CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE INTO THE 1990s CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE INTO THE 1990s

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE INTO

THE 1990s

Thomas Boyd-Carpenter

Palgrave Macmillan

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE INTO

THE 1990s

Thomas Boyd-Carpenter

Palgrave Macmillan

ISBN 978-1-349-10504-5 ISBN 978-1-349-10502-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-10502-1

© Royal United Services Institute, 1989 Foreword© Michael Heseltine, 1989 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1989 978-0-333-47593-5

All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

First published in the United States of America in 1989

ISBN 978-0-312-02511-3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Conventional deterrence into the 1990s Includes index. 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Armed Forces. 2. Europe-Defenses. 3. Deterrence (Strategy) 4. Warfare, Conventional. I. Boyd-Carpenter, Thomas. UA646.3.C66 1989 355' .031'091821 88-30617 ISBN 978-0-312-02511-3

To my family To my family

Contents

Foreword by the Rt Hon Michael Heseltine, MP Notes on the Contributors List of Abbreviations

PART I

1 Introduction

2 The Political Context of Deterrence

3 Matching the Future

4 A Prescription for Britain

PART II 5 Defence: A Sense of Balance

The Rt Hon George Younger, MP

6 US Military Power and Global Security Admiral William 1. Crowe, USN

7 Smart Weapons: Trends and Capabilities Dr A. R. Newbery

ix xi

xiii

3

7

44

85

99

112

121 8 Defence Procurement and the Impact of High Technology

Thomas A. Campobasso 131

9 Cooperation and Competition: The Western European Contribution to Alliance Security Policies Professor Sir Ronald Mason 138

10 The Land Battle and the Army's Needs General Hans Henning von Sandrart 143

11 The Future of LandfAir Warfare General Sir Nigel Bagnall 151

Vll

Contents

Foreword by the Rt Hon Michael Heseltine, MP Notes on the Contributors List of Abbreviations

PART I

1 Introduction

2 The Political Context of Deterrence

3 Matching the Future

4 A Prescription for Britain

PART II 5 Defence: A Sense of Balance

The Rt Hon George Younger, MP

6 US Military Power and Global Security Admiral William 1. Crowe, USN

7 Smart Weapons: Trends and Capabilities Dr A. R. Newbery

ix xi

xiii

3

7

44

85

99

112

121 8 Defence Procurement and the Impact of High Technology

Thomas A. Campobasso 131

9 Cooperation and Competition: The Western European Contribution to Alliance Security Policies Professor Sir Ronald Mason 138

10 The Land Battle and the Army's Needs General Hans Henning von Sandrart 143

11 The Future of LandfAir Warfare General Sir Nigel Bagnall 151

Vll

viii Contents

12 Air Force Capabilities Lieutenant General Walter Schmitz 157

13 Defence and International Security: Transatlantic Perspectives Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dalton 166

14 Future Alliance Policies Professor Laurence W. Martin

Index

177 187

viii Contents

12 Air Force Capabilities Lieutenant General Walter Schmitz 157

13 Defence and International Security: Transatlantic Perspectives Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dalton 166

14 Future Alliance Policies Professor Laurence W. Martin

Index

177 187

Foreword Conventional Deterrence into the 1990s contains a selection of RUSI lectures by eminent figures in the defence field including the UK Secretary of State for Defence, the US Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and a former Chief of the General Staff and are drawn together by an introductory essay by Major General Thomas Boyd Carpenter. The book serves as a timely reminder. Thomas Boyd Carpenter is a man profoundly concerned with defence, its philosophy and its means. At the moment when from one end of what Mr Reagan called 'the evil empire' to the other riots, disturbances and protests provoke uncharacteristically moderate response, the Russian army saves what it can from its retreat from Afghanistan and the first of the SS20s have already been decommissioned, it would be just too easy for the West to forget the harsh experiences of the twentieth century.

The world is enjoying a ringside seat at a fascinating political spectacle as Mr Gorbachev tries to teach the Russian people new tricks. This does not seem the stuff of menace or threat. And if the face of aggressive communism has for the moment been turned from sight, in a more profound sense the whole world has moved on from the centralist intolerance and control upon which that philosophy was based. Nationalism has proved more durable than the international brotherhood of man; the dominoes remain resolutely upright. Individualism has survived the socialist experiment and it is to the practices of economic pluralism that tomorrow belongs.

