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Dossiê Temático No 04/2009

Cooperação Policial-

Judiciária na União Européia

Bolsista Responsável:

Anaís Medeiros Passos

Porto Alegre, Setembro/2009

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Sumário

1.Documentos acadêmicos

1.1 Justice and Home Affairs Issues at the European Union Level…………………….3

1.2 Replacing and Displacing the Law: the Europeanisation of Judicial Power………16

1.3 Europol y el Modelo europeo de inteligencia criminal: una respuesta no estatal a la

delincuencia organizada..................................................................................................22

2. Clipping de notícias.....................................................................................................30

3.Leituras recomendadas

3.1 Documentos acadêmicos...........................................................................................52

3.2 Documentos oficiais..................................................................................................53

4.Anexos

4.1 Tabelas

4.1.1 Síntese da Evolução da Cooperação Policial-Judiciária na União Européia,

Estados Unidos e América Latina...................................................................................55

4.1.2 Agências de segurança............................................................................................56

4.2 Esquemas

4.2.1 Prerogatives and competencies of the European security Agencies……………...59

4.2.2 Technology, inter-connexion of data-bases and intelligence-led approaches……59

4.2.3 The Legal Bases and the European Field of the Profesionals of Security……......60

4.2.4 The position of the Security Agencies and unites in the Process of

Europeanization...............................................................................................................60

4.2.5 Mapping of the Security European Agencies…………………………………….61

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1. Documentos Acadêmicos

1.1 Justice and Home Affairs Issues at the European Union Level

Fonte: GUILD, E.; GEYER, F. Justice and Home Affairs Issues at the European Union Level. Written

evidence submitted by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) to The SELECT COMMITTEE

ON HOME AFFAIRS House of Commons. Nov 2006. Disponível em: www.ceps.eu. Acesso em 09 set

2009.

Further European integration in the field of police and judicial cooperation in

criminal matters is at the crossroads. While its JHA sibling – asylum and immigration –

was able to emancipate itself from the ―Third Pillar‖, police and judicial cooperation in

criminal matters was forced to stay under the Union‘s wings. Since their separation

enacted by the Amsterdam developments. A comparison elucidates that police and

judicial cooperation in criminal matters has done considerably worse and currently

suffers from a high degree of inconsistencies.

Inconsistencies on various levels:

a) Traditional inconsistencies among legal systems of member states.

b) New European inconsistencies emanating from the fragmented participation in

Schengen structures.

c) Institutional inconsistencies resulting from EU pillar structures.

d) Conceptual inconsistencies by focusing on security and failing to pay sufficient

attention and priority to the citizens, civil liberties and fundamental rights.

It is the principle of mutual recognition that tries to address the first

inconsistency. It was conceived as a means to avoid harmonization and to conserve the

difference of different legal systems while at the same time allowing for a certain degree

of effective European cooperation. Experience has shown, however, that it most

probably has not delivered the expected results. A reassessment of mutual recognition is

currently taking place. Its results might lead to a more open minded approach towards

the continuously defied instrument of approximation of laws.

The Schengen inconsistency - with two Member States voluntarily only partly

―in‖ and ten Member States involuntarily ―out‖ - must be ended as soon as possible.

The two might not be convinced to enter, but for the willing ten every possible effort

must be made to realize their complete participation. Only this guarantees, e.g. that a

genuinely European instrument like the European Arrest warrant is not dependent on an

unaccountable international tool like Interpol to be effectively disseminated among EU

Member States.

Attempts to avoid the institutional inconsistency have only recently failed. This

is regrettable as a majority of actors, e.g. Member States, Parliament and Commission

has been prepared and willing to address the undisputed lack of democratic and judicial

control within the Third Pillar.

With regard to the conceptual inconsistency, unfortunately there appears to be

no sign of change. Judicial and practical cooperation in criminal matters is still focusing

on ―security‖. ―Security‖ and ―freedom‖ are presented as antithetical values that

supposedly require a balancing procedure. Coercive security, however, cannot be

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divorced from rule of law, civil liberties and fundamental rights. Instead, security must

be understood as a flanking measure to secure freedom within the rule of law.

These conclusions will be elaborated in the course of this paper. It presents a

comprehensive set of answers to the main questions raised by the Select Committee on

Home Affairs of the House of Commons.

List of Questions and answers

1. The current state of progress in developing practical co-operation between

member states in the JHA field, and future options in this area.

• What benefits have accrued so far from practical co-operation between law

enforcement and judicial authorities?

Answer: To assess the ―benefits of practical cooperation between law

enforcement and judicial authorities‖ within the context of European JHA policies is not

an easy task. Statistics are not necessarily available or may not provide the whole

picture. This is particularly true for statistics dealing with the question to which extent

judicial authorities of Member States use different possibilities provided by European

law.1 Apart from this technical problem, the very concept of ―benefit‖ may vary from

different points of view: what might be beneficial from a law enforcement‘s perspective

might be highly detrimental to civil liberties and fundamental freedoms.

Attention must further be given to the fact that European co-operation in

instruments that aim to facilitate immediate cooperation between competent authorities

of Member States on one hand and ―European‖ judicial and law enforcement bodies on

the other hand. A prominent example of the first is the framework decision on the

European arrest warrant (EAW)2. Examples of the latter are Eurojust, Europol and

others.3

Having regard of these preliminaries, it is possible to conclude from available

figures that law enforcement and judicial authorities in Member States make more and

more use of European instruments. There is a tangible added-value of European

cooperation and coordination that is constantly increasing. However, in order to ensure

individual procedural rights we consider it necessary that a parallel development

allowing -among others - for an effective and coordinated cross-border defense must

finally be instigated.

The number of cases referred to Eurojust by national authorities has risen from

202 in the year 2002 to 588 in 2005. The U.K. is among the top five users of Eurojust

with 39 requests in 2005 after Germany (99), Italy (51) and Sweden (40). In 2005

Eurojust organised 73 co ordination meetings to discuss with officials from national

authorities the best way to proceed in specific cases. In 2004 52 such meetings were

1 A recent Commission communication deals with the lack of data and seeks to develop a coherent

ramework on crime and criminal justice, cf. COM (2006) 437 final, 7.8.2006: ―Developing a

comprehensive and coherent EU strategy to measure crime and criminal justice: An EU Action Plan 2006

– 2010‖. 2 Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1.

3 Note however that Eurojust and Europol are based on different legal acts, cf. § 13.

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held. Taken from a nonrepresentative Eurojust survey among national authorities the

quality and swiftness of Eurojust‘s assistance appeared to be highly satisfactory.4

These figures, however, merely reflect the law enforcement‘s perspective. Seen

from a more coherent angle it is a considerable setback that there is hitherto no legal

framework envisaged that would facilitate effective cross-border cooperation and

coordination for defense lawyers. Existing structures are based on private initiatives that

are not institutionalized and do not guarantee that every suspect who faces international

investigations is able to enjoy the benefits of international defense teams. To address

this shortcoming the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) has

proposed to establish a European Criminal Law Ombudsman whose task not only would

be to safeguard the rights of defense but also to provide help assembling international

defense teams.5 While this proposal is still under discussion and may not be the final

answer6, it illustrates, however, that there is need to create a European legal framework

and European structures that allow for equality of arms in criminal procedures.

It is in particular with Eurojust‘s work that the possible problem of ―forum-

shopping‖ must be addressed. What does this indicate? One of Eurojust‘s tasks is to

suggest to national authorities which jurisdiction is ―in a better position‖ to undertake an

investigation or to prosecute specific acts.7 In which sense ―better position‖ is to be

understood, remains, however, open to interpretation. It might include that a jurisdiction

is ―better‖ where legal obstacles like admissibility of evidence or other procedural rights

are lower. Eurojust itself has addressed this issue quite early and has drawn up

―Guidelines for deciding which prosecution should prosecute‖.8 These guidelines

establish a presumption that prosecution should take place ―where the majority of the

criminality occurred or where the majority of the loss was sustained‖. It is also

explicitly foreseen that ―prosecutors must not decide to prosecute in one jurisdiction

rather than another simply to avoid complying with the legal obligations that apply in

one jurisdiction but not in another‖. Based on these guidelines, the fear of ―forum-

shopping‖ seems to be banned. However, they are no more than internal suggestions

without binding legal force. The Eurojust Council decision does not explicitly forbid the

practice of ―forumshopping‖.

It cannot be excluded therefore that under specific circumstances, e.g. political

pressure to achieve prestigious results, or in the course of day-to-day work, distinctions

between ―law-enforcement friendly― and ―defense-friendly‖ jurisdictions might be

drawn and national authorities accordingly advised.

With regard to legislative measures it is towards the application of the European

arrest warrant that some figures are available. Numbers for 2005 comprising 17

Member States were discussed in this year‘s June JHA Council: from 1.526 people

arrested, 1.295 were effectively surrendered within 30 to 40 days.9 For the time up to

September 2004 - comprising 20 Member States - 2.603 warrants had been issued with

4 All figures: Eurojust, Annual Report 2005, p. 30 ff.

5 Proposal by the CCBE for the establishment of a European Criminal Law Ombudsman, December 2004.

6 Cf. Han Jahae, The European Criminal Law Ombudsman, speech delivered at the ERA Seminar held 7

April 2006 in Trier, www.ecba.org/cms. 7 Articles 6 (a) (ii) and 7 (a) (ii) Eurojust Council decision, OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1.

8 Annex to Eurojust Annual Report 2003.

9 Press Release 9409/06 (Presse 144), 2732nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg,

1-2 June 2006, p. 24.

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653 persons arrested and 104 surrendered.10

Concerning the effectiveness of EAWs the

Commission‘s report indicates that the average time to execute a warrant had fallen

from more than nine months to 43 days. It is important to note furthermore that in those

cases where the person consents to his surrender the average time is only 13 days.11

Consented surrender is frequent according to the Commission‘s report. This illustrates

in our view that benefits from practical police and judicial cooperation are highest when

aconsented solution together with the citizen under investigation is sought. When

measures are coerced, however, swiftness and effectiveness suffers considerably.

What are the lessons of practical co-operation for European policy and

legislation, and how effective is Eurojust in spreading best practice?

Answer: In particular with regard to new European institutions and bodies one

quite obvious lesson is that it is often not enough to simply establish such bodies. In

addition Member States‘ authorities must be able and willing to cooperate and provide

necessary information. The reluctance of national authorities to pass information, e.g. to

Europol is a continuing problem that has often been mentioned and criticized.12

National officials must furthermore be aware of the possibilities, instruments and

bodies that exist to facilitate European co-operation. However, to promote such

knowledge cannot be the exclusive responsibility of these bodies or EU themselves. It is

first and foremost Member States‘ duty to train and inform their officials. In spite of

this, there is done a lot at EU level to disseminate relevant knowledge, e.g. by CEPOL,

the European Police College in Bramshill, U.K. In 2005 CEPOL organized 56 courses

training a total number of 1.087 officials.13

Eurojust as well is active in training and

knowledge dissemination. In 2005 it organized seven strategic seminars on different

issues like terrorism, EAW implementation, Euro counterfeiting, drug trafficking,

trafficking in human beings and money laundering.14

One lesson that could be learned from the initial difficulties of CEPOL is that

setting up European bodies without providing them neither with legal personality nor a

budget - as the first Council decision of 22 December 200015

did - makes it rather

unlikely that this body will be able to deliver the envisaged effects.16

Apart from these more practical lessons, there are two observations that aim

more directly at legislators. Further developments of EU Justice and Home Affairs will

be influenced by the answers found to these observations:

a) European police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters under the

existing legal framework is dependent on Member States‘ willingness to implement the

10

COM (2006) 8 final, 24.1.2006: ―Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council

Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedure

between Member States‖, p. 4. 11

Ibid., p. 5. 12

Cf. Commission communication COM (2004) 376 final, 18.5.2004: ―Enhancing police and customs

cooperation in the European Union‖, p. 15. 13

CEPOL, Annual Report 2005, p. 19.Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS 14

Eurojust, Annual Report 2005, p. 36 – 47. 15

OJ L 336, 30.12. 2006, p. 1. 16

Commission communication COM (2004) 376 final, 18.5.2004: ―Enhancing police and customs in the

European Union‖, p. 22.

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necessary measures on national level. It can be observed, however, that Member States‘

implementing activities are generally rather slow and reluctant in spite earlier

agreements on binding deadlines or invigorated declarations on the urge and necessity

of certain measures. This observation can be made in relation to nearly every single

Third Pillar action taken by the Council in the last years.17

A very prominent and sad

but by far not the only example is the ratification of three protocols amending the 1995

Europol Convention. These protocols date back to 2000, 2002 and 2003. Only very

recently all Member States succeeded in ratifying these provisions making it possible,

that they enter into force in 2007.18

b) The most important lesson, however, is the need to develop a coherent

understanding of the issues at stake. It is not without deeper meaning that the official

label of JHA policies on European level, the ―Area of freedom, security and justice‖

names ―freedom‖ in the first place and flanks ―security‖ with both ―freedom‖ and

―justice‖. Security cannot be achieved without securing fundamental rights and

guaranteeing true judicial control and rule of law. The constitutional difficulties that

became visible in many Member States in connection with the European arrest warrant

made this very clear. Further progress must therefore strictly adhere to the principles of

democratic accountability, judicial control and unconditional protection of civil liberties

and fundamental rights. As could be seen from the German ruling on the EAW19

,

national constitutional courts are observing European JHA developments very closely

and with a certain amount of scepticism. EU governments are therefore well advised to

resist the temptation of misusing current intransparent and uncontrolled Third pillar

Council structures to realise security focused policies that – due to national

constitutional limitations – they wouldn‘t be able to realise at home.

•What should be the role of Europol, Interpol and Eurojust in facilitating

practical cooperation?

Answer: Answering this question makes it necessary to recall that Europol,

Interpol and Eurojust are set up by different legal acts and consequently have very

distinct features. Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization, is an

international organization founded in 1923 with currently 186 member countries.

Europol was established in 1995 by an intergovernmental convention20

and up till now

stands outside genuine EU structures. Only Eurojust is – from its legal nature – a

distinct ―EU child‖, established by a Council decision in 200221

. But even Eurojust

differs from other EU bodies and agencies as powers and competences of Eurojust staff

are unbalanced: national members have different judicial powers according to their

Member States‘ national laws; their salary is also paid by Member States.22

Despite their differing legal construction Interpol and Europol have concluded

agreements among each other with the aim of increasing effectiveness and avoiding

17

Cf. e.g. Council document 9589/06 ADD 1, 19.5.2006: ―Implementation of the Action Plan to combat

terrorism‖, providing lists with the implementation state of play for several legislative instruments

considered urgent. 18

Cf. Speech delivered by the Europol Director, Max-Peter Ratzel, on the Joint Parliamentary Meeting

held in Brussels, 2-3 October 2006. 19

Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of 18.7.2005, 2 BvR 2236/04. 20

OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 1. 21

OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1. 22

Articles 9 and 33 Eurojust decision.

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duplication of work. This entails exchange of information and the exchange of liaison

officers. As far as could be seen, however, there are no official links between Eurojust

and Interpol. This seems us to be a major disadvantage taking into account which

considerable practical role Interpol plays in realizing European judicial cooperation:

Interpol currently bridges the gap for fast and effective transmission of EAWs via its

system.23

This is because not all Member States participate in the Schengen Information

System. Two of the Member States decided to participate only partly but ten - and from

2007 on twelve – Member States are kept deliberately out of the system, despite their

wishes to join. That Interpol - as a consequence - has in effect become an intrinsic part

of the European system of judicial cooperation is unacceptable. To remedy this we

consider it necessary that the new Member States must have access to the Schengen

Information System as soon as possible.

Various links including a cooperation agreement exist between Eurojust and

Europol. Their roles seem to be clearly defined and distinct. While Europol‘s task is to

improve effectiveness and cooperation of national authorities in, preventing and

combating― certain criminal acts where two or more Member States are concerned,

Eurojust shall stimulate and improve coordination and cooperation ―in the context of

investigations and prosecutions‖ of criminal behaviour where two or more Member

States are concerned. The role of Europol is - so far - characterized by information

driven police work, while Eurojust follows a more practical approach, assisting Member

States‘ authorities in overcoming obstacles in cross border investigations and

prosecutions, that arise from different legal systems and language. In day-to-day work,

however, the lines between the bodies‘ fields cannot be excluded that rivalries exist or

arise between Europol and Eurojust. This might lead to a situation where information is

held back in order to secure visible successes for one of the two actors. Published

figures indicate that there is in fact much more room for co-operation. Only once in the

whole year of 2005 did Europol send a request to Eurojust. In the other direction - from

Eurojust to Europol - there have been 64 requests inthe same year while only 52 have

been answered by Europol.24

Concerning the future role of Interpol, Europol and Eurojust, we are in favour

of a system that would reflect the distinction between judicial tasks and police tasks in

Member States‘ legal system. Eurojust should therefore be empowered to control police

activities performed by Europol, including practical cooperation between Europol and

Interpol.

2. The current state of progress in mutual recognition, including the

development of minimum standards, across the EU, and whether further steps in this

direction are desirable.

• In which areas is mutual recognition currently employed (for example

recognition of judicial judgements in other member states)?

Answer: The principle of mutual recognition traces back to the Cardiff

European Council on 15 and 16 June 1998. The Tampere European Council concluded

that mutual recognition should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both

civil and criminal matters within the Union. A program of measures to implement this

23

Cf. Council document 7702/05, 1.4.2005. 24

Eurojust, Annual Report 2005, p. 19.

