DIMACS ELECTRONIC VOTING MAY 26, 2004 COPYRIGHT © 2004 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Theory v. Practice in Electronic Voting Michael I. Shamos, Ph.D., J.D. Co-Director,

DIMACS ELECTRONIC VOTING

MAY 26, 2004

COPYRIGHT © 2004 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS

Theory v. Practice in Electronic Voting

Michael I. Shamos, Ph.D., J.D.Co-Director, Institute for eCommerce

Carnegie Mellon University


MAY 26, 2004


Voting System Certification

• Before voting equipment can be used or “offered for sale” in a state, it must be certified by the state

• Certification procedures differ among the states• Most require examination by a statutory panel of

examiners• I was an examiner for

– Pennsylvania (1980-2000)– Texas (1987-2000)– West Virginia (1982)– Delaware (1989)– Nevada (1995)

• Examined ~100 different voting systems


MAY 26, 2004


Outline

• Voting history• Voting administration• General voting model• Vulnerabilities• Important problems

History of Voting• Ancient: clash of spears, division by groups, wooden tickets (tabellæ), balls in urns• “ballot” from Italian ballotta, meaning “little ball”• American colonies: voting aloud to public official• Early 1800s: Handwritten paper ballots• 1857: Australia introduces secret paper ballot• 1888: Australian ballot introduced in U.S. (KY, MA)• 1892: Mechanical lever machine to

“protect mechanically the voter from rascaldom”• 1960s: Punched cards• 1970s: Optical scan• 1978: Direct-recording electronic systems• 2000: Internet voting in primaries


MAY 26, 2004


Paper Ballots• Original paper ballots were handwritten. Easy to

identify voter!

• Australian ballot (U.S., 1888)SOURCE: DOUGLAS W. JONES


MAY 26, 2004


Paper Ballots

1/27/192510/29/1864

New York Times, April 4, 1855

BALLOT BOXES DESTROYED

INJURIES IN RIOTS

MORE BALLOTS CAST THANNAMES ON THE POLL LIST


MAY 26, 2004


Voting Irregularities

“The ballots shall first be counted, and, if the number of ballots exceeds the number of persons who voted … the ballots shall be placed back into the box, and one of the inspectors shall publicly draw out and destroy unopened as many ballots as are equal to such excess.” F.S. §102.061

“If two or more ballots are found folded together to present the appearance of a single ballot … if, upon comparison of the … appearance of such ballots, a majority of the inspectors are of the opinion that the ballots were voted by one person, such ballots shall be destroyed.” F.S. §102.061


MAY 26, 2004


New York Times, January 12, 1925


MAY 26, 2004


Voting is an Ill-Conditioned Problem

• Consider a two-candidate election with n voters• Let e (error) be the fraction of votes that can be

counted incorrectly without changing the result• Let p be the fraction of voters who prefer candidate A• As n grows and p 0.5, we must have e < 1/n to

obtain the correct result• But e does not decrease as n increases


MAY 26, 2004


Florida Vote Totals8:00 a.m. Nov. 15, 2000

SOURCE: CNN.COM

MARGIN WAS 300 OUT OF 5,820,684 VOTES = 1 IN 20,000

FEC STANDARDS ALLOW AN ERROR OF~1 IN 2000 BALLOTS


MAY 26, 2004


What’s the Chance of a Repeat?

• Assume we draw 6 million samples with equal probability of choosing A or B (voters are truly indifferent)

• What is the probability margin(x) that | A – B | < x?

1225/

0

2/22)(

xt dtexmargin

• (1225 is the standard deviation of the binomial distribution with n = 6,000,000, p = 0.5)

• margin(300) > 19%!• margin(16) > 1%• Final Bush-Gore margin was 537; margin(537) > 33%!

Voting Administration in the U.S.• Voting in the U.S. is conducted by the states

– 50 states + DC + territories– Supervised by Secretaries of State through “elections bureau”– Process delegated to counties, supervised by county clerk

• 3141 counties in the U.S.• ~170,000 precincts (wards, etc.), about 54/county• 205M eligible voters; 150M registered voters;

105M actual voters; 1M poll workers • Federal government has only limited constitutional power over

voting procedures– Certain “Federal offices,” e.g. U.S. Senator– Constitutional rights, e.g. “equal protection”– Can’t conduct elections


MAY 26, 2004


U.S. Voting Methods 2000-2004

• Punched-card (32%)• Optical scan (28%)• Lever (16%)• DRE (12%)• Paper (1%)• Indeterminate: (11%)

Card

Optical

Lever

DRE

Indet

Paper

PUNCHEDCARD

OPTICAL

LEVER

DRE

?

2000

PAPER

• Optical scan (34%)• DRE (31%)• Lever (14%)• Punched-card (14%)• Paper (1%)• Indeterminate: (6%)

DRE

CARD

OPTICAL

LEVER

?

