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Developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit

Published by Pearson

2012 REPORTLESSONS IN COUNTRYPERFORMANCE IN EDUCATION


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L , p h j h Th L C w...

www.h.p.

Full report online and in PDF

The Learning Curve databank

Case studies

Country profiles

Video interviews

Data visualisations


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1

FwBy Sir Michael Barber, Chie education advisor, Pearson

Ow

Rh y

App 1

02

E yA summary o the reports findings and it s conclusions 06

PAn explanation o the research context, objectives and itscontributing experts

04

Education inputs and outputs: its complicatedAssessing the evidence or correlations between educationinputs and outputs as well as socio-economic outcomes

12

Th : income, cultureand education outcomesThe relevance o wealth and cultural at titudes toeducation perormance

18

G h wh fHow does the quality o teaching that children receiveafect their uture prospects?

22

Sh h y:caveat scholacticusWhy expanding choice has positive efects in somecircumstances but not others

26

R h: education, labourmarket and social outcomesHighlighting the key personal, social and economic benefitso a better educated population

33

Tw pCreating a comparative index, to identiy common actorsin countries education success

38

C h yNext steps, and a call or more research

44

MhyMethodology or Quantitative Componentso The Learning Curve programme 46

App 2 S phy 49


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Over the last decade, international benchmarking o

education systems has become ever more prevalent.

More importantly, it has become increasingly influential

in shaping education policy at local, regional and

national levels. As studies by OECD-PISA and TIMSS

become more sophisticated and longitudinal time

sequences develop there is ever more to learn about

what successul education systems look like and how

success can be achieved.

In the early days o international benchmarking,education ministers and other leaders tended to worry

more about the media impact than the implications or

policy. However, once the regular routine o published

PISA results was established, in 2001, this changed.

Germany, or example, ound itsel much urther down

the first PISA rankings than it anticipated. The result was

a proound national debate about the school system,

serious analysis o its flaws and then a policy response

to the challenges that were identified. A decade later,

Germanys progress up the rankings is visible to all.

Now, in act, we are beyond the phase o individual

country reactions. Increasingly what we see is a

continuous dialogue among education ministers and

top ocials around the world about the evidence rom

international benchmarking and the implications or

education reorm. Education ministers in places such

as Singapore are constantly monitoring and visiting

other countries to learn what they might do better.

Arne Duncan organised a series o international

Foreword

dialogues with ellow ministers and union leaders

about the uture o the teaching proession around the

world. Meanwhile Michael Gove, Secretary o State

or Education in the United Kingdom has shown more

interest in international benchmarking than any o

his predecessors.

The continuous benchmarking series also enables

more sophisticated analysis o what works in education,

which leaders rom around the world can draw upon.

I have been involved in a series o three publicationswhich have explored the lessons in depth. The first o

these, written with colleagues at McKinsey, How the

Worlds Best-Performing School Systems Come Out on Top,

examined the lessons rom the most successul school

systems, and highlighted the importance o recruiting,

training and developing great teachers.

The second, also written with colleagues at McKinsey,

How the Worlds Most Improved School Systems Keep

Getting Better, took a new angle and looked not atwhat great systems do, but at how, over time, systems

come to be successul. The third, published earlier

this year with colleagues rom Pearson, Oceans of

Innovation, went a step urther and asked whether

achieving educational success as measured by PISA and

TIMSS was sucient to ensure a country was on track

or economic and social success in the 21st century.

The work o Eric Hanushek has likewise connected

PISA and TIMSS outcomes to the wider goals o society,

especially GDP growth. Eric has demonstrated a strongcorrelation between the quality o school systems and

economic growth.

Th L C 2012 Fw


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This report, published by Pearson and writtenby the Economist Intelligence Unit, is part o a

wide-ranging programme o quantitative and

qualitative analysis, entitled The Learning Curve.It seeks to urther our understanding o what leads to successul educational outcomes both economic and social. The design and execution o the programme hasbenefited rom the ongoing advice o some o the worlds leading educational scholars.

This report itsel outlines the main findings rom analysis o a large body ointernationally comparable education data The Learning Curve Data Bank.It also draws on extensive desk research, as well as in-depth interviews conductedwith 16 experts in education. The research was conducted entirely by the Economist

Intelligence Unit, and the views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflectthose o Pearson. The report was written by Dr Paul Kielstra, and edited byDenis McCauley o the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Preace

Th L C 2012 P


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6 Th L C 2012 E y

The goal o improving education today enjoys

great prominence among policymakers and other

stakeholders in societies worldwide. Although they may

not be able to quantiy it, governments in most countries

recognise a link between the knowledge and skills with

which young people enter the workorce and long-term

economic competitiveness. For this reason, interest is

intense in research which explores the actors that seem

to lead in some countries to outstanding educational

perormance, and ultimately to better qualifiedworkorces.

Executive summary

This report, and the broaderThe Learning Curve

programme o which it is part, is aimed at helping

policymakers, educators, academics and other

specialists to identiy some o these actors. At its

heart is a significant body o quantitative research.

The Learning Curve Data Bank (LCDB), which is

accessible online, brings together an extensive set o

internationally comparable data on education inputs

and outputs covering over 50 countries. This in turn has

enabled a wide-ranging correlation analysis, conductedto test the strength o relationships between inputs,

outputs and various socio-economic outcomes. It also

underpins an initiative to create a comparative index

o educational perormance which, as will become

apparent, is anything but a straightorward exercise.

Educators might hope that this or other similar bodies o

research would yield the holy grail: identification o the

input, or set o inputs, that above all else leads to better

educational results wherever it is applied. Alas, i this

report makes nothing else clear, it is that no such magic

bullets exist at an international level or at least that

they cannot, as yet, be statistically proven. Nonetheless,

our research which is also based on insights gathered

rom experts across the world provides some definite

signposts. Following are its highlights:

Although they may not be able to quantiy it,governments in most countries recognise a linkbetween the knowledge and skills with which

young people enter the workorce and long-termeconomic competitiveness. This report is aimedat helping policymakers, educators, academics andother specialists to identiy some o these actors.


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7Pearson plc

S hp w w

p p

The research examined a wide range o education

inputs, both quantitative such as spending on pupils

and class size as well as qualitative such as level o

school choice. It also looked at numerous potential

outcomes, ranging rom inculcation o cognitive skills

to GDP growth. A number o inputs show a statistical

link over time with certain outputs, notably betweenincome and results. These are discussed in the chapters

that ollow, but the most striking result o the exercise

is how ew correlations there are. Education remains

very much a black box in which inputs are turned into

outputs in ways that are dicult to predict or quantiy

consistently. Experts point out that simply pouring

resources into a system is not enough: ar more

important are the processes which use these resources.