That is why this is an important book. The maintainance of adequate defence, the articulation of the need for it and the expenditure associated with it are easier to ensure when the enemy is visible, glowering and of self-evident danger. Public opinion is notoriously fickle and, as memories fade and new generations emerge, it is all too easy for the lessons of history to lose their immediate significance.

It is quite impossible to predict where Mr Gorbachev's reforms will lead, or whether even he will survive. If Russians grow tired of dissent at their frontiers and see little economic progress at home, a post-Gorbachev regime could return to a more traditional foreign policy. Then Western security could only be prejudiced if our deterrence had in the meantime been impaired. On the other hand,

lX

Foreword Conventional Deterrence into the 1990s contains a selection of RUSI lectures by eminent figures in the defence field including the UK Secretary of State for Defence, the US Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and a former Chief of the General Staff and are drawn together by an introductory essay by Major General Thomas Boyd Carpenter. The book serves as a timely reminder. Thomas Boyd Carpenter is a man profoundly concerned with defence, its philosophy and its means. At the moment when from one end of what Mr Reagan called 'the evil empire' to the other riots, disturbances and protests provoke uncharacteristically moderate response, the Russian army saves what it can from its retreat from Afghanistan and the first of the SS20s have already been decommissioned, it would be just too easy for the West to forget the harsh experiences of the twentieth century.

The world is enjoying a ringside seat at a fascinating political spectacle as Mr Gorbachev tries to teach the Russian people new tricks. This does not seem the stuff of menace or threat. And if the face of aggressive communism has for the moment been turned from sight, in a more profound sense the whole world has moved on from the centralist intolerance and control upon which that philosophy was based. Nationalism has proved more durable than the international brotherhood of man; the dominoes remain resolutely upright. Individualism has survived the socialist experiment and it is to the practices of economic pluralism that tomorrow belongs.

That is why this is an important book. The maintainance of adequate defence, the articulation of the need for it and the expenditure associated with it are easier to ensure when the enemy is visible, glowering and of self-evident danger. Public opinion is notoriously fickle and, as memories fade and new generations emerge, it is all too easy for the lessons of history to lose their immediate significance.

It is quite impossible to predict where Mr Gorbachev's reforms will lead, or whether even he will survive. If Russians grow tired of dissent at their frontiers and see little economic progress at home, a post-Gorbachev regime could return to a more traditional foreign policy. Then Western security could only be prejudiced if our deterrence had in the meantime been impaired. On the other hand,

lX

x Foreword

if perestroika actually results in an unleashing of the national independence of the nation-states of central Europe, there is nothing to argue that this automatically offers future stability in a part of the world that has been the birth-place of two cataclysmic wars. Safety depends on security in deterrence. If Mr Gorbachev actually achieves the near miracle of securing Western-style economic performance from his sluggish economy, it hardly follows that this will result in a reduction in Soviet military strength. Far more credible is the historic view that the Soviet Union will spend what she must to satisfy her traditionally perceived defence requirements but that in these changed circumstances she would be all the more able to do so without crippling her economy.

The case for defence through deterrence therefore remains. But no situation is static. Understandably, the USA will continue to press Europe to act as a more effective partner in her own defence. And so she should. Without American postwar leadership it is hardly credible that Europe would have found the physical or human resources, let alone achieved the technical superiority (particularly in the nuclear field), to mobilise such coherent deterrence. But the economic balance of the Atlantic is shifting. The aspirations of Europe are rising. America's perception of her own self-interest is changing and will change further as the political profile of that country shifts south and west towards the Pacific. The European peoples should by now have progressed further than they have in coordinating both a political strategy and their military capability, particularly in arms procurement. The timetable must be stepped up.

And as an integrated Europe draws closer, some will see it as an excuse to encourage the USA to leave. I see it as the best hope to persuade the USA to stay in Europe.

Our strategy must anticipate both what we would like Mr Gorbachev to achieve and also the risk that he may fail. I doubt if we will move towards lower levels of defence expenditure even if conventional or nuclear arms limitation presents practical and prudent options. Any such options must include the continuing modernisation of a nuclear and conventional strength adequate to provide deterrence in all circumstances, and this will not be secured cheaply.