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principle was drawn up by the Commission and agreed upon by the JHA Council held

in Marseille on 28 and 29 July 2000.25

In criminal matters the principle of mutual

recognition is the foundation of enacted EU legislation in the following areas: arrest

warrants26

, orders freezing property or evidence27

, mutual recognition of financial

penalties28

, exchange of information extracted from criminal records29

.

October 2006 the JHA Council finally adopted a framework decision on the

application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders30

. It is

furthermore foreseen that an agreement on the framework decision on mutual

recognition of judgments in criminal matters will be reached in December 200631

.

The framework decision on the European evidence warrant32

is still in discussion

in the Council working groups. Other areas of mutual recognition that are already

addressed or – most likely – will be comprise: a European supervision order in pre-trial

procedures33

, recognition of earlier convictions in the course of new criminal

proceedings34

, recognitions of disqualifications arising from criminal convictions35

, the

ne bis in idem principle36

. In a territorial scope, the principle of mutual recognition will

be ―exported‖ to the Kingdom of Norway and Iceland: an agreement on the surrender

procedure between EU Member States and these countries is currently finalized in the

Council working groups.37

• How has the principle, including minimum standards and protocols, worked in

these areas? Is it an effective approach, including in terms of cost?

Answer: In order to avoid repetitions we refer to the statistical data given in § 6.

The figures on the EAW particularly the decrease of lengthy procedures show that the

principle of mutual recognition can contribute to speed-up procedures – especially when

there is consent of the individual – and can hereby reduce costs. However, there are a

number of open questions and limitations, that we address in §§ 23-26.

Additionally we like to mention that cost efficiency is a particular aspect of the

Commission‘s proposals on the European supervision order. The aim of this proposal is

to avoid pre-trial detention of suspects that are arrested in a Member State that is not

25

Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal

matters, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001, p. 10. 26

OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1. 27

OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, p. 45. 28

OJ L 76, 22.3.2005, p. 16. 29

OJ L 322, 9.12.2005, p. 33. 30

Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs,

Luxembourg, 5-6 October 2006, p. 30. 31

Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs,

Luxembourg, 5-6 October 2006, p. 21. 32

Press Release 9409/06 (Presse 144), 2732nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg,

1-2 June 2006, p. 9. 33

Commission proposal, COM (2006) 468 final, 29.8.2006. 34

Commission proposal, COM (2005) 91 final, 17.3.2005; see also Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258),

2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 5-6 October 2006, p. 24. 35

Commission communication COM (2006) 73 final, 21.2.2006: ―Disqualifications arising from criminal

convictions in the European Union‖. 36

Commission Green Paper COM (2005) 696 final, 23.12.2005: ―On conflicts of jurisdiction and the

principle of ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings. 37

Council document 5653/4/06 REV 4, 29.6.2006.

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their Member State of residence. In this case a detention order is often issued because

authorities see a flight risk. The European supervision order aims at avoiding such

unnecessary pre-trial detentions by allowing the suspect to return to his Member State

of residence and oblige authorities there to ensure that the suspect will appear and stay

possible court proceedings and/or further investigations.

With an average pre-trial detention time of 42,5 days in the U.K. and costs of

3.039 € per month 38

and person, this proposal could help to reduce expenditures and

save prison space.

A coherent and European wide application of the principle of ne bis in idem,

furthermore, is another means that does not only serve the individual‘s right to be only

sentenced once for the same wrongdoing but also helps to reduce costs: duplicate, cost

intensive proceedings in different Member States can be avoided.

• What are the limitations of mutual recognition as a cornerstone of co-

operation, for example in cases such as the European Arrest Warrant where there are

controversies over dual criminality? What have been the successes, and how might

these be built on?

Answer: The principle of mutual recognition has always been a compromise

solution to enhance cooperation in criminal justice matters without the need to

harmonise different legal systems. As a ―working compromise‖ it might be

characterized as a truly European product. However, as it is often the case: solutions

that might seem easy, turn out to be more problematic. After several years of trying to

make the principle of mutual recognition work, it seems that it –while delivering some

results – eventually has caused more difficulties than benefits. This assessment is

illustrated by a recent Presidency proposal, named: ―Follow-up to the mutual

recognition programme: difficulties in negotiating legislative instruments on the mutual

recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and possible solutions‖39

.

Major limitations of the principle are less certain technical intricacies that might

be solved. Instead the most pressing constraint towards the principle of mutual

recognition is the context in which it stands and is applied. Apart from our concerns

formulated in § 12, we consider it – particularly in the field of criminal substantive and

procedural law – indispensable that the development of a common judicial area built on

the principle of mutual recognition is accompanied by measures that guarantee effective

procedural rights of a suspect. The way Council is and has been dealing with the

respective Commission‘s proposal from April 200440

compromises the entire system

with no signals in sight that there will soon be an agreement. This despite the fact that in

2001 it was agreed upon that ―mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of third parties,

victims and suspects‖ are an important parameter which determines the principles‘

effectiveness.

38

Commission staff working document SEC (2006) 1079, 29.8.2006, p. 11 and 13 based on official U.K.

information. 39

Press release, Finnish Presidency, 4.9.2006. 40

Commission proposal, COM (2004) 328 final, 28.4.2004.

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Furthermore - like in the field of practical police co-operation – effective

democratic and judicial control as well as accountable and transparent legislative

procedures are necessary preconditions to develop and maintain mutual trust. Without

mutual trust, the principle of mutual recognition is doomed as the latter builds on the

first. It is furthermore not enough that mutual trust is gained between judicial authorities

and their officials. In order to realise the common area of freedom, security and justice

trust into each others legal systems that guarantee civil liberties, fundamental freedoms

and rule of law must exist between the citizens of Europe.

The inherent link between mutual recognition, mutual trust and the shared

commitment to t for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law has been

seen and established by the Council and the Commission in an early phase.41

It seems,

however, that this coherent approach and understanding has progressively been

abandoned in the last five years. It is these developments that, in our view, constitute

major limitations of mutual recognition.

The current state of progress in and appetite for harmonising criminal justice

systems across the EU, and whether further steps in this direction are desirable.

How do proposals for harmonisation of criminal law across member states

substantially differ from mutual recognition?

Answer: As far as can be seen, there are no European efforts to harmonise entire

―criminal justice systems‖ as the heading of this set of questions suggests. There are

however certain European acts that approximate some rules on criminal matters as it is

foreseen in articles 29 and 31 (e) TEU. Approximation of criminal matters aims to

ensure that certain procedural measures and/or certain substantive rules exist in all

Member States in order to give effective answers to cross-border crime within the

common judicial area by trying to close existing gaps. It differs from mutual recognition

in so far as it aims at establishing a common set of rules. Mutual recognition, however,

tries to avoid exactly this, by recognizing and accepting existing disparities among

Member States‘ criminal law systems.

From a theoretical point of view, approximation of laws seems to be more

efficient and effective compared to mutual recognition as disparities among legal

systems might provide certain obstacles to the practical application of mutual

recognition. However, approximation of laws has often proven to be difficult. It has

involved lengthy discussions and procedures. These discussions have in some cases

eventually lead to the setting of minimum standards, which open possibilities of

downgrading existing standards or maintaining existing disparities.

In spite these difficulties, approximation of laws has been the path that was

chosen in establishing a common asylum and immigration policy. Although certain

setbacks in this field has shown that Member States are eventually able to achieve

results. While some approaches to downgrade standards have been undertaken, we

consider that this should not be the reason to abandon the instrument of approximation

of laws as such. Several aspects have to be kept inmind: 1) Approximation of laws - in

41

Cf. p.10 of the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in

criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001, p. 10.

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contrast to mutual recognition – provides a clear and certain set of rules. 2) It prevents

Member States – even in case of minimum standards – to go below these minimum

standards. Such an effect could be observed lately in connection with the directive on

family reunification and certain plans of the Netherlands to further restrict national laws

on family reunification. 3) As all Member States are members of the Council of Europe

and therefore bound by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms, any European legislation is eventually subject to the rulings of

the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Concerning approximation of criminal law a considerable amount of turmoil has

been produced recently by the European Court of Justice‘s (ECJ) involvement. In case

C-176/03 from 13 September 2005 the ECJ has annulled a Council framework decision

approximating environmental criminal law. The ECJ was of the view that article 175

TEC provides the Community and not the Union with the competence to adopt

measures relating to criminal law of Member States. The framework decision

approximating environmental criminal law therefore encroached on this Community

competence. A second case is currently pending with the Commission seeking to get

annulled another environmental crime frameworkdecision.42

After the first ECJ

judgment the Commission has released a communication announcing that it revises a

large number of existing approximation acts and that considers that a solution must be

found in order to guarantee legal certainty.43

Before the ECJ has not delivered its

judgment it is unlikely that the Council will press forward with further approximation

measures.44

Until now approximation of laws has been enacted in the following areas:

fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment45

, confiscation of crime-related

proceeds, instrumentalities and property46

, counterfeiting in connection with the

introduction of the euro47

, terrorism48

, trafficking in human beings49

, unauthorized

entry, transit and residence50

, private-sector corruption51

, sexual exploitation of children

and child pornography52

, attacks on information systems53

, ship-source pollution54

. A

legislative proposal has been tabled dealing with ensuring the enforcement of

intellectual property rights55

.

• Would particular areas benefit from harmonisation on issues such as

migration, serious crime cases and terrorism, rather than practical co-operation or

mutual recognition?

42

Case C-440/05, OJ C 22, 28.1.2006, p. 10. 43

Commission communication, COM (2005) 583 final/2, 24.11.2005. 44

Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs,

Luxembourg, 5-6 October 2006, p. 23 45

OJ L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 1. 46

OJ L 182, 5.7.2001, p. 1 and OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p. 49. 47

OJ L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 3. 48

OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3. 49

OJ L 203, 1.8.2002, p. 1. 50

OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 17. 51

OJ L 192, 31.7.2003, p. 54. 52

OJ L 13, 20.1.2004. p. 44. 53

OJ L 69, 16.3.2005, p. 67. 54

OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 164. Please note: the validity of this framework decision is challenged by the

Commission in the European Court of Justice, case C-440/05, OJ C 22, 28.1.2006, p. 10. 55

Commission proposal, COM (2006), 168 final, 26.4.2006.

NERINT 13

Answer: As preliminaries we would like to recall that ―migration‖ is not a crime

and that we are astounded about grouping migration in a row with ―serious crime cases‖

and ―terrorism‖. We furthermore like to recall that the term ―benefit‖ does depend on

the spectator‘s view, see §1.

We think that a common understanding and common definitions of certain

crimes would benefit the whole system. Legal certainty and clarity would be gained.

The existing legal instruments on mutual recognition mainly imply a list of 32 crime

descriptions to which certain legal consequences are attached, e.g. no double criminality

check. The lack of common definitions of these crimes, e.g. ―computer related crime‖ or

―racism and xenophobia‖ is seen by many as a considerable flaw. We concur with this

assessment. However, defining criminal acts, implies defining which human behaviour

is deemed punishable. This, however, is not for governments to decide behind closed

Council doors, void from parliamentary scrutiny and control. Under the existing Third

Pillar rules and procedure we therefore consider it not beneficial to approximate

substantive criminal law in a large scale.

4. The process of decision-making on JHA issues at EU level: in particular, the

extent to which current difficulties in reaching agreement derive from ‘third pillar’

voting procedure and might be remedied by implementation of the passerelle clauses in

previous treaties.

• What implications might use of the passerelle have for the UK’s legal and

judicial systems? What alternative action might improve decision-making? How can

transparency and accountability at European level best be extended?

Answer: With the Constitutional Treaty being unlikely to come into force within

foreseeable time and acknowledging that European police and penal co-operation has

positive effects for the safety of European citizens we see - under the existing legal

possibilities provided for by TEU and TEC – no alternative to reach acceptable levels of

transparency, accountability as well as democratic and judicial control other than to

make use of article 42 TEU. This view is shared not only by the Commission, the

European Parliament and nearly all NGO‘s working in the field, but also by a

considerable number of Member States, not least the current Finnish presidency. 56

We

consider it therefore regrettable that attempts to make use o article 42 TEU were

recently blocked, namely by Germany.57

However, we like to highlight that our main

concern in this context is not about efficiency in terms of speed, but about true

accountability, legitimacy and control.

5. How significant is the recent trend towards internal agreements between

groups of member states outside the framework of the EU, for instance the Schengen

countries, or the Prum convention? To what extent is this due to unanimity or

56

Press Release, Finnish Presidency, 22.9.2006: ―EU‘s operating conditions in matters of justice and

home affairs must be guaranteed‖; see also Commission Communication, COM (2006) 331 final,

28.6.2006:‖Implementing The Hague Programme: the way forward‖, p. 13 seq. 57 Cf. Euractiv. 25.9.2006: ―Justice veto left standing post-Tampere‖.

NERINT 14

difficulties in decision making? What are the implications for the UK and for EU

fragmentation?

Answer: The trend towards internal agreements between groups of Member

States in the field of JHA policies is significant in so far as it avoids full force of the

European Union/Community cooperation. As the JHA unit of CEPS has stated earlier in

relation to the Prüm treaty but applicable to other comparable activities, like the G6

meetings in Heilgendamm and Stratford-upon-Avon: ―The Treaty of Prüm undermines

the EU‘s ability to become an efficient policy-making body in the field of security. To

start with, by setting up exclusive and competitive measures that seek to address threats

that affect the EU as a whole, it blurs the coherence of EU action in these fields.

Second, by developing new mechanisms of security that operate above and below the

EU level, it dismantles trust among Member States. Finally, by establishing a

framework whose rules are not subject to Parliamentary oversight, the Convention

impacts on the EU principle of transparency. These three principles – trust, coherency

and transparency – are yardsticks agains which Prüm should be assessed‖58

Difficulties in decision making or unanimity do not appear to us as being

underlying motivation of these or similar initiatives. If this were the case, it would not

make any sense why Prüm signatory states have been divided over the implementation

of the passarelle in September 2006.

While France, Spain and Luxembourg apparently backed the passarelle proposal,

Germany – a leading actor in nearly all small JHA circles – fiercely opposed it.59

It

should be noted that all informal JHA activities tend to emphasise that they are in line

with EU JHA activities and that they aim to strengthen it, however, one gets the

impression that the true objective is to pre-design JHA co-operation in a smaller extent

with the aim of importing it later into the European structure. In the light of EU Treaty

provisions that allow for enhanced cooperation even in the JHA field (articles 40, 43 –

45 TEU) one might question not only the political wisdom of separate JHA circles but

their legality as well.

6. What are the current developments in the area of common border controls

and visa arrangements?Will the proposed changes to the short-stay visa arrangements

in relation to the eastern neighbours of the EU open up new channels for illegal

migration further westward in the EU? What are the implications of enlargement for

JHA issues, including the impact of labour migration and confidence in new member

states’ justice systems?

Answer: Recent years have seen efforts to Europeanize and to strengthen EU

external borders management and visa rules as well as efforts to ease some effects of

EU enlargement for neighbouring countries. Common rules for the movement of

persons across borders, the Schengen Borders Code60

have been enacted and an agency

for the management of operational cooperation at external borders, Frontex,

established61

. Standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel

58

T. Balzacq, D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild, Security and the Two-Level Game: The Treaty of Prüm,

the EU and the Management of Threats, CEPS Working Document, No. 134, January 2006, p. 17. 59

ADNKI.com, 22.9.2006: ―EU: Ministers deadlocked over immigration and terrorism‖. 60

OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1. 61

OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1.

NERINT 15

documents have been agreed upon62

as well as a tool to provide exchange of Visa data,

the Visa Information System63

. Proposals have been tabled to establish a Community

Code on Visas64

and a mechanism for the creation of so called ―Rapid Border

Intervention Teams‖65

. Visible actions are currently performed on Europe‘s southern

maritime borders while their effectiveness and legality, especially with regard to

―interceptions at sea‖ aiming at preventing migrants to reach Europe‘s shores allow for

some questions.

Concerning envisaged visa facilitations for citizens from Russia and Ukraine, we

do not see any imminent threat that these measures will ―open up new channels for

illegal migration‖. Instead we conceive such measures as being part of very sensible

developments that aim at strengthening economic, humanitarian, cultural and scientific

ties with neighboring countries that will positively influence trade, stability and inter-

personal exchange.

Regarding EU enlargement and JHA issues it is possible to observe a common

more skeptical and less enthusiastic trend. While by 2006 nearly all Member States

have opened up their labour markets for EU citizens from the ten new Member States,

only some Member States will allow for unrestricted inner-EU-migration with regard to

Bulgaria and Romania. We like to recall, however, that free movement within the EU is

a fundamental right and essential part of the whole European project. Therefore:

limitations to this fundamental right in the form of transitional safeguarding measures

are only allowed in exceptional circumstances. We welcome that the EU 15 had opened

up towards EU 10 much faster than initially expected and hope that a similar

development will be possible towards EU citizens from Bulgaria and Romania.

Safeguarding clauses, however, are not only foreseen for the movement of

people but may also apply in relation to mutual recognition and other principles of JHA

policies.66

In its monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of

Bulgaria and Romania the Commission has formulated some criticism with regard to

their respective justice systems.67

Safeguarding JHA measures from the date of

accession, however, have not been proposed by the Commission. Instead a reporting

system was instigated with a first report due by 31 March 2007. In some Member

States, however, e.g. in Germany, there were parliamentary discussions dealing with the

question if the Government should be officially asked to implement and notify JHA

safeguarding measures from the date of accession.68

Such developments highlight again

that mutual trust cannot be imposed. It must grow, instead, relying on tangible facts and

shared fundamental principles and values. It is furthermore a strong argument for

62

OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, p. 1. 63

OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, p. 5. 64

Commission proposal COM (2006) 403 final, 19.7.2006. 65

Commission proposal COM (2006) 401 final, 19.7.2006. 66

Article 38 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the

adjustments to the treaties on which the European Union is founded, OJ L 157, 21.6.2005, p. 203. 67

Commission communication, COM (2006) 549 final, 26.9.2006, p. 9. 68

Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und Buendnis90/DIE

GRUENEN―EU-Beitritt Bulgariens und Rumaeniens zum Erfolg fuehren‖, Drucksache 16/3090,

25.10.2006;Deutscher Bundestag - 16. Wahlperiode - 60. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 26. Oktober

2006. Plenarprotokoll

NERINT 16

agreeing on common binding principles in JHA issues within the EU instead of trying to

cover existing disparities by relying on the principle of mutual recognition.