I , y On the surace, money and education seem to create

a virtuous circle, with rich countries and individuals

buying good education or their children who, in turn,

benefit economically. A closer look, though, indicates

that both higher income levels and better cognitive test

scores are the result o educational strategies adopted,

sometimes years earlier, independently o the income

levels existing at the time. More important than money,

say most experts, is the level o support or education

within the surrounding culture. Although cultural change

is inevitably complex, it can be brought about in order to

promote better educational outcomes.

Th h

Good teachers exercise a proound influence: having a

better one is statistically linked not only to higher income

later in lie but to a range o social results including lower

chances o teenage pregnancy and a greater tendency to

save or their own retirement. The problem is that there

is no agreed list o traits to define or identiy an excellent

teacher, let alone a universal recipe or obtaining them.

That said, successul school systems have a number othings in common: they find culturally efective ways to

attract the best people to the proession; they provide

relevant, ongoing training; they give teachers a status

similar to that o other respected proessions; and the

system sets clear goals and expectations but also lets

teachers get on with meeting these. Higher salaries,

on the other hand, accomplish little by themselves.

Wh h h,

Recent research indicates that countries with greater

choice o schools have better education outcomes.

Presumably, allowing parents to choose the best

schools rewards higher quality and leads to overall

improvement. In practice, however, finding the

mechanism to make this happen is dicult. Extensive

studies o voucher programmes and charter schools

in the United States indicate that, while both can be

beneficial, neither is a magic ormula. On the other

hand, or-profit private education is providing students

in some o the least developed areas o the world

an alternative to poor state provision and showing

the potential benefits o choice and accountability.

Ultimately, as in any market or quasi-market, the real

value o choice comes rom people having the right

inormation to select the option that is truly superior.


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12

Education has always mixed the local and the global.The survival o Latin in Europe as a language o learning,

long ater its disappearance almost everywhere

else in society, reflected an ideal o the universality

o knowledge. On the other hand, state education

provision has long been closely associated with local

needs and the preservation o local cultures: in many

ederal systems, it alls to the state or province rather

than the national government. As currently delivered,

says Andreas Schleicher, the OECDs Deputy Director

or Education, education is very inward looking, a very

local activity. A lot o walls exist between countries.

Since the 1990s, the interaction between the parochial

and the international has taken on a new orm.

Comparative tests such as Progress in International

Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), Trends in International

Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), and the

Programme or International Student Assessment

(PISA) maniest a growing emphasis on benchmarking

the perormance o diferent systems and onunderstanding what sets apart the highest achievers.

In Proessor Schleichers words, education debates are

no longer about improvement by national standards.

Best perorming countries now set the tone.

He also believes that PISA has undamentally challengedthe idea that education should be valued largely on the

volume o spending and other inputs, and the premise

that more investment is always better. The shit rom

inputs to outcomes [as the ocus o study] has been a

significant impact o the tests, he says. Such research

has also made clear that, or policymakers, more than

childrens grades are at stake: economists have ound

a close relationship between economic growth and

certain population-wide outputs o education such as

cognitive skills.1

Th D B wh

The Learning Curve Data Bank (LCDB) created

by the Economist Intelligence Unit as part o the

broader Learning Curve programme is an efort

to advance study in this area. It is a purpose-built,

substantial collection o data which includes more

than 60 comparative indicators gathered rom over

50 countries. Many o these indicators in turn relyon multiple pieces o inormation, so that, even with

some inevitable gaps, the LCDB encompasses over

2,500 individual data points. These go well beyond

traditional education metrics, such as teacher-student

ratios and various spending metrics, to cover a broad

range o educational inputs and possible outputs, rom

the degree to which parents demand good results

o schools to the proportion o adults who end up in

jail. The appendix to this report describes the LCDB

and the rest o the Quantitative Component, and themethodology behind it, in detail.

Th L C 2012 E p p: p...

Education inputs and outputs:its complicated...

1 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann,

Education and Economic Growth,

in Dominic J. Brewer and Patrick J. McEwan, eds.

Economics of Education (2010).


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14

Beyond providing a useul tool or researchers, agoal o the Quantitative Component and Data Bank

has been to make possible a search or correlations

between inputs and outputs that endure over time.

The ultimate hope is to uncover, where possible, any

interventions which might have a positive efect not only

on the development o cognitive skills and scholastic

achievement, but also on societal outcomes such as

higher employment. The methodology appendix also

describes how these correlations have been sought.

The data suggest a small handul o strong links.

Two correlations show a connection between national

income and aspects o academic success: higher GDP

seems related to better Grade 8 PISA results; and a

better score on the Human Development Index (o

the United Nations Development Program UNDP)

and its Income Index are associated with higher upper

secondary graduation rates. LCDB data also suggest

a link between more years in school on average and

higher labour productivity in a country. (One apparentlystrong link that the higher a countrys average school

lie expectancy, the greater the proportion o students

will graduate is almost tautological given the time

requirements involved in most diplomas and degrees.)

S

These findings will be discussed in the chapters that

ollow, but the most striking result o the search or

correlations is the overall paucity o clear linkages.

In this, our study is not alone. Ludger Woessmann,

Proessor o Economics at the University o Munich,explains that a lack o any relationship between inputs

and outputs mirrors the extensive academic literature

on this topic. I you try to go beyond simple correlations,

the general result is nearly always the same. Chester

Finn, President o the Thomas Fordham Institute, an

education research organisation, and ormer United

States Assistant Secretary o Education, agrees. What

works, he says, takes place inside a black box that has

inputs coming in and outputs going out; but the inputs

do not predict the results and what goes on in the black

box is hard to quantiy.

The research does, though, at least point to some o

the diculties o seeing inside the black box. The first,

says Paul Cappon, ormer President o the Canadian

Council on Learning, is that in the study o education

we measure just a ew things, usually inputs more

than outputs because they are simpler and easier to

measure, not because they are more significant they

are not. Vibha Parthasarathi, a distinguished Indianeducationalist, adds that successul outcomes arise

rom the interplay o several actors, some tangible,

others intangible. What Ive seen in any number o

surveys is you measure what is measurable. The soter

inputs o education get let out. These inputs, however,

can be crucial, such as the cultural context in which

education occurs.

Th L C 2012 E p p: p...