This book sets out in great detail the conventional choices and priorities we face. Within the nuclear shield their careful selection will remain the only lasting guarantee of peace.

Rt Hon MICHAEL HESELTINE, MP

x Foreword

if perestroika actually results in an unleashing of the national independence of the nation-states of central Europe, there is nothing to argue that this automatically offers future stability in a part of the world that has been the birth-place of two cataclysmic wars. Safety depends on security in deterrence. If Mr Gorbachev actually achieves the near miracle of securing Western-style economic performance from his sluggish economy, it hardly follows that this will result in a reduction in Soviet military strength. Far more credible is the historic view that the Soviet Union will spend what she must to satisfy her traditionally perceived defence requirements but that in these changed circumstances she would be all the more able to do so without crippling her economy.

The case for defence through deterrence therefore remains. But no situation is static. Understandably, the USA will continue to press Europe to act as a more effective partner in her own defence. And so she should. Without American postwar leadership it is hardly credible that Europe would have found the physical or human resources, let alone achieved the technical superiority (particularly in the nuclear field), to mobilise such coherent deterrence. But the economic balance of the Atlantic is shifting. The aspirations of Europe are rising. America's perception of her own self-interest is changing and will change further as the political profile of that country shifts south and west towards the Pacific. The European peoples should by now have progressed further than they have in coordinating both a political strategy and their military capability, particularly in arms procurement. The timetable must be stepped up.

And as an integrated Europe draws closer, some will see it as an excuse to encourage the USA to leave. I see it as the best hope to persuade the USA to stay in Europe.

Our strategy must anticipate both what we would like Mr Gorbachev to achieve and also the risk that he may fail. I doubt if we will move towards lower levels of defence expenditure even if conventional or nuclear arms limitation presents practical and prudent options. Any such options must include the continuing modernisation of a nuclear and conventional strength adequate to provide deterrence in all circumstances, and this will not be secured cheaply.

This book sets out in great detail the conventional choices and priorities we face. Within the nuclear shield their careful selection will remain the only lasting guarantee of peace.

Rt Hon MICHAEL HESELTINE, MP

Notes on the Contributors*

Thomas Boyd-Carpenter joined the Scots Guards in 1956. He is currently Chief of Staff, Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine and was formerly Director of Defence Policy in the Central Staff of the UK Ministry of Defence. (The views expressed by the author in this volume are his alone and do not reflect official opinion.)

The Rt Hon George Younger, MP, is Secretary of State for Defence.

Admiral William J. Crowe, US Navy, is Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dr A. R. Newbery is Superintendent of A W3 Division, Attack Weapons Department, RAE Farnborough.

Thomas A. Campobasso is Vice President, International Marketing and Regional Management, Rockwell International Corporation.

Professor Sir Ronald Mason is a former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Ministry of Defence.

General Hans Henning von Sandrart is Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINCENT). His article is based on an address delivered as part of the Slessor Symposium 'Land-Air Warfare: Past, Present and Future' held at the RUSI in 1987.

"'In order of contributions.

xi

Notes on the Contributors*

Thomas Boyd-Carpenter joined the Scots Guards in 1956. He is currently Chief of Staff, Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine and was formerly Director of Defence Policy in the Central Staff of the UK Ministry of Defence. (The views expressed by the author in this volume are his alone and do not reflect official opinion.)

The Rt Hon George Younger, MP, is Secretary of State for Defence.

Admiral William J. Crowe, US Navy, is Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dr A. R. Newbery is Superintendent of A W3 Division, Attack Weapons Department, RAE Farnborough.

Thomas A. Campobasso is Vice President, International Marketing and Regional Management, Rockwell International Corporation.

Professor Sir Ronald Mason is a former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Ministry of Defence.

General Hans Henning von Sandrart is Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINCENT). His article is based on an address delivered as part of the Slessor Symposium 'Land-Air Warfare: Past, Present and Future' held at the RUSI in 1987.

"'In order of contributions.

xi

xii Notes on the Contributors

General (now Field Marshal) Sir Nigel Bagnall is a former Chief of the General Staff and a former Commander of the Northern Army Group. This article stems from the Slessor Symposium on Land-Air Warfare.