2004

The Voting Process

VOTER

REGISTRATIONAUTHORITY

ELECTIONAUTHORITY

18. TABULATEVOTES

1. PRESENTCREDENTIALS

2. RECEIVETOKEN A

CERTIFYINGAUTHORITYVENDOR

3. SUBMIT DEVICEAND SOFTWARE

4. CERTIFY DEVICEAND SOFTWARE

VOTING DEVICE

5. FURNISH DEVICETO COUNTY

6. FURNISHSOFTWARE

SETUPSLATE

7. “BALLOTPROGRAMMING”

PRESENTSLATE 8. LOAD

ELECTIONDATA

POLLAUTHORITY

ELECTIONDAY

9. TURN ONDEVICE

10. PRESENTTOKEN A

11. RECEIVEVOTING

TOKEN B

12. PRESENTVOTING

TOKEN B

13. PRESENTSLATE

14. CAPTURECHOICES CAPTURE

VOTE15. PROVIDE

VERIFICATION

RECORDVOTE

16. STOREVOTES

TABULATIONDEVICE

17. TRANSMIT VOTES

19. TRANSMIT TOTALS

WINNERS

20. CERTIFYRESULTS


MAY 26, 2004


Counting Punched Cards

SOURCE: LOS ANGELES COUNTY


MAY 26, 2004


Vulnerabilities in the Process

• Registration– Authentication of credentials

– Registration of dead voters, voters who have moved, etc.

• Registered voter tokens– Forgery

– Transferability

• Voting System Vendors– No requirements

– No accountability

– Tendency to hide behind trade secret claims to conceal defects

– What’s in the software?


MAY 26, 2004


Vulnerabilities II

• Certification– Role of “Independent Testing Authorities”– Federal Election Commission standards– Lack of meaningful state certification (usually check only for

conformance to state law)– Lack of meaningful code review, source or object

• Distribution and storage of machines– Vendor modifications and maintenance– Insider modifications and maintenance– Intruder access


MAY 26, 2004


Vulnerabilities III

• Distribution and storage of software– Lack of central distribution– Presence of central distribution– Vendor, insider, intruder modification– Testing procedures

• Ballot (slate) programming– Error– Delegation to vendor– Control over ballot programming (memory packs, etc.)– Connection between candidate names and voting positions


MAY 26, 2004


Vulnerabilities IV

• Polling place procedures– Poll worker training– Testing procedures, verification of slate– Error recovery, irregularities, power failure– Voter education

• Voting– Connection between registration token and vote? (Privacy)– Multiple voting– Tampering with machines, stuffing, alteration of ballots– Choice capture, confusion, early completion, fleeing voter– Verification– Vote storage, redundancy, ballot images


MAY 26, 2004


Vulnerabilities V

• Transmission and tabulation of votes– How do they get to the tabulation device?– Authentication and accounting for memory packs– Avoiding multiple counting

• Post-election procedures– Testing– Impound, custody over software, slate programming– Canvass– Retally– Recount


MAY 26, 2004


FEC Standards

• Focus on mechanical reliability, not security• Example: Volume I Standard 6.4.2.,

“Protection Against Malicious Software”:• “Voting systems shall deploy protection against the

many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Vendors shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status.”


MAY 26, 2004


Complications

• Ballot complexity, e.g. 135 candidates• Straight-party voting• Ballot (slate) rotation• Split precincts• Vote-for-many• Language• Write-in votes• Spoiled, invalid, damaged, defaced ballots• Open ballot

– W.V. Constitution “In all elections by the people, the mode of voting shall be by ballot; but the voter shall be left free to vote by either open, sealed or secret ballot, as he may elect.”


MAY 26, 2004


Complications

• Absentee voting• Early voting• Challenged voters• Disabled access, e.g. audio ballots• Huge variety of state-imposed requirements


MAY 26, 2004


What’s an Audit Trail?

• Two types:– A. Record of voting system events, e.g. opening of polls– B. Record of ballot images

• In Maryland, a voting system must be “be capable of creating a paper record of all votes cast in order that an audit trail is available in the event of a recount.” Md. Election Law § 9-102(c)(1)(vi)

• This is done by storing complete ballot images in randomized order


MAY 26, 2004


What’s a Recount?

• Purpose: “verify” that the original tabulation was correct

• Three kinds of recounts:– A. Physical ballots exist: Count them again.– B. Computer records exist: Tabulate them again.– C. No physical ballots or computer records exist

(e.g. lever machines): Read the counters again


MAY 26, 2004


Desirable Voting System Characteristics

• Secret• Accurate• Eligible voters• Vote once only• Tamper-proof• Reliable• Auditable• No vote-buying

(receipt-free)

• Verifiable• Non-coercible• Transparent

MOST STATESREQUIRE

NO STATES REQUIRE(except coercion is a crime)


MAY 26, 2004


Role of Cryptography in Voting

• Profound• BUT:• To be adopted, protocols must deal with ALL

vulnerabilities, not just theoretically convenient ones• Transparency problem: not enough people understand

cryptography or the claims made for it• Requires reliance on a small community of experts• Naming problem: few politicians will vote for

“homomorphic” anything


MAY 26, 2004


Absentee Voting

• Of the 105 million registered voters, ~ 5 million are

unable to vote on Election Day because of inability to

comply with absentee voting requirements

• Almost 5% of the electorate wants to vote but can’t

• Bush-Gore was decided by a margin of 0.01% in

Florida, 1/500 of the non-voting absentee population

• The biggest problem in voting is not tampering or

paper trails, but how to include the absentees


MAY 26, 2004


QA&


MAY 26, 2004


Voting Law Environment

• U.S. Constitution• Federal law• State constitutions• State law• State administrative regulations• Local practices


MAY 26, 2004


Constitutional Review

• Presidential elections: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.” U.S. Const. Art II, §1

• “The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.” U.S. Const. Art II, §1

• Tuesday after the first Monday in November 3 U.S. §1.• If no winner on election day, “the electors may be appointed on a

subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.” 3 U.S. §2.