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Second, straightorward correlations are dicult to

find because education involves complex, interrelated

processes rather than simple activities. Nahas Angula,

Prime Minister o Namibia who, as education minister,

oversaw the post-apartheid reconstruction o that

countrys education system, says that achieving good

outcomes is not really a question o spending money,

money, money. The question is how to get the most

out o the money you have spent. Dr Finn agrees:

Processes, more than inputs, are important. It is like

having a good cook versus a bad one: the ingredients

might be identical, but one produces something worth

eating. I education itsel is so complex, teasing out its

impact on broader societal phenomenon, like economic

growth, is harder still.This does not mean that education is a complete

mystery. Some key elements are apparent. Proessor

Schleicher explains that We have a good sense o what

makes a good education system. That doesnt answer

how you do it, but you can say these are the key actors.

The rest o this study will explore the most important o

those actors, bearing in mind that there is no single best

way to address them in every country. As with cuisine,

a variety o approaches may bring success. For example,

as we will discuss later, education in Finland and South

Korea two o the worlds top-perorming countries in

many benchmarks seem to have ew similarities other

than high academic achievement.

The main message o the lack o strong correlations,

though, should be humility. Brian Stecher, Associate

Director at RAND Education, says: We use jargon that

seems to explain student behaviour, but we really dont

understand the way students learn and the complex

mix o inputs amily, community and learning that

lead to skills and temperaments. I you compare

research in education to research in healthcare, you

see a dramatic diference in our knowledge o cause

and efect. Claudia Costin, Rio de Janeiros Municipal

Secretary o Education, adds that Reorming education

requires more than figures and analysis. You need to

avoid arrogance and the eeling o having a technocratic

approach.

Rather than being able to pronounce the last word,then, education research is still learning how to promote

better outcomes. The Data Bank itsel is only one step in

an efort that is hoped to last many years. The discussion

which ollows will look at several major issues relating

to successul educational outcomes, including national

income, culture, teaching quality and questions o choice

and accountability. In doing so, it seeks to be part o an

ongoing deepening o knowledge about education, and

to illuminate the key issues meriting urther investigation.

GDP per capita (US$PPP) Grade 8 PISA overall reading literacyGrade 8 PISA

PositivePositive

UN Human Development Index Upper secondary graduation rate Positive

UN Income Index Upper secondary graduation rate Positive

School lie expectancy(primary to tertiary)

Overall productivity o labour(GDP at US$PPP per worker)

Positive

Ratio o maximum teacher salary overaverage gross wage at primary level

Upper secondary graduation rate Negative

Ratio o maximum teacher salary overaverage gross wage at secondary level

Upper secondary graduation rate Negative

VARIABLE 1 VARIABLE 2 TYPE

Pearson plc

SELECTED STRONG RELATIONSHI PS FROM THE CORRELATION ANALYSIS

Note: Strong correlations, such as those shown here, are above a threshold o 0.65. Correlation te sts were conducted between two variab les over time

(on an annual basis). Each correlation reers to a minimum o 15 countries out o the sample.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.


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I : fp?

Two correlations rom the quantitative analysis indicate

a link between a countrys income and its educational

outcomes: higher GDP is associated with better

overall PISA scores, and the UNDPs Income Index is

a predictor o national secondary school graduation

rates. Similarly, PISA results correlate with national

GDP and Income Index scores in the years ollowing

the tests being administered. In both cases, however,the causation is not clear. In relation to the second

link, or example, those who were age 15 in 2009 and

2006 have had so little time in the labour orce that the

contribution o their skills is unlikely to have had much

efect yet on national income. That said, Proessor

Schleicher reports that PISAs extensive longitudinal data

on test-takers indicates that the tests predictive power

o ease o transition to work and initial income is high.

On the surace, this suggests a virtuous circle moneybuys good education, which instils higher earning

power. This seems to parallel an oten observed link

between socio-economic status and academic results

within countries. I anything, this association is growing

in the United States,2 but it is ar rom an American

phenomenon. It is present in European countries, such

as the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as, according to

a 1999 study by a World Bank researcher, in 43 largely

developing nations.3

Money, or both countries and individuals, does bringsobvious advantages. As Ms Parthasarathi notes or

amilies, wealth gives you access to schools where

you assume there are better teachers, etc, [and] ...

people who dont have the means miss out on a lot o

opportunities. The wider link to educational results,

however, is ar rom straightorward. Ms Parthasarathi

points out that, at the individual level, even something

as basic as student motivation can be greatly afected by

economic background.

More generally, a recent OECD report indicates that a

commitment to equity within an education system can

greatly diminish the correlation between amily income

and educational outcomes. It points to Finland, Canada

and South Korea, among others, as examples o success

in this area.4 This is consistent with research conducted

by the Canadian Council on Learning, says Mr Cappon.

Our composite learning index showed no direct

correlation between the wealth o a community and its

learning environment. It is not a given that you simply geta higher result with higher income levels.

Similarly, the tie between GDP per capita and PISA

results is ar rom linear. For countries with incomes

under $20,000 per person, economic growth appears

to bring rapidly improving educational results. Ater that

point, however, the gains become much less obvious.5

This type o result is common in economics, appearing

in areas such as the impact o national income on lie

expectancy: up to a certain point, the need is so greatthat almost any spending brings gains; thereater the way

that the money is spent becomes much more significant.

The tangible and intangible:income, culture andeducation outcomes

Th L C 2012 Th : ,

2 See Greg J. Duncan and Richard Murnane, eds.

Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and

Childrens Life Chances, 2011.

3 Deon Filmer, Inequalities in Education:International Experience, in Ismail Sirageldin,

Human Development in the Twenty First Century.4 Equity and Quality in Education: Supporting

disadvantaged students and schools, 2012.

5 Does money buy strong perormance in PISA,

PISA in Focus, February 2012.


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25Pearson plc


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Experts interviewed or this study repeatedly point

to several o these other actors which are essential in

promoting teacher quality:

Attracting the best people to the proession: Gettinggood teachers begins with recruiting talented individuals.

Finland and South Korea two perennially cited

examples o education success and the top countries in

our Index obtain their annual teacher intake rom the

top 10% and 5% o graduating students respectively.

The key to such success is the status in which teaching

is held culturally. Here money can have some efect,

not just as a simple inducement but as a signal o status.

The South Korean government uses high levels o

teacher pay in this way both to compensate or large

class sizes and to indicate the importance it accords to

the proession.

Providing the right training: The training o these new

recruits has to be appropriate to the conditions in which

they will work. This varies by country. The Finnish

system, or example, benefits rom teachers having

graduate degrees. On the other hand, Nahas Angula,

Prime Minister o Namibia, points out that his countrys

policy o requiring all teachers to have an undergraduatedegree may be driving up the cost o education when

other training would suce or primary grades.