Lieutenant General Walter Schmitz is currently Chief of General Air Force Office, Koln, and a former Commander Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF). (His article stems from the Slessor Symposium on Land-Air Warfare.)

Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dalton, KCB, was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic from 1984 to 1987.

Professor Laurence W:Martin is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and formerly Professor of War Studies at King's College, London.

xii Notes on the Contributors

General (now Field Marshal) Sir Nigel Bagnall is a former Chief of the General Staff and a former Commander of the Northern Army Group. This article stems from the Slessor Symposium on Land-Air Warfare.

Lieutenant General Walter Schmitz is currently Chief of General Air Force Office, Koln, and a former Commander Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF). (His article stems from the Slessor Symposium on Land-Air Warfare.)

Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dalton, KCB, was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic from 1984 to 1987.

Professor Laurence W:Martin is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and formerly Professor of War Studies at King's College, London.

List of Abbreviations

AAFCE ABM ACE ACLANT AEW AFCENT AMRAAM ASM ASRAAM ATAF ATOC BALTAP BAOR CCM CDE CENTAG CINCENT CINCHAN CM CMF COCOM CSCE CVBG EEC EFP FOFA GDP IEPG IFF INF

Allied Air Forces Central Europe Anti-Ballistic Missile Allied Command Europe Allied Command Atlantic NATO Airborne Early Warning Allied Forces Central Europe Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile Anti-Ship Guided Missile Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile Allied Tactical Air Force Allied Tactical Operations Centre Baltic Approaches British Army of the Rhine Counter-Counter-Measures Conference on Disarmament in Europe Central Army Group Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe Commander-in-Chief Channel Counter-Measures Conceptual Military Framework Coordinating Committee (on East-West trade) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Carrier Battle Group . European Economic Community Explosively Formed Projectile Follow on Forces Attack General Defence Plan Independent European Programme Group Identification, Friend or Foe Intermediate Nuclear Forces

xiii

List of Abbreviations

AAFCE ABM ACE ACLANT AEW AFCENT AMRAAM ASM ASRAAM ATAF ATOC BALTAP BAOR CCM CDE CENTAG CINCENT CINCHAN CM CMF COCOM CSCE CVBG EEC EFP FOFA GDP IEPG IFF INF

Allied Air Forces Central Europe Anti-Ballistic Missile Allied Command Europe Allied Command Atlantic NATO Airborne Early Warning Allied Forces Central Europe Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile Anti-Ship Guided Missile Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile Allied Tactical Air Force Allied Tactical Operations Centre Baltic Approaches British Army of the Rhine Counter-Counter-Measures Conference on Disarmament in Europe Central Army Group Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe Commander-in-Chief Channel Counter-Measures Conceptual Military Framework Coordinating Committee (on East-West trade) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Carrier Battle Group . European Economic Community Explosively Formed Projectile Follow on Forces Attack General Defence Plan Independent European Programme Group Identification, Friend or Foe Intermediate Nuclear Forces

xiii

xiv List of Abbreviations

IR Infra-Red LRINF Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces LRSOM Long Range Stand-Off Missile MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MLF Multi-Lateral Force MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MNC Major NATO Commander MSOW Modular Stand-Off Weapons NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NORTHAG Northern Army Group OMG Operational Manoeuvre Group SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SADARM Search and Destroy Armour SAM Surface to Air Missile SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SLOC Sealines of Communication SSBN Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine SSN Nuclear powered (Attack) submarine TGSM Terminally Guided Sub munition UKMF United Kingdom Mobile Force WEU Western European Union

xiv List of Abbreviations

IR Infra-Red LRINF Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces LRSOM Long Range Stand-Off Missile MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MLF Multi-Lateral Force MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MNC Major NATO Commander MSOW Modular Stand-Off Weapons NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NORTHAG Northern Army Group OMG Operational Manoeuvre Group SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SADARM Search and Destroy Armour SAM Surface to Air Missile SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SLOC Sealines of Communication SSBN Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine SSN Nuclear powered (Attack) submarine TGSM Terminally Guided Sub munition UKMF United Kingdom Mobile Force WEU Western European Union