1.1Replacing and Displacing the Law: the Europeanisation of Judicial Power

Fonte: MÉGIE, A. Replacing and Displacing the Law: the Europeanisation of Judicial Power. CEPS

Special Report/March 2009. Disponível em www.ceps.eu. Acesso em 09 set 2009.

This paper looks at the consequences of the social and political process of the

Europeanisation of judicial power. The creation of arrest and judicial mechanisms at the

European level represents an important aspect of European security, characterised by a

multiplicity of political, social and judicial mobilisations, the most central instruments

of which are the Eurojust Unit and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Drawn up and

negotiated before 9/11, these two legal instruments were adopted in the name of the

‗global war on terror‘ following the attacks on New York. The adoption of such

political measures has important consequences for the legal form of these new

mechanisms, the study of which allows us to explore the constitutional ramifications of

counterterrorism policies in European democracies. We see that the European Union has

modified its legal approach in the name of the fight against terror, in effect displacing

and replacing the law at this level.

1. A pragmatic and negotiated process by judicial regime

European judicial matters are a construct that is the outcome of political events;

a sharing of political representations in the fight against transnational crime, and the

configuration of European institutions characterised by competition and collaboration

between national authorities, the European Council and the European Commission.

If we analyse the process of specialisation and expertise of the high civil

servants and judges involved in judicial cooperation during the 1990s, we see the link

between the policy stream (common ideas within the community of public policy) and

the political stream (choice of thevarious institutional actors).69

These professional

actors play an important role as political entrepreneurs and judicial experts at the

crossroads of national and transnational legal processes.70

It is their orientations, in

favour of a pragmatic and operational approach to judicial cooperation that are at the

basis of projects such as the Eurojust Unit and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).

The understanding of these dynamics and the social interaction between them allow us

to make sense of the organisational and normative shape of the European judicial

regime.71

The focus of the talks on legitimisation in the fight against transnational

organised crime and the terrorism of 2001 is not without consequences for the

mechanisms of cooperation.72

The sharing of an operational approach towards judicial

69

John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Polities, Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1984. 70 Didier Bigo, ―La mondialisation de l‘(in)sécurité? Réflexions sur le champ des professionnels de la

gestion des inquiétudes et analytique de la transnationalisation des processus d'(in)sécurisation‖, Cultures

et Conflits, No. 58, 2005, pp. 53-100. 71

Didier Bigo et al., The Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies, Paris: L‘Harmattan, 2008. 72 Monica den Boer (ed.), Organised Crime: A Catalyst in the Europeanisation of National Police and

NERINT 17

cooperation in the name of the fight against crime strongly influences the organisation

of Europe‘s judicial regime. Structured by these representations, as well as by the

international and European political agenda, the negotiations focus on the adoption and

implementation of arrest and punishment measures while at the same time a global legal

approach that takes into account arrest procedures and those concerning the guarantee of

defendants‘ rights are most often blocked.

The example of the European Arrest Warrant illustrates this institutional and

political dynamic. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, European governments

decided, extraordinarily quickly, to introduce a new European procedure of extradition.

Under pressure from member states to hasten the discussions, the proposal concerning

the rights of defence within the European

Commission project were marginalised in order to reach political agreement.73

Those political and legal choices will result in resistance from the national courts

concerning the normative form of the new extradition instrument.

A better understanding of the social and institutional relations that led to the

creation of the Eurojust Unit and the EAW demonstrates the investment of an increasing

number of actors in the realisation of a European judicial space.74

In this perspective,

the judicial field is characterised by both competition and collaboration among

numerous actors holding different standpoints. The consequence is a competition in the

respective fields of competence between the different cooperation mechanisms. This

fact gives rise to an accumulation of solutions with uncertain orientations.75

The

institutional relations between OLAF, Eurojust, the Liaison Magistrates and Europol

reflect such a configuration.76

Hence, unlike the representation of a progressive

formalisation and homogenisation of EU rules, European judicial cooperation is mainly

characterised by informal and heterogeneous cooperation practices.

2. The transformation of the territories of justice and its relationship to the law

Understanding the dynamics that define the field of European judicial

cooperation enables one to explain how justice is removed in its spatial dimension and

in its relationship to the law.

Through the implementation of the Eurojust Unit and the European Arrest

Warrant, we redefine the territories of legal action. During the Europeanisation of

judicial power, various concepts of ‗a European space‘ emerged to legitimise the

Prosecution Agencies?, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 2002. Bill Gilmore and

Valsamis Mitsilegas, ―The EU legislative framework against money laundering and terrorist finance: A

critical analysis in the light of evolving global standards‖, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,

Vol. 56, 2007, pp. 119-141. 73 Antoine Mégie, ―Généalogie de la coopération judiciaire‖, Cultures et Conflits, Paris: L‘Harmattan,

No. 62, June 2006, pp. 7-42. 74 Jacques Commaille, L’esprit sociologique des lois. Essai de sociologie politique du droit, Paris, Presses

universitaires de France, coll. ―Droit, éthique et société‖, 1994. 75 Jacqueline Domenach, ―Le droit de l‘espace judiciaire pénal européen : un nouveau modèle juridique‖,

in Arrêter et juger en Europe: genèse, luttes et enjeux de la coopération pénale, Cultures et Conflits,

Paris: l‘Harmattan, No. 62, 2006. 76 Antoine Mégie, ―Mapping the Actors of European Judicial Cooperation‖, in Didier Bigo et al., op. cit.,

2008, pp. 67-96.

NERINT 18

adoption of new cooperation mechanisms. The mobilisations and projects in favour of

strengthened judicial cooperation introduce variablegeometry approaches within a

European judicial space. This definition is at the heart of the struggle between the

projects in favour of an intergovernmental approach and those in favour of a community

approach.

According to the promoters of the intergovernmental method, it is necessary to

build am‗European penal space‘ defined through the 25 territories in a logic of

‗strengthened‘ transnational cooperation. In contrast to this approach, the basic idea of

the promoters of the second perspective is the concept of a ‗European judicial space‘

through a logic of harmonisation that leads to uniform national systems and the creation

of a European legal territoriality. The adoption of the Eurojust project and the rejection

of corpus juris in favour of a European Prosecutor suggest that the logic of convergence

is usually preferred over that of harmonisation.

Nevertheless, the creation of the Eurojust Unit and the European Arrest Warrant

means a transnational extension of national judicial powers. The participation of the

French judges from Eurojust in criminal affairs concerning one or several other states

illustrates the transnationalisation of national judicial power, which remains entirely

limited to the decision of foreign national judges. More precisely, this dynamic

concerns the recognition of foreign judicial decisions, through an acceleration of the

procedures concerning the exchange of information and people. In the case of the

European Arrest Warrant, this transformation is translated by the introduction of the

principle of mutual recognition.77

For example, in a Belgian extradition procedure, a

judicial decision taken by an Italian court takes on an equivalent legal authority to a

decision taken by a Belgian judge. The implementation of new transnational judicial

mechanisms signifies a deep transformation of the traditional territories of justice.

Beyond such legal mechanisms, the most important issue remains the level of mutual

confidence between the national judicial authorities.

In this new judicial territory, the institutional and practical relations between

Eurojust and national judges are essential. The national judges also appear in the

European judicial field as holders of ‗material power‘. Research carried out in the

sociology of law sheds light on the importance of judges in the construction and

development of ‗the legal‘ at the European level. It is usually assumed that the symbolic

use of ‗the legal‘ is still the prerogative of governments and legislators. However,

judges are pivotal to a large extent to its technical dimension as operators. This aspect

can be seen in cooperation mechanisms such as the Eurojust unit. It has been admitted

by Eurojust‘s representatives that their institution can only endure and produce concrete

outcomes if national judges resort to it.

The standpoints of the national professionals thus vary between learning and

resisting. Along with the obstacles related to cognitive issues (language, knowledge of

foreign legal systems etc.), structural factors also seem to be crucial in the analysis of

the logics of resistance. In the case of French judges, Europe appears as a far removed

and complex issue. Therefore, the judges are reluctant to make use of the cooperation

instruments such as Eurojust. Indeed these instruments do not, according to them,

77 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ―The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in

the EU‖, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 43, 2006, pp. 1277-1311.

NERINT 19

correspond to their objectives of efficiency as imposed by their national system. It

would seem that personal and informal relations remain the judges‘ preferred mode of

action when dealing with a transnational affair. This mutual confidence is at the heart of

the exchange of information and people between national jurisdictions. In light of this,

the development of high standards concerning the protection of individual rights

represents a crucial in the years to come.

In the case of the Europeanisation of judicial power, the second dynamic that

reshaped justice involves the relationship between justice and law as a reference

element and an instrument of action. The adoption of judicial mechanisms is the

outcome of a process of negotiation that is characterised by a pragmatic approach in

which the rules of organisation are usually preferred over normative content.78

This

legal and political orientation has led to the construction of a European judicial space in

which the objectives of cooperation and procedural norms seem to have prevailed.

This logic leads to a definition of the procedures of cooperation while

fundamental rights issues are, at least at the beginning, still peripheral. As suggested by

the example of the Eurojust Unit, the European Arrest Warrant and the uncertain

adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Affairs, the instruments that

strengthen the organisation of cooperation are privileged because their adoption does

not mean a transformation of the judicial national systems. The refusal to realise the

harmonisation project (harmonisation of judicial procedures in criminal affairs, corpus

juris, European chief public prosecutor) illustrates this approach that results, partially,

from the desire of the national executive and legislative authorities to protect their authority in

criminal matters.

This consensus, in particular during negotiations, results in the introduction of

foreign judicial elements into national orders. In the case of the European Arrest

Warrant, these integrations are made up of heterogeneous modalities, depending on the

countries. In certain cases, such as Germany or Poland, the transposition is opposed to

national constitutional principles. More generally, the focus on the ‗organisational‘

dimension of judicial power means that the legal bases governing judicial cooperation

are adopted a posteriori to justify and legitimise the practices that already exist. The

operational dimension is promoted as the main objective with regard to the legal

coherence of the norms in the logic of Law in Action.79

This approach rests on the idea

that judicial coherence will develop through daily practice.

3. Resistance in the National Constitutional Courts

The marginalisation of the European and national legislative actors that

characterise the construction of the European mechanisms of judicial control is also

followed by a marginalisation of judiciary powers. The national constitutional courts, as

well as the European courts, have no direct powers of decision-making or orientation on

issues of judicial cooperation. This absence of court competencies in the field of the

78 Pierre Lascoumes, ―Normes juridiques et mise en oeuvre des politiques publiques‖, l’Année

sociologique, Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 43-71. 79 Jacques Commaille, ―La Justice entre détraditionnalisation, néolibéralisme et démocratisation: vers

une théorie de sociologie politique de la justice‖, in Jacques Commaille and Martine Kaluszynski (eds),

La fonction politique de la justice, Paris: La Découverte, 2007.

NERINT 20

third pillar raises the issue of the constitutional control of European judicial

mechanisms in criminal affairs. However, the national constitutional courts are

increasingly making their voices heard through the European Arrest Warrant.

In fact, after its adoption and while the EAW framework decision was

designated to reduce litigation before the criminal courts,80

mostly in procedural

matters, the constitutional dimension of the EAW soon appeared as a normative

obstacle in the implementation at the national level81

. The Polish Constitutional Court

was the first to raise it, declaring the enabling provision of the Polish Criminal

Procedure Code unconstitutional. Based on article 31(3) of the Polish Constitution, the

Court declared the new European extradition procedure incompatible with the ban on

extraditing Polish nationals. For this reason, the Court set a transition period for its

decision in order to enable constitutional reform without incurring a breach of EU law.

Along the same lines, on 7 November 2005, the Supreme Court of Cyprus reached a

similar conclusion and declared national legislation implementing the EAW

unconstitutional in light of the constitutional prohibition barring the extradition of

Cypriot citizens.

The most significant act is probably the decision of the German Federal

Constitutional Court. On 18 July 2005, the German Federal Constitutional Court took

issue with the EAW by the German European Arrest Warrant Act unconstitutional and

suspending it. Article 16.2 of Germany‘s Constitution expressly allowed the extradition

of German nationals member states of the European Union ―provided that constitutional

principles are observed‖. In the case of M. Darkazanli – a person having both Syrian

and German nationality – and who, according to the EAW, was due to be extradited to

Spain on the basis of an EAW, the Constitutional Court refused to implement the act on

the grounds of a breach of articles 16.2 and 19.4 of the German Constitution.

In its decision, the Court considered that the German legislature did not make

good use of the margin of discretion granted to member states by the EAW framework

decision, particularly under two circumstances. The first concerned the case whereby a

German citizen is accused in another member state of offences committed partly or

entirely on German territory. Since Germany had not implemented the optional ground

of refusal provided in article 4.7 of the EAW framework decision, the Court determined

that such an omission was incompatible with the national constitution. The second

circumstance concerned the question of the fundamental right and the respect of this

right. The disposition introduced by the German government concerning an

administrative procedure before the definitive execution of an EAW was considered

unconstitutional because of its breach of the fundamental right of access to justice

(article 19.1 of the Grundgesetz, the German constitution).

The Belgian Constitutional Court was presented with a similar case with the

constitutional implications of having failed to observe the traditional requirement of

double criminality. In a radically different approach to its counterparts, the Belgian

Court made use of the preliminary reference procedure, provided in article 35 of the

TEU, requesting the ECJ make a decision on the validity of the EAW framework

decision.

80

Rob Blextoon (ed.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, Cambridge: TMC Asser Press, 2005. 81

Elspeth Guild (ed.), Constitutional challenges of the European Arrest Warrant, Nijmegen: Wolf, 2006.

NERINT 21

The constitutional conflicts created by the EAW in the Polish, German, Cypriot

and Belgian cases may have strengthened the role of constitutional courts in the third

pillar. In all of these cases, national courts requested a new definition of the EAW in its

national implementation while at the same time legitimising the normative design of the

new European extradition procedure. This normative and social process

(redefinition/legitimisation) can be found in the position of the Canadian Supreme Court

concerning the security certificate on immigration matters and Bill C 36, the new

national counter-terrorism Bill.

On 18 December 2001, the new Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act, also known as

Bill C36, was adopted just three months after the attacks on New York. Just as EU

member states envisaged the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant and the European

Action Plan to fight terrorism, the Canadian government decided to assert its diplomatic

position in the new international coalition against terrorism.

Following its adoption, Bill C 36 has seen a reformulation due to numerous

interventions and legal mobilisations. The bar of Quebec as well as the Association of

the Canadian Bar (ABC) multiplied reports and press releases to review these new anti-

terrorism measures. These actors explain that certain tools or procedures threaten the

fundamental values that define the Canadian Criminal Code. According to these

associations, the introductions of the Anti-terrorism Act in the Criminal Code introduce

a strong incoherence and confusion with the already existing texts in national law.82

If

the associations of lawyers are critics, the legal positions of the Supreme Court

fluctuated between redefinition and legitimatisation as national European Courts for the

EAW.

On 11 January 2002, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada in

the case of Suresh v. Canada is interesting. If the appeal had been introduced before 11

September 2001, had to instruct the constitutionality of such legislation through the

relation between the international Conventions and the Canadian Charter of Rights.

While recognising the importance of the fundamental values of freedom contained in

the Canadian Charter, the Supreme Court legitimised the new counterterrorism law and

proclaimed the importance of referring to the international legal frame. This position

finds a concrete illustration in the Khawaja case, who is the first person to be accused

thanks to the new Bill C 36. At the beginning of the trial, the Superior Court of the

Ontario judged that the presence of "religious

motives" in the definition of the ―terrorism activity‖ act was inconsistent with the

freedom of

religion as guaranteed by the Canadian Constitution. If the Supreme Court of Canada

confirmed

this appeal decision with regard to the religious motivation aspect, at the same time it

legitimised Bill C 36 and claimed the necessity of this new legal framework.

1.2 Europol y el Modelo europeo de inteligencia criminal: una respuesta no estatal

a la delincuencia organizada

82 Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach (eds), The security of freedom essays on Canada’s

anti-terrorism bill, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

NERINT 22

Fonte: BRADY, H. Europol y el Modelo europeo de inteligencia criminal: una

respuesta no estatal a la delincuencia organizada. ARI nº 126, 2007. Disponível em:

www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Acesso em 09 set 2009.

La UE no tiene competencias para dictar a sus Estados miembros cómo

estructurar sus cuerpos policiales o actuar en materia de ley y orden. Más bien, los

Gobiernos se valen de la UE para intentar lograr que policías y fiscales de toda Europa

piensen y actúen de forma conjunta en la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada, que

acuerden una acción común –en particular en la lucha contra el narcotráfico y la trata de

personas– y que intenten aproximar la legislación penal de los distintos países. A pesar

de las diferencias existentes entre los sistemas jurídicos europeos, la UE ha elaborado

una serie de ideas innovadoras, aunque aún sin poner a prueba, que respetan las

sensibilidades nacionales, entre ellas un modelo no estatal que aúna la inteligencia

criminal de los distintos países para planificar operaciones conjuntas. Aún quedan cosas

por hacer, especialmente ahondar en el papel que representarán órganos de la UE como

Europol.

