1. WINONA BAUTISTA, et al VS. RTC OF MAKATI AND JESSIE JOHN GIMENEZ

FACTS: Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of

the Yuchengco Family (“in particular,” former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),[4] a criminal complaint,[5] before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans,

Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the

Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational

decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI

sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under

their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6] under the website addresswww.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various

dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he “was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13],

maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory

statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,

Malayan.” The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed

thirteen (13) separate Informations[11] charging them with libel.

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13] reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of “internet libel” was non-existent; hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.

Petitioners, as co-accused, thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a

Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest

jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law

since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for

failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense of libel.

By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan. It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.

The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,[20] insisting that the

Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v.

Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication

was “printed and first published” in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an

office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that

the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment

Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.[22] By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecution’s motion for

reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to “amend the Information to cure the

defect of want of venue.

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were “printed and first published” by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, ISSUES:

(1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and

(2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent’s admission of the Amended Information.

RULINGS:

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.

In the present case, a pure question of law is involved -jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC –whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading: The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published.

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is

limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate

or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the

offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material

appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with “printing and first publication” would spawn the very ills that the

amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts

of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’

motion to quash the Amended Information.

2. PEOPLE VS. JOSE PEPITO COMBATE aka PEPING

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate was charged of killing using a firearm and with

treachery Edmund Osabel and Leopoldo Guiro in Negros Occidental. He stands convicted of the crime of Murder and Homicide, as defined and penalized under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion temporal and reclusion perpetua by the RTC. The decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence a petition before the court with the appellant contending the the RTC erroneously rendered the judgment as it failed to consider the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witneses. ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crimes of homicide and murder despite the fact that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt?

2. RULING:

Time-tested is the doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality. The Supreme Court will not interfere with that assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion.

Complementing the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and insignificant inconsistencies in the testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses, for they show that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed. As the Court put it in People v. Cristobal, “Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.”

A careful review of the records shows that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as opposed to accused-appellant’s bare denials.

Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by witnesses, everything stated by them on direct, cross, and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered. It must be stressed in this regard that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in an answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by the answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied to this jurisdiction. Defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification

For his defense, accused-appellant wants this Court to believe his innocence and offers his version of the facts wherein he did not commit the crime. This Court is not persuaded.

Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial. Accused-appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to perjure and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any consideration other

than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their testimonies were not moved by any ill will and bias stands, and, therefore, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right after the incident, an act that is evidence of his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.

3. JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III VS. P/SUPT GERMAN DORIA & SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZ

FACTS:

Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotgun’s license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell.

P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also arrested other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed against petitioner before this Court. The RTC dismissed the petition of the petitioner. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Hence the petition before the court. ISSUES:

1. Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section

5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; 2. Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil

Code; and 3. Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner are conclusive in this case.

RULING: The petition has no merit. Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the arresting officers, and thus they have no personal knowledge of facts as required by the Rules. We do not agree.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. ¾ A peace officer or a private person may, without

a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts

indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or

place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Plain View Doctrine

The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be

in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[9] The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.

In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant and that firearms were validly seized from his possession. The trial court found that petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. We agree with the trial court in rejecting petitioner’s allegation that he was merely framed-up. We also agree with the trial court that respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be held civilly liable for their actions.

For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment or order must be final;

(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;

(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.

While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential facts and

circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the respondent for the commission of the acts complained of. The case before us deals with the civil liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of parties in the first and second cases.

There is no identity of parties between the present case and the administrative case. The administrative case was filed by Benjamin Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia Lao is not a party to this case. Respondents in the present case were not parties to the administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is the complainant against respondents. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to petitioner’s complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable for damages as discussed above.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE VS THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 189122- March 17, 2010 Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied Issue: Whether or not bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court filed by an appellant pending appeal? RULING: NO. Absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 means that a less stringent approach in granting bail only subject to the discretion of the court to grant bail. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the

proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Quintin Saludaga and SPO2 Fiel Genio VS Sandiganbayan and People GR No. 184537, April 23, 2010 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal, denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The petitioners were charged for violation of paragraph e section 3 of RA 3019. An information has been filed against them for causing undue injury to the government. It was subsequently quashed for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, which is an essential element of the crime charged. The Office of the Special Prosecutor re-filed the information; this time by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. The petitioners filed a motion for preliminary investigation which was strongly opposed by the prosecution. Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case. But the Sandiganbayan denied the petition contending that there was no substantial amendment in the information that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Hence the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a write of preliminary injunction and TRO before the court. Issues:

Whether or not the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or another preliminary investigation. Rulings:

Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[17] provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode[18] or under both should both modes concur.[19] Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,[20] ruling that, “in substitution of information another preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information” is not applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged. Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar,[21] that failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated. Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the same must likewise fail.