the recovery of said firearm, accused pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered:

14 marron notebook

15 pamphlets: Ang Byan, Pahayagan ng Paritdo Komunista ng Pilipinas ets

Accused admitted that firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimines, team leader of sparro unit.

RTC: convicted

Issue: WON warrantless arrest was valid

Held: NO

Ratio:

Not under the conditions provided in rules

1. The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.

2. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator

3. Under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that a person to be arrested has committed a crime; a crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

Issue: WON search was valid

Held: NO

Ratio:

If an arrest without a warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful.

16 There was to waiver to search in case at bar.

To constitute waiver, 3 requisites must concur:

1. that the right exists

2. that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right

3. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right

Others:

17 denied of right to counsel during custodial interrogation

18 counsel was only called when accused subscribed under oath his statement

Masamloks testimony was uncorroborated. He was an interested witness. Wanted trade-off: membership with Civil Home Defense Force.

Disposition. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

ACQUITTED.Cruz vs. GatanFacts: Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents onAugust 30 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along KennonRoad, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, SanFernando, Pampanga, under the command of respondentGen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial interrogation, where he ispresently detained.On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance ofa writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf wherein it wasclaimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held incommunicado;that he is restrained of his liberty without due process of lawand is in the custody of the respondent not by virtue of ajudgment or court order; that he is not a member of anysubversive organization covered by Proclamation No.1081and falls within the clays of persons to whom the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended.The petitioner is said to be an over-all Commanderand Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command,an unregistered veterans outfit. He is thus allegedly violatedArt.147 of the RPC (Illegal Associations).Subsequently, the counsel for the petitionerhowever calimed after a discussion with the petitionerclaimed that his continued detention is the free will andvolition of the petitioner who expressed fears that he mightbe harmed or injured by some members of the "BataanDefenders Command" if he were free from custody while themastermind and legal counsel of the association, one Atty.Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested.

Issue:Was the petitioner illegally detained?

Held: No. The privilege of writ of habeas corpus wassuspended by virtue of the declaration of PD 1081.Moreover, the case (petition for habeas corpus) becamemoot and academic since the petitioner voluntarily give itsconsent for its detention due to threats.The petitioner in the instant case was arrested anddetained by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Orderissued by the Secretary of National Defense for violation ofArticle147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to theaforequoted General Order No. 2-A, as amended; hence, hisarrest and continued detention is legal. The declaration ofmartial law and the consequent suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonablybelieved or charged to be engaged in the disorder or infomenting it having been settled in the case of Aquino, Jr. vs.Ponce Enrile etc., et al., any inquiry by this Court into thecontinued detention of the petitioner would be purposeless.G.R. No. 38715, People v. Noynay and Ruiz

September 15, 1933

G.R. No. 38715THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARTIN NOYNAY and BUENAVENTURA RUIZ, defendants, BUENAVENTURA RUIZ, appellant.

M.G. Bustos for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.Vickers,J.:Martin Noynay and Buenaventura Ruiz were charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the crime of asesinato, committed as follows:

Que en o hacia el 28 de agosto de 1932, en el Municipio de Medellin, Provincia de Cebu, Islas Filipinas, los referidos acusados, corcertando entre si y ayudandose mutuamente provistos de armas mortiferas punzo cortantes, con premeditacion conocida yalevosia, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente atacaron y agredieron a Silvestre Arriesgado, infiriendole lesiones en diferentes partes del cuerpoqueprodujeron la muerta instantanea del mencionado Silvestre Arriesgado.

After hearing the evidence, Judge Fortunato Borromeo Veloso found the defendants guilty of homicide with the presence of the mitigating circumstances of No. 4 and No. 6 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to suffer eight years and one day ofreclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs.

The defendant Buenaventura Ruiz appealed to this court, and his attorneyde oficiomakes the following assignments of error:

I. El Juzgado inferior erro al no declararquelas pruebas de la acusacion no establecen fuera de toda duda racional la culpabilidad del acusado Buenaventura Ruiz.