Teacher training also needs to be ongoing. This has a

very practical reason that no teachers college course

will maintain complete relevance across decades o

work but also a demonstrative one. As Mr Cappon

notes, teachers need to be lielong learners themselves.

You cant inculcate a love o learning unless you live

it. Efective proessional development needs to

address not just upgrading the knowledge o teachers

providing, or example, a better understanding o new

technology and teaching strategies but also allow them

to advance along their career path into more senior

positions where relevant.

Treating teachers like proessionals: Consistent with the

need to promote the status o teaching is its treatment

as a proession. Mr Ratteree notes that things like

continual proessional development and proessionalautonomy can be powerul incentives or better learning

outcomes. Mr Cappon agrees: Teachers must be

seen as proessionals who exercise judgement, not just

technicians.

Implementing clear goals and efective oversight, and

then letting teachers get on with it: Proessors Hanushek

and Woessmann both point to this combination

o accountability and independence as consistently

correlated with improved outcomes. Says the latter:

Education economists emphasise the need to think

about incentives or people in the system to use

resources eciently. These are mostly ramed by the

surroundings o the education system, the accountability

system and whether schools can act autonomously.

There is clear evidence o strong relations between

these and improved outputs. Proessor Schleicher

agrees. High-perorming school systems, he says,

combine demanding standards, low tolerance o ailure,

and clear articulation o expectations with a lot oproessional responsibility within a collaborative work

organisation at the ront line, or both teachers and

schools.

None o these on their own is enough. Instead, they

orm an overlapping, and mutually supporting, set o

strategies to provide the high-quality teachers that are

so important or education and to use them in the most

efective ways.9

Pearson plc

9 For a similar discussion o the key success actors

in teacher development see Michael Barber and

Mona Mourshed, How the Worlds Best-Performing

School Systems Come Out on Top , McKinsey andCo., 2007, pp 15-23.

26 Th L C 2012 Sh h y: h


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Th h

In the English city o Guildord in 2011, every final-year

student in the Royal Grammar School earned at least

three A-levels, the highest secondary-school subject

qualification. The equivalent figure or the citys Kings

College or the Arts and Technology was just 69%.

Neither figure was a surprise, nor is such variation

exceptional. In most places, it is simply accepted that

specific schools like individual teachers have diferent

results which tend to persist over time. A naturalconclusion is that giving parents, and through them

students, the ability to choose better perorming

schools should lead to better outcomes.

Unortunately, this issue is ar more complex and not just

because o the range o systems through which choice

operates across the world including both publicly

and privately unded options. Whatever their specific

strong and weak points, all these arrangements need

accurate inormation. Getting it wrong can be harmul.

A study o Beijing parental selection o primary schools

ound that excessive optimism about place availability

at better schools led parents to use up application

choices on schools that were already ull. Less optimistic

parents snapped up places at the next tier o schools,leaving only markedly worse ones or the children o

those making the initial mistake.10 On the other hand,

researchers in North Carolina ound that better, clearer

inormation on local schools increased the number o

low-income parents taking advantage o school choice,

and that the children so placed perormed better.11

As in any quasi-market, or choice to work, schools

have to reveal how well they are doing: choice and

accountability must go hand-in-hand.

Any accountability system, however, requires some

decision on what should be measured. Demographic

diferences between the children in the two Guildord

schools above might explain the gap in results ar

better than the education provided. Mr Cappon notes

o Canada: Social class and school choice tend to go

together. Indeed, much o the choice and accountability

debate continues because such other issues cloud

the picture.

School choiceand accountability:caveat scholacticus

y

10 Fang Lai, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry,

The Adverse Efects o Pare nts School Selection

Errors on Academic Achievement: Evidence romthe Beijing Open Enrollment Program, Economics

of Education Review(2009) v28 n4: 485-496.

11 Justine S. Hastings and Jefrey M. Weinstein,

Inormation, School Choice, and AcademicAchievement: Evidence rom Two Experime nts,

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2008):

1373-1414.

27Pearson plc


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Recent research suggests that, at the system-wide

level, the potential or inormed choice helps raise

educational outcomes and reduces costs. In particular,

a cross-country comparison o the number o private,

oten aith-based, schools an indication o the degree

o choice with the 2003 PISA results ound that,

even ater controlling or other actors, the share o

schools that are privately operated has an economically

and statistically significant positive efect on student

achievement in mathematics, science, and reading.12

The benefits were greater than average or students

with a lower socio-economic status where such

private schools were publicly unded, as in Belgium and

the Netherlands. Proessor Woessmann, one o the

authors, explains: I there is more choice or parents,

and more non-governmental school operators so that

schools are not managed by one big state monopoly,

countries perorm much better.

Note: The score, which is on a scale o 0 to 1, is an ag gregate o the ollowing indicators: enrolment choices (reedom o enrolment choice at primary and lower

secondary education), the level o school choice (percentage o pupils living in an area with more than t wo schools), parental expectations, and fina ncial choiceand inormation (availability o school vouchers and governme nt responsibility or inorming parents on school choices (primary and lower secondary).

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and OECD.

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A

B

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Ch

Gy

Czh Rp

Nh

A

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Jp

Sw

Sh K

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Swz

0.88

0.85

0.79

0.79

0.78

0.67

0.64

0.62

0.59

0.59

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0.54

0.49

0.47

0.44

0.41

0.41

0.23

0.17

0.17

0.09

0.07

SCHOOL CHOICE SELECTED COUNTRIES, AGGREGATED SCORE, 2009

12 Ludger Woessmann and Martin West,

Competition rom private schools boostsperormance system-wide, Vox, http://www.

voxeu.org/article/competition-private-schools-

boosts-perormance-system-wide.

... the shareo schools thatare privatelyoperated hasan economicallyand statisticallysignificant positiveefect on studentachievementin mathematics,science, andreading.

Ludger Woessmann and

Martin West, Competitionrom private schools boosts

perormance system-wide

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How this choice drives the system to better results

in practice, however, is a matter o no little debate.

Indeed, any discussion involving market-like mechanisms

and education inevitably leads to contentious, oten

politicised, debate. Unortunately, the resultant heat has

shed little consistent light.