Análisis

Introducción

La delincuencia organizada transnacional supone una amenaza creciente en el

mundo posterior a la guerra fría. Las oportunidades para operar de forma transfronteriza

de que disfrutan los bajos fondos de la delincuencia se multiplican a medida que se va

multiplicando también la disponibilidad de las tecnologías de la información y las

comunicaciones, aumenta la movilidad de personas, bienes y servicios entre los

distintos países y surge una economía globalizada. Actualmente, las bandas criminales

venden armas, realizan contrabando de inmigrantes y trata de personas, trafican con

droga y cometen fraudes en distintos países de todo el mundo.

Por ese motivo, la delincuencia organizada se ha convertido en un área

prioritaria para la legislación comunitaria y para su agenda de Justicia e Interior (JAI),

de está creciendo rápidamente. En 2004, los Estados miembros acordaron ampliar

radicalmente las competencias de la UE en materia de delincuencia y actuación policial,

dos cuestiones que afectan de lleno a la soberanía nacional. En las negociaciones sobre

el Tratado Constitucional y el Tratado de Reforma de la UE, los Gobiernos acordaron

renunciar al veto nacional en casos de decisiones sobre delincuencia y actuación

policial, si bien el mantenimiento de la ley y el orden propiamente dicho seguirá siendo

una cuestión estrictamente nacional. También acordaron dar más facilidades a la UE

para iniciar legislación penal y armonizar los procedimientos judiciales de los distintos

países.

La policía sobre el terreno de toda Europa, que inicialmente se mostró escéptica,

ha pasado posteriormente a tener una visión más favorable de Europol, el cuerpo

policial de la UE, y a considerar que puede llegar a constituir una vía útil de

coordinación de la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada. En un mundo en que la

delincuencia no respeta fronteras, se ha convencido de que una cooperación

transfronteriza más proactiva puede reportar beneficios. ―Haciendo de Europa un lugar

más seguro, contribuimos a la seguridad de este país‖, afirma un alto cargo de la Policía

Metropolitana de Londres. ―Nuestra seguridad no empieza exclusivamente dentro de

NERINT 23

nuestras fronteras, sino también en las Islas Griegas o la frontera finlandesa‖ Aun así,

sigue quedando mucho por hacer. Los órganos de la UE se han ganado la aceptación de

la comunidad policial y judicial europea, pero no su admiración universal. Europol no

es aún un elemento indispensable de las investigaciones transfronterizas, en parte por

graves problemas burocráticos que reducen su utilidad, motivo por el cual los Gobiernos

están negociando una importante reforma de sus competencias básicas.

Estas delicadas reformas cuentan con apoyo nacional, ya que los Gobiernos

consideran que la UE tiene importancia en sus esfuerzos por desmantelar y desbaratar lo

peor de la delincuencia organizada y confiscar los activos financieros de las bandas. Los

policías y jueces no pueden desmantelar por completo esas redes transfronterizas de

delincuencia europea actuando sólo dentro de sus fronteras. Las bandas transnacionales

cometen delitos en un país pero su cúpula y sus activos financieros a menudo

permanecen escondidos y a buen recaudo en el extranjero (Informe de Europol sobre la

valoración de las amenazas de 2006, p. 20). La cooperación policial y judicial entre la

totalidad de los países europeos aún no está al nivel de la de los delincuentes. Aun así,

la preocupación por la soberanía nacional y las diferencias culturales y jurídicas siguen

limitando la eficacia de las investigaciones transfronterizas en materia de delincuencia

organizada.

Cooperación policial en Europa

Los 1,2 millones de policías europeos operan de formas muy distintas, en

ocasiones incompatibles. Dinamarca, Finlandia e Irlanda cuentan con un único servicio

de policía nacional cada uno, centralizado a las órdenes de un ―jefe‖ claramente

designado. En el Reino Unido y los Países Bajos, en cambio, la policía está

descentralizada: el Reino Unido, por ejemplo, cuenta con 50 cuerpos de policía

distintos. En algunos países, la policía dispone de competencias de investigación

independientes, mientras que en otros actúa a las órdenes de fiscales nacionales. Los

policías que actúan a las órdenes de los fiscales tienden a reaccionar a la delincuencia,

actuando sólo una vez que se ha cometido un delito, es decir, llevan a cabo poca labor

de prevención. Esta diferencia de funciones implica que tanto los policías como los

fiscales de los distintos países se dividen en dos bandos, proactivo y reactivo, al hablar

de cómo combatir la delincuencia transnacional.

Los países también tienen distintas normas para iniciar investigaciones y reunir

pruebas. Esta diferencia hace más difícil llevar a cabo investigaciones conjuntas sin

problemas. En el Reino Unido, por ejemplo, no puede emplearse como prueba en un

juicio información obtenida mediante escuchas telefónicas, pero la policía sí puede

basarse, y de hecho lo hace, en grabaciones obtenidas de cámaras de seguridad de

circuito cerrado. Por el contrario, Francia considera legal las escuchas, viéndolas

compatibles con los derechos humanos, pero considera una intromisión mucho mayor la

utilización indiscriminada de grabaciones de cámaras de seguridad. En algunos otros

países europeos no se emplean este tipo de cámaras en lugares públicos; en Dinamarca,

por ejemplo, la ley las prohíbe.

La policía puede llegar a sortear estas diferencias cuando colabora de manera

informal con sus colegas extranjeros, pero tanto ellos como los tribunales siguen

experimentando un amplio abanico de obstáculos para investigar y enjuiciar de forma

transfronteriza. Si la policía requiere citaciones de testigos, órdenes para obligar a

NERINT 24

alguien a aportar pruebas, una orden de registro e incautación o una orden para congelar

cuentas bancarias, puede que tenga que solicitar a un juzgado de otro país que las emita.

Su principal herramienta para conseguirlo es el Convenio de asistencia judicial en

materia penal del Consejo de Europa, de 1959, en virtud del cual los jueces aprueban

peticiones de ayuda en investigaciones y enjuiciamientos procedentes del extranjero. En

2000, el Consejo de Europa actualizó el Convenio a fin de incluir las peticiones para

poder realizar operaciones encubiertas en el extranjero, interceptar comunicaciones

telefónicas y de Internet entre distintos países y llevar a cabo operaciones de vigilancia

como las denominadas ―entregas controladas‖ (en las que las autoridades vigilan en

secreto delitos como el narcotráfico para destapar una red criminal).

Aun modificado, el Convenio del Consejo de Europa es demasiado complejo e

inflexible como para proporcionar una base para la lucha moderna contra la

delincuencia. Se están tardando años en ratificar las nuevas modificaciones y las

solicitudes pueden tardar semanas, meses e incluso años en recibir una respuesta. El

Reino Unido, por ejemplo, exige una información demasiado detallada a los países que

presentan estas peticiones, mientras que la burocracia española puede llegar a

traspapelarlas por completo (Informe Anual de Eurojust, año 2005, p. 46).

Más allá de las dificultades que plantea la cooperación judicial formal, los

Gobiernos europeos se han esforzado por impulsar la cooperación operativa de la

policía, sobre todo en el caso de los países que han eliminado los controles fronterizos

entre ellos en la zona Schengen, integrada en la actualidad por 15 países: la ―vieja‖ UE

menos el Reino Unido e Irlanda y Noruega e Islandia (Suiza decidió en un referéndum

celebrado en 2005 que se uniría pronto). De aquí a 2008, a excepción de Chipre, los

países que se adhirieron a la UE en 2004 también pasarán a formar parte de esta zona.

Las fuerzas policiales de los países de la zona Schengen disponen de

competencias adicionales para perseguir delitos de carácter transnacional. Por ejemplo,

los policías neerlandeses pueden vigilar a sospechosos en Bélgica, con o sin notificación

previa. Los policías italianos pueden seguir a un sospechoso de contrabando de drogas

en ejercicio del derecho de ―persecución transfronteriza‖ en Austria, hasta que llegue la

policía local. Los policías de la zona Schengen también comparten información sobre

sospechosos, coches y bienes robados mediante el Sistema de Información de Schengen

(SIS), una base de datos policial de carácter multinacional. Aunque el Reino Unido e

Irlanda optaron por mantener sus propios controles fronterizos, sí hacen uso de partes

del Acuerdo de Schengen. El Reino Unido participa en operaciones transnacionales de

vigilancia y se ha adscrito al SIS, al igual que Irlanda.

La policía de ciertas partes de la zona Schengen coopera todavía más

estrechamente, gracias a un mosaico de acuerdos bilaterales y multilaterales. El mayor

grado de sofisticación en las cooperaciones se produce cuando esos países comparten

fronteras terrestres, disponen de sistemas jurídicos similares y se enfrentan a amenazas

comunes de las mismas bandas organizadas o los mismos terroristas. Los policías de los

países del Benelux se ayudan unos a otros en las labores policiales cotidianas e incluso

disponen de normas comunes de capacitación y equipamiento. Antes del Mundial de la

FIFA de 2006, Alemania y Austria firmaron un tratado por el que la policía de cada uno

de esos países quedaba a las órdenes del otro cuando fuera necesario y que permitía a

los policías de cada país llevar a cabo operaciones encubiertas en el territorio del otro

NERINT 25

sin ningún tipo de restricciones. Posteriormente, Alemania firmó un tratado similar con

los Países Bajos. Los países nórdicos llevan años realizando patrullas conjuntas y

compartiendo comisarías en regiones fronterizas escasamente pobladas, al igual que los

españoles con sus homólogos franceses en los Pirineos.

Los jefes de policía de la UE colaboran en la lucha contra algunos de los líderes

más notorios de la delincuencia organizada de Europa mediante la Unidad operativa de

jefes de policía de la UE. Este órgano informal se reúne cuatro veces al año en las

oficinas de Europol en La Haya y Bruselas y organiza con Europol e Interpol

operaciones europeas conjuntas contra redes de delincuencia organizada. Al principio,

eran solamente reuniones de debate para altos funcionarios europeos de la ley y el

orden, pero en mayo de 2005 la Unidad empezó a llevar a cabo operaciones

propiamente dichas con la Operación Callidus, encabezada por Suecia, una exitosa

ofensiva a nivel de toda la UE contra la pornografía infantil en la que participaron

cientos de policías de Suecia, el Reino Unido, Dinamarca, Francia, los Países Bajos,

Malta, Noruega y Polonia.

Los jefes de policía de la UE organizan su trabajo designando equipos de policía

multinacionales conforme a un sistema denominado COSPOL (Planificación

Estratégica Operacional General de la Policía). Este sistema hace referencia

sencillamente a cómo los jefes de policía dividen las responsabilidades para las distintas

investigaciones. Cada investigación organizada con este sistema está dirigida por un

―conductor‖, un país directamente afectado por una red de delincuencia concreta y

responsable de dirigir las operaciones destinadas a combatirla (Suecia, por ejemplo, fue

el país conductor de la Operación Callidus y Polonia dirige las operaciones COSPOL

contra la delincuencia de Europa del Este).

El papel de la UE

Los ministros de Justicia e Interior se reúnen actualmente en el Consejo de

Ministros de la UE (o Consejo JAI) para tratar de reducir los vacíos legales entre las

distintas legislaciones penales de los Estados miembros y acordar leyes y medidas

prácticas para facilitar las investigaciones policiales transfronterizas. En la actualidad,

los 27 Estados miembros de la UE tienen que acordar por unanimidad cualquier nueva

medida. Los funcionarios elaboran nuevas propuestas en una red enormemente

complicada de comités que conforman cuatro niveles distintos de toma de decisiones.

En ellos se incluyen grupos de trabajo sobre cooperación policial, de aduanas y de

justicia penal, así como el denominado ―Grupo Multidisciplinar Delincuencia

Organizada‖, integrado por expertos nacionales en materia policial con competencias

para evaluar métodos de lucha contra la delincuencia de toda la UE. Personal de la

secretaría del Consejo y la Comisión Europa ayuda a elaborar los primeros proyectos de

legislación y a evaluar acuerdos comunitarios previos. Dos de los comités más

importantes son el COREPER, la poderosa agrupación de embajadores nacionales ante

la UE, y un comité de funcionarios de alto nivel de los Ministerios de Justicia e Interior

(denominado CATS, por su acrónimo en francés).

Una gran parte de la labor del Consejo de Ministros en materia de justicia e

interior tiene que ver con sustituir los lentos procedimientos establecidos por el Consejo

de Europa para la cooperación policial y de justicia penal por unas normas comunitarias

más rápidas y eficaces, como ―órdenes‖ que aceleren la extradición de sospechosos y el

NERINT 26

intercambio de pruebas entre los distintos Estados miembros. Eurojust, una unidad de

altos funcionarios de la fiscalía, la judicatura y la policía nombrados por los Estados

miembros, ayuda a que estos acuerdos jurídicos funcionen en la práctica y coordina los

enjuiciamientos de carácter multinacional en la UE. El número de casos que gestiona ha

crecido con rapidez desde que empezó a funcionar en 2003: la unidad notificó un

aumento del 31% en su carga de trabajo en 2006 y del 54% el año anterior (Informe

Anual de Eurojust, 2006, p. 24).

Mientras que Eurojust se encarga fundamentalmente de los enjuiciamientos,

Europol es el principal instrumento comunitario de apoyo a las investigaciones en

materia de delincuencia organizada transnacional. Europol recaba y analiza información

de inteligencia sobre diversos delitos, desde narcotráfico hasta falsificaciones y

terrorismo. Su oficina se organiza mediante una estructura radial: todos los Estados

miembros envían agentes de policía a su sede en La Haya, que actúan como radios,

compartiendo información directamente con los demás policías y con un núcleo de

analistas de Europol. Estos analistas rastrean el corpus común de inteligencia criminal

europea en busca de vínculos y tendencias transnacionales que puedan haber sido

pasados por alto por los cuerpos de policía nacionales o regionales, más centrados en lo

que sucede en su propio terreno. Los funcionarios de Europol no pueden efectuar

detenciones ni iniciar investigaciones, pero pueden ayudar durante las investigaciones y

estar presentes durante los interrogatorios de sospechosos si se lo permiten los Estados

miembros. Desde 1999, Europol se ha centrado en desarrollar la capacidad analítica

necesaria para aportar valor añadido a las investigaciones nacionales.

En 2005, los ministros de Interior acordaron un ―Modelo europeo de inteligencia

criminal‖, un plan no estatal de actividad policial para coordinar las investigaciones

contra la delincuencia organizada en toda la UE conforme a un método denominado

―actividad policial basada en el análisis de información‖, una teoría de inspiración

británica que hace hincapié en la recopilación de información de inteligencia y en dirigir

los recursos policiales a combatir los peores criminales. La idea es conseguir que

policías de distintos países planifiquen investigaciones conjuntas haciendo uso de la

mejor información de inteligencia disponible. El Modelo establece cómo la UE puede

conseguirlo asegurando una cooperación entre los cuerpos nacionales de policía, los

analistas de inteligencia criminal de Europol y los jefes de policía en la lucha contra las

mismas amenazas criminales.

El Modelo sigue diversos pasos. En primer lugar, los cuerpos policiales de los

Estados miembros comparten inteligencia con Europol, que realiza una valoración

general de la amenaza que plantea a la UE la delincuencia organizada. En base a esa

evaluación, el Consejo de Ministros acuerda qué prioridades de ley y orden abordarán

conjuntamente sus policías. Los jefes de policía de la UE organizan entonces

operaciones conjuntas contra los delincuentes y posteriormente informan a Europol al

respecto y acerca de la experiencia adquirida, a tiempo para que se realice la siguiente

valoración de la amenaza.

Los Estados miembros de la UE probaron por primera vez esta nueva forma de

colaboración en 2006. En base a la primera valoración de la amenaza realizada por

Europol, los Gobiernos de la UE establecieron cuatro prioridades regionales en la lucha

contra la delincuencia organizada en Europa: narcotráfico y trata de personas por parte

NERINT 27

de bandas africanas que operan en el Mediterráneo, narcotráfico de heroína y trata de

mujeres desde los Balcanes por parte de bandas albanesas, contrabando de mercancías

en la región del Mar Báltico y fabricación ilegal de drogas sintéticas en Bélgica, los

Países Bajos, Alemania y el Reino Unido (ENFOPOL 30, pp. 1-3). Los primeros datos

apuntan a que ni los Gobiernos ni la policía se toman lo suficientemente en serio este

Modelo, aunque, en un principio, el establecimiento de Europol recibió la misma

acogida. Y sin embargo, la adopción de un modelo comunitario para el mantenimiento

de la ley y el orden supone un importante avance. Este Modelo es además un sutil

intento de promover el uso de métodos policiales basados en el análisis de inteligencia

en toda la UE.

En privado, los agentes de policía muestran su preocupación por el hecho de que

ciertas iniciativas comunitarias estén más enfocadas a satisfacer motivaciones políticas

que a dar respuesta a sus necesidades en materia de cooperación sobre el terreno. Está

previsto que los policías organicen investigaciones COSPOL multinacionales haciendo

uso de la legislación comunitaria para el establecimiento de equipos conjuntos de

investigación, en virtud de la cual policías de varios países distintos tendrán

competencias para trabajar en la misma investigación en equipo, prácticamente como si

estuvieran trabajando en una única jurisdicción.