II. El Tribunal de origen tambien erro al no declararquela preponderancia de las pruebas, al menos, esta en favor del acusado Buenaventura Ruiz, yque, por tanto, si no ha demostrado concluyentemente la inocencia de este por la naturaleza de las pruebas obrates en autos, debe ser absuelto siquiera por duda racional.

III. Finalmente erro al no absolver libremente al acusado ahora apelante Buenaventura Ruiz.

The facts of the case are as follows:

A carabao belonging to Martin Noynay was destroying sugar cane planted by the deceased Silvestre Arriesgado. The deceased caught the carabao and took it to the house of Martin Noynay. The deceased was accompanied by his son, Jose, who was 9 years old. When they reached the house of Martin Noynay, they found him and the appellant Buenaventura Ruiz. The deceased told Noynay that his carabao had destroyed the sugar cane and that he had to pay the damages. Noynay replied that he did not have to pay anything because his carabao was tied. The deceased then told Noynay that if he did not wish to pay, he would take the carabao to the lieutenant of thebarrio, and started to do so. Thereupon Noynay grabbed a spear from the azotea of his house, and he and Buenaventura Ruiz pursued the deceased. The deceased began to run, but he was over taken under a tree about 82 meters from the house of Martin Noynay. Jose Arriesgado ran and hid behind some clumps of maguey, and from there he saw Martin Noynay stab the deceased in the shoulder with a spear. The deceased picked up a stone and threw it at Noynay, striking him in the forehead. Noynay stabbed the deceased in the side with the spear. The appellant Buenaventura Ruiz then said let us finish him, and stabbed the deceased twice in the breast with a dagger. The defendants ran away, Martin Noynay going towards his house, and the appellant towards the provincial road. Jose Arriesgado then went to the place where his father had fallen, and a few moments later the wounded man died.

Rosa Malinao, the wife of the deceased, after being told by her daughter Maria that the defendants were pursuing the deceased, ran towards the scene of the crime and saw the defendants running away. She then went to the place where her husband had been killed, and found there her son Jose, who was crying. When she asked him who had killed his father, he replied that Martin Noynay and Buenaventura Ruiz had killed him; and when asked why they had attacked his father, he replied that it was because the deceased had taken the carabao to Martin Noynay and demanded payment for the sugar cane the carabao had destroyed.

The appellant Buenaventura Ruiz set up as his defense an alibi, alleging that when the deceased was killed he, the appellant, was in a cockpit 7 kilometer away.

The evidence was carefully considered by the trial judge. It leaves no doubt in our minds as to the guilt of the appellant. We not only have the testimony of Jose Arriesgado as to the direct participation of the appellant in the crime, and the testimony of the wife of the deceased that she saw the appellant as well as his coaccused running away from the scene of the crime, but also the fact that the corpse of Silvestre Arriesgado showed that he had been wounded with two different kinds of instruments.

Feliciano Pepito testified that at noon on the day in question he met the appellant going towards the house of Noynay. It should be recalled here that the appellant and Noynay were related by marriage. Agripina de la Rama saw the appellant about noon going from the scene of the crime towards the provincial road. This testimony completely refutes the contention of the appellant that he was in the cockpit from 10 oclock in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, and destroys his alibi.

The trial judge found that the defendants were entitled to the benefit of two mitigating circumstances, provocation on the part of the deceased and the obfuscation of the accused. The evidence does not warrant a finding that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act of the defendants. The action of the deceased in taking the carabao to Noynay and demanding payment for the sugar cane destroyed, and in taking the carabao to the lieutenant of thebarriowhen Noynay refused to pay was perfectly legal and proper and constituted no reasonable cause for provocation as to Noynay and certainly none at all as far as the appellant was concerned. The finding that the defendants acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation was likewise not justified by the evidence of record. The deceased, as we have said, was clearly within his right in what he did. The defendants, without any rational cause for provocation, pursued the deceased and deliberately killed him. In order to be entitled to this mitigating circumstances, it must appear that the obfuscation of the accused arose from lawful sentiments. The fact that an offense was committed in an uncontrollable burst of passion (con arrebato y obcecacion) should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts. (U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162.)