Vh h h

Some o the most investigated choice initiatives operate

in the US. Voucher programmes provide unding

generally assigned by lottery as the programmes are

almost invariably oversubscribed that pay or the

private education o underprivileged children. A 2008

review by Patrick Wol, Proessor o School Choiceat the University o Arkansas, looked at the ten best

studies o these programmes and ound widely varying

results.13 In general, all or some students who used

vouchers did better academically in certain fields,

especially maths. A more recent study by Mr Wol o

the long-standing Milwaukee voucher system brought

urther variability: voucher students there outdid peers

in reading but underperormed in maths.14

The impact o such programmes on abilities tends to be

unpredictable, but that may not be the point. Parents

almost invariably are satisfied with them, although

perhaps or reasons quite apart rom grades. Given

the public options available to some o these students,

physical saety is an issue: one study ound no academic

diferences or voucher users, but they did have lower

arrest rates.15

Another possible impact o choice is to create

competition so that all schools improve, especially

where they are made to give data on results. Debate on

the extent to which this has taken place and whether

competition was the driver o perceived change is also

ongoing.16 The one clear point is that vouchers, and

choice, do not seem to hurt existing school systems.17

A more widespread US experiment in using choice

and accountability to improve education has been

the growth o charter schools. These autonomous,

privately-run but publicly-unded schools open to all

students capacity permitting exist in 41 states.

In return or autonomy, these institutions are made

accountable. Charters are granted with binding

requirements to achieve certain levels o academic

success among students.

As with vouchers, the success o charter schools

as a whole is the ocus o intense debate. The largest

review to date o research presents a mixed picture.

The Center or Research on Education Outcomes

looked at research rom 15 American states and the

District o Columbia. It ound that, on average, students

in these schools tended to do slightly worse than thosein nearby public schools. But the broader message was

variety: 17% o charter schools do better, 46% are just as

good, and 37% do worse. Moreover, the success o the

schools depends on the way they are regulated. Roughly

even numbers o states had schools where students on

average did better than in traditional schools and schools

where students did worse.18

13 School Voucher Programs: What the Research

Says About Parental S chool Choice, Brigham

Young University Law Review, (2008): 415-446.

14 The Comprehensive Longitudinal Evaluation of the

Milwaukee Parental Choice P rogram: Summary ofFinal Reports, February 2012, http://www.uark.

edu/ua/der/SCDP/Research.html.15 Julie Berry Cullen, Brian A. Jacob, and Steven

Levitt, The Efect o S chool Choice onParticipants: Evidence From Randomized

Lotteries,Econometrica, (2006), 74: 11911230.

16 See: Caroline Hoxby, School Choice and School

Productivity: (Or Could School Choice Be A Tide That

Lifts All Boats?), 2002, NBER Working Paper 8873,

an influential, article advocating this argument,

http://www.nber.org/papers/w8873; GregForster,A Win-Win Solution: The Empirical Evidence

on School Vouchers, 2011; David N. Figlio and

Cecilia Elena Rouse, Do Accountability and VoucherThreats Improve Low-performing Schools?, 2005,

NBER Working Paper 11597.

17 Research on voucher programmes in Chile have

produced similarly contrasting results to those

in America (Francisco Gallego, School Choice,

Incentives, and Academic Outcomes: Evidence or

Chile, paper 39, Econometric Society 2004 L atinAmerican Meetings; Chang-Tai Hsieh and Miguel

Urquiola, The efects o generalized school

choice on achievement and stratification: Evidencerom Chiles voucher program,Journal of Public

Economics (2006) 90: 14771503).

18 Center or Research on Education Outcomes,

Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in

16 States, June 2009.


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Sh h p Where such provision is poor, however, choice and

accountability can be essential. James Tooley, Proessor

o Education Policy at Newcastle University, has done

extensive research into the huge number o unocial

private schools used by economically underprivileged

students in developing countries. In many cases, rather

than trusting state provision, amilies are willing to

spend oten a substantial part o their income to send

children to these unregistered schools. The reason is

simple: parents know that education is important but

public provision is sub-standard or illusory. Proessor

Tooley ascribes parents decisions in this area to their

mistrust o state-school teachers, who are accused o

absenteeism, poor teaching habits and poor attitudes

toward students themselves.

As with any unocial activity, it is hard to assess its

ull scope. Proessor Tooley notes that the best data

rom India shows around a quarter attending private

schools in rural areas, and other research indicatesaround 6570% do so in urban areas. He thereore

estimates the overall total at around 40% or more

a figure consistent with his own, less detailed research

in communities in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria.20

These schools exist because they provide results:

Proessor Tooleys research in a variety o locations

has ound significantly better reading, mathematics,

and English skills. Similarly, World Bank-supported

researchers rom the Learning and EducationalAttainment in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) project ound

that in that Pakistani state, students in such private

schools were on average 1.5 to 2.5 years ahead ocounterparts in government schools, even though the

latter spent three times as much per pupil.21

What makes these private schools so much more

efective is not immediately clear, says Proessor Tooley.

They typically have ewer resources, class sizes vary

widely and oten the teachers are not as well trained or

do not have as much teaching experience. He concludes

that there is a missing ingredient [rom public schools

that exists] in private schools. It must be accountability.

The teachers have to teach, otherwise they get

removed; the schools need to please parents.

The extreme situation aced by these parents gives

the same message as the correlation between PISA

outcomes and private-school numbers: choice and

accountability can have an important impact on results.

On the other hand, the experience o school choice

in the US shows that the way these mechanisms

work are complex, require parents to have as much

inormation as possible and can penalise wrong choicesas much as reward right ones. Rio de Janeiros Ms

Costin points out, however, that the efort needed to

bring in parents is worth it even in the poorest areas:

They are not second-class citizens. Their opinion is

important. Parents know which school is a good school.

Social pressure or quality can be exerted even by

illiterate parents.

20 It should be noted or disclosure purposes thatPearson, who commissioned this report rom the

Economist Intelligence Unit, is a minority investor

in a chain o schools in Ghana co-ounded by

James Tooley.

21 James Tooley, Yong Bao, Pauline Dixon,John Merrifield, School Choice and Academic

Perormance: Some Evidence From Developing

Countries,Journal of School Choice, 2011,

5: 139; Baladevan Rangaraju, James Tooley,

Pauline Dixon, The Private School Revolution in

Bihar: Findings from a survey in Patna Urban, 2012;World Bank, Learning and Educational Achievement

in Punjab Schools Report Summary, 2008.


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In considering country-level benefits, the more common

area o study has also been economic. On a basic level,

education helps. Our correlation analysis shows a strong

link between average years in school or school lie

expectancy and labour productivity. This does not

surprise Namibias Mr Angula: A well-educated nation

is likely to be innovative. I dont think that you have to

go to the statistical evidence to find that. People are

able to use knowledge or economic development. It is

not simply that better educated people themselves are

more productive. Extensive research has ound a spill-

over efect rom education, with benefits arising both

rom how the educated share their knowledge with

others and how they are better able to pick up new skills

themselves by building on their existing education.