MAY 26, 2004


Federal Election Comission

• Role of the FEC in voting in the United States

• None!• The FEC

• enforces campaign financing laws• assists states with voter registration


MAY 26, 2004


Functions of a Voting System

1. Present candidates and issues to the voter (HCI)

2. Capture the voter’s preferences (HCI)

3. Transport preferences to counting location

4. Add up the vote totals (tabulation)

5. Publish the vote totals (reporting)

6. Provide audit mechanisms

But: vote must be secret


MAY 26, 2004


Paper (1.7%)

• Ridiculous!– Requires manual counting– Easy fraud– Ballot stuffing– Invalidation

SOURCE: TOMPKINS COUNTY, NY

XOVERVOTE CANCELSVOTE FOR MAYOR


MAY 26, 2004


Mark Sense, Optical Scan (24.6%)

TIMINGMARKS

START OFBALLOT


MAY 26, 2004


Mark-Sense, Optical Scan (24.6%)

• Scanning methods– Visible light– Infrared

• Issues:– Dark/light marks– Some scanners require

carbon-based ink – Voter intent may not be

captured by machine

• Machine does not see what the human sees


MAY 26, 2004


Direct-Recording Electronic (7.7%)

SOURCE: SHOUP VOTING SOLUTIONS


MAY 26, 2004


Direct-Recording Electronic (7.7%)

SOURCE: SHOUP VOTING SOLUTIONS


MAY 26, 2004


Punched-Card Problems

• Can’t see whom you’re voting for• Registration of card in ballot frame• Must use stylus: no positive feedback on punch• Hanging chad: chad that is partially attached to the

card– How may corners?– Hanging chad causes count to differ every time

• Dimple: chad that is completely attached but shows evidence of an attempt to punch– Dimple can turn into a vote on multiple readings


MAY 26, 2004


Buchanan Vote by County (Florida, 2000)

GRAPH COURTESY OF

PROF. GREG ADAMSCARNEGIE MELLON

&PROF. CHRIS FASTNOW

CHATHAM COLLEGE

SOURCE: PROF. GREG ADAMS

Broward (Fort Lauderdale)

Miami-Dade

Hillsborough (Tampa)

Pinellas (St. Petersburg-Clearwater)

Orange (Orlando)

LINEAR FIT WITHOUT PALM BEACH, BROWARD, MIAMI-DADE

(PURPLE ANNOTATIONS ADDED)


MAY 26, 2004


Election Contest

• The certification of election or nomination of any person to office, or of the result on any question submitted by referendum, may be contested in the circuit court by any unsuccessful candidate for such office ... or by any taxpayer, respectively.

• The grounds for contesting an election under this section are: ... .

– (c) Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election. …

– (e) Any other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person other than the successful candidate was the person duly nominated or elected to the office in question or that the outcome of the election on a question submitted by referendum was contrary to the result declared by the canvassing board or election board.”F.S. §102.168.

• Successful challenge results in a “judgment of ouster.”


MAY 26, 2004


Recounts in Florida

• If a candidate is defeated by 1/2% or less, the board responsible for certifying the results ... shall order a recount of the votes cast with respect to such office. F.S. §102.166(3)(c). Or: candidate may protest to county canvassing board

• “If there is a discrepancy which could affect the outcome of an election, the canvassing board may recount the ballots on the automatic tabulating equipment.” F.S. §102.166(3)(c).

• “The county canvassing board may authorize a manual recount.”F.S. §102.166(4)(c).

• “Each duplicate ballot shall be compared with the original ballot to ensure the correctness of the duplicate.” F.S. §101.5615.


MAY 26, 2004


Manual Recount

• “If the manual recount indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election, the county canvassing board shall:

– (a) Correct the error and recount the remaining precincts with the vote tabulation system;

– (b) Request the Department of State to verify the tabulation software; or – (c) Manually recount all ballots.” F.S. §102.166(5)

• “Procedures for a manual recount are as follows:

– (a) The county canvassing board shall appoint as many counting teams of at least two electors as is necessary to manually recount the ballots.

– (b) If a counting team is unable to determine a voter's intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board for it to determine the voter's intent.” F.S. §102.166(7)

Documents

DIMACS ELECTRONIC VOTING MAY 26, 2004 COPYRIGHT © 2004 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Theory v. Practice in Electronic Voting Michael I. Shamos, Ph.D., J.D. Co-Director,