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant Buenaventura Ruiz is sentenced to suffer fourteen years, eight months, and one day ofreclusion temporal, instead of the prison sentenced imposed by the lower court. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

D E C I S I O N(En Banc)PUNO,J.:I.THE FACTSAs a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretappedmobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warnedin a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority.It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and theKapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas(KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

II.THE ISSUES1.Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?

2.Did themere press statementsof respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

III.THE RULING[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement was concerned.]1.NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the pressbased on contentis given thestrictest scrutiny,with thegovernmenthavingtheburdenof overcoming the presumedunconstitutionality by theclear and present danger rule.This rule applies equally toallkinds of media,includingbroadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test.[T]hegreat evilwhich government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version.Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule thatnot every violation of a law will justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Ourlaws are of different kindsand doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation,by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press.In fine,violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press.Thetotality of the injurious effectsof the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test,the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluingviolationsof law.By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecutedbythe State for they breed their own evil consequence.But to repeat,the need to prevent their violation cannot per setrump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers thenational security of the State.

2.YES, themere press statementsof respondents DOJSecretaryand the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.[I]tisnotdecisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media.Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an officialcapacityis covered by the rule on prior restraint.The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circularwill result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA

Facts:Petitioner has atelevisionprogram entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired onChannel2 every Saturday and onChannel13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondentBoardofReviewfor Moving Pictures andTelevisionthe VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. TheBoardclassified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of itsTV SeriesNo. 128 which allowed it through a letter of formerExecutiveSecretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendezreversingthe decision of the respondentBoard. According to the letter the episode in isprotected bythe constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondentBoardacted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In theirAnswer, respondentBoardinvoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of theRevisedPenal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literaltranslationof the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. Theboardcontended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue:Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.

Held:Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondentBoardto overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. attack is different from offend any race or religion. The respondentBoardmay disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondentboardcannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especiallythe gravityand imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as aBoardof Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

Espuelas vs People

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

Espuelas vs People G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951

Facts:On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.Issue:Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?Held:Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27,1948]Facts:An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to thegovernment. The reason alleged by the respondent in hisdefensefor refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in theirgovernment, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches ofthe peaceand a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to localgovernment. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as amisdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturbthe peaceor excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1

Issue:Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held:Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, saidsectionprovides for twoconstructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or processionin the streetsand other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the secondconstruction. Firstconstructiontantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system ofgovernmentno suchunlimitedpower may be validly granted to anyofficerof thegovernment, except perhaps in cases ofnationalemergency.The Mayors firstdefenseis untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing

ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

2. Facts:Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing andsellingpostage stampscommemorative of the 33rdInternationalEucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of theseparation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance ofpostage stampsas would be advantageous to thegovernment.

Issue:Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held:What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to thegovernment does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling tofavora particular church or religiousdenomination. They were not sold for the benefit of theRoman CatholicChurch. Thepostage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of thePhilippinesand thelocationof Manila, with the words Seat XXXIIIInternationalEucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise thePhilippinesand attract more tourists, theofficialsmerely took advantage of an event considered ofinternationalimportance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with theRoman CatholicChurch, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of theGovernment.

Facts:New YorksEducationLaw requires local public school authorities to lendtextbooksfree of chargeto allstudentsin grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. TheBoard of Educationcontended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State andFederalConstitutions. An order barring the Commissioner ofEducation(Allen) from removing appellants members from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase oftextbooksto be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. TheNew York Courtof Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

Issue:Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held:Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked forthe biblesand other religiouspamphletswas in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engagedin the businessor occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to saidbusiness, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax thebusinessof plaintiff Society.

WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.

SWAGGART MINISTRIES v. CALIFORNIA BOARD OF EQUALIZATION

Facts of the Case

California law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct and mail-order "evangelistic crusades." After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization ("Board") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.