Los equipos conjuntos de investigación pueden llegar a convertirse en una

herramienta innovadora en la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada transnacional,

pero hasta la fecha la policía sólo ha creado un puñado de ellos (mayoritariamente para

casos de narcotráfico, fraude y terrorismo) y ninguno de ellos compuesto por policías de

más de dos países distintos. Los policías alegan que ello se debe a que el proceso para

poner en marcha los equipos requiere demasiada burocracia y a que resulta difícil

gestionarlos, por lo que prefieren hacer uso de los antiguos procedimientos del Consejo

de Europa o recurrir a acuerdos informales. Los funcionarios de la UE responden a ello

que estos equipos serán cada vez más comunes, y más ambiciosos, en cuanto la policía

y los fiscales se acostumbren al nuevo sistema.

Reveses al intercambio de información

Europol depende totalmente de la inteligencia criminal que recibe de los Estados

miembros, de forma que ha tenido que esforzarse mucho por demostrar que sus archivos

pueden aportar un valor añadido a las investigaciones nacionales de delitos. Con su

director actual, Max-Peter Ratzel, Europol está logrando convencer poco a poco a los

Estados miembros de su potencial. Un alto cargo de la policía británica afirmaba:

―Europol ha madurado. (...) Sus analistas entienden mejor lo que necesitamos de ellos y

están empezando a producir los resultados deseados. Actualmente llevamos a cabo

muchas operaciones a través de Europol‖. Para empezar, más allá de la mejora de la

labor de inteligencia, los policías afirman que el simple hecho de tener a funcionarios de

los 27 Estados miembros de la UE en un mismo pasillo en La Haya supone un recurso

sin precedentes en la cooperación policial cotidiana.

Aun así, aún siguen existiendo importantes problemas. Algunos Estados

miembros siguen sin prestar a Europol apoyo suficiente y sistemático. En 2006,

mientras que un Estado miembro aportó más de 500 páginas de inteligencia criminal a

la primera evaluación de la amenaza planteada por la delincuencia organizada que llevó

a cabo Europol, otro no aportó más que una. Algunos Estados miembros envían a

NERINT 28

Europol agentes de policía sin la autoridad necesaria en sus respectivos países para

ayudar a sus colegas a resolver cuestiones transfronterizas. Esto plantea graves

dificultades a la hora de establecer una base de confianza y reforzar la coordinación en

las investigaciones internacionales, ya que los agentes no están seguros del nivel de

cooperación que pueden esperar de sus homólogos extranjeros. El mismo problema

inhibe el trabajo de Eurojust cuando los fiscales no tienen un nivel de competencias

parecido. Por ejemplo, sólo algunos fiscales de Eurojust disponen de competencias

básicas para emitir y activar peticiones formales de pruebas y autorizar entregas

controladas, escuchas telefónicas u operaciones encubiertas.

La eficacia de Europol también se ve obstaculizada por su convenio constitutivo,

que hizo de esta oficina un órgano difícil de manejar y que dificulta las acciones de su

personal. Hasta las menores decisiones de su director requieren la aprobación unánime

de los 27 Estados miembros de la UE representados en su consejo de administración.

Además, en virtud del convenio, la policía ordinaria y los analistas de Europol sólo

puede colaborar a través de los oficiales de enlace de La Haya, que operan mediante

unidades especiales con sede en las capitales nacionales, lo cual puede llegar a conducir

a una parálisis burocrática.

Los Estados miembros trataron de agilizar la burocracia de Europol modificando

ese convenio una vez que el órgano comenzó a funcionar en 1999. Le añadieron nuevos

protocolos que ponían a disposición de sus funcionarios procedimientos más sencillos

para trabajar y que les conferían mayores competencias de investigación de actividades

de blanqueo de dinero y de apoyo a investigaciones multinacionales sobre el terreno en

curso. Pero puesto que esos cambios debían ser ratificados por todos los parlamentos

nacionales de los Estados miembros, no entraron en vigor hasta transcurridos varios

años, de ahí que los Estados miembros quieran deshacerse del antiguo convenio.

Europol volverá a establecerse mediante legislación comunitaria que pueda modificarse

con mayor facilidad en el futuro, como los acuerdos empleados para establecer Eurojust

o Frontex, la Agencia de Fronteras de la UE.

Conforme a la nueva legislación, Europol dispondrá de mayores competencias

de investigación para una mayor cantidad de delitos, será menos burocrática y dispondrá

de mayor libertad para recabar inteligencia e información como datos de ADN.

También informará, de forma anual, al Parlamento Europeo y mantendrá cierta

comunicación con los parlamentos nacionales, aumentando así en cierto modo su

rendición de cuentas. Estos cambios distan mucho de convertir a Europol en un

organismo similar a la Oficina Federal de Investigación (FBI) estadounidense. En

EEUU, los agentes del FBI tienen plenas competencias policiales para investigar más de

3.000 delitos federales. La UE no cuenta con un corpus semejante de leyes penales

federales que permitan a Europol llevar a cabo ese tipo de actividad policial. De hecho,

el ―valor añadido‖ que Europol aporta a los cuerpos nacionales de policía quedaría

destruido si la oficina se convirtiera en un competidor con competencias operativas. De

ahí que, aun renovada, esta oficina no será capaz de efectuar detenciones ni iniciar

investigaciones sin contar con la colaboración de los Estados miembros.

Esas reformas eran necesarias, pero no abordan el problema fundamental a que

se enfrenta la cooperación europea en materia policial y judicial: los distintos papeles

representados por los fiscales y la policía de los distintos Estados miembros. Tanto los

NERINT 29

representantes de Europol como los de Eurojust deben tener competencias equivalentes

si se quiere que ambas organizaciones funcionen correctamente. La forma evidente de

superar este problema sería fusionar estos dos órganos en un único órgano europeo de

coordinación judicial y policial que incluyese también a la Unidad operativa de jefes de

policía de la UE. Un único órgano podría contribuir a alcanzar un nivel uniforme de

cooperación a nivel de toda la UE, independientemente de cuáles fueran las estructuras

nacionales de mantenimiento de la ley y el orden, y también contribuiría a evitar que se

duplicara el trabajo de recopilación y análisis de información de inteligencia y a

asegurar una mejor transición desde la investigación hasta el enjuiciamiento en los casos

de naturaleza transfronteriza. Está previsto que Eurojust y Europol empiecen a

compartir instalaciones en 2009, una ocasión ideal para poner en marcha su fusión.

Conclusión: El objetivo de la cooperación comunitaria no debería ser centralizar la

cooperación policial y judicial en órganos como Europol y Eurojust. Tampoco deberían

quedar sujetas a procedimientos formales todas las formas de cooperación policial (una

combinación de mecanismos formales e informales garantiza los mejores resultados),

sino que, más bien, la UE debería convertirse en punto de enlace para el surgimiento de

una nueva comunidad paneuropea de agentes de policía. En este sentido, las fuerzas de

mantenimiento del orden tienen mucho que aprender de sus homólogos en aduanas. El

hecho de que su trabajo siempre haya sido de carácter internacional ha hecho que la

cooperación entre los agentes europeos de aduanas sea altamente sofisticada,

especialmente en las esferas del intercambio de información, la evaluación conjunta de

las amenazas y las incautaciones coordinadas de mercancías ilegales.

Los Gobiernos europeos están realizando una sólida inversión a largo plazo en

cooperación policial y judicial transnacional para combatir la delincuencia organizada,

algo que queda de manifiesto en su determinación de renunciar a los vetos nacionales

para decisiones sobre delincuencia y actuación policial, reformar Europol y otros

órganos y compartir cada vez más información en materia de mantenimiento de la ley y

el orden por diversos canales. Sólo se conseguirá que esta inversión genere una

rentabilidad si los Gobiernos logran conseguir que sus cuerpos policiales se tomen en

serio el Modelo europeo de inteligencia criminal, un proceso que probablemente lleve

varios años. Y una fusión de Europol, Eurojust y la Unidad operativa de jefes de policía

de la UE supone una respuesta convincente para los persistentes problemas planteados

por las diferencias en los sistemas jurídicos y las tradiciones de los distintos Estados

miembros y el elevado riesgo de duplicación de los esfuerzos.

NERINT 30

3. Clipping de notícias

12/12/08 - Round two for the Lisbon Treaty - STRATFOR

18/04/09 - Europol to become EU agency in 2010 – Assessoria de Imprensa da União

Européia

22/04/09 - Europe must deliver a common immigration policy, say MEPs -

Assessoria de Imprensa do Parlamento Europeu

29/04/09 - Frontex and the US Department of Homeland Security – Assessoria de

Imprensa da Frontex

13/05/09 - Turkey joins European Gendarmerie force as Observer – Assessoria de

Imprensa da Frontex

11/06/09 - Sweden's EU immigration plans facing headwinds - EurActiv

21/06/09 - Frontex handover of migrants to Italy results in forced repatriation –

Malta today

24/06/09 - The Comission proposes a new policy to enhance chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear security in the EU - Assessoria de Imprensa da União

Européia

24/06/09 - The setting up of an Agency for the operational management of large-

scale IT systems proposed by the Commission - Assessoria de Imprensa da União

Européia

24/06/09 - Europe's race to the right – The Guardian

30/06/2009 - World Bank investigators and OLAF jointly target aid fraud -

Assessoria de Imprensa do Banco Mundial

1º/07/09 - Sweden: Stockholm Takes the Reins of the European Union -

STRATFOR

23/07/09 - EU looking for better deal on data transfer - European Observer

2/09/09 - Olli Rehn: why visas have been scrapped for certain Balkan countries –

Assessoria de Imprensa do Parlamento Europeu

04/09/09 - Fears for Lisbon as 'Yes' vote plunges - Independent Irish

10/09/2009 - Commission aims at intensifying fight against serious crime and

terrorism by authorizing law enforcement authorities to consult fingerprints of

applicants for international protection - Assessoria de Imprensa da União Européia

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11/09/09 - Le futur secrétaire général du Conseil de l'Europe héritera d'une

institution en crise – Le Monde

………………………………………………………………………………………….

Ireland: round two for the Lisbon Treaty 12/12/2008

The Irish government agreed in principle Dec. 10 to hold a second referendum on the

EU Lisbon Treaty, which was originally defeated in Ireland in June. The second

referendum will take place by the end of October 2009, before the end of the current

EU Commission mandate. If the referendum passes, it will remove the single largest

obstacle to the treaty‘s passage.

Thus far, 24 of the 27 EU member states have approved the Lisbon Treaty. Officially

only the Czech Republic — whose Senate decided Dec. 10 to postpone the vote on

the treaty until Feb. 3 — and Ireland have not ratified the treaty. Poland, whose

parliament approved the treaty earlier in the year, is still awaiting its president‘s

signature, which is necessary for ratification.

The Lisbon Treaty is the European Union‘s last-gasp attempt to create a semblance of

a political union out of its 27 members. The treaty would strengthen the European

Parliament‘s role in policymaking, simplify voting procedures and improve the EU‘s

visibility on the world stage by streamlining its common security and defense policy.

Among the contentious policies, the treaty would also reduce the number of

commissioners from 27 (one commissioner for each country) to 18.

The Irish referendum rejected the treaty on the grounds that it contradicted Ireland‘s

traditional neutral foreign policy and that it went against Irish sovereignty by

reducing the number of commissioners. Irish voters were also concerned that the new

treaty would force change in Irish tax policies and on ethical issues such as abortion.

Therefore, the EU leaders meeting at the Dec. 11-12 summit in Brussels moved to

assure Dublin that Irish neutrality would not be impinged, that its taxation or social

laws would not be forced to change and that Ireland, and other member states, would

still have the right to nominate a commissioner.

The latest polls, from November, suggest that these concessions to Ireland will move

the electorate to approve the referendum by the slightest of margins. This would

follow the trend set so far with EU treaty ratification, in which concessions to the

country holding out usually result in approval. This was the case in 1993 with the

second Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and in 2002 with the Irish vote

on the Nice Treaty.

The question, however, is whether the current set of concessions will still be relevant

in mid-2009, when the Irish are set to hold the referendum. With the global economic

crisis hitting Europe and Ireland particularly hard, the Irish may be consumed by an

altogether different set of problems in mid-2009. And referendums on EU treaties are

often an avenue for voicing public discontent on ancillary issues, as the Dutch and

French rejections of the EU Constitution in the summer of 2005 reflected public

displeasure with immigration issues and domestic political leadership.

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Europol to become EU agency in 2010 18/04/09

Police coordination centre in The Hague to join family of EU bodies.

For Vice-President Jacques Barrot, "This is a veritable transformation, not merely a

cosmetic one. Europol will become a full EU body, with the tools to support law

enforcement agencies in the Member States even more effectively. As a result,

European police forces will cooperate more closely".

After some 15 months of intense discussion in the Council, the Member States agreed

on the text of a Decision conferring EU agency status on the European Police Office

(Europol) effective 1 January 2010.

The Decision's aim is two-fold:

First, to replace the current Europol Convention with a Council Decision, so that

Europol's legal framework can be adapted more rapidly in response to trends in

crime. This is no trivial matter when one considers that it took an average of more

than five years to ratify the protocols to the Europol Convention adopted in 2000,

2002 and 2003.

Second, to replace intergovernmental financing with Community funding. Europol

will become an EU agency, subject to the Financial Regulation and the Staff

Regulations of officials and other servants of the European Communities.

The improvements resulting from Europol's new legal framework, in terms of

organisational flexibility and effectiveness, will go hand in hand with closer

involvement of the European Parliament, notably in its capacity as budgetary

authority;

By their decision, the Member States are acknowledging the importance of Europol's

role as a key contributor to the European project and placing it on equal footing with

the other European institutions.

In substance, the extension of Europol's mandate to cover all serious forms of cross-

border crime represents an undeniable advance in boosting police cooperation in

Europe and better protecting citizens.

Europe must deliver a common immigration policy, say MEPs 22/04/09

The European Parliament is proposing a blue-print for a common policy on European

immigration. The report recognises the importance of legal immigration, in the face

of Europe's ageing population and declining workforce, but also urges Member States

to jointly tackle the problems caused by illegal immigration. They also propose to

reinforce migrant's rights, by allowing them to vote in local elections.

MEPs describe immigration as "one of the foremost challenges that Europe is

currently facing", and believe that it will remain a significant challenge for the

coming decades. Furthermore, a common approach to immigration is vital as shared

NERINT 33

European borders mean that "action or inaction by one Member State has a direct

impact on others and on the EU as a whole." If migration is poorly managed, it will

not only have a negative impact on the countries of destination but also to the

countries of origin and the migrants themselves.

The European Parliament adopted an own-initiative report drafted by Simon Busuttil

(EPP-ED, MT) on Wednesday, by 485 votes in favour, 110 against and 19

abstentions.

Past and future impact of migrants in Europe

Migrants have always played "a vital role in the development of the EU", and the

report stresses the importance of recognising their past and continuing contribution.

Therefore, Europe should continue to be a welcoming environment for migrants;

especially as, according to Eurostat statistics, the European working age population is

expected to fall by 50 million workers by 2060. Well managed immigration could

help to provide crucial economic stimulus to the EU in the coming years.

However, MEPs are concerned about the effect of the "brain drain" on third

countries, and are therefore recommending that a "cycle of exchange of knowledge"

should be encouraged, through programmes of temporary migration. They are also

proposing a scheme to facilitate training in countries of origin "in order to preserve

occupations in key sectors", and are urging Member States to refrain from actively

recruiting workers in these sectors, such as health and education, in countries which

are already suffering from a lack of workers.

Statistics presented by the Commission suggest that by 2050, the EU will need 60

million migrant workers, which clearly shows that channels for legal migration need

to be improved. MEPs regret that so far little has been done to encourage this, and

calls on Member States to establish a coordinated approach, "taking into account the

demographic and economic situation of the EU."

Integration

Integration should be a key part of EU legislation on immigration. The report

supports integration efforts by Member States, to help immigrants to learn the

language of their host country and to develop an understanding of the values of the

EU and its Member States. However, MEPs also recognise that integration is very

much a two-way process, and also requires adjustments on behalf of the population

of the host state

The report also supports the view that immigrants from third countries should be

granted the right to full mobility in the EU, after a period of five years' legal

residence in a Member State. A further recommendation from MEPs suggests that

democratic participation is crucial to integration they are therefore calling for

migrants to be allowed to vote in local elections.

Successful integration also requires cooperation with third party countries, which

regrettably, has so far not achieved sufficient results. The one exception to this is

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Spain's successful cooperation with third countries, such as Senegal and Mauritania

which in 2008 helped to reduce arrivals in the Canary Islands by 70%.

Common European border strategy

MEPs are calling for the replacement of national Schengen visas with universal

European Schengen visas, and for a joint consular service for visas to be set up on a

gradual and voluntary basis. The report also calls on the Council and Member States

to adopt arrangements based on solidarity to share the burden of border policing

amongst Member States.

The European Parliament is particularly shocked by the "human tragedy caused by

illegal migratory sea routes." The rapporteur states that in 2008, more migrants lost

their lives at sea that in the war in Gaza. Therefore, the report is calling for urgent

action to stop this tragedy, and to reinforce cooperation with countries of origin.

MEPs are concerned that illegal immigration organised by criminal networks has so

far proved to be more effective than common European actions, and urges Member

States to take action in "the fight against organised crime, human trafficking and

smuggling."

FRONTEX, the Warsaw based EU agency designed to coordinate border security

cooperation between Member States, should be reinforced and have its powers

extended. The report suggests that FRONTEX should be provided with adequate

funding and resources so that it has the potential to acquire its own equipment.

MEPs are calling on the Commission to investigate the possibility of "upgrading

FRONTEX operations at sea into an EU coast guard, without undermining Member

States control of their borders."

Frontex and the US Department of Homeland Security 29/04/09

In the margins of the EU-US Troika on Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting

held in Prague on 28 April, Frontex and the US Department of Homeland Security

signed a Working Arrangement on the establishment of operational cooperation.

The arrangement which was signed by Frontex Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen and

Mrs. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security,

will lead to transatlantic cooperation in areas related to border security management

including exchange of strategic information, training, capacity building and

collaboration on relevant technologies.

Turkey applied in 2005 to become an observer member of the European

Gendarmerie force. 13/05/09

During the High Level Interdepartmental Committee (CIMIN) meeting in Paris on

the 13 of May 2009, Turkey was accepted as an observer country. Both CIMIN and

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: ―Turkey's participation in the force

will constitute another value in addition to its contributions to international security".

Sweden: Stockholm Takes the Reins of the European Union 1/06/2009

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Summary

Sweden became the next European Union country to hold the presidency of the

European Union on July 1. Sweden has many issues to deal with, including the global

financial crisis, ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and expansion of the bloc. Instead of

addressing these problems, Sweden will turn its attention to challenging Russia for

influence in the Baltic region. The next six months will allow Stockholm to try its

hand at politics on the global stage.

Analysis

Sweden assumes the presidency of the European Union on July 1. The EU presidency

is a unique institution because it is not elected but instead rotates among the various

EU powers on an equal basis for six-month terms. Whoever holds the presidency sets

the bloc‘s agenda, mediates internal European disagreements and serves as the main

negotiator with other powers, which includes representing the bloc at the upcoming

G-8 and G-20 summits.

EU nations always try to use the presidency to put their national stamp on EU

policies or to achieve some national goal, but little is ever accomplished since the

window of opportunity is only six months. Since the presidency rotates and a country

cannot serve consecutive terms, the issues of the day tend to overwhelm its original

aspirations. This was certainly the case for the Czech Republic, which has just now

completed a turbulent six months at the wheel of the European Union. Despite the

problems of government instability (the government fell apart during Prague‘s turn at

the presidency), a global recession, a European constitutional crisis and a convoluted

political system that gave the eurosceptic Czech president the ability to magnify,

rather than mitigate the crisis, the Czech Republic demonstrated how to ineffectively

run the EU presidency.

European states welcome the Swedes‘ turn for the presidency with great relief.

Stockholm has a reputation for quiet competence and honest brokering, a welcome

change after the frazzled nature of the Czech presidency and the somewhat pushy

French presidency that preceded them. Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and

Foreign Minister Carl Bildt — himself a former prime minister — will officially

represent the European Union.

Sweden faces challenges to include a global recession, pending ratification of the

Lisbon Treaty, problems with expanding the union and the detritus left by the Czech

presidency. Sweden is likely to ignore all of these problems — even though the

issues are important — because Stockholm is unable to resolve them. The Lisbon

Treaty is stuck in ratification mode, with Ireland, Germany, Poland and the Czech

Republic thus far withholding formal approval. Since ratification is a national issue,

the best thing that any EU president can do to maximize the chances of ratification is

to remain silent. A territorial dispute with Slovenia and a name dispute with Greece

have snarled EU membership for Croatia and Macedonia, respectively. Bildt has

personally spent a great deal of time dealing with the Balkan imbroglio throughout

the 1990s and has already made it clear that he does not plan to deal with bilateral

disputes. (All EU members have full veto power over the acceptance of new EU

NERINT 36

members.) That leaves the recession, and Sweden cannot accomplish much to resolve

this issue on a European level either. Europe‘s economic problems are a mix of

export failures and homegrown banking problems, issues that fall under national

sovereignty — as opposed to European-wide regulation. Since Sweden is not a

member of the eurozone, it lacks a credible platform to push for controlling Europe‘s

spiraling deficits and any meaningful shifts in monetary policy.

Rather than dealing with the issues of the day, Sweden‘s presidential responsibilities

instead will be something of a homecoming. Four centuries ago, Sweden was one of

Europe‘s most powerful states. It dominated the Baltic Sea region until a series of

losses — culminating in the 1809 Finnish war with Russia — forced it into a self-

imposed geopolitical irrelevance (that is, neutrality).

Times have changed. Between NATO‘s expansion and Russia‘s slide since the Cold

War (currently paused by a period of resurgence following the August 2008 Georgia

war), Sweden has seen its sphere of influence return. Therefore, with many European

issues either not on its radar or outside of its reach, Stockholm will be able to

concentrate on the one issue it truly cares about: the Baltic region. Following patterns

established centuries ago, Sweden will use economics rather than armed conflict to

deepen its influence in the Baltic countries.

First on Stockholm‘s agenda is reducing the Baltic countries‘ dependence on Russian

energy, a lever that Moscow can always use in the region for political gain. The

Swedish presidency will have the opportunity to influence the EU Commission plan,

signed on June 17, to link up the Baltic states‘ energy networks with the rest of

Europe. While the project funds are not immense — 500 million euro ($708 million)

— the plan sets an ambitious agenda of linking Baltic countries‘ electricity networks

with the rest of Europe and reversing natural gas pipelines to bring gas to the region,

insulating it from a potential future Russian natural gas cutoff.

Aside from energy, Sweden will look for opportunity in the current severe recession

affecting the Baltic region. Swedish banks have claimed the region as their turf since

the end of the Cold War and are now overexposed to the troubled economies. But

that also means that Stockholm is sympathetic toward bailout plans for the emerging

Europe. Not only does Sweden have its own money at stake, it also expects to remain

a key financial player in the region in the future. The challenge will be convincing

Germany and France that Central Europe and the Baltic states need EU funds.

The success of Sweden‘s attempts to diversify the Baltic region‘s energy and fix the

region‘s economic problems in the next six months is suspect, but it can at least begin

the process. The main difference between the Czech presidency and the Swedish

presidency is that Stockholm will not try to resolve every crisis that befalls the

European Union and instead concentrate on crises that it finds both strategic and self-

serving.

What is more important than actual progress in the Baltic region is Stockholm‘s

public announcement to Moscow that it intends to characterize its EU presidency by

competing with Russia in the Baltic region. Additionally, Sweden remains close to

NATO and is contemplating membership in the alliance. These moves may take the

NERINT 37

Kremlin by surprise and make it nervous, since it was able to dismiss Swedish

presence in the Baltic for the last 200 years.

The latter part of 2009 may therefore be quite a coming-out party for Stockholm.

Unlike the Czech Republic, Sweden will be able to concentrate on its strategy

because it is not facing a domestic political meltdown. Reinfeldt‘s job is secure, with

his center-right coalition holding up in its most recent test during the EU

parliamentary elections, and Bildt is highly respected internationally. None of the EU

member states, including the more powerful members, will be able to dismiss the

Swedish presidency in the same manner as Prague‘s disjointed leadership. The next

six months will be a test of how ready Sweden is for the big leagues.

Sweden's EU immigration plans facing headwinds 11/06/09

The renewal of the EU's justice and home affairs priorities will be a key challenge for

the forthcoming Swedish EU Presidency. But despite the country's legislative

credentials, Sweden's 'Stockholm Programme' is likely to fall short of its ambitions,

sources told EurActiv.

Background:

The 'Stockholm Programme' is the Swedish EU Presidency's proposed legislative

agenda in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA) for the 2009-2014 period.

The current JHA agenda, the Hague Programme, expires this year. According to the

Swedish Presidency, the Stockholm Programme aims to "define the framework for

EU police and customs cooperation, rescue services, criminal and civil law

cooperation, asylum, migration and visa policy".

Of these issues, immigration and asylum policy has arguably become the biggest

political 'hot potato' for the EU, with a number of Mediterranean countries in

particular (including Malta and Italy) calling for greater assistance from their

northern counterparts.

Sweden has one of Europe's most liberal asylum policies, and intends to push for a

comprehensive Common Asylum System when it takes the EU's helm on 1 July.

The Swedish government has outlined its progressive ambitions on immigration,

arguing for a "humane refugee policy," and emphasising that "the current trend in

Europe to close more borders must be opposed".

However, the government is also issuing a clear warning to its EU partners, stating

that "if Sweden has to shoulder a disproportionate share of the responsibility for

refugee situations […] this will eventually raise questions about the sustainability of

our asylum system".

The solution, argues Sweden, is obvious: "All EU member states must share the

responsibility for offering protection for refugees." This, says the presidency, is why

NERINT 38

common rules for EU countries will be its goal.

Sweden has considerable "moral authority" on this issue, according to Bjarte

Vandvik, secretary-general of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE),

an NGO. Speaking to EurActiv, Vandvik noted that "if you look at numbers, Sweden

takes the same number of asylum seekers per capita as Malta, or even more".

Indeed, the European Commission yesterday called for a JHA programme which

moves "towards a common asylum system" and insists on "burden-sharing and

solidarity between member states".

Political will not there, say experts

However, while the Swedish Presidency has lofty ambitions, there is very little

chance of these targets being met, according to an immigration expert contacted by

EurActiv.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the source said that the Stockholm Programme

"encapsulates all the good intentions" about harmonising and working together on

protection issues for refugees, migration, and so on.

"At the same time, however, we know that there is no real political will, let alone

consensus, in the Council to make this happen," they added.

All previous efforts to harmonise EU immigration and asylum systems have failed

and are reflected in "the fact that the Commission is currently so eager to show off"

the new European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the source continued.

"This is actually a red herring, basically giving the message that 'well, we didn't

succeed in actually getting where we wanted with the Common Asylum System, but

look at this wonderful office we created instead'."

Bjarte Vandvik agrees. "With the best of intentions for the Swedes, I think they're in

a difficult position. They have a brand new Parliament which has yet to grasp the

importance of these issues in a procedural way. And this Parliament is far more right-

wing and conservative, and is likely to be more sceptical on these questions of

harmonisation," the ECRE boss told EurActiv.

He did, however, think that "something manageable like the question of resettlement

- taking refugees out of camps, for instance, or deciding on the size of quotas for

refugees - that has a chance to succeed".

A right-wing Europe

The current political reality in the EU may also be a constraint for Sweden's

ambitions. The centre-right currently leads 20 of 27 member states, and won a

majority in last week's European Parliament elections.

Traditionally, the centre-right has been more hardline on immigration and asylum

NERINT 39

issues, and a number of EU countries are likely to be vehemently opposed to the

Swedish plans.

"My greatest worry," said Bjarte Vandvik, is that the EU "will continue with this

policy of just shutting the borders, as has been the case so far".

"Making border controls efficient, making security measures efficient, and then not

taking any steps on the other issues" would be a mistake, he argues.

"I think a truly harmonised Common European Asylum System will not happen. It's

still a pipe dream," Vandvik concluded.

Positions:

The Swedish EU Presidency "will take its share of the responsibility for the

international protection of refugees, but if Sweden has to shoulder a disproportionate

share of the responsibility for refugee situations around the world in relation to

comparable countries, this will eventually raise questions about the sustainability of

our asylum system," according to the presidency website.

"All EU member states must share the responsibility for offering protection for

refugees. This is why common rules for the countries in the EU are one of the

government's main objectives in the area of migration," the statement concludes.

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said that "in future, EU action

must aim above all at delivering the best possible service to the citizen in an area of

freedom, security and justice more tangible for the citizens".

"We want to promote citizens' rights, make their daily lives easier and provide

protection, and this calls for effective and responsible European action in these areas.

In this context, I consider immigration policy particularly important. This is the

vision the Commission is presenting to the Council and Parliament for debate, with a

view to the adoption of the new Stockholm Programme by the European Council in

December 2009," he said.

Bjarte Vandvik, ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles) secretary-

general, told EurActiv that "the old JHA divide between the north and south of

Europe is less evident today than in previous years. If you look at numbers, Sweden

takes the same number of asylum seekers per capita as Malta, or even more".

He added that "the smaller states in the south, certainly, are calling for greater

support from their wealthier neighbours".

Frontex handover of migrants to Italy results in forced repatriation 21/06/09

The European Union border agency Frontex operating from Malta has for the first

time ever coordinated a mission that led to the forced repatriation operation of

migrants at sea.

74 illegal migrants sighted last Thursday afternoon by a Maltese private aircraft at

NERINT 40

approximately 126 miles south-east of Malta, was transmitted to a German Puma

helicopter participating in Operation Nautilus IV that is being coordinated from

Malta.

Senior military sources revealed with MaltaToday that the German helicopter was

instructed to work closely with the Italian coast-guard in the area, that picked up the

migrants Friday morning, and handed them over to a Libyan patrol boat.

The Italian army is participating in another joint patrol along with France, to monitor

the Sardignia-Lampedusa route.

The mission has been defined as the first ever forced repatriation operation

coordinated by Frontex on the high seas. Even though the migrants were intercepted

by an Italian coast guard boat, the same migrants, that included women and children

were identified by a Frontex asset that followed the operation through.

Meanwhile Italian police have reportedly been in contact with the Maltese

authorities, after 10 migrants who escaped from Safi and Marsa detention and open

centres, were apprehended in Sicily.

The migrants were caught on the Ragusa coast shortly after being ferried by a

Maltese speedboat.

The news re-opens past issues with the Italian authorities following a series of tragic

trips by speedboats driven by Maltese criminals that exploit the migrants and secretly

take them to Sicily.

The Commission proposes a new policy to enhance chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear security in the EU 24/06/09

The European Commission has today adopted a policy package on chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security. The core of the package is the

EU CBRN Action Plan. Resulting from an extensive consultation process, the

proposed package represents a consensus of all stake-holders to protect EU citizens

from these threats.

"This CBRN package is an important and timely initiative. Terrorist groups acquiring

weapons of mass destruction, including CBRN materials, is the most frightening

scenario." declared Vice-president Jacques Barrot, Commissioner responsible for

Justice, Freedom and Security. "Although Europe has fortunately not seen a large

scale attack using these materials, the seriousness of the potential consequences for

our societies is such that we cannot be complacent. The proposed package represents

the EU contribution to support the efforts of the Member States in this field", he

added.

Why is an EU approach needed?

The threat of terrorism has not disappeared and knows no borders. The latest threat

assessments suggest that terrorist organisations aspire to obtain and use chemical,

biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons. Although it is not easy for these

groups to obtain and use these weapons, rapidly developing technologies and the

wide-spread use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for

legitimate purposes make such aspirations more and more realistic.

The main aim of the package, which consists of a Commission Communication, an

NERINT 41

EU CBRN Action Plan and a Commission Staff Working Document called "Bridging

Security and Health", is to support the ongoing efforts of the Member States in this

field and to provide a framework for better coordination of and cooperation between

all involved stakeholders.

What does the Commission propose in its CBRN package?

The core of the package is the EU CBRN Action Plan. The 133 measures included in

the EU Action Plan are the result of a long consultation process with experts from

national authorities of all EU Member States, EU institutions and agencies, as well as

from the private sector and the research community. In line with these

recommendations, the Commission proposes a broad approach to CBRN security

ranging from prevention and detection to enhancing preparedness and response

capacities.

The approach focuses on:

ensuring that unauthorised access to CBRN materials of concern is as

difficult as possible ( prevention);

having the capability to detect CBRN materials ( detection);

being able to efficiently respond to incidents involving CBRN materials

and recover from them as quickly as possible ( preparedness and

response).

Implementation of the CBRN package

The measures included in the EU CBRN Action Plan will be implemented

predominantly by already existing national, EU and international structures and using

a broad variety of tools. The Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security

plans to allocate up to 100 million euro from existing financial programmes to

support the implementation process over the period 2010-2013 – other Commission

funding programmes – such as the Security Research programme under the 7 th

framework Programme, will also contribute.

VP Barrot concluded: " The European Union is committed to ensuring that terrorist

threats do not materialise. We believe that the CBRN package will contribute

significantly to this commitment."

The setting up of an Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT

systems proposed by the Commission 24/06/09

Following the request of the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission

adopted today a legislative package proposing the setting up of an Agency for the

long-term operational management of the Schengen Information System (SIS II),

Visa Information System (VIS), EURODAC and other large-scale IT systems in the

area of freedom, security and justice.

Vice President Barrot, Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security,

said: "The legislative proposals adopted today aim to simplify the current situation by

NERINT 42

establishing a single management structure for several large-scale IT systems in the

area of freedom, security and justice. The establishment of a dedicated Agency for

the operational management of these systems will allow their effective and secure

operation, assuring quality of service for users, continuity and uninterrupted service.

The gradual building up of expertise will allow the Agency to become a centre of

excellence for the development and operational management of future large-scale IT

systems in the area of freedom, security and justice".

The legislative package adopted by the Commission is composed of a Regulation

establishing the Agency, a Decision and a horizontal Communication providing a

quick overview of the legislative proposals.

The core mission of the Agency would be to fulfil the operational management tasks

for SIS II, VIS and EURODAC, keeping the systems functioning 24 hours a day,

seven days a week. In addition to these operational activities, the Agency will also be

responsible for adopting the necessary security measures, reporting, publishing

statistics, monitoring of research, SIS II and VIS related training and information

issues. It will ensure data security and integrity as well as compliance with data

protection rules.

A dedicated, specialised Agency will be able to achieve important synergies and

economies of scale as all three existing IT systems will be housed in one location,

under common management. As a centre of excellence, the Agency will have the

potential to be entrusted with the development of new IT systems in the area of

freedom, security and justice.

The Agency will be set up in the form of a Regulatory Agency, an independent

European body. The Commission and the participating States will be represented on

the Management Board, which will be the Agency's governing body. The Agency

will be assisted by advisory groups composed of national experts.

The Agency should become operational as of 2012 and be in a position to take over

tasks related to the operational management of SIS II, VIS and EURODAC.

Europe's race to the right 24/06/09

The results of the European elections look certain to cement the centre right and far

right's sway over politics in Europe - Tony Bunyan

EU institutions and governments regularly repeat the mantra that we all "share

common values", as if the project has unchanging standards and principles, but do

we?

At the time of the 1999 European elections, when there were 15 EU member states,

there were 12 social democratic governments and three on the centre right. Now there

are 27 member states, with 20 governments on the centre right or far right and just

seven on the so-called centre left (and that is including the UK government).

This has a direct effect on what happens in the most powerful body on EU decision-

making, the Council of the European Union. When national interior ministries send

officials, police and immigration officers and ministers to the plethora of justice and

home affairs working parties (pdf), the article 36 committee, the strategic committee

NERINT 43

on immigration, frontiers and asylum and numerous sub-groups, the options they will

support reflect national policies.

After 9/11, we have been told time and time again that terrorism could destroy our

common values and democracies. But when Statewatch examined the proposed

measures after the dreadful bombings in Madrid in March 2004, it produced a

scoreboard (pdf) showing that 27 of the 57 measures put forward had little or nothing

to do with tackling terrorism.

Terrible though the current threat of terrorist attacks are, they will not destroy "our

common values and democracies". What is destroying them is the response of EU

governments to terrorism. When the EU says it is balancing security and liberty you

know that the former will always win out over the latter. This is a reflection of the

shift to the right at the core of the EU.

The results of the European parliament elections look likely to give the centre right

and far right a permanent majority. We are faced with the prospect of both the

Council of the European Union and the European parliament being dominated by the

right for the next five years.

The election gave the conservatives' group (PPE) 264 MEPs, the rightwing Europe of

Nations (UEN) have 35 MEPs, the Independence-Democracy group have 18 MEPs

(including Ukip, though the group may fail to meet the new minimum criteria to form

a separate group – seven member states and 25 MEPs). To which can be added, on

civil liberties issues, the UK Conservative party, with 29 MEPs, who have just

cobbled together a new anti-federalist group (the European Conservatives and

Reformists, ECR) with bed-fellows of highly dubious politics. This will give a total

of over 346 MEPs out of 736. To this total can be added many of the remaining 43

"Other" MEPs who are extreme-right, racist or fascist.

In the last parliament the racist/fascist MEPs formed the Tradition-Sovereignty group

of 23, which then fell apart. This time around there are estimated to be between 30

and 35 MEPs who are ultra-nationalist, racist or fascist including – from France:

three; Belgium: two; Hungary: three; UK: two; Netherlands: four; Austria: two;

Bulgaria: two; Denmark:two; Finland: one; Slovakia: one; Romania: two: and

Greece: two.

Some, such as the groups on the Italian far right, the National Alliance and

Alessandra Mussolini's Social Alternative (who have eight MEPs) who merged with

Silvio Berlusconi's new centre-right People of Freedom party in March are hidden in

the PPE and the anti-migrant Northern League has eight MEPs in the UEN group.

The progressive groups, if they vote together, can muster the socialist group (PSE,

which is to rename itself the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats for Europe,

ASDE): 182 MEPs, the liberal group (ALDE): 80 MEPs; the Green group

(Green/EFA): 53 MEPs; and the United Left (GUE): 32 MEPs, a total of 347. This

coalition is by no means guaranteed. In the last parliamentary session the two big

parties, the PPE and the PSE, joined forces to push through biometric passports and

NERINT 44

the mandatory retention of communications.

On these figures the balance of power on civil liberties issues would rest with the

"Others" on the extreme right. In 1979 61.99% of the electorate voted in the EU

parliament elections and every election voter participation has fallen – now to its

lowest-ever level, at just 43.24%. Disenchantment with the two mainstream political

parties who have both moved to the right and the failure of the EU institutions to

operate in an open and transparent manner has contributed to this growing

disengagement.

In the past two European elections, the main parties have attempted to "triangulate"

the far right and racists by responding to their perceived appeal, especially on race

and immigration. This tactic has failed, serving only to legitimate their extremist

views and leaving us with racist and fascist MEPs from 12 EU member states. A

frightening prospect for the future.

World Bank investigators and OLAF jointly target aid fraud 30/06/2009

The joint fight against fraud affecting development aid is at the centre of a co-

operation agreement signed today in Brussels between the European Anti-Fraud

Office (OLAF) and the World Bank‘s Integrity Vice-Presidency. The World Bank is

the trustee of significant funds from the EU. The agreement will allow investigators

from both institutions‘ anti-fraud and anti-corruption bodies to join forces more

effectively in the defence of monies dedicated to help the poorest and in other fields

of their work.

On the occasion of the signing of the co-operation agreement OLAF-Director

General Franz-Hermann Brüner declared: ―The European Union and its Member

States are the world‘s largest donor of development aid. We need to work together as

closely as possible with the investigative departments of other donors worldwide in

order to prevent fraudsters from exploiting international help.‖ He added: ―The

World Bank‘s Integrity Vice-Presidency is a key partner for OLAF because of its

broad experience in the field of anti-fraud and anti-corruption and because of the

significant sums of EU aid administered by the World Bank‖. Leonard McCarthy,

Vice President for Integrity for the World Bank Group, stated: ―The World Bank is a

vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the

world. Our agreement with OLAF will allow our investigators and prevention

specialists to combine forces in taking action against those who illegally pocket aid

funds. Given the current economic and financial crisis, it is of paramount importance

that agencies work together to reduce the incidence of malfeasance in international

development.‖

The agreement between OLAF and World Bank‘s Integrity Vice-Presidency (INT)

will enable the investigation offices to work more closely, more collaboratively and

more effectively over the entire range of their competences, not only in the fight

against aid fraud but also in the field of anti-corruption. This will be achieved by

conducting joint investigations where common interests of both the EU and the

World Bank are involved. Within the rules and laws which govern OLAF‘s and

INT‘s activities the agreement allows for the exchanging of information and

NERINT 45

intelligence. Another goal is to examine ways in which standards can be harmonised,

common definitions found and best practices and procedures indentified in the area

of investigations.

From the perspective of the European Union, the co-operation arrangement between

OLAF and INT is of particular importance in the field of development aid. In

addition to being involved in many projects together, the World Bank is also the

trustee of significant funds from the EU. Closer co-operation between the

investigative arms of both institutions will help maximise the protection of those

funds.

Background

The Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) has a critical role in the World Bank Group‘s

Governance and Anti-corruption strategy, aimed at protecting against corruption,

building project integrity into operations, and assisting client countries strengthen

governance policies. As a result of its investigations into allegations of fraud and

corruption in Bank Group-financed operations, 355 firms and individuals have been

debarred from bidding on future World Bank-financed contracts.

The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) protects the financial interests of the

European Union by fighting fraud, corruption and any other irregular activity,

including misconduct within the European Institutions. OLAF is an independent

administrative investigative body collaborating closely with the law-enforcement

services of the 27 Member States of the EU.

EU looking for better deal on data transfer 23/07/09

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS – EU justice commissioner Jacques Barrot on

Wednesday denied accusations that the European parliament was being sidelined from

discussions with the US on the transfer of financial data.

In addition, Mr Barrot said the commission - set to gain a new mandate this month to

renegotiate the terms under which financial data is transferred to the US for counter-

terrorism purposes - will be pushing hard for favourable deal.

Jacques Barrot sought to allay MEP concerns (Photo: European Commission)

"We must negotiate an agreement based on reciprocity rather than allowing the US to

continue as they have up until now as if they were top dog," the French commissioner

told members of the newly formed parliamentary committee on civil liberties, justice

and home affairs.

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US treasury department has been

checking financial information provided by the Society of Worldwide Interbank

Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a financial network owned by banks, in an

attempt to prevent future attacks.

NERINT 46

The move initially proved highly controversial in Europe with member state protection

supervisors saying the transfer of the financial data, including that of EU citizens,

contravened EU laws.

In 2007, an agreement was reached between the EU and US on the conditions under

which a limited subset of the SWIFT data could continue to be transferred, and member

states now generally agree that the process has merits.

In addition, a European expert was sent over to the US to verify that the data was been

used according to the agreed terms.

A report by the French judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, published in February of this year

concluded that the SWIFT data was been used purely for anti-terrorism purposes and

was also being deleted when no longer necessary, two important criteria under the EU-

US agreement.

New deal

In a bid to comply better with EU data protection laws however, the SWIFT server is set

to be moved from the US to Switzerland, resulting in the imminent renegotiation of the

data transfer terms.

"It's one we would like to conclude under the Lisbon Treaty," said Mr Barrot referring

to the EU's proposed new rulebook that would give the parliament a greater say in the

area of justice and home affairs.

MEPs have complained recently that the commission was attempting to push through

the new deal under the current Nice rules that limit the parliament's powers of co-

decision in the area.

However ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is currently held up in a number of EU

member states, with the commission therefore looking to negotiate a temporary

agreement with the US until Lisbon comes into effect.

"All we are looking for is an interim decision to extend the status quo," said Mr Barrot

responding to MEP questions.

Stockholm strategy

Mr Barrot also discussed the commission's proposed justice and home affairs plan for

2010-14 - known as the Stockholm strategy – with the committee.

Although broadly welcoming the four-part blueprint, MEPs were critical of the lack of

detail in certain areas of the document published last month, and insisted measurable

criteria needed to be put in place so that the effectiveness of the plans could be assessed.

Mr Barrot agreed that both ex-ante and ex-post implementation yardsticks needed to be

put in place.

NERINT 47

The Stockholm programme aims to set up a framework for EU police and customs

cooperation, rescue services, criminal and civil law cooperation, asylum, migration and

visa policy for the next five years.

Components include the mutual recognition of decisions made by different member

state judicial systems and a convergence of sentences for criminal offences.

The plan also envisages greater police co-operation in the area of cross-border crime

and the setting up of an observatory to monitor migratory flows within the bloc.

Olli Rehn: why visas have been scrapped for certain Balkan countries 2/09/09

Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs on Wednesday criticized the European Commission's

decision to retain visa requirements for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania, despite lifting

them for three other Balkan countries. Parliament's principal political groups underlined

to Commissioner Olli Rehn the potential risk of regional instability that this decision is

likely to create.

A few weeks before the Commission adopts its latest report on enlargement, on 14

October, Mr Rehn commented on its recent decision to partially waive the requirement

for Schengen visas for three western Balkan countries.

"The abolition of visas is not just a political decision but is linked to compliance with

particular criteria", said the Commissioner.

On15 July this year the Commission adopted a proposal to exempt citizens of the

former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia from EU visa rules.

Provided they have the new biometric passports, people from these three countries will

be able to travel freely around the Schengen zone from 1 January 2010.

The Commissioner told MEPs that the Commission could review the situation of Bosnia

and Albania in mid-2010, depending on progress made by these countries on border

controls, combating organised crime and introducing biometric passports.

The coordinators of Parliament's main political groups highlighted the potential risk of

regional instability created by the Commission's decision. For example, Bosnian Serbs

and Croats who have dual nationality will be able to travel freely to the EU.

Croatia and Serbia

Speaking about Croatia, Mr Rehn said "If this country meets the criteria as regards its

judiciary, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia

(ICTY) and reform of its dockyards, and if the issue of its frontier with Slovenia is

settled, we can envisage completing negotiations in the first half of 2010".

NERINT 48

Hannes Swoboda (S&D, AT), Parliament's rapporteur for Croatia, asked the

Commissioner if he was still involved in efforts to resolve the border dispute. Mr Rehn

replied "the Commission has done its work. It's now up to the leaders of the two

countries to overcome the remaining differences".

On Serbia, the Commissioner said "cooperation with the ICTY is much improved

recently. This improvement could be enough to allow the interim agreement to go

ahead in the near future". The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU

and Serbia signed on 29 April 2008 cannot enter into force unless Belgrade cooperates

fully with the ICTY, under a compromise agreed by European foreign ministers.

No accelerated procedure for Iceland

"Even though Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area and the Schengen

Area, which represents two thirds of the acquis communautaire, no accelerated

procedure is envisaged for this country, which is currently between the 35th and 40th

kilometres out of the 42.195 kilometres in a marathon", said the Commissioner in reply

to questions by Ignacio Salafranca (EPP, ES) and Charles Tannock (ECR, UK).

Fears for Lisbon as 'Yes' vote plunges 04/09/09

Support for the Lisbon Treaty has dramatically faded amid new fears that there could be

a repeat of the turnaround in the first referendum campaign.

A new opinion poll shows there has been a plunge of eight points in the 'Yes' vote (to

46pc) over the summer. That delivered a resounding wake-up call last night to the pro-

treaty campaign.

The 'No' side is now at 29pc, up 1pc, but the number of 'don't knows' has risen by seven

points to 25pc. In the referendum result in June 2008, the 'No' vote came to 53.4pc with

46.6pc voting 'Yes'.

The poll findings show the referendum is far from over and mirrors the pattern in the

Lisbon I referendum when the 'Yes' vote was initially in the lead, but still lost.

At the same time, four out of five voters agree that Ireland is better off as a member of

the EU in the current economic crisis.

The findings prove the political parties and other groups campaigning for the treaty still

have to convince the public to vote 'Yes'.

The slippage on the 'Yes' side in the past three months comes despite the emphasis

being placed by the Government on the guarantees the treaty will not interfere with the

NERINT 49

country's position on tax, abortion or neutrality, and for the return of a permanent

European Commissioner.

Apart from potentially major implications for our role within Europe, rejection of the

treaty would threaten the end of Taoiseach Brian Cowen's tenure in office. Although he

says he does not contemplate defeat, Mr Cowen's position would be under severe

pressure if there was another 'No' vote.

The poll figures are another setback for Mr Cowen and Fianna Fail, which has plunged

to new depths of unpopularity. But Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny told his party

supporters yesterday not to use Lisbon to kick the Government.

Mr Kenny said he would not "cross swords" with Fianna Fail over the Lisbon

referendum, despite wanting them out of office.

He appealed to his own party supporters not to punish the Taoiseach or the Government

when they vote on October 2.

Mr Cowen, Mr Kenny, Labour leader Eamon Gilmore and Green Party leader John

Gormley met yesterday to discuss the co-ordination of their campaigns.

In a bid to avoid alienating voters, however, the four party leaders will not be

campaigning together in public to call for a 'Yes' vote.

Appetite

"I don't get a sense there is any particular appetite for that. The party leaders appearing

together create an obvious target for anti-establishment groups," a political source said.

Former European Parliament president Pat Cox said the results showed there was a lot

of work still to be done.

The Ireland for Europe campaign director said the poll results gave him "cautious

confidence" but the 'Yes' side will be leaving nothing to chance.

When asked if it was better to be part of the EU in the current economic crisis, 80pc of

voters agreed, 9pc disagreed and 11pc had no opinion.

Of those polled, 74pc said they were very likely to vote, 13pc fairly likely, 2pc fairly

unlikely, 6pc very unlikely and 5pc had no opinion.

Of 'Yes' voters, 91pc said they were very likely to vote, but among 'No' voters the figure

was 70pc.

NERINT 50

Meanwhile, senior ministers Dermot Ahern and Micheal Martin have rallied to the

Taoiseach's defence amid unprecedented low levels of support for Fianna Fail.

In a robust defence of his leader, Mr Ahern, the Justice Minister, insisted he was not a

"liability".

"We don't have a history of changing our leader because of political polls. The

Taoiseach is working extremely hard on these difficult issues, as are the Government.

We are united in dealing with these serious issues," he said.

Commission aims at intensifying fight against serious crime and terrorism by

authorizing law enforcement authorities to consult fingerprints of applicants for

international protection 10/09/2009

The Commission has adopted today a package of measures aimed at authorising law

enforcement authorities to consult the EURODAC database for the purpose of fighting

terrorism and serious crime, such as trafficking in human beings and in drugs. The

measures also aim at integrating the suggestions of the European Parliament and the

Council on the EURODAC Regulation for making the EURODAC database more

efficient.

Vice-President Barrot, Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security,

stated: "Problems relating to cross-border law enforcement cooperation cannot be

effectively dealt with at a national level or on the basis of bilateral arrangements

between Member States. Only coordinated action at an EU level can ensure such

cooperation. The absence of the possibility for European law enforcement authorities to

access EURODAC to combat terrorism is a shortcoming that the Commission is facing

with this important proposal. This improvement in the fight against terrorism and

criminality will go hand to hand with the protection of fundamental rights, including the

protection of personal data".

The measures proposed by the Commission regulate the procedure in which law

enforcement authorities can consult the EURODAC database and the conditions under

which such request can be made. At the same time, the measures provide a series of

guarantees aimed at ensuring the protection of the personal data of the persons

concerned and in safeguarding the right to asylum.

It was found that, even though the law enforcement authorities of many Member States

have access to their national databases which contain the data of applicants for

international protection, it is very difficult and burdensome for them to exchange such

information among them. Despite the fact that several instruments exist at EU level

which facilitate the exchange of information between Member States of fingerprints

required, the new proposal will avoid multiple cooperation requests, by identifying

directly at EU level the Member States which holds the fingerprints in question.

Comparison of fingerprints can then take place between the requesting Member States

and the Member States in possession of the file.

The EURODAC database contains the fingerprints of applicants for international

protection and of those third country nationals who crossed the border of one of the

Member States irregularly. It has been created and, until today, been used for the

purposes of the asylum policy of the Union.

NERINT 51

Le futur secrétaire général du Conseil de l'Europe héritera d'une institution en

crise 11/09/09

Depuis le 1er

septembre, le bureau du secrétaire général du Conseil de l'Europe est vide.

Le Britannique Terry Davis a quitté ses fonctions. Son successeur sera normalement

désigné fin septembre. L'institution se trouve dans la tempête, mais on se dispute son

gouvernail. Les deux candidats en lice - le Norvégien Thorbjörn Jagland et le Polonais

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz - seraient au coude à coude, selon un décompte officieux à

Strasbourg. Leur parcours est comparable. Tous deux ont été premier ministre et

ministre des affaires étrangères. Quel que soit le nom du vainqueur, sa tâche s'annonce

redoutable. Plus ancienne institution continentale, le Conseil de l'Europe traverse une

crise institutionnelle et politique aiguë.

Vigie des droits de l'homme dans l'espace européen, le Conseil semble peu audible. Il

souffre d'une forme de concurrence avec les institutions de l'Union européenne. La

réduction de la liste des candidats au poste de secrétaire général de quatre à deux noms,

décidée par le comité des ministres du Conseil au printemps, a provoqué la fureur des

Parlementaires et le report de l'élection à l'automne.

Dans les tourments que traverse l'institution, un de ses membres, la Russie, joue un rôle

considérable. "On a invité les Russes dans le Conseil (pendant la présidence de) Boris

Eltsine. On voulait les faire entrer dans le concert européen, explique le député

travailliste britannique Denis MacShane. Mais à présent, la nouvelle Russie (du premier

ministre Vladimir) Poutine, riche, puissante, parfois arrogante, montre ses muscles. A

Strasbourg, les Russes sont très bien organisés, ils disposent d'une vaste équipe de

diplomates expérimentés, ils votent de façon disciplinée, alors que les autres

délégations nationales se divisent souvent en fonction d'appartenances politiques."

"La question des minorités"

Ces dernières années, la Russie a fait obstruction à la réforme de la Cour européenne

des droits de l'homme. En 2004, afin de fluidifier son fonctionnement, le comité des

ministres avait adopté le protocole 14, prévoyant qu'un seul magistrat serait dorénavant

nécessaire pour juger de la recevabilité d'une plainte, contre trois jusqu'alors. Depuis,

tous les membres ont ratifié le protocole, sauf la Russie. Un protocole 14 bis a fini par

entrer en vigueur, appliquant la réforme aux 46 autres pays.

Pour les spécialistes, nul doute que cette attitude de la Russie est liée à ses multiples

condamnations devant la Cour. "En quatre ans, il y a eu plus de 100 affaires

d'assassinats et d'enlèvements dans le Caucase", souligne Thomas Hammarberg,

NERINT 52

commissaire aux droits de l'homme. Ce dernier, qui a entamé le 3 septembre une visite

d'une semaine en Russie, qui le conduira notamment en Tchétchénie et en Ingouchie,

s'inquiète de l'engorgement de la Cour. "Au total, 100 000 dossiers ont été enregistrés

mais toujours pas traités, résume-t-il. Le risque, c'est que les gens ne voient plus

l'intérêt de s'adresser à la Cour."

En septembre 2008, quelques semaines après la guerre en Géorgie, 24 parlementaires de

pays de l'Est du continent avaient proposé - en vain - la suspension du droit de vote de

leurs homologues russes. Certains se sont même interrogés sur l'opportunité d'une

exclusion de leur délégation. "Quelle est la meilleure option ?, se demande M.

Cimoszewicz, le candidat polonais. Exercer des pressions sur un Etat membre pour le

faire évoluer, ou bien utiliser des moyens radicaux, c'est-à-dire l'exclusion ? Celle-ci ne

changerait rien à la situation intérieure russe. Je suis donc favorable à la première

option."

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, souffre d'un handicap dans la course électorale. Son

compatriote, Jerzy Buzek, a été désigné, le 14 juillet, président du Parlement de l'Union

européenne. M. Cimoszewicz espère le soutien de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Italie

et de l'Espagne. Mais la position de la Russie sera déterminante.

Outre ses 18 sièges (sur 318), Moscou exerce aussi une influence sur les votes de

l'Arménie, de l'Azerbaïdjan, ou encore de la Moldavie. Les représentants russes siègent

au sein du Groupe démocrate européen, dont le premier vice-président est Konstantin

Kosatchev, député expérimenté de la Douma russe, où il préside la commission des

affaires étrangères.

Au vu des rapports tendus entre la Pologne et la Russie, le soutien de Moscou à la

candidature de M. Cimoszewicz paraît peu vraisemblable. Pourtant, celui-ci estime que

la sensibilité d'un candidat de l'Est du continent conviendrait bien aux nouveaux défis

qu'affronte le Conseil. "Dans les pays du sud et de l'est de l'Europe, dit-il, j'ai constaté

que la température monte sur la question des minorités ethniques. C'est une bombe

ancienne qu'on croyait désactivée. Le Conseil doit se saisir de ces sujets.

NERINT 53

3. Leituras recomendadas

3.1 Documentos acadêmicos

ANDOURA, S.; TIMMERMAN, P. Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate

on European Agencies Reignited. EPIN Working Paper, 19, 2008.

BIGO, D. et al. The Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies .L‘Harmatan:

Paris, 2007.

…………………..Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: the (in)security

Games. L‘Harmatan: Paris, 2006.

BALZACQ, T. et al. Security and the Two-Level Game: the Treaty of Prüm, the

EU and the Management of Threats. CEPS Working Document, Bruxelas, 234,

2006. Disponível em www.ceps.eu. Acesso em 09/09/09.

BRADY. Europol y el Modelo europeo de inteligencia criminal: una respuesta

no estatal a la delincuencia organizada. ARI, 126, 2007. Disponível em

www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Acesso em 09/09/09.

CEPIK, M. A. C. Sistemas Nacionais de Inteligência: origens, lógica de

expansão e configuração atual, DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, 46, 1: 75-

127, 2003.

DARCY, F. União Européia. Instituições, políticas e desafios. Rio de Janeiro:

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2002.

JEANDESBOZ, J. Reinforcing the Surveillance of EU Borders The Future

Development of FRONTEX and EUROSUR.CEPS Reasearch Paper, 11, 2008.

Disponível em www.ceps.eu. Acesso em 09/09/09

PALOSAARI, T. Beyond normal politics: Integration, EU enlargement and

securitisation theory. epsNet Plenary Conference, Praga, 2004.

PEERS, S. The EU‘s JHA agenda under the Swedish Presidency. Statewatch

analysis, 3 jul 2009. Disponível em www.statewatch.org. Acesso em 10/09/09.

…………The exchange of personal data between Europol and the USA.

Statewatch analysis, 15. Disponível em www.statewatch.org. Acesso em

10/09/09.

………..UK and Irish opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law.

Statewatch analysis, 4. Disponível em www.statewatch.org. Acesso em

10/09/09.

NERINT 54

RODRIGUEZ, Júlio César Cossio. Contestação Internacional e Cooperação

Securitária Transatlântica. In: Seminário Nacional de Ciência Política da

UFRGS, 2008, Porto Alegre. CD-ROM Anais - Democracia em Debate. Porto

Alegre : Nova Prova, 2008.

WICHMANN, N. The intersection between Justice and Home Affairs and the

European Neighbourhood Policy. CEPS Working Paper, 275, 2007. Disponível

em www.ceps.eu. Acesso em 09/09/09.

3.2 Documentos oficiais

Justice, Freedom and Security in Europe since 2005: An evaluation of the Hague

Programme and Action Plann. Communication from the Comission to the

Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic Commitee and the

Commitee of the regions. Bruxelas, 10 jul 2009

G8 Ministerial Meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Declaration, Rome, 30th

May 2009. Disponível em www.statewatch.org. Acesso em 10/09/09.

Draft on possible implications of the Treaty of Lisbon provisions for the JHA

working structures, Bruxelas, 8 set 2009. Disponível em www.statewatch.org.

Acesso em 10/09/09.

NERINT 55

4. Anexos

4.1 Tabelas

Cooperação interestatal na União Européia

Fonte: Carlos S. Arturi. Movimentos antiglobalização, terrorismo e cooperação insterestatal na Europa e

na América do Sul.Trabalho apresentado no Congresso de 2009 da LASA (Associação de Estudos Latino-

Americanos), p.2-4;12-18. Disponível em: http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/. Acesso em: 9 set 2009.

4.1.1Síntese da Evolução da Cooperação Policial-Judiciária na União Européia,

Estados Unidos e América Latina

1957 Tratado de Roma: criação da Comunidade Econômica Européia

1975 Grupo de Trevi: Cooperação informal em matéria de segurança e informações.

1985

(1990)

Acordo de Shengen: Quadro formal de cooperação intergovernamental, visando à livre

circulação de pessoas sem controle das fronteiras internas.

1993 Tratado de Maastricht (TUE): UE organizada em três pilares:

1) Comunitário (decisões por maioria qualificada);

2) Política Externa e de Segurança Comum (intergovernamental, unanimidade);

3) Justiça e Assuntos Internos – JAI (intergovernamental, unanimidade): asilo,

imigração, controle de fronteiras, cooperação aduaneira, cooperação policial e

judiciária, combate ao crime organizado e tráfico de drogas.

1995

(1999)

Criação da EUROPOL

1997 Tratado de Amsterdã:

1) Cidadania européia;

2) ―Espaço de Liberdade, Justiça e Segurança‖;

3) Reforma do 3º Pilar (Justiça e Assuntos Internos - JAI): Questões ligadas a asilo,

imigração, cooperação judiciária transferidas para o 1º Pilar (comunitário);

4) Reforço do 3º Pilar: início do funcionamento da EUROPOL, amálgama entre crime

organizado, manifestações anti-sociais (hooligans, etc.), crimes comuns (pedofilia,

xenofobia, racismo, tráfico de drogas) e terrorismo.

1999 Acordos de Tampere (Outubro): aumento da cooperação policial e judiciária, integração do

―acervo‖ Shengen na EU (sobretudo os arquivos de informações – SIS).

2000 Primeiro Encontro dos Chefes de Polícia Europeus (Abril) e criação da Academia de Polícia

Europeia - CEPOL (Dezembro).

2001 Atentados terroristas 11 de Setembro nos EUA

20 de Setembro: Reunião do Conselho da JAI: Intensificação imediata da cooperação policial,

judiciária e de inteligência entre os Estados-membros da UE e aprovação pelo Conselho de uma

maior cooperação com EUA.

Outubro: Reunião dos Ministros da Defesa da EU: ―militarização‖ da luta contra o terrorismo.

Dezembro: Reunião extraordinária do Conselho Europeu e criação de uma Task-force anti-

terrrorista européia.

PATRIOT ACT: Concede um grande poder às agências do governo norte-americano para

empreender ações e investigações contra suspeitos de terrorismo.

NERINT 56

2002 Fevereiro: Criação da EUROJUST, por decisão do Conselho Europeu.

Junho: Reunião da JAI: criação do Mandato de Captura Europeu, do procurador-Geral Europeu

e definição comum e ampla de ―terrorismo‖.

2004 Atentados de 11 de Março em Madri

Logo após, aumento substancial da cooperação intergovernamental na UE, criação de Equipes

policiais comuns, Coordenador Europeu de Segurança e da Força Européia de Manutenção da

Paz.

- Criação da EUROINTEL (Agência Européia de Informações)

- Criação da FRONTEX (Agência Européia de Controle de Fronteiras).

2005 Atentados de 07 e 21 de Julho em Londres

Armazenamento e controle de mensagens via Internet e Telefonia na UE, expulsão de

estrangeiros ―indesejáveis‖ e proposta da criação de Tribunais de Exceção na Inglaterra.

Fevereiro – Criada a Comunidade Latino-americana e do Caribe de Inteligência Policial

(CLACIP).

22 de Julho: O brasileiro Jean-Charles de Menezes foi confundido com um terrorista

muçulmano e executado a tiros no interior de uma estação de metrô em Londres.

Agosto: Suspensão dos Acordos de Schengen pela Finlândia, durante o Campeonato Mundial de

Atletismo.

Outubro: Ceuta e Melila (Espanha) - Forças de segurança marroquinas e espanholas matam ao

menos 15 solicitantes de asilo que tentaram entrar à força nos enclaves espanhóis.

Novembro: O jornal ―The Washington Post‖ denuncia que a CIA possui ―prisões secretas‖ em

vários países da Europa do Leste (Polônia, Romênia, Kosovo). Chega a 24 o número de países

com ―centros secretos‖ ou CTIC (Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers) da CIA, na Europa, Ásia

e Oriente Médio. Na França encontra-se a sede do único CTIC multinacional, conhecido como a

―Base Aliada‖.

Dezembro: Aprovado pelo Parlamento Europeu nova diretiva que reforçou a legislação européia

em matéria de conservação e utilização de dados telefônicos e eletrônicos dos cidadãos.

2006 MILITARY COMISSIONS ACT: regulamenta o tratamento das pessoas suspeitas de atos

terroristas, sejam elas estrangeiras ou americanas, definindo-as como ―war enemies‖ e ―enemy

combatants‖. Submete os suspeitos de colaboração com o terrorismo à jurisdição militar.

2007 Novembro: Fundação da Comunidade de Polícias da América Latina e do Caribe – AMERIPOL.

NERINT 57

4.1.2 Agências de segurança

EUROPOL EUROJUST EUROINTEL FRONTEX

ORIGEM Prevista pelo

Tratado de

Maastricht (1992).

Instituída por decisão do

Conselho da UE em

2002.

2004 Out/2004

OBJETIVOS Agência de

Inteligência

Criminal da UE

Fortalecimento da

cooperação Judiciária na

UE. É competente no que

diz respeito aos

procedimentos penais no

domínio das formas

graves de criminalidade,

organizada ou

transfronteiriça.

Centralizou a as

atividades de

inteligência em

relação ao crime

organizado, à

imigração ilegal e

ao terrorismo.

Coordena a

cooperação

operacional entre os

Estados-Membros

no domínio da

gestão das fronteiras

externas

As competências dos dois órgãos sobrepõem-se,

abrangendo os seguintes domínios: criminalidade

informática, fraude e corrupção, branqueamento

dos produtos do crime, crimes contra o ambiente

e participação em organização criminosa.

ATUAÇÃO Âmbito da UE, 27

membros.

Âmbito da UE, 27

membros.

Âmbito europeu. Âmbito da UE, 27

membros.

NÍVEIS DE

COOPERA-

ÇÃO

Técnica, estratégia e

compartilhamento de

dados no âmbito da

UE e com agências

norte-americanas;

Acordos de

cooperação com

países terceiros e

organizações

internacionais.

Concentra os

ministérios públicos

nacionais da União,

sendo composta por 27

representantes

nacionais. Auxílio

judiciário mútuo em

matéria penal; e a

execução dos pedidos

de extradição ou do

mandado de captura

europeu.

Âmbito europeu;

Cooperação com a

EUROPOL.

Ligações com a

EUROPOL, CEPOL

e OLAF; cooperação

no domínio

aduaneiro e dos

controles

fitossanitários e

veterinários.

NERINT 58

AMERIPOL AMERIPOL CEPOL O

L

A

F

ORIGEM Nov/2007 Nov/2004 Set/2005 1999

OBJETIVOS Melhorar a eficiência

e cooperação entre

autoridades

competentes para

prevenção do crime

organizado e

terrorismo nas

Américas

Investigação

Conjunta.

Academia

Européia de

Polícia.

Organismo europeu de

luta anti-fraudes.

Proteger os interesses

financeiros da União

Européia, lutar contra

a fraude, a corrupção

e qualquer outra

atividade irregular

ATUAÇÃO Âmbito da OEA, 18

membros.

Âmbito

europeu, 22

membros.

Âmbito europeu,

27 membros.

NÍVEIS DE

COOPERAÇÃO

Regional. Facilitação

de troca de

informações entre

ALOs; produção de

boletins estratégicos.

Encontros de

especialistas

em Times de

Investigação

Conjunta,

promovidos

pela

EUROPOL e

EUROJUST.

Reúne altos

funcionários dos

serviços de

polícia de toda a

Europa para

promover a

cooperação

transfronteiriça na

luta contra a

criminalidade e

na manutenção da

ordem e da

segurança

pública.

Investigações.

Ccooperação regular

entre as autoridades

competentes dos

Estados-Membros.

Parceiros: EUROPOL,

EUROJUST,

Agências Norte-

Americanas.

NERINT 59

4.2 Esquemas

O campo securitário europeu

Fonte: BIGO, D. et al. The Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies .L‘Harmatan.: Paris, 2007.

4.2.1 Prerogatives and competencies of the European security agencies

4.2.2 Technology, inter-connexion of data-bases and intelligence-led approaches

Acces to

information

EUROJUST

EUROPOL

OLAF

European

Magistrate

networks

(call of

Geneva)

Operational

capacity and

competencies FRONTEX

European

Magistrate

networks

(call of

Geneva)

Intelligence

logic

focusing on

antecipation

Criminal

justice logic

focusing on

acts already

committed

Practices targeting

categories through

profiling/logic of

depersonalisation

Practices

targeting

individuals

OLAF

EUROJUST

EUROPOL

(liasion files)

Proactive

prevention/

pre-emption

SITCEN

Traditional

policing

Surveillance

of specific

individuals

NERINT 60

4.2.3 The Legal Bases and the European Field of Professionals of Security

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

4.2.4 The position of the security agencies and unites in the process of Europeanization

4.2.5 Mapping of the Security European Agencies

Pooling of

Sovereignty

Supranational

level

EGF Ad hoc

creations:

Treaty of

Prüm (with

only 7

countries),

Schengen

Convention

Prior

Europol Eurojust OLAF

Frontex

Harmonization

27 spaces of

control One space of

control

Mutual

recognition

Corpus

Juris

European

Chief

Prosecutor

OLAF

Frontex

Europol

Eurojust

EAW

Treaty

of Prüm

NERINT 61