The diculty or policymakers, though, is deciding what

sort o education works best when so many actors

afect the economy. Predictably, quality appears to

be more important than duration. In one analysis,

Proessors Hanushek and Woessmann ound that

when cognitive skills, as measured by PISA scores, are

correlated with GDP, then the impact o total years

o schooling becomes irrelevant. In other words,

how long it took to learn was less important than that

learning had occurred.26 This may seem obvious, but it is

directly applicable to decisions such as starting primary

education a year earlier or using the same resources or

teacher training.

Overallproductivityof

labour(GDPatUS$PPPperworker)

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHOOL LIFE EXPECTANCY AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 19902011

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

1991 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.69

1992 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.70

1993 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.73

1994 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.72

1995 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73

1996 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.72

1997 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.70

1998 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.70

1999 0.76 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.74

2000 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.77

2001 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.79

2002 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.80

2003 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.82

2004 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.79

2005 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.80

2006 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.82

2007 0.76 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.85

2008 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.83

2009 0.77 0.77 0.82

2010 0.77 0.77

2011 0.78

Note: The scatter matrix shows the correlation o school lie expectancy or all years against a ll possible uture years or overall productivity o labour.The correlation in each set o years is well above our threshold or strong correlations o 0.65.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and UNESCO.

26 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann,

Education and Economic Growth,in Dominic J. Brewer and Patrick J . McEwan, eds.

Economics of Education (2010).

School lie expectancy (primary to tertiary)

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More complicated than quality is the question o

what sort o content in an education system will yield

the best labour market and economic outcomes.

For example, some countries prize strong vocational

school programmes while others preer more unified

systems. One advocate o vocational education is

Proessor Schwartz, who says o the US that having a

system ocused entirely on preparing students or our-

year colleges and universities is a major problem. Only

30% o young Americans actually get a our-year degree

by their mid-twenties, and many o those wind up in

jobs that didnt require a degree. The consequence o

not having a strong post-secondary vocational system

is that most young Americans reach their mid-twenties

without the skills and credentials needed or success in a

technology-driven economy.

Mr Angula, whose country is looking to bolster its

vocational education system, adds that systems need to

create linkages between the school and the community,

and the school and the economy, so that education

should have a meaning in the context that it is practised.

Sometimes it is hard or students to apply their

knowledge or skills. Without seeing any relevance, they

might simply leave education.

INDONESIA

THAILAND

COLOMBIA

ROMANIA

RUSSIA

MEXICO

TURKEY BULGARIA ARGENTINA

SLOVAKIA

CZECH REPUBLIC

HUNGARYPORTUGAL

KOREA

NEW ZEALAND

AUSTRALIA

BELGIUM

NETHERLANDS

UNITED STATES

NORWAY

AUSTRIAIRELAND

GREECE

JAPAN

CANADA

FINLAND

SWEDEN

SPAIN

GERMANYFRANCE

ITALY

UK

DENMARK

ISRAEL

CHILE

CHINA

School lie expectancy (primary to tertiary)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Overallproductivityoflabour(GDPatUS$PPPperworker)

100,000

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHOOL LIFE EXPECTANCY (IN 1995) AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (IN 2010)

SWITZERLAND

Note: The scatter chart shows the correlation o school lie expectancy in 1995 against overall productivity o labour in 2010 or 37 countries.The correlation is 0.817, well above our threshold or strong correlations o 0.65.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and UNESCO.

36 Th L C 2012 R h: ,


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S The questions o the appropriate education content to

best ensure uture economic growth and how best to

equip students to ace an uncertain uture are also at the

core o reorms in some o the more successul school

systems, particularly in Asia. Singapores Proessor Lee

explains that o todays job titles compared to those

o 1995, many are very new; the skills are very new.

We anticipate that evolution will be ast into the uture.

For over a decade, his countrys Ministry o Education

has engaged in uture scanning to identiy the likely skills

needed in the coming years, and adjusted its oferings

to students accordingly. More important, since 1997,

says Proessor Lee, Singapore has shited away rom

teaching rote knowledge to a firm oundation in the

basics o maths, science, and literacy combined with an

inculcation o how to understand and apply inormation.

We eel it contributes toward the students acquiring

knowledge and skills o cognition and creativity attributes

which are very important in the 21st century landscape.

Both o these developments reflect an attitude thateducation systems need to be prepared or ongoing

change rather than seek a single, best end state.

No education system can remain static, writes

Singapores Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, in

the oreword to a recent report on education and

geopolitics in the 21st century. The world is changing

rapidly. Technology is transorming our l ives. The skills

needed in the uture will be very diferent rom those

needed today.27

Singapore is not alone. Shanghai students finished first

in the latest PISA tests, but China is also shiting toward

a much greater emphasis on creativity. Proessor Zhao

explains that the countrys leadership believes the

economy is moving quickly rom a labour-intensive

one to a knowledge economy. It needs creative talent.

Indeed, he finds it ironic that China is moving more in

the direction o Western models even while politicians

in those countries sometimes praise that o traditional

Asian education. South Korean schools, meanwhile, arenow being encouraged to develop creativity, character

and collaboration.

Teaching people how to work together is indeed o

growing relevance to the economy. According to

Ms Parthasarathi, A lot o education in the second

hal o the 20th century has made children fiercely

27 Foreword to Michael Barber, Katelyn Donnelly

and Saad Rizvi, Oceans of innovation: The Atlantic,

the Pacific, global leadership and the future ofeducation, 2012.

No education system can remain static. The worldis changing rapidly. Technology is transorming ourlives. The skills needed in the uture will be verydiferent rom those needed today.

Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister o Singapore


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The methodology appendix describes in more detail

the Indexs construction and relevant data issues.

The broader message o this lengthy disclaimer is that

the Index is very much a first step. We hope that, as

understanding o the outcomes o education grows,the Index will become more complex and nuanced as

well as be populated with more robust and varied data.

For now, however, it is better to light a candle than curse

the statistical darkness.

Wh h h h

Given the attention paid to the results o international

education tests, the leading countries in the cognitive

skills category o the Index come as no surprise.

The top five Finland, Singapore, Hong Kong,

South Korea and Japan all score more than one

standard deviation above the norm in this part o the

Index. The educational attainment category, based on

literacy and graduation rates, tells a slightly diferent

story. Here South Korea leads, ollowed by the UK,

Finland, Poland and Ireland, with Japan, Hong Kong

and Singapore urther down the table. Because o their

strength in both measures, then, Finland and South

Korea are the clear overall leaders o the Index.These results mirror the conventional wisdom: already

in 2007, the BBC reerred to the two countries as

among the superpowers o education.28 But what do

these have in common that might help to identiy the

keys to educational success? On the ace o it, there is

remarkably little.

In many ways, it is hard to find two education systems

more diferent. South Koreas schools are requently

described as test-driven, with a rigid curriculum and anemphasis on rote learning. Most striking is the amount o

time spent in study. Once the ormal school day is over,

the majority o students go to private crammer schools,

orhagwons. According to OECD data, o 15-year-old

students or whom data was available in 2009, 68%

engaged in private study o the Korean language, 77% in

mathematics, 57% in science and 67% in other subjects.

In later years, students typically do ar more privately.

The government has become so worried about the

extent o these studies that it has banned hagwons

rom being open ater 10pm, but still needs to send

out patrols to shut down those which mask illegal,

ater-hour teaching by posing as sel-study libraries.

On the other hand Finland, in the words o Proessor

Schwartz, is a wonderul case study. Kids start school

later; school hours are shorter than most others; they

dont assign homework; their teachers are in ront o

kids less. By one estimate, Italians go to school three

years longer. The PISA data shows that very ew Finns

take out-o-school lessons either, and those who do

typically do worse on standardised tests, suggesting

that this is largely remedial help. Finally, the systemhas a reputation or being ocused on helping children

understand and apply knowledge, not merely repeat it.

The existing data also paint a picture o two distinct

approaches. In some cases, the systems are widely

diferent: average teacher salaries in South Korea are

over twice the national average, while those in Finland

are almost exactly average; pupil-teacher ratios, on the

other hand, are much higher in South Korea. Where

the two systems are similar, they are usually near theaverage or all countries in the Index. The only diference

is school choice, where both are highly restrictive.

That said, the vast amount o ater-school private

education in South Korea brings into question the

relevance o that metric.

The two systems, though, do share some important

aspects when examined closely. When you look

at both, you find nothing in common at first, says

Proessor Schleicher, but then find they are very similar

in outlook. One element o this is the importance

assigned to teaching and the eforts put into teacher

recruitment and training. As discussed above, the

practices o the two countries difer markedly, but the

status which teaching achieves and the resultant high

quality o instruction are similar. Proessor Schleicher

adds that both systems also have a high level o ambition

or students and a strong sense o accountability, but

again these are articulated diferently. In South Korea,

accountability is exam driven; in Finland, it is peeraccountability, but the impact is very similar.

28 Finland stays top o global class, 4 December

2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7126562.stm


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Finally, there are cultural parallels. The two societies

are highly supportive o both the school system itsel

and o education in general. O course, other countries

are also highly supportive o education, but what may

set Finland and South Korea apart is that in both, ideasabout education have also been shaped by a significant

underlying moral purpose.

Although discussions o Korean attitudes to education

requently reerence Conucian ideals, under a quarter

o South Koreans were even literate by the end o the

Korean War. In the decades that ollowed, education

was not just about sel-improvement: it was a way to

build the country, especially as the Japanese colonial

power had restricted the access o ethnic Koreansto schooling. The immediate cause o this drive has

disappeared, but it has helped inculcate a lasting ethic

o education which only strengthened the more

widespread attitude in Asia that learning is a moral duty

to the amily and society as well as a necessary means o

individual advancement.

In Finland, the ethos is diferent but no less powerul.

As Mr Mackay explains, that country has made

a commitment as a nation to invest in learning as a

way o liting its commitment to equity. They wish

to lit the learning o all people: it is about a moralpurpose that comes rom both a deeper cultural

level and a commitment at a political-social level.

In other words, education is seen as an act o

social justice.

Both o these moral purposes can cause diculties in

diferent ways. The high expectations and pressure

mean that studies regularly find South Korean teenagers

to be the least happy in the OECD. In Finland, the

egalitarian system seems less efective at helping highlytalented students to perorm to the best o their

ability than at making sure average results are high.

Nevertheless, the power o these attitudes in shaping

cultural norms and political decisions in ways that help

education attainment overall are undeniable. Mr Angula,

ater many years as a teacher, Minister o Education,

and Prime Minister, believes that the key ingredient

[in creating a successul education system] is or

everybody to be committed and to understand that

they are doing a public good.

The two societies [that score highest] are highly

supportive o both the school system itsel ando education in general.


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47Pearson plc


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national ministry or statistics bureau

data were sanity-checked and then used

i deemed internationally comparable.

C wh

In order to make indicators directlycomparable across all countries in the

Index, all values were normalised into

z-scores. This process enables the

comparison and aggregation o diferent

data sets (on diferent scales), and also

the scoring o countries on the basis

o their comparative perormance.

A z-score indicates how many standard

deviations an observation is above

or below the mean. To compute the

z-score, the EIU first calculated each

indicators mean and standard deviation

using the data or the countries in the

Index, and then the distance o the

observation rom the mean in terms o

standard deviations.

The overall Index score is the weighted

sum o the underlying two category

scores. Likewise, the category scores

are the weighted sum o the underlying

indicator scores. As recommended by

the Advisory Panel, the deault weightor the Index is two-thirds to cognitive

skills and one-third to educational

attainment. Within the cognitive skills

category, the Grade 8 tests score

accounts or 60% while the Grade 4

tests score accounts or 40% (Reading,

Maths and Science all account or

equal weights). Within the educational

attainment category, the literacy rate

and graduation rates account or equal

weights. The user can, however, change

the weightings and recalculate scores

according to personal preerence via the

website that accompanies this report.

A

Because indexes aggregate diferent data

sets on diferent scales rom diferent

sources, building them invariably

requires making a number o subjective

decisions. This index is no diferent. Eacharea or caution is descr ibed below.

Z- PISA, TIMSS PIRLS

It is important to note that, strictly

speaking, the z-scores or PISA, TIMSS

and PIRLS are not directly comparable.

The methodology applied both by

the OECD and the International

Association or the Evaluation o

Educational Achievement (IEA) to

calculate the perormance o theparticipating countries consists o

comparing the perormance o the

participating countries to the respective

mean perormance. (The countries

raw test scores beore normalisation

are not published; just their scores in

comparison to the other participants.)

Thus, which countries participate in

each test and how well they perorm in

comparison to the other participants

has a direct impact on the resultingfinal scores. Given that the sample o

countries that take the PISA, TIMSS

and PIRLS tests are not exactly the

same, there are limitations to the

comparability o their scores.

The EIU has chosen not to change these

scores to account or this lack o direct

comparability; however, it did consider

other options along the way. The main

alternative suggestion rom the Advisory

Panel was to use a pivot country inorder to transorm the z-scores o other

countries in comparison to that pivot

countrys z-score. Although this method

is used in some studies, ater substantial

consideration, the EIU decided not to

employ this method or the purpose o

an index. The resulting z-scores ater

transormation depend heavily on thechoice o pivot country; choosing one

country as a pivot over another afects

countries z-scores quite substantially.

The EIU did not eel it was in a position

to make such a choice. Despite these

limitations to test scores direct

comparability, the EIU believes that the

applied methodology is the least invasive

and most appropriate to aggregate

these scores.

G

Some members o the Advisory Panel

questioned the use o graduation

rates in the Index in that it is not clear

whether they add value as a comparative

indicator o education perormance.

Unlike test results and literacy rates,

standards to gaining an upper secondary

and tertiary degree do difer across

countries. Notwithstanding, the EIU

believes that graduation rates do add

value in evaluating a national educationalsystems perormance, as there is

common acceptance that national

education systems should aim or their

citizens to gain educational qualifications,

especially at the secondary level.

Including graduation rate data in the

Index thereore awards countries that

have put this aim into practice, albeit at

varying levels o quality.

Because o the variation in how countries

measure graduation rates, the EIU

ollowed the Panels suggestion in using

OECD graduation rate data, which use

one main definition. When OECD

data were not available, national ministry

or statistics bureau data were sanity-

checked and then used i deemed

comparable. In some cases, no dataon graduation rates were available.

In this case, the EIU awarded the

country the mean score or this

indicator. One disadvantage o giving

a country the mean score is that i in

reality it perorms worse than the

average in this indicator, the Index

boosts its score, and vice versa.

The EIU used the most recent data

available. Because graduation rates

are based on the pattern o graduationexisting at the time, they are sensitive to

changes in the educational system, such

as the addition o new programmes or

a change in programme duration. As an

extreme example, Portugals upper

secondary graduation rate increased

rom a range between 50% and 65%

in the early 2000s to 2008, to 104% in

2010, as a result o the governments

New Opportunities programme,

launched to provide a second chance orthose individuals who let school early

without a secondary diploma. In order

to treat countries consistently, the Index

takes the 2010 figure. Although this

inflates Portugals score in this indicator,

this inflation should eventually all out

o the Index should it be updated on

an annual or bi-annual basis. Given the

limitations o graduation rate data, the

EIU ollowed the Panels suggestion o

giving a smaller weighting (one-third) to

educational attainment.

48 Th L C 2012 App 1: Mhy h Q Cp Th L C


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It is also important to note that the

tertiary graduation rate indicator covers

only tertiary-type A programmes.

Tertiary-type B programmes are not

included. This methodology was chosen

largely because not all countries collectdata and organise their education

systems along the lines o A and B.

As per the OECD, tertiary-type

A programmes are largely theory-

based and are designed to provide

qualifications or entry into advanced

research programmes and proessions

with high requirements in knowledge

and skills. These programmes are

typically delivered by universities, and

their duration ranges rom three to five

years, or more at times. Tertiary-type

B programmes are classified at the

same academic level as those o type

A, but are oten shorter in duration

(usually two to three years). They are

generally not intended to lead to urther

university-level degrees, but rather to

lead directly to the labour market.

Although excluding tertiary-type B

programmes makes or a more relevant

comparison among countries, it alsoslightly disadvantages a number o

countries that have particularly high

type B graduation rates (as these rates

are not included). These countries

are Canada, Ireland, Japan and New

Zealand. Nonetheless, this exclusion

has a limited impact on these countries

ranking in the Index.

Oh

The EIU had wanted to include other

education perormance indicators in

the Index, such as how well national

education systems prepare students

or the labour market and theperormance o vocational studies.

However, data availability was a limiting

actor. The EIU ound that sucient

data were not available that isolates

educational attainment within labour

market outcomes; and internationally

comparable data on vocational studies

covering all countries in the Index were

not readily available either.

C

With the comprehensive-data

countries data rom the Data Bank, a

correlations exercise was undertaken

in order to test relationships across

countries between education inputs,

outputs and wider society. The EIU

tested or correlations between the

inputs to and outputs o education, the

inputs to education and socio-economic

environment indicators (as a proxy

or wider society), and the outputso education and socio-economic

environment indicators.

Dfi

hh

The correlation coecient is a

measure o the degree o linear

relationship between two variables.

While in regression the emphasis is on

predicting one variable rom the other,

in correlation the emphasis is on thedegree to which a linear model may

describe the relationship between two

variables. Importantly, the presence o a

correlation does not imply causality.

In order to ensure that relationships

being ound were indeed strong,

the EIU looked or at least a 0.65

level o correlation (the higher it is,the stronger the relationship). It is

important to acknowledge that some

social science research uses a lower

level o correlation, but the EIU wished

to maintain a high level to avoid finding

relationships between indicators that

might not be significant.

C

Correlation tests were conducted on

an indicator-by-indicator basis, betweentwo variables over time (on an annual

basis) and at three-year growth rates

(or example, the three-year growth

rate o 1999 (199699) against the three-

year growth rate o 2007 (200407)).

For the latter tests, adjustments were

made to include TIMSS and PIRLS tests

even though these are not taken every

three years (they are taken every our

and five years respectively). The EIU

used the same time lags across countrieson the same indicator, as per the Panels

suggestions.

When looking or evidence o a strong

correlation, the EIU sought a strong

relationship over time. For example,

although there may have been evidence

o a strong correlation between one

input variable in 1990 and an output

variable in 2005; a strong level o

correlation would also need to be ound

or 1991 and 2006, 1992 and 2007, and

so on, or at least a number o years. In

addition, correlation tests were only run

i there were at least 15 countries with

relevant data or both o the indicators

being assessed.F f h

The EIU did not find a great number

o strong relationships. Given the

complexity o education, this was not

totally surprising. However, other

actors may also account or the lack o

correlations. For one, not all indicators

were available going back 1520 years

in time. There was also a lack o data

availability or some countries (some

o this due to the Data Banks ocus

on ensuring that data being used were

internationally comparable). Finally,

other qualitative actors that are dicult

to measure, such as culture and the

quality o teaching, were not included in

the Data Bank. These actors may have a

significant impact on education outputs,

but the EIU was not able to take these

into account within the correlations

exercise.


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