Question

Did California's imposition of a sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials violate the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision:9 votes for California Board of Equalization, 0 vote(s) againstLegal provision:Free Exercise of Religion

No. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.FREEDOM OF RELIGIONA.C. No. L-350. August 7, 1959GenaroGerona, et al.vs. Secretary ofEducation, et al.106 Phil 2FACTS:RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rule Dep Order 8 says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge. Geronas children attendingtheBuenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is prohibited in their religion and because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Sec of Ed that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. Sec of Ed denied the petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.

ISSUE:Is Dep Order 8 unconstitutional?

RULING:Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-

Discriminatory therefore it is constitutional. The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but its exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield. Petitioners salute the flag during boy scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education.

330 US 1 February 10, 1947Arch R Everson v. Board of EducationFacts:NJ enacted a law that gave School Dist authority to make rules and cases pertaining to the transportation of children to and from schools. Board of Ed authorized reimbursement of money paid by parents for bus transportation of their kids who rode public transit to school. Some of this money was paid for the transportation of some kids to parochial schoolsCatholic.

Issue:Whether the NJ statute or the Board resolution, authorizing the reimbursement of tax funds to parents with students of parochial schools, unconstitutionally regulates the establishment of religion?

Ruling:No, under the facts the 1stAmend does not bar NJ from spending tax funds to pay the bus fares of parochial students under a general program that reimburses the fares of students who attend other schools. As a general program NJ law is neutral in its application.

319 US 624 June 14, 1943West Virginia State Board of Education v. BarnetteFacts.In 1942, the Petitioner adopted a rule that forced all teachers and pupils to pledge allegiance the nations flag each day. If the student refused he would be found insubordinate and expelled from school. He would not be readmitted to school until he conformed. Meanwhile, he was considered to be unlawfully absent and subject to delinquency hearings. The parents could be fined $50 per day with a jail term not to exceed 30 days. The Respondent asked for an exception for all Jehovahs Witnesses because this pledge goes against their religious belief. But he was denied an exception.Issue.Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution?

Ruling:Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individuals intellect and right to choose their own beliefs. The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long as the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The state has not power to mandatee allegiance in hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is something the citizens will choose or not.

G.R. NO. 95770 March 1, 1993Ebralinag v division superintendent of schools of cebu219 SCRA 256FACTS:Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Cebu.Public schoolauthorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing thenational anthemand recite the pledge required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against theirteachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom.

Issue:Has religious freedom been violated?

Held:Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt suchceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is exemption from flagceremonies and not exclusion from publicschools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does nottotallyconstitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of theschool curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified. Expulsion is ANNULLED.

G.R. NO. 45459 MARCH 13, 1937AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ 64 PHIL 201Facts:Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue:Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held:What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994MARTIN CENTENO,vs.HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS 236 SCRA 197Facts:The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikaylaunched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.

Issue:Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?

Ruling:No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

Cox v. New Hampshire312 U.S. 569 (1941)Facts:A group of Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for engaging in a public parade without obtaining a permit. The defendants assembled at their church and divided into smaller groups that marched along sidewalks, displayed signs, and handed out leaflets announcing a later meeting. They claimed that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated including their rights to freedom of worship and freedom of assembly.

Issue:Whether time, place, and manner restrictions on holding a parade violate the First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.

Ruling:No. A unanimous Supreme Court, via Justice Charles Evans Hughes, held that, although the government cannot regulate the contents of speech, it can place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech for the public safety. The Court held that the New Hampshire law was not meant to prohibit speech, but simply to regulate it when it took the form of a parade or other form of large gathering. The Court said that the government had a legitimate interest in keeping order at such events, and it could impose a fee for the license that was proportional to the amount of police presence that would be required to ensure the peaceable nature of the event.

G.R. L-5917 JANUARY 28, 1955FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS 96 PHIL 417Facts:Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render anaccountingof his administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was anaccounting of his administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church ofAmerica. CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render anaccounting of his admistration. CA affirmed the decision of the CFIIssue:Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.Held:Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws

To finally dispose ofthe propertyissue,the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictlyindependentof any other superior ecclesiasticalassociation(such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.

G.R. L-53487 MAY 25, 1981GARCES VS. ESTENZO 104 SCRA 510Facts:Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refusedto returnthe image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against thepriestfor the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointe