Katholieke Universiteit-LeuvenHoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte

Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant by Ingeborg KozaReview by: A. LichtigfeldTijdschrift voor Filosofie, 42ste Jaarg., Nr. 2 (JUNI 1980), pp. 401-403Published by: Peeters Publishers/Tijdschrift voor FilosofieStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40883555 .

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BOEKBESPREKINGEN 40 1

Finally Fink offers a cosmological dialectics as a corrective to Hegelian dialectics. Fink's original work is a work of immense interest for both scholar and student.

A. LlCHTIGFELD

Ingeborg Koza, Das Problem des Grundes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. Kastellaun, A. Henn Verlag, 1967, 20,5X13, 147 p., kart. DM 18,-.

Though coming to the notice of Tijdschrift voor Filosofie a decade after its publication, Koza' s 'Problem of the Ground in Heidegger's disputation with Kant' appears to be as revealing as it was at the time of publication. This pioneer-study of a particular aspect of Heidegger's philosophy succeeds not only in setting Heidegger's discussion of the problem of the Ground in the wider context of his philosophy but also in providing an interesting account of the philosophical tradition leading up to Heidegger.

Koza holds that Heidegger - despite the often asserted 'Kehre' (reversal) - had a single philosophical program which he worked on throughout the whole of his life (18). That program consisted of the articulation of a vision of reality - the Being of being. It will be noticed, it is argued, that after 'the Kehre instead of Dasein being in the center of Heidegger's philosophizing, it is Being. Koza is of the conviction that Heidegger's enterprise is best understood as one of continuous growth, branching, as it does, in directions controlled by his findings in Being and Time regarding the question of the sense of Being and its relation to Time (19). Koza refers to Heidegger's view of Dasein as being „an entity that has been thrown" α which „is, in its existing, the basis" (the Ground)" 2 of its potentiality-for-Being". Dasein „as Being-its-Self, it is the Being of its basis" (Ground) 3. In pointing to Heidegger's Satz Vom Grunde, Koza re-states and expounds Heidegger's4 conclusion that 'Being and Ground are the same' (21, 28). There is also, as Koza states, a connection between Truth and Ground for, to follow Heidegger, ontic and ontological truth

„concern, each in its own way, beings (entities) in their Being and Being of beings. They belong essentially together on the ground (by reason) of their referring to the difference between Being and beings (ontological difference)." 5

It is in this context that Koza discusses Heidegger's proximity to Kant (38). In particular, reference is made to the fact that the Satz vom Grunde, the principium

1. Η. Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie - E. Robinson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1973, p. 284 (German pagination).

2. Heidegger, o.e., p. 284. 3. Heidegger, o.e., p. 285. 4. As Metha remarks „Being and Ground are the same in the sense of belonging together in

a unity of essence, not fusing together in bare identity but held apart in their togetherness" (J. L. Metha, M. Heidegger : The Way and the Vision, Univ. Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976, p. 347).

5. M. Heidegger in : Vom Wesen des Grundes, Wegmarken, V, Klosterman, Frankfurt, 1967, p. 30 ; this passage is tr. by Elizabeth F. Hirsch in : Journ. of the History of Philosophy, 1978, p. 489.

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402 BOEKBESPREKINGEN

rationis, plays a dominant role in Kantian thinking (38). Further light on the

Heideggerian relationship to Kant can, Koza assures us, be gained by considering characteristics of Kant's highest principle of all synthetic judgments (45-55). In that

proposition („matching in its greatness the majesty of early Greek thinking") 6, Heidegger claims that „Kant tells us that, and how, thinking - the forming of ideas

concerning the Being of empirical beings - belongs together with the Being of

beings" 7. Heidegger found this principle (of all synthetic judgments) to „express the essential unity of the complete structure of transcendence ... the going beyond to ... is accordingly a constant ex-position to ... (Ekstasis)", and „this essential

exposition ... proposes to itself a horizon"8. Therefore „transcendence is in itself ecstatic-horizontal" 9.

It was important for Heidegger to represent the Kantian endeavour as one that he aimed at in his 'Fundamental Ontology' :

„When clearly understood, the true result of this endeavour lies in the disclosure of the bond which unites the problem of the possibility of metaphysics with that of the revelation of the finitude in man." 10

In thus 'interpreting the Critique of Pure Reason from the standpoint of fundamental

ontology' ", Heidegger concludes that

„the problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the Dasein in man, i.e. in the question of his ultimate ground, which is the com- prehension of Being as essentially existent finitude." 12

Highlights of discussion include an exposition of Kant's cosmological and existential

world-concept and the chapter on 'Reason and Ground'. I will dose by stating that though there is no significant new departure in Koza's

treatment of the subject, it will be found that a highly original contribution is made in the chapters which expound the results of Koza's painstaking researches into

Heidegger's philosophy which bear upon her chosen theme.

6. Heidegger, What is called Thinking, tr. J. Glenn Gray, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1968, p. 242-243.

7. Heidegger, o.e., p. 243. 8. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill, Indiana Univ.

Press, Bloomington and London, 1975, p. 123. 9. Heidegger, o.e., p. 123 ; it might be of interest - in this context - to quote a passage

from Heidegger : Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24, Die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie, Ed. F. W. von Herrmann, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 1975, p. 429 as follows : „The transcendence of Being-in-the-world is grounded in its specific totality in the primordial ecstatico-horizontal unity of temporality. If transcendence makes the understanding of Being possible, and if transcendence is grounded in the ecstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality, then the latter is the condition for the possibility of the understanding of Being" (this passage is tr. by Michael E. Zimmerman in : Journ. of the History of Philosophy, 1978, p. 246).

10. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, o.e., p. 239. 11. Heidegger, o.e., p. 253. 12. Heidegger, o.e., p. 238 ; what is of significance here is, as Heidegger urges, „that in

Dasein as such temporality is made manifest as a transcendental primordial structure" (p. 238).

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BOEKBESPREKINGEN 403

A translation of this fascinating work which undoubtedly fills a gap in the vast literature on Heiddegger would receive, I am sure, a very warm welcome on the part of interested readers.

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R. Kl. Maurer, fuergen Habermas' Aufhebung der Philosophie (Philosophische Rundschau, Sonderheft, 24. Jahrgang, Beiheft 8). Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1977, 22X14,5, 70 p., kart. DM 16,-.

Erudition as well as brilliant and sensitive intelligence revealing itself through what seems at times a dizzying whirl of references to Habermas* many writings - in brief, an investigation in depth, - this is the impression gained from this monograph on Habermas' 'cancellation of philosophy' on the part of our distinguished author, Professor Maurer. Habermas himself explains this 'cancellation' in the following terms

„Philosophy is preserved in science as a critique. A social theory that puts forth the claim to be a self-reflection of the history of the species cannot simply negate philosophy. Rather, the heritage of philosophy issues in the critique of ideology, a mode of thought that determines the method of scientific analysis itself." *

It has been said that „it is not altogether easy to assess the work of a scholar whose

professional competence extends from the logic of science to the sociology of knowledge by way of Marx, Hegel and the more recondite source of the European metaphysical tradition" 2. In view of this and of the fact that „there is always the same uncanny mastery of the sources, welded to an enviable talent for clarifying intricate logical puzzles" 3, our author must be congratulated on having performed his task of critically evaluating Habermas' achievement so well and, at the same time, giving a first-rate introduction into Habermas' work.

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W. Lenzen, Recent Work in Epistemic Logic. (Acta philosophica fennica, vol. 30, no. 1). Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978, 23,5X15, 219 p., z.p.

Dit speciaal nummer is een beredeneerd literatuuroverzicht van het recente werk in de epistemische logika en, gedeeltelijk, in de epistemologie (de scheiding is soms

erg moeilijk). Met „recent" is hier bedoeld : na 1962 (nl. na J. Hintikka's Knowledge and Belie j).

Het eerste gedeelte van het werk behandelt 5 belangrijke topics : (1) „The aim of epistemic logic" (definitie en afbakening van het veld) ; (2) „Basic epistemic and doxastic concepts" (kennis en waarheid, kennis en geloof, kennis en rechtvaardigheid, kennis - geloof - waarschijnlijkheid) ; (3) „Consistency and deductive closure" (kon-

1. Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, sec. ed., tr. by J. J. Shapiro, Heine- mann, London, 1978, p. 63.

2. Times Literary Supplement on J. Habermas, 1969, p. 599. 3. Times Lit. Suppl., o.e., p. 